Gaza: Escalation or a Deal?

On this episode, Chief Policy Officer Michael Koplow and Distinguished RAND Israel Policy Chair Shira Efron join Tel Aviv-based journalist and Policy Advisor Neri Zilber to discuss the current juncture in the Gaza war, including Israel's impending Gaza City offensive, prospects for a deal, Israel's mass demonstrations on Sunday, the humanitarian situation in Gaza, the role of the Trump administration, and more.

Support the show

Follow us on Instagram, Twitter/X, and Bluesky, and subscribe to our email list here.

Episode Transcript

Speaker 1 (00:05):
Shalom and welcome to Israel Policy Pod.
I'm Nery Zilber, a journalistbased in Tel Aviv and a policy
advisor to Israel Policy Forum.
So a lot to discuss, as always.
But this week we have ourregular catch-up with Israel
Policy Forum's very own ChiefPolicy Officer, michael Koplow,
and our dear friend andcolleague, shira Efron, who, as

(00:26):
of today, in fact, is a seniorfellow at the RAND Corporation
and their distinguished IsraelPolicy Chair.
So mabruk and mazel tov toShira from all of us.
All eyes obviously are still onGaza and the war, so we touched
on if and how Israel's muchthreatened offensive into Gaza

(00:46):
City would play out and couldplay out.
We also talked about the massdemonstrations across Israel on
Sunday demanding a deal torelease the hostages and end the
war and definitely not escalateinto Gaza City, and we also
talked about the humanitariansituation inside Gaza as well,
as the Trump administrationCan't get away from it.
As we were recording, reportscame out that there may be

(01:11):
emphasis on, may be somemovement on, a new slash old
ceasefire deal between Israeland Hamas Obviously good news
and, don't worry, we got intoall of that as well.
A great conversation with thesetwo, as always.
So let's get to michael andshira hi michael hi shira.

Speaker 3 (01:28):
Welcome back to the podcast hi guys, hi mary, hi
michael uh, hi to you both.

Speaker 1 (01:36):
Uh, we're recording this monday afternoon, tel aviv
time.
I think it's maybe been 48hours since we all saw each
other.
Uh, I told you both at dinneron Friday night don't talk shop,
save it all for the podcast.
So here we are.

Speaker 2 (01:52):
Although I'm not sure that was a successful order.

Speaker 1 (01:55):
Never, never.
Successful order.
What food-wise?

Speaker 2 (01:59):
No, I'm not sure it was a successful directive from
you.
I think we probably talked someshop anyway.

Speaker 3 (02:05):
Yeah, but it's when are?

Speaker 2 (02:08):
we going to talk about Michael's t-shirts?
No, apparently my t-shirts arecontroversial to some.

Speaker 1 (02:13):
Very, very controversial.
We're going to do like only 20minutes about Michael's t-shirts
and then the rest of the timewe'll talk about the Gaza war
and various other issues relatedto the Gaza war.
No, I'm kidding, but the moralof the story is don't give away
free content, especially orincluding at dinner.
But I just it's really good tosee you both once again.

(02:34):
The big issue, obviously, bothat our dinner and for this
podcast the Gaza War and variousrelated things to the Gaza War
and stemming from it, including,by the way, a big day of
protests here in Israelyesterday, on Sunday, which
we'll also touch on.
But I wanted to start withgeneral thoughts about the new

(02:56):
potential threatened offensiveby Israel into Gaza City that
the Netanyahu government orderedabout 10 days ago exactly.
We got into the details of theoperation last week on the
podcast with Michael Milsteinthat the Netanyahu government
ordered about 10 days agoexactly.
We got into the details of theoperation last week on the
podcast with Michael Milstein adeep dive, and I don't think he

(03:17):
minced his words or held backabout what he thought about this
offensive.
But I'm curious to get yourthoughts as we start off the
conversation.

Speaker 2 (03:36):
As we start off the conversation, michael, what do
you think about the idea of theoffensive?
The timeline for when it couldstart is that.
It's almost as if people haveno short-term memories.
How many times have we heardthat an offensive is going to be
the thing that gets thehostages back and that defeats

(03:57):
Hamas?
We don't have to go back thatfar.
Just let's go back only a fewmonths to Gideon's chariots.
That was also supposed to bethe thing that was going to
definitively break Hamas andbring back the hostages.
It has not brought back evenone living hostage.
Not one was rescued during thisoperation.

(04:21):
If you listen to the Israeligovernment, it clearly hasn't
broken Hamas, because now weneed yet another offensive
that's allegedly going to breakHamas.
So I don't understand whypeople keep on believing the
rhetoric.
I do understand why the Israeligovernment keeps on selling it
because they don't have anyother ideas, and so I feel like

(04:44):
I've described this as GroundhogDay on this podcast.
I don't even know how manytimes consistently now for
almost two years, but it's justthe thing.
That is the abiding way for meto describe all of this.
It's Groundhog Day.
It's the same thing over andover again, and this offensive,
if it actually happens, is notgoing to be any more successful

(05:06):
than the previous one or the onebefore that or the one before
that, and, furthermore, gideon'schariots caused unbelievable,
incalculable damage to Israel inall sorts of ways.
I know we're going to talk laterabout the United States and
what's going on, but we have thecondemnation coming from all

(05:30):
over the place about thehumanitarian situation, which,
of course, was directly linkedto Gideon's chariots.
We have pretty much everybody atthis point, except for the
United States, signing on tounilaterally recognize a
Palestinian state in September,something that I think is a bad
idea and that isn't going toactually accomplish anything for
Palestinians but just feedsinto the sense of Israel's

(05:54):
isolation.
And I got to tell you here inthe United States, where there's
this perception, that it's fine, the US is on board and
whatever the government and theIDF want to do, they have the
backing of the Trumpadministration.
That might be true, but prettymuch with every other
constituency in this country,israel is failing and failing

(06:18):
badly.
So I just I think thisoffensive is going to be just as
bad, if not worse, when pushcomes to shove, than the one
that just ended, as to whetherit's going to start or not.
To me, this is entirely aboutIsraeli politics and Bibi's
political survival, and when theKnesset reconvenes in October,

(06:41):
he'll decide whether he needsthis offensive or whether he
doesn't, and that's what's goingto determine whether it happens
or not.

Speaker 1 (06:47):
So hold that thought about the reaction in America
and Israel's growinginternational isolation.
We'll touch on it later onShira, what do you think?
And also, by the way, shira,why was the IDF so opposed to
this plan, which was ultimatelyapproved by the cabinet?
And well, chief of Staff YaelZamir in the IDF is, by order,

(07:09):
moving ahead with plans for thisoffensive.

