After Iran: What Now?

On this week’s episode, Israel Policy Forum Policy Advisor and Tel Aviv-based journalist Neri Zilber hosts Chief Policy Officer Michael Koplow and The Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation Senior Fellow and Research Director Shira Efron. The trio discuss the success of the Israel-Iran war, whether diplomacy with Iran can work in this new postwar era, the potential of further Israeli and U.S. military action against Iran, the prospect of Netanyahu agreeing to end the Gaza war in return for a Trump-led "grand bargain" in the Middle East, the current state of play in Israeli politics, and more. 

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Episode Transcript

Neri (00:02):
Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod.
I'm Nery Zilber, a journalistbased in Tel Aviv and a policy
advisor to Israel Policy Forum.
So a lot to discuss this week,with our regular catch up with
Israel Policy Forum's very ownChief Policy Officer, michael
Koplow, and Shira Efron, theDiana and Guilford Glazer
Foundation Senior Fellow andDirector of Research.
Ayan Gilford Glazer FoundationSenior Fellow and Director of

(00:23):
Research.
We looked back and summed upthe recent Israel-Iran war after
last week's ceasefire, and wealso looked ahead to what may be
in store for us on the Iranfront post-war, both
diplomatically and potentiallymilitarily.
And then we got into the wholecomplicated question of whether

(00:45):
a grand bargain was in the worksto end the Gaza war ahead of
Prime Minister BenjaminNetanyahu's trip to the White
House next week to meet withPresident Donald Trump.
A very complicated questionindeed, this grand bargain, but
it was all part of a greatconversation, as always.
So let's get to Michael andShira.
Hi Michael, hi Shira.
Welcome back to the podcast.

Shira (01:04):
Hi guys, Good to be here.

Neri (01:06):
Hi, it's good to see both your smiling faces.
Fair to say, not too much hasbeen going on over the past
couple of weeks.

Shira (01:14):
Never, I'm kidding, never .

Neri (01:16):
I'm kidding, obviously Completely normal.
Last couple of weeks I spokeabout my own personal
experiences during the recentIran war.
Last week with Amos Ha'arel asdid.
He Talked about it in somepersonal terms, but I'm curious
to get a sense how the war wason your respective ends, shira.

Shira (01:39):
Oh, okay, I'll start Well .
I Okay, I'll start Well.

(02:00):
On Thursday morning, before ithappened, right, the Israeli
strike took place on the nightbetween Thursday and Friday.
I had a sense that this wascoming that evening and I have
evidence because I sent myhusband to the supermarket to go
shopping and he said why?
And I was like I have a feelingit's happening tonight.
And he's like what are youtalking about?
No way, it won't happen beforeSunday, the wedding I was
supposed to get married.
I was like no, no, no, no, no.
I'm telling you it's based onconversations with people who
actually know it's going tohappen.

(02:22):
And I was rushing to find aflight out of here that Thursday
but there were like kids stuffand my brother was visiting from
the States and we made sure mybrother departs at 11 PM.
The strike started at 3 AM,right Four hours later, and I
told him you have to go.
He was going to wait for themorning to fly the day after.
I was like just go, so sort ofanticipating this.

(02:42):
But then waking up at 3 am tocrazy sound that Israeli FEMA
equivalent created just to alertus that we attacked in Iran and
we should be on alert in casethey retaliate.
It was still something that,even though I was sort of ready

(03:03):
for it for a few hours, youcan't think about it right.
How long is we've been hearingabout the threat of Israel sort
of striking Iran?
For many, many years now, sountil many years, and so when it
actually happened, we weresurprised.
There were many sleeplessnights.
I have children here.

(03:23):
We spent a lot of time in thebomb shelter that fortunately,
we have in our house, in ourbasement, so, unlike many
Israelis, didn't have to lookfor one or go somewhere with the
neighborhood, which is notawful, but I mean we could do it
in the privilege of, you know,privacy of our own home and
pajamas.
But we live in close proximityto some military bases, so there

(03:48):
was a lot of you know, therewas a lot of noise, and you know
and we do feel we do knowpersonally people who their
homes have been destroyed,ruined and had to be evacuated.
I have someone who just gonethrough a surgery, a friend,
because her apartment was struckand she's injured.

(04:09):
So I mean this was, you know,you take the personal and you
take the national and it wasreally scary and because I think
and we can talk about it, sortof like it's successful or not
successful, but we were, I think, as someone who knew sort of
the threat scenarios and whatcould be coming right from Iran.
There's this constant fear thatthis is going to go escalate

(04:33):
and I think this dimension ofalso the uncertainty and how
long this will continue and itis serious.
This was, you know, somethingthat I felt, in addition to
obviously having to work,explain to the kids, and it was
sort of a combination of war andCOVID in a weird way, just
everyone being stuck at home.

(04:55):
But we've had a lot of practice,you know, in the last five, six
years.
So it's fine and, fortunately,on the personal level, totally
fine, very lucky.

Neri (05:04):
Right and, by the way, Shira, I have proof that you
knew Thursday morning as well,because you texted me as I was
on a plane at Ben Gurion, nottelling me what was going to
happen.
But you're like are you sureyou're still going?
And I was like, yeah, of course, we have a few more days, It'll
be fine.
Obviously, I wasn't going toget off the plane, but you tried
to warn me and I didn't want tolisten.

Shira (05:26):
I did, I did, anyway, yeah.

Michael (05:32):
Michael.
So obviously because I'm herein the United States, nothing is
romantic as Shira.
But I did have a little bit ofdrama that weekend because
Shabbat, june 14th, was my son'sbar mitzvah, and so on Thursday
night here, friday morning,israel time, when this started I

(05:57):
was out on Thursday and Fridaywith bar mitzvah preparations
and family and friends coming inand I had all of a sudden a
flood of requests to do stuffand I told everybody no.
And then Friday morning I hadlike a quiet hour and the
Atlantic had asked me to write apiece.
So I wrote a piece, for theAtlantic had my son's bar
mitzvah, my brother-in-law, whomade Aliyah 15 years ago.

(06:20):
16 years ago he was in for thebar mitzvah, as was my
14-year-old nephew, and so theywere here and had no way of
getting back.
Unfortunately, my sister-in-lawwas not in the United States
for the bar mitzvah, but she wasin the United States for her
father's 80th birthday and cameto surprise him.

(06:41):
So they were here and their two18-year-old twins 16-year-old
and nine-year-old were in Israelas this was going on, with
their parents in the UnitedStates with no prospect of
getting back.
Thankfully they live in BeitShemesh, which is relatively
quiet.
Nothing got hit.

(07:02):
They didn't even really havethat many, that many as a coat,
that many sirens, but you knowfour out of the five kids were
there, for it ended up being aweek and a half, almost two
weeks, without their parents andyou know they managed, but
obviously it was.
It was it was a bit a bit hecticand nerve wracking.

(07:24):
Obviously it was a bit hecticand nerve-wracking, and we have
a joke here at IPF that everytime I go on vacation something
happens.
And the bar mitzvah was, as Isaid, about June 14th and then
on Wednesday, the 18th, we wereleaving for a family vacation
for a week and, as you both know, I joked on the office Slack

(07:44):
before I left that because I'mgoing on vacation, the US is
going to join the war, bibi'sgoing to call elections and Abu
Mazen is going to pass away.
Two of those things did nothappen, but one of them did, and
I was out on family vacation,which means I'm really out.
So I actually ended up missingthe entirety of US involvement,
which started while I was outand ended while I was out.

