July 24, 2025 • 56 mins
On this week’s episode, Israel Policy Forum Policy Advisor and Tel Aviv-based journalist Neri Zilber and Israel Policy Forum Director of Strategic Initiatives and IPF Atid Shanie Reichman discuss the crisis inside the Netanyahu governing coalition over the ultra-Orthodox military draft issue, the chances of a snap election being called early next year, the status of the Gaza ceasefire talks, the escalation last week between Israel and Syria over spiraling inter-ethnic violence in the largely Druze part of southern Syria, American Jewish perceptions of Israel and the ongoing war, and more.
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Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Shanie (00:05):
Shalom and welcome to Israel Policy Pod.
I'm your host, Cheney Reichman,the Director of Strategic
Initiatives and of IPFFT atIsrael Policy Forum.
I'm joined by Neri Zilber, ajournalist based in Tel Aviv and
Policy Advisor at Israel PolicyForum.
Hi, Neri.
Neri (00:19):
Hi, cheney, great to be back with you.
Shanie (00:25):
Shani, great to be back with you, good to see you.
Today we're going to cover thespectacle in the Israeli Knesset
, prospects for a ceasefire,hostage deal and Israel's
engagement in Syria.
So are you ready to start?
Neri (00:33):
I am ready to start, and what we had in mind for this
week was this kind of not evenmidsummer but deep into summer
laundry basket, varioushodgepodge of various issues
domestic politics, gaza, syriabut, as always, shani, never a
dull moment here.
So it's not recently, but inthe not too distant past, even
(00:57):
here in Israel, the summer was aslower period, but, yeah,
nothing like that of the sortthese days, for obvious reasons.
So, looking forward to to tryto break it all down for for our
listeners and our viewers.
By the way, a reminder, we arealso a video podcast, so you can
check us out on youtube and notjust on the various podcast
(01:18):
platforms that you've beenlistening to us, uh.
So check it out, subscribe and,yeah, content should be the
same, but you get to see ourfaces, and usually it's the
guests' faces are beautiful thisweek notwithstanding.
Shanie (01:34):
And you can also catch some clips on Instagram if you
follow Israel Policy Forum onInstagram With that.
Neri (01:40):
Very important.
Shanie (01:41):
Very important United Torah Judaism.
Just to start off with theknesset stuff, as always, united
torah judaism is theultra-orthodox ashkenazi party,
not to be not to be confusedwith shas.
The mizrahi party left thecoalition in protest of the
government's failure to pass alaw exempting ultra-orthodox men
from military service.
This has been an ongoing dramafor years, decades, between the
(02:04):
ultra, the ultra-Orthodoxparties and sort of everybody
else.
Now Shas has also quit thegovernment, but they stay in the
coalition, which I don't reallyknow what that means.
Maybe you can tell me.
All of this is a verylong-winded way of asking will
there be an election and how dowe know?
Neri (02:21):
So that's a good setup, shani.
Yes, some drama over the pastweek in domestic Israeli
politics.
The ultra-Orthodox, the Haredis, essentially left the
government Again.
Have they left the coalition?
This is like a Talmudicdisputation.
When does a party actuallyresign from the government,
(02:42):
resign from the coalition?
When is a government a minoritygovernment?
Can it be both a minoritygovernment and not a minority
government?
It's a strange animal at themoment, the current Netanyahu
governing coalition, and I'llexplain why in just a second.
But yes, they've essentiallyleft in a huff in protest at the
(03:02):
fact that this coalition hasnot provided them with a get out
of jail free card, notliterally, it's get out of the
IDF free card, basically anexemption for their young boys
and men to not have to serve.
Now, again, we don't have to goback to the very beginning and
into the weeds of this issue.
But, yes, you're right, thishas been going on for years,
(03:24):
shani, and every time the canhas kicked down the road,
there's never been a realsolution, primarily because, for
the vast majority of this time,benjamin Netanyahu has been
prime minister and BibiNetanyahu owes his entire
political comeback back in 2009and longevity through successive
elections, successivecoalitions, successive coalition
(03:48):
crises, etc.
To the Haredim, to theultra-Orthodox.
They're really his safety netthe Haredis, that and basically
his core base of support insidethe Likud party, but in terms of
the broader Knesset, theparliament, it's the Haredis.
So now their patience has runout, for the most part, but not
(04:11):
completely, because at thebeginning of this government,
way back in late 2022, when wewere all much younger and it was
much simpler times, they wonthe election and they were
promised by Netanyahu and thisgovernment to pass a real law
that would exempt them, theirboys, from service.
(04:32):
That never happened for avariety of reasons.
Number one the judicialoverhaul overtook everything
else, so that was a big as yousay here, balagan big chaos.
By the way, the judicialoverhaul was meant to pave the
way to legally allow theultra-Orthodox to get this bill
passed, but obviously that wasstalled back in 2023 due to the
(04:55):
efforts of the Israeli people onthe streets.
And then, obviously, october7th and the war overtook
everything else, at least for ayear or so, before everything
came, came roaring back, uh, andreally netanyahu has been able
to deliver, uh, that bill forthem.
Uh, for two reasons.
Number one uh, the person withhis hand kind of on the uh, on
(05:17):
the remote uh is yuli edelstein,who, until about an hour ago,
was the head of the veryimportant Knesset committee, the
foreign and defense committeein the Knesset, and so basically
, the bill had to go through hiscommittee and he he's, by the
way, part of the Likud party,he's the chairman of the
committee and he was refusing toplay ball.
(05:40):
He actually wanted toostensibly pass something with
teeth that would get asignificant number of Haredis
into the military and, if not,then to pass a bill that had
actual teeth to sanction thedraft dodgers and the, let's say
, the overall ultra-Orthodoxcommunity Basically sanction
them personally.
Things like travel ban youcan't leave the country, you
(06:01):
can't take out a license andcollectively to free subsidies
to various yeshivot and schoolsand the like that were not
abiding by the law.
Basically, that never got offthe ground either and, like I
said, an hour ago, yuliEdelstein was dismissed as the
(06:22):
head of this committee byNetanyahu and basically a Likud
loyalist, a stooge, boaz Misput,was put in charge of this
committee with the eye basicallyto paving the way for a bill to
be passed through the committeeand then by the Knesset to give
the Haredis what they want.
Now, hold that thought for justa second.
(06:43):
It's an open question whetherBoaz Bismut and this rearranged
committee will actually get thejob done, but basically the
Haredis have not yet beenplacated, so they left.
So UTJ, the Ashkenaziultra-Orthodox party, united
Torah Judaism, left everything.
They quit the government andleft the coalition.
Shas left the government, butnot the coalition, and both
(07:06):
parties made it clear thatthey're not going to play ball
with the opposition to eitherreplace the current government
in the current Knesset oralternatively, and more likely,
work with the opposition totrigger early elections.
So that's why I say that youneed a kind of a Talmudic
scholar which the Haredis willnot provide us, to actually
(07:27):
figure out what they're doingand what they actually did.
You know officially, butbasically this is a play by them
to show Netanyahu that they'rereally, really, really unhappy.
And now Netanyahu has respondedand at least is making a move
towards trying to draft a billmore to their liking.
(07:48):
Now, the important thingthroughout all of this, shani,
as you all know, the calendar.
So this is the last week wherethe Knesset is in session for
this Knesset session, and thenall of our dear leaders in
parliament will be going on avery languid summer, and then
all of our dear leaders inparliament will be going on a
very languid summer and thenrecess, so they're only going to
(08:09):
be back in three months,basically mid-october.
So nothing can really be done,not really until mid-october uh,
not passing this law.
So they'll be working to draftsomething, I suppose, in
committee during the recess, andyou can't, more than likely,
trigger an early election duringthe recess.
So Netanyahu has succeeded inachieving total victory, not in
(08:34):
Gaza or various other fronts,but over the calendar, and
Netanyahu essentially has playedout the clock very successfully
and gotten to the safe harborof the recess without anyone,
whether the ultra-Orthodox orthe far right or the opposition,
being able to kind of combineforces and trigger, a, the
(08:58):
dissolution of the Knesset andthen, b, early elections, and
that's what Netanyahu was reallygoing for.
So again, when theultra-Orthodox left the
government quote unquote lastweek, everyone knew it didn't
really matter because thegovernment, and really the
Knesset, wasn't going to bedoing much of anything over the
coming three months, and so thiswas a more symbolic move by the
(09:21):
ultra-Orthodox.
And then again Netanyahuresponded, basically this
afternoon and recording this, onWednesday afternoon, tel Aviv
time by getting rid of YuliEdelstein, a dramatic move we
should note for everyonelistening and watching a highly
unpopular move by Netanyahu totry to do this.
(09:41):
You know, 80% of the Israelipublic, including major major
parts of the Likud and the farright parties who send their
boys and girls to serve, want tosee a more equitable
distribution of the burden ofconscription into the IDF.
And so when you do somethingwhere you only have something
(10:03):
like 20% support amongst thegeneral public for it like
getting rid of Yuli Edelstein ina bid to get basically a draft
dodging bill through committeeand then through Knesset, it's
really just a move by Netanyahuto placate the Haredim.
Again, we can maybe get into itin just a minute, but it likely
won't work either.
Again, we can maybe get into itin just a minute, but it likely
(10:24):
won't work either.
But this is essentially whatwe've been dealing with inside
the Netanyahu coalition andgovernment over the past week
and really over the past hour ortwo.
Shanie (10:33):
What do you think is the likelihood that this actually
leads to the dissolution of thegovernment before?
Neri (10:43):
Remind me when it's supposed to actually end their
four-year term.
Well, officially, elections aresupposed to be held in the fall
of 2026, so a little over ayear Before all this happened.
The smart money here in Israelwas that elections would likely
be moved up to basically spring,summer of next year, because it
would be very difficult to passa budget in an election year.
(11:05):
And then, after the Haredispulled this schtick and this
trick over the past week, thenthe smarter money was, yeah,
there's probably going to bedissolution of the Knesset and
early elections, really inOctober, early November of this
year, and so we're looking mostlikely at elections January,
(11:27):
february, march, timeframe ofnext year, like really the
beginning of the year.
But it just goes to show you, Ithink and I told this to some of
our colleagues yesterday I wassurprised that Netanyahu did
this right, because it's sounpopular, as I said, and julie
edelstein had been sitting thereand, um, you know a thorn in
netanyahu's side for months nowand uh, he, he didn't get rid of
(11:52):
him, didn't go to vietnam,edelstein, until today.
So it shows you, I think, howscared netanyahu is of facing
the israeli voting public, thatat least in theory, he's going
to try to buy himself a few moreweeks, or a few more months in
power until early elections aretriggered, and so this, I think,
was the rationale for trying todo this.
(12:12):
I don't think he's going topass an actual bill, right?
You're not going to pass a billexempting the Haredim from IDF
service a few months before anelection or in an election year.
Let's put it that way.
It's deeply, deeply unpopular.
And to square the circle ofpassing something with teeth
will just piss off the Haredim.
(12:33):
So he doesn't want to do thatfor the reason that I mentioned
at the top.
They're his real safety net.
So I think this move to make itseem like he's working towards
some kind of bill to the hardy'sliking is a is a play by
netanyahu to essentially buyhimself more time once the
(12:53):
knesset comes back in october,to placate the hurting for a few
more weeks.
