Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
SPEAKER_01 (00:12):
Hello everyone and
thank you for joining us today.
My name is Neri Zilber, ajournalist based in Tel Aviv and
a policy advisor at IsraelPolicy Forum, where I host the
Israel Policy Pod.
I want to welcome those of youwho are joining Israel Policy
Forum for the first time today,as well as our returning viewers
and those listening on IsraelPolicy Pod later on.
Before we begin, a big thank youto Israel Policy Forum
(00:35):
supporters.
Our work, including today'sprogram, is made possible by
you.
Israel Policy Forum relies ondonors like you to produce free
expert analysis andinformational content on the
most pressing issues affectingIsrael and the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
If you enjoy Israel PolicyForum's webinars but don't yet
support the organization's work,please do so by visiting
(00:55):
Israelpolicyforum.org slashsupport to make a tax-deductible
donation today.
So, with all that said, uh thereason why we're all here
yesterday in Washington was abig day, a beautiful day,
potentially one of the greatdays ever in civilization, or so
we were told, as PresidentDonald Trump, alongside Prime
(01:16):
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu,unveiled his 20-point plan for
an end to the Gaza War,including, of course, the return
home, hopefully soon, of all theremaining Israeli hostages.
To help us break it all down andfigure out if indeed all those
adjectives were and arewarranted, I'm honored to have
with us today Israel PolicyForum's very own chief policy
(01:36):
officer, Michael Koplo, andRachel Brandenburg, IPF's
Washington Managing Director andSenior Policy Analyst.
So, Michael and Rachel, before Istart firing questions at you
both, and then of course starttaking questions from you, our
dear audience, here are some ofthe big broad strokes of the
plan as unveiled by the WhiteHouse yesterday.
(01:59):
And don't worry, I'm not gonnago read all 20 points.
But basically, big picture thedeal calls for an immediate end
to the fighting, the releasewithin 72 hours of all 48
hostages, 20 of whom are stillbelieved to be alive, the
disarmament of Hamas anddemilitarization of the strip, a
gradual, some would say verygradual IDF withdrawal, the
(02:20):
setup of an internationalsupervisory board and
Palestinian committee toactually run Gaza, the
introduction of an internationalstabilization force for Gaza,
economic redevelopment, andmore.
Believe me, there is more.
It's 20 points that are uh uheach one is a world unto itself.
Uh but finally there areaccommodations to have a reform
(02:42):
to Palestinian authority, retakegovernance over Gaza, and also
the plan sets forward a pathwayto Palestinian statehood,
however heavily caveated uhthose two clauses are in the
deal, which I'm sure we'll touchon in our conversation.
So, with all that said, Michael,let's start with you.
What are your first broadgeneral thoughts about the deal?
And what do you think was theprime motivating factor uh to
(03:05):
your mind for Trump actuallypushing for this in this way at
this time?
SPEAKER_02 (03:10):
Thanks, Neri.
Broadly, I think that these 20points make a lot of sense to me
as a foundation for a plan toend the war and to get to a day
after in Gaza.
A lot of these points are onesthat that you and I on the
podcast have been talking aboutfor almost two years.
And um there's a lot here, a lotin here that I think makes
(03:33):
perfect sense.
In terms of the timing, and Ishould also add that I think
it's it's structuredparticularly broadly because you
have to get everybody to signon.
We've seen now for two years thedifficulty of putting forward
something that Israel can agreeto and that Hamas can agree to,
and that the US can live with,and that Arab states will
(03:55):
actually back.
So, you know, the the criticismsthat uh of of individual points
and in terms of details missing,details will be ironed out.
I think that to if you're gonnaget a new movement, it had to be
broad uh in the way that thisplan is brought.
In terms of the timing of it, Ithink that President Trump has
just sort of lost patience.
(04:17):
Uh he's been talking aboutwanting to end the Gaza War
since before he took office.
He's been talking about wantingto see the hostages come home
since before he took office.
He saw his initial ceasefire,which was really the Joe Biden
proposal, but it got over theline because of not even yet
President Trump's intervention.
(04:37):
He saw that break down, and Ithink he wants to get back
there.
And we all know that he wantshis Nobel Peace Prize, and he
also he likes things that aresuccessful.
And it seems pretty prettyevident to me that he thinks
what's happening in Gaza is notsuccessful.
And he clearly was not happy inthe aftermath of the Israeli
strike on Qatar.
Uh maybe he didn't like thestrike itself, maybe he didn't
(05:00):
like it because it didn't work.
But I think we're now at a pointwhere uh he really wants to end
this once and for all.
And I think this is the the lastchance to do it.
I worry that if this plan for,you know, I'm sure we'll talk
about the the ways in which itis far from perfect and the
(05:21):
various faults, but if this plandoesn't at least get off the
ground and start to beimplemented, then I think we're
going to see Israel push forwardas Prime Minister Snyahu
promised that he would.
We're gonna see President Trumpwash his hands of all of it.
And uh there's really no moreoff-ramps that I can see beyond
(05:43):
this.
So um, you know, I think thisplan is the last best chance to
get some movement, and I'm gladit's out there.
And you know, now the hard workhas to start of translating what
are 20 points on paper intosomething that can actually be
implemented and that both sideswill actually see through.
SPEAKER_01 (06:01):
Absolutely.
Uh, implementation and reallythe technicalities of what it
will look like on the ground umcan make or break this very
easily, which uh I'm sure we'llwe'll touch on in just a moment.
Uh Rachel, same question to you.
What were your initial overallthoughts uh when this came down
the pike and was unveiled uhyesterday?
And uh what do you think theU.S.
role and motivation in bringingall this together was?
(06:23):
Uh, you know, especially forDonald Trump, who had been very
supportive of Israel and reallyNetanyahu's kind of escalation
of the war, even breaking theprior ceasefire earlier this
year.
And it seemed like this, itseemed like this was an about
face.
SPEAKER_00 (06:40):
Yeah, thanks, Neri.
I I agree with everythingMichael said.
I would just add a few things.
I think Donald Trump's primaryinterest is Donald Trump.
And to me, the one thing thatmay have sort of really lit a
fire under him to bring everyonetogether and push forward
something.
Because this this 20-pointproposal, for all of its
(07:01):
pitfalls and for it actuallybeing very light on details,
it's more like principles than aplan.
It is the first assertion ofpolicy on a lot of these issues
from the United States in thisadministration.
So we heard President Trump on,I think it was Friday, say, no,
I won't support annexation,which incidentally is not in the
20-point plan, but he sort ofput a line in the sand on that,
(07:23):
but on very few other issuesthat are now part of this
20-point proposal.