Speaker 3 (07:13):
Right.
So, first of all, in terms ofwhere the IDF is on this, you
know the chief of staff isspeaking a lot about the need
for soldiers and officers to getyou know refreshing up.
People have been in reserveduty for 650 days.
This is unimaginable.
It's taking an immense toll onthe enlisted soldiers, but also

(07:34):
on the reservists, israel, atthe end of the day, this is a
small military right and it's asmall country.
So if you look at what ishappening in practice in the IDF
, it doesn't look like there'snow.
We're about to break into ahuge operation and this will be
a huge operation.
So it is a question of ifMichael is talking about after

(07:54):
the holidays.
There is supposedly a directivefrom the government to begin
this operation before October7th.
I don't know what begin meansoperation before October 7th.
I don't know what begin means.
I also know that often we hearabout fighting that is happening
and about operations, but youknow this, neri, also very well
that in practice there's verylittle fighting that is

(08:15):
happening in Gaza.

Speaker 1 (08:16):
Yeah.

Speaker 3 (08:17):
And there has been very little fighting for a long
time.
So also when there werehumanitarian pauses, for
instance, this was almost afacade, because in areas where
there was no fighting to beginwith, we talk about aerial
strikes, but also those arelimited and soldiers just sit
there holding a line, not evenperforming policing.

Speaker 1 (08:34):
Destroying infrastructure, buildings,
looking for tunnels.

Speaker 3 (08:38):
I mean, they're not actually fighting or just
sitting there and waiting to betold what to do in a great heat
wave, like others there andwaiting to be told what to do in
a great heat wave, like others?
I'm not.
This has been basically justholding forward, but not active
fighting.
It doesn't mean there are nocasualties obviously more on the
Palestinian side, but alsosoldiers, but they're hit by
IEDs and other things, but notthe active fighting that we've

(09:00):
seen before.
So we'll see if this operationis operation, this stage of the
fighting is implemented or not.
I agree with Michael that weheard that the bane of our
existence, right, the bastion ofour support, was the Rafah
crossing at the time.
Then it was right, philadelphia, and then it was Han Yunus, and

(09:22):
then it was Jabalia and Zaytun,and now it's the last one we're
promising you.
It's Gaza City, and after GazaCity it's going to be the
central camps and everyone'sgoing to be shoved into the
Muassi.
And I think, before even I gointo the costs, which I do want
to elaborate on for Israel, notjust the international damage

(09:42):
but other things that are- youknow sort of like more tangible
that we can reach.
My understanding is that theunderlying assumption that this
more pressure eventually willlead to Hamas surrender, hamas
will give up.
Now I don't know of any otherjihadist organization in the

(10:04):
world that has ever given up.
So this is an assumption.
If it hasn't worked with forceuntil now, we'll just apply more
force, and that will help, eventhough it can make Hamas have
even less to lose.
And if this is the directionwhere we're going, because it
hasn't worked until far, I thinkwhat makes sense to ask Israel

(10:24):
is okay, let's operationalizethis.
Let's say I'm with you inHebrew, zoemet.
Okay, whatever you say, Iaccept it didn't work until now.
Because we didn't do it.
Well, let's do it again.
How does Hamas surrender looklike?
How does Hamas disarmament looklike?
Is there a big box and a tent,everyone goes, gives their
kalach, we leave.

(10:45):
What does exile mean?
Who do you want to exile?
Is it 10 people?
Is it 200?
Like, I think, even if we'renot, we cut Israel some slack
and say, well, maybe this timeit will work, even though it
hasn't worked in 23 months.
How do you actuallyoperationalize all the stuff?
And you don't have that?
And this is, I think, is veryunfair for all of us.
I just heard President Trump.

(11:07):
He just tweeted on his truesocial many, many things.
Not all of them were OK.
I'm not sure everything wasaccurate, but he did say that
Not all of them were okay.
I'm not sure everything wasaccurate, but he did say that
Not everything was coherent.
I'm going to be, again, Ihaven't done the fact checking.
I will just say that I thinkhe's saying the hostages will

(11:32):
come back only when Israelfinishes Hamas.
So I think with this trump, uh,green light wait, shira, hold
on.

Speaker 1 (11:40):
This is you're breaking news in a live
recording with.
Well, you're breaking news forme.

Speaker 3 (11:45):
Oh, it was just like 10 minutes before we got on the
phone so wait he.

Speaker 1 (11:49):
He tweeted out basically full-on 100 support
for the israeli offensive hesaid one.

Speaker 3 (11:56):
the last things he said was Basically.
It's interpreted in Israelbasically Trump saying the
hostages will be released I'mreading the Hebrew translation
when Hamas will be destroyedcompletely.
And in Israel it's interpretedas the message from the
president is fight, but fight towin and do it quick.
So that's how it's interpretedhere.

Speaker 1 (12:14):
That's major news.

Speaker 2 (12:17):
Yeah, win and do it quick.
So that's how it's interpretedhere.
That's major news, I mean alsoin line with what he told
reporters last week.
So at least he's maintainingsome consistency for a few
minutes.

Speaker 3 (12:29):
But then we come to the question what does victory
look like?
We never receive this answer,right?
Is it every teenager with agreen bandana on their forehead
eliminated?
Is it something?
And we haven't received this?
Now, when we're talking aboutthe specifics here and we also
talk about why the IDF has beenso opposed, this has immense

(12:50):
implications.
First of all, it's for IDFsoldiers.
Right, there are going to becasualties, and many, not just
the IDF.
It's de facto.
They're not going to call itlike this, but this is the
general's plan.
Right, we're going to put,we're going to buy fire.
It's a forced displacement ofpeople from Gaza and anyone who
is not going to leave to thedesignated areas and they're not

(13:11):
going to be in many designatedareas, because the territory
that Israel is talking aboutcondensing the opposition is
small, smaller than thepopulation should have Then, if
we're talking about this andanyone who stays, they will
assume they're a fighter orsomething and will be the siege.
So there's going to be immensehumanitarian damages and, in

(13:34):
terms of occupation, just thecost of this if this eventually
leads to some sort of fulloccupation and the establishment
of a military rule, which Iknow Netanyahu says he doesn't
want to, but you can get draggedinto this.
We are talking about KarnitFlug, who was from the central

(13:57):
back of Israel and now with theIsrael Democracy Institute, idi.
She had a podcast on this.
I urge our listeners to listento her.
But the costs are enormous.
Like to set up the only thisoperation now could be 25

(14:22):
billion shekels for the militarystep.
In terms of the 20 billionshekels a year for running Gaza
right, not talking about thecost.
I mean, if you look at theproposal of how much it is just
to quadruple, like GHFoperations, this is immense.
And already Israel, among theOECD countries, is a country
that has way more militaryexpenses to civilian ones.
I mean, what kind of countrywill you have if you do this?
So is immense.
And already Israel, among theOECD countries, is a country
that has way more militaryexpenses to civilian ones.
I mean, what kind of countrywill you have if you do this?
So, and not to mention all theother issues.