(08:06):
So I had a strange experiencefor the Israel-Iran war and for
the US involvement, butdefinitely memorable given
everything that was going on inmy personal life.

Neri (08:20):
Definitely memorable.
I don't know whether you're agood luck or bad luck charm,
michael, but uh, I think itdepends, yeah, on your bingo
card, though.
2025 is only halfway done, sothere's still still time.
Uh, as we'll talk about, uh, inthis episode, about what, what
we may be looking at in thecoming weeks and months.

(08:41):
Um, so let's get into it.
Obviously, the big news was theIsrael-Iran war, the 12-day war,
as Donald Trump called it.
So, first of all, I wanted toget your opinions, analyses,
looking back and summing up thisconflict.
You've had what a week now,exactly, I think, since the

(09:03):
ceasefire.
So a bit more breathing room, abit more sleep, especially for
for Shira and her, her familyand everyone here in Israel.
Uh, what did you think of thecampaign?
Uh, operation Rising Lion, uh,israel, as Michael and Shira you
both had, or Shira, you saidright, bb finally did it.
He finally attacked Iran, after, I think, probably at least 15

(09:26):
years, of this is going to bethe day, this is going to be the
year.
So I mean, michael, let's startwith you Looking back.
What do you think of thiscampaign, the fact that it
happened and then, obviously,the damage inflicted on Iran by
Israel?

Michael (09:45):
So the fact that it happened.
I wasn't surprised that ithappened eventually.
I was surprised by the timing,as I think we've discussed on
this podcast a bunch, andcertainly, as I've written, I
never expected Netanyahu toembark on a military campaign
against Iran without a US greenlight and I didn't think that a

(10:06):
US green light was coming soquickly.
I thought that President Trumpbecause he was in the middle of
this on-again, off-againnegotiating process with the
Iranians and he very clearlywanted some sort of deal I
expected that he was going togive it more time, so I was
surprised by the timing of it.

(10:28):
In terms of success, obviouslywe can't really judge until we
have more information, but basedon what we know, I think this
was enormously successful, bothfrom an Israeli perspective and
from a US perspective.
We have, of course, the dueling, conflicting reporting about

(10:50):
how much damage was actuallydone there.
It was the initial reportingabout a low-confidence defense
intelligence agency assessmentthat this barely set the Iranian
nuclear program back, and nowwe have other reporting that it
set it back more than theinitial reports may have granted
, and more reporting today aboutwhat the Iranians were up to

(11:12):
around Fordow and activityaround ventilation shafts and
entrances and did they move theuniversity uranium or not?
Ultimately, Israel and theUnited States were able to
strike all of the major siteswith very big and lots of bombs.

(11:32):
It clearly did lots of damage,even if it didn't obliterate any
of these sites, as PresidentTrump claimed.
Managed to take caught caughtthe iranians so off guard that
they killed most of the topmilitary leadership.
Um in the first few hours, gota huge number of important

(11:54):
nuclear scientists in theirfirst few hours.
Managed to do all of this withthe support of almost the entire
world, including countries thathave been condemning Israel's
war in Gaza left and right andwith increasing vehemence.

Neri (12:14):
As we've discussed in previous weeks.

Michael (12:17):
Right.
And Israel got the US to joinin, and the US joined in in a
way that avoided pretty muchevery single worst case doomsday
prophecy right.
The idea that it was going toignite a regional war, the idea
that it was going to pull the USinto another unending conflict
akin to Iraq, that there wasgoing to have to inevitably be a

(12:39):
ground invasion.
That was going to cost either,you know, either Israeli lives
or US lives.
I mean, you know thesepredictions were out there
almost from the first secondthat President Trump announced
that the US was joining in, andnone of this came to pass, by
the way, also the proxies.

Neri (13:00):
Iran's proxies in the region didn't get involved, as
Shira alluded to, the damage onthe Israeli home front, even by
the IDF's kind of assessments,was a lot lower than they
expected and they had very, verybad, worst-case scenarios about
the damage from the Iranianballistic missiles.

Michael (13:18):
Exactly and none of these worst-case scenarios came
to pass.
So we can and we will debate formonths, if not years, how much
damage was actually done to theIranian nuclear program and, as
I'm sure we'll discuss, I dothink that, probably greater
likelihood than not, that Iran'slesson from this is that they
have to race to break out comehell or high water, because it's

(13:41):
the only real failfe ofguaranteeing regime survival,
especially in the aftermath ofsomething like this.
But if we're sitting hererecording on July 1st looking at
this, you'll never convince methat enormous damage was not
done to Iran's nuclear andmilitary infrastructure.
You'll never convince me thatit didn't send a real message of

(14:02):
deterrence around the region,both on Israel's part and on the
US's part.
And, as you pointed out, theseworst case scenarios in terms of
blowback to Israel or blowbackto the United States did not
materialize.
So there's obviously hugenumbers of future chapters of
this yet to be written, but Ithink, sitting here where we are

(14:25):
, this was a huge success andfor me the question now isn't
whether this was successful ornot.
It's whether Israel and theUnited States are going to be
smart and savvy enough to followup on this with some sort of
political and diplomatic followthrough, because if they don't,
then I think we'll see problemsdevelop down the road.

(14:46):
But in terms of what's gone on,I think that this was almost
the best case scenario.

Neri (14:51):
So hold that thought about future scenarios.
But, Shira, I want to get yourthoughts looking back, summing
up what did you think of the 12day war and do you subscribe to
the general view that you hearhere in Israel, which is the
nuclear program was, if notobliterated, then taken back
several years, that Israelsucceeded in removing the

(15:14):
existential threat of Iran'snuclear and ballistic missile
programs?
I mean, where do you land onboth the debate here in Israel
and your own sense of howsuccessful the operation was?

Shira (15:39):
You know I haven't read the intelligence that Israelis
say they have that Iran was tooclose to breaking into nuclear
weapon, more so than just beingthis threshold, that we knew
before, right, that the sort ofwhat we call the weapons group
made advancements and this wasescalated to an existential
threat level.
And I want to believe that thiswas the intelligence here in

(16:00):
Israel In terms of the ballisticmissiles.
I think this reflects anIsraeli mindset.
It is not so existential threat, but Israel is at a preemption
mode after October 7, with justrisk tolerance.
That is completely different,right, israel wouldn't, you know
, in the past I would say Israelwould never like conduct a
preemptive strike.
I mean, we had, you know, 67 inEgypt and stuff.

(16:22):
But in recent years, right, wewouldn't.
I wouldn't think this wouldhappen.
When you would pile up aconventional threat with weapons
for mass destruction, the samesentence.
But I think Israel is in adifferent mindset after this.

Neri (16:35):
And Bibi Netanyahu is a different, bibi Netanyahu also.

