June 18, 2025 • 59 mins
This is a recording of an Israel Policy Forum webinar held on Wednesday, June 18, at 1pm ET.
Days into its military campaign against Iran, Israel has racked up an impressive series of achievements: decimating Iran’s top military echelon, setting back its nuclear program, taking out drones and rocket-launchers, and achieving freedom of operation in the skies above Tehran. Yet the war’s impact on the Israeli homefront has been costly, with at least two dozen casualties and unprecedented levels of destruction in central Israel. Israel’s endgame and Washington’s appetite to assist in eliminating Iran’s nuclear program remain unclear.
Israel Policy Forum Washington Managing Director and Senior Fellow Rachel Brandenburg hosts Raz Zimmt, director of the Iran program at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies, and Kenneth Pollack, vice president for policy at the Middle East Institute, to unpack the state of the war.
Follow us on Instagram, Twitter/X, and Bluesky, and subscribe to our email list here.
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (01:21):
Thank you the Hello everyone, and thank you for
joining us today.
My name is Rachel Brandenburg,israel Policy Forum's Washington
Managing Director and SeniorFellow.
I want to welcome those of youwho are joining Israel Policy
Forum for the first time today,as well as our returning viewers
(01:41):
and those listening to ourpodcast, israel Policy Pod.
Before we begin, a big thankyou to Israel Policy Forum
supporters.
Our work, including today'sprogram, is made possible by all
of you.
Israel Policy Forum relies onyour support to produce free
expert analysis andinformational content on the
most pressing issues affectingIsrael and the
(02:03):
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
If you enjoy Israel PolicyForum's webinars but don't yet
support the organization's work,please do so by visiting
israelpolicyforumorg support.
Okay, let's get started.
Over the next hour, I will askour guests a few questions, but
we also welcome audienceparticipation.
Please put any questions youhave for our guests in the chat
(02:25):
and I will incorporate as manyas I am able into the
conversation.
We are so fortunate today tohave with us two very
knowledgeable and experiencedanalysts who have long been
watching and working on issuesrelated to Iran, both within and
outside their respectivegovernments.
I am personally humbled to beon screen with both of them, in
particular Ken, for whom Iworked as an intern nearly 20
(02:48):
years ago, and I'm reallylooking forward to our
conversation.
Dr Raz Zimet joins us fromIsrael, where he is the director
of Iran and the Shiite AxisResearch Program at the
Institute for National SecurityStudies, which many of you
watching probably know as INSS.
Raz holds a master's degree andPhD in Middle Eastern history
(03:10):
from Tel Aviv University, wherehis PhD focused on Iranian
policy toward Nasserism and Arabradicalism between 1954 and
1967.
He has authored the book Iranfrom Within State and Society in
the Islamic Republic.
He has authored the book Iranfrom Within State and Society in
the Islamic Republic, publishedin 2022 in Hebrew, and has
written and commentedextensively on Iranian politics,
society and foreign policy.
(03:31):
Rand Raz is a longtime Iranwatcher, including during his
service in the Israeli DefenseForces, where he was for more
than two decades.
Dr Ken Pollock is vice presidentfor policy at the Middle East
Institute, a DC-based think tankfocused on the Middle East.
Previously, he was seniorfellow at the American
Enterprise Institute and, priorto that, a senior fellow at the
(03:55):
Brookings Institute Saban Centerfor Middle East Policy, where
he was also, for a time, thecenter's director and director
of research.
Ken has served twice on the USNational Security Council, first
as Director for Near East andSouth Asian Affairs and then as
Director for Persian GulfAffairs.
He began his career as aPersian Gulf military analyst at
the CIA.
(04:15):
During his time in government,ken also worked on Middle
Eastern political and militaryaffairs for the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
Ken has authored 10 books.
I will not name them all, but Ican say each of them could be
related to the topics we hope tocover in today's conversation.
Raz Ken, thank you so much forjoining us this afternoon.
(04:35):
As we've all been watching,israel and Iran have been at war
now for about six days.
Since Israel's initialoperations last Thursday night,
friday morning, israel hasseverely damaged a number of
sites related to Iran's nuclearprogram, its ballistic missile
program and launch sites, aswell as much of Iranian military
leadership and a number ofnuclear scientists.
(04:56):
Israeli strikes.
They have responded with anumber of waves of missile and
drone strikes aimed at Israelthat have unfortunately led to a
number of casualties, far moreinjuries and quite a bit of
physical destruction.
Over the past 24 hours inparticular, there's been much
conversation in the UnitedStates, in Israel and presumably
(05:17):
around the world about whetherthe United States will join the
fight militarily and how,following the movement of
significant amounts of USmilitary platforms toward the
Middle East?
Nobody still knows to includePresident Trump himself, as he
said this morning what our USpresident is thinking, raz, I
(05:38):
want to turn to you first.
Can you shed some light for uson Israeli thinking amidst this
war?
In your view, how successfulhave the operations been thus
far?
How much has Israel been ableto degrade Iran's ballistic
missile and nuclear capabilities, and where are they within sort
of the spectrum of the militaryobjectives they set out to
(06:00):
achieve?
Speaker 2 (06:02):
Yeah, thank you Rachel, thank you the IPF for
hosting me tonight.
It's a pleasure.
Hopefully we won't have anyalerts coming in the next hour.
You know, I think that from theIsraeli point of view, until
now it's doing quite well and Iwould like to point out perhaps
three main Israeli achievements,military achievements, to point
(06:25):
out perhaps three main Israeliachievements, military
achievements, over the last fewdays.
The first one, of course, wasthe first few hours of the
operation the decapitation ofsenior Iranian military
commanders, including the chiefof staff, bakheri Salami, the
commander of the RevolutionaryGuards, the Air Force commander
Haji Zayed Salami, the commanderof the Revolutionary Guards,
the Air Force commander HajiZayed.
(06:47):
And yes, everyone realized,also in Israel that in a state
of 90 million people it's notthat difficult to find
successors to those commanders.
But it was a strategic surprisefor the Iranians.
It certainly increased thesense of, I would say, israeli
intelligence and operationalinfiltration into Iran, into the
(07:09):
top echelon of Iran,high-ranking officials, and it
seems to be that Khamenei reallyfeels in a way alone when some
of the high-ranking commanderssurrounding him suddenly
disappeared.
So that's one aspect of theIsraeli successes.
(07:29):
Then the second one is, ofcourse, the main objective of
this war, israeli attempt todegrade Iran's nuclear
facilities.
And here I would like to saythat perhaps there are three
main elements for this success,or partial success, at this
point.
One is Natanz.
Natanz, one of the two mainenrichment sites in Iran, was
(07:53):
not totally destroyed, that'sfor sure.
But even if you look at thestatements of Mr Grossi, the
director general of the IEA, twodays ago, saying that more than
15,000 centrifuges weredestroyed due to Israeli
operation, that's a big success.
Then there were other sitesbeing targeted by Iran.
(08:16):
Tonight there were severalreports about Israeli targeting
Karaj, another site which isrelated to the production of
advanced centrifuges near Tehran.
The site in Isfahan, anothersite affiliated with Iran's
enrichment infrastructure.
And then another element whichin my view is very important,
(08:39):
was the assassination of morebeginning of more than 10
nuclear scientists, and that hasalways been quite a bottleneck
of Iran's scientific communityworking not just on nuclear
issues in general but also onweaponization part of the
nuclear program, and that byitself could certainly have an
(09:02):
impact not just on Iran'snuclear program today but on
Iran's ability to reconstituteits nuclear program the day
after the war.
Last but not least, there havebeen dozens of Israeli attacks
against different kinds ofIranian assets missiles
(09:23):
production, missiles launchers.
You ask about missilescapabilities.
Well, yesterday the spokesmanof the IDF mentioned that about
a third of the launchers in Iranwere destroyed.
Israel has attacked command andcontrol posts, headquarters of
the IRGC, today, law enforcementforces.
(09:45):
So, despite the fact and we canspeak about it later despite
the fact that there is noobjective for Israel for a
regime change in Iran, butcertainly some of the actions
carried out by Israel in recentdays certainly managed in a way
to weaken the regime Bottom line, very significant operational
(10:08):
capabilities.
One missing point is stillFordow.
Fordow is perhaps the last mainnuclear facility which has not
been yet targeted.
That's why there are more andmore voices in Israel calling
for US intervention.
There are more and more voicesin Israel calling for US
intervention.
But other than that, I thinkthat after five days of war,
(10:29):
israel can certainly be quitesatisfied.
Main concern again we mighttalk about it later is the risk
of being dragged into a kind ofwar of attrition if we don't
know where to put an end to that.
Speaker 1 (10:46):
Thank you.
Yes, I will come back to thatand where we go from here.
I want to turn first to Ken Kenfrom Iran.
You've had a lot of experiencelooking at Iran's military
program, other actors in theregion.
What are you seeing in Iranright now?
What do you view as theirreaction?
What capabilities do they haveto keep responding to Israeli
(11:08):
attacks?
They've said they want to cometo the table.
What are you thinking about?
Speaker 3 (11:28):
with Raz, delighted to be in it with IPF, which I
think is a terrific organization.
We should recognize, of course,that one of the.
It seems.
Again, none of us knows exactlywhat Prime Minister Netanyahu
was thinking, but it seems quiteobvious that one of the
rationales for launching thisattack when he did is that Iran
is at a moment in time when itscapacity to retaliate is quite
low.
Hezbollah has been eliminatedas a potential source of
(11:50):
retaliation.