(14:43):
So I'm sure the chief of staff,he knows this and he knows what
it's going to do, buteventually it's a democracy
right, and he received an orderand I think he is at the stage
where he is trying to mitigatethe damage and have the sort of
plan that will create moredamage and maybe even stole

(15:05):
through the bureaucracy, throughletting the soldiers be out,
and I'm sure he will never admitit, but this looks like where
it's going looks like where it'sgoing.

Speaker 1 (15:14):
No, he can't admit it , especially since, on a daily
basis, he's under immensepolitical and public pressure by
the defense minister, by theprime minister, by the entire
government and also thegovernment's mouthpieces and the
right-wing quote-unquote mediaecosystem.
So he's under immense pressure,which is why they're at least
moving forward with preparationsfor the plan and this new

(15:38):
offensive.
By the way, just for ourlisteners and viewers, if you
didn't listen to the podcastlast week, Gaza City, the
central camps in the centralGaza Strip and the Mwasi are
basically the three enclavesthat are left that are not
controlled by the IDF, sobasically 25% of Gaza.
That well, netanyahu isthreatening to take care of and

(16:01):
take over, but not, according tohim, occupy, because he wants
to hand it over to an unnamed,yet to be determined
international Arab force.
Again, we don't have to belaborthat point.
That is well, that is almostpie in the sky at this point we
all spent.

Speaker 3 (16:20):
We all spent, uh, the last weekend um in an unnamed
conference with many arabofficials with unnamed people
and but everyone took um made itpretty clear that no such arab
force exists.
Not in this context, obviously,and we wrote it ourselves.
Obviously, if it's in thecontext of a political horizon

(16:42):
for the Palestinians andrecovery and reconstruction, you
can get Arab support.
But this whole concept of likeno Palestinian state forever and
we're going to annex territoryin the West Bank.

Speaker 1 (16:53):
And no Palestinian authority, which is a major uh
condition for the arabinternational uh community maybe
no palestinians yeah, uh, again, we don't have to get into all
the details, it's um, well, theday after, as you both know,
better than better than most uh,there has been no serious
thinking on the israeli sideabout the day after this war

(17:15):
ends, if it ends.
And I will say just from mypoint of view, I actually take
this government at their wordwhen they are threatening and
ordering the IDF to prepare andlaunch this operation.
I think, barring any diplomaticintervention and some kind of
deal, I think there will be anoffensive into Gaza City in the

(17:37):
coming weeks, I think before theHigh Holy Days.
I don't think it's going to bevery popular to start it on Erev
Chag, so I think they'llprobably try to start it
beforehand and try to kind ofmitigate the public backlash.
October 7th, obviously thisyear, is right in the middle of
the Chagim, so I don't thinkthey're going to wait until the

(18:00):
first week of October to launchit.
And you hear it from Netanyahuand really over the past week,
on an almost daily basis, he'srepeating the five principles
and five conditions, thesemaximalist conditions that he
has for the end of the war, andhe's promising once again a
swift victory, whatever thatmeans.

(18:21):
And at a certain point he willhave to make good on something,
if not actual victory, then atleast the perception of movement
on the ground, in the militaryspace, to convince the Israeli
public, and especially his base,that he is working towards some
kind of resolution to the war.
That's what Netanyahu ispromising publicly for well, for

(18:45):
now a week and a half, twoweeks consistently, and I don't
think he can just, I don't knowstall or allow it to be stalled.
You know, whether he can acceptthe deal, I think is a
different conversation whichwe'll touch on in just a second
and final point.
Tashira's well-taken point.
What does victory look like?
What does the defeat of Hamaslook like?

(19:06):
What does disarming Hamas looklike?
Will Hamas, on a personal level, these thousands of young men
with Kalashnikovs, ak-47s, willthey just hand over the AK-47s?
Is that the bar?
And again, it doesn't even haveto do with Israel.
It's only for their ownpersonal protection from all the
many people in Gaza who hatethem.
So are they expected to go intothat proverbial or literal tent

(19:30):
and hand over their AK-47sbecause Israel demanded that
they do so?

Speaker 2 (19:36):
Or is it more likely and, at the beginning, right?
The expectation is that thishappens first and then after
there will be some sort ofIsraeli withdrawal or ceasefire
and the problem?

Speaker 3 (19:48):
is what's happening in Lebanon, right, which is
where there's a historicaldecision by the Lebanese cabinet
to disarm Hezbollah, withinstruction to the army to work
on this plan and, God willing,it will be successful and
Lebanon needs all the help thatthey can.
Right, but like if you canportray a victory over Hezbollah

(20:09):
where the situation is.
Hezbollah, I would argue, ismore organized than Hamas today,
right, and its stocks are notdepleted.
It suffered a big damage, sowhy can't you tell the same
story about Hamas?
You have an off-ramp if youwanted one.

Speaker 1 (20:26):
Yeah, but Netanyahu, to my point, he's made clear
that he does not want thatoff-ramp.
He's not preparing the publicfor that off-ramp, Quite the
opposite.
He's steering in the oppositedirection.
At a certain point, even forNetanyahu, who's a master
spinner and can sell ice toEskimos and sand to the

(20:47):
residents of Beersheba, even forhim, I think that's a bridge
too far to mix multiplemetaphors.
That's a bridge too far to mixmultiple metaphors.
So yeah.
And again, why can't he accept asimilar end to the war that he
agreed to with Hezbollah inLebanon, in Gaza, with Hamas?

(21:09):
Because he's promised totalvictory for 22 months and he
doesn't want to step back, andnow, obviously with the backing
of the us president.
Uh, maybe he feels like hedoesn't have to um, I want to
make one.

Speaker 2 (21:25):
I want to make one, one last point on this, which is
that yesterday israel had ahuge general strike that shut
down all sorts of things, andyou had, you know, somewhere
between hundreds of thousandsand a million people in various
places on the streets.
And the government's maincriticism is that every single

(21:45):
time, israelis go out andprotest that they want an end to
the war and they want thehostages back home, it gives
strength to Hamas and it makesthem raise their price and
become more intransigent innegotiations.
What happens when the Israeligovernment keeps on launching

(22:05):
operations and each one issupposed to be the one that's
going to destroy Hamas and itdoesn't happen.
So then they say it again andit doesn't happen.
They say it again and itdoesn't happen.
Why does that not give strengthto Hamas?
Why does that not raise theprice for the hostages?
I've lost track of how manytimes we've been on the cusp of
an operation that's going todefeat Hamas and bring total
victory, and every time itdoesn't happen.

(22:26):
You don't hear the folks in thegovernment saying oh well,
maybe promising it again isgiving strength to Hamas.