Like I said, a few more months,uh, and then, and only then, to
actually go to elections.
That that's my bestunderstanding because, like I
said, I didn't quite understandwhy Netanyahu was doing this in
terms of the Knesset committee.
Shanie (13:11):
Nery.
Obviously there's a lot more toit than this, but from where I
sit, firing someone important,even when it's deeply unpopular,
seems like something Netanyahudoes pretty consistently.
Over time, I've seen him kindof do that again and again, even
when right firing the defenseminister caused massive riots in
the street, so he doesn't seemto shy away from firing people,
(13:32):
even when they're very importantand even when it upsets the
Israeli public.
Neri (13:36):
So fair point counterpoint when he fired Gallant back in
what was it?
March of 2023, during the majorupheaval internally regarding
the judicial overhaul, that wasa miscalculation by Netanyahu.
So, yes, he fired Gallant andthen, a day or so later, he had
to Walk it back Right and helearned his lesson from that to
(14:00):
go head to head with the Israelipublic on an issue that was so
deeply unpopular.
And again, you know Galant'sfiring back then.
There was no plausibledeniability that it was about
anything else other than thejudicial overhaul and Galant
warning about a clear andpresent danger to Israeli
national security if thiscontinued.
(14:21):
Galant, sadly, was provencorrect.
What?
Five, six months later, onOctober of 2033.
But in the meantime, netanyahufired Galant last fall and there
wasn't a major pushback by theIsraeli public.
(14:41):
Again, for a variety of reasons, he's fired other people, like
you said.
Shanie (14:43):
Attorney.
Speaker 3 (14:44):
General.
Neri (14:45):
Well, he's tried to, trying to, again, he's tried to
and it's again.
Are they really trying to firethe Attorney General?
Do they know that the SupremeCourt will block the firing of
the Attorney General?
So he lets his ministers kindof play at firing the attorney
general Again?
I think the Israeli publicwould come out on the streets if
she were truly fired and if thegovernment, let's say, directly
(15:12):
disavowed and disregarded aSupreme Court ruling on
something that critical, I thinkthe Israeli public would come
out because they understand thestakes.
But getting back to YuliEdelstein, yeah, they fired a
Connecticut committee chair thatprobably a large portion of the
public has never heard of,because we talk about this stuff
(15:32):
.
But, again, the general publicisn't in this on an hourly basis
like we are, and no bill hasbeen passed yet.
So he still has plausibledeniability that, oh, we're
going to work towards areasonable bill that will get
the Haredis into the military,which is what Netanyahu is
putting out publicly, right.
He's not saying, oh, we'regoing to pass a bill that's
(15:53):
going to exempt all the Haredis.
He's saying no, we're going tofind something equitable.
He's still kind of playing thatgame, at least outwardly, uh,
and in terms of his messaging uh, so can I say, you know,
replacing a classic committeechair, fine, but again, in terms
of the voting public, uh, if itcomes to it, it'll do him
damage.
So he's, I think, banking onthe fact that, uh, three months
(16:16):
from now, the connective willcome back.
There'll be other crises, I'msure, other issues.
He'll try to spin it in acertain way.
People will forget, and thenwe'll see if they actually try
to pass something asostentatious and as ridiculous
and as deeply unpopular as abill to the heart he's liking.
(16:38):
So, yeah, he did it, I think,for more internal kind of
coalition maintenance, to showthe Haredim that he was doing as
much as he can in their favorAgain, to buy time on the other
side of the contestant recessand maybe with an eye to a
future election where he likelybelieves he can at least have a
(17:02):
chance at winning.
And then he'll need the Haredimonce again.
Shanie (17:08):
Yeah.
Moving to the potential forhostage ceasefire negotiations
in Gaza, it seems they are backon again in their on again, off
again situation.
Israeli minister andnetanyahu's confidant slash, bff
, ron durmer, is supposed tomeet with mid-east envoy steve
wickhoff to discuss some kind ofplan that will get us out of
(17:32):
this war.
What are the main stickingpoints here?
Because, as we both know andall of our listeners know, this
has been ongoing since the lastceasefire broke down in January.
Neri (17:43):
It has.
And we should remember that,basically, a similar deal was on
the table back in what March interms of kind of moving ahead
with the next phase, again, thisphased ceasefire deal.
That was Israel's decision, notanyone else's decision, to have
it in phases.
So, yes, netanyahu neverfulfilled the second phase of
(18:06):
the previous ceasefire, whichlikely would have forced Israel
and Netanyahu to end the war.
So now we're back at these kindof temporary truces again with
an eye to extending it towardssomething more permanent.
I mean some context right.
So, yes, the negotiations gotmore serious earlier this month.
Again, talking about thecalendar, I don't think that's a
(18:29):
surprise, shani.
I don't think it's a surprisethat talks are ramping back up,
just as the Knesset is rampingdown.
Again, domestic politics abovemost other considerations when
it comes to this prime minister.
So, yes, the talks made abreakthrough earlier this month.
I never bought into the ideathat a deal was imminent.
(18:49):
Say, two weeks ago that wassome of the spin that we were
hearing, because there werestill a few more weeks left in
the Knesset session.
But, more to the point, therewere still a lot of details to
figure out and not minor details.
Now, again, according to thepeople I've spoken to, a lot of
(19:10):
the gaps have been closed, sothey are close to a deal and,
unlike previous conversationsthat I've had with you, shani,
and other podcast guests, I'mstill actually optimistic that
there will be a deal.
I think both sides understandthat now is the correct time to
at least halt the war for theproposed 60 days.
Again, for different reasons,both Hamas and Israel would take
(19:34):
that deal, I think, at thecurrent moment.
But in terms of the stickingpoints, look, the biggest
sticking point is the guaranteesor not that Hamas has been
provided by the Trumpadministration, and less so by
Qatar and Egypt and the othermediators, that this will
actually lead to an end to thewar after 60 days.
(19:55):
They've gotten some kind ofguarantee from the Americans,
but nothing concrete, basicallywording to the effect that the
ceasefire will be extended ifnegotiations towards a permanent
end to the war are ongoing andin good faith and constructive
and something along those lines.
Right, so you can extend theceasefire.
(20:16):
That's a guarantee that Trumpgave Hamas, a guarantee that
Trump gave Hamas.
But the biggest sticking pointin terms of getting into the
first 60 days is again, to thebest of my understanding,
according to the people I'vespoken to the extent of the IDF
withdrawal from Gaza during the60 days and we have to remember
that at this point the IDFcontrols most of Gaza.
(20:39):
By the IDF's count, about 75%of the territory.
So basically you have a lot offorces not on every square inch
of the territory but controllingabout 75% of the territory.
Basically, 2 million people inGaza are now for the most part
located in three enclaves, sobasically Gaza City, the central
(21:02):
camps, including Deir el-Balak,and then just a bit further
south, kind of the Mawassihumanitarian zone and bits of
Khan Yunus.
That's it.
That's it Again.
A few thousand here and thereand other places that the IDF
controls, but that's pretty muchit.
So where the IDF will move backto is not a minor point and I
(21:24):
think Hamas is quibbling aboutthat.
Some other minor points theidentities of the quote-unquote
heavier prisoners sitting inIsraeli jails, ie terrorists
that Israel will have to releaseas part of the hostage for
prisoner and ceasefire exchange.
So I think the lists are beingkind of drafted as we speak.
(21:47):
I think the ratio, the numberof Palestinian prisoners to each
hostage, whether alive or dead,they've kind of figured that
out due to past precedent, sothat's less of an issue.
Aid in terms of humanitarian aid, less of an issue.
I know there have been somereports.
Well, there are reports all thetime in the Western media, in
(22:10):
the Israeli media, in the Arabmedia about this negotiation and
a lot of it is spin put out byone of the various parties to
either promote their interestsor spit it in a certain way.
Take it with a grain of salt,but aid isn't a big issue.
We know that the old model, viathe UN and other international
(22:31):
aid organizations, is going tobe ramped up during the 60 days
and that's obviously all for thegood, given the very, very dire
humanitarian situation in Gazaright now, as we all know.
So I think we're close.
I think, well, I think, slashknow that a lot of people
(22:52):
involved in negotiations are nowblaming Hamas for dragging
their feet, and I think Hamasare playing games over the past
week, trying to kind of maximizethe concessions they're going
to get, or think they're goingto get, from Israel and in
return, israel has ramped up themilitary pressure on Hamas.
So some of our listeners may beaware that the IDF sent troops
(23:14):
and tanks into Dir el-Balak incentral Gaza.
That's not a minor move by theIDF.
There's a reason why Direl-Balakh and the other central
camps, as they're called, havebeen pretty much untouched by
ground forces over the past 21months, and it's not because the
IDF, for whatever reason,wanted to spare central Gaza.
(23:38):
It's because well, it's not asecret anymore the hostages are
being held there.
So they sent forces intosouthern Deir el-Balak to apply
more pressure on Hamas, to focusHamas minds to come to the
negotiating table in, I guess,not good faith, because they're
Hamas and a bunch of gangstersand terrorists, but better faith
(24:00):
than they've been showing overthe past week.
And that obviously drew a lotof alarm and anger and criticism
by the hostage families because, I would argue rightfully, it
imperils the hostages that arebeing held in that general area.
Let's hope the IDF has goodintelligence about where exactly
(24:22):
they're held and what they'redoing in central Gaza.
So again you have this kind ofHamas dragging their feet, the
IDF ramping up both militarypressure and threats, basically
rhetoric, with the hope thatit'll essentially get Hamas back
with a reasonable proposal andthat the mediators, whether
(24:44):
Steve Woodcoff and the Qatarisand Egyptians, can kind of close
the deal.
Like I said, I'm moreoptimistic than not, but again
we have to kind of be clear-eyedabout what this means and
doesn't mean ride about whatthis means and doesn't mean.
(25:06):
I think everyone would be veryhappy if the war was halted for
60 days at least and thathostages came home, especially
at least half of the remaining20 that are still believed to be
alive.
And well, there's going to be anumber of the hostages that are
deceased will also be comingout during the 60 days,
according to the terms of thedeal.
But these are almost like theeasy negotiations, right, cheney
(25:29):
?
This is like the appetizer towhat will be a terrible main
course, which will be the actualnegotiations that are
stipulated in terms ofpermanently ending the war and
releasing all the remaininghostages.
And those negotiations aregoing to be I mean, I can't
curse on this podcast because weare nothing if not a family
(25:51):
podcast but it's going to bevery, very difficult because
Netanyahu has made clear that hewants Hamas to essentially
surrender, lay down their arms,demobilize, even maybe exile
some of the leadership I mean,there's only a handful of
leaders, well-known leaders,left.
That's his demand, and Hamas'sdemand obviously will be not
(26:14):
that they want to still leveragethe hostages to A survive and B
end the war.
Still leverage the hostages toA survive and, b end the war.
So I don't know how you squarethat circle, but those
negotiations are supposed tostart immediately once the
initial 60-day truce is supposedto start, and that's going to
be very, very difficult to cometo terms.
(26:37):
But you know we'll, as an oldfriend used to say, we'll blow
that bridge up when we get to it.
So uh, so uh.
We TBD, uh, tbd, as the kidssay, uh.
And then one final point on theon the hostage stocks.
