Amb. Dan Shapiro on the State of U.S.-Israel Ties

On this week’s episode, Israel Policy Forum Policy Advisor and Tel Aviv-based journalist Neri Zilber hosts Dan Shapiro, former U.S. ambassador to Israel. They discuss the method and timing behind the Trump-brokered Gaza ceasefire deal, comparisons with the Biden administration’s diplomacy, whether senior U.S. officials are really coming to Israel to "Bibi-sit,” the prospects for Phase I of the deal holding, the challenges looming in Phase II, whether more regional normalization is really at hand, what’s next on the Iran front, and more. 

Support the show

Follow us on Instagram, Twitter/X, and Bluesky, and subscribe to our email list here.

Episode Transcript

Neri (00:05):
Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod.
I'm Neri Zilber, a journalistbased in Tel Aviv and a policy
advisor to Israel Policy Forum.
We have a great episode for youthis week with Dan Shapiro back
with us to discuss the Gazaceasefire deal, US Israel ties
in the age of babysitting, myterm, not necessarily Dan's
term, and what next on the Iranfront, and much, much more.

(00:29):
Dan was, of course, U.S.
Ambassador to Israel for mostof the Obama administration, the
Deputy Assistant Secretary ofDefense for the Middle East in
the recent Biden administration,and in general has held a slew
of senior policy positions atthe State Department, the
National Security Council, andthe U.S.
Congress over the past threedecades.
Dan is currently adistinguished fellow at the

(00:51):
Atlanta Council in theScullcroft Middle East Security
Initiative.
Some of our listeners andviewers, remember, we're now a
video podcast available onYouTube.
But you all may recall that Danwas on this past June,
literally on the eve of theoutbreak of the 12-day war
between Israel and Iran.
Like everything else during thenext two weeks, that episode,

(01:13):
which was terrific, trust me,kind of got lost in the shuffle.
But it's still super relevantin terms of Biden administration
policy throughout the Gaza warafter October 7th.
Barack Obama's eulogy forShimon Paris, way back when.
There was a lot in that episodefrom June 12th, so do check it

(01:36):
out.
After you finish this episode,of course.
One other programming note,I'll be traveling over the next
few weeks, so podcast productionmay be a bit different while
I'm away.
Even journalists deserve timeoff, especially journalists.
No, I wouldn't go that far, buteven journalists need some time
away.
So just FYI on that.
And also, just by way ofcontext, we recorded this

(01:59):
episode around midday Tel Avivtime on Wednesday.
Despite the ceasefire, we justhad another escalation in Gaza
yesterday, on Tuesday, when oneIDF reservist was uh tragically
killed by Hamas fire in thesouthern Gaza Strip.
And this came after Hamasstaged the recovery of a
deceased hostage's body, whichlater turned out to be the

(02:20):
remains of Ofil Zalfati.
Ofil Zalfati was abducted fromthe Nova Music Festival during
the October 7th attack.
He was killed in captivity byHamas, and his body was
officially recovered by the IDFway back in November 2023 and
brought back home to Israel forburial.
It's a terrible story that wedon't need to get into now, but

(02:42):
Israel responded with fairlywide-scale airstrikes overnight.
But as of now, and with DonaldTrump's prodding, the ceasefire
is back on, and more hostageswill hopefully be released soon.
But can the deal hold?
For an answer to that question,amongst many other questions,
let's get to Dan Shapiro.
Hi Dan.

(03:06):
Welcome back to the podcast.

Dan (03:07):
Thanks, Neri.
Good to be back, good to bewith you again.

Neri (03:10):
It's great to have you back, Dan.
Uh especially after last timeyou were on right before the
12-day war, back in June.
So this should be, uh, if allgoes according to plan, what we
call here in Israel aKhawayamata Kenet, a corrective
experience to uh to the lastepisode you were on, uh, which
by the way was terrific.
And I will urge all ourlisteners and viewers to go back

(03:31):
and check that out.
Uh but you also, I thought,would be the exact right guest
for this week as well, uh, todiscuss all things Gaza,
US-Israel relations, uh, Iran,and more.
Uh so thank you again for foragreeing to come on.
Hopefully, this time there willnot be a full-blown uh war in
the Middle East, um, fingerscrossed, especially since I'm
getting on a on another flightuh tomorrow.

(03:52):
That's a different story.
Um so, Dan, the first and mostobvious question uh to you and
probably to most of ourlisteners, um, what did you make
of the Gaza ceasefire deal uhbrokered by Donald Trump and his
team?
Uh came into effect on October10th, um, especially as someone
like yourself who was intimatelyinvolved in the diplomacy
during the Biden administration,uh looking to halt, if not end,

(04:15):
uh the Gaza war.
Uh yourselves?

Dan (04:17):
Thanks again, uh Neri for having me.
Yeah, look, this uh ceasefireand hostage deal uh that uh
President Trump was able toannounce and then see executed
uh during his visit uh was uh avery significant accomplishment.
Obviously, the return of the 20living hostages was uh
essential and uh a major, majorevent for all of Israeli society

(04:42):
uh and uh something that neededto happen.
Uh and so an unalloyed good uhthat that was achieved.
Uh the other elements of thedeal, the end of the fighting,
the pullback of Israeli forcesto uh what's called now the
yellow line, the 53% of Gaza, uhthe uh inflow of uh

(05:03):
significantly increased uhamount of humanitarian
assistance, the return ofPalestinian prisoners, some of
them, of course, uh very uh uhbloody-handed terrorists.
Uh these were all the otherelements of that deal that sort
of had to happen.
Now, in his typical style,President Trump oversold it.
It's not Middle East peace,it's not going to be

(05:23):
everlasting, it's not you knowuh the end of a 3,000-year
conflict, uh, but it's reallyimportant.
And uh all credit due to himand uh his team, Steve Whitkoff
and uh Jared Kushner.
I think actually Kushner'sinvolvement was really critical
because his uh relationships andexperience in this field, I
think, are sort of uh uh somethings that Whitkoff was in some

(05:45):
way struggling with, but uhKushner sort of helped help
land.
In terms of the elements of it,but you know, Middle East wars
tend to end messy.
Uh there's not often a clearvictory or surrender.
Uh everybody uh has to sort ofaccept terms that are less than
their optimal terms or theirmaximal terms they had set.
Uh and often the terms are setby the United States and they're

(06:08):
less than Israel wants, butsort of meet Israel's basic
needs.
In this case, I think there wasan exhaustion that had set in.
I mean, a lot of people haveasked me, well, why didn't it
happen uh during the Bidenadministration?
And you know, there are a wholerange of reasons for that.
One is simply time, you know,exhaustion.
Uh Hamas, of course, uh wasunder renewed military pressure

(06:30):
because of the Israeli operationuh in Gaza City that was
advancing, although slowlybecause the IDF was very
concerned about losing hostages,losing soldiers, uh, etc.
Uh but there was real pressurethere.
Uh Iran, uh Hamas was furtherpressured by how much Iran and
the other uh members of the Axisof Resistance had been weakened

(06:52):
uh over the course of the war,and at some point was looking to
just to survive, which isreally Hamas's main goal in
these types of wars, to be ableto crawl out from the rubble
when it's over.
Um Israel though was alsoexhausted.
We know how uh I was in Israelfor much of uh September uh
before Rosh Hashanah, and youknow, at that time, you know,

(07:13):
the the the impatience and thebitterness even of many Israelis
about you know that it wastaking so long to get hostages
out uh was really, reallyprofound.
We know how stressed thereserve force was.
Uh, we know that Israel wasfacing uh a kind of a wave of
international isolation, uh, ofcourse, the recognition of
Palestinian state by numerouscountries, and even, as we've

(07:36):
seen, you know, blows toIsrael's support in the United
States uh and in both parties tosome degree.
Um so there were those thosefactors.
And you know, Trump then, ofcourse, had leverage uh for his
goals and and used it.
I must say I think he had thatleverage all along.
You know, he came into officewith a ceasefire in place, uh,