So I think it is helpful in atleast indicating where the
United States is.
Um, there are, however, a ton ofloopholes and a ton of caveats
and a ton of opportunities forhedging.
Um, so as Michael said now, thehard work needs to begin.
If Hamas accepts this, there isso much to be done, not only to
(07:45):
work out the details of how doyou implement any one of these
20 pieces, but also to ensurethat Trump doesn't lose
attention, that Netanyahudoesn't find a way to wiggle out
of it, and that all the partiesactually um continue to move
this forward so it doesn't justend up a failed piece of paper.
I think uh back to my firstcomment about President Trump's
ego.
(08:06):
As of last week, we saw for thefirst time not only the future
expansion of the Abraham Accordsthreatened, but the actual
agreements and the combinationof Israel's conduct and conduct
in Gaza, and then really theIsraeli, the current Israeli
government's push toward formalannexation, which was in
reaction, as they say inreaction to the flurry of
(08:27):
international recognitions ofPalestinian statehood.
But that actually led Arabcountries, the UAE, to say uh if
Israel moves forward withannexation, not only will it
threaten future expansion, uhfuture normalization agreements,
but it may also threaten ourcurrent agreement.
And that may have been a wake-upcall to President Trump,
(08:48):
realizing not only are the daysrunning out to expand the
Abraham Accords, but there mayactually be um uh they may
actually be rolled back ifaction doesn't come soon.
SPEAKER_01 (09:02):
That's right.
Uh a threat to his first-termlegacy.
And we saw it last week at theUN.
Uh Trump spent a lot of timetouting his own abilities to end
wars, um, and the UN's abilityin his mind to not end wars.
Uh, and it seemed like a realpoint of pride uh for this US
president.
So um I'm sure that was a amotivating factor to get, I
think it would be by his count,number eight uh on the list of
(09:25):
wars that that he ended.
Uh doesn't matter that he let itcontinue for for the better part
of this year.
That's a a separate issue, whichwe don't need to touch on.
Um but it's a good point.
We should mention for for our uhviewers and listeners, all of
what we're talking about iscontingent on Hamas actually
agreeing to this deal.
Uh which again, uh we'll getinto the the maybes of that in
(09:47):
just a second, trust me.
Uh and you're right, Rachel, theuh the clear articulation of US
policies on these issues, andsupported, by the way, by uh the
Arab and Muslim states who cameout in support of this plan, and
by the way, also by the Israeligovernment and the Prime
Minister Bibi Nyao.
Uh no annexation by Israel ofGaza, right?
No new resettlement of Gaza, uhno implementation of Trump's own
(10:11):
uh so-called Gaza Riviera plan,the voluntary so-called
emigration of the Gazapopulation, right?
So these are very uh importantpolicy principles that are
actually laid out there in thisdeal uh on black and white.
Uh so that's you know, in termsof the principles, that's a a
major point, uh, an importantpoint.
Um let's get into it.
(10:32):
The the various players, the thewinners and losers.
Everyone wants to know uh whowho came out ahead, who who may
have conceded more.
Uh Michael, let's start with youand let's start with Israel.
Uh obviously, to my mind,there's a lot of upside here for
Israel, uh, but also somepitfalls, uh, especially
politically for Netanyahu amonghis far-right political allies,
(10:53):
uh, who are already quite upset.
We've seen that uh during thecourse of today, although not
everyone has come out uh andpublicly slammed the deal.
Uh Itamar Benvir has beensuspiciously quiet.
Yeah, oddly silent.
Oddly silent, eerily silent.
Um So let's start with Israel,uh, obviously.
(11:13):
Uh do you think, like I do,number one, that Israel actually
came ahead in this deal uh uh onits merits, um, and that if the
deal is actually consummated,then we're likely heading to
early elections pretty soonbecause BB can't and won't be
able to keep this coalitiontogether.
SPEAKER_02 (11:33):
I think Israel
definitely comes out ahead on
the merits of this deal.
Prime Minister Netanyahu, one ofthe first things he said
yesterday at the pressconference was that this deal um
is in line with his fiverequirements for ending the war
in Gaza, uh was to remind remindviewers and listeners um our uh
(11:55):
return of the hostages, completedisarmament of Hamas,
demilitarization of Gaza,Israeli security control of
Gaza, and uh government that isnot Hamas and not the PA.
On some of these, uh I thinkthat that claim definitely
stands up, and others not somuch, but there's enough wiggle
room that that he was able tosomewhat credibly argue that all
(12:18):
five are men.
And it's also the case that inthis deal, Israel gets what it
wants pretty quickly.
If it goes through, then all thehostages has to be released
within 72 hours.
I think that's gonna be a reallytall order.
Um, if Hamas knows where all thehostages are, um, and
particularly where all thebodies of the deceased hostages
(12:40):
are, I'll be surprised.
But you know, at least in thecontours of this deal, Israel
gets this up front.
And then what Hamas wants mostof all, which is full IDF
withdrawal from Gaza, that comesmaybe at the end, but it's very
nebulous because the thestandards for um when the IDF is
(13:00):
gonna have to withdraw areliterally in this document to be
negotiated by the IDF inconjunction with other parties.
And then the IDF gets todetermine when those standards
have been met.
And, you know, one of thestandards in there for full
complete withdrawal is noterrorism from Gaza.
That's that that's that's not astandard that I think um anybody
(13:20):
can ever promise.
You know, we have terrorism inevery country in the world,
including including right herein the United States.
So it's possible that what thisultimately looks like is a deal
where Hamas capitulates, um, andas as they should, as they
should um principally, but alsoas they should because they're
(13:41):
getting pretty badly beaten.
Uh, but Israel may not actuallyhave to end up giving Hamas the
thing that it wants.
So from that perspective, thisis definitely a deal that is
weighted towards Israel upfront.
With that said, there are thingsin here that Prime Minister
Netanyahu promised would neverhappen.
Um, one of them is that itexplicitly says in this
(14:05):
agreement that there is going tobe a path to Palestinian
self-determination andstatehood.
Is that the phrase Palestinianstate?
No, but it's awfully close.
Uh, it explicitly says in thisdocument that the Palestinian
Authority, at the end of aprocess of reform, is going to
take over from uh the Gaza Boardof Peace and the International
(14:25):
Stabilization Force.
There are other things in herethat uh I think will definitely
hit people on the Israeli rightum like a gut punch.
The the parts where Hamas has tocompletely disarm, um, they're
gonna like that, but but HamasHamas members get complete
(14:47):
amnesty if they simply hand overtheir weapons and and make a
pledge to peacefully coexistalongside Israel.