Shira (16:41):
And Israel as a country.
You know this is not apolitically charged issue.
I'm sure we'll get to Israel,but Israelis are all cheering
for that.
What I'm sure is not readingthe intelligence is that I'm
sure there was a greatoperational window here For a
variety of reasons.
Right, there was the long-termstuff, since Israel sort of

(17:03):
really undermined HezbollahHezbollah is not gone, but
really undermined Hezbollah, soyou don't have this access.
Right, hezbollah was sort of asecond strike capability and if
you attack Iran, hezbollah isgoing to retaliate.
Iran's air defenses were downbecause of the previous strikes
that Iran attacked Israel andconvincing Trump that they can

(17:26):
do it.
What's also really interestingfor me is that the thing I think
, like you, neri, and likeMichael, what's to me so
surprising is that Iran itselfwas in their own.
The word that we used on Israelwas the conceptia.
The conceptia they also right.
They were like oh, it's Bibi,we've known him, he's been

(17:47):
threatening, he's not doinganything and we have
negotiations with the Americansand he has his son's wedding
Again, not reading, but I'm sure, because otherwise how do you
explain that they all, havingknown this could be coming right
in a few days?
They all slept in their homes.
They all convened in the sameplaces and I think that if you
look at the Israeli, the majorsuccesses which there were many,
but what made this anoperational success and for the

(18:10):
Israeli Air Force to go and roamTehran skies as if it's Gaza
really was the fact that thoseassassinations, quickly, of the
top brass of you know.
So we're talking about themilitary and the IRGC and Haji
Zadeh, which is the head of theAir Force, and all of their
commands, because we know now tosay that the Iranians did aim

(18:32):
hundreds of ballistic missilesat Israel but there was no one
to press the button and theoutcomes could have looked much
worse.
There's also centrifuges thatwere taking out and Israel did
damage, and the scientists also,and there are a lot of other, I
think, operational achievementsIn addition to that.
It's the fact that you got theAmericans to put in the final

(18:54):
nail, and I know there's goingto be intelligence the leaked
report, that's low confidence,that only looked at what the
American attack did right, whichis really not comprehensive,
not looking what Israel did, andsort of the war games that I
know.
This is a lot of those mopsright that were dropped to make
sure there's an actual weapon.

Neri (19:16):
The bunker busters.

Shira (19:17):
The bunker busters.
I mean, I knew of differentnumbers that were meant for this
type of operation, that weremeant for this type of operation
, so this was almost double thenumbers that I knew.
And you say that this was aimedto deliver a message and in
addition to, I'll get to thesecond.
I think it's too early to judgeexactly to the extent of the
damage, but I'm of the view thatI think there is a damage here

(19:39):
that's operational definitelyballistic missiles, definitely
with the nuclear program.
There is a damage.
It's hard to assess at themoment, but there's also, you
know, showing the penetrationthat Israel has in Iran.
I think there's an intelligenceachievement and there's also a
diplomatic achievement.
Right, it wasn't just the US,you had the Europeans coming and

(20:01):
supporting Israel and the wholelanguage changed.
Right, when we spoke a fewmonths ago or a few weeks ago,
we said, oh, this is such aludicrous requirement, asking
the Iranians to give up onenrichment.
Well, all of a sudden, it's alegitimate request and we can
get to if this is something thatthe Iranians are going to do.
And how do you find a way?
But so I think there are manyachievements for Israel.

(20:24):
And what I alluded to earlier,I think, neri, because we live
here and we see the incrediblejuxtaposition with the war in
Gaza.
Right, we fear not only thescenarios that Tel Aviv skyline
will be down right and that manycivilians will be damaged, we
also I think there was also afear that this would be dragged

(20:45):
on and on and on.
I mean, there was a scenariothat this could turn into an
attrition war, that you'd seelower marginal gains right as we
continue and more risk as we goforward with this.
And I think this shows you sortof like Israel knew how to when

(21:07):
to start right a war or when tostrike, how to do it and when
to end it.
If it was Israel's choosing ornot when to end it, then I think
this to me, is all a success.
The question that Michaelbrings is sort of what comes
next?
And before we get even to anagreement, not agreement, I
think there's this very uniquestyle of Trump right where he

(21:28):
announced a ceasefire betweenIran and Israel without them
maybe knowing that it was agreed.
The terms are not very clear tome.
And what's the enforcement?
And what do we even enforce?
And I think these are likequestions that, short of an
agreement, we have to discussthem.

Neri (21:49):
It's a good summation.
Look, in terms of the ceasefire, I think he declared it, but I
think Israel was already readyfor it to be over.
So I think he was on firmground on that end.
And on the Iranian side, itcame right after the
choreographed and very how dothey say here in Israel,
Dardaleh the Dardaleh responseof Iran against the US military

(22:11):
base in Qatar.
So I think he was probably alsoon firmer ground, or firm
ground with the Iranians.
There were also back channelsduring the war that we know of
with the Iranian foreignminister.
So, yeah, a very unique Trumpstyle just to declare a
ceasefire.
I mean, we talked about it withAmos last week.
I think he confused himself andhe confused both sides with

(22:35):
what he put out there, and thenhe kind of reaffirmed the
ceasefire.
But, anyway, that's neither herenor there.
He, he got it done.
Uh, look, let's look ahead.
Uh, get into some of the issuesthat you both raised.
Um, first, I think it's veryclear that post-war uh, for the

(22:55):
us and the internationalcommunity, but also for israel,
that diplomacy is going to be anemphasis that they actually
want to get a new deal with Iran, obviously a deal that's
hopefully tougher and moreexpansive.
Michael, you talked about thisin your Kaplow column last week,
basically diplomacy being thebest option out of the available

(23:19):
options coming out of this war.
So my question to you both and,by the way, I asked this
question not just on the podcast, but to other people how
realistic is it now that Iran,after all this, caves on its
long held pre-existing demandsand red lines and actually
concedes, if not everything,then a lot in terms of its

(23:41):
nuclear program?
Michaelael, let's start withyou.
What do you think the prospectsof actually getting a deal with
iran are?
Uh, obviously you're.
You're in favor of it now,post-war yes, I, I am.

Michael (23:55):
but the signals right now are are kind of strange
right because trump?
Who who?
Right Because Trump, who, evenduring the fighting and in the
immediate aftermath, was postingon Truth Social and by the way,
I know, I do this all the time.
I still don't know what theverb is for that, because I
refuse to call it a truth.

(24:16):
Right, trump, truth we got tocome up with something else.

Neri (24:22):
That's how they get you.
I I you know, I still call xtwitter and I still call them
yeah, me too, me too.

Michael (24:28):
But you know, I feel like I can't say he tweeted when
he's not even on the platform.
In any event, whatever, whateverwe're going to call it, he was
talking about a deal and then, acouple of days ago, he flipped
and, you know, is now sayingthat that there, there are no
talks, there are no negotiations, there isn't even any need to
have a deal.
I don't know if that's becausehe's claiming that the nuclear

(24:53):
program was obliterated, whether, in the future, it will even be
possible to get a trumpadministration to follow up
militarily, because I worry thatthis issue is going to be like
the 2020 election, where, um,it's, it's a, it's a political

(25:18):
and ideological, a political andideological principle that the
program was obliterated.
And so, you know, if there'sintelligence saying otherwise,
well, that can't possibly be,because we all know the program
was obliterated.
I think that's actually goingto be a thing, maybe, maybe not
to discuss for this podcast, but, you know, keep, keep your eye
on it.
Um, so you know to, to, to putthat tangent aside, unclear to

(25:42):
me if Trump is now saying notalks because his position is
there's nothing to talk about,the program is gone, or if it's
because he's angry at theIranian messaging, or if because
he's angry that Democraticsenators are warning that he,
president Trump, is now about tosign a deal that's going to

(26:03):
look like the JCPOA again.
Trump is now about to sign adeal that's going to look like
the JCPOA again, and it may be,it's all three.
But I think that you know fromthe US side, right now it's not
entirely clear what the statusis of talks or even an effort at
talks From the Iranian side.
I don't think that we shouldreasonably expect them to say,