Shani, uh, this is something Iheard.
(26:57):
It's not confirmed because thenumbers, I think, are still in
flux.
I think they're more in fluxthan people realize.
But in terms of the number ofhostages that are supposed to
come out during the 60 days andhow many kind of phases and
installments are supposed totake place, the initial proposal
, as put forward, called forfive phases and something like
(27:18):
eight hostages coming out livehostages coming out in the
beginning, and then, I think,two live hostages coming out on
day 50.
And in between, I think, 18deceased hostages, their bodies,
coming out.
So that was the initialproposal as we came to
understand it.
That may not be the finalproposal that we see if and when
(27:41):
a deal is closed, I'll kind ofleave it.
That may not be the finalproposal that we see.
If and when a deal is closed,I'll kind of leave it at that.
But there may be a slightlydifferent formula.
That again, I mean 10 livehostages should be coming out,
but maybe initially, and then 10live hostages maybe will be
proposed to come out on day 60or 61 if there's a final deal.
(28:04):
That's something I heard and Ireported and I think it speaks
to the idea that it's not finaluntil it's actually final.
Shanie (28:14):
Basically, a deal.
Yeah, Thanks for that, Narek.
Neri (28:18):
So yeah, I mean, you know again, I hope this is good news
and, like I said, we'rerecording this on Wednesday.
Witkoff is supposed to be inRome on Thursday, so tomorrow,
to meet with Dermer and, Ibelieve, a Qatari and Egyptian
envoy, and then if Witkoff hearswhat he wants to hear, or sends
(28:40):
the message to Dermer andothers that needs to be sent,
then Witkoff will continue on toDoha.
And we've been hearing for welltwo weeks now that if Witkoff
actually shows up in Doha, thecapital of Qatar, where the
talks are being held, then thatwill be a sign that we're
(29:00):
actually pretty close to a deal.
And let's hope, shani, let'shope.
Okay, we'll be right back afterthis brief message.
Speaker 3 (29:09):
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(29:51):
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Shanie (30:05):
Yeah, we'll look forward to seeing that news.
Moving to Israel's northernborder, Israel's gotten a lot of
criticism lately, includingfrom the Trump administration,
for involving themselves alittle too much in Syria.
While most of the Western worldis taking a wait-and-see
approach with Ahmed al-Sharra'snew government in Syria, Israel
(30:25):
is putting its thumb on thescale by attacking them,
partially in reaction to attackson the Druze community in Syria
.
What's the logic here, whenSyria's new leader has pretty
clearly indicated he's notinterested in fighting with
Israel and has also indicated alevel of openness to negotiating
some kind of agreement withthem?
Whether or not you believe him,why stir the pot preemptively?
Neri (30:48):
Why stir the pot?
Great question.
Look, I'll be facetious tobegin with and then serious
subsequently.
Facetiously, it's been a monthsince the Iran war, so there's
only been one front, gaza, goingon.
So people here got bored.
(31:09):
There was what I call thetwo-day war with the new Syrian
government last week, and thenit stopped and we'll get into
the reasons why it stopped.
But, yeah, it was too quiet,shitty, basically.
So why not?
Why not start a relatively newand open front, uh, in syria?
You know why not?
Um, more seriously, look, uh,I'll give you the official
(31:33):
version and then we'll get intothe problems with the official
version.
The official version by thisisrael since December, when
al-Shara, formerly known asJolani, and his rebels took
Damascus and toppled the Assadregime, is twofold.
Number one Israel will notallow southern Syria to turn
(31:54):
into a, I guess, armed launchingpoint for potential attacks in
future against Israel, ie theGolan Heights and the
communities there.
Right, so Israel moved in,seized territory, right,
essentially, there's a securityzone, a buffer zone, at least 15
kilometers into Syria,basically from the Golan Heights
(32:15):
in, since, since December, Imean their IDF forces, their
nine outposts, I mean they'reholding territory inside syria.
Uh, what are we?
July, sorority for almost eightmonths.
That's number one.
So israel wants to kind ofuphold, uh, by force, this new
doctrine.
That's not unique to syria.
(32:36):
It's same thing as playing outin lebanon, in the west Bank and
obviously a very active way inGaza, which is forward defense,
forward defense and defensethrough offense.
This is a lesson coming out ofOctober 7th you don't just
defend on your borders, you, ifneed be, take territory in enemy
(32:56):
territory and then you attackfrom there and obviously from
the air and through intelligence, a lot more aggressive doctrine
.
And that's not by mistake, notby mistake and again, not unique
to Syria.
So that was the first, shall wesay, policy red line by Israel
(33:18):
and again it's not unique to theNetanyahu government.
I think it has buy-in amongstlarge parts of the security
establishment as well.
But the second issue wasprotection of the Druze in
southern Syria and the Druze areobviously an important minority
and a beloved minority here inIsrael.
(33:38):
The Druze are integral membersof the IDF, so they send their
boys to serve in the IDF.
You know, you've had prominentDruze politicians in various
quote unquote Zionist parties.
So the Druze are, shall we say,blood brothers that's the term
(33:59):
used here because they fight andthey fall alongside the other
IDF soldiers and have been fordecades, right since really the
beginning of the state.
So what happened last week isthat basically I mean to make a
long story short there was anattack on a Druze trader,
(34:24):
merchant Unclear, in southernSyria by local Bedouin clans.
That led to kind ofintercommunal fighting between
the Druze and the local Bedouinsin southern Syria, in Jabal
al-Druz, pretty much Suwaita,which is the predominantly Druze
city in southern Syria.
(34:46):
And in retaliation, or again,depending on who you ask, either
in a bid to quell the unrestand separate the two sides or in
a bid to side with the Bedouinand attack the Druze, shara from
Damascus sent his, I mean, andthey got into all kinds of
clashes and fighting with theDruze.
(35:24):
Allegations I think pretty wellfounded, that they were killing
civilians, obviously,infamously, they were capturing
Druze and shaving mustaches ofprominent elders in these
communities and that triggered amajor Israeli response, not
just striking al-Shara's forcesin Soweta but, as we all know,
(35:48):
striking at the heart ofDamascus, hitting the defense
ministry, hitting next to thepresidential palace really heavy
stuff, really heavy stuff.
And again that went on for twodays before the Trump
administration came in and saidyeah, this needs to stop.
So al-Shara's forces withdrew.
Israel was forced to allow themback in on a certain level by
(36:09):
the Trump administration.
Israel stopped bombing Damascusand basically they figured out
some tenuous ceasefire betweenthe Druze and the Bedouins down
there to restore calm.
That's pretty much the long andthe short of it.
The problem and we get to kindof the criticism of Israeli
government, the position and thepolicy is why are you involving
(36:32):
yourself so deeply in this kindof intercommunal,
inter-confessional fighting in aneighboring state?
How far do you want to take it?
Are you going to send theGolani Brigade into Soweta, into
the Jewish community, to go andprotect them?
Is it just going to be from theair?
Are you going to continue doingthis?
(36:53):
And bigger picture and this iswhy Israel stopped bombing
al-Shara's forces in DamascusTrump administration was really
upset, really upset, becausetheir policy, their position, is
they're trying to supportal-Shara, they want to keep
Syria unified, they want him toestablish control over various
(37:16):
or all of the country uh,something that he doesn't have
not by a long shot, um, aftereight months and so they want to
see him succeed.
Uh, israel, I think you know, ifnetanyahu was here with us
today he'd be like I don't careabout a unified syria, I want
syria to be fragmented and weakand not pose a threat to israel
and have it be this kind offailed state that we can, um,
(37:41):
either either mold to our likingor bomb when needed.
Uh, that's not what theamericans want to see, that's
not what, uh, the turks want tosee, that's not what the gulf
arabs want to see.
So israel was uh, out on anisland with this very aggressive
policy and again it speaks tookay, you can have these red
lines, but A what are you goingto do to actually enforce them?
(38:03):
Do you have internationalsupport and backing to do that?
And what's the downside if youdon't?
And two, just the resources andcontinuing to hold territory
inside Syria the damage,potentially, of getting
intimately involved in aneighboring civil war.
Israel doesn't have a greattrack record of that, dating
(38:24):
back to Lebanon in the late 70sand 1980s.
The Lebanese civil war drewIsrael more and more in, leading
up to a 20-year occupation ofSouthern Lebanon and many dead
IDF soldiers.
So again you can have this kindof post-October 7th doctrine,
(38:44):
very aggressive doctrine, but ithas to be, I think, smart and
calibrated and not lead you intoforeign adventures and foreign
quagmires.
Shanie (38:56):
Are there any clear red lines right now in Syria?
Because there were previously,before al-Sharaq takeover, but I
would not have thought ofattacking a Druze community as
being one of those red lines.
Honestly, I'm wondering ifthere's some internal pressure
from the Druze community withinIsrael.
Neri (39:11):
You mean, oh, for red lines for Israel?
Shanie (39:14):
Yeah, like the red lines that Israel has for things that
Syria would do that would causethem to intervene.
Neri (39:19):
Yeah, I mean, look, this wasn't this red line with regard
to the Druze.
Leaving aside, you know, israelmade clear they don't want to
see al-Shara send forces intosouthern Syria at all, which is
a very maximalist red line.
But Israel also said we don'twant to see any harm befall the
(39:39):
Druze.
So this doesn't start last weekright With the fighting.
This has been now eight monthsof this position.
So for Israel it was adeclarative position vis-a-vis
the new Syria whether it's goingto be a new and improved Syria,
TBD again, as the kids say.
(40:02):
But yes, absolutely.
This is something I failed tomention.
There was a major internaldomestic pressure by the Israeli
Druze from the leadership allthe way down, and I got messages
and you could see it onFacebook.
Even Druze who are notpolitical right, not the
activist types, not the formersenior IDF colonels and generals
(40:23):
who are very public figures,not the religious leaders and
the Druze, just the averageDruze here in Israel, were
apoplectic, right.
They're like how can thismassacre be going on with our
not only co-religionists butsometimes family members in
southern Syria and ourgovernment, ie Israel, does
nothing to stop it?
And so there was major pressureinternally to act in a strong
(40:48):
way.
I think, if you ask the Druze,not enough was done to stop the
massacres early enough to stopthe massacres early enough.
That's when you saw hundreds,if not thousands, of Jews break
through the fence on the GolanHeights and make their way into
Syria.
Most of them have returned, notall of them.
(41:09):
So that was also a major issuebecause some of the Jews not all
the Jews, but a lot of the Jewsare Israeli citizens.
So you can't have an Israelicitizen, no matter who they are,
running around Syria, which,again, it's not exactly a
coherent country at the moment.
So that was a major, well,dramatic images and also a major
(41:30):
problem for the authoritieshere.
But yeah, undoubtedly it becamea domestic political issue here
.
There was major support amongst, shall we say, non-jews, the
general public here.
But yeah, undoubtedly it becamea domestic political issue here
there was major support amongst, shall we say, non-jews, you
know, the general public here totake a forceful stand, because
the media here was alsoreporting and airing images of
the killing and the atrocitiesperpetrated against the Jews.
(41:54):
By the way, according toeverything we understand, the
Jews also gave, maybe not asgood as they got, but they also
gave right.
So the Jews were also attacking, whether the Bedouins or the
government forces that were sentdown there.
So a lot of blame to go around.