(07:58):
and I think he could have actedas he did uh only after you know
uh the strike in Doha, whichI'll get to in a second, uh,
much earlier in the year.
And I wrote about it you knowseveral times, um, and even took
decisions that kind of set backthe uh eventual uh achievement
of this ceasefire and hostagedeal with his Gaza Riviera plan

(08:19):
and not objecting to the GazaCity project, etc.
But uh what did clearly flipthe script was the Doha strike
uh by Israel against Hamasleaders.
It wasn't very successful, ofcourse.
It really raised the alarm, uh,both for the Cutteries but
others in the Gulf as well, andfor Trump, uh, who had said he

(08:40):
wanted to end the war or hewanted to get the hostages out.
Again, I think he'd made somedecisions earlier in the year
that were not in concert withthose goals.
But once that risk of the warcoming to the Gulf uh presented
itself, uh it really uh I thinkcaused him to change his
approach.
And then he really began toexercise very quickly the

(09:01):
leverage he always had on uhNetanyahu.
But very importantly, it wasn'tjust U.S.
pressure on Israel uh to agreeto terms it had not agreed to,
which it did.
Uh it agreed ultimately to endthe fighting without the full
disarmament uh and removal frompower of Hamas from all of Gaza.

Neri (09:19):
But he also no uh no total victory like had been promised.
Correct.

Dan (09:24):
Correct.
So he had to he had to acceptterms that he had said he would
not.
But he also very importantlythen got uh Qatar and Turkey
particularly.
I think Turkey was really acritical element here, not one
sufficiently exercised duringthe Biden administration uh
because of their connection withHamas.
He got those two countries touse their leverage on Hamas uh

(09:44):
to pressure them uh to agree toterms that they had not agreed
to previously, which was thereturn of all the hostages,
which they haven't fullyfulfilled yet on the other among
deceased hostages, but to agreeto those terms uh without
Israel's full uh departure fromGaza or even a guarantee that
the end of the war waspermanent.
Although I think he Trumpstrongly implied that that would

(10:06):
be the case.
And he did that with some ofthe transactional kind of deals
that he does, uh, which seemedto be effective in this case.
Turkey got at least a softapproval of the F-35 aircraft
that they've been seeking.
Cutter got a security guaranteeand an executive order.
Uh so you know, he used all ofthose tools and and and got you

(10:26):
know both sides then to agree toless than their total victory
uh demands.
Now, there again, back to thequestion of you know why Trump
did it, Biden didn't do it, whynow, not earlier.
There are clearly some uniquepolitical factors uh here.
Uh Netanyahu, because of theway he has tied himself and his
political identity to Trump, uh,really does not have the

(10:49):
ability, uh, or not at withoutvery high political cost uh to
say no.
If Trump says, I need you to dothis, I'm insisting you do
this.
Uh, he doesn't really have theability to say no.
We know that Netanyahu'shistory, and this was true in
the Obama administration,actually it's true all the way
back in the Clintonadministration, uh, and it was
true in periods of the Bidenadministration, found that he

(11:10):
could sort of gain politicalbenefits in some ways by
resisting uh the demands of uhDemocratic presidents.
Didn't work that way uh for himwith Trump.
And then in the U.S.
side, uh Trump faced nodomestic political pushback at
all uh for kind of leaning in uhwith the the pressure that he
he did on the leverage he did hedid exert.

(11:30):
Uh it's hard to imagine, youknow, that there wouldn't have
been some very strong reactionuh had President Biden you know
called publicly for ceasefiresthe way Trump has now twice,
once in Iran and once in withGaza.
Uh if he had engaged in directtalks with Hamas, as at one
point Kushner and and Whitkoffdid, if he had publicly said, I,

(11:52):
you know, uh red line for uhannexation of the West Bank.
These are all things Trump hasdone.
Not a whisper of criticism fromhis own party.
The Republican Party basicallydoesn't criticize him on
anything.
And Democrats want the war toend.
Uh, and so we're kind ofencouraging uh of using these
tools.
Uh now that's not to say thateverything, I'm not in the camp

(12:14):
that says, you know, everythingthat was done during the Biden
administration was perfect.
It was not.
There were mistakes made,things could have been done
differently better.
In the end, that ceasefire thatTrump inherited and worked on
together during the transitionwith Biden, I think, is
meaningful and helped lead tothis point.
But uh clearly, you know, wewanted to achieve more uh than
than we did.
So this is not a defense ofthat.

(12:35):
It's just saying that it's notapples to apples uh comparison
about the politicalcircumstances in either country
uh that uh Biden that Bidenfaced.
The last thing I'll just say isthat uh Trump then, when he
made that decision after Doha touh really push, he he used uh,
I think a very uh unconventionaland improvisational style of

(12:56):
diplomacy, but from whichthere's a lot to learn uh in
order to get everyone to yes.
Uh he met with a bunch of Arableaders uh at the UN General
Assembly, uh, kind of laid outwhat was what then became known
as the 20-point plan to them andgot their endorsement to it.
And then he was going into ameeting uh the following Monday
with Netanyahu at the WhiteHouse where he was going to

(13:17):
announce it, but over theweekend uh the Israelis came and
said, Well, there are things wedon't like about it.
So they rewrote a big chunk ofit.
Uh and then what he announcedwith Netanyahu on that Monday
was not exactly what he hadpresented to the Arab states.
And they didn't, you know,really squeal publicly, although
it was clear that there werechanges.
But then when Hamas respondedto what he announced with
Netanyahu with a very obviousyes but, where that he agreed to

(13:41):
parts and didn't agree to otherparts, uh, and Netanyahu
clearly was uncomfortable withthat because he wanted them, you
know, to accept everything.
Uh Trump just took the yes andignored the but.
And uh he dared everyone uh tosay no to him once he was
announcing things that evenpeople hadn't fully agreed to
yet.
Um, and clearly, you know,making the decision that the

(14:01):
most important thing was to getthe ceasefire and the hostages
home, uh, and that the phase twoelements, which we'll talk
about, you know, would have toyou know be dealt with after the
fact.
I think that was that was avery good and correct decision
and and facilitated by this sortof very improvisational style
diplomacy.
And again, I think there'sthere's lessons to be learned
from that.
Um, so meaningfulaccomplishment for sure, very

(14:23):
meaningful, uh, and credit dueto the president and his team.
Um clearly we're seeingviolations of the ceasefire to
some degree.
Hamas is shot at Israelisoldiers across the yellow line,
most recently in Rafah.
Uh Hamas has not returned, butI think it's still 13 uh of the
deceased hostages and is youknow playing kind of the cruel
games it does to uh pretend itdoesn't know where they are, or

(14:46):
you know, maybe there are a fewit doesn't, but probably most it
does, uh, and try to hold on tothat leverage and uh and the
psychological warfare benefits.
Uh and so Israel has to respondto some of these violations,
but I think the the violationsand the responses are sort of
within the range of the usualtesting of the limits of a of a
of a ceasefire.
And I I do think there's apretty high likelihood this the

(15:09):
fundamental ceasefire is goingto hold for uh for the
foreseeable future because Trumpreally doesn't want it to
resume again.
He wants to say, you know, thiswas a big accomplishment, have
the war flare back up againwould be uh would be a blow to
that.
Uh Hamas had mentioned wasexhausted and under pressure
from from its supporters uh andand their partners that uh uh it
not uh resume major fighting.

(15:29):
So I I think it it it's a gooduh opportunity to to keep that
those benefits in place whiletrying, and we'll talk about it
now, to to get on to phase two.
But phase two is much, muchharder and much, much more
complicated.