Hamas has also been degraded tothe extent that they were
likely the Houthis as well.
Iran's own ballistic missileforce had been revealed to be a
very limited capacity in termsof penetrating Israeli ballistic
missile defenses, so it wasalways clear that Iran was going
to have a very limited abilityto respond to it.
(12:11):
I will simply say, rachel, thatI think that what I've seen
from the Iranians so far isexactly what I expected, and in
fact, I wrote about this forForeign Affairs about six months
.
They asked me what would anIsrael-Iran war look like, and I
think I did pretty well inlaying out what was going to
happen.
The Iranians have responded, Ithink, both in terms of anger,
(12:32):
but also in an effort to try torestore some deterrent by simply
firing off what they're able toat the Israelis Drones when and
where they're able, ballisticmissiles when and where they're
able, as missiles when and wherethey're able.
As I said, I think this is bothbecause they are angry and
they're frightened, but I dothink that there is an aspect of
(12:53):
trying to impose some damage onIsrael to try to get the
Israelis to stop, because, atthe end of the day, that is
Iran's problem.
They have very little capacityto fight back against Israel and
really what they want right nowis they want this thing to end.
And that's what I'm mostlyseeing from the Iranians.
(13:15):
And you know Raz made a numberof really important points and I
do hope we'll come back to them.
You know I'll just pull out onethat I think is particularly
important that both on theIsraeli side and the Iranian
side, we've actually seen atremendous amount of care taken
with the kinds of targets thatare being struck.
Yes, iran is salvoing missilesand drones at Israel, trying to
(13:41):
do damage to Israel, but it'snot doing a lot of other things
that it might.
It's not attacking Americans,it's not going after the Gulf
states or after the oil exportsin the Gulf right.
There are things that Irancould do, which it is
deliberately choosing not to.
And the same thing for Israel.
Again, I completely agree withRaz.
I think he was spot on and Ithink it's an important point.
(14:02):
You've had people out theresaying oh, the Israelis are
clearly going after regimechange.
Absolutely not Right.
Again, I don't know what's inPrime Minister Netanyahu's head
and maybe you'll get around tothat, but just as a military
analyst looking at what Israelis striking, this is not an air
campaign right now that isdesigned to bring about regime
change.
The Israelis would be strikinga whole range of other targets
(14:27):
if they were trying to do so.
I think that is very deliberate.
I think that there is astrategic rationale behind it,
which I actually think is quitesmart, and I think that the
Iranians also do recognize thatto a certain extent, to the
extent that they are able to doso.
And again, it's why this waryou know it looks terrible.
It's obviously horrible for thepeople who are suffering in
(14:49):
various different ways, but thetruth of the matter is, right
now, this conflict is actuallyquite well contained because the
Iranians are looking to get outof it as quickly as they can
and the Israelis are being verydeliberate about what they're
trying to achieve.
Thanks, ken.
Speaker 1 (15:04):
So I want to pull on that thread for a moment and
where we are being verydeliberate about what they're
trying to achieve.
Thanks, ken.
So I want to pull on thatthread for a moment and where we
are now versus where we couldgo.
Two things that have been on mymind and, I think, on the mind
of many folks who are watching,is will the US get involved?
What is the US considering?
And then I'll turn back to you,raz, on what if the US doesn't
get involved.
What are Israel's options?
(15:24):
So, ken, can you talk to us fora moment about US
considerations?
What has the US been doing thusfar?
Who knows what our president isthinking, but what would you be
thinking about if you wereweighing this decision?
Speaker 3 (15:37):
Sure, and you know, yeah, this is such a strange
administration.
It just doesn't behave like anyother one that we've ever seen
not anyone that I've ever workedfor.
You know, the president makeshis decisions.
He makes his decisions notbased on staff work but,
famously, on his gut.
It's what his impulses tell him.
(15:58):
I do have the impression thathe is certainly interested in
(16:26):
getting involved.
I think that a number ofstatements he's made, fact that
he has been so dismissive anddespairing of Tucker Carlson
right, the fact that he's been,you know, criticizing Tucker
Carlson, who's been, you know,arguing the United States should
not get involved in this, I see, is actually quite significant,
revealing of where Trump's headis Now.
Setting aside the president andgetting to the rest of your
(16:47):
question, point number one, theUnited States is moving
additional forces to the region.
We're sending another surfacecombatant, we're sending an
additional aircraft carrier, youguys all know we're sending
refueling aircraft closer to thetheater.
We're clearly posturingourselves so that we could
intervene militarily if we choseto do so.
(17:08):
But don't assume that that'swhat this is about.
This is also completelyconsistent with the United
States simply wanting to do abetter job to be able to defend
our interests in the region,which, by the way, include
protecting Israel from Iranianstrikes, right.
So this is all very consistentwith that, and while it would
enable us to enter the war andconduct offensive operations
(17:30):
against Iran more effectively,it doesn't mean that we
absolutely are doing so.
Then the last piece of yourquestion, which I think is the
most important one, is why wouldwe intervene?
Right?
What would we be trying toaccomplish if we did so?
You know Raz mentioned Firdo.
Firdo is very important.
(17:50):
Again, I think there's been alot of kind of people saying
things without fully havingthought all of it through.
Yes, as best we understand, itwould be very difficult for
Israel to destroy Firdo throughairstrikes alone, right, but
let's recognize that Israel mayhave other plans for Firdo.
You know, I will say that I wasspeaking to a very senior IDF
(18:15):
officer the other day, and youknow he made the statement to me
and I asked him and he said yes, you're welcome to repeat this.
He said I think that if thiscampaign ends and Ferdow remains
operational, that we will nothave achieved all of our
objectives.
Right, which I took as a signthat you know Israel has thought
this through and you knowIsrael has been thinking about
(18:38):
the problem for Ferdow for overa dozen years and typically when
the IDF thinks really hardabout a problem, they come up
with some really creativesolutions.
They might be thinking aboutspecial forces or cyber or some
combination of the two, alongwith airstrikes.
Or, let's recognize, the IDFmay have come up with a solution
(18:58):
to Ferdow that none of us hasever thought of right, none of
us at least.
Maybe Roz did, but certainlyyou and I, rachel.
We didn't have any inkling ofthe beeper attack.
That was a complete surprise tous.
I don't think any of us wouldhave predicted that the Israelis
would be able to build a dronebase outside of Tehran.
So let's recognize that that isall out there.
(19:20):
But the real issue for theUnited States is less about what
gets destroyed in this strike.
That's certainly part of it and, yes, us intervention could be
about taking out Firdo and someother facilities that Israel may
be having difficulty with.
The bigger issue and again whatI hope President Trump is
thinking about, but I'm afraidthat he isn't is this issue of
(19:41):
the long term and preventingIran from reconstituting its
nuclear program down the road.
Israel has struck variousfacilities around the region
over the course of time Iraq in1981, syria 2007, and then,
along with us with the Stuxnetattack, iran again in 2002,
(20:03):
sorry 2010, with very mixedresults in terms of the
long-term impact.
Right, this war cannot result inIran getting a nuclear weapon
in two or five or 10 years.
That would be a terribleoutcome.
And so, whatever the US doesand I'm glad to unpack the
(20:24):
different scenarios, but I wantto stop talking right now
Whatever we do, our interventionhas to be designed to make it
that much less likely, in fact,impossible, if we can do it, for
Iran to reconstitute.
That's what we need to bethinking about, and it can go
either way.
Either way, thanks.
Speaker 1 (20:41):
Ken, yeah, I want to come back to some of the
potential implications for theUS in the region and Israel.
But first, raz, from theIsraeli perspective, let's say
the US doesn't strike Fordow.
And in your answer, just torespect some of the audience
questions, can you say a wordabout what Fordow is for some of
our watchers?
Speaker 2 (21:01):
Yeah well, Fodor is the second enrichment site in
Iran, but it's more difficult todeal with Fodor, in which there
is enrichment today to 60%.
By the way, the fact that Fodoris under the ground in the
mountains is the main reason why, according to the JCPOA sign in
2015, the Iranians were notallowed to enrich uranium in
(21:24):
Fordow, but only in the Tansk.
It shouldn't come as a surprisethat Israel wants the Americans
to take direct part in thiscampaign.
It's been discussed for manyyears that there is a very big
difference between the impact ofan Israeli unilateral attack on
Iran and a jointIsraeli-American efforts.
(21:47):
It could be much quicker, itcould be more efficient, and I
certainly agree with Kenconcerning that.
There are some ways to dealwith Fordow other than aerial
attack.
By the way, it's not justmilitary commanders saying that
without dealing with Fordow,Israel is not going to put an
(22:08):
end to the war.
Just two or three days ago, thenational security advisor the
Israel national security advisoralso said very clearly in a TV
interview.
He said we are not going to endthis war with Fordow still
intact, and the meaning of that,as he still doesn't know if the
(22:31):
United States is going to playa role in that that probably
there are other ways to dealwith Fordow, but they are
probably much riskier andtherefore Israel would certainly
love the Americans to do that.
If the United States doesn'tplay a direct role and, by the
(22:52):
way, the United States, we haveto say, plays a major role in
defending Israel right now butif not, then I think that the
main purpose would be to try anddeal with FODO in other ways,
At least to have a certainimpact on FODO.
I'm not sure that Israel iscapable of destroying FODO
(23:18):
entirely, but it would certainlyassist Israel to see American
involvement, and then I thinkone implication would be not
just that it would be moreefficient, but I think that the
US involvement could certainlyput an end to the war much
quicker than perhaps anadjusting Israeli operation.