And I think that's somethingthat not many Israelis
contemplated.
Uh so there are definitelythings in here that are gonna be
hard for the Israeli right toswallow.
And I think you're correct,Neri.
If this goes through, then ithas to mean early elections
(15:09):
because Netanyahu is gonna haveto run on this.
He's gonna have to spin it as,you know, I promised to get the
house truths back, and I did.
I promised that we would defeatHamas, and this is the defeat of
Hamas.
I promised that we would movetoward normalization and look at
all these countries in theregion that are now helping us
out and contributing in Gaza.
So his only chance of stayingwhere he is, I think, is
creating a deadlock in the nextelection.
(15:31):
And the only way he's gonna getthe two, three, four seats he
needs to at least force adeadlock is by running on this
as a huge success.
Uh, so I think I think that thatis the path forward for him
politically if Hamas actuallysigns on and if this actually
gets implemented.
SPEAKER_01 (15:48):
Rachel, what do you
think of the the Israeli
politics of it all and uhwhether Israel came out ahead in
terms of of the deal relativeto, well, the other parties.
SPEAKER_00 (16:00):
I agree with
everything Michael said.
I think Israel certainly cameout ahead, and particularly in
the amount of caveating andhedging that are in the 20
points.
Um what I what I think is alsointeresting, though, is we've
seen an outpouring of supportafter yesterday's press
conference.
Even though Netanyahu prettymuch hedged even in the press
conference, he said, thank youso much.
This is a, you know, all creditto the president for getting us
(16:24):
this far.
But he also said, you know, Idon't support a Palestinian
state.
And there's enough um uh it'slight enough on details to allow
him to continue to Wordsmith ashe needs to politically for now.
What I think will be interestingto watch is to what extent do
some of the other internationalactors now come in and how
heavily to make sure that ifHamas agrees, this does continue
(16:48):
to build momentum and there'ssome meat put on the bones of
the 20 points.
The Europeans, uh, as individualcountries as the EU are probably
at the moment among the actorswith the most facility for
details and the most backgroundin kind of past negotiations,
different sets of terms for thePA, for Israel.
(17:09):
Um and in a the United States, adifferent US administration
would have and probably couldhave played a role in a way
different than thisadministration in actually being
the ones to drive thenegotiations and put different
plans on the table.
I don't see this administration,this American administration,
(17:29):
doing that with respect to thedetails.
So I think the Europeans have arole to play in that respect.
And the Arab states who may haveless um ability or interest in
really getting into the weedshave a tremendous amount of
influence with this USadministration, particularly the
Gulf states.
So I think there's aninteresting dance to be done
between those who do have theinformation and the capability
(17:52):
to turn this 20 points intosomething real, and those who
have the uh the influence withthe United States and then the
United States with Israel.
But it's got to be kind of acoordinated dance happening all
at the same time, uh, witheveryone still willing to move
in the right direction.
And um that that would be atremendous feat if it actually
(18:13):
is pulled off.
SPEAKER_01 (18:15):
Uh a tremendous feat
of diplomacy that will need a
strong uh guiding hand.
Um didn't mention it at the top,but uh Trump uh he claimed he
wasn't self-nominated to be thechairman of the board of the
International Uh Advisory Groupor Board or whatever.
It's called the Peace Board.
The Board of Peace.
Um I don't know if I completelybelieve him, but he's supposed
(18:37):
to head it.
Uh and Tony Blair, the formerBritish Prime Minister, uh, will
be on this board as well.
Um it will need a strong uhguiding hand.
Uh hold that thought, Rachel,about the Arab states.
I'm gonna come back to you to uhunpack that a little bit more,
but just to wrap up the issue ofIsraeli politics, um
wordsmithing is is a nice termfor it.
(18:58):
Uh the the ink wasn't yet dry uhon the document uh that wasn't
signed at the White House uhballroom last night, and
Netanyahu was already issuingvideos from DC uh in Hebrew, uh
uh you know, assuaging his basethat uh you know there the
Palestinian Authority uh has norole in this future plan.
There's no Palestinian state inthe plan.
(19:21):
The IDF will not have towithdraw uh as part of this
plan.
Obviously, all of that isincluded in the in the deal.
So yes, uh there was already um,as you said, wordsmithing and
spitting uh coming from theIsraeli Prime Minister.
Uh but yes, I think, you know,aside from the Palestinian
Authority issue and thePalestinian state issue and all
those, I think in in brass taxon the ground, there are issues
(19:42):
that may complicate Israel'slife going forward, and that
some hawks and hardliners, callthem what you will hear, were we
actually concerned about.
I think maybe for legitimatereasons, like introducing into
the Gaza Strip a internationalforce uh made up of potentially
Emiratis and Indonesians andEuropeans and Egyptians.
I mean, that may complicate theIDF's life in future if it feels
(20:06):
it needs to take action.
Um also as part of the deal, uh,this was a bone of contention
that Smotrich had with the planthat you know you're outsourcing
Israeli security to foreigners.
Uh the plan says that quoteunquote international monitors
will be responsible formonitoring Hamas' disarmament.
I have no idea who theseinternational monitors are and
who uh will send them into, Idon't know, Gaza City or Khan
(20:30):
Yunis or Dilbalach or whereverto make sure that Hamas has
actually disarmed.
So, yes, um a lot still to be uhfigured out, uh a lot of very,
very tricky detail, especiallyon security, uh I'd argue.
Um Back to the Arab States, uhanother key part of this entire
dance uh Rachel.
(20:52):
Um I mean, we already talkedabout this in conversation uh
offline with some of our IPFcolleagues, but uh some of us
were quite surprised that a lotof the red lines or very, very
hard lines that the Arabgovernments had taken for many
months, i.e., you know, a directand immediate role for the
Palestinian Authority, uhperhaps um a full IDF withdrawal
(21:16):
before they agreed to deployforces into the Strip, had been,
shall we say, somewhat diluted.
Um and yet the Arab states allcame out last night and
supported the deal.
They're now urging Hamas toaccept the deal.
So what do you think?
I mean, did the Arab statesactually I don't want to say
capitulate, but they softentheir position, did they not?
SPEAKER_00 (21:39):
I think everyone's
ready for the war to be done and
the region to be able to moveover, move, move on.
I'm sorry.
And I think uh at this point,nine months into this
administration, nine plus monthsinto this administration, uh,
everyone's pretty clear-eyedabout how things work and don't
in the United States.
And also that you can say onething one day and say something
(22:01):
the next day, and you know, sobe it.
SPEAKER_01 (22:04):
Um you're saying
word words have no longer have
any meaning.