Neri (15:42):
So that's a great uh laying out of um, well, not only
your opinion, but basicallywhat just transpired uh in
recent weeks and and recentmonths.
Um and we'll dive into variousissues that you raised, Dan.
Yeah, I I also um was struck byTrump's method, by his uh, like
you said, improvisationalstyle.
Uh some would say takingconstructive ambiguity to its um

(16:05):
nth degree, uh like essentiallyignoring what Hamas did or did
not agree to.
So the Trump people keepsaying, well, Hamas agreed to
disarm.
Uh and Hamas uh I'm not it'snot at all clear to me whether
Hamas uh agreed to disarm atall.
Uh and that will have to be umThat was in the butt, right?

Dan (16:23):
They they said yes to phase one and they did not say yes to
disarmament, which is phasetwo, and they didn't sign for
that.
That's not what was signed, andnow they're now we're still
working on phase two.

Neri (16:34):
Yeah, but he uh he took uh the win, he took phase one.
Um I'm curious, just in termsof the Biden administration and
the history of the negotiationswhen you guys were in power
versus the deal we got just afew weeks ago.
I'm sure you're aware there'sobviously a debate, definitely
here in Israel, maybe even inthe United States, about well,

(16:54):
this deal was on the table uh ayear ago uh under the Biden
administration.
Um I'm curious to get yoursense.
You know, you laid out theissues of why uh the deal didn't
happen, but in terms of theactual details that we
eventually got, do you think uhthey are comparable to what
could have been or at least wason the table a year ago?
Um, or was it strictly a casethat a year ago Israel was only

(17:17):
willing to negotiate a partialdeal uh and not a full deal like
Trump essentially forcedNetanyahu into?

Dan (17:24):
I think uh again, I think at that time uh there were
numerous occasions.
I wasn't a direct uhparticipant in those
negotiations, although I wasobviously largely aware of what
was happening.
Uh, there were numerousoccasions in which Hamas uh made
clear it was not talking aboutor willing to discuss uh the

(17:45):
release of all hostages andintended to hold on to some, uh,
even in a hostage deal.
And and in all thosenegotiations, it would take to
the very, very last stage uhbefore they would even put names
on the table, before they wouldactually start to talk about
who might be eligible uh to bereleased.
And so that was not, I think,something Hamas was really
prepared to do.

(18:06):
Uh, in the end, the deal thatwas struck during that
transition uh involved uh atwo-phase element, which I think
30 hostages came out in thatfirst phase, and then second
phase never really happened, butit all still need that second
phase still needed to benegotiated.
But it was also true duringmost of that period that uh you
know Netanyahu also didn't wantto uh go to uh an end, uh

(18:27):
permanent end of the war uhwithout achieving those more
maximal goals, and at varioustimes added conditions uh to
ceasefires.
I think most famously lastsummer uh 24 uh was the
Philadelphia Corridor, uh, whichat the time Minister of Defense
Gallant, who was our maincounter counterpart when I was
working in the Pentagon, wassaying was not uh a security

(18:50):
requirement.
He considered it would be apolitical uh additional
condition to those negotiations.
So, you know, I mean they youknow really were not
sufficiently exhausted, I guessyou could say, either side to
you know ultimately start toclimb down from some of those
conditions.
By the time you get to the fallof 24, you know, then the US

(19:10):
political calendar becomes afactor uh when you know nobody's
gonna make a decision becausebefore they see what the outcome
of the election is, thinkingthat they might get you know
better terms or you know, adifferent team or when when you
say when you say no one, youmean the the Israeli government.
I think the Israeli government,but I'm not sure it was any
different for Hamas, to behonest.

(19:30):
I mean, you know, I don't knowthat they had an opinion yet.
I think at a certain point,once Trump was elected and and
took office, you know, there's acertain fear factor because of
you know his his style, uhsomewhat blustery style,
sometimes he makes sort ofthreats that he doesn't really
have uh an ability to back up,but uh they clearly didn't want
to cross with him.
Uh they you know maybe didn'tfully assess his uh relationship

(19:54):
and influence with theCutteries.
Uh but I I think at a certainpoint the negotiations just sort
of you know go into a uh afreeze uh freeze zone, uh, which
was really what was happeningin September, October of 24.
And then even after anelection, it takes a while to
figure out what's going on.
Then it got serious inDecember, January during the

(20:14):
transition.

Neri (20:15):
Okay.
Uh I think that's a that's afair answer.
Um and uh just finally on theissue of phase one and the
flare-up that we saw yesterdayon Tuesday, uh also uh
escalation uh over a week agoafter two additional IDF
soldiers were killed in southernGaza and Israel launched
airstrikes um back then as wellacross the strip.

(20:37):
Um you're fair to say, youknow, optimistic that this will
still hold uh that Trump and histeam can apply enough pressure
on both Israel and Hamas to uhuh to keep it contained, uh to
get back on track, to keepreleasing uh the hostages.

Dan (20:51):
I'm I'm fairly optimistic that the the core of the
ceasefire can hold uh and thatneither side you know really
wants to get back into sort offull-scale fighting.
Uh there may be theseskirmishes and exchanges.
I'm you know, I'd say uh lessoptimistic that Hamas is gonna
fulfill its obligation on theremaining 13 uh deceased

(21:13):
hostages.
I think it will do ones andtwos uh and delay and claim they
don't you know know thewhereabouts or can't reach uh
all these kinds of things.
And and I certainly worry thatuh you know the final well,
there's not really gonna be afinal, but we're that it'll be
hard to get to zero, right?
There will always be two orthree or four that you know

(21:35):
either will be some you knowdispute about their whereabouts
or there'll be a generally aknown, or they will you know
have an incentive to keep thatwound open.
And of course that includes uhin all and every one of these
cases, it's it's tragic, ofcourse.
But it includes two American uhhostages, uh and uh and Itai
Khan.
Uh and it includes uh HadarGolden, uh whose uh remains were

(21:59):
were taken in 2014 uh during uhSuke Tan.
So uh you know there's a lot ofpain, uh psychological pain
that Hamas can generate and seesthat it maybe benefits from in
a sick way uh by dragging thisout and holding on to what it
can hold on to.

Neri (22:18):
Yeah, um and then it becomes a question uh how does
Israel respond if uh the thenumber doesn't go to zero, how
the Trump administrationresponds, what what's the fate
of the deal and in stage two?

Dan (22:29):
Right, and and Trump Trump just said a few days ago, 48
hours, you know, Hamas had torelease the you know all of
them.
Well, they didn't uh I don'tknow what the so what of that
is.
Uh I d he but he does not wantIsrael to go back into
full-scale fighting.
I don't think most Israeliswant to go back to full scale
fighting uh for you know theremains of thirteen hostages as

(22:49):
much as they need to come homeand as are the terms of the
deal.
But that's so that's achallenge, and you know, Hamas
is is is is adept at playing uhplaying those games when it has
that uh that that kind ofleverage, right?

Neri (23:01):
It most certainly is, uh not just over the past two
years, but uh in in years uhwell past that.
Um and the the issue of HadarGolden, too, uh the soldier who
uh who fell during the 2014Israel Hamas war, um it belies
any uh any realistic kind ofunderstanding that Hamas, who

(23:21):
had been holding his remains forover a decade, uh doesn't know
where they are.

Dan (23:27):
Not plausible.

Neri (23:29):
Yeah, it's not plausible.
Um out of anybody, he should heshould have been the first uh
to be returned.
And and the fact that Hamasdidn't, uh, like you said, it's
probably playing games becauseum they they certainly knew
where his remains were for overa decade.
Um yeah.
Uh Dan, um in terms of thefirst phase, uh we've also seen
what uh can only be called amajor diplomatic push uh uh by

(23:53):
the Trump administration uh youknow, first to begin
implementation of the deal andthen to continue implementation
of the deal.
Um but last week I think uhreached a new peak where we saw
this kind of uh it's not evenshuttle diplomacy.
It's called uh here in Israelthey called it like uh uh air
trade from uh DC to Ben GurionAirport.