Speaker 1 (23:42):
Thanks, raz.
I had in mind and we've gottena number of questions from the
audience related to diplomacy.
You mentioned the war could endquickly if there's a more
decisive strike on Fordow or USinvolvement.
There's also still talk fromthe US president, from the
Iranians, about negotiations.
Is there and Ken, I'll turn toyou first for this do you
envision a scenario in which theUS and Iran can come to the
(24:06):
table right now to havemeaningful conversations that
could lead to an Israeli andIranian ceasefire and achieve
Israel's objectives with respectto Iran's nuclear program?
And then, raz, I'll ask youfrom the Israeli perspective is
there any scenario in whichIsrael would stand down, and
what would a sufficientagreement look like?
Speaker 3 (24:28):
Sure, look, rachel.
I think in some ways that'sexactly what the Iranians would
like.
I think that, again, they aredesperate to stop this war and
if they can get intonegotiations with the United
States as a way to putting anend to the war, that is exactly
what they need to have happenNow.
(24:48):
Again, if they can do it withsome other country, that'd be
even better, right, but theUnited States may be its last
preference, but nonetheless it'sthe only realistic one out
there.
The Israelis are not going tobe terribly interested if the
Iranians decide to sit down withthe Qataris over talks about
their nuclear program.
The big question mark, ofcourse, will be what happens in
(25:11):
those negotiations.
What is Iran actually willingto give on?
You know, again, this is thebig question mark lying out
there.
It's not just how much doesIsrael destroy in these strikes,
it's making sure that Iran doesnot reconstitute down the road
right.
Nobody wants to repeat this.
Nobody wants this war to leadto an Iranian nuclear arsenal,
(25:35):
and again, part of Iran'sstrategy might well be hey,
let's get to those negotiations.
Let's take up President Trumpon his offer in hope that we can
end the Israeli airstrikes andjust play out the negotiations
without having to give upanything meaningful.
I think that's actually why thestatements that President Trump
(25:56):
is making that there can be noenrichment in Iran is a very
important one is a veryimportant one, right?
I'd actually like to see him goa little bit beyond that and
say you know basically nothingother than civilian nuclear uses
, and those are going to have tobe tightly controlled.
And he said things that areclose to it, right?
But the Iranians have tounderstand that that's got to be
(26:17):
what these talks look like.
So can I imagine, absolutely.
But point number one, back toRaz's point Israel is going to
prosecute this war, and it'sgoing to prosecute this war
until it believes that it istaking care of everything that
it needs to believe, and I don'tthink that there's going to be
again.
I want to be a little carefulbecause it's the Middle East
unexpected things happen, butcertainly Israel is going to
(26:39):
resist any effort to shut downthis war before then.
Once that happens, I do thinkthat it is a perfectly
reasonable off-ramp for the warto say we're now going to shift
to negotiations mediated by theUnited States that will put a
permanent end to Iran's nuclearprogram, but in return again, as
(27:00):
President Trump has offered wewould lift our sanctions.
They would get to rebuild theireconomy, at least to a certain
extent, that way, as somethingof a carrot for them.
But the Iranians are going tohave to be willing to accept
that, and at the moment it's notentirely clear that they are.
It's the kind of thing that Icould certainly imagine
(27:20):
Ayatollah Khamenei agreeing to,but he's got other
constituencies right now.
He's got a Revolutionary GuardCorps and other more hardline
members of his regime whoprobably are opposing him rather
fiercely.
He'll have to get his domesticducks in order.
So, yes, I can definitely see usmoving in that direction.
But I'll also say I don't thinkthat's the inevitable way that
(27:42):
this ends.
I don't think it's a foregoneconclusion.
I don't think we should bePollyanna-ish about that's the
inevitable way that this ends.
I don't think it's a foregoneconclusion.
I don't think we should bePollyanna-ish about that being
the likely end to this.
Speaker 1 (27:51):
Thanks, ken.
Before I turn to Raz, we'vegotten a couple of questions, as
both of you have been talkingabout what is happening inside
Iran.
One in response, ken you saidthey're desperate to stop the
war beyond sort of thedegradation of their military
capabilities.
What are you seeing amongreactions in Iran economy,
infrastructure, et cetera?
Sorry to me or to Raz yeahsorry, Ken you, and then I'll
(28:15):
turn back to Raz.
Speaker 3 (28:17):
So you know, again, I'm paid to look a little deeper
than most people, but most ofwhat I'm seeing is what most of
other people are seeing too, theIranian I should.
I should caveat this pockets ofthe Iranian population are
deeply frightened.
You know, everyone focuses onTehran and Tehran is a huge, you
know, symbol for Iran.
(28:38):
A lot of people do live inTehran, but we should remember,
you know, there are 92 millionpeople in Iran.
Most of them don't live inTehran, right, and we're not
necessarily seeing everyoneevacuate Mash that are big and
go boom and burn very bright andvery loud, but the Israelis
(29:18):
didn't wipe out all of Tehran'sinfrastructure.
They didn't wipe out all of itsoil infrastructure.
Again, they were very precisein picking out targets that
would send a very big message topeople without actually
destroying civilian life there.
Gasoline situation isn't bad.
You can get gas.
It's just that people are sofrightened and they are leaving.
(29:47):
But we've not yet seen anydegradation of the regime's
control over Iranian society.
We've not seen any particularshutdown of the Iranian economy.
The Iranian economy was inreally bad shape before this
started.
It's not like we've seen anykind of an economic collapse.
The big thing is that a lot ofpeople are afraid, particularly
(30:07):
in places like Tehran.
Speaker 1 (30:10):
Thanks, ken Raz.
I'll turn back to you on thetopic of negotiation, sort of
what might it take for Israel tostand down absent achievement
of all military objectives?
And as an addition to that, isthere a point at which there's
too much pain for Israelis orinterceptors run out?
Is there a limit to Israel'sability to prosecute this war?
Speaker 2 (30:34):
First of all, israel is not going to oppose diplomacy
.
I think it's very clear inIsrael, and it's been very clear
from the beginning, that thereis no way to totally destroy
Iran's nuclear program, eventhrough an American joint and
American-Israeli efforts.
And at the end of the day we'llhave to make sure that Iran
doesn't reconstitute its program, doesn't use what is remains of
(30:57):
its nuclear program, whetherit's just a few hundreds of
kilograms of fissile materialand a few thousands of hundreds
of centrifuges, and those willhave to be sorted out through
diplomacy.
I'm not sure that Israel isgoing to be thrilled with a
possible agreement between Iranand the United States because
(31:18):
even if that's going to be thebest deal ever signed in human
history, it's very clear that atleast one thing will be
included in this deal as Kensaid, sanctions are going to be
removed and we all know thatprobably the money is not going
to be invested just to improvethe electricity and water
(31:42):
infrastructures in Iran.
They will go to missiles anddrones and perhaps even although
it's much more difficult todayto support Iran's proxies in the
region.
But basically, israel's storyis not going to impose diplomacy
.
The Israeli position before thewar was very clear and that was
(32:03):
basically the same as theofficial US position.
We want to get a deal in whichthere is no enrichment inside
Iran, no right for Iran toenrichment inside Iran.
If Iran wants to use some fuelfor its civilian uses, then it
(32:25):
can import fuel from otherplaces.
So that has been the Israeliposition and it's not going to
change.
On the contrary, perhaps wewill see some other demands
coming from Israel, exploitingthe Israeli successes over the
last few days.
I have to say that one of myconcerns and we discussed that
(32:49):
in recent days at INSS is thepossibility that there might be
some disagreements between theUnited States and Israel when it
comes not to the issue ofenrichment but perhaps to other
issues, for example the missiles.
Here I can definitely see anIsraeli demand saying OK, we
(33:09):
took care of the main threat,which is the nuclear program,
but we have to also discuss theissue of long range missiles and
I'm not sure that the USadministration is going to
insist on this issue, forexample, concerning the second
part of your question, look, theproblem is, I'm not sure that
(33:31):
the problem, at least at thispoint, is the interception
capabilities.
Of course there is a limit, notjust to interception
capabilities, also to theability of the Israeli pilots
and the Israeli Air Force tocontinue working in Iran so far
(33:52):
away.
Iran is not Gaza, it's not evenLebanon.
It's very difficult to workthere for a relatively long
period of time, but Israel cando that.
There is a kind of I don't likethe use of this term
competition, but there is acompetition between the
production capabilities insideIran of new missiles and the
(34:13):
Israeli capabilities tointercept them.
But I think that the main issueactually refers to Israeli
resilience when it comes to itseconomic.
From the economic point of view, israeli way is disconnected.
Those days, no flight.
Or today there was the renewalof the flights to Israel to get
(34:38):
all those hundreds of thousandsof Israelis who were stuck
abroad, to get them back toIsrael.
It's still at the beginning ofthis process abroad to get them
back to Israel.
It's still at the beginning ofthis process.
Until today, no working placesworking in Israel.
The economy is actually in ahalt.
No schools.
So, yes, the school year isgoing to be ending anyway in a
(35:02):
matter of days, ending anyway ina matter of days, but still
it's a major problem to persistwith this situation for much
longer.
We don't have a lot of sleepbecause of the continued alerts
and there is concern in Israel.
What will happen if, at somepoint and we've already seen a
(35:23):
decline in the number ofmissiles being launched from
Iran?
But what will happen if theIranians continue to launch not
20 or 30 or 50 missiles per day,just two or three missiles per
day?