(26:24):
all right, you won, we lost, youknow we're, we're going to
enter talks and basically totalsurrender mode.
Right, this is.
This is not like, despite,again, president Trump's
messaging.
This is not like the USdropping the bomb on Hiroshima,
nagasaki in 1945.
On Hiroshima and Nagasaki in1945.
And the Japanese say, oh my God, we can't believe what just

(26:46):
happened.
You know we need to basicallyconcede everything, or else
we're going to be destroyed.
I don't think the Iranians arequite there.
So they're going to have tohave something, even if it's
something symbolic, and if theyenter into a deal.
I also, you know, as I alludedto before, I expect their lesson
from this is that they need tohave a nuclear weapon, even if

(27:09):
it's a crude one, so that theycan prevent an attack like this.
Going forward, the lessons fromthe last 20 years are pretty
clear.
If you look at North Korea, ifyou look at Libya, if you look
at Ukraine, right, countriesthat either had nuclear weapons
and gave them up or were workingtowards them and decided not to
by the way, even Basharal-Assad.
If we go back to the Israelistrike on that nuclear reactor,

(27:31):
the lesson is you know thatnuclear weapons gives you
immunity, and everybody knewthat theoretically, but I think
we now have many examples.
So, and North Korea, iranianshas been left untouched for
decades, exactly, exactly, andthere's really nothing anybody
can do about it.
So you know, even if you are theIranians and you go into
negotiations, I expect that theywill do everything they can to

(27:52):
to cheat and preserve uh,preserve some sort of pathway.
And so if there's a deal, it'sgoing to have to be just far
more ironclad, with no sunsets,unlike the JCPOA, and this is
going to be difficult.
So, yeah, I think that, withoutquestion, the best path, and
really the only sustainable path, is getting them into a deal,

(28:15):
but I think it's going to bedifficult.
And that's before we even getto the fact that Prime Minister
Netanyahu is basically on recordnow for, you know, at least a
decade, if not more, as sayingthat there really is no good
deal.
So you know, I think thatultimately, the Israelis are
going to be an obstacle to thistoo.

(28:36):
So I think it's important totry and get it done, but I think
it's going to be an obstacle tothis too.

Neri (28:41):
So I think it's important to try and get it done, but I
think it's going to be hard.
It's going to be hard certainly, especially with well less
leverage than you would have had, say in the middle of a
military conflict, which isobviously not an ideal time to
negotiate a very complicatednon-proliferation agreement.
But now that the bombing hasstopped you, obviously we all
see the messaging from Iran.
Not only that we've won, butwe're still going to remain

(29:03):
defiant, which it's a very sillyposition to take, but not a
surprising one now in thispost-war era.
But also, if diplomacy is notgoing to work, do you believe
that Israel probably not thestates, the United States, but

(29:28):
Israel will continue in theorystriking Iran if they see Iran
moving to rebuild capabilitieslike its nuclear program, like
the ballistic missile program,do you think that mowing the
grass is a feasible Israeliposition?
You know, not next week, but inthe coming months and years?

Shira (29:45):
So I mean, I agree with Michael.
I think you know, I'm surethere's a lot of like
negotiation theories in terms ofstuff.
It's Iran can choose now, right, and I don't know that it made
the choice.
It is a choice that is.
There is this chess Everyone istalking about Iranians playing

(30:07):
chess, right?
So there's this chess metaphorthat that they invented chess.
They didn't.
It's the Indians.
Yeah, they didn't invent chess,it's the Indians, but they
invented the Begumon, I thinkright.

Michael (30:21):
Backgammon I don't know , that was the best
pronunciation of Backgammon I'veever heard in my life.
I mean, of course you know youcall it Cheshbash.
They invented something, Anyway.

Shira (30:30):
But anyway, but not chess .
But there's this sort of likeif is the queen, will you
sacrifice, right, the nuclearprogram to save the regime?
And this is sort of thecalculation are they better off
with a nuclear agreement orthey're better off with some
sort of face saving measure,right?

(30:53):
Uh, that that does.
They don't have a nuclearweapons, but they have a nuclear
program.
And you know if you're Iranian,right, if you think how much
money they put into this and howmany years of experience, and
really, if they're reallyinterested just in civilian
nuclear program, it hasn'tdelivered much in terms of their
energy needs.
So there's probably, there'sprobably a way to make them come

(31:15):
to the negotiation table.
I'm just not sure.
It's probably not byhumiliating them completely,
right, which is what we arehearing now from Trump.
And also something's got togive.
They want enrichment, somebasic level of enrichment to
which they're entitled under theNPT, and they want it on their

(31:35):
territory.
But you can find this likeremote Quiche Island, right,
there are ways to do that.
The technical solutions couldbe there if there's a will.
I think in Israel the views aredivided of professionals.
You do hear officials in themilitary people saying that an
agreement would be needed.
So I don't know that Israelnecessarily has to be an

(31:56):
obstacle.
There is also other voices,right?
What can the Iranians give usnow in an agreement?
And we want more agreementwould be needed.
So I don't know that Israelnecessarily has to be an
obstacle.
There is also other voices,right?
What can the Iranians give usnow in an agreement?
And we want more.
But you do hear some Israelistalking about the need for an
agreement, but you know Israelis not going to be a party to
the agreement.
Right, israel can be sort ofderailing an agreement or being
a side.
This has to be a US-led effortand this depends on how the

(32:19):
president wakes up in themorning and what he sees.
And you know, I hope there'sroom for diplomacy.
And then there's the otherquestion If there's no diplomacy
, israelis are invoking theexample of Lebanon, where Israel
, just like, continues tooperate in Lebanon freely, right
, mowing the grass pretty much,when they see a threat by

(32:42):
Hezbollah.
But there are many reasons whyit's going to be very difficult
to do in Iran.
First of all, it's much farther.
There are a lot of othercountries' airspace to go
through which you do need tomaybe coordinate.
I know Syria and stuff, butlike I don't know that it's
necessarily going to be easy.
If it's something that'smarketed in perpetuity, there's
also risks to pilots, it'sexpensive.

(33:04):
Munitions are also.
I mean, I know Trump justapproved some packages, but I
don't know.
It's what you need to bomb inIran.
There could be retaliation fromIran, right?
So we're going to put theIsraeli home front under risk
again.
So we're going to put theIsraeli home front under risk
again, and then the question iswhat the US will do.
Will they support it?

(33:25):
I heard in one of the pressersthe President Trump was asked if
Iran resumes its activities,right, if he's going to strike
again, and he said somethinglike no question, of course.

Neri (33:37):
I will yeah.
Sure, he said yeah, of course.

Shira (33:39):
Which might be the case, and there are some people saying
that we could be on the vergeof further escalation.
You know there can be moreescalation, so we're definitely
not out of the danger zone.
But I think determining theterms of enforcement and what
are we enforcing is reallyreally important now.