SPEAKER_00 (22:09):
Uh have less
meaning.
Have less meaning.
Um, but at the end of the day,it is in the interest of all of
the Arab states, um,particularly though, Egypt and
Jordan, and the goal for thiswar to be over, for the region
to be able to move on, for someamount of stability to begin to
(22:30):
be developed.
Um, they have their own politicsto deal with.
They also have their owneconomic interests to deal with,
different different situationsfor each country.
But um, it seems to me that thisthe Israeli strikes in Doha had
something of a unifying effecton the region, both in terms of,
you know, it's a rare day thatthe Imradi and the Saudi
(22:53):
leadership flock to Doha insolidarity with Qatar, but also
in unifying everyone around,it's enough.
Israel is no longer astabilizing force.
Israel is um not necessarilyacting in even its own interest,
and the United States is notguiding them, and the United
States is not playing aleadership role.
So it's time for us to dosomething.
(23:14):
And if President Trump can getPrime Minister Netanyahu to
agree to his 20 points with allof the challenges for Israeli
politics that Michael laid outand all of the loopholes that
we've all talked about, it'sstill something and it's still a
starting point.
So if I were them, any of them,I would also say, okay, we
(23:34):
support President Trump'seffort.
Not, and I didn't read everystatement, but the ones that I
saw, very few of them said wesupport this deal, right?
They said we commend PresidentTrump's effort, we support this
process.
I think everyone realizes thatthis is not a deal that is going
to be implemented the minuteit's signed.
It's the beginning of a process.
But if you don't start here andif you lose this opportunity to
(23:57):
move on from something, asMichael said earlier, that's it.
This is sort of this is the lastbest hope for a process to begin
to get where everyone wants tobe.
So if that means fudging theirum enthusiasm for it a little
bit in order to keep it movingalong, I expect they've made the
calculus that that's okay.
SPEAKER_02 (24:18):
And just to jump in
on that, I think there's also
something to the fact that whatthey've seen from President
Trump so far have been wildpie-in-the-sky fantasies, right?
You know, we we have the GazaRiviera, we have the constant
threats to open the gates ofhell on Gaza.
Um, you know, these are thingsthat obviously the the Arab
(24:40):
states were not going to engagewith.
And so I think that once theyhad this meeting with President
Trump last week and he presentedthem something that seemed like
a reasonable plan that couldcome from could have come from
the previous administration,quite frankly.
Um, I think that they'reprobably gonna want to jump on
it and try to hold them to it asmuch as possible.
SPEAKER_00 (24:59):
I would also add
there are a couple key areas
where it reflects progress, andwe've all alluded to these, but
no longer is the United Statescalling for the transfer of
Gazans out of Gaza.
No longer is the United Statesor President Trump saying, I'm
gonna own Gaza and turn it into,you know, the Gaza Riviera he
talked about months ago.
And for the first time, I thinkthis administration, the United
(25:22):
States, is acknowledging thatthe PA will have a role down the
line.
And it is putting out at leastsomething on a recognition of, I
think it was framed, you know,we acknowledge that Palestinians
want um sovereignty in additionto the credible pathway for
Palestinian statehood, right?
That's the first time we'rehearing this this times Trump
(25:43):
administration uh state thesethings.
So for the Arab states who wantthis and more, this is a better
starting point than where wewere even two weeks ago.
SPEAKER_01 (25:53):
All valid points.
And yes, I think um I use thisword a lot last night uh with
various uh bosses and and otherpeople I spoke to.
It's a very clever documentbecause, like you said, there is
something there for everyone,and there are certain
compromises that each party hasto make.
Some, as we've talked about now,uh more than others.
(26:14):
Some have to make biggercompromises than others, but uh
there are compromisesnonetheless.
So um credit to the Trump teamfor kind of putting it all
together.
Now, obviously, implementationwill be will be key, and then
the devil is always in thedetailed, especially especially
in the Middle East.
Um, a reminder for all ourviewers, uh please leave your
questions in the Q ⁇ A box, andwe'll do our best to uh to
(26:37):
address them uh in due course.
So keep them coming.
Um and just uh a final point uhabout those uh bigger picture
issues that you raised, uhRachel.
If I were a uh conspiratorialfellow, which I sometimes am, uh
this is classic Netanyahu andRon Dermer, right?
Where you create major, majorproblems and major threats that
(27:01):
get everyone uh all up in armsand bent out of shape, like West
Bank annexation, likeessentially the transfer of
Gazans out of Gaza, uh like uh,you know, as Smartrich said the
other day, uh, you know, Gazabeing a real estate bonanza, and
then offering it up uh at thealtar of a end of deal,
(27:22):
end-of-war deal and hostagerelease, uh, as major
concessions by Israel.
Even though each one of thosesteps would have been, I'd
argue, disastrous for Israel.
So um, you know, we gave creditto uh to the Trump team.
Maybe we have to give somecredit to uh Netanyahu and
Dermer for uh navigating uhwell, the various actors into
(27:43):
this position.
Um we'll we'll find out uh maybemaybe when when one of them
writes a book uh in future whenuh when they're uh retired on
the coast of uh well, I don'twant to say which which country
or which uh which city?
Um we have to talk about uhHamas.
Uh obviously uh we're still allwaiting for their response, and
(28:08):
like we said, it may all bemoot, but um we have a question
from uh well anonymous uh whosays above all else, this is a
document of Hamas surrender.
What chance is there actuallythat Hamas will surrender and
give up its key asset in thenext four days, as Donald Trump
demanded uh today?
So he basically said, Yeah, wewe want them to respond in in
(28:28):
the next three or four days.
Uh basically, Michael, we'llstart with you.
Do you think Hamas will and canaccept this deal?
SPEAKER_02 (28:37):
I think that they
can accept it if they want.
I think that if they decide thatthey want to sign on the dotted
line, then they can very easilyspin a story here that says we
fought the IDF to a standstill.
Um you know, we have now offersfrom Israel of amnesty, and uh
sure we have to give up ourweapons, but we can stay in
(28:59):
Gaza.
And our great rivals in thePalestinian Authority are not
gonna be the party that come inimmediately and and take
control.
We're still gonna be rootedhere, and at the end of this,
the IDF is gonna have towithdraw after promising that
they would never do so.
So there is a story here thatHamas can tell itself and tell
(29:20):
its supporters if it wants topaint this as a victory.
Is Hamas gonna do that?
I don't I don't think that uhanybody has has ever lost any
money by betting on Hamasintransigence and um Hamas not
being cooperative.
So you know, I I I think it'sprobably a long shot that they
(29:43):
come with a yes.