This by itself is a majorproblem.
So we are trying to, and thereis already some changes in the
(35:45):
regulations concerning theIsraeli home front, and some of
the places are going to bereopened beginning of tomorrow,
because there is a recognitionin Israel that it's not going to
be as easy to keep thisemergency status quo much longer
.
But again, I think that Israelcan still manage that and I
(36:10):
think and that would be my lastremark here there is almost a
consensus in Israel.
We with the INSF, justconducted a survey two days ago.
90% of the Israeli populationsupports this war, despite the
damage and despite thecasualties, and the reason for
that, I think, is very clear.
For many years we've beendiscussing in Israel the number
(36:34):
one threat, the number onepotentially existential threat
to the state of Israel, which isIran and therefore most
Israelis.
I'm not talking just of thepolitical system and the
security establishment in Israel.
Ordinary Iranians realize thateven if they have to deal with
the Iranian threat, nuclearthreat and at the end of the day
(37:08):
the question will be whetherIsrael managed, if not to
destroy the nuclear threat, atleast to delay it in many years.
Speaker 1 (37:46):
Thanks, raz.
You mentioned window ofopportunity and some of that
window is born out of Israel'sability to degrade Iranian
proxies around its borderscapability.
We haven't seen much from Iraq.
The Houthi reaction has beenvery muted.
Hezbollah said you know we'renot going to get involved.
What are you thinking about asyou watch this?
Speaker 2 (37:59):
You know, rachel, I spent almost 25 years in the
Israeli military intelligenceand then about a decade at the
NSS.
I participated in dozens ofsimulations and war games and
discussions.
What will happen if and whenIsrael decides to strike the
nuclear facilities in Iran?
And, with all due respect toIran missiles capabilities,
(38:22):
which, of course, upgradedduring the recent years the
number one concern was alwaysHezbollah and the arsenal of
hundreds of thousands of rocketsand missiles, and I think that
there is no doubt that this wasnot the trigger for what Israel
did six days ago.
But we can't understand Israelidecision to do that without
(38:45):
understanding that, for thefirst time since the summer of
2024, when Israel was discussingthe possibility of striking
Iran, it didn't have to takeinto consideration the
possibility of Hezbollahretaliation.
Syria is out of the game.
I think I would guess that manyin Damascus today are actually
(39:06):
quite happy with what Israel isdoing in Iran.
Hezbollah is under majorpressure.
By the way, we still have thisconcern that at some point, if
the situation in Iran becomesalmost an existential threat to
the stability of the regime, wemight see some intervention by
Hezbollah, but it's not going tobe easy and it's certainly not
(39:28):
going to be as significant asbefore.
The Afghans, the Shabi, thepro-Iranian militias in Iraq,
are not in the business rightnow.
We've seen some clues ofperhaps activity against the US
forces there.
The Falis are already doingwhatever they do to support the
Palestinians in Gaza.
That's not significant.
So the bottom line is that thiscomes as perhaps the first real
(39:58):
indication for the direposition of Iran, which has lost
in recent months a very vitalcomponent of its deterrence
strategy against Israel.
And of course, we all hope thatthe voices inside Iran which
called in recent months to tryand compensate for the loss of
(40:21):
proxies and Iran's inability toforce a new equation of
deterrence against Israelthrough its missiles, both in
April and then in October, inthe two Iranian attacks against
Israel, and they called fortrying to change the nuclear
doctrine of Iran in order tocome up with the nuclear
(40:42):
solution I hope that thisnuclear option is going to get
out of the table up the tableand I think this will certainly
have a major impact not just onIran and on the Iranian-Israeli
confrontation, but on the MiddleEast as well.
Speaker 1 (40:58):
Thanks, Raz.
I want to come back to Gaza ina moment, which we've also
gotten a number of questions onas well, as sort of that new
Middle East architecture you'retalking about.
But first, Ken, sticking withother regional players, how do
you think about where golfpartners are in this scenario?
Speaker 3 (41:16):
Sure.
So I think this is an importantquestion because it's a little
bit complicated.
Gulf publics seem I'll put itthis way angry at Israel,
unhappy with Israel.
There seems to be a lot ofnegative public opinion toward
Israel within the Gulf and a bigchunk of that is a reflection
(41:37):
of their sympathies for thePalestinians.
A big chunk of that is aboutGaza and what's going on in Gaza
, and they don't like to see theIsraelis act with impunity and
throw around their uniquemilitary weight.
Their governments have a verydifferent perspective on these
things.
First, their governmentsabsolutely like to see, or want
(41:58):
to see, iran defanged.
Iran has been their number onethreat for decades, arguably
since the 1979 revolution.
Decades, arguably since the1979 revolution.
Cutting down Iran to size isvery, very helpful and very
positive for them.
There seems to be some concern.
My own conversations with Gulfofficials.
They certainly are somewhatconcerned about the potential
(42:20):
for horizontal escalation, thatis, escalation beyond Israel and
Iran to encompass othercountries.
There is some degree of a senseof you know this could get out
of hand.
You know the Israelis might dothis, that might cause the
Iranians to do that.
That's certainly out there,that's certainly on the table.
But, as I said earlier, we'veactually we have not seen that
(42:43):
and we've seen both sides tryingvery hard not to move in that
direction so far.
But that's a consideration forthem as well, I think for the
gulf states.
Um, if this war ends with theuh destruction, I'll put it that
way.
But we really mean raz madethis point earlier, he's
absolutely right setting backthe iranian program very
(43:03):
severely right, and then add onto it the point that I keep
making, which is that theoutcome of the war results in
this Iranian regime neveracquiring nuclear weapons.
However that happens, whetherit's all military or diplomatic
or some combination of the two,that would be a very good
outcome for the Gulf states.
(43:24):
That said, I do want to add awrinkle to it which I think is
important to understand.
We saw this already after thedismantling of Hezbollah by
Israel, which is we need torecognize that the major driver
behind the Abraham Accords, withthe exception of the Emirates.
(43:44):
The Emirates are in a somewhatdifferent area because they're
looking for genuine economiccooperation with Israel for
their own reasons.
It's just a different kind ofcountry.
For the majority of the Arabstates, even Saudi Arabia as it
was considering it, the majordriver for normalization with
Israel was the Iranian threatsright and before October 7,
(44:06):
2023,.
The Gulf States were veryconcerned about that, in
particular, because the UnitedStates, under three successive
administrations Obama, trump,won, and Biden had been
progressively disengaging fromthe Middle East.
All of that created fears ontheir part, which drove them
into the arms of the Israelis.
(44:26):
With the destruction of Hamasand Hezbollah began to see the
Gulf states pulling back alittle bit, no longer feeling
the need.
It wasn't essential to haveIsrael as an ally, as they once
did, and, of course, it wasn'tjust Hezbollah and Hamas.
It was also the damage thatIsrael had inflicted directly on
(44:47):
Iran right, demonstratingIsrael's military superiority
over Iran.
This war because it is, I think,going to result in an even far
worse diminution of Iranianmilitary power, of Iran's
military capability, not justwithin Iran but around the
region, and, of course, inmassive diminution of Iran's
(45:08):
reputation to be able to wieldinfluence in the region.
I suspect, and I think we'realready starting to see it again
many of these Gulf states aregoing to be less desirous of
normalization with Israel.
They won't feel the need theway that they once did, and the
fact that they all have publicswho are antagonistic toward
(45:33):
Israel, not sympathetic towardIsrael, that will weigh more
heavily for them, right, and sothis is kind of a perverse
outcome for the Israelis.
Potentially I don't think thatit's you know should change
their minds about this, but I dothink that it's worth thinking
about that.
Whereas before this war andbefore October 7, 2023, we saw
(45:54):
this convergence of the moderateArab states and Israel in a new
alliance against Iran, messessince October 7, 2023, are
causing many of the Gulf states,many of the moderate Arab
states, to say you know what?
We don't need that alliancewith Israel as much as we once
did, and therefore our public'sunhappiness with the situation
(46:17):
in Gaza, with Israel's treatmentof the Palestinians more
broadly, that will weigh moreheavily in their calculations.
Speaker 1 (46:26):
Thanks.
I want to push on that for amoment and wonder if you think
the same logic applies or it'sjust a totally different
scenario for Lebanon and Syria.
Speaker 3 (46:35):
Yeah.
So I do think that it's verydifferent for both Lebanon and
Syria, because the stakes aremuch more immediate, right?
In fact, it's kind of thereverse of the incentives for
the Gulf States and, to someextent, jordan as well, although
, again, jordan is literally themiddle ground in all of this.
Lebanon wants Hezbollahdefanged and it wants peace with
(46:57):
Israel.
Right?
The vast majority of Lebanese,as we can tell, seem absolutely
sick of the constant conflictwith Israel.
I think they've been sick of itfor decades.
They see this now as anopportunity to end that.
Obviously, the Shia populationof Lebanon is the big unknown
out there.
(47:17):
Just how supportive will theybe of Hezbollah?
How much does Hezbollah have aprotection racket over them?
But yes, I think in the case ofLebanon, it's pretty clear.
The new government and many ofits constituents absolutely want
a normalization with Israel,defanging Hezbollah and end to
this conflict which has justbeen so ruinous for them for
(47:40):
decades.
And Syria, the same thing, atleast insofar as what many
Syrians seem to want.
Same thing, at least insofar aswhat many Syrians seem to want
and what Ahmed al-Shara wants,the now leader of Syria.