(34:00):
And maybe this is where Israelcomes to the US and says like
that to me should be anincentive for diplomacy.
Right, and you use theEuropeans and you use the fact
that the snapback, our rightmechanisms, which are about
October 2025, right, this issort of literally the money time
for getting Iran.
But I don't think that I'm notnecessarily sure the current

(34:23):
approach is going to get themback to the negotiation table.
And if they don't let the IAEAinspectors come in, right,
because the Iranians are sayingthat mostly the head of the IAEA
is collaborated with Israel onthis and they don't have NPT,
the NPT and other means, I meanwe will have to rely mostly on

(34:44):
intelligence to provideinformation, and that's also not
, I mean, with all theintelligence penetration.
This is also not the best wayto go forward on this.
So I'm hoping we will get todiplomacy, but not sure.

Neri (35:00):
So NPT is the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which
Iran is a signatory to andrequires and demands a certain
level of inspections and accessto nuclear sites.
Yeah, I mean, look, I think eventhe Israeli government, I think
, would go for the diplomaticpath after this military path.

(35:21):
But again, it depends what theterms of the deal are and
obviously this Israeligovernment will hold American
and European feet to the fireand they want, if not a complete
capitulation by Iran, thensomething very close to it,
something very close to it.
And that's before we even getto the whole issue of maybe a

(35:41):
small covert program thatsurvived the 12-day war, the 400
kilos of highly enricheduranium to 60% that may have
survived the war, advancedcentrifuges sitting somewhere.
It is remarkable that theIsraelis I've spoken to don't
seem all that concerned by thisscenario, that there is a covert

(36:03):
program that survived somewherein Iran and that, as Michael
alluded to earlier, this couldbe the seed of a breakout.
The professionals here to havebeen maybe a bit more concerned
about it.
It's a huge debate in mycircles right, in media circles

(36:23):
and people who track the issues,but again it remains to be seen
what happens with that and howmuch did survive.
So we'll see.
Okay, we'll be right back afterthis brief message.

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Michael (37:32):
For what it's worth.
My sense is that the the, thatthe seeming lack of alarm over
that um is because it's it'seven if they retained what they
need to enrich it to weaponsgrade that the stuff that was
destroyed is what would beneeded to take it to the next
step.
Right, so you know, convertingit back into a metal core,

(37:54):
miniaturizing it, the warheaditself.
You know all that stuff um's mysense, but obviously I am not a
nuclear expert, so take thatall with a grain of salt.

Neri (38:03):
No wait.
I mean, we're all nuclearexperts now, because this was
the issue of the month and it'slike the summer that everyone
became an Afghan expert duringthe fall of Kabul and then
obviously we all becameepidemiologists during the COVID
pandemic.
You know, this never stoppedanyone from hosting a podcast or
writing an article.

(38:24):
Fair enough, fair enough.
Yeah, with all that said, let'sshift gears, like we were
talking about earlier.
Never a dull moment.
So, literally, as the Iran warended I mean you know, literally
we were getting increasedchatter from the prime minister
on down about new peace slash,normalization agreements with

(38:49):
additional Arab and Muslimstates.
In Netanyahu's words, there's awindow of opportunity now after
the Iran war.
And again in his words, wecan't waste even a moment.
So again, this kind of this newstoryline to sell to the public
here and not just here, thisnew sense of urgency, this new

(39:11):
carrot to dangle in front ofeveryone.
By the way, netanyahu isheading to Washington early next
week to meet with PresidentTrump in the White House.
So again that will feed intothe storyline and the narrative.
The Trump-Netanyahu well justdomination of all our lives and

(39:32):
the 24-7 news cycle every day,all over the place, all over the
place.
But I'm really I wanted to beardown on this issue of, okay,
the possibility of what probablyPresident Trump is pushing for,
but what we like to call thegrand bargain.
That would see basically a dealin Gaza, that would then unlock

(39:53):
a deal to normalize relationsbetween Israel and Saudi Arabia
and perhaps other Arab andMuslim states, which would then
potentially destabilize theNetanyahu coalition.
So that's why President Trumpis tweeting every few days about
Netanyahu's trial and demandingthat the court system and the

(40:14):
legal authorities here end thetrial, because it's a witch hunt
and it's a disgrace.
And Netanyahu, the warrior andthe wartime hero you know why is
he dealing with cigars and BugsBunny dolls.
I mean verbatim the lines andthe rhetoric that you hear from
Netanyahu mouthpieces here.
So obviously it was given tohim by someone.
He didn't just get into thenitty-gritty of the Netanyahu

(40:39):
corruption trials.
But then obviously that wouldentail potentially a plea deal
to get Netanyahu out of hislegal troubles, all leading to
early elections, maybe by thefall.
How did I do?
Is that the long and the shortof this grand bargain?
Obviously it's highlycomplicated.

(41:02):
Basically Gaza, saudi,potentially Syria, the Netanyahu
trial, elections, coalitionpolitics, all of it tied
together.
I don't know.
In this fever dream, shira, youand I have been talking about
this for the last couple days.
Uh, is there any real substance?

(41:22):
Uh, to these comments comingout of both jerusalem and
washington that you know, very,very close is the day that you
know trump will force netanyahuto end the gaza war and then all
this will unfold before oureyes.
What do you think?

Shira (41:39):
So I think there are a few questions here.
Okay, there is Just a few.
No, no, I mean there are many.
There are many questions hereOn the question on whether Trump
will actually force Netanyahuto end the war in Gaza.
I'm just getting those pushesnow that President Trump is
speaking again and he's sayingthat they do want to finish the

(42:02):
war in Gaza.
And my sense again, my sense isfrom conversations with IDF
folks working on Gaza is thatthe impression is that the IDF
can sort of like do one lastthing in Gaza to wrap this up,
so Israel can can, you know,find a ladder right, we're all

(42:26):
very good here in the MiddleEast of like climbing trees and
then finding ladders to climbdown from.
So Israel can, can, can declareits victory in Gaza and sign
onto an agreement.
So maybe it's wishful thinkingWe've been saying it for a long
time but I think that you areright in your analysis that
probably Trump I'm not talkingabout the fact that he can

(42:46):
relate to Netanyahu beingpersecuted by the deep state,
announcing his great leadershipand the fact that he, if he
ordered 52 Israeli air force toturn around and not respond to
Iran violating, so he could justorder the Israeli judges right

(43:07):
To dismiss the case, or thepresident.
I mean, it's just like what'sthe problem?
He probably would have pardonedNetanyahu himself if he could.
Maybe he doesn't understand whyhe can't, but I think there's
what's.
What's missing, is there?
There's so many assumptions intothis.
So, first of all, there's a lotof chat, chatter in Israel that
when we talk about this bigpeace, peace is coming and

(43:27):
normalization is coming andthey're putting in one bucket
Syria and also Lebanon, butmostly Syria.
And then the other is SaudiArabia.
On Syria, from the promise ofyou know, there's a Hebrew.
It sounds better, but, likenext week, we will eat hummus in
Damascus, you know.
Now we are realizing that thisis a non-aggression pact, some

(43:48):
sort of security arrangementthat very much resembles the
December 74, basically ceasefireterms agreement after the Yom
Kippur War Between.

Neri (43:58):
Israel and Syria.

Shira (43:59):
Israel-Syria one which.
Israel will withdraw from theparts that it, you know,
entering the buffer zone that itoccupied after the fall of the
Assad regime, but it's very farfrom peace, which makes sense, I
think.
Still, it would be great, andespecially if it's not just like
going back to 74, right thesame terms that actually build

(44:22):
some collaboration agreements,maybe on some water sharing and
other technical things, becauseif you judge where we were two
months ago in terms of theIsraeli policy that called the
Shara right jihadists in a suit,we will stay in Syria forever.
It's 180 degrees and it'sreally positive change, but it's
not peace.
When it comes to Saudi Arabiaand after Saudi Arabia, right,

(44:45):
the Lebanese and the other many,many countries could fall the
opportunity for sure is there,but I just don't see the
assumption of like ending thewar in Gaza or accepting some
sort of Witkoff I, witkoff IImodel and we could talk about
the sort of modalities for aceasefire that's gonna bring the
Arab world.