(24:13):
Uh Jared Kirschner and SteveWoodkoff were here, uh Vice
President J.D.
Vance was here, and thenSecretary of State Marco Rubio
just left this past weekend.
Um so as a as a veteran of ofthese visits and these
diplomatic efforts, uh give ussome perspective.
Um is it really thatunprecedented?
Uh is it really uh as it's cometo be known, uh bb sitting to

(24:34):
make sure Netanyahu you knowadheres to the ceasefire and and
fulfills his end?
Uh or uh had this kind of thinghappened before?

Dan (24:42):
There's uh some precedent.
I'll sort of say what I thinkmaybe the closest precedent I'm
aware of is uh from from mytime.
But I look, first thing to sayis uh it demonstrates uh a
serious and high-levelcommitment to seeing this
ceasefire hold and to trying toget uh phase two uh underway.
And again, we'll get into moredetails about that.

(25:03):
Um and importantly, uh theyhave set up this civil military
uh coordination center with uh agroup of 200 or so U.S.
service members from uh CENCOM,U.S.
Central Command, led uh by uhtheir chairman, uh the commander
of Central Command, Admiral uhBrad Cooper, who I know very
well, um, who I'm not sure he'son the ground constantly, but

(25:27):
but has been on the ground asignificant amount of time to
help manage a lot of the phaseone implementation aspects and
the preparation for uh what theyhope will be phase two.
So there's a kind of anoperational piece of it.
But on the political side,obviously, the president coming
in with a very successful visit,warm visit, speech in the
Knesset, uh the day of the 20 uhliving hostages returning home,

(25:48):
uh, followed by uh all thoseother uh visits you mentioned,
uh is clearly a sign that youknow this has high level
attention and uh and and andthat's important, right?
I mean, I think one of theconcerns some have, I have, is
that over time President Trump'sattention uh will uh move

(26:10):
elsewhere.
And you know, he's thepresident of the United States,
he has a lot on his plate.
Um, and demonstrating that uhyou know the the political level
of this administration, andsince so much is uh handled top
down in this administration,that's really important, uh, is
focused and committed is a wayof getting all sides to stay

(26:31):
focused and committed to uh tokeeping it going.
Now, they can't sustain that,right?
You can't have the vicepresident and the secretary of
state there uh every day, everyweek.
Uh so we'll see how that howthat you know continues over the
time.
But uh certainly in those earlydays and and first couple of
weeks to try to make sure thatyou know violations and

(26:52):
skirmishes which are happeningon the margins of the ceasefire
don't uh escalate into some morefull-blown conflict, uh, that's
an important way of doing that.
And uh yeah, the the term BBsitting isn't one I'm using, but
uh there's clearly an elementof that, right?
There's clearly an element ofconcern that based on the fact
that Hamas is in some violation,based on the fact that this was

(27:15):
a hard deal to swallow, basedon the fact that there are still
elements of Netanyahu'scoalition and government who
oppose the original deal and uhwant to respond more strongly to
the fighting, uh, that makingsure that that political level
touch is uh keeping him focusedon staying in the deal and
moving forward, probably there'san element to that.
You know, I think it was 2012,which was sort of, you know,

(27:39):
still in my first year asambassador.
Uh I got there in the summer of2011.
So, but probably late spring,early summer of 2012 was a
period when you know we had somesignificant concerns that
Israel was uh activelyconsidering a military strike in
Iran.
Uh they were.
That was known, it became moreknown later, but it was

(28:00):
something we were obviously uhable to assess somewhat from
things they told us, somesomewhat from uh you know things
that leaked out or otherinformation.
And uh there was a period whenevery it wasn't back-to-back
kind of relay race style, butevery week to two weeks, uh for
a good two to three months, uh,we had uh cabinet-level visits,

(28:24):
Secretary of State, Secretary ofDefense, uh Director of the
CIA, uh senior special envoys,national security advisor coming
to Israel to continue thatconversation specifically, uh,
because we were still in a veryuh sensitive phase where we and
Israel had agreed uh muchearlier in Obama's first term

(28:45):
that we were going to try uhsanctions and uh holding out the
prospect of diplomacy uh to getIran to come to the table on uh
negotiating uh significantlimits on its nuclear program.
The sanctions were having aneffect, uh, even some military
options were being put in placein case they didn't work, but

(29:06):
the diplomacy had not yet begun,the Iranians had not yet come
to the table, and uh theIsraelis were worried that they
were going to lose their windowwhen their military option would
still be viable.
Uh, and so you know there was areal risk that they would take
that action.
So uh, you know, it it didn'tuh escape our uh, you know, uh
kind of analysis that uh if youhave every week or two a you

(29:30):
know cabinet level US official,the preparation for the visit,
the visit itself, the immediateaftermath of the visit, that's
probably buys you a week or twowhen it's not a very likely
window uh that you know thatdecision on uh uh on a military
strike that we you know wantedthem to wait on uh you know
wouldn't be taken because youknow they wouldn't want us to be

(29:50):
as implicated in it and that wemight be able to persuade them.
So uh there was some kind ofprecedent for that, but again,
you can't sustain that formonths.
uh at some point uh you have toget some more durable and and
more stable set ofunderstandings in place.
Uh but I you know I I I thinkthat was a that's a legitimate
tool uh for uh the United Statesto use in any relationship and

(30:14):
and particularly with the uniqueuh closeness of the US Israel
relationship.

Neri (30:18):
For sure.
And I don't think people shouldforget that uh in the early
months of the of this currentwar or you know the October 7th
war uh after the Hamas attack uhit wasn't like they didn't see
Biden and Patient officials atthe highest levels coming to
Israel I don't want to say on adaily basis, but you know almost
every week there was someonehere uh even sometimes sitting

(30:40):
in on on cabinet meetings uh anddeliberations so uh that's
right and you know that in thatpoint it was more about
supporting Israel in the crisisbut obviously there were also
tough decisions being made onwhether to attack Israel in
Lebanon on how to deal with thehumanitarian aid needs of Gaza
and so there was both supportand uh you know the ability to

(31:02):
express U.S.

Dan (31:03):
views that you know mean leverage or pressure if if uh if
we felt we needed to so that'sthat's something we've seen
before Israel Policy Forum is apolicy organization rooted in
the Jewish community.

Speaker 1 (31:17):
Our mission is to build support for a secure
Jewish democratic Israel througha viable resolution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict,advancing pragmatic U.S.
policy towards the conflict,U.S.
Israel relations and regionaldiplomacy among policymakers and
community leaders.
We promote policy measuresendorsed by credible security
experts, develop analysis andcommentary, and convene programs

(31:37):
that engage and educate leadersacross the political,
denominational and generationalspectrums.
Our Young Professionalsinitiative IPF a team works to
elevate the discourse among nextgeneration leaders by building
community and facilitatingengaging programs related to
Israeli-Palestinian affairs.
To learn more about our workvisit us online at
Israelpolicyforum.org and followus on social media.

Neri (31:58):
If you rely on Israel Policy Forum for credible and
nuanced analysis, please make atax-deductible gift today at
IPF.li slash support the pod orat the support the show link in
the show notes something that wemay not have seen before Dan
and it's something I've actuallythought a lot about uh over the
past two or three weeks thelike you said the civil military

(32:19):
coordination center sitting inKiyat Gat in southern Israel uh
200 US service members therecoordinating not only with the
IDF but also uh many otherpartner nations the UK Canada
Jordan um Egypt probably and andmany others uh sitting there
essentially um trying to figureout how to how to manage Gaza in

(32:39):
the postwar environment andalso obviously set up uh this
kind of new multinationalpeacekeeping force this is
really the internationalizationof the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict is it not I mean if youhad told me uh I want to say
three years ago that you'd haveUS service members you know
sitting in Israel trying to uhfigure out how to get a a

(33:01):
multinational peacekeeping forceinto Gaza um I don't know I'm
not sure Israel would have beentoo thrilled about that scenario
and uh I I don't know if I'dhave believed you.
Uh so I think that is in and ofitself unprecedented is is it
not?