Now, again, there are bigquestion marks surrounding other
members of his government, andparticularly his military
(48:00):
leaders, who seem to be muchmore kind of radical jihadi in
their orientation, don't reallyknow how they think about Israel
.
But you know, shara has goneout of his way to indicate that
he too wants normalization andpeace with Israel.
And again, that puts them in avery different set of
circumstances, and I will saythat in both of those cases,
(48:24):
israel's further destruction ofIranian military power, I think,
makes that even easier.
Right, it's going to make iteven harder for Hezbollah to
fight back.
It is going to make it eveneasier for Shara to convince his
people hey, we want to makepeace with Israel.
We don't want to get in anotherfight with these guys.
We want a better, peaceful,more prosperous future, and that
(48:46):
means making peace.
Speaker 1 (48:49):
Thanks, ken Raz.
I welcome any of your reactionto what Ken just put on the
table and sort of what thiscould all mean for the region.
And then I would ask that youtouch on any implications that
this war has on Israel's war inGaza.
Speaker 2 (49:20):
Yeah, so I get the sense in Israel that the war
against Iran is the last phaseof the Israeli efforts to create
a new environment in the MiddleEast, after dealing with Gaza,
hezbollah, then of course, syriawas not our operation, but that
was clearly a result of whatIsrael did in Lebanon.
And I think that until the warin Iran erupted there was a
sense of some kind of okay, westill missed something.
We managed to deal with Gaza,with Hamas of course not
(49:40):
entirely, we still remember thatwe have more than 50 hostages
in Gaza.
We managed to deal withHezbollah.
That was a major Israelisuccess, which actually
surprised even the Israelis thelevel of success against
Hezbollah.
A Syrian regime collapsed.
But there was this bitterness,knowing that the number one
(50:04):
threat on the security of thestate of Israel has always been
Iran.
That was the head of the snake,as some Israeli politicians
refer to.
And I think that if and when andI want to be very cautious
about that because we stilldon't know how this war is going
to end we certainly hope thatit won't turn into some kind of
(50:25):
war of attrition with manycasualties and damage caused,
but, if this war is over,dealing very successfully with
Iran's nuclear and othermilitary threats.
I think it can certainlyincrease not just the
(50:46):
opportunities to move forwardwith Syria and perhaps to
complete trying to get this newarchitecture with Hezbollah and
with Lebanon as well, but italso can convince even the more
hardliners in Israel of coursenot Smotrich and Ben-Gur, but
perhaps the more self-right inIsrael.
(51:09):
Okay, we managed to do that,and the meaning of that is that
we have to put an end to the warin Gaza as quickly as possible
and then move forward, perhapsto create better conditions for
Israel.
I still think that, despite allthe problems and I certainly
agree with Ken that it's muchmore problematic to resume talks
(51:35):
with Saudi Arabia onnormalization of progress not
towards Palestinian states, buttowards a kind of settlement
with the Palestinians this byitself will be enough to
(51:57):
reignite the possibility ofnormalization with the Saudis,
and that would certainly be anhistorical turnout.
Speaker 1 (52:06):
Thanks, Raz.
I want to remind the audiencewe have about five minutes left,
so please continue putting anyquestions into the chat.
I've been trying to incorporatea number of them into our
discussion, but I'm going to aska couple very discreet ones now
before I turn to anotherclosing question.
One for Raz Do you have anysense of why Israel allegedly
(52:28):
targeted Shamkhani?
Speaker 2 (52:32):
That's a difficult question.
I have a thesis, but it'swithout being exposed to any
kind of intelligence.
That might have something to dowith the position held by
Shomkhani concerning theso-called nuclear file in Iran
(52:52):
and not just responsibility forsome of the talks.
But perhaps he had otherassignments from the Supreme
Leader Khamenei, dealing notjust with this political or
diplomatic angle of Iran'snuclear program.
Of course he was very close toKhamenei as well, as we know,
but unlike the high-rankinggenerals, this was the exception
(53:17):
and I'm not sure that, otherthan his connection to the
nuclear issue or the nuclearfile, we could find a better
explanation for that.
Speaker 1 (53:26):
Thank you, and another very discreet question
for Ken.
We got a question from formerboard chair and longtime IPF
supporter and board member,Susie Gellman, about Congress.
What is the mood in Congressthese days?
There are those primarily onthe Democratic side maybe a
Republican or two who are veryfocused on the authorization of
(53:47):
use of military force andcongressional oversight over the
US path to war.
There are those who areadvocating that the US needs to
get involved because Iran'snuclear program is a threat to
us too.
What are you seeing and whatare you hearing?
Speaker 3 (54:01):
Sure, and I love the fact that Susie is asking me,
because I could just as easilyask Susie, but I'll give my
answer since I'm the one on thescreen.
So first, I suspect that youwere going to find a great many
Democrats voting against anyauthorization to use force
simply because it is PresidentTrump who wants it.
Obviously, there will besupporters of Israel there and I
(54:25):
think that some of them mightdefect and vote in favor of it,
but you know the partisanship isso rancorous at this moment
that you know I do suspect thatthere will be a very significant
Democratic opposition and let'srecognize that.
You know big chunks of theDemocratic Party have turned
(54:45):
against Israel and I think thatthey will enthusiastically
oppose any kind of anauthorization for the use of
military force.
In many ways, I think that theissues within the Republican
Party are the much moreinteresting ones.
You've got this split nowbetween and in some ways it's
(55:07):
not a clean split, it's athree-way break.
Most people think of it interms of a break between the
neo-isolationists and thetraditional internationalists
within the Republican Party, andI think that division is out
there and we have seen it on anynumber of occasions where you
do have the kind of Rand PaulTucker, carlson wing of the
(55:29):
Republican Party that JD Vancealso in that category, not
interested in the world, notinterested in what's happening
out there, not particularlyinterested in supporting Israel.
And then, of course, you've gotmore traditional Republicans
Lindsey Graham, tom Cotton,marco Rubio would have once
fallen into that category I'mnot sure he still does, but he
(55:50):
once did who I think will bevery supportive of the use of
military force in Israel's favor.
But, as I said, I think there isa third group that we're not
really thinking about too much,which is a group of Republicans
who will simply do whateverPresident Trump wants them to do
right.
These are the true MAGA folkswho you know.
Whatever President Trump wantsthem to do right, these are the
true MAGA folks who you know.
Whatever President Trump tellsthem to do, they will do it.
(56:12):
And so on, one day they may bein favor of a war and the next
day they may be opposed to it,depending on what the
president's position is.
And what that obviously suggestsis that if the president does
decide one way or the other,whatever it may be, you'll get a
split.
You know the Republican Partywill split, but that MAGA group
will be with the president, andthen the president will pick up
(56:34):
either the traditionalconservatives, traditional
internationalist Republicans orthe neo-isolationist
conservatives, depending on whathe does Now.
Is that enough for an AUMF?
No idea.
What he does Now, is thatenough for an AUMF?
No idea.
We've also seen the Republicansfall in line behind the
president, simply because theyare afraid of all the different
powers that he has and the gripthat he has on the Republican
(56:58):
base.
That might carry the day, butit's also a reason why we might
not see a request for anauthorization for the use of
military force from thisadministration.
They may choose to avoid theissue altogether.
Speaker 1 (57:13):
Thanks, ken.
We have about two minutes left.
In that Uncertainty about whatwe'll see here at home in the
United States is a good segue tothe uncertainty in all of this.
I think it is still very muchan evolving situation.
So what are you each watchingfor in 60 seconds or less, over
the coming days?
What are the indicators, whatare the signs, what are the
(57:33):
things that will be on your mind, raz, go ahead.
Speaker 2 (57:37):
I think that we'll have to see in the next 24 or 48
hours whether the United Statesis involved in this war.
This will have a major impacton the way the war is being
conducted.
If there is no US involvement,my sense is that in about a week
or so, israel will probablyreach the conclusion that most
(58:03):
of the goals or the objectivescould be achieved and then
strive to get either a ceasefireeven a unilateral ceasefire or
some kind of a regime whichcould put an end to the war.
But, as I said before, my mainconcern today is that you know,
(58:25):
if there is too much appetiteand if there are too many
successes in the next few days,there could be some voices in
Israel saying, ok, we've doneremarkably well, let's try this
as an opportunity to look forother objectives, including
perhaps regime change, and this,in my view, could be
catastrophic.
(58:45):
Thank you, ken.
Speaker 3 (58:48):
Just very quickly.
I completely agree with Raz.
What the US decides to do ishugely important.
I'll put Raz's second pointslightly differently Changes in
the Israeli target set.
Again, I think that Israel hasbeen very focused and very
successful in going after those.
There's still more to be done.
I am watching for Ferdow butyes, like Raz, my big question
(59:08):
mark is does Israel start goingafter additional target sets,
either because it feels like theopportunity is there or, to an
earlier point that Raz made,because Israel believes that the
only way to bring the war to aclose, because the Iranians
won't give up, is by going afterother targets to inflict
greater pain on the Iranians?
Speaker 1 (59:30):
Thank you.
While our time is up, I couldcontinue this conversation for
hours, but we will stop.
Ken Raz, thank you again forjoining us To our audience and
participants.
Thank you for joining us, forsending in your questions.
I think this has been a veryinformative, timely and
insightful conversation.
For those who want more fromIsrael Policy Forum, please
visit our website,israelpolicyforumorg.
(59:52):
You can sign up for moreanalysis, emails, webinar
announcements, podcasts and allthat we offer.