(42:14):
But for now, a tenuous calm hasbeen restored.
Israel has stopped bombinginside syria.
I think the trump administrationis happy about that and, um,
look it's.
It's going to be a major pointof emphasis, not next week, not
next month, but for the comingmonths, in the coming years,
(42:35):
whether the new post-assAssadSyria can actually make a real
go of it right, whether Shara orwhoever else can actually keep
this country united or basicallyreunify the country, rebuild
the country, reintegrate thecountry into the broader region
and the broader world.
Like, like you said, shara atleast uh wants to do um or not?
(43:06):
And what does it not look like?
And uh, again, you know, forthose of us who have studied uh
kind of the modern, uh, themodern history of the middle
east, uh, syria was never, wasnever a successful state since,
since it achieved independencefrom the French, a successive
number of failed governments,coup upon coup upon coup, until
(43:26):
Assad, the father, hafezal-Assad, basically took over
and instituted a dictatorshipthat held for a few decades and
then his well less qualified sonthrew it away.
But that's not exactly a wildlysuccessful country.
So again, hopefully the futurebrings something better for
Syria.
Shanie (43:47):
Yeah, we'll look forward to seeing that.
Nery, you wanted to take this.
Neri (43:54):
You're like.
Good luck with all that.
Shanie (43:56):
I'm skeptical, but you know I love that cautious
optimism, so I'm aligned we haveto remain optimistic and I
think, overall, it's good thatAssad fell.
Neri (44:08):
Obviously, shahrra formerly Jalani, and the people
who who deposed Assad are noteveryone's cup of tea, to put it
mildly formally affiliated withAl-Qaeda and other Islamist
radical jihadist groups Fine,the burden of proof is on them.
They are getting a lot ofsupport from other actors in the
(44:31):
region, other prominent statesand the West, so everyone's
trying to put them in a positionto succeed.
I think for Israel, despitewhat Netanyahu and his
government may or may not want,I think it behooves Israel to
play ball and try to make it asuccess and not just pound them
from the air every time they dosomething not to Israel's liking
(44:54):
.
I think that would make better,better neighborly relations.
And we have to be clear, shani,there were negotiations before
last week, before the well, thetwo day war with Syria, about a
real security slash, nonbelligerence agreement being
signed between the new Syria andIsrael.
So those were real.
(45:16):
Yeah those are real negotiations.
Obviously, they've now beendelayed.
We'll see if they get pickedback up, but you're right.
Transitioning, I wanted, beforewe sign off, I wanted to ask
you, from your perch in MidtownManhattan and all across North
America, as the head of IsraelPolicy Forum's young
(45:36):
professional program, atid, whatis the mood, what is the vibe
in America, north America, atthe moment with regard to these
issues, other issues, israel.
I get asked this question a lotfrom people here, but I
obviously sit here.
So you know I am of thecommunity but not part of the
(46:00):
community anymore.
So give us an update, atemperature check.
Shanie (46:05):
I think that one of the reasons Israelis ask this
question is because online theyonly see the two poles.
So on one side they see theanti-Zionist movement and the
other side they see a prettytraditional pro-Israel movement
that's very comfortable withNetanyahu and comfortable with
the ongoing war, and they don'tsee the other 80%.
So I'll tell you about them.
(46:26):
The discourse here is honestlywhat it's been for a very long
time among young American Jews,which is to say they believe in
a Jewish state, they care aboutIsrael, they feel connected to
Israel, they follow the newsclosely about Israel and also
they feel that many of Israel'sactions conflict both at a
political and military level,conflict with their values, both
(46:47):
morally and politically.
They have enormous empathy forPalestinians and for Israelis
and they feel a sense of urgencyto resolve this conflict as a
whole and, of course, the waritself.
I actually think that's reallyamazing because it shows how
resilient the relationship isYoung American Jews.
They may feel really conflictedabout things Israel does, but
(47:08):
they don't feel conflicted aboutthe fact that Israel needs to
exist, the fact that Israel isstill the Jewish homeland.
To me that's really importantthat their relationship is
resilient enough to survivebeyond that.
So I think of it as prettypositive, and we need to, of
course, meet the moment andbuild spaces for the vast
majority who are sitting in thatkind of uncomfortable space of
(47:28):
not knowing how to be supportive.
Right, how can they support theIsraelis on the ground who
share their values when thegovernment doesn't represent
them, et cetera, et cetera.
So that's kind of where most ofthe people I speak to are at
and that's where most of thedata points.
Neri (47:42):
Interesting.
So basically support Israel perse, but maybe not the
government or certain policies,especially vis-a-vis the war in
Gaza.
It's probably a healthyposition to be in.
It's probably well, notprobably.
It is the position of themajority of the Israeli public
according to every opinion poll.
Do you see people that are kindof on the fence, shifting one
(48:06):
way or the other?
So people that have become kindof very pro, I guess,
pro-government or pro-currentpolicy versus other people that
have been like oh well, you know, the war and the policies being
pursued by this government haveput me off Israel completely.
Shanie (48:23):
I think the longer the war goes on, the harder it's
become, and I joke that for thepast two years I've been saying,
oh, once the war ends it'll beso much easier to rebuild and
have these really importantdialogues and conversations.
Meanwhile we're still sittinghere at almost the two-year
point of the war, so at acertain point it does become
really challenging to pick toseparate Israel from the war,
(48:44):
especially when where I thinkAmerican Jews diverge a little
bit more from Israelis in theground is when it comes to the
military.
Ultimately, the IDF iscomprised of Israelis' brothers
and sisters and sons anddaughters, and so they're not
going to be as critical asAmerican Jews who are sitting
all the way over here andreading about things that make
them deeply uncomfortable andcritical in the news.
(49:06):
That Israelis may not feelpretty connected, and I'm really
curious about how Israelisinterpret the American discourse
if you have anything to add onthat and the types of questions
you're hearing.
But I appreciate knowing thatpeople care at least and want to
(49:27):
know what's going on on thisside of the ocean.
Neri (49:30):
They do care.
It is a major topic ofconversation, by the way, not
just the American Jewishcommunity and where they are
vis-a-vis Israel in the war, butalso just American public
opinion in general and wherethey are vis-a-vis the war.
I don't know if you'll like myanswer, but Israelis aren't the
most sophisticated watchers andanalysts of American society or
(49:54):
politics.
I know that's, I know that'sshocking.
No, no, uh, I mean, I've beensaying this for for years uh,
whenever you sit down with withan israeli you know me being
american uh, the israeli will,will, I don't say mansplain, but
israelis play in americanpolitics to me, uh, well, it's
(50:16):
just a trait, right, and I don'tappreciate it, but I'm nothing
if not polite about it.
I don't tell them they have noidea what they're talking about,
but oftentimes they have noidea what they're talking about.
So that's a long way of sayingfor many Israelis.
I think it's a caricature,right?
Israelis don't see the nuancein the debate in America,
(50:38):
especially amongst American Jews, about them, ie Israel and the
war in the Middle East, right?
So they think either everyoneor a certain segment is with
them and then another segmentshall remain, nameless is
against them.
And it's really kind of black orwhite for many Israelis,
(50:59):
whereas when I do engageIsraelis on the issue of
American politics and publicopinion and Israel, I say there
is a lot of nuance to the debate, that you can be a deep, deep
and committed friend of Israeland be very critical of certain
policies and Israelis sometimesdon't understand that difference
(51:24):
and that nuance, which I don'tknow if it's new, but I think
it's definitely very commonplacehere since October 7th.
And it's a shame because youcan't really have a constructive
conversation when one side ieyour side, shani, geographically
at this point is waking up andfollowing events here very, very
(51:47):
closely and the other side, iemy side here in Israel, just
view everything through thiskind of prism of bad good.
Yes, no, pro anti.
You know it's a caricature.
Again, I don't know how closelyIsraelis follow, you know, the
debate inside America likeAmericans and really American.
Shanie (52:09):
Jews especially follow the debate inside Israel.
I think what's most importantfor me for Israelis to
understand is that they're notan island.
Neri (52:37):
no-transcript they get.
It also impacts you, right, aswe've seen tragically over the
past 21 months.
Shanie (52:51):
Unfortunately, yes, and I don't believe that Israel, on
a personal level, I don'tbelieve that Israel need, on a
personal level, I don't believeIsrael should be making
decisions on its nationalsecurity based on how it impacts
diaspora Jews not that, but Ihappen to, but I happen to not
agree with a lot of itsdecisions.
So it's just a happy coincidence, but, um, but if it were those
were the right decisions forIsrael, then they should make
(53:12):
those right decisions.
And we will need to navigateanti-Semitism here, which you
know in some ways could put usat odds with them.
But that's our responsibilityto handle our side of the ocean
and their responsibility tohandle theirs in some way.
Neri (53:27):
Sure and I think again, this is not a new debate, this
has been true for decades right,that Israel will do what it
deems necessary and fit for itsown national security.
Uh, interests as, as thegovernment of the day sees it,
fine, uh.
But my point is, it wasn't justabout diaspora jewry, right,
it's just israel standing in theworld, including amongst
(53:49):
diaspora jews.
Uh needs to be a majorcomponent of israeli decision
making and a major component ofhow Israel understands its own
national security, and that is,shall we say, lacking of late in
a major, major way.
Shanie (54:07):
On that I agree, certainly in Israel.
The way that they are perceivedworldwide does affect their
national security in tangibleways as well in the long term.
So it needs to be consideredwhen making any of these
calculations.
Neri (54:20):
Right, and just final question to you, going back to
what you said earlier.
I mean, are the questions thatyou and IPF get?
Is it pretty much about theGaza war, the humanitarian toll
and disaster inside the Strip,the death toll?
I mean, is it pretty much justthe images and videos and the
headlines that people see forweeks and months on end, whereas
(54:43):
in Israel obviously we'vetalked about it on the podcast
before it's not something theaverage daily sees on a daily
basis through its media diet.
Again, that's a lot ofself-censorship, although that
is also cracking over the pasttwo or three months.
So is it as simple as like.
Yes, the carnage in Gaza is sobad that I believe X, y and Z
(55:06):
about wider issues, not just theactual war.
Shanie (55:10):
Honestly, neri, more than anything else, I think it's
the aid and you and I know, andyou've discussed in this
podcast, the very many reasonswhich of course include a lot of
Hamas, hamas's actions thatlead to the aid issues.
But hundreds of Palestinianshave been killed while seeking
aid.
People know that.
They're very aware of that.
They also know that atdifferent points in time, for
different reasons, israel hascut off aid but also tried to
(55:33):
distribute at different times.
So they're seeing a lot ofconflicting behavior here.
I think a lot of it comes downto the aid.
I think other pieces people canlook away from, because they
will argue and understand thatit's a complicated war zone,
that Hamas is operating there,et cetera.
I think people are a lot lessforgiving when it comes to the
aid piece.
So that's just important to say.
Neri (55:53):
I think that's a fair point and an important point and
one, like I said, that is evencracking the high, high walls of
the average Israeli's mindpost-October 7th and hopefully
the government does shift tack,regardless of the ceasefire,
which, again, you're going tosee a lot more aid go in as part
(56:15):
of the deal.
But even before the deal, I'dargue, and probably, agree,
shani, that it needs to happentoday, tomorrow, god willing.
Thanks, neri.