(45:06):
It's not what they're saying.
They are saying that at thevery minimum, we need an end of
war in Gaza, but it's an end ofwar that paves the way to
addressing the Palestinianquestion, and I think they also
realize the Palestinian state ismaybe not around the corner,
even though this is what they'resaying, that they want, right

(45:26):
that Saudi Arabia has been a bigproponent of this and was
supposed to.
One of the things that this warruined was a UN conference
hosted by Saudi Arabia and theFrench and the French about
maybe a recognition of aPalestinian state by multiple
countries.
But it requires makingconcessions or, you know, for

(45:49):
Israel figuring out how it wantsto address the Palestinian
question at large, and so it'snot just a ceasefire agreement
in Gaza, it's also.
It comes to the West Bank, itcomes to Temple Mount right
Haram al-Sharif, it comes to thecore questions of Palestinians,
and at the moment, netanyahudoesn't have a government for

(46:11):
that.
And the problem is that alsothe opposition in Israel doesn't
speak in those terms they do.
Everyone here assumes and I'llend with this that because
everyone saw Israel's amazingachievements, right, the Mossad
and Amman and the Israeli AirForce in Iran, everyone's
knocking at the door.
The Arabs are knocking atIsrael's door just to normalize

(46:32):
ties so they can be next to thestrong side.
What I'm hearing from folks inthe Gulf is that actually you
know now that this is over, allthe pictures we see in the news
are still from Gaza and we'reseeing what's happening in the
West, which we didn't get into,but some parts of it look like
Gaza now and we are not sure ifIsrael is just a strong player

(46:55):
or a bully.
And we don't like the Iranians,but they're very, very cautious
.
You see their behavior, very,very cautious.
And if you hear Israeliopposition leaders, naftali
Bennett gave a big interview onIsraeli press I think he's first
one since he started hiscampaign and he basically

(47:16):
posited there are two optionalways.
He says we we should finish, weshould end the war now and we
can't defeat hamas this, wefailed at this and we have to
save the hostages and enoughwith sacrificing our soldiers.
I'm paraphrasing, obviously.
But um and um eliminating hamas, toppling hamas, would be left
for the next government, or westay in and full occupation and

(47:37):
military rule.
And there's, there's a thirdway, and this is the third way
that the Arabs want, which isthe way we spoke about many
times transitional option whichwill unlock all these promises
that Israeli leaders are tellingus.
But without it, I just I don'tsee the domino tiles falling

(48:07):
into place as they, as they, asthey say.

Neri (48:12):
Yeah, I mean we're talking about chess, backgammon
dominoes.
I mean this is what did theysay about baby four
four-dimensional chess?
I mean this is likefive-dimensional chess.

Shira (48:24):
Even for him and ron dermer it would be quite a lift,
uh and, by the way we've beenin this, normalization is
imminent conversation for atleast like two years.

Neri (48:34):
So yeah, and and look, this isn't new, right?
The Biden administration a yearago, even over a year ago, was
talking about the same thingthat if Israel deigned Netanyahu
deigned, to end the Gaza warand get the hostages out, that
this would unlock all theseother potential benefits,

(48:55):
including normalization withSaudi Arabia, et cetera, et
cetera.
A year plus ago, netanyahuturned its back on that option.
Who knows, after the successeson the battlefield of the past
year, maybe his position hasalso changed, maybe his thinking
has also changed, that's maybethe wager and also the US

(49:16):
president has changed.
It's a lot more dangerous tosay no and spurn this US
president than the previous one.
But, michael, you know aboutthese issues better than we do.
What do you think the prospectsare to get this off the ground?
Obviously, as Shira mentioned,you have to start with Gaza
first.

Michael (49:35):
I agree with Shira.
I think it's a monumentallyheavy lift.
Now we've seen things that overthe past couple of years that I
don't think any of us everexpected, both in directions
good and me.
So the first is that when youhear Israeli government

(50:01):
officials talk about the idea ofa grand bargain and that it has
to start with ending the Gazawar, they're still talking about
it in the terms that have notworked up until now.
They're still talking about itnot as, oh, we're going to
definitively end the war.
It's, it's okay.
We're now that we, now that wedid this to Iran, now Hamas is

(50:27):
going to accept the 60 dayceasefire where they give us
half of the hostages, you know,up front, and the rest later,
and we're not going to have toagree to end the war.
Right, and I right the Wyckoffproposal.
And you know, you see thismessaging coming from Israeli
government officials.
You see this messaging comingfrom Trump administration
officials.
And you know, maybe, maybe youguys have seen something that I
haven't, but I still see zerosign from Hamas that anything

(50:51):
that's happened over the pastcouple of weeks has made them
change their tune and say, yeah,you know what, that's fine, we
don't, we don't need the end ofthe war tune and say, yeah, you
know what, that's fine, we don'tneed the end of the war, we'll
now accept the partial ceasefire.
And so this conversation.
You know in these reports thaton Thursday the Israeli security
cabinet is going to vote to.

(51:12):
You know one of two options,right Either keep on pushing on
in Gaza and expand the militaryoperation, or vote for the
Wyckoff proposal.
Okay, great.
Is there any guarantee that ifthey vote for the Wyckoff
proposal, that Hamas is going toaccept it?
I haven't seen any indicationthat that's the case.

Neri (51:33):
So the fact that this is by the way, the Israeli
government has already said itaccepted the Wyckoff proposal
because it's a temporarytwo-month ceasefire and they get
half the hostages back.
The Israelis have yeah theIsraelis have.

Michael (51:44):
That's what I'm saying.
Sure, right, hamas, but yeah,yeah, for any of this to happen,
you need Hamas to accept theWitkoff proposal, and I haven't
seen any indication that theyhave or that they will.
Now again, I'll never say never, but it just seems to me that
this conversation about stepnumber one of this grand bargain

(52:04):
is taking place in this worldthat doesn't necessarily exist.
So you know, that's number one.
Number two I think that all ofthis stems from a question, like
a 30,000-foot question, of yourview of the world.
It has long been the Israeliview of the world that

(52:27):
everything we see happening inthe West Bank and Gaza and the
Palestinian arena, it all stemsfrom Iran.
And you saw this over and overagain, post, post October 7th
right, this, this, the these,these statements that, um, this
is, this is not, this is not.
There is no Israeli Palestinianconflict.
There isn't, there isn't anIsraeli-Iran conflict, there's

(52:48):
an Israeli-Iranian conflict.
And once you solve the Iranproblem, then the rest of this
goes away.
And it seems to me that theidea of this grand bargain now
just unfolding over the next,you know, two weeks, four weeks,
two months, whatever, whateverit is, it stems from that idea,
so that you know, now Iran hasbeen put in its place and

(53:11):
therefore you can.
You can just end the Gaza waron Israel's terms and you can
get to.
You can expand the AbrahamAccords and you can have Saudi
normalization.
Because the only thing that wasdriving any of these
developments was Iran, and Ifundamentally disagree.
I don't think it's right.
And to Shira's point, I thinkthat's if that were correct and

(53:36):
we'll see, maybe I am wrong andShira is wrong and lots of other
people are wrong, although Idon't think we are If that was
correct, then, yeah, you wouldsee the entire region, including
the Saudis, saying, oh great,but the only reason we didn't
want to normalize was because wewere scared of what Iran would
do.
And now you've shown that youcan do whatever you want to the
Iranians.
So you know Israelnormalization.