Speaker 1 (22:41):
Yeah, I mean you're looking for consistency from a
government who doesn't careabout public opinion gaslights
on these issues and nearly everyother issue.
It's like I've said this beforeon this podcast but in every
argument it's heads I win, tailsyou lose.
So you can't win an argument.
In every argument, it's heads Iwin, tails you lose, right, so
you can't win an argument.
And even the best example wasyesterday, during these mass

(23:02):
demonstrations which, again, Iwasn't here to cover them, so
I'm going to be a bit humblewith regard to the scope and the
scale, but I think it wasdefinitely the largest
demonstration since lastSeptember, after the six
hostages were killed andmurdered in Rafah, in the
tunnels of Rafah, in southernGaza.

(23:24):
So we had a big, bigdemonstrations and not a general
strike, but a nationwidepartial strike back then I think
I don't know if it was biggerthan last September, but
significant nonetheless,although I would maybe quibble
with the numbers.
And the strike didn't includethe biggest trade labor union in

(23:45):
the East of the route, so itwasn't, you know, the country
was still functioning, but againit's.

Speaker 3 (23:50):
But the streets were empty, neri.
I mean I went by, you know,just like Main Street in Tel
Aviv driving.
I mean I went by, you know,just like Main Street in Tel
Aviv driving.
I got back yesterday and I meanit seemed like I'm sure there
was GDP.
You know, sort of the economicactivity of the country has not
stopped and maybe he hasn'temerged, but lots of stores were
closed with, I mean in the TelAviv center area.

(24:11):
We're out, we're striking, we'rewith hostages, we're on the
streets.
The reports are talking about400,000 demonstrators.
I don't know if it's true, butit was big Look.

Speaker 1 (24:21):
Far be it for me to minimize these demonstrations
honestly, as someone who is outon the streets with them usually
.
But my colleague in Jerusalemsaid Jerusalem was completely
normal, so we shouldn'tnecessarily extrapolate Tel Aviv
to the entire country.
We have to be wary of that forour own biases.
But, again, significantlynonetheless.

(24:43):
Even more significant was thereaction by the government right
.
So nearly every governmentminister and coalition member
tweeted out in late morning whatyou alluded to, that this is
only giving support to Hamas.
It's only hardening Hamas'sposition.
It will how did they say it?
It will stop the hostages fromcoming home.

(25:04):
Netanyahu said it verbatim.
He also said that it would leadto another October 7th if we
end the war.
So basically blaming thevictims of Hamas again, the
hostage families and the peopleof the families, the relatives
of those who were killed, thatwere leading these
demonstrations and this strikeaction.
So he's blaming the victims ofHamas for helping Hamas.

(25:24):
He's helping.
He's arguing that the familiesof hostages are the ones who
don't want to bring their lovedones home again and again.
So it's complete and uttergaslighting.
Up is down, down is up.
I think.
The question to you, and we'lltouch on the demonstrations
first, shira, you know.

(25:44):
Do you think it'll move theneedle right?
So do you think it'ssustainable?
Do you think, you know, likethe hostage families are calling
for to shut down the country,do you think they'll actually
succeed?
I?

Speaker 3 (25:56):
don't know.
First of all, I just breakingnews here, right, so it's also
reported.
The Al Arabi channel justreported that Hamas gave their
answer to the mediators and thecontext of there's context for
President Trump's tweet, whichis basically, like Hamas was
given, you know, a fight, kindof a final offer and if not,

(26:19):
hold us, we're coming in.

Speaker 1 (26:22):
You're doing a great job of you're like a broadcast
journalist.

Speaker 3 (26:25):
Sure, I'm a broadcast journalist.

Speaker 1 (26:27):
But the audience, the audience, basically, is just me
and Michael, because it's goingto come out tomorrow and all of
this.
We don't know.

Speaker 3 (26:38):
But I'm just saying I don't know if it's going to
move a deal or not a deal,because I'm not optimistic, but
but if, if, if we play this outright and again, it might be not
relevant tomorrow.
If Hamas says yes and thenIsrael says, oh, screw this, we

(27:08):
can't.
We are not going to go forpartial deal because now we are
going for the mindset in Israel.
I mean, a lot of peopleunderstand that, a lot of the
reasons why I'm not.
There's nothing good to sayabout hamas, nothing right
there's.
No, I can't believe.
After two years, I even have tosay this it's not about this.

Speaker 1 (27:22):
But hamas has been fairly consistent about wanting
demanding an end of the war, andisrael said no, um, so in
israel and, by the way, israelhas said no, and also israel's
demands of Hamas are maximalist,right, essentially surrender,
complete capitulation.

Speaker 3 (27:38):
Right, and Israel violated the terms of the
January ceasefire, in a senseright, because it didn't agree
to discuss the end of the warafter 42 days Anyway.
So I'm just saying like it alldepends, I guess, on what also
Hamas says now and how is itportrayed now says now and how

(28:00):
is it portrayed now.
And then, if the Israeli publicis enraged so much to to
continue this protest and shutdown the country.
But you know, the Israelipublic is is tired, right,
there's fatigue here, it'sreally hard.
But the fact that there were somany people in Tel Aviv, you
know, on the streets yesterday,in August, I think it does tell
you something.
And all these steps that arehappening against the Israelis

(28:21):
and Jews, obviously around theworld, and there are there's an
awakening of parents, parents tosoldiers that don't want them
to go because they don't want usto fight.
So it's not just about thehostages, right, the hostages
are a big, big, big part of it,but there's so much more.

(28:41):
If this turns into sort of thetipping point, that does
something and if the governmentresponds Right, because this is
a question, as you said before,do they care?
They care about what their basesays, not about the rest of the
country.

Speaker 2 (28:52):
Right, right.
Even even if they aresuccessful shutting down the
country, I don't know that it'llmake a difference.
You know the polls that are outjust today show, every single
poll shows that the governmentis still massively underwater.
And it doesn't matter whatcombination of opposition
parties you have, whether youknow Eisenhower is running on
his own or with Lapid or withBennett, every single poll shows

(29:13):
this current coalition at 49 or50 seats.
I don't see anything they cando to turn it around.
So if the country is shut downby protests, is that going to
get this government that has notbeen responsive to public
opinion on anything?
Is that going to get them toshift course?
I don't think it will, and Isay that with my sympathies,

(29:34):
basically completely with theprotesters and the hostage
families and their gold and whatthey want.
I just don't know that thiswill be an effective tactic.

Speaker 3 (29:43):
But it's still important right, because there
is signaling and also feel thatthere's hope.
Officials sent Trump a pictureof this protest to do to show
that the Israeli public is theviews of the Israeli government
that they represent is notrepresenting of the view of the
Israeli public, and I think youknow this gaslighting narrative.

(30:05):
You spoke about how we are not.
We are.
I was on the street.
People that are protesting arethe defeatist that are giving
Hamas the chance to have anotherOctober 7th and only because of
them, right, hamas will not win.