Thank you, shani.
Have a good rest of the summer.
Hopefully we'll catch up soon,hopefully once the fighting has
(56:38):
been paused at least, and Hodgescome out, hopefully we'll have
a ceasefire next time we chat.
Shanie (56:44):
Amen amen.
Neri (56:45):
Bye, take care.
Shalom and welcome to Israel Policy Pod.
I'm your host, Cheney Reichman,the Director of Strategic
Initiatives and of IPFFT atIsrael Policy Forum.
I'm joined by Neri Zilber, ajournalist based in Tel Aviv and
Policy Advisor at Israel PolicyForum.
Hi, Neri.
Neri (00:19):
Hi, cheney, great to be back with you.
Shanie (00:25):
Shani, great to be back with you, good to see you.
Today we're going to cover thespectacle in the Israeli Knesset
, prospects for a ceasefire,hostage deal and Israel's
engagement in Syria.
So are you ready to start?
Neri (00:33):
I am ready to start, and what we had in mind for this
week was this kind of not evenmidsummer but deep into summer
laundry basket, varioushodgepodge of various issues
domestic politics, gaza, syriabut, as always, shani, never a
dull moment here.
So it's not recently, but inthe not too distant past, even
(00:57):
here in Israel, the summer was aslower period, but, yeah,
nothing like that of the sortthese days, for obvious reasons.
So, looking forward to to tryto break it all down for for our
listeners and our viewers.
By the way, a reminder, we arealso a video podcast, so you can
check us out on youtube and notjust on the various podcast
(01:18):
platforms that you've beenlistening to us, uh.
So check it out, subscribe and,yeah, content should be the
same, but you get to see ourfaces, and usually it's the
guests' faces are beautiful thisweek notwithstanding.
Shanie (01:34):
And you can also catch some clips on Instagram if you
follow Israel Policy Forum onInstagram With that.
Neri (01:40):
Very important.
Shanie (01:41):
Very important United Torah Judaism.
Just to start off with theknesset stuff, as always, united
torah judaism is theultra-orthodox ashkenazi party,
not to be not to be confusedwith shas.
The mizrahi party left thecoalition in protest of the
government's failure to pass alaw exempting ultra-orthodox men
from military service.
This has been an ongoing dramafor years, decades, between the
(02:04):
ultra, the ultra-Orthodoxparties and sort of everybody
else.
Now Shas has also quit thegovernment, but they stay in the
coalition, which I don't reallyknow what that means.
Maybe you can tell me.
All of this is a verylong-winded way of asking will
there be an election and how dowe know?
Neri (02:21):
So that's a good setup, shani.
Yes, some drama over the pastweek in domestic Israeli
politics.
The ultra-Orthodox, the Haredis, essentially left the
government Again.
Have they left the coalition?
This is like a Talmudicdisputation.
When does a party actuallyresign from the government,
(02:42):
resign from the coalition?
When is a government a minoritygovernment?
Can it be both a minoritygovernment and not a minority
government?
It's a strange animal at themoment, the current Netanyahu
governing coalition, and I'llexplain why in just a second.
But yes, they've essentiallyleft in a huff in protest at the
(03:02):
fact that this coalition hasnot provided them with a get out
of jail free card, notliterally, it's get out of the
IDF free card, basically anexemption for their young boys
and men to not have to serve.
Now, again, we don't have to goback to the very beginning and
into the weeds of this issue.
But, yes, you're right, thishas been going on for years,
(03:24):
shani, and every time the canhas kicked down the road,
there's never been a realsolution, primarily because, for
the vast majority of this time,benjamin Netanyahu has been
prime minister and BibiNetanyahu owes his entire
political comeback back in 2009and longevity through successive
elections, successivecoalitions, successive coalition
(03:48):
crises, etc.
To the Haredim, to theultra-Orthodox.
They're really his safety netthe Haredis, that and basically
his core base of support insidethe Likud party, but in terms of
the broader Knesset, theparliament, it's the Haredis.
So now their patience has runout, for the most part, but not
(04:11):
completely, because at thebeginning of this government,
way back in late 2022, when wewere all much younger and it was
much simpler times, they wonthe election and they were
promised by Netanyahu and thisgovernment to pass a real law
that would exempt them, theirboys, from service.
(04:32):
That never happened for avariety of reasons.
Number one the judicialoverhaul overtook everything
else, so that was a big as yousay here, balagan big chaos.
By the way, the judicialoverhaul was meant to pave the
way to legally allow theultra-Orthodox to get this bill
passed, but obviously that wasstalled back in 2023 due to the
(04:55):
efforts of the Israeli people onthe streets.
And then, obviously, october7th and the war overtook
everything else, at least for ayear or so, before everything
came, came roaring back, uh, andreally netanyahu has been able
to deliver, uh, that bill forthem.
Uh, for two reasons.
Number one uh, the person withhis hand kind of on the uh, on
(05:17):
the remote uh is yuli edelstein,who, until about an hour ago,
was the head of the veryimportant Knesset committee, the
foreign and defense committeein the Knesset, and so basically
, the bill had to go through hiscommittee and he he's, by the
way, part of the Likud party,he's the chairman of the
committee and he was refusing toplay ball.
(05:40):
He actually wanted toostensibly pass something with
teeth that would get asignificant number of Haredis
into the military and, if not,then to pass a bill that had
actual teeth to sanction thedraft dodgers and the, let's say
, the overall ultra-Orthodoxcommunity Basically sanction
them personally.
Things like travel ban youcan't leave the country, you
(06:01):
can't take out a license andcollectively to free subsidies
to various yeshivot and schoolsand the like that were not
abiding by the law.
Basically, that never got offthe ground either and, like I
said, an hour ago, yuliEdelstein was dismissed as the
(06:22):
head of this committee byNetanyahu and basically a Likud
loyalist, a stooge, boaz Misput,was put in charge of this
committee with the eye basicallyto paving the way for a bill to
be passed through the committeeand then by the Knesset to give
the Haredis what they want.
Now, hold that thought for justa second.
(06:43):
It's an open question whetherBoaz Bismut and this rearranged
committee will actually get thejob done, but basically the
Haredis have not yet beenplacated, so they left.
So UTJ, the Ashkenaziultra-Orthodox party, united
Torah Judaism, left everything.
They quit the government andleft the coalition.
Shas left the government, butnot the coalition, and both
(07:06):
parties made it clear thatthey're not going to play ball
with the opposition to eitherreplace the current government
in the current Knesset oralternatively, and more likely,
work with the opposition totrigger early elections.
So that's why I say that youneed a kind of a Talmudic
scholar which the Haredis willnot provide us, to actually
(07:27):
figure out what they're doingand what they actually did.
You know officially, butbasically this is a play by them
to show Netanyahu that they'rereally, really, really unhappy.
And now Netanyahu has respondedand at least is making a move
towards trying to draft a billmore to their liking.
(07:48):
Now, the important thingthroughout all of this, shani,
as you all know, the calendar.
So this is the last week wherethe Knesset is in session for
this Knesset session, and thenall of our dear leaders in
parliament will be going on avery languid summer, and then
all of our dear leaders inparliament will be going on a
very languid summer and thenrecess, so they're only going to
(08:09):
be back in three months,basically mid-october.
So nothing can really be done,not really until mid-october uh,
not passing this law.
So they'll be working to draftsomething, I suppose, in
committee during the recess, andyou can't, more than likely,
trigger an early election duringthe recess.
So Netanyahu has succeeded inachieving total victory, not in
(08:34):
Gaza or various other fronts,but over the calendar, and
Netanyahu essentially has playedout the clock very successfully
and gotten to the safe harborof the recess without anyone,
whether the ultra-Orthodox orthe far right or the opposition,
being able to kind of combineforces and trigger, a, the
(08:58):
dissolution of the Knesset andthen, b, early elections, and
that's what Netanyahu was reallygoing for.
So again, when theultra-Orthodox left the
government quote unquote lastweek, everyone knew it didn't
really matter because thegovernment, and really the
Knesset, wasn't going to bedoing much of anything over the
coming three months, and so thiswas a more symbolic move by the
(09:21):
ultra-Orthodox.
And then again Netanyahuresponded, basically this
afternoon and recording this, onWednesday afternoon, tel Aviv
time by getting rid of YuliEdelstein, a dramatic move we
should note for everyonelistening and watching a highly
unpopular move by Netanyahu totry to do this.
(09:41):
You know, 80% of the Israelipublic, including major major
parts of the Likud and the farright parties who send their
boys and girls to serve, want tosee a more equitable
distribution of the burden ofconscription into the IDF.
And so when you do somethingwhere you only have something
(10:03):
like 20% support amongst thegeneral public for it like
getting rid of Yuli Edelstein ina bid to get basically a draft
dodging bill through committeeand then through Knesset, it's
really just a move by Netanyahuto placate the Haredim.
Again, we can maybe get into itin just a minute, but it likely
won't work either.
Again, we can maybe get into itin just a minute, but it likely
(10:24):
won't work either.
But this is essentially whatwe've been dealing with inside
the Netanyahu coalition andgovernment over the past week
and really over the past hour ortwo.
Shanie (10:33):
What do you think is the likelihood that this actually
leads to the dissolution of thegovernment before?
Neri (10:43):
Remind me when it's supposed to actually end their
four-year term.
Well, officially, elections aresupposed to be held in the fall
of 2026, so a little over ayear Before all this happened.
The smart money here in Israelwas that elections would likely
be moved up to basically spring,summer of next year, because it
would be very difficult to passa budget in an election year.
(11:05):
And then, after the Haredispulled this schtick and this
trick over the past week, thenthe smarter money was, yeah,
there's probably going to bedissolution of the Knesset and
early elections, really inOctober, early November of this
year, and so we're looking mostlikely at elections January,
(11:27):
february, march, timeframe ofnext year, like really the
beginning of the year.
But it just goes to show you, Ithink and I told this to some of
our colleagues yesterday I wassurprised that Netanyahu did
this right, because it's sounpopular, as I said, and julie
edelstein had been sitting thereand, um, you know a thorn in
netanyahu's side for months nowand uh, he, he didn't get rid of
(11:52):
him, didn't go to vietnam,edelstein, until today.
So it shows you, I think, howscared netanyahu is of facing
the israeli voting public, thatat least in theory, he's going
to try to buy himself a few moreweeks, or a few more months in
power until early elections aretriggered, and so this, I think,
was the rationale for trying todo this.
(12:12):
I don't think he's going topass an actual bill, right?
You're not going to pass a billexempting the Haredim from IDF
service a few months before anelection or in an election year.
Let's put it that way.
It's deeply, deeply unpopular.
And to square the circle ofpassing something with teeth
will just piss off the Haredim.
(12:33):
So he doesn't want to do thatfor the reason that I mentioned
at the top.
They're his real safety net.
So I think this move to make itseem like he's working towards
some kind of bill to the hardy'sliking is a is a play by
netanyahu to essentially buyhimself more time once the
(12:53):
knesset comes back in october,to placate the hurting for a few
more weeks.
Like I said, a few more months,uh, and then, and only then, to
actually go to elections.
That that's my bestunderstanding because, like I
said, I didn't quite understandwhy Netanyahu was doing this in
terms of the Knesset committee.
Shanie (13:11):
Nery.