And you know, we're alreadyseeing some of the Tipo Hamas
behavior, which was the initialresponse was okay, we're gonna
we're gonna study it and we'llcome back with with an answer.
And then Hamas leaking that theyhave revisions they want to all
sorts of things.
And you know, earlier today wasreported.
That American Israeli officialssay that maybe there can be some
(30:04):
slight revisions, but this isthis is the deal, and Hamas can
either take it or the IDF isgoing to keep on doing what it's
doing.
So we'll see what Hamas haslearned from this two-year
process.
I do think that this is aninstance where the IDF operation
in Gaza City may end up workingas as it should work, which is
(30:28):
putting more pressure on Hamasto actually agree to something
that will avert the continuedIDF operation in Gaza City.
But we're operating in such aninformation vacuum, especially
given that the Hamas leaders inDoha are underground and Hamas
military military leaders inGaza have uh thankfully been
(30:48):
picked off by Israel one by one.
And at this point, you know,unless you're somebody who um
has been studying Hamas middlemanagement for 30 years, and
that's not me, um, you're notgonna have a sense of you know
the the folks in charge whattheir inclinations are.
So I'm certainly hopeful thatthe cutries and Egyptians have
(31:09):
enough leverage over Hamas andyou know can can lean on the
various wings of Hamas to sayyes, you know, even if it takes
a few days and even if theyfirst demand some revisions in
certain places, whether it bethe IDF with the specific IDF
withdrawal lines or thetimetable, I hope that they get
there.
Uh but I think it would befoolish to bet definitively on
(31:32):
them actually agreeing to this.
SPEAKER_01 (31:35):
So all valid points.
Um Hamas middle management, uhespecially in the Gaza Strip, uh
it could go both ways, right?
They have a lot less to lose, sowhy essentially, you know, play
ball and give up?
Um, or you know, maybe they'llaccept the amnesty, safe
passage, whatever provisions areprovided in this deal to uh, you
(31:58):
know, live and fight anotherday, maybe out of Gaza.
But again, that would be amajor, a major step for them.
Um before we get to you, Rachel,uh, Taya Benami is asking uh why
we haven't heard yet from Hamas.
Uh haven't they have they reallynot gotten the deal delivered to
them?
Um so they have confirmed thatthey got the deal.
The Egyptians and the Qatarisconfirmed, uh, as Michael said,
(32:22):
that uh they delivered the dealto Hamas, and Hamas is uh
deliberating over the deal.
Um various Hamas spokespeoplehave taken to uh various Arab
media and satellite channels uhsaying various things.
Uh I think you know they'rethey're not happy.
Their initial inclination is notto be happy with this deal, and
their also initial inclinationis probably not very happy that
(32:43):
the entire Arab and Muslim worldis urging them to take this
deal.
Um, they still have toofficially uh come together and
decide on that um, hopefullysoon.
Uh, Rachel, what are yourthoughts about Hamas?
Yes, no, maybe, no, actuallyagree.
SPEAKER_00 (33:00):
Yeah, I'm also who
knows, right?
Who knows what they're gonnasay.
The things you just alluded tosomething that I find
interesting is now that all ofthese other countries have come
out in support of the deal,whether or not Hamas accepts
will also reflect back on Qatar,Egypt, maybe to some extent
Turkey and what leverage theyhave.
(33:21):
So for those countries who havebasically said, okay, we support
and are also waiting for Hamas,what do they do if Hamas says
no?
I know what Israel does, right?
And the United States for a timeprobably says, fine, gloves off
Israel, but Trump has said thatalready once or twice before.
But the this is the first timethat both the United States and
Israel and the Arab world havecoalesced around a set of
(33:44):
principles.
And I'm um I'm curious to seewhat happens for those
negotiating partners, themediators, if Hamas says no.
SPEAKER_01 (33:56):
Yes.
Uh what what the consequenceswill be.
Uh they may truly be adrift andand left alone.
Um do the the guys in thetunnels in in Gaza actually
care?
Maybe.
Uh the officials that wereapparently not killed in Doha
and Qatar probably care a lotmore.
(34:16):
Uh we'll see who who's actuallycalling the shots.
Um final or one of the finalmajor issues and actually
questions that I had, and youtwo are probably the really well
positioned to answer this.
Uh, and it's a actually aquestion raised in the Q ⁇ A by
one of our viewers, um, the roleof the West Bank, and I'll
(34:37):
expand it, the role of the PA inall of this.
So basically, uh there is aprovision there for the PA to
reform itself and then beallowed to retake governance
over Gaza, right?
Now, the word reform um I thinkis in the eye of the beholder
and may mean certain things tocertain people.
(34:58):
Uh even Netanyahu yesterday uhhow did he put it?
Uh a leopard can't change hisspots, or maybe that was at the
UN last week.
But Netanyahu's cabinetsecretary, Yossi Fuchs, um wrote
on Twitter slash X veryexplicitly, again, after the
press conference at the WhiteHouse, uh the PA will never
(35:18):
reform, right?
It literally it will neverreform, and so it will never
take control of Gaza.
So I'm curious, Rachel, uh PAreform.
A, what have they done so far,and what more needs to be done
in your mind to actually reformitself uh to the satisfaction,
this is the second question, tothe satisfaction of who?
(35:39):
Who actually will decideaccording to this broader
framework deal uh that the PAhas actually reformed itself and
is uh now allowed to go back toGaza?
SPEAKER_00 (35:50):
So I think a lot of
this is um somewhat
intentionally not spelled outyet, because you have to come up
with something that the PA, theArab states, Israel, and the
United States are all willing toget behind, and that's hard.
Um, there are a number of thingsthat the PA has begun to do that
the United States hasn'trecognized.
At least uh beginning theprocess to end martyr payments,
(36:13):
for example, which they'veinvited the US multiple times to
come check, sort of check ourhomework, look and see what
we've done, and the US has yetto comment.
Um, there are so many morethings that will have to be
done.
Uh, but we're also at a timewhen the United States, for
example, has cut off allassistance to the PA.
So other countries are going tohave to step in.
(36:34):
And the EU has to some extent,other European actors have to
some extent, um, the Saudis andthe Emirates have to some
extent, both with financialsupport and technical support to
try and initiate some of theseuh some of the reforms that are
needed.
There also has to be a politicalhorizon, though.
And I think that's where thisplan, if if pushed in all the
(36:56):
ways we've talked about, and ifit is the beginning of the
process, can potentially set outa political horizon in a way
that we haven't yet seen in awhile, simply by that sort of
pathway to a credible, I'msorry, a credible pathway to
Palestinian statehood andrecognition of the desire for
sovereignty, those sorts ofthings, um, which right now is
(37:16):
just rhetoric and just words.