So thank you again and wishingeveryone a safe night.
Bye, thank you.
Thank you the Hello everyone, and thank you for
joining us today.
My name is Rachel Brandenburg,israel Policy Forum's Washington
Managing Director and SeniorFellow.
I want to welcome those of youwho are joining Israel Policy
Forum for the first time today,as well as our returning viewers
(01:41):
and those listening to ourpodcast, israel Policy Pod.
Before we begin, a big thankyou to Israel Policy Forum
supporters.
Our work, including today'sprogram, is made possible by all
of you.
Israel Policy Forum relies onyour support to produce free
expert analysis andinformational content on the
most pressing issues affectingIsrael and the
(02:03):
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
If you enjoy Israel PolicyForum's webinars but don't yet
support the organization's work,please do so by visiting
israelpolicyforumorg support.
Okay, let's get started.
Over the next hour, I will askour guests a few questions, but
we also welcome audienceparticipation.
Please put any questions youhave for our guests in the chat
(02:25):
and I will incorporate as manyas I am able into the
conversation.
We are so fortunate today tohave with us two very
knowledgeable and experiencedanalysts who have long been
watching and working on issuesrelated to Iran, both within and
outside their respectivegovernments.
I am personally humbled to beon screen with both of them, in
particular Ken, for whom Iworked as an intern nearly 20
(02:48):
years ago, and I'm reallylooking forward to our
conversation.
Dr Raz Zimet joins us fromIsrael, where he is the director
of Iran and the Shiite AxisResearch Program at the
Institute for National SecurityStudies, which many of you
watching probably know as INSS.
Raz holds a master's degree andPhD in Middle Eastern history
(03:10):
from Tel Aviv University, wherehis PhD focused on Iranian
policy toward Nasserism and Arabradicalism between 1954 and
1967.
He has authored the book Iranfrom Within State and Society in
the Islamic Republic.
He has authored the book Iranfrom Within State and Society in
the Islamic Republic, publishedin 2022 in Hebrew, and has
written and commentedextensively on Iranian politics,
society and foreign policy.
(03:31):
Rand Raz is a longtime Iranwatcher, including during his
service in the Israeli DefenseForces, where he was for more
than two decades.
Dr Ken Pollock is vice presidentfor policy at the Middle East
Institute, a DC-based think tankfocused on the Middle East.
Previously, he was seniorfellow at the American
Enterprise Institute and, priorto that, a senior fellow at the
(03:55):
Brookings Institute Saban Centerfor Middle East Policy, where
he was also, for a time, thecenter's director and director
of research.
Ken has served twice on the USNational Security Council, first
as Director for Near East andSouth Asian Affairs and then as
Director for Persian GulfAffairs.
He began his career as aPersian Gulf military analyst at
the CIA.
(04:15):
During his time in government,ken also worked on Middle
Eastern political and militaryaffairs for the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
Ken has authored 10 books.
I will not name them all, but Ican say each of them could be
related to the topics we hope tocover in today's conversation.
Raz Ken, thank you so much forjoining us this afternoon.
(04:35):
As we've all been watching,israel and Iran have been at war
now for about six days.
Since Israel's initialoperations last Thursday night,
friday morning, israel hasseverely damaged a number of
sites related to Iran's nuclearprogram, its ballistic missile
program and launch sites, aswell as much of Iranian military
leadership and a number ofnuclear scientists.
(04:56):
Israeli strikes.
They have responded with anumber of waves of missile and
drone strikes aimed at Israelthat have unfortunately led to a
number of casualties, far moreinjuries and quite a bit of
physical destruction.
Over the past 24 hours inparticular, there's been much
conversation in the UnitedStates, in Israel and presumably
(05:17):
around the world about whetherthe United States will join the
fight militarily and how,following the movement of
significant amounts of USmilitary platforms toward the
Middle East?
Nobody still knows to includePresident Trump himself, as he
said this morning what our USpresident is thinking, raz, I
(05:38):
want to turn to you first.
Can you shed some light for uson Israeli thinking amidst this
war?
In your view, how successfulhave the operations been thus
far?
How much has Israel been ableto degrade Iran's ballistic
missile and nuclear capabilities, and where are they within sort
of the spectrum of the militaryobjectives they set out to
(06:00):
achieve?
Speaker 2 (06:02):
Yeah, thank you Rachel, thank you the IPF for
hosting me tonight.
It's a pleasure.
Hopefully we won't have anyalerts coming in the next hour.
You know, I think that from theIsraeli point of view, until
now it's doing quite well and Iwould like to point out perhaps
three main Israeli achievements,military achievements, to point
(06:25):
out perhaps three main Israeliachievements, military
achievements, over the last fewdays.
The first one, of course, wasthe first few hours of the
operation the decapitation ofsenior Iranian military
commanders, including the chiefof staff, bakheri Salami, the
commander of the RevolutionaryGuards, the Air Force commander
Haji Zayed Salami, the commanderof the Revolutionary Guards,
the Air Force commander HajiZayed.
(06:47):
And yes, everyone realized,also in Israel that in a state
of 90 million people it's notthat difficult to find
successors to those commanders.
But it was a strategic surprisefor the Iranians.
It certainly increased thesense of, I would say, israeli
intelligence and operationalinfiltration into Iran, into the
(07:09):
top echelon of Iran,high-ranking officials, and it
seems to be that Khamenei reallyfeels in a way alone when some
of the high-ranking commanderssurrounding him suddenly
disappeared.
So that's one aspect of theIsraeli successes.
(07:29):
Then the second one is, ofcourse, the main objective of
this war, israeli attempt todegrade Iran's nuclear
facilities.
And here I would like to saythat perhaps there are three
main elements for this success,or partial success, at this
point.
One is Natanz.
Natanz, one of the two mainenrichment sites in Iran, was
(07:53):
not totally destroyed, that'sfor sure.
But even if you look at thestatements of Mr Grossi, the
director general of the IEA, twodays ago, saying that more than
15,000 centrifuges weredestroyed due to Israeli
operation, that's a big success.
Then there were other sitesbeing targeted by Iran.
(08:16):
Tonight there were severalreports about Israeli targeting
Karaj, another site which isrelated to the production of
advanced centrifuges near Tehran.
The site in Isfahan, anothersite affiliated with Iran's
enrichment infrastructure.
And then another element whichin my view is very important,
(08:39):
was the assassination of morebeginning of more than 10
nuclear scientists, and that hasalways been quite a bottleneck
of Iran's scientific communityworking not just on nuclear
issues in general but also onweaponization part of the
nuclear program, and that byitself could certainly have an
(09:02):
impact not just on Iran'snuclear program today but on
Iran's ability to reconstituteits nuclear program the day
after the war.
Last but not least, there havebeen dozens of Israeli attacks
against different kinds ofIranian assets missiles
(09:23):
production, missiles launchers.
You ask about missilescapabilities.
Well, yesterday the spokesmanof the IDF mentioned that about
a third of the launchers in Iranwere destroyed.
Israel has attacked command andcontrol posts, headquarters of
the IRGC, today, law enforcementforces.
(09:45):
So, despite the fact and we canspeak about it later despite
the fact that there is noobjective for Israel for a
regime change in Iran, butcertainly some of the actions
carried out by Israel in recentdays certainly managed in a way
to weaken the regime Bottom line, very significant operational
(10:08):
capabilities.
One missing point is stillFordow.
Fordow is perhaps the last mainnuclear facility which has not
been yet targeted.
That's why there are more andmore voices in Israel calling
for US intervention.
There are more and more voicesin Israel calling for US
intervention.
But other than that, I thinkthat after five days of war,
(10:29):
israel can certainly be quitesatisfied.
Main concern again we mighttalk about it later is the risk
of being dragged into a kind ofwar of attrition if we don't
know where to put an end to that.
Speaker 1 (10:46):
Thank you.
Yes, I will come back to thatand where we go from here.
I want to turn first to Ken Kenfrom Iran.
You've had a lot of experiencelooking at Iran's military
program, other actors in theregion.
What are you seeing in Iranright now?
What do you view as theirreaction?
What capabilities do they haveto keep responding to Israeli
(11:08):
attacks?
They've said they want to cometo the table.
What are you thinking about?
Speaker 3 (11:28):
with Raz, delighted to be in it with IPF, which I
think is a terrific organization.
We should recognize, of course,that one of the.
It seems.
Again, none of us knows exactlywhat Prime Minister Netanyahu
was thinking, but it seems quiteobvious that one of the
rationales for launching thisattack when he did is that Iran
is at a moment in time when itscapacity to retaliate is quite
low.
Hezbollah has been eliminatedas a potential source of
(11:50):
retaliation.
Hamas has also been degraded tothe extent that they were
likely the Houthis as well.
Iran's own ballistic missileforce had been revealed to be a
very limited capacity in termsof penetrating Israeli ballistic
missile defenses, so it wasalways clear that Iran was going
to have a very limited abilityto respond to it.
(12:11):
I will simply say, rachel, thatI think that what I've seen
from the Iranians so far isexactly what I expected, and in
fact, I wrote about this forForeign Affairs about six months
.
They asked me what would anIsrael-Iran war look like, and I
think I did pretty well inlaying out what was going to
happen.
The Iranians have responded, Ithink, both in terms of anger,
(12:32):
but also in an effort to try torestore some deterrent by simply
firing off what they're able toat the Israelis Drones when and
where they're able, ballisticmissiles when and where they're
able, as missiles when and wherethey're able.