Obviously there's a lot more toit than this, but from where I
sit, firing someone important,even when it's deeply unpopular,
seems like something Netanyahudoes pretty consistently.
Over time, I've seen him kindof do that again and again, even
when right firing the defenseminister caused massive riots in
the street, so he doesn't seemto shy away from firing people,
(13:32):
even when they're very importantand even when it upsets the
Israeli public.
Neri (13:36):
So fair point counterpoint when he fired Gallant back in
what was it?
March of 2023, during the majorupheaval internally regarding
the judicial overhaul, that wasa miscalculation by Netanyahu.
So, yes, he fired Gallant andthen, a day or so later, he had
to Walk it back Right and helearned his lesson from that to
(14:00):
go head to head with the Israelipublic on an issue that was so
deeply unpopular.
And again, you know Galant'sfiring back then.
There was no plausibledeniability that it was about
anything else other than thejudicial overhaul and Galant
warning about a clear andpresent danger to Israeli
national security if thiscontinued.
(14:21):
Galant, sadly, was provencorrect.
What?
Five, six months later, onOctober of 2033.
But in the meantime, netanyahufired Galant last fall and there
wasn't a major pushback by theIsraeli public.
(14:41):
Again, for a variety of reasons, he's fired other people, like
you said.
Shanie (14:43):
Attorney.
Speaker 3 (14:44):
General.
Neri (14:45):
Well, he's tried to, trying to, again, he's tried to
and it's again.
Are they really trying to firethe Attorney General?
Do they know that the SupremeCourt will block the firing of
the Attorney General?
So he lets his ministers kindof play at firing the attorney
general Again?
I think the Israeli publicwould come out on the streets if
she were truly fired and if thegovernment, let's say, directly
(15:12):
disavowed and disregarded aSupreme Court ruling on
something that critical, I thinkthe Israeli public would come
out because they understand thestakes.
But getting back to YuliEdelstein, yeah, they fired a
Connecticut committee chair thatprobably a large portion of the
public has never heard of,because we talk about this stuff
(15:32):
.
But, again, the general publicisn't in this on an hourly basis
like we are, and no bill hasbeen passed yet.
So he still has plausibledeniability that, oh, we're
going to work towards areasonable bill that will get
the Haredis into the military,which is what Netanyahu is
putting out publicly, right.
He's not saying, oh, we'regoing to pass a bill that's
(15:53):
going to exempt all the Haredis.
He's saying no, we're going tofind something equitable.
He's still kind of playing thatgame, at least outwardly, uh,
and in terms of his messaging uh, so can I say, you know,
replacing a classic committeechair, fine, but again, in terms
of the voting public, uh, if itcomes to it, it'll do him
damage.
So he's, I think, banking onthe fact that, uh, three months
(16:16):
from now, the connective willcome back.
There'll be other crises, I'msure, other issues.
He'll try to spin it in acertain way.
People will forget, and thenwe'll see if they actually try
to pass something asostentatious and as ridiculous
and as deeply unpopular as abill to the heart he's liking.
(16:38):
So, yeah, he did it, I think,for more internal kind of
coalition maintenance, to showthe Haredim that he was doing as
much as he can in their favorAgain, to buy time on the other
side of the contestant recessand maybe with an eye to a
future election where he likelybelieves he can at least have a
(17:02):
chance at winning.
And then he'll need the Haredimonce again.
Shanie (17:08):
Yeah.
Moving to the potential forhostage ceasefire negotiations
in Gaza, it seems they are backon again in their on again, off
again situation.
Israeli minister andnetanyahu's confidant slash, bff
, ron durmer, is supposed tomeet with mid-east envoy steve
wickhoff to discuss some kind ofplan that will get us out of
(17:32):
this war.
What are the main stickingpoints here?
Because, as we both know andall of our listeners know, this
has been ongoing since the lastceasefire broke down in January.
Neri (17:43):
It has.
And we should remember that,basically, a similar deal was on
the table back in what March interms of kind of moving ahead
with the next phase, again, thisphased ceasefire deal.
That was Israel's decision, notanyone else's decision, to have
it in phases.
So, yes, netanyahu neverfulfilled the second phase of
(18:06):
the previous ceasefire, whichlikely would have forced Israel
and Netanyahu to end the war.
So now we're back at these kindof temporary truces again with
an eye to extending it towardssomething more permanent.
I mean some context right.
So, yes, the negotiations gotmore serious earlier this month.
Again, talking about thecalendar, I don't think that's a
(18:29):
surprise, shani.
I don't think it's a surprisethat talks are ramping back up,
just as the Knesset is rampingdown.
Again, domestic politics abovemost other considerations when
it comes to this prime minister.
So, yes, the talks made abreakthrough earlier this month.
I never bought into the ideathat a deal was imminent.
(18:49):
Say, two weeks ago that wassome of the spin that we were
hearing, because there werestill a few more weeks left in
the Knesset session.
But, more to the point, therewere still a lot of details to
figure out and not minor details.
Now, again, according to thepeople I've spoken to, a lot of
(19:10):
the gaps have been closed, sothey are close to a deal and,
unlike previous conversationsthat I've had with you, shani,
and other podcast guests, I'mstill actually optimistic that
there will be a deal.
I think both sides understandthat now is the correct time to
at least halt the war for theproposed 60 days.
Again, for different reasons,both Hamas and Israel would take
(19:34):
that deal, I think, at thecurrent moment.
But in terms of the stickingpoints, look, the biggest
sticking point is the guaranteesor not that Hamas has been
provided by the Trumpadministration, and less so by
Qatar and Egypt and the othermediators, that this will
actually lead to an end to thewar after 60 days.
(19:55):
They've gotten some kind ofguarantee from the Americans,
but nothing concrete, basicallywording to the effect that the
ceasefire will be extended ifnegotiations towards a permanent
end to the war are ongoing andin good faith and constructive
and something along those lines.
Right, so you can extend theceasefire.
(20:16):
That's a guarantee that Trumpgave Hamas, a guarantee that
Trump gave Hamas.
But the biggest sticking pointin terms of getting into the
first 60 days is again, to thebest of my understanding,
according to the people I'vespoken to the extent of the IDF
withdrawal from Gaza during the60 days and we have to remember
that at this point the IDFcontrols most of Gaza.
(20:39):
By the IDF's count, about 75%of the territory.
So basically you have a lot offorces not on every square inch
of the territory but controllingabout 75% of the territory.
Basically, 2 million people inGaza are now for the most part
located in three enclaves, sobasically Gaza City, the central
(21:02):
camps, including Deir el-Balak,and then just a bit further
south, kind of the Mawassihumanitarian zone and bits of
Khan Yunus.
That's it.
That's it Again.
A few thousand here and thereand other places that the IDF
controls, but that's pretty muchit.
So where the IDF will move backto is not a minor point and I
(21:24):
think Hamas is quibbling aboutthat.
Some other minor points theidentities of the quote-unquote
heavier prisoners sitting inIsraeli jails, ie terrorists
that Israel will have to releaseas part of the hostage for
prisoner and ceasefire exchange.
So I think the lists are beingkind of drafted as we speak.
(21:47):
I think the ratio, the numberof Palestinian prisoners to each
hostage, whether alive or dead,they've kind of figured that
out due to past precedent, sothat's less of an issue.
Aid in terms of humanitarian aid, less of an issue.
I know there have been somereports.
Well, there are reports all thetime in the Western media, in
(22:10):
the Israeli media, in the Arabmedia about this negotiation and
a lot of it is spin put out byone of the various parties to
either promote their interestsor spit it in a certain way.
Take it with a grain of salt,but aid isn't a big issue.
We know that the old model, viathe UN and other international
(22:31):
aid organizations, is going tobe ramped up during the 60 days
and that's obviously all for thegood, given the very, very dire
humanitarian situation in Gazaright now, as we all know.
So I think we're close.
I think, well, I think, slashknow that a lot of people
(22:52):
involved in negotiations are nowblaming Hamas for dragging
their feet, and I think Hamasare playing games over the past
week, trying to kind of maximizethe concessions they're going
to get, or think they're goingto get, from Israel and in
return, israel has ramped up themilitary pressure on Hamas.
So some of our listeners may beaware that the IDF sent troops
(23:14):
and tanks into Dir el-Balak incentral Gaza.
That's not a minor move by theIDF.
There's a reason why Direl-Balakh and the other central
camps, as they're called, havebeen pretty much untouched by
ground forces over the past 21months, and it's not because the
IDF, for whatever reason,wanted to spare central Gaza.
(23:38):
It's because well, it's not asecret anymore the hostages are
being held there.
So they sent forces intosouthern Deir el-Balak to apply
more pressure on Hamas, to focusHamas minds to come to the
negotiating table in, I guess,not good faith, because they're
Hamas and a bunch of gangstersand terrorists, but better faith
(24:00):
than they've been showing overthe past week.
And that obviously drew a lotof alarm and anger and criticism
by the hostage families because, I would argue rightfully, it
imperils the hostages that arebeing held in that general area.
Let's hope the IDF has goodintelligence about where exactly
(24:22):
they're held and what they'redoing in central Gaza.
So again you have this kind ofHamas dragging their feet, the
IDF ramping up both militarypressure and threats, basically
rhetoric, with the hope thatit'll essentially get Hamas back
with a reasonable proposal andthat the mediators, whether
(24:44):
Steve Woodcoff and the Qatarisand Egyptians, can kind of close
the deal.
Like I said, I'm moreoptimistic than not, but again
we have to kind of be clear-eyedabout what this means and
doesn't mean ride about whatthis means and doesn't mean.
(25:06):
I think everyone would be veryhappy if the war was halted for
60 days at least and thathostages came home, especially
at least half of the remaining20 that are still believed to be
alive.
And well, there's going to be anumber of the hostages that are
deceased will also be comingout during the 60 days,
according to the terms of thedeal.
But these are almost like theeasy negotiations, right, cheney
(25:29):
?
This is like the appetizer towhat will be a terrible main
course, which will be the actualnegotiations that are
stipulated in terms ofpermanently ending the war and
releasing all the remaininghostages.
And those negotiations aregoing to be I mean, I can't
curse on this podcast because weare nothing if not a family
(25:51):
podcast but it's going to bevery, very difficult because
Netanyahu has made clear that hewants Hamas to essentially
surrender, lay down their arms,demobilize, even maybe exile
some of the leadership I mean,there's only a handful of
leaders, well-known leaders,left.
That's his demand, and Hamas'sdemand obviously will be not
(26:14):
that they want to still leveragethe hostages to A survive and B
end the war.
Still leverage the hostages toA survive and, b end the war.
So I don't know how you squarethat circle, but those
negotiations are supposed tostart immediately once the
initial 60-day truce is supposedto start, and that's going to
be very, very difficult to cometo terms.
(26:37):
But you know we'll, as an oldfriend used to say, we'll blow
that bridge up when we get to it.
So uh, so uh.
We TBD, uh, tbd, as the kidssay, uh.
And then one final point on theon the hostage stocks.
Shani, uh, this is something Iheard.
(26:57):
It's not confirmed because thenumbers, I think, are still in
flux.
I think they're more in fluxthan people realize.
But in terms of the number ofhostages that are supposed to
come out during the 60 days andhow many kind of phases and
installments are supposed totake place, the initial proposal
, as put forward, called forfive phases and something like
(27:18):
eight hostages coming out livehostages coming out in the
beginning, and then, I think,two live hostages coming out on
day 50.