But if uh if some of thestakeholders who do care to
represent the PA and who do careto push for reforms uh and an
eventual path to statehood, ifthey're willing to really get
behind uh this process withtechnical and financial support,
we could see um we could seemore progress happen.
(37:39):
Uh, but absent that, we're justgonna be stuck where we are
because there are quite a fewways for Israel to continue to
say, but they haven't madeenough progress.
We're not actually gonna followthrough on the things that we've
agreed to.
So in that way, I go back tokind of what we have so far is
light on the details and fairlyvague.
Um, but there's also a lot ofroom to make it better.
SPEAKER_01 (38:00):
Yes.
Uh the bar I think is uhintentionally very, very high,
if not um, well, non-existentfor Israel in terms of PA
reform.
Uh Michael, what do you think uhin terms of PA reform, how far
it's come, how far uh more needsto be done, how much more needs
to be done.
SPEAKER_02 (38:20):
The Israeli
government is clearly counting
on PA kleptocracy to win out.
That's and again, it's anotheruh another bet that you know, if
you bet on it, you you wouldnever have lost in the past 30
years.
But I also think it's importantto acknowledge we're in a
moment, even before the releaseof this plan and the call for PA
reform.
(38:40):
We're in a moment where wherethe PA seems to actually be
undertaking real reforms.
And prisoner and martyr paymentsis an interesting one because as
Rachel noted, the PA declared inJune that they had reformed the
prisoner and martyr paymentsystem, that they had they had
transformed it, but it's now acompletely needs-based system.
Um, and they invited the StateDepartment to come and verify
(39:02):
it.
And the Trump administration hasjust not literally not
responded.
And so right now, the PA isapparently paying international
auditors to come and verify thatthey've done what they've said
that they're gonna do.
Now, I don't know if that'sgonna be enough to meet the
standards of Congress, and theTaylor Force Act requires the
State Department to verify thatprisoner and martyr payments is
(39:23):
is over if the US is gonna startsending money to the West Bank
that uh that directly benefitsthe Palestinian Authority, let
alone get back to supporting thePalestinian Authority budget
directly.
But uh the Palestinian Authorityseems to be confident enough
that they invited the US andagain, this administration to
(39:45):
come and uh, as Rachel said,check their homework.
So I I would have no way ofknowing whether they've done
everything they need to do.
But it would seem like a veryrisky move to invite the Trump
administration, Marco RubioState Department, to come and
verify that they've done whatthey need to do if it's all just
(40:06):
window dressing.
On top of that, in the contextof the various European
recognitions of Palestinianstatehood, the PA made a number
of public commitments.
Now, yes, these are justcommitments, they're just words,
but they're committing to dothings and specific things to a
much greater degree than we'veseen from them in a very long
(40:29):
time.
Um, you know, certainly for forat least 15 years.
Um and, you know, it includesuh, of course, prisoner martyr
payments, but they've alsocommitted to holding
presidential and parliamentaryelections within one year after
the war ending.
They've committed to um overhaultheir their education curricula
in line with UNESCO standards,they've uh committed to um to
(40:53):
transform and and make moretransparent their budget.
So they're making a number ofpromises, and Israel is counting
on them not doing any of them,but but given the pledges that
they're making to Europeanstates and to Arab states to
entities that actually fundthem, this definitely seems like
(41:14):
a moment to hold their feet tothe fire and get them to
actually do what they'repledging.
Um and you know, the the WestBank portion of this is
interesting too, because I'mpretty sure that the the words
West Bank and uh and certainlythe words Judea and Samaria do
not uh appear in this 20-pointplan.
(41:35):
Now, last week there was allsorts of reporting what that the
original 21-point plan includeda pledge that Israel would not
annex the West Bank.
Um that's obviously not in thisversion.
And uh, you know, and I saw abunch of comparisons today of
the version that was leaked lastweek and the version that
(41:55):
actually came out yesterday.
And there was nothing in therein the previous version either
about West Bank annexation.
But President Trump came out,you know, we all saw him.
He said it very forcefully tothe cameras on Thursday that
he's not going to allow it.
Uh, and it's clearly anexpectation of the Arab and
Muslim states that that met withPresident Trump last week and uh
(42:16):
and that have that have backedthis document and that issued
their own statement yesterdaywhere you know they support this
plan.
And in their statement, theyemphasized, they didn't actually
mention the PalestinianAuthority, but they emphasized
uh a two-state outcome.
And that can only can onlyhappen if we're talking about a
plan that isn't only Gaza butincludes the West Bank.
(42:38):
So it isn't in this plan, but Ithink it's the the West Bank is
the subtext that's that's in thebackground here.
Because when the plan talksabout Palestinian
self-determination andstatehood, that has to involve
the West Bank.
And for these countries to geton board with doing anything in
Gaza, they're gonna need somereal Israeli concessions on the
(42:59):
West Bank and an actualpolitical horizon.
So, you know, it's not in here,and the role of the PA is gonna
continue to remain murky.
Um, but I do think that this isa real opportunity to get the PA
to actually carry out thesereforms.
Um, you know, get get get themto do what they're what they're
not used to doing, which is umputting the burden back on
(43:20):
Israel and saying, we'veactually done what we're
supposed to do.
Now you have to follow throughas well.
Uh if this ends up beingsomething where Israel takes
this plan um and uses it as away to do whatever it wants in
the West Bank, I think that thisplan, the Gaza components of
this plan, are going to fallapart very, very quickly.
SPEAKER_01 (43:43):
So uh in terms of,
you know, originally this was a
a 21-point plan.
Uh yesterday they unveiled a20-point plan.
I saw a report that the 21stpoint was uh a pledge by Israel
not to attack Qatar again.
Yeah.
But that was uh um overtaken bya phone call uh in the Oval
Office by Trump and BibiNetanyahu to uh Doha, uh where
(44:04):
Netanyahu apologized for thestrike earlier this month and
said it would it won't happenagain.
Um so again, the 20 the theelusive 21st point uh we can we
can quibble about that.
You know, there have also I'veI've been told also that there
were commitments, take it forwhat you will, but commitments
made um by Israel via the US tothe Arab States that the whole
(44:26):
issue of Jerusalem and theAl-Aqsa Mosque Temple Mount
compound um status quo on themount wouldn't be wouldn't be
altered or messed with.
Uh again, as part of these kindof broader uh uh commitments
made by Israel.
Uh again, remains to be seen,right?
Uh status quo has been has beenaltered uh in recent years.