As I said, I think this is bothbecause they are angry and
they're frightened, but I dothink that there is an aspect of
(12:53):
trying to impose some damage onIsrael to try to get the
Israelis to stop, because, atthe end of the day, that is
Iran's problem.
They have very little capacityto fight back against Israel and
really what they want right nowis they want this thing to end.
And that's what I'm mostlyseeing from the Iranians.
(13:15):
And you know Raz made a numberof really important points and I
do hope we'll come back to them.
You know I'll just pull out onethat I think is particularly
important that both on theIsraeli side and the Iranian
side, we've actually seen atremendous amount of care taken
with the kinds of targets thatare being struck.
Yes, iran is salvoing missilesand drones at Israel, trying to
(13:41):
do damage to Israel, but it'snot doing a lot of other things
that it might.
It's not attacking Americans,it's not going after the Gulf
states or after the oil exportsin the Gulf right.
There are things that Irancould do, which it is
deliberately choosing not to.
And the same thing for Israel.
Again, I completely agree withRaz.
I think he was spot on and Ithink it's an important point.
(14:02):
You've had people out theresaying oh, the Israelis are
clearly going after regimechange.
Absolutely not Right.
Again, I don't know what's inPrime Minister Netanyahu's head
and maybe you'll get around tothat, but just as a military
analyst looking at what Israelis striking, this is not an air
campaign right now that isdesigned to bring about regime
change.
The Israelis would be strikinga whole range of other targets
(14:27):
if they were trying to do so.
I think that is very deliberate.
I think that there is astrategic rationale behind it,
which I actually think is quitesmart, and I think that the
Iranians also do recognize thatto a certain extent, to the
extent that they are able to doso.
And again, it's why this waryou know it looks terrible.
It's obviously horrible for thepeople who are suffering in
(14:49):
various different ways, but thetruth of the matter is, right
now, this conflict is actuallyquite well contained because the
Iranians are looking to get outof it as quickly as they can
and the Israelis are being verydeliberate about what they're
trying to achieve.
Thanks, ken.
Speaker 1 (15:04):
So I want to pull on that thread for a moment and
where we are being verydeliberate about what they're
trying to achieve.
Thanks, ken.
So I want to pull on thatthread for a moment and where we
are now versus where we couldgo.
Two things that have been on mymind and, I think, on the mind
of many folks who are watching,is will the US get involved?
What is the US considering?
And then I'll turn back to you,raz, on what if the US doesn't
get involved.
What are Israel's options?
(15:24):
So, ken, can you talk to us fora moment about US
considerations?
What has the US been doing thusfar?
Who knows what our president isthinking, but what would you be
thinking about if you wereweighing this decision?
Speaker 3 (15:37):
Sure, and you know, yeah, this is such a strange
administration.
It just doesn't behave like anyother one that we've ever seen
not anyone that I've ever workedfor.
You know, the president makeshis decisions.
He makes his decisions notbased on staff work but,
famously, on his gut.
It's what his impulses tell him.
(15:58):
I do have the impression thathe is certainly interested in
(16:26):
getting involved.
I think that a number ofstatements he's made, fact that
he has been so dismissive anddespairing of Tucker Carlson
right, the fact that he's been,you know, criticizing Tucker
Carlson, who's been, you know,arguing the United States should
not get involved in this, I see, is actually quite significant,
revealing of where Trump's headis Now.
Setting aside the president andgetting to the rest of your
(16:47):
question, point number one, theUnited States is moving
additional forces to the region.
We're sending another surfacecombatant, we're sending an
additional aircraft carrier, youguys all know we're sending
refueling aircraft closer to thetheater.
We're clearly posturingourselves so that we could
intervene militarily if we choseto do so.
(17:08):
But don't assume that that'swhat this is about.
This is also completelyconsistent with the United
States simply wanting to do abetter job to be able to defend
our interests in the region,which, by the way, include
protecting Israel from Iranianstrikes, right.
So this is all very consistentwith that, and while it would
enable us to enter the war andconduct offensive operations
(17:30):
against Iran more effectively,it doesn't mean that we
absolutely are doing so.
Then the last piece of yourquestion, which I think is the
most important one, is why wouldwe intervene?
Right?
What would we be trying toaccomplish if we did so?
You know Raz mentioned Firdo.
Firdo is very important.
(17:50):
Again, I think there's been alot of kind of people saying
things without fully havingthought all of it through.
Yes, as best we understand, itwould be very difficult for
Israel to destroy Firdo throughairstrikes alone, right, but
let's recognize that Israel mayhave other plans for Firdo.
You know, I will say that I wasspeaking to a very senior IDF
(18:15):
officer the other day, and youknow he made the statement to me
and I asked him and he said yes, you're welcome to repeat this.
He said I think that if thiscampaign ends and Ferdow remains
operational, that we will nothave achieved all of our
objectives.
Right, which I took as a signthat you know Israel has thought
this through and you knowIsrael has been thinking about
(18:38):
the problem for Ferdow for overa dozen years and typically when
the IDF thinks really hardabout a problem, they come up
with some really creativesolutions.
They might be thinking aboutspecial forces or cyber or some
combination of the two, alongwith airstrikes.
Or, let's recognize, the IDFmay have come up with a solution
(18:58):
to Ferdow that none of us hasever thought of right, none of
us at least.
Maybe Roz did, but certainlyyou and I, rachel.
We didn't have any inkling ofthe beeper attack.
That was a complete surprise tous.
I don't think any of us wouldhave predicted that the Israelis
would be able to build a dronebase outside of Tehran.
So let's recognize that that isall out there.
(19:20):
But the real issue for theUnited States is less about what
gets destroyed in this strike.
That's certainly part of it and, yes, us intervention could be
about taking out Firdo and someother facilities that Israel may
be having difficulty with.
The bigger issue and again whatI hope President Trump is
thinking about, but I'm afraidthat he isn't is this issue of
(19:41):
the long term and preventingIran from reconstituting its
nuclear program down the road.
Israel has struck variousfacilities around the region
over the course of time Iraq in1981, syria 2007, and then,
along with us with the Stuxnetattack, iran again in 2002,
(20:03):
sorry 2010, with very mixedresults in terms of the
long-term impact.
Right, this war cannot result inIran getting a nuclear weapon
in two or five or 10 years.
That would be a terribleoutcome.
And so, whatever the US doesand I'm glad to unpack the
(20:24):
different scenarios, but I wantto stop talking right now
Whatever we do, our interventionhas to be designed to make it
that much less likely, in fact,impossible, if we can do it, for
Iran to reconstitute.
That's what we need to bethinking about, and it can go
either way.
Either way, thanks.
Speaker 1 (20:41):
Ken, yeah, I want to come back to some of the
potential implications for theUS in the region and Israel.
But first, raz, from theIsraeli perspective, let's say
the US doesn't strike Fordow.
And in your answer, just torespect some of the audience
questions, can you say a wordabout what Fordow is for some of
our watchers?
Speaker 2 (21:01):
Yeah well, Fodor is the second enrichment site in
Iran, but it's more difficult todeal with Fodor, in which there
is enrichment today to 60%.
By the way, the fact that Fodoris under the ground in the
mountains is the main reason why, according to the JCPOA sign in
2015, the Iranians were notallowed to enrich uranium in
(21:24):
Fordow, but only in the Tansk.
It shouldn't come as a surprisethat Israel wants the Americans
to take direct part in thiscampaign.
It's been discussed for manyyears that there is a very big
difference between the impact ofan Israeli unilateral attack on
Iran and a jointIsraeli-American efforts.
(21:47):
It could be much quicker, itcould be more efficient, and I
certainly agree with Kenconcerning that.
There are some ways to dealwith Fordow other than aerial
attack.
By the way, it's not justmilitary commanders saying that
without dealing with Fordow,Israel is not going to put an
(22:08):
end to the war.
Just two or three days ago, thenational security advisor the
Israel national security advisoralso said very clearly in a TV
interview.
He said we are not going to endthis war with Fordow still
intact, and the meaning of that,as he still doesn't know if the
(22:31):
United States is going to playa role in that that probably
there are other ways to dealwith Fordow, but they are
probably much riskier andtherefore Israel would certainly
love the Americans to do that.
If the United States doesn'tplay a direct role and, by the
(22:52):
way, the United States, we haveto say, plays a major role in
defending Israel right now butif not, then I think that the
main purpose would be to try anddeal with FODO in other ways,
At least to have a certainimpact on FODO.
I'm not sure that Israel iscapable of destroying FODO
(23:18):
entirely, but it would certainlyassist Israel to see American
involvement, and then I thinkone implication would be not
just that it would be moreefficient, but I think that the
US involvement could certainlyput an end to the war much
quicker than perhaps anadjusting Israeli operation.
Speaker 1 (23:42):
Thanks, raz.
I had in mind and we've gottena number of questions from the
audience related to diplomacy.
You mentioned the war could endquickly if there's a more
decisive strike on Fordow or USinvolvement.
There's also still talk fromthe US president, from the
Iranians, about negotiations.
Is there and Ken, I'll turn toyou first for this do you
envision a scenario in which theUS and Iran can come to the
(24:06):
table right now to havemeaningful conversations that
could lead to an Israeli andIranian ceasefire and achieve
Israel's objectives with respectto Iran's nuclear program?
And then, raz, I'll ask youfrom the Israeli perspective is
there any scenario in whichIsrael would stand down, and
what would a sufficientagreement look like?
Speaker 3 (24:28):
Sure, look, rachel.