Dan (33:16):
That is unprecedented uh and it's uh it's not clear you
know how successful it will beright because still there are
all kinds of hurdles to clear toget that phase two portion of
the 20-point plan implementedbut uh this is a major
investment uh by uh really youknow some of the most talented
parts of of the US system theseuh military uh planners and uh

(33:39):
civil military experts andthey've got numerous features uh
monitoring the ceasefire uhwhich I think includes
monitoring whether both sidesare abiding by the terms of the
ceasefire bit intrusive actuallyfrom the point of view of the
US Israel relationship butclearly something that uh Israel
has has uh decided they canthey can live with uh helping

(34:02):
with the delivery ofhumanitarian assistance to help
map the the routes and you knowimprove the flows uh and uh
support the uh creationdevelopment training ultimate
deployment of uh aninternational stabilization
force uh these are all thingsthe United States military is

(34:23):
very good at I mean there aregonna be a lot of other things
that are gonna be needed if ifwe get underway in phase two and
I'm concerned that some of theTrump administration's earlier
decisions on more or lessdisbanding USAID and a lot of
our other experts in developmentand post-conflict transitions
and things like that uh aregonna cost us because those are
also skill sets and andexpertise that we don't have as

(34:46):
much in in in good supply uhbecause of that.
But this yeah this is a majorreally important point.

Neri (34:52):
Right this is but this is a already even without that a
major investment obviously amajor footprint hard to think of
any precedent for that or thatit doesn't come without some
discomfort uh from uh manyIsraelis that the US is so
present that it will really haveyou know a veto or an ultimate

(35:12):
say uh on certain decisions butuh even with that said uh many
of the elements of phase two arestill well ahead of us and very
difficult uh I don't know ifyou want to switch to talk about
those but uh but we should yeahyeah no that was my my next
question uh especially like Isaid as someone who um was
dealing with uh post-warscenarios and trying to rally

(35:34):
support um especially around theMiddle East amongst uh Arab
governments for uh an activerole in in post-war Gaza uh now
that post-war Gaza is apparentlyupon us and discussions are are
ongoing and yet you know to thebest of my understanding
nothing has been fully decidedyet how uh optimistic are you
that these kind of heavy liftsecurity governance and other

(35:58):
issues related to phase two ofthe ceasefire deal um will
actually not only succeed but uhactually get off the ground?

Dan (36:05):
Right.
I'm very concerned I I mean uhthis isn't a criticism this is
just an analysis that uh this isgonna be very very difficult um
the key elements of phase twoof course are the disarmament of
Hamas and essentially itsremoval from from power uh the
reconstruction of Gaza uh to bepaid for by largely by Gulf uh

(36:27):
Arab states uh there are variousestimates from the World Bank
and the UN and EU run in therange of 50 billion to 70
billion dollars uh to do a kindof a full reconstruction of Gaza
so that the the population ofGaza can can live um the
creation of this internationalboard uh President Trump
currently chairing that boardmaybe Tony Blair having some

(36:48):
board uh some role but also theboard the board of peace uh also
having you know some kind ofoversight internet of the the
international uh governing uh orthe sorry the interim
transitional governance of Gazauh and that's supported by an
international stabilizationforce uh of probably Arab and

(37:10):
Muslim states uh andfacilitating the entry of more
moderate Palestinian governancewhether it's connected to the
Palestinian Authority or not asit goes through a reform process
a little bit gray a little bitmurky but even you know at the
end of that uh 20-point plan adiplomatic process between
Israelis and Palestinians on auh future and a political

(37:34):
horizon which acknowledges thePalestinian desire for a
credible pathway for aPalestinian state and that that
should be part of thisdiscussion.
That's all in the two pointplan uh 20-point plan.
Now just to back up youmentioned that uh I had
previously done some work on theday after planning.
In fact I was still at theState Department on October 7th

(37:56):
I was working on the regionalimmigration portfolio.
Obviously that unfortunatelygot very much shelved uh in the
immediate aftermath of the ofthe attacks and and the war
starting and I was asked to kindof lead an effort on day after
planning and I I insisted thatour kind of our one of our core
planning assumptions be thatunless Hamas was actually

(38:17):
defeated and actually removedfrom power and actually
disarmed, we really wouldn't getto a day after uh and that's
because I felt that no Israelileader, not Danyo and not
anybody else could withlegitimacy say to the Israeli
public after the horrificslaughters of uh slaughter of
October 7th worst attack on theJewish people since the

(38:37):
Holocaust that this Gaza warwill end more or less as all the
previous Gaza wars have endedwith Hamas battered and bruised
but clinging to power stillholding onto weapons and
ultimately trying to rebuild andand prepare for another round
unacceptable outcome.
And it certainly was in thefall of 2023 and it you know I

(38:58):
think for most Israelis it'sstill sort of an unacceptable
outcome the difference is twoyears have passed the exhaustion
the cost the unacceptably highcost it would have been to
actually continue this war forseveral more months in terms of
more dead hostages, more deadsoldiers, many more dead
Palestinian civilians, furtherisolation of Israel, Israel

(39:19):
getting stuck in a kind of apermanent occupation of all of
Gaza um and so we're stuck stillat the end of phase one with
that exact scenario that I saidwouldn't really allow us to get
into a real day after Kamal isbattered and bruised clinging to
power in now 47% of Gaza butstill potent enough.

(39:41):
Right consolidating its controlin that 47% absolutely using
using yeah right and so whateverweapons it has to attack Israel
it may still have you know somesmall store of rockets uh but
it certainly has enough smallarms to occasionally attack
Israel across the uh and I thinkKalashikovs and you know RPGs
and the things like that toattack Israel across the line

(40:02):
but really it's to consolidatecontrol uh internally and it's
47% and to really carry outthese just gruesome retribution
killings of uh of Palestinianswho they think have have opposed
their rule.
So that is disarming Hamas isreally the the key that unlocks
the ability to get to all thoseother elements of pay of phase

(40:24):
two.
If you can't get that done uhI'm not sure anything else
moves.
Uh I don't see uh Gulf statesbeing willing to invest
significant resources inreconstruction if Hamas is still
in power because they expectthere will be another war and
Israel will end up destroyingwhat is rebuilt.
I know from my laterresponsibilities in the Pentagon

(40:48):
talking to Arab governments andMuslim governments about their
participation in aninternational stabilization
force uh that they are veryunlikely to agree to come in if
the requirement is to fightHamas or disarm Hamas.
They're not going into thetunnels they're not uh taking
away the weapons um and I don'tsee a pathway for the

(41:10):
Palestinian Authority or someother you know more moderate
Palestinian governing structureto kind of take hold if Hamas
hasn't really been uh removed.
Um and so you have a conflictkind of in suspended animation
um but not a uh a very easypathway to get all those other
elements of phase two going ifHamas manages to uh to hold on

(41:32):
to those weapons and and can'tbe disarmed.
So how do we disarm Hamas?
That's the you know thecritical question and nobody has
a good answer to it.
I don't have a great answer toit.
There are probably only twoparties who would actually fight
Hamas sort of to the lastweapon which is Israel if it
needed to and for all thereasons earlier stated I think

(41:53):
even Israelis don't want to getback into that fight.
Or it's Palestinians.
It's Palestinians we've seensome of these clans or some of
these other small groups thathave done it on the margins but
probably don't have the strengthto really challenge Hamas uh
you know for full control.
The other alternative is thePalestinian Authority but
they're not ready uh they're notsufficiently reformed there's
of course not a full Israeliagreement on that but they would

(42:14):
need training and time and andpreparedness to put a force in
that could actually do that.
So you know all of thoseprospects are are way way in the
future how would you get Hamasto disarm you know earlier look
I think the tool that PresidentTrump exercised to get Hamas to
agree to what it had notpreviously agreed to which was