(53:57):
Here we are, sign us up,doesn't matter what else is
going on.
I don't think we're going to seethat they do care about what
happens in Gaza.
They do care about what happensin the West Bank.
It doesn't all stem from Iran,even if there is Iranian
involvement in all of thesearenas.
So I think that all of this isproceeding based on a

(54:17):
fundamentally flawed view thatIran is the root of everything,
not just attempts to get rid ofIsrael as a Jewish state, as the
Iranians say, but that it'salso the root of everything
going on in theIsraeli-Palestinian arena.
I just do not think that that'sthe case.
I don't think that Hamas thinksthat's the case.
I don't think that Hamas thinksthat's the case.

(54:39):
I don't think that the PAthinks that's the case.
I don't think ordinaryPalestinians think that's the
case, and I don't think theregion thinks that's the case.
So you know again, we'll seehow this unfolds and obviously
Iran is a big part of it, butuntil, in my view, the Israeli

(54:59):
government and the Trumpadministration grant that not
every single thing that happensis related to Iran, I think
we're still going to be stuck.

Shira (55:04):
Narian, can I add something to this?
Because I do think, even if yousubscribe to the view that Iran
was sort of the root of allevil in this region which I
don't disagree with, right, I'mputting, the Palestinian
question is a different questionand it predates the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
So let's say there was an issuealso when Israel and Iran were
best friends.
But I'm putting this aside.

(55:25):
If there was leadership thatwanted to use the fact that Iran
is on its back now in a verymeaningful way right, just in
all parts, and maybe this canturn very wrong could argue that
this might be a way to reallyundermine hamas's rules.
Right, we spoke about it manytimes.
Right, this was iran, sort ofthe head of the snake, the head

(55:47):
of the octopus, the head of thecat was a different animal.
Right, this could make hamascompromise, but also it removes
right israelis saying to thepoint that michael raised, that
there's israel saying like no,what if Iran penetrates to the
West Bank and undermines it?
What if the West Bank becomes?
This is like, this is anopportunity in the sense of use

(56:08):
the fact that Iran is on itsback to strengthen not just
kinetically, militarily thisdiplomatic network around it and
I think it is useful to hearhow albumazen of the pa was has
been speaking about thepalestinian, about iran, in the
last few years and the lastcouple of years, especially
since october 7.

Michael (56:29):
Right, there's no and, by the way, shira also also just
in the last two weeks, right, Imean the messaging from the pa
about the israel-iran war wasremarkable right and also before
that right, like if we onlydare to hear, and I'm not saying
, but they are also scared ofIranian sponsored terrorism in
their territories.

Shira (56:54):
Like we're trying to poo-poo this whole idea.
The door is open, but Israelhas to take a leap of faith,
like it did in other parts, andgo ahead with what might offer a
better path forward on Gaza.
And then there's no separateGaza question or it's a

(57:15):
Palestinian question, and myhope is is if we're talking
about the Arabs on this, youknow there's a whole lot of talk
to the Israelis explaining yourthing.
That's one thing, but I thinkthat one of the things that
Israel clings on to Israeliofficials are clinging on to
Trump's vision of voluntarymigration of Gaza and the

(57:38):
Gaza-Rivera idea In someofficial documents.
Right, we have.
One of the war aims is tofulfill President Trump's vision
.
There is a directorate in theMinistry of Defense.
I don't know if Trump is stillon this.
I haven't heard him talk aboutit.

Neri (57:54):
He hasn't mentioned it in months.

Shira (57:56):
In months.
But I think if there's one rolefor the Arabs now, or whoever
or someone listens and talks tothe administration, and just, I
don't expect Trump to say thathis idea was a bad one, but
maybe he says you know, I putthis in because this was my
negotiation card and the Arabshave convinced me that they're
willing to put money and helpthe Palestinians.

(58:18):
And that's what Arabs should do.
They should help them, not us.
Da da, da something, just saysomething and remove this idea
from the table, because I think,as long as Israelis are like,
wait, but we have that thingthat we can cling on to.
It lifts off the pressure toactually discuss other sensible
and less sensible ideas, andthis is the president has to do

(58:41):
this.

Neri (58:42):
The Trump-Riviera plan caused a lot of damage because
it gave a broader vision to thehardliners in Israel about the
war aims and the extent of thewar.
And when the US president putsit out, it's very difficult for
people in Israel to say well,who are you to disagree with the

(59:03):
US president?
He's just basically told us youcan do whatever you want in
Gaza and to Gaza.
So why should we not?
And obviously there are reasonswhy not, but from the Israeli
mindset there are a lot lessquestions.
So I think that would be hugelybeneficial.
And, shira, you talked aboutIsrael needing to take a leap of

(59:23):
faith.
I think Israel needs to startconsidering the option of maybe
making concessions vis-a-visGaza, vis-a-vis the West Bank,
to unlock all these broaderthings that Trump and many
others want to see done.
And it's not far-reachingconcessions we're not talking

(59:47):
about the Oslo Accords beingsigned on the White House lawn
in September of 2025, but itwould be things like allowing
the PA to have a role back inGaza in order to get Arab state
buy-in to a post-war order.
It would necessitate sayingwell, like Naftali Bennett and

(01:00:08):
others are saying, okay, wedon't need to destroy every last
Hamas guy with a green bandanaand an AK-47 to reach total
victory and that the hostages,getting them back, is the first
order of priority.
And, by the way, you see signsof this amongst right-wing I

(01:00:29):
don't want to call themjournalists, but mouthpieces.
In recent days it's like well,the threat from Hamas out of
Gaza is a lot less than it wasNow.
What changed between now and amonth ago on the ground?
Nothing in military terms, butwhat changed is the broader
political and diplomatic contextcoming out of the Iran war,
which is what we've been talkingabout for months now that the

(01:00:50):
idea that if you end the war now, that Israel would suffer
another October 7th and it'd beonly a matter of time, is
ridiculous in just pure militaryterms.
But you're hearing more of thatfrom the Israeli right and I
don't think that's a coincidence.
So, again, israel needs tostart considering the option of
that and also giving somehorizon to a Palestinian state

(01:01:12):
if they want Saudi or othernormalization.
Again, remains to be seen, andit really remains to be seen
what the prime minister herewants to do.
Going back to Michael's point,I think the likeliest option is
that Netanyahu and Trump andWoodcuff and Ron Dermer try to
convince Hamas that this timeWashington is really serious and

(01:01:36):
they're going to not allowIsrael to restart the war after
two or three months that theytry to get Hamas to agree to
this kind of Woodcock proposal.
Two or three months ceasefire,get half the hostages back, and
then Netanyahu will make hisdecisions sometime in September,
october.
By the way not a coincidencethe Knesset is going on recess
at the end of this month, at theend of July, until mid to late

(01:02:00):
October.
So again buying time and allthe while dangling the prospect
of more peace deals and moretotal victories or not, and
potentially an election on theother side of it.
That's my best guess.
But again, who knows, who knows?