And in between, I think, 18deceased hostages, their bodies,
coming out.
So that was the initialproposal as we came to
understand it.
That may not be the finalproposal that we see if and when
(27:41):
a deal is closed, I'll kind ofleave it.
That may not be the finalproposal that we see.
If and when a deal is closed,I'll kind of leave it at that.
But there may be a slightlydifferent formula.
That again, I mean 10 livehostages should be coming out,
but maybe initially, and then 10live hostages maybe will be
proposed to come out on day 60or 61 if there's a final deal.
(28:04):
That's something I heard and Ireported and I think it speaks
to the idea that it's not finaluntil it's actually final.
Shanie (28:14):
Basically, a deal.
Yeah, Thanks for that, Narek.
Neri (28:18):
So yeah, I mean, you know again, I hope this is good news
and, like I said, we'rerecording this on Wednesday.
Witkoff is supposed to be inRome on Thursday, so tomorrow,
to meet with Dermer and, Ibelieve, a Qatari and Egyptian
envoy, and then if Witkoff hearswhat he wants to hear, or sends
(28:40):
the message to Dermer andothers that needs to be sent,
then Witkoff will continue on toDoha.
And we've been hearing for welltwo weeks now that if Witkoff
actually shows up in Doha, thecapital of Qatar, where the
talks are being held, then thatwill be a sign that we're
(29:00):
actually pretty close to a deal.
And let's hope, shani, let'shope.
Okay, we'll be right back afterthis brief message.
Speaker 3 (29:09):
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Shanie (30:05):
Yeah, we'll look forward to seeing that news.
Moving to Israel's northernborder, Israel's gotten a lot of
criticism lately, includingfrom the Trump administration,
for involving themselves alittle too much in Syria.
While most of the Western worldis taking a wait-and-see
approach with Ahmed al-Sharra'snew government in Syria, Israel
(30:25):
is putting its thumb on thescale by attacking them,
partially in reaction to attackson the Druze community in Syria
.
What's the logic here, whenSyria's new leader has pretty
clearly indicated he's notinterested in fighting with
Israel and has also indicated alevel of openness to negotiating
some kind of agreement withthem?
Whether or not you believe him,why stir the pot preemptively?
Neri (30:48):
Why stir the pot?
Great question.
Look, I'll be facetious tobegin with and then serious
subsequently.
Facetiously, it's been a monthsince the Iran war, so there's
only been one front, gaza, goingon.
So people here got bored.
(31:09):
There was what I call thetwo-day war with the new Syrian
government last week, and thenit stopped and we'll get into
the reasons why it stopped.
But, yeah, it was too quiet,shitty, basically.
So why not?
Why not start a relatively newand open front, uh, in syria?
You know why not?
Um, more seriously, look, uh,I'll give you the official
(31:33):
version and then we'll get intothe problems with the official
version.
The official version by thisisrael since December, when
al-Shara, formerly known asJolani, and his rebels took
Damascus and toppled the Assadregime, is twofold.
Number one Israel will notallow southern Syria to turn
(31:54):
into a, I guess, armed launchingpoint for potential attacks in
future against Israel, ie theGolan Heights and the
communities there.
Right, so Israel moved in,seized territory, right,
essentially, there's a securityzone, a buffer zone, at least 15
kilometers into Syria,basically from the Golan Heights
(32:15):
in, since, since December, Imean their IDF forces, their
nine outposts, I mean they'reholding territory inside syria.
Uh, what are we?
July, sorority for almost eightmonths.
That's number one.
So israel wants to kind ofuphold, uh, by force, this new
doctrine.
That's not unique to syria.
(32:36):
It's same thing as playing outin lebanon, in the west Bank and
obviously a very active way inGaza, which is forward defense,
forward defense and defensethrough offense.
This is a lesson coming out ofOctober 7th you don't just
defend on your borders, you, ifneed be, take territory in enemy
(32:56):
territory and then you attackfrom there and obviously from
the air and through intelligence, a lot more aggressive doctrine
.
And that's not by mistake, notby mistake and again, not unique
to Syria.
So that was the first, shall wesay, policy red line by Israel
(33:18):
and again it's not unique to theNetanyahu government.
I think it has buy-in amongstlarge parts of the security
establishment as well.
But the second issue wasprotection of the Druze in
southern Syria and the Druze areobviously an important minority
and a beloved minority here inIsrael.
(33:38):
The Druze are integral membersof the IDF, so they send their
boys to serve in the IDF.
You know, you've had prominentDruze politicians in various
quote unquote Zionist parties.
So the Druze are, shall we say,blood brothers that's the term
(33:59):
used here because they fight andthey fall alongside the other
IDF soldiers and have been fordecades, right since really the
beginning of the state.
So what happened last week isthat basically I mean to make a
long story short there was anattack on a Druze trader,
(34:24):
merchant Unclear, in southernSyria by local Bedouin clans.
That led to kind ofintercommunal fighting between
the Druze and the local Bedouinsin southern Syria, in Jabal
al-Druz, pretty much Suwaita,which is the predominantly Druze
city in southern Syria.
(34:46):
And in retaliation, or again,depending on who you ask, either
in a bid to quell the unrestand separate the two sides or in
a bid to side with the Bedouinand attack the Druze, shara from
Damascus sent his, I mean, andthey got into all kinds of
clashes and fighting with theDruze.
(35:24):
Allegations I think pretty wellfounded, that they were killing
civilians, obviously,infamously, they were capturing
Druze and shaving mustaches ofprominent elders in these
communities and that triggered amajor Israeli response, not
just striking al-Shara's forcesin Soweta but, as we all know,
(35:48):
striking at the heart ofDamascus, hitting the defense
ministry, hitting next to thepresidential palace really heavy
stuff, really heavy stuff.
And again that went on for twodays before the Trump
administration came in and saidyeah, this needs to stop.
So al-Shara's forces withdrew.
Israel was forced to allow themback in on a certain level by
(36:09):
the Trump administration.
Israel stopped bombing Damascusand basically they figured out
some tenuous ceasefire betweenthe Druze and the Bedouins down
there to restore calm.
That's pretty much the long andthe short of it.
The problem and we get to kindof the criticism of Israeli
government, the position and thepolicy is why are you involving
(36:32):
yourself so deeply in this kindof intercommunal,
inter-confessional fighting in aneighboring state?
How far do you want to take it?
Are you going to send theGolani Brigade into Soweta, into
the Jewish community, to go andprotect them?
Is it just going to be from theair?
Are you going to continue doingthis?
(36:53):
And bigger picture and this iswhy Israel stopped bombing
al-Shara's forces in DamascusTrump administration was really
upset, really upset, becausetheir policy, their position, is
they're trying to supportal-Shara, they want to keep
Syria unified, they want him toestablish control over various
(37:16):
or all of the country uh,something that he doesn't have
not by a long shot, um, aftereight months and so they want to
see him succeed.
Uh, israel, I think you know, ifnetanyahu was here with us
today he'd be like I don't careabout a unified syria, I want
syria to be fragmented and weakand not pose a threat to israel
and have it be this kind offailed state that we can, um,
(37:41):
either either mold to our likingor bomb when needed.
Uh, that's not what theamericans want to see, that's
not what, uh, the turks want tosee, that's not what the gulf
arabs want to see.
So israel was uh, out on anisland with this very aggressive
policy and again it speaks tookay, you can have these red
lines, but A what are you goingto do to actually enforce them?
(38:03):
Do you have internationalsupport and backing to do that?
And what's the downside if youdon't?
And two, just the resources andcontinuing to hold territory
inside Syria the damage,potentially, of getting
intimately involved in aneighboring civil war.
Israel doesn't have a greattrack record of that, dating
(38:24):
back to Lebanon in the late 70sand 1980s.
The Lebanese civil war drewIsrael more and more in, leading
up to a 20-year occupation ofSouthern Lebanon and many dead
IDF soldiers.
So again you can have this kindof post-October 7th doctrine,
(38:44):
very aggressive doctrine, but ithas to be, I think, smart and
calibrated and not lead you intoforeign adventures and foreign
quagmires.
Shanie (38:56):
Are there any clear red lines right now in Syria?
Because there were previously,before al-Sharaq takeover, but I
would not have thought ofattacking a Druze community as
being one of those red lines.
Honestly, I'm wondering ifthere's some internal pressure
from the Druze community withinIsrael.
Neri (39:11):
You mean, oh, for red lines for Israel?
Shanie (39:14):
Yeah, like the red lines that Israel has for things that
Syria would do that would causethem to intervene.
Neri (39:19):
Yeah, I mean, look, this wasn't this red line with regard
to the Druze.
Leaving aside, you know, israelmade clear they don't want to
see al-Shara send forces intosouthern Syria at all, which is
a very maximalist red line.
But Israel also said we don'twant to see any harm befall the
(39:39):
Druze.
So this doesn't start last weekright With the fighting.
This has been now eight monthsof this position.
So for Israel it was adeclarative position vis-a-vis
the new Syria whether it's goingto be a new and improved Syria,
TBD again, as the kids say.
(40:02):
But yes, absolutely.
This is something I failed tomention.
There was a major internaldomestic pressure by the Israeli
Druze from the leadership allthe way down, and I got messages
and you could see it onFacebook.
Even Druze who are notpolitical right, not the
activist types, not the formersenior IDF colonels and generals
(40:23):
who are very public figures,not the religious leaders and
the Druze, just the averageDruze here in Israel, were
apoplectic, right.
They're like how can thismassacre be going on with our
not only co-religionists butsometimes family members in
southern Syria and ourgovernment, ie Israel, does
nothing to stop it?
And so there was major pressureinternally to act in a strong
(40:48):
way.
I think, if you ask the Druze,not enough was done to stop the
massacres early enough to stopthe massacres early enough.
That's when you saw hundreds,if not thousands, of Jews break
through the fence on the GolanHeights and make their way into
Syria.
Most of them have returned, notall of them.
(41:09):
So that was also a major issuebecause some of the Jews not all
the Jews, but a lot of the Jewsare Israeli citizens.
So you can't have an Israelicitizen, no matter who they are,
running around Syria, which,again, it's not exactly a
coherent country at the moment.
So that was a major, well,dramatic images and also a major
(41:30):
problem for the authoritieshere.
But yeah, undoubtedly it becamea domestic political issue here
.
There was major support amongst, shall we say, non-jews, the
general public here.
But yeah, undoubtedly it becamea domestic political issue here
there was major support amongst, shall we say, non-jews, you
know, the general public here totake a forceful stand, because
the media here was alsoreporting and airing images of
the killing and the atrocitiesperpetrated against the Jews.
(41:54):
By the way, according toeverything we understand, the
Jews also gave, maybe not asgood as they got, but they also
gave right.
So the Jews were also attacking, whether the Bedouins or the
government forces that were sentdown there.
So a lot of blame to go around.
(42:14):
But for now, a tenuous calm hasbeen restored.
Israel has stopped bombinginside syria.
I think the trump administrationis happy about that and, um,
look it's.