(42:34):
releasing all those hostageswhich was to motivate Qatar and
Turkey the two countries thathave the most influence over
Hamas Qatar because they're thepolitical support the host of
their leadership some financialsupport Turkey in a way again I
think was not sufficientlyexploited as a as a as an asset
here in the Biden administrationbecause of the ideological

(42:57):
connection.
Erdogan is a fellow traveler.
He believes in the MuslimBrotherhood cause which is you
know the Hamas cause and when hesufficiently motivated because
of his relationship with Trumpor whatever he was getting or
just because he felt the momenthad come was able to tell Hamas
this is the moment you have toget these hostages you have to
get this war over they made thisterrible a terribly difficult

(43:17):
decision to do things they hadsaid they would not do.
I think we've got to PresidentTrump has to use the same tool
uh and and use the same leveragewith those parties and maybe
more transactional deals withthose parties to get them to put
that kind of pressure on Hamasand then construct a a weapons
you know relinquishmentstructure and even an exile plan

(43:41):
for those uh Hamas fighters andand leaders that remain in
Gaza.
This is something I also feltwe should have worked on much
earlier.
There's some history to thisit's in the 20-point plan now
the idea of safe passage out ofGaza but in 1982 U.S.
diplomats arranged the exileand departure of about 14,000
PLO fighters from Beirut whenthe IDF had Beirut under siege

(44:05):
went to camps all around theMiddle East at some distance
from Israel.
This is not the same situationHamas is not the PLO they're in
what they consider theirhomeland they might be jihadists
willing to die in the tunnelsand yet properly pressured and
properly incentivized by the theparties they rely on for any
political or economic or freedomof movement oxygen which is

(44:28):
Qatar and Turkey and to somedegree Egypt I don't rule out
that you could get thoseremaining Hamas fighters and
leaders to say we're gonna youknow live to fight another day
from some other place.
That's a terrible way to thinkabout it.
And we'll probably continue topursue those people over time
but that is the sort ofnecessary key to unlock the a

(44:52):
pathway to getting the rest ofphase two underway.
So I I I think those are thethe tools that have to be
exercised and I'm concerned thatabsent that and I think
everybody's concerned about thisthat you're gonna we're gonna
have this kind of stasis and adrift and a kind of a low grade
conflict you know the thefreezing in place of Israel in
control of roughly half of Gaza,Hamas in control of the

(45:15):
remaining half, no realreconstruction happening, no
entry of international forcesand the seeds really being shown
sown for the next round of ofthe conflict just as I feared
you know would be the case andwas and remains sort of an
unacceptable outcome but maybewhere we are.
The the one caveat to this isthat you hear talk about well

(45:37):
maybe the reconstruction canstart in the 53% that Israel
holds some new new Gaza.
New Gaza it's being calledright I'm dubious uh I'm dubious
that uh the Arab states willinvest in reconstruction in an
area that is essentially underIsraeli occupation.
I'm dubious that uh Palestiniancivilians will move in any

(46:00):
significant numbers into thatspace uh the idea that that's
where they could live morepeacefully and start schools
that would teachde-radicalization and uh you
know get you know better uh flowof humanitarian systems or
something I just don't seesignificant numbers of
Palestinians wanting to move uhinside Israeli lines.
So you know it's a it's an ideauh it should be tested uh the

(46:24):
notion that you could prove toGazans that uh the better life
is available when not underHamas rule uh I suppose is
something that we hope is trueand uh Palestinians will want
and then help uh help achievebut I think it's very hard to
imagine either the investment orthe or the movement of the

(46:44):
population uh into that area atleast in the near term right um
and just on that point uh howIsrael would vet those people I
mean is it just women andchildren uh is it uh you know
like we know from from otherplaces you know uh uh boys under
the age of 17 and and older menover the age of 55?

Neri (47:05):
I mean is that going to be the criteria um and how
sustainable is is that really umbut uh very uh very sobering
but I I'd say very realistic uhoverview you just gave Dan um
and also uh the focus onsecurity and and really Hamas's
disarmament I think is criticaland will likely be the main
issue um if and when for thefirst phase kind of comes to uh

(47:29):
comes to completion.
I'm curious just to uh to beardown on this um on this issue uh
so you're essentially arguinguh that Turkey, Qatar and others
need to apply political andmaybe economic pressure on Hamas
to agree to things that itperhaps doesn't necessarily want
to agree to uh likedisarmament.

Dan (47:49):
Uh but then that disarmament okay you're talking
maybe about the heavier weaponsthe tunnels that you know
essentially they'll be like okayyou know get rid of these and
and then maybe we can uh we canmove forward is that fair I
think that's uh necessary uhobviously the tunnels are
essentially used for a militarypurpose moving fighters around

(48:12):
uh of course that's wherehostages were held moving
tunnels uh moving weapons evenmanufacturing weapons in those
tunnels uh you know it's notgonna be easy for Hamas to kind
of use them as they as theypreviously did especially Israel
controls still all the crossingso it's harder to get you know
materials in into Gaza butthat's a that's part of the
military infrastructure of Gazaand uh yeah so I think it's

(48:33):
cutter in Turkish pressure onrelinquishing the weapons and
departing at least some criticalmass of uh of Hamas fighters
and and remaining leaders um andthen you know then you could
come up with a a mechanism andan agreed party uh might be some
Israelis might be someEuropeans might be some Arabs

(48:54):
might be some others who couldgo in and sort of do the
technical piece of of destroyinguh or otherwise decommissioning
tunnels and and things likethat but you know not in a phase
when Hamas could be shooting atthem and and trying to fight
them and prevent them fromcoming in.

Neri (49:08):
Okay.
That's a good clarification.
Um I'm trying to kind of playthis out in my own mind.
Uh it's hard.
This is really hard it is hard.

Dan (49:17):
Yeah.
No criticism I mean that's notcriticism of of of President
Trump and his team.
You know I think what's laidout in the 20 point plan is are
are the steps we want to seeachieved but the key that
unlocks most of the rest of itis disarmament.
And the kind of proposal I justput out is the best one I can

(49:37):
come up with.
It's not great, but I don'tknow of a better one.

Neri (49:39):
Right.
Um but this has been an issuevis-a-vis Gaza now for many
years, even predating this war.
How do you actually shift Hamasout, undermine its rule, bring
in an alternative um it wasalways messy even before the
last two years of war and theyou know the the utter
destruction of of physical Gazatoo.

Dan (50:00):
And look let's let's be clear a critical element of this
is what the citizens or theresidents of Gaza decide.
It's hugely risky to take onHamas.
We've seen that in terriblybloody fashion and just in the
last couple of weeks and longbefore that.
But you know at some pointPalestinians saying we we we

(50:20):
want to get this albatross offour necks we want to get this
organization that has ruined ourlives out of our lives is also
a really critical element.
Now they could be supported andinspired and you know maybe
encouraged to take on that kindof risk and that kind of role by
some of these outside actors.
But I do think that's also acritical element also a very

(50:42):
difficult one to generate withsufficient force.
Right.

Neri (50:46):
And just to tie this up I think if I hear you correctly
Dan but I happen to agree withthe sentiment um this can't just
be a military or kinetic actionuh there has to be a kind of a
political arm to it to to pushHamas in the direction we we all
want them to go and that wewant Gaza to go into as well.