(44:49):
And uh yes, the the commitmentsby the PA uh predate the Gaza
peace plan, as it were.
Um even last week, right, interms of the French Saudi
proposal.
Uh Abu Maz and Mahmoud Abbas,the Palestinian president, made
a lot of commitments to to themand and the other states that
recognize Palestinian statehood.
So he needs to fulfill andfollow through on those on those
(45:10):
commitments, uh irrespective ofuh new Gaza and what happens
there.
Uh but yes, Michael, ideally itwould be it would be linked.
SPEAKER_02 (45:18):
Um and just it bears
noting that for for BB's
coalition politics, probably theone thing in there that would
have forced Batzales Motric outof the coalition would have been
a pledge to never annex or applysovereignty in the West Bank.
And you know, Batzala Smotricblasted the plan, but he also
(45:39):
hasn't said he's gonna leave thegovernment.
So, you know, leaving thatleaving that out may have been
the most important component inthere from the Israeli side.
SPEAKER_01 (45:47):
Yeah, he hasn't
threatened to leave yet, because
I think everyone here, I mean hesaid it uh literally he he said
it and wrote it.
Uh hopefully Hamas will uh saveus from ourselves and say no,
and then we can go back toactually fighting the war and
continuing the war.
That's literally what he said.
Um Rachel, uh a question came inuh which I'd love to get your
(46:10):
thoughts on.
Uh so to what extent do youexpect the U.S.
administration to be involved uhbeyond investment deals, their
words not mine, uh, in what isneeded to reach the midterm and
long-term goals uh included inthe 20-point plan?
Uh i.e., you know, is thereenough bandwidth and attention
and really just personnel on theUS side to actually engage with
(46:31):
the Israelis and thePalestinians and the Arabs to
actually move this forward?
SPEAKER_00 (46:37):
I think it's it's a
good question.
And I think it depends how we umhow we frame involvement.
In so many past rounds ofnegotiations, the U.S.
has been the one convening theparties, driving the process
with the pen, working out thedetails, shuttling between
different sets of staffers fromdifferent sets of um
stakeholders.
(46:57):
I don't think that's the levelof involvement that we're gonna
see.
The sheer number of peopleengaged, unless they bring back
or hire a bunch.
There's just you have basicallyone special envoy, Steve
Whitkop, who is in charge of somany different major
negotiations and conflict zones,he can't possibly give full
attention to any single one.
Jared Kushner seems to be backin the scene.
(47:17):
Um, maybe one or two othersupport staff, but uh I expect
to see the US role more as powerbroker and the one who's maybe
bringing Israel to the table, orthe one who's maybe, you know,
deciding that now's the time topush on X, Y, or Z.
As we've seen, this seems tothis where we are now seems to
(47:38):
be the result of at least someamount of US pushing, both to
get this, um, to get everyonearound these 20 points, but then
also, of course, to bring Israelon board.
So I would, I would imagine adifferent construct um than
we've seen in the past.
I also don't think we are goingto, we as the United States are
going to be um providing thelevel of assistance, financial
(48:02):
support that past USadministrations have.
This administration just doesn'treally believe in giving
handouts.
Um and most foreign assistance,particularly to the PA, to other
parts of the Middle East, um,particularly for civil society
support, has already been cut.
So some of the things that willbe needed to actually implement
(48:26):
um or or figure out the detailson some of those 20 points, I
don't think the US is going tobe writing checks for.
I think they're gonna be relyingand waiting for other people to
do that.
Um, which is why I sort of thinkof this as I think I mentioned,
like a some sort of dance or thechoreography that will need to
be created where there are somestakeholders who are hammering
(48:49):
out the details and others whoare exerting influence on the
parties uh where they need to.
But someone needs to beresponsible for pushing this
forward.
They seem to have named TonyBlair as the one responsible for
sort of pushing any Gazareconstruction process forward,
if and when that happens.
Uh, but someone's gonna have tobe willing to marshal the whole
(49:10):
thing, too.
SPEAKER_01 (49:13):
Yeah.
Um well, Trump may be thechairman of the board, but I
think Tony Blair may be the uhthe prime mover on that board.
Um again remains to be seen.
There are uh there are variousproposals floating around about
how this um new Gaza governanceregime will look like, uh the
Palestinian TechnocraticCommittee on the ground that
(49:36):
will be responsible forimplementing it, coordination
with the Palestinian Authority,um, coordination with the UN and
other humanitarianorganizations, coordination with
the International SecurityForce, um, there are a lot of
moving parts, uh, to say theleast.
SPEAKER_00 (49:51):
Um, one additional
thought.
There are there are alsotemplates, right?
We've done this before.
We've built the United Stateshas built coalitions before.
Europe has built coalitionsbefore.
If you have enough uh enoughcountries and enough leaders
actually interested in creatingthe body, whether you call it a
peace board or something else,but the coalition of folks who
are interested in takingresponsibility for different
(50:14):
pieces of this 20-point plan, itcan absolutely be done.
I just haven't seen that levelof interest in this
administration just yet.
SPEAKER_01 (50:24):
Yeah.
Um hopefully uh they followthrough for for all our sakes.
Um before we wrap up, uh finalquestion I wanted to pose to you
both.
Uh so obviously uh the plan wasunveiled yesterday.
Um we laid out the various kindof potential pitfalls, but also
the upside, right?
(50:45):
Um I think it's very easy, andbelieve me, I I I tried
yesterday to to be very kind ofcynical and pessimistic about
the plan, to poke holes in it.
Uh as someone said it's it'slike Swiss cheese, very airy
Swiss cheese with a lot ofholes.
Um and yet it's a it's a uh Ithink overall a positive piece
of cheese.
If it stops the war and thesuffering in Gaza, um,
(51:07):
especially for the people ofGaza, gets all the hostages back
fairly quickly, whether in threedays but fairly quickly, and
then hopefully sets everyone ona on a more positive trajectory
after two very, very uh at leastvery difficult years.
Um so with all that positivityuh having been said, uh I wanted
(51:28):
to get your thoughts about whatthe biggest pitfalls may be
moving forward, um, to yourmind.
Uh if and when hopefully Hamasagrees and we start the process
to actually implement this onthe ground.
Um, Rachel, what to your mind,uh out of all the things we've
already mentioned or things wehaven't mentioned, uh what do
you think will be the biggestpitfall?
SPEAKER_00 (51:48):
I think the biggest
pitfall will be if nobody picks
up.
I I would love to, I can'tfigure out the cheese analogy.
Nobody picks up the bait, right?
Nobody takes this as their ownand actually drives it forward.