Speaker 2 (30:19):
I mean, I think there's no one in this country
that doesn't want Hamas defeated, but there are a lot of people
who don't want to commit suicideon the way and this is the
issue and Lapid was making thepoint yesterday and today,
clearly for the audience of onein the White House that look at
what's going on in the streetsof Israel.
This is representative of theIsraeli people and Israeli

(30:40):
public opinion, not necessarilywhat you're hearing from the
prime minister or from JohnDermott.

Speaker 1 (30:47):
But well, if the response by that audience of one
Donald Trump was a green lightfully backing the Israeli
government's position, then Idon't think those images from
last night in Tel Aviv and thetweets from Lapid really swayed
him.

Speaker 3 (31:02):
I guess Otherwise maybe we would have seen a
different reaction.
Right.
But I mean sorry, I'm justgoing to say like, yeah, dual
citizen, the whole thing, right,it's fine.
But I mean as an Israeli, I'msaying it's OK, you get a green
light from Trump and it's reallyimportant.
Israel's strategic right, themost important ally, it's all
good.
Trump's money, occupation,diplomatic.

(31:30):
Israel's going on the pathwayof I mean the things I'm hearing
now it's like the South Africalane, right.
So you know it's fine if Trumpsays that, but this is not the
only consideration Israel has.
And again, I just want to couch, because I don't know if the
president issued this threat aspart of the idea to pressure
Hamas in its response to themediators thing.

(31:52):
But you know, the presidentsays he can say a lot of things.
He doesn't need to implementthe plan.

Speaker 4 (32:00):
Israel Policy Forum is a policy organization rooted
in the Jewish community.
Our mission is to build supportfor a secure Jewish democratic
Israel through a viableresolution to the Israeli
Palestinian conflict, advancingpragmatic US policy towards the
conflict, us-israel relationsand regional diplomacy among
policymakers and communityleaders.
We promote policy measuresendorsed by credible security

(32:21):
experts, develop analysis andcommentary and convene programs
that engage and educate leadersacross the political,
denominational and generationalspectrums.
Our Young ProfessionalsInitiative, ipf ATT&CK, works to

(32:44):
elevate the discourse amongnext, thank you rely on Israel
Policy Forum for credible andnuanced analysis.
Please make a tax-deductiblegift today at ipfli slash
supportthepod or at the supportthe show link in the show notes.

Speaker 1 (32:58):
No, he doesn't.
And, like you said, what is thecost really to Donald Trump and
the US?
Right, this is Israel's war.
Unlike other fronts across theMiddle East, it doesn't directly
implicate America and Shira, toyour point.
The cost of continuing withthis war and even escalating
this war for the average Israeliis only going up.

(33:21):
So it's everything combined,coupled with potential
demonstrations and strikeactions and what could be the
trigger for largerdemonstrations or a real,
genuine nationwide generalstrike that really shuts down
the country.
I don't know, but I suppose thepeople on the streets last
night and really every weeksince I don't want to say since

(33:43):
the start of the war, but earlyon in the war demanding the
hostages come back there, theyare the platform back there,
they are the platform, they arethe vanguard to uh hopefully get
more people out on the streetsand and a larger uh, larger
mobilization, but uh, look, interms of uh really shutting down
the country.
I think they stood with the biguh trade union federation.

(34:06):
I think they made the rightdecision not joining yesterday.
I know that's probably anunpopular opinion, but this is a
quote-unquote doomsday weaponand a bullet in their chamber
that they can't use too often,if at all.
They have to be very, veryjudicious when they fire that
bullet.

(34:26):
And they squandered a lot ofthat the kind of deterrence
factor with respect to thegovernment last September, when
they did call a general strikeand it was unsuccessful, mostly
because the courts didn't allowit.
They reversed a lot of it.
So they tried to actually shutdown the country last September
and it didn't go that well, Ithink, spurred on Netanyahu to

(34:48):
take various actions on variousfronts because he knew, or
thought, that the threat of areal shutdown of the country
wasn't as great as he had feared.
So you can't, or you should be,sparing with both threatening
this action and also withimplementing this action.
If you're the East of the Lutonand various other big bodies
here here in israel, um, onlywhen it really comes down to it,

(35:10):
either with regard to a gazadeal, or if he tries to fire
whoever, uh really fire theattorney general or do something
completely unconstitutional,then uh, or it violates the
supreme court order, which Ithink is the real red line for
the east, according to their,their chairman, um yes, we're
already well down.

Speaker 2 (35:30):
We're already well down that rabbit hole.

Speaker 1 (35:32):
Yeah, but not down the rabbit hole, but I guess not
over the red line, because youstill need that deterrence and
that is important.
The deterrence is important, soit remains to be seen In terms
of a deal.
I personally think Netanyahuwould probably accept a partial

(35:54):
deal.
60-day ceasefire get half thehostages back.
He allows more time.
It allows the IDF to do thethings that Shira was talking
about.
60 days also gets you past thehakim, past the high holidays.
It's not necessarily a bad dealif Netanyahu can get it, if

(36:14):
Hamas agrees.
What do you think?
You both look at me like maybe.

Speaker 2 (36:20):
Maybe.
I mean it's topsy-turvy landright.
We've spent almost two yearswith the Israeli government
saying only a partial deal, nocomprehensive deal.
And now it's the Israeligovernment saying only a partial
deal, no comprehensive deal.
And now and now it's, you know,the Israeli government saying
only a comprehensive deal, nopartial deal.
And I'm clear if that's all thegovernment, I'm clear if that's
Ron Dermer versus others, andyou know I just there's no way.

(36:46):
There's no way of actuallyknowing what, what they, what
they actually want, what theiractual position is, what the
position of different ministersare, whether they're in line
with the negotiating team or not.
I honestly, at this point, haveno idea what the Israeli
government actually wants, whatthey'd be willing to accept,

(37:08):
what they're going for.
I just don't know.

Speaker 3 (37:11):
And Hamas.
We have to also say Hamas, Imean if you say to Hamas give us
10 live hostages.
I know we're saying the 20 areconsidered to be alive.
We don't know that right.
And there could be less, therecould be fewer.
So for Hamas to sign on apartial deal to give 10, to

(37:34):
return 10, so their asset willbe even less, only for Israel to
better plan for implementingthe master plan to eliminate.
I mean, what is Hamas'calculation when Israel's back
is against the wall?
When they see those assessmentsif I know the numbers, I mean
they know the numbers they seethat the IDF is resisting and is

(37:55):
unhappy about it.
They see the internationalcampaign against Israel.
Let Israel drown.
They want to come into GazaCity.
We're waiting, you're going totry to move us all to the Moasi.
What do you think?
No, because this is reallysomething that I think people
are not talking about Gaza City.
There, I'm talking about GazaCity.
There are three populationcenters now that are big in Gaza
.
Right, it's the Gaza City,where they're considered to be a
million to 1.2 million people.