Michael (01:02:17):
Right and this, really this would be a great time to
break the Israeli cycle of youknow saying, when you're in a
weak position, you can'tpossibly negotiate, because you
know it'll send the wrongmessage to the other side.
And when you're in a strongposition, why should you
negotiate?
You know you're in a positionof strength and right now, in
pretty much every imaginable way, israel is in the ultimate

(01:02:37):
position of strength with regardto what they've done to Iran,
with regards to what they'vedone to Iranian proxies, with
regard to everything thatPresident Trump appears willing
and ready to support.
This would be a perfect time tobreak that cycle, and I'm
always pessimistic it'll happen,but I sincerely hope I'm wrong.

Neri (01:03:00):
And look, this is the classic Netanyahu and Dermer to
just create a massive problem oftheir own making and then look
for people to bail them out ofthe problem and to cash in.
This would be the ultimate wayto cash in very, very high.
But there will be a price, andthe price will likely be
Netanyahu's coalition andpotentially an election.

(01:03:21):
And the shift now and I wroteabout this over the weekend is
maybe for the first time in atleast 21 months, netanyahu is
willing to take that risk andeither is gearing up to run
again or God help me seriouslyconsidering resigning.

(01:03:42):
Benny Gantz Taryn, what aboutBenny Gantz?

Shira (01:03:47):
Look, I have no idea.
I just a political analyst thatI respect a lot because, you
know, my least favorite topic isIsraeli elections.
But he assesses and he wasright until now, that we're not
going to be seeing and it's nowbreaking to elections in the
next few months that we're stillon the sort of one year time

(01:04:07):
horizon.
I don't know if it's true ornot, but as we were speaking,
gadi Eisenkot, former chief ofStaff, betty Gantz's partner or
number two in his party rightannounced today that he's
retiring.
He's leaving.

Neri (01:04:25):
Not retiring.
He resigned from the party,resigned from the Knesset, but
wants to come back in adifferent format.

Shira (01:04:34):
Anyway, and my understanding is that he's not
joining anyone in particular,that he's actually going to go
roam the country, work on sortof creating a block of votes and
stuff.
But if you think there's, Idon't know that Benny Gantz will
actually join Netanyahu again,but Netanyahu can have a safety
net for making he can have analternative government even now.

(01:04:56):
If you want to do these thingsand, by the way, I think that
this was also my hope was thatbeing so strong after the
iranian strike?
It's, it's crazy.
We're just a week in, but hadhe done it like the day after,
when he's the war hero, right?
I don't know that.
There's like ben vir, smotrichthreats day after um if he would

(01:05:17):
go for some sort of.
It falls short of what the Saudidemands are, but showing more
inclination to do somethingconstructive in Gaza.
I don't know how fragile hiscoalition is.
We're looking at all pollingand this coalition doesn't score
well.
They are not going to be in thenext.
I mean, if things continue asthey are, this coalition doesn't

(01:05:45):
have public support.
The Haredi blocs in thecoalition.
They also want the war to end.
I don't know if they're veryconcerned for the welfare of the
Gazans or the IDF soldiers, butthey don't want to be pressured
to send to get enlisted also,right.
So that's, there's a cynicalconsideration there.
So I don't know, know, I I mean, maybe I'm hoping, but I I
think this whole, like bb, can'tdo it politically and maybe,

(01:06:06):
maybe, maybe trump does removethe, the, the threat of the
trial, and then he can dowhatever he wants, all right
yeah, I didn't want to get intothe weeds of israeli politics,
we you know, for for a personwho doesn't like Israeli
politics, you brought it up,Shira.

Neri (01:06:20):
I was going to end it early because we're already over
time, but you raise a goodpoint right.
There are other permutations.
No, no, this is great, this isgood podcasting off the cuff.
But there are otherpermutations where, yes, you
know, Lapid and Gantz and otheropposition parties give him a
safety net to get a hostageceasefire deal over the line in

(01:06:40):
Gaza, like they've beenpromising now for a year, and
that buys him time.
But again, if he makes it to theend of July, then the Knesset
is in recess, he's not really inany risk of being toppled, and
then he can come back in October, November, December and make
his own decisions either keepsome new configuration going or

(01:07:03):
likely it won't last for thatlong Elections in early the
first quarter of 2026, like mostpeople believe, but it's
probably the likeliest option.
But again, he has a space nowthat he didn't.
He probably didn't think he hada year ago to do this because
he just, as someone who knowshim well told me over the

(01:07:25):
weekend, you know, he just hejust completed his, his life's
mission and ultimate dream ofbombing Iran.
What else is left?
It's a very good question.

Shira (01:07:36):
Saudi Arabia.

Michael (01:07:38):
Yeah, right, and, and of course, as you know,
elections are getting closer,whether it's in the next three
months or, you know, next, nextspring, of course.
The Israeli opposition is, asusual, can't get out of its own
way.
Right With Right, you know God.
I mean probably should havesplit from Gantz a while ago,
but of course he didn't.
And now is when he's doing it.

(01:07:58):
And you know, lapid and Golanat each other's throats, it's
just things.
The amount of Netanyahu isprobably the most talented
politician walking the face ofthe earth.
I don't know how you canconclude otherwise, but the
amount of luck he has beenhanded throughout his entire

(01:08:18):
career with just fecklessopposition after feckless
opposition politically is not tobe believed.

Neri (01:08:26):
Yeah, Probably the most talented and the luckiest by far
.
Obviously, you make your ownluck, but you can't make your
own feckless opposition leaders,yeah, yeah, but we'll see what
happens on the Israeli politicalfront.
We'll see what happens on thediplomatic front, next week in
Washington.

(01:08:46):
We'll see what happens on thebattlefields of Gaza and also,
farther east, what happens withthe Iran, diplomacy or not.
All things to keep in mind inthe dog days of summer.
But to be continued, shira,Michael, thank you very much for
your time.

(01:09:06):
Hopefully nothing too dramaticlike an Israeli-Iran war happens
before the next time we talk.
And, shira, if it doespotentially happen, I want like
a proper notice so I don't geton any fights.

Shira (01:09:22):
I know and I really hope it doesn't happen.

Michael (01:09:25):
Well, I'm off again.
I'm off again in two weeks, soyou know, put that on the
calendar for the next big event.

Neri (01:09:30):
So something terrible will happen.

Shira (01:09:33):
Yeah, maybe we'll have you know.
If flights resume, we will besafe it.
Maybe we'll have you know ifflights resume, we will be safe
it's.
Yeah, anyway, life in IsraelNever a dull moment.

Neri (01:09:44):
No, never a dull moment.
It's very difficult to makeplans in Israel these days.

Michael (01:09:49):
Yeah, I was supposed to be with you guys in person this
week, but I'm glad we were ableto do this virtually instead.

Neri (01:09:54):
Virtually, Hopefully soon.
Take care guys.

Michael (01:09:57):
Bye guys, bye-bye said virtually, uh, hopefully soon.

Neri (01:09:59):
Take care, guys.
Bye, guys, bye, bye.
Okay, thanks again to michaelcoppola and shira efron, as
always, for the generous timeand insights.
Also, special thanks to ourproducer, jacob gilman, and to
all of you who support israelpolicy forums work.
Do consider making a donationto israel policy forums to keep
being a credible source ofanalysis and ideas on issues
such as these that we all caredeeply about, including this

(01:10:20):
podcast and, most importantly,thank you for listening.