Uh someone recently described itas sort of a a book with the
titles for the chapters, but thechapters yet to be written,
right?
Someone needs to take the penand actually write those
(52:09):
chapters and figure out whatthey're going to say and figure
out what they mean.
Um, and absent that, then itjust becomes another piece of
paper that maybe got people'shopes up for a few days and then
lets everything proceed a pacein, I think, what we'd all agree
has been a pretty terrible way,with not a lot of opportunity to
shift course absent this processthat's now been put on the
(52:32):
table.
SPEAKER_01 (52:36):
Michael, what do you
think the biggest pitfall may
be?
SPEAKER_02 (52:40):
So we talked about
the nebulous security standard.
Um, you know, that can easilyenable the IDF to to stay in
Gaza um forever.
But there's another one, whichis that you know, at the end of
at the end of the proposal, uhone of the last points says that
if Hamas delaze or rejects,everything above is going to
(53:02):
proceed in the terra-free areasum that that uh that the IDF uh
hands over to the internationalstabilization force, um,
including the step up eightoperation.
Now, if Hamas doesn't agree, Ireally don't see a world in
which the internationalstabilization force ever gets
created.
I don't think any of thesestates are going to agree to go
(53:24):
in there and and send their owntroops um when it's still an
active war zone and Hamas isstill fighting and has not
agreed to lay down its arms andIsrael's not agreed to stop the
war.
Um if President Trump says tothe Israelis, okay, Hamas said
no, but you know, we're stillgonna, like this plan says,
we're still gonna proceed asfollows, um, including with the
(53:46):
stepped up eight operation, thenyou're literally taking
something that's supposed to endthe war and get Israel out of
Gaza and turning it into adocument for the creation of an
IDF military administration inGaza.
Because if you're demanding thatthe stepped up eight operations
happen, well, that's gonna be onuh on the back of the IDF.
(54:07):
And um if you're talking abouthanding over areas from the IDF
to an internationalstabilization force that never
gets created, then that meansthe IDF is just occupying these
areas and administering themdirectly.
So I think that in some ways, ifHamas says no, there's um a very
dark timeline whereby this laysthe groundwork for a full IDF
(54:30):
occupation and militaryadministration of Gaza and every
facet of Gaza.
Um so you know, to me, that's athat's a huge downside.
And um, as I said before, Idesperately hope Hamas says yes.
But if Hamas says no, then thereare a lot of different ways this
can spin out of control beyondjust what we've seen over the
(54:52):
past two years, you know, of anendless war, but the actual
status quo not changing.
I think that there's a world inwhich the status quo might
change anyway, um, but in a in afar um more difficult way.
SPEAKER_01 (55:08):
Yeah, I uh you beat
me to it, but I'll take it in a
slightly different direction.
I think the security aspect willmake or break everything because
ultimately Gaza is a securityproblem.
I mean, it's it's it's a wholehost of problems, obviously a
humanitarian problem, apolitical governance problem, a
regional problem, but it'sfundamentally a security
problem.
Um I'll do you one better,Michael.
(55:29):
What if Hamas says yes andsomeone has to go in and
actually disarm them, as wealluded to earlier?
Uh the InternationalStabilization Force is meant to,
I think, control the perimeterof the Gaza Strip, according to
the proposal.
They're supposed to help raise aPalestinian civil police force
from, I imagine, inside Gaza,but good luck sending them to go
(55:52):
and disarm the Qassam brigades.
Uh as I mentioned, there's thisamorphous entity called
International Monitors that'ssupposed to monitor Hamas'
disarmament.
So you can already see uh asuccession of events where Hamas
agrees to the deal, the war isended, hopefully the hostages
come out, but then you have youyou rub up against the the big
issue of Hamas not actuallydisarming like maybe it
(56:15):
committed to, uh, and then theIDF is still present in major
parts of Gaza, and it goes intoquote unquote disarm Hamas,
demilitarize the strip, and thenyou could very easily be on a
glide path towards uh renewedconflict.
Um I think that's the biggestpitfall.
I mean, there are otherpitfalls, but I think to my mind
that's uh the biggest pitfall.
(56:36):
Um I think as we've now talkedabout for nearly an hour, it
needs to be uh fleshed out aheadof time.
So it's not just uh sending, Idon't know, Indonesians to man,
you know, a checkpoint and tryto disarm uh the Kassam
brigades.
Um and then my my actual answer,and we'll we'll end with this,
uh the real pitfall here is thatuh if Hamas agrees to the deal,
(57:00):
uh Ben Vir and Smartwich leavethe Netanyahu coalition, uh, and
yet no new elections aretriggered, the coalition
survives because Benny Gantz uhgoes in and um makes up the
numbers.
And I did back of the envelopemath uh earlier this evening,
and yes, if the ultra-Orthodoxparties that have already left
Netanyahu's coalition uh comeback along with Benny Gantz, he
(57:24):
still has uh over 60 seats justbarely in the Knesset, and so
potentially he could hang on.
Um I don't deem it to be a highprobability scenario.
Uh I don't know what Benny Gantzwill do in a coalition with the
Ultra Orthodox when you stillneed to pass a conscription bill
for the Alharis, but uh crazierthings have have happened,
(57:44):
especially when uh Benny Gantzis involved.
So that I think is the biggestpitfall that if we actually got
a deal, the war has ended.
Uh everything is movingsmoothly, but uh well, we're
still stuck with more or lessthe same Israeli government, uh,
no elections, no uh return ofthe mandate to the Israeli
public after two say three yearsof this.
(58:05):
Um that's my real, my realpitfall.
Uh with that, uh Rachel,Michael, thank you as always.
Um and uh once again, uh we'llsay a big thank you to Israel
Policy Forum supporters who arewith us on today's webinar.
Um again, I invite the rest ofyou to join Israel Policy Forum
uh and its family of donors byvisiting Israelpolicyforum.org
(58:25):
slash support.
The recording of this webinarwill be posted on the briefings
page of the Israel Policy Forumwebsite.
Um please subscribe to thepodcast, uh Israel Policy Pod.
I hear it's fantastic.
Uh sign up to receive the weeklycoplo column in your email
inbox.
Also fantastic.
Uh and please visit the IsraelPolicy Forum website for more
insight and analysis from ourteam of experts.
(58:47):
Um stay tuned for the nextIsrael Policy Forum video
briefing.
And until then, thanks again fortuning in.
Shana Tovah, Gamal Khadimatova,to all those observing, and
we'll see you again soon.
Take care.
SPEAKER_00 (58:59):
Thank you.
SPEAKER_01 (59:00):
Thanks.