(38:15):
There's the Muassi area, whichis supposed to be a humanitarian
area, where Israel is, andthere's the central camps In all
those areas.
Who do you think is managingthe affairs?

Speaker 1 (38:30):
It's.

Speaker 3 (38:30):
Hamas Now.
It's not the same as Hamasbefore, but we need to remember
that Hamas is a terroristorganization.
It is a terror army.
It's gone, but is trash stillbeing collected here?
I mean, how are you going to dothis so we can say, if Israel,
michael takes on Israel, butwithout Israel?
And we go back to this, andwe've been talking about this

(38:51):
since I don't know, november of2023, right, without thinking of
the day after, without having aviable plan out of this mess.
And I also just don't seeanyone helping Israel with its
humanitarian bubbles,humanitarian zones, getting out
of this and also what is in itfor Hamas.
It's not just Israel here Iagree with the Israeli

(39:11):
government that says that Hamasdoesn't agree.
Well, put yourself in Hamas'sshoes, would you agree?

Speaker 2 (39:17):
No and for sure.
Yes, I tend to pick on theIsraeli government, but of
course they're dealing withHamas.
I mean, we all know what Hamasis and doesn't need any further
elaboration.
What frustrates me is thatthat's what you expect from a
deeply ideological, islamist,nihilistic, terrorist

(39:38):
organization.
You expect them to constantlybe shifting the goalposts and
not actually care about thepeople that not their citizens,
but the people that they haveresponsibility for.
We're supposed to match thatstandard for the Israeli
government.
We're supposed to have it thatHamas behaves this way, so it's

(39:59):
okay if the Israeli governmentbehaves this way.
No, I expect more from theIsraeli government than Hamas.
So sure, let's remember, hamashas a huge share of blame, of
course, but if we're now at apoint where we expect Hamas and
the Israeli government to havethe same standards, then Hamas
is one.

Speaker 1 (40:19):
Before we do anything , yeah, I mean Israel obviously
has a lot more to lose and Hamashas made it 22 months into this
disaster of their own making.
They have a lot less to losenow than they did on October 6,
2023, and a lot less leadersthat they've already been

(40:45):
eliminated.
So, yeah, it's like a bankrobbery with hostages, where the
police outside are saying, well, we don't really care about the
hostages and we're going toboth take out the robbers and
also retrieve the hostages, whenyou know that the robbers don't
really care about their ownfate and definitely don't care

(41:08):
about the fate of the hostagesthey're holding.
Right, I mean, it's ridiculousand definitely don't care about
the fate of the hostages they'reholding.
It's ridiculous.
The rhetoric and also thestrategy put forward, at least
publicly, by the Israeligovernment, where they continue
to state we're going to botheliminate Hamas and get all of
our hostages back.
How, by, by the way, destroyingGaza City and potentially the

(41:32):
rest of those enclaves thatShira mentioned.
We have to move ahead.
The next topic of conversationthe humanitarian situation in
Gaza, which I know many peopleall over the world are very
aware of, very concerned aboutShira.
You are our resident expert andalso an expert writ large.

Speaker 2 (41:55):
I urge everyone to Everybody's resident expert.

Speaker 1 (41:57):
Yeah, everyone's resident expert.
I urge everyone to go and checkout Not resident.
Yeah, shira's op-ed in the NewYork Times last week laid out
the big picture about thehumanitarian situation and the
aid situation in Gaza right now.
But I'm curious, shira, give usa sense.
Has there been any major shift,slash, improvement, since this

(42:21):
Israeli government changed itspolicy 180 degrees late last
month and finally allowed, Iguess, more aid back into Gaza,
to your understanding?
Has that improved things?

Speaker 3 (42:35):
So, first of all, it has improved things in terms of
how much aid is actually goingin.
Right, there are many moretrucks that are going in.
Where we haven't seenmeaningful improvement is that
the vast majority of thesetrucks and I'm talking about I
haven't checked in the lastthree days, but we're talking
about close to 90% it wasmajority of these trucks and I'm
talking about I haven't checkedin the last three days, but
we're talking about close to 90%it was last week of trucks

(42:57):
maybe are being looted.
The organizations that are ableto get trucks aid in without
being looted use some sort ofprotection.
I'll get to GHF, srs in asecond GHF, the distribution
centers that Israel is in.
They're in a differentsituation.

Speaker 1 (43:15):
The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation.

Speaker 3 (43:17):
Gaza Humanitarian Foundation.
I will get to them in a second.
I think what has not improvedis the.
There are a few things.
First of all, the situation wasso terrible right beforehand
and it takes it would take morethan what we're seeing now to
actually see meaningfulimprovement.

(43:37):
The second thing is that Ithink we're constantly talking
about the food and of course,the food is the most visible
sort of visceral to see theimages from Gaza.
But humanitarian is so muchbigger.
Right, there's the water andsanitation and, you know, a
medical system, a health systemthat really doesn't exist.

(43:57):
I know everyone's talking aboutthe field hospitals, but this
is not a proper health responseto what's happening.
And shelter, with 90% of Gazansare being displaced, and this
is not addressed at all even inthe current response.
I mean, you have some medicines, you have stuff, but the big
scale, the big picture, and thisis not addressed at all even in
the current response.
I mean you have some medicines,you have stuff, but the big
scale, the big picture and youknow, if we look at the core of
this and we go back to likethings we spoke about, it's

(44:19):
really frustrating because thesame conversation, the same
issues, the same fundamentalissues.
Hamas sadly right, and a lot ofthings to Israeli policy
throughout the years grew up tothis monster that it wasn't just
a terrorist organization, youknow, a cruel, cynical terrorist
organization.
It was also the sovereign, itwas the de facto sovereign.

(44:39):
Israel when it fights Hamas, itfights it very legitimately
because it's a terroristorganization.
The humanitarian organizationssort of used to work with Hamas
because it was, you know, thegovernment, you like it or not,
the UN.
You work with them.
We can go into everythingthat's wrong and infiltration of
Hamas into the humanitariansystems and other NGOs.

(45:02):
But the fact is that this dualcharacteristic of Hamas makes it
very difficult to, becauseIsrael went in and wants to
break the system, but withouthaving a proper system in case.
How do you solve the issues?
Then what's wrong also is thatIsrael and the humanitarian
community at large, but led bythe UN, have non-functioning

(45:24):
relationship.
So if you say let's solve thisfundamental problem or let's
discuss it, let's have somegrown up in the room that can
bring us together and kind of,ok, what do we do with this?
You don't have thisconversation, it doesn't exist.
And then, in addition to that,if you look at the logistical
capacity, we have to say it'snot working right, like the

(45:45):
logistical, the UN is broken.
They're not enough people, Iguess, from the trucks that come
from, wherever they come from,through the taxation, security,
security inside Israel, whatIsrael wants?
The registrations organization,the registration prioritizing
the privacy of the people.