I think in some ways that'sexactly what the Iranians would
like.
I think that, again, they aredesperate to stop this war and
if they can get intonegotiations with the United
States as a way to putting anend to the war, that is exactly
what they need to have happenNow.
(24:48):
Again, if they can do it withsome other country, that'd be
even better, right, but theUnited States may be its last
preference, but nonetheless it'sthe only realistic one out
there.
The Israelis are not going tobe terribly interested if the
Iranians decide to sit down withthe Qataris over talks about
their nuclear program.
The big question mark, ofcourse, will be what happens in
(25:11):
those negotiations.
What is Iran actually willingto give on?
You know, again, this is thebig question mark lying out
there.
It's not just how much doesIsrael destroy in these strikes,
it's making sure that Iran doesnot reconstitute down the road
right.
Nobody wants to repeat this.
Nobody wants this war to leadto an Iranian nuclear arsenal,
(25:35):
and again, part of Iran'sstrategy might well be hey,
let's get to those negotiations.
Let's take up President Trumpon his offer in hope that we can
end the Israeli airstrikes andjust play out the negotiations
without having to give upanything meaningful.
I think that's actually why thestatements that President Trump
(25:56):
is making that there can be noenrichment in Iran is a very
important one is a veryimportant one, right?
I'd actually like to see him goa little bit beyond that and
say you know basically nothingother than civilian nuclear uses
, and those are going to have tobe tightly controlled.
And he said things that areclose to it, right?
But the Iranians have tounderstand that that's got to be
(26:17):
what these talks look like.
So can I imagine, absolutely.
But point number one, back toRaz's point Israel is going to
prosecute this war, and it'sgoing to prosecute this war
until it believes that it istaking care of everything that
it needs to believe, and I don'tthink that there's going to be
again.
I want to be a little carefulbecause it's the Middle East
unexpected things happen, butcertainly Israel is going to
(26:39):
resist any effort to shut downthis war before then.
Once that happens, I do thinkthat it is a perfectly
reasonable off-ramp for the warto say we're now going to shift
to negotiations mediated by theUnited States that will put a
permanent end to Iran's nuclearprogram, but in return again, as
(27:00):
President Trump has offered wewould lift our sanctions.
They would get to rebuild theireconomy, at least to a certain
extent, that way, as somethingof a carrot for them.
But the Iranians are going tohave to be willing to accept
that, and at the moment it's notentirely clear that they are.
It's the kind of thing that Icould certainly imagine
(27:20):
Ayatollah Khamenei agreeing to,but he's got other
constituencies right now.
He's got a Revolutionary GuardCorps and other more hardline
members of his regime whoprobably are opposing him rather
fiercely.
He'll have to get his domesticducks in order.
So, yes, I can definitely see usmoving in that direction.
But I'll also say I don't thinkthat's the inevitable way that
(27:42):
this ends.
I don't think it's a foregoneconclusion.
I don't think we should bePollyanna-ish about that's the
inevitable way that this ends.
I don't think it's a foregoneconclusion.
I don't think we should bePollyanna-ish about that being
the likely end to this.
Speaker 1 (27:51):
Thanks, ken.
Before I turn to Raz, we'vegotten a couple of questions, as
both of you have been talkingabout what is happening inside
Iran.
One in response, ken you saidthey're desperate to stop the
war beyond sort of thedegradation of their military
capabilities.
What are you seeing amongreactions in Iran economy,
infrastructure, et cetera?
Sorry to me or to Raz yeahsorry, Ken you, and then I'll
(28:15):
turn back to Raz.
Speaker 3 (28:17):
So you know, again, I'm paid to look a little deeper
than most people, but most ofwhat I'm seeing is what most of
other people are seeing too, theIranian I should.
I should caveat this pockets ofthe Iranian population are
deeply frightened.
You know, everyone focuses onTehran and Tehran is a huge, you
know, symbol for Iran.
(28:38):
A lot of people do live inTehran, but we should remember,
you know, there are 92 millionpeople in Iran.
Most of them don't live inTehran, right, and we're not
necessarily seeing everyoneevacuate Mash that are big and
go boom and burn very bright andvery loud, but the Israelis
(29:18):
didn't wipe out all of Tehran'sinfrastructure.
They didn't wipe out all of itsoil infrastructure.
Again, they were very precisein picking out targets that
would send a very big message topeople without actually
destroying civilian life there.
Gasoline situation isn't bad.
You can get gas.
It's just that people are sofrightened and they are leaving.
(29:47):
But we've not yet seen anydegradation of the regime's
control over Iranian society.
We've not seen any particularshutdown of the Iranian economy.
The Iranian economy was inreally bad shape before this
started.
It's not like we've seen anykind of an economic collapse.
The big thing is that a lot ofpeople are afraid, particularly
(30:07):
in places like Tehran.
Speaker 1 (30:10):
Thanks, ken Raz.
I'll turn back to you on thetopic of negotiation, sort of
what might it take for Israel tostand down absent achievement
of all military objectives?
And as an addition to that, isthere a point at which there's
too much pain for Israelis orinterceptors run out?
Is there a limit to Israel'sability to prosecute this war?
Speaker 2 (30:34):
First of all, israel is not going to oppose diplomacy
.
I think it's very clear inIsrael, and it's been very clear
from the beginning, that thereis no way to totally destroy
Iran's nuclear program, eventhrough an American joint and
American-Israeli efforts.
And at the end of the day we'llhave to make sure that Iran
doesn't reconstitute its program, doesn't use what is remains of
(30:57):
its nuclear program, whetherit's just a few hundreds of
kilograms of fissile materialand a few thousands of hundreds
of centrifuges, and those willhave to be sorted out through
diplomacy.
I'm not sure that Israel isgoing to be thrilled with a
possible agreement between Iranand the United States because
(31:18):
even if that's going to be thebest deal ever signed in human
history, it's very clear that atleast one thing will be
included in this deal as Kensaid, sanctions are going to be
removed and we all know thatprobably the money is not going
to be invested just to improvethe electricity and water
(31:42):
infrastructures in Iran.
They will go to missiles anddrones and perhaps even although
it's much more difficult todayto support Iran's proxies in the
region.
But basically, israel's storyis not going to impose diplomacy
.
The Israeli position before thewar was very clear and that was
(32:03):
basically the same as theofficial US position.
We want to get a deal in whichthere is no enrichment inside
Iran, no right for Iran toenrichment inside Iran.
If Iran wants to use some fuelfor its civilian uses, then it
(32:25):
can import fuel from otherplaces.
So that has been the Israeliposition and it's not going to
change.
On the contrary, perhaps wewill see some other demands
coming from Israel, exploitingthe Israeli successes over the
last few days.
I have to say that one of myconcerns and we discussed that
(32:49):
in recent days at INSS is thepossibility that there might be
some disagreements between theUnited States and Israel when it
comes not to the issue ofenrichment but perhaps to other
issues, for example the missiles.
Here I can definitely see anIsraeli demand saying OK, we
(33:09):
took care of the main threat,which is the nuclear program,
but we have to also discuss theissue of long range missiles and
I'm not sure that the USadministration is going to
insist on this issue, forexample, concerning the second
part of your question, look, theproblem is, I'm not sure that
(33:31):
the problem, at least at thispoint, is the interception
capabilities.
Of course there is a limit, notjust to interception
capabilities, also to theability of the Israeli pilots
and the Israeli Air Force tocontinue working in Iran so far
(33:52):
away.
Iran is not Gaza, it's not evenLebanon.
It's very difficult to workthere for a relatively long
period of time, but Israel cando that.
There is a kind of I don't likethe use of this term
competition, but there is acompetition between the
production capabilities insideIran of new missiles and the
(34:13):
Israeli capabilities tointercept them.
But I think that the main issueactually refers to Israeli
resilience when it comes to itseconomic.
From the economic point of view, israeli way is disconnected.
Those days, no flight.
Or today there was the renewalof the flights to Israel to get
(34:38):
all those hundreds of thousandsof Israelis who were stuck
abroad, to get them back toIsrael.
It's still at the beginning ofthis process abroad to get them
back to Israel.
It's still at the beginning ofthis process.
Until today, no working placesworking in Israel.
The economy is actually in ahalt.
No schools.
So, yes, the school year isgoing to be ending anyway in a
(35:02):
matter of days, ending anyway ina matter of days, but still
it's a major problem to persistwith this situation for much
longer.
We don't have a lot of sleepbecause of the continued alerts
and there is concern in Israel.
What will happen if, at somepoint and we've already seen a
(35:23):
decline in the number ofmissiles being launched from
Iran?
But what will happen if theIranians continue to launch not
20 or 30 or 50 missiles per day,just two or three missiles per
day?
This by itself is a majorproblem.
So we are trying to, and thereis already some changes in the
(35:45):
regulations concerning theIsraeli home front, and some of
the places are going to bereopened beginning of tomorrow,
because there is a recognitionin Israel that it's not going to
be as easy to keep thisemergency status quo much longer
.
But again, I think that Israelcan still manage that and I
(36:10):
think and that would be my lastremark here there is almost a
consensus in Israel.
We with the INSF, justconducted a survey two days ago.
90% of the Israeli populationsupports this war, despite the
damage and despite thecasualties, and the reason for
that, I think, is very clear.
For many years we've beendiscussing in Israel the number
(36:34):
one threat, the number onepotentially existential threat
to the state of Israel, which isIran and therefore most
Israelis.
I'm not talking just of thepolitical system and the
security establishment in Israel