It's going to be a major pointof emphasis, not next week, not
next month, but for the comingmonths, in the coming years,
(42:35):
whether the new post-assAssadSyria can actually make a real
go of it right, whether Shara orwhoever else can actually keep
this country united or basicallyreunify the country, rebuild
the country, reintegrate thecountry into the broader region
and the broader world.
Like, like you said, shara atleast uh wants to do um or not?
(43:06):
And what does it not look like?
And uh, again, you know, forthose of us who have studied uh
kind of the modern, uh, themodern history of the middle
east, uh, syria was never, wasnever a successful state since,
since it achieved independencefrom the French, a successive
number of failed governments,coup upon coup upon coup, until
(43:26):
Assad, the father, hafezal-Assad, basically took over
and instituted a dictatorshipthat held for a few decades and
then his well less qualified sonthrew it away.
But that's not exactly a wildlysuccessful country.
So again, hopefully the futurebrings something better for
Syria.
Shanie (43:47):
Yeah, we'll look forward to seeing that.
Nery, you wanted to take this.
Neri (43:54):
You're like.
Good luck with all that.
Shanie (43:56):
I'm skeptical, but you know I love that cautious
optimism, so I'm aligned we haveto remain optimistic and I
think, overall, it's good thatAssad fell.
Neri (44:08):
Obviously, shahrra formerly Jalani, and the people
who who deposed Assad are noteveryone's cup of tea, to put it
mildly formally affiliated withAl-Qaeda and other Islamist
radical jihadist groups Fine,the burden of proof is on them.
They are getting a lot ofsupport from other actors in the
(44:31):
region, other prominent statesand the West, so everyone's
trying to put them in a positionto succeed.
I think for Israel, despitewhat Netanyahu and his
government may or may not want,I think it behooves Israel to
play ball and try to make it asuccess and not just pound them
from the air every time they dosomething not to Israel's liking
(44:54):
.
I think that would make better,better neighborly relations.
And we have to be clear, shani,there were negotiations before
last week, before the well, thetwo day war with Syria, about a
real security slash, nonbelligerence agreement being
signed between the new Syria andIsrael.
So those were real.
(45:16):
Yeah those are real negotiations.
Obviously, they've now beendelayed.
We'll see if they get pickedback up, but you're right.
Transitioning, I wanted, beforewe sign off, I wanted to ask
you, from your perch in MidtownManhattan and all across North
America, as the head of IsraelPolicy Forum's young
(45:36):
professional program, atid, whatis the mood, what is the vibe
in America, north America, atthe moment with regard to these
issues, other issues, israel.
I get asked this question a lotfrom people here, but I
obviously sit here.
So you know I am of thecommunity but not part of the
(46:00):
community anymore.
So give us an update, atemperature check.
Shanie (46:05):
I think that one of the reasons Israelis ask this
question is because online theyonly see the two poles.
So on one side they see theanti-Zionist movement and the
other side they see a prettytraditional pro-Israel movement
that's very comfortable withNetanyahu and comfortable with
the ongoing war, and they don'tsee the other 80%.
So I'll tell you about them.
(46:26):
The discourse here is honestlywhat it's been for a very long
time among young American Jews,which is to say they believe in
a Jewish state, they care aboutIsrael, they feel connected to
Israel, they follow the newsclosely about Israel and also
they feel that many of Israel'sactions conflict both at a
political and military level,conflict with their values, both
(46:47):
morally and politically.
They have enormous empathy forPalestinians and for Israelis
and they feel a sense of urgencyto resolve this conflict as a
whole and, of course, the waritself.
I actually think that's reallyamazing because it shows how
resilient the relationship isYoung American Jews.
They may feel really conflictedabout things Israel does, but
(47:08):
they don't feel conflicted aboutthe fact that Israel needs to
exist, the fact that Israel isstill the Jewish homeland.
To me that's really importantthat their relationship is
resilient enough to survivebeyond that.
So I think of it as prettypositive, and we need to, of
course, meet the moment andbuild spaces for the vast
majority who are sitting in thatkind of uncomfortable space of
(47:28):
not knowing how to be supportive.
Right, how can they support theIsraelis on the ground who
share their values when thegovernment doesn't represent
them, et cetera, et cetera.
So that's kind of where most ofthe people I speak to are at
and that's where most of thedata points.
Neri (47:42):
Interesting.
So basically support Israel perse, but maybe not the
government or certain policies,especially vis-a-vis the war in
Gaza.
It's probably a healthyposition to be in.
It's probably well, notprobably.
It is the position of themajority of the Israeli public
according to every opinion poll.
Do you see people that are kindof on the fence, shifting one
(48:06):
way or the other?
So people that have become kindof very pro, I guess,
pro-government or pro-currentpolicy versus other people that
have been like oh well, you know, the war and the policies being
pursued by this government haveput me off Israel completely.
Shanie (48:23):
I think the longer the war goes on, the harder it's
become, and I joke that for thepast two years I've been saying,
oh, once the war ends it'll beso much easier to rebuild and
have these really importantdialogues and conversations.
Meanwhile we're still sittinghere at almost the two-year
point of the war, so at acertain point it does become
really challenging to pick toseparate Israel from the war,
(48:44):
especially when where I thinkAmerican Jews diverge a little
bit more from Israelis in theground is when it comes to the
military.
Ultimately, the IDF iscomprised of Israelis' brothers
and sisters and sons anddaughters, and so they're not
going to be as critical asAmerican Jews who are sitting
all the way over here andreading about things that make
them deeply uncomfortable andcritical in the news.
(49:06):
That Israelis may not feelpretty connected, and I'm really
curious about how Israelisinterpret the American discourse
if you have anything to add onthat and the types of questions
you're hearing.
But I appreciate knowing thatpeople care at least and want to
(49:27):
know what's going on on thisside of the ocean.
Neri (49:30):
They do care.
It is a major topic ofconversation, by the way, not
just the American Jewishcommunity and where they are
vis-a-vis Israel in the war, butalso just American public
opinion in general and wherethey are vis-a-vis the war.
I don't know if you'll like myanswer, but Israelis aren't the
most sophisticated watchers andanalysts of American society or
(49:54):
politics.
I know that's, I know that'sshocking.
No, no, uh, I mean, I've beensaying this for for years uh,
whenever you sit down with withan israeli you know me being
american uh, the israeli will,will, I don't say mansplain, but
israelis play in americanpolitics to me, uh, well, it's
(50:16):
just a trait, right, and I don'tappreciate it, but I'm nothing
if not polite about it.
I don't tell them they have noidea what they're talking about,
but oftentimes they have noidea what they're talking about.
So that's a long way of sayingfor many Israelis.
I think it's a caricature,right?
Israelis don't see the nuancein the debate in America,
(50:38):
especially amongst American Jews, about them, ie Israel and the
war in the Middle East, right?
So they think either everyoneor a certain segment is with
them and then another segmentshall remain, nameless is
against them.
And it's really kind of black orwhite for many Israelis,
(50:59):
whereas when I do engageIsraelis on the issue of
American politics and publicopinion and Israel, I say there
is a lot of nuance to the debate, that you can be a deep, deep
and committed friend of Israeland be very critical of certain
policies and Israelis sometimesdon't understand that difference
(51:24):
and that nuance, which I don'tknow if it's new, but I think
it's definitely very commonplacehere since October 7th.
And it's a shame because youcan't really have a constructive
conversation when one side ieyour side, shani, geographically
at this point is waking up andfollowing events here very, very
(51:47):
closely and the other side, iemy side here in Israel, just
view everything through thiskind of prism of bad good.
Yes, no, pro anti.
You know it's a caricature.
Again, I don't know how closelyIsraelis follow, you know, the
debate inside America likeAmericans and really American.
Shanie (52:09):
Jews especially follow the debate inside Israel.
I think what's most importantfor me for Israelis to
understand is that they're notan island.
Neri (52:37):
no-transcript they get.
It also impacts you, right, aswe've seen tragically over the
past 21 months.
Shanie (52:51):
Unfortunately, yes, and I don't believe that Israel, on
a personal level, I don'tbelieve that Israel need, on a
personal level, I don't believeIsrael should be making
decisions on its nationalsecurity based on how it impacts
diaspora Jews not that, but Ihappen to, but I happen to not
agree with a lot of itsdecisions.
So it's just a happy coincidence, but, um, but if it were those
were the right decisions forIsrael, then they should make
(53:12):
those right decisions.
And we will need to navigateanti-Semitism here, which you
know in some ways could put usat odds with them.
But that's our responsibilityto handle our side of the ocean
and their responsibility tohandle theirs in some way.
Neri (53:27):
Sure and I think again, this is not a new debate, this
has been true for decades right,that Israel will do what it
deems necessary and fit for itsown national security.
Uh, interests as, as thegovernment of the day sees it,
fine, uh.
But my point is, it wasn't justabout diaspora jewry, right,
it's just israel standing in theworld, including amongst
(53:49):
diaspora jews.
Uh needs to be a majorcomponent of israeli decision
making and a major component ofhow Israel understands its own
national security, and that is,shall we say, lacking of late in
a major, major way.
Shanie (54:07):
On that I agree, certainly in Israel.
The way that they are perceivedworldwide does affect their
national security in tangibleways as well in the long term.
So it needs to be consideredwhen making any of these
calculations.
Neri (54:20):
Right, and just final question to you, going back to
what you said earlier.
I mean, are the questions thatyou and IPF get?
Is it pretty much about theGaza war, the humanitarian toll
and disaster inside the Strip,the death toll?
I mean, is it pretty much justthe images and videos and the
headlines that people see forweeks and months on end, whereas
(54:43):
in Israel obviously we'vetalked about it on the podcast
before it's not something theaverage daily sees on a daily
basis through its media diet.
Again, that's a lot ofself-censorship, although that
is also cracking over the pasttwo or three months.
So is it as simple as like.
Yes, the carnage in Gaza is sobad that I believe X, y and Z
(55:06):
about wider issues, not just theactual war.
Shanie (55:10):
Honestly, neri, more than anything else, I think it's
the aid and you and I know, andyou've discussed in this
podcast, the very many reasonswhich of course include a lot of
Hamas, hamas's actions thatlead to the aid issues.
But hundreds of Palestinianshave been killed while seeking
aid.
People know that.
They're very aware of that.
They also know that atdifferent points in time, for
different reasons, israel hascut off aid but also tried to
(55:33):
distribute at different times.
So they're seeing a lot ofconflicting behavior here.
I think a lot of it comes downto the aid.
I think other pieces people canlook away from, because they
will argue and understand thatit's a complicated war zone,
that Hamas is operating there,et cetera.
I think people are a lot lessforgiving when it comes to the
aid piece.
So that's just important to say.
Neri (55:53):
I think that's a fair point and an important point and
one, like I said, that is evencracking the high, high walls of
the average Israeli's mindpost-October 7th and hopefully
the government does shift tack,regardless of the ceasefire,
which, again, you're going tosee a lot more aid go in as part
(56:15):
of the deal.
But even before the deal, I'dargue, and probably, agree,
shani, that it needs to happentoday, tomorrow, god willing.
Thanks, neri.
Thank you, shani.
Have a good rest of the summer.
Hopefully we'll catch up soon,hopefully once the fighting has
(56:38):
been paused at least, and Hodgescome out, hopefully we'll have
a ceasefire next time we chat.
Shanie (56:44):
Amen amen.
Neri (56:45):
Bye, take care.
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