(46:05):
I mean we don't have time to gointo the weeds, but the whole
chain is kind of like broken andthose things all feed each
other because Israel says to theUN and Israelis really believe
this, look at those UN, they'renot doing their job and the UN
can't do their job.
And then the UN also says lookat Israel, what is Israel doing?
And Israel says but we'reallowing everything.
So Israel is correct to saythey're not limiting.

(46:27):
But what?
They're only allowing?
The registered organizationthat completes the registration
process.
I think there are four orsomething to bring stuff in.
They there are.
No.
The secure roads arecomplicated and you know the UN
and other organizations.
They can't travel with IDFsoldiers to provide aid.

(46:50):
They don't feel comfortable.
By the way, other organizationsnot.
This is where GHF, the GazaHumanitarian Foundation, differs
.
They, the IDF, created roadsfor them and they are escorted
by IDF security into areas thatare under IDF control.

Speaker 1 (47:07):
Right.

Speaker 3 (47:08):
This is okay for an organization like that, but any
other humanitarian organizationcan.
So I mean what encourages menow not because what occurs now
that I think that, unlike thoseback and forth that we saw with
Israel turning on and off thehumanitarian situation, I think
the message from the UnitedStates and the rest of the world
has been loud and clear and Ithink this policy will remain.

(47:29):
The problem is theimplementation of the policy and
there are a lot of issues tosolve for Israel, but it would
have been good if there would besomeone else helping with those
technical issues.

Speaker 1 (47:46):
What do you mean like an outside influential actor?

Speaker 3 (47:49):
I think the fact that this whole idea is that the
solution is portrayed in Israelis like oh, we are going to
quadruple, have 16 distributioncenters run by GHF instead of
four and thinking this and maybethe US will pay for them?
I've seen the price tag.

Speaker 1 (48:05):
I doubt it, michael for those only listening to us,
michael's face.
When Shira said maybe the USwill pay for it seemed well
classic Michael face.
Yeah.

Speaker 3 (48:16):
I mean, president Trump said that the US is the
only party that gave $60 millionto the humanitarian.
They didn't.
There's a conditionalcommitment to $30 million.
That is a grant that has to gothrough 12 stages for approvals.
The numbers here I'm talkingabout are very entirely scale.
I mean, it's something very,very different.
So if the US pays but even ifthe US pays for it, which I

(48:37):
really doubt because the pricetag is quite big does this solve
the problem?
Does this provide shelter?
Does this provide new communitykitchens?
Does this provide no?
So that's why you need acomprehensive solution that
brings everyone together, youknow, maps out all the issues
and say, okay, let's solve this.
And it would have been if therewas a US serious effort at this

(49:00):
, also with Israel.
And we also need to say I mean,the UN's leadership has not
been a constructive partner onthis Sure.

Speaker 1 (49:13):
That was a good overview, shira.
We could spend an hour just onthe Sure.
That was a good overview, shira.
We could spend an hour just onthe humanitarian situation.
And, yes, I mean this is allthe current situation after the
shift in Israeli policy, themajor shift in Israeli policy,
but before a potential offensivethat will relocate potentially
a million people to a differentarea of Gaza with different

(49:36):
humanitarian and logisticalinfrastructure or lack thereof.
So what kind of humanitarianimpact will that have?
Again, we don't need to answerthat question today, but just as
a thought experiment.
Yeah, it will require a lot todo this properly, and I don't.
Well, after 22 months of war, Idon't see whether the Israeli

(49:59):
system can do that kind ofappropriate planning, and you
know partner organizations inGaza either.

Speaker 3 (50:06):
Which right and, by the way, which is one of the
things that you know at least,it was leaked that the IDF chief
of staff, yael Zamir, did saythis.
He cited several reasons forhis objection for this, but
apparently it was leaked butposted on Israeli press that he
said that.
Where will those million peoplego?

(50:27):
What kind of health response dothey have?
Who's going to take care ofthem.
What do we have now?
So I don't know if it'sencouraging or not, but I'm
reassured that at leastleadership of the idea of the
professional leadership, there'ssomeone who understands the
magnitude of the issues.
It doesn't mean he has thetools, by any means, to address

(50:50):
them.

Speaker 1 (50:51):
Right and those areas where those million Gazan city
folk are supposed to move.
It's a wasteland.
There's nothing there.
Michael, your thoughts aboutthe humanitarian crisis and also
the discourse surrounding thecrisis.

Speaker 2 (51:13):
I defer to Shira completely on the crisis itself.
Nothing I say is going to addto her expertise On the
perception and the rhetoricaround it.
I'm just to build on somethingShira said.
The Israeli government nowkeeps on saying, oh look, we let

(51:33):
in this many tons of food andthis many trucks, and the GHF
keeps on tweeting out how manymillions of quote-unquote meals
they've distributed, when inreality GHF hasn't distributed
even one meal.
A meal is not a 45-pound box ofdry goods that you need water

(51:57):
and oil and a kitchen to be ableto make anything out of.
I would love to see in theUnited States somebody go to a
soup kitchen and say they'regiving out bags of flour and dry
lentils and pasta and claimthat somehow they've made
somebody a meal.
So we're still at this pointwhere the rhetoric on this seems

(52:21):
to be for a lot of people, thepriority.
It's not actually solving theproblem.
It's, you know, can we win theinformation war?
And it's just incrediblydisheartening, the information
war, and it's just incrediblydisheartening.
And when the US plan, you know,as noted, is to increase the
currently what is it, shira?
Three GHF operating sites to 16, but to not actually change the

(52:51):
practice of what they're givingout and how they're
distributing things.
I just don't understand whyanybody thinks this is a viable
plan, even if the US was goingto fund it, which, as you noted
before from my face, theyabsolutely are not.
So I wish that everybody andagain, yes, there's blame here
to go around on literallyeverybody Hamas, the United
Nations, ngos, the IDF, the USadministration, literally

(53:16):
everybody has blame for this.
I just wish that people wouldbe far more focused on how you
actually solve the problemversus everybody here, whether
it's the Israeli government orwhether it's NGOs.
I wish everybody here was notfocused on trying to win the war
as to who is more to blame andwho is more at fault, because

(53:38):
ultimately that is doing nothingfor Palestinians who can't get
food.

Speaker 3 (53:50):
There's an image in the New York Times of a child
suffering from prior conditions,or someone who died of leukemia
and out of hunger.
I mean, first of all, the mostvulnerable society are going to
get hurt first, so it doesn'tmean that people that are sick

(54:11):
and with other previousconditions don't deserve food.
That's one thing.
The second thing is that, withIsrael even if you know, I agree
, that the media, internationalmedia, can be sometimes very
irresponsible and I wish theydid better fact checking on this
it doesn't help Israel's case.
I mean, israel convinces thosewho are already convinced.