Dan (51:05):
That's 100% true and especially to get the Arab
states to really play the partsthey're supposed to play
reconstruction and and and uhinternational forces but also
even on the disarmament piecethe 20-point plan also contains
elements that they needed rightguarantees that we're Israel's
not talking about uh expellingthe population from Gaza or that
anybody who leaves couldn'treturn uh that Israel's not

(51:28):
planning to annex Gaza uhseparately outside of the
20-point plan President Trumphas said you know a red line is
uh annexing the West Bank theUAE that said that's a red line
but that President Trump saidit's not going to happen.
He's not gonna allow it tohappen uh because he promised
the Arab states it wouldn't.
And they want to hear thatthere's some willingness to

(51:48):
discuss a political horizonabout you know a credible
pathway to a Palestinian state.
At the moment that's not highon any Israeli's agenda for
perfectly understandablereasons.
And it'd be very hard to havethat discussion as Israel goes
into an election campaign whenyou know the prime minister will
probably be arguing to theIsraeli public, which is all
nearly across the boardskeptical or hostile to the idea

(52:10):
of a Palestinian state, youknow, I'm the leader that knows
how to resist that pressure andwho do you trust to prevent that
from coming into being DonaldTrump's best friend or some
rookies and some newbies and uhand he'll make that argument.
And even the opposition willprobably say yeah we're not for
that either.

Neri (52:26):
So if that's the discourse uh in an election year in
Israel that weighs heavily ongetting the Arabs to feel that
they're uh getting what theyneed to make the investments uh
different kinds of investmentsthat uh we need them to make
right uh Ninyahu has been uhputting out that message for 30
years uh it's usually worked uhfor him so I don't see him uh
changing uh in the coming monthsas we likely look at uh

(52:49):
elections here in Israel um bythe way Dan given all that with
regard to a political horizonfor the Palestinians um you know
future Palestinian statehoodand and and that issue uh if all
that is true do you then seethe prospect of further
normalization say between Israeland Saudi or Israel and other
Arab or Muslim states very lowuh despite the fact that the

(53:12):
Gaza war has now seeminglyended?

Dan (53:15):
I think uh it's uh not immediate, but I think those
opportunities are still verypresent and should be uh uh
seized and exploited as much aspossible.
Uh first of all there's severallayers to why they're present.
Uh among them is the dramaticweakening of uh Iran and its
access of uh of proxy terrorgroups uh because of US military

(53:38):
power well first because ofIsraeli military power and US
military power uh used over thelast two years uh and so that's
a huge opportunity to help thatyou know alternative coalition
of Israel, modern Arab states,all US partners, all members of
Central Command working witheach other to defend each other.
Frankly that integrationprocess in the defense sector

(53:58):
was still happening allthroughout the war and something
I really the opportunity tocontinue to work on at the
Pentagon.
But you know we know the Saudisuh continue to be open to uh
some kind of discussion on onnormalization.
Of course watch carefully uhMBS the Crown Prince of Saudi
Arabia will be in uh Washingtonon November 18th meeting with

(54:20):
President Trump an opportunityfor uh them to describe you know
that vision of what it lookslike for Saudi Arabia to take
that step uh President Trump mayannounce a security guarantee
for Saudi Arabia in that meetingjust as he has already
announced one for Qatar theseare done through executive order
so it's not the same as thefull mutual defense treaty we
were negotiating which we wantedto be a an accompanying

(54:43):
agreement to a normalizationdeal but I don't expect them to
announce normalization but maybethere's a way of signaling that
you know that that path isstill open.
You know other Arab partnershave said they're uh fortunately
the Abraham countries haveremained but other countries
have indicated they're open tothis both within the region and
and outside Indonesia mostprominently seems to be very

(55:06):
interested in in getting on thatpath but all this still has to
be tested right and and whathappens in Gaza uh and how you
know Arab publics are absorbinguh that news it's not the same
news as it was during the warwith pictures of casualties and
and and hungry kids necessarilybut but the the lack of progress
towards some better futurecould you know weigh heavily on

(55:29):
on people making real decisions.
Obviously what happens in theWest Bank uh where we've seen a
kind of a spike in in and someviolence by uh Israeli
extremists there uh could uhalso weigh heavily and I
mentioned the Israeli politicalfactors and and frankly
Netanyahu himself right he's uha figure uh of significant

(55:49):
controversy in uh the Arab worldand so it's plausible that MBS
or any other uh Arab or Muslimleader would say yeah I'm still
open to do this but it surewould be easier to do it uh with
a different Israeli leader orit sure isn't uh something a
gift I want to give to Netanyahuduring his election campaign.
Why don't we wait until 2027and see where we are?

Neri (56:10):
I hope uh Arab leaders are listening to this podcast.
Uh I think I think they are uhbut I hope they definitely take
on board that message Danbecause um uh in the past we've
also seen I think the Arabs uhmisread Israeli domestic
politics and then they'resurprised with the outcome even
though that outcome was heavilyinfluenced uh by certain

(56:31):
decisions that they that theytook in the past um and also you
know leaving aside Netanyahu uhdo you want to actually make
this deal with this specificIsraeli government right it's
not just Nyahu right there'sBanger and Smotrich are are part
of that government too.

Dan (56:43):
So I I think that's difficult.
Now of course I don't rule outthat Trump has more
transactional goodies in hispockets that you know he he did
that was how part of how theAbraham Accords came about F-35s
for the UAE which they neverultimately got but was sort of
promised Western Sahara forMorocco Bahrain didn't really
get much but I mean you knowhe's this is his style and he's
proven that it it has some valueand so maybe you know Arab

(57:05):
states who otherwise would bereluctant to move before there's
a better path than Gaza orduring his reelection might find
there's some other motivationthat says yeah I'll at least
signal or at least take apartial step maybe some
exchanges with the Indonesianswithout full uh normalization
and and opening of embassies.
I mean you can imagine partialsteps along the way even during
this period and and I'm for allof it, right?

(57:26):
I think we want to want to geton that path.
So I'm I'm I still think thoseopportunities are there, but you
know I also approach it with acertain degree of caution
because of uh the the thechallenges that I laid out.
Right.
Uh very important to beclear-eyed uh that this may not
be happening uh tomorrow despitewhat so you know is sold in in
various quarters both here andin other places um Dan uh last

(57:49):
question for you before wefinish up uh and it's a big one
uh Iran uh to your credit uhbefore Netanyahu decided to uh
launch airstrikes and missilesat Iran uh this past June uh you
actually did take the threat ofIsraeli and US military action
uh seriously and you said so uhduring our our last conversation

(58:11):
uh and a lot you took it a lotmore seriously let's say than
than many of us and I includemyself in that group so uh now
on the other side of uh the12-day war uh with this perhaps
new reality vis-a-vis Iran andits uh capabilities uh two part
question for you first um howsuccessful do you actually think

(58:31):
the 12-day war was uh indegrading Iran's uh capabilities
especially the nuclear programum and then second second part
of the question stemming fromthat uh what do you expect will
happen in the coming weeks andmonths uh on this front either
in terms of diplomacy either interms of potentially further
military action or either interms of just nothing uh so

(58:55):
you're right in your previousprediction so what do you think
will happen uh moving forwardpeople should always be uh
cautious about considering theirabilities to predict uh to have
improved just because they gotone right but look I no but uh
but uh people often forget uhthe correct prognostications
that people made um and thenkind of say oh well that it was

(59:18):
inevitable that that wouldhappen yeah well thank you I
look I I do think that it wasinevitable and necessary to
conduct military action againstuh Iran's nuclear program and I
thought it might take placelater in the year maybe after
the snapback sanctions thatoccurred around this time
frankly so I was a littlesurprised by the timing uh as I
probably you know indicated onthe previous podcast but uh not

(59:39):
by the need or by the ultimatedecision and I supported it uh
and I know very well the planthat President Trump uh ordered
the US military to carry out uhuh at the end of that 12 days uh
and it was you knowdramatically facilitated by what
Israel had accomplished in thefirst 11 days obviously Against

(01:00:00):
the leaders, against various uhkey sites, but especially
against the air defenses ofIran.
And uh there's no question uhthat that campaign by the two
militaries uh overall dealt avery significant blow to Iran's
uh nuclear uh program.
Uh there is no prospect of themusing those facilities uh that

(01:00:21):
that we struck and that Israelstruck uh anytime soon to do
enrichment uh or to doconversion or uh to do uh some
of the research that wasunderway.
Now that's those facilities.
So uh very meaningful, probablybuys, you know, it's hard to
know the exact amount of time,right?
Usually when we say, well, itset them back a year or two
years, that assumes that the dayafter the bombing, they would

(01:00:42):
immediately begin digging outand reconstructing what was what
was destroyed.
That's not realistic.
And there are lots of ways youcan add to that time through you
know sanctions, througheconomic pressures, through
political to dialogue, through,you know, maybe additional
strikes if necessary.
So I think there's asignificant amount of time put
on the clock uh when Iran is notanyway not going to be able to
be as close to a nuclear uhweapon as they were.

(01:01:05):
And they were much too closefor comfort, both on the
enrichment side and on theweaponization side.
So that's to the good.
Uh, but of course, this storyis not over, right?
They still have somecapabilities and some materials.
There's they still have thehighly enriched uranium, whether
they have access access to itor whether it's buried, we're
not totally sure.
Uh, we don't have inspectors inuh Iran right now to check

(01:01:26):
that.
Um there may always befacilities that uh we don't know
about, and that's certainly arisk that they you know set up
some undeclared site uh andretrieve that enriched material
and then do uh enrichment to 90%somewhere we haven't uh
haven't, we don't know about.
Certainly that risk uh exists.
And then of course there's thefact that even though they're

(01:01:48):
weakened, badly weakened, uh,and not just Iran, but the toll
access, you know, you have tosay they're down but not out.
Um and we've got to be vigilantthat they uh, at least at the
level of the Supreme Leader andyou know the immediate circle,
are still committed to the sameideology that's got them to this
point.
Uh that they have that hasdriven them to make just

(01:02:09):
enormous sacrifices, reallysquandering of massive
resources, probably approachinga trillion dollars worth over
decades to build that nuclearinfrastructure, to arm those
proxies, all for the purpose ofan ideological commitment to
destroy Israel uh and to drivethe United States out of the
Middle East and dominate theMiddle East.
So there's probably a debate.

(01:02:31):
In fact, people who knowinternal Iranian politics much
better than I do are describinga very significant debate that's
happening internally in thesort of closing chapter of the
Supreme Leader's life andleadership.
We don't know how much longerhe'll he'll be in that role, of
course.
But you know, should theydouble and triple down despite
the blows they've taken and youknow commit to uh the same

(01:02:53):
agenda uh and maybe even try todo it uh covertly on the nuclear
side and try to sprint to anuclear weapon uh in a way that
uh you know, sort of following aNorth Korea model?
Um or uh should they say, gosh,you know, look what this has
wrought for our country.
The country is in dramatic uheconomic distress, water

(01:03:16):
distress, power distress,societal distress.
Um maybe we should think abouta different path and a different
approach.
Uh, and maybe we could get someof the sanctions, the new
sanctions reimposed under theSNAPEC uh lifted.
Maybe we could get into somedialogue.
I think that debate is probablyhappening inside Iran, but it's
not settled yet.
Uh what do we need?

(01:03:36):
We need to try to continue touh obviously enforce all those
sanctions, the the old and therenewed.
Uh we need to try to get theinspectors back in so we have
some answers to those sort oftechnical questions about where
the material is and if it'sbeing uh used in any way.
Uh we need to try to get anegotiation underway if they are
willing, but driving toward youknow a much harder bargain than

(01:03:59):
Iran had ever agreed to.
I think where the Trump was onthe right, Trump administration
on the right track in theearlier negotiations, zero
enrichment, really an end tothat uh capability at any time
to produce nuclear weapons.
Um of course we have to holdout the possibility that either
the Israel or the United Statesmight need to take additional
strikes.
That's a uh that's a real uhhas to be a tool on the table uh

(01:04:21):
if if it's needed.
Um the last thing I'd just sayon this is that I mentioned the
you know, sort of transitionIran is heading toward, it is
heading toward a leadershiptransition at some point.
The Supreme Leader can't liveforever.
Um and I don't support orpropose regime change as a
policy to be executed by theUnited States and certainly not

(01:04:44):
Israel, you know, from as anexternal factor.
Um, but regime change iscertainly possible, uh, and
transition is certainly going tohappen, but a regime and regime
change is possible if theIranian people take matters into
their own hands and decide uhthat they want a better life,
and this is not the kind ofleadership that can deliver it.
And I do think we shouldalready now be doing the

(01:05:06):
planning to prepare for how theUnited States and a bunch of
other uh uh partners in and outof the region would help support
that transition and try tosteer it to the safest possible
outcome because there are a lotof different ways it could go.
Um, but uh, you know, we we caneven today be doing the things
we probably are doing some, andI think we should do more to
support the Iranian people inappropriate ways, their ability

(01:05:28):
to communicate over theinternet, uh, obviously calling
out uh the abuses of uh Iranianleaders and officials against
their people.
That can and should be beingdone now.
But uh you can prepare a planagain with some of those
post-conflict uh or transitiongovernance experts that we might
have already dismissed from theUS government.

(01:05:48):
But that expertise exists tosupport a transition, uh, you
know, think about how to help uha transition government in Iran
structure its institutions,reform its institutions and
structure them, uh, what kind ofassistance would be needed, how
to try to help ensure thatregional governments are able to
uh reassure uh a transitionalgovernment in Iran that uh they

(01:06:10):
would have support and couldavoid conflict if they would
take a certain set of uh stepsand a certain path.
So I think that preparation uhshould be happening internally
in the US government and andbetween the US uh and the allies
now.
Very hard to do because youdon't really know when you're
planning for.
You don't really know what thattransition is going to look
like.
As I said, it could go inmultiple directions, some even

(01:06:32):
more dangerous than the current,and some far, far better, and
could involve a lot of internalcombustion within Iran.
But uh, you know, regime changeplanning or how to support that
change when the Iranian peoplemake that decision, so that we
hopefully help steer it to oneof the better paths it could go
on is uh is a project we shouldbe engaged in now.

Neri (01:06:53):
Absolutely.
And uh just like planning forpost-war Gaza, it should have
been done uh yesterday, beforethe day after, um, and not two
days after the day after, likewe are in uh right now.
Um couldn't couldn't agreemore.
Uh and it's interesting, youknow, my my big takeaway from uh
what you just said in terms ofwhat the coming months and maybe

(01:07:13):
years will will bring is thatit really depends on what
happens inside Iran, less thandecisions necessarily taken in
Jerusalem or Tel Aviv orWashington.
Um it's you know kind ofdevelopments on the ground
inside Iran that will dictatewhere we go.
Uh it will.

Dan (01:07:29):
And and I yeah, there's been some good writing on this,
uh, particularly Kareem Sajadpuris a terrific piece in uh
foreign affairs on differentpathways that an Iranian
transition could go.
Uh and it's uh it's a hugechallenge, most of all for the
Iranian people uh to try to gettheir country on a path uh of a
better future uh internally andand with its neighbors.

(01:07:50):
Um and it could go a lot ofdifferent directions.
Yep.

Neri (01:07:53):
Um Dan, we're out of time, but thank you so much for
coming back on uh and layingeverything out uh for us.
And you know, I'm not evengonna say it, but uh, but yes,
this this episode will have a alarge longer shelf life uh than
the last one when um you know uha 12-day war uh broke out.
So um we will see you uhhopefully sooner rather than

(01:08:14):
later to discuss how uh all thethings you laid out in terms of
Gaza and the first stage and thesecond stage uh you know
actually transpires on theground.
So thank you again.
Thanks, Neri.
Appreciate it.
Okay, thanks again to DanShapiro for his generous time
and insights.
Also a special thanks to ourproducers, Jacob Gilman and
Aidan Jettleton, and to all ofyou who support Israel Policy

(01:08:36):
Forum's work.
Do consider making a donationto Israel Policy Forum, so keep
being a credible source ofanalysis and ideas on issues
such as these that we all caredeeply about, including this
podcast, of course.
And most importantly, thank youfor listening.