(54:33):
Right, everyone helps Else.
It doesn't help, and I can tellyou this from like the number,
from the hate I received overarticles that I wrote where I
said you know, it's a collectivefailure, it's not just Israel,
it doesn't matter at the point.
So this information war doesn'thelp.
I will say, though, now,because I'm on this like I have
this role here of breaking news,so I will say that, according

(54:54):
to Al-Arabiya and Al Jazeera Idon't know one of them that
Hamas said yes to the proposal.
I have no idea what yes byHamas means, and if it's yes,
what are the conditions?
But maybe we're all sopessimistic and, for a change,
some good news.
So you beat me to it.

Speaker 1 (55:13):
I was going to break the news on this podcast.
Oh, some good news.
So you beat me to it.
I was going to break the newson this podcast.
Oh, sorry, sorry but this isyour role today.
You are the journalist, shira.
Yes, according to variousreports in the Arab media, hamas
agreed to an Egyptian, qatariproposal, which I think is for a
60-day ceasefire.
Now, again, the devil is alwaysin the details.

(55:34):
Did Hamas really agree?
What did it agree?

Speaker 2 (55:37):
to.

Speaker 1 (55:38):
And then I imagine, even if they agreed, an Israeli
delegation will have to go toeither Cairo or, more likely,
doha in Qatar, to actuallynegotiate the final details of
whatever this deal is.
And, as we've known, in thisGroundhog Day, to use Michael's
allusion, that's where thingscan get a bit arry.
But hopefully the threats ofthe offensive maybe got Hamas to

(56:03):
move a little bit, like manypeople wanted, maybe even Bibi
Netanyahu, and hopefully theremay be at least a temporary
ceasefire.
But again, we've been down thisroad before, so we shouldn
shouldn't get our hopes too, toohigh.

Speaker 2 (56:16):
I'll add that this will only work if the Egyptian
and Saudi proposal explicitlyhas the sign off of President
Trump's to Wyckoff, becausewe've seen this before too,
where Hamas agrees to somethingthat the Qataris or the
Egyptians before and Israel sayswell, we already agreed to the
Wyckoff framework and it'sdifferent.

Speaker 3 (56:37):
So right and it could be, and we might record this
again tomorrow, because this isall kind of wrong, no, no.
It could be that it's all in thecontext of everyone's trying to
use the Israeli threats to getHamas to agree to ceasefire
terms, and it looks like youknow we call them the Witkoff

(56:58):
model.
So it's an updated Witkoffmodel, but the lines are the
same in 60 days and within itthere's everything we were so
optimistic about a few weeks agoor at least I was optimistic
about a few weeks ago in termsof also a commitment by the
sides to discuss the day afterwithin the framework, which, I

(57:18):
mean, I would obviouslywholeheartedly support.
Let's hope Hamas did say reallyyes and that Israel also said
yes and we're not going to godown this going to be sucked
into a black hole, right that isGaza.

Speaker 2 (57:35):
Yes, if the first segment we recorded today
becomes completely irrelevant,I'll be thrilled.

Speaker 1 (57:40):
Yeah well, we're not going to re-record because a lot
of the things that we talkedabout will still be relevant,
whether or not there may be arenewed push for a partial
ceasefire.
So don't worry, we've been downthe road before over the course
of 22 months of war.
I think we're okay for nowbecause, as we know from this
podcast, some of us werecautiously optimistic,

(58:01):
cautiously pessimistic and adeal didn't materialize last
month, even though I think itwas generally close.
So close doesn't mean an actualdeal, but you could see it from
both sides.
Right?
That for Netanyahu, okay, hecan, like we said, take a 60-day
ceasefire, get the armyprepared, get half the hostages

(58:23):
back, but doesn't have to fullycommit to tending the war.
And oh, by the way, two monthsfrom now brings him exactly to
late october when the knessetcomes back, so he can promise
his far-right allies by lateOctober.
This IDF offensive is going tohappen.
So the political calendar stillworks for Netanyahu.

(58:46):
For Hamas, obviously it canrelieve the pressure on the
battlefield, can forestallincursion into Gaza City.
They can also prepare forwhatever comes next.
But it's not a cost-freedecision by Hamas because, like

(59:06):
Shira said, it's given up halfof its assets right, by the way,
half the living hostages andalso half the deceased hostages,
which we shouldn't forget, notfor a second, to bring them back
for burial in Israel and tobring closure to their families,
without any real guarantee fromthe Israeli side that this will
actually be an end to the war,unless Trump did something

(59:30):
unexpected and provided thatguarantee.
But we don't.
We haven't seen any indicationof that.
So, again, we need to becautiously pessimistic, even if
the reports today are accurate.
I think we should leave itthere for today.
We'll see what happens tomorrow.
There's going to be a lot ofnews on this podcast.
That's going to be a day oldfor our, for our listeners, but

(59:53):
but the analysis, the analysisis still very current and very
spot on.
But I did want to use thisopportunity to wish Shira a big
congratulations in Mazel Tov onher new position at the Rand
Corporation.
She is how should I put it?
She is leaving the IPF home,but not the IPF family.
You're moving out but notleaving the family.

(01:00:17):
So she has assured us and shehas assured me that she will
still be participating on thepodcast.
So for my purposes, that's themost important thing, frankly,
but I couldn't be happier.
So, shira, we'll talk to yousoon and congratulations thank

(01:00:39):
you, thank you.

Speaker 3 (01:00:40):
You better keep inviting me and you know,
michael and you are people Italk to all the time and I
definitely intend to continuetalking to all the time.
So it's really once an IPF, youknow, always an IPFP, and I'm
definitely staying in the familyand I love the organization,
the people, the analysis, themission.

(01:01:01):
So, under maybe a different hat, but I'm committed.

Speaker 1 (01:01:10):
Absolutely, and well, you know I didn't want to leave
it on this note, but to becontinued and hopefully.
Well, we'll see what happens ifthere's a ceasefire or not, but
I hope to have you both onbefore the Hageem to talk about
well, talk about a loomingmeeting in New York having to do
with Palestinian statehood andthe whole international

(01:01:34):
dimension which you didn't havea chance to touch on today.
But to be continued.
So, thank you both, as always.

Speaker 2 (01:01:41):
Thank you guys.

Speaker 3 (01:01:42):
Thank you guys.
Bye, Talk soon.

Speaker 2 (01:01:45):
Bye.

Speaker 3 (01:01:45):
Bye.

Speaker 1 (01:01:46):
Okay, thanks again to Michael Koplow and Shira Efron,
as always, for their generoustime and insights.
Also a special thanks to ourproducer, jacob Gilman, and to

(01:02:09):
all of you.
Thank you for listening anddon't forget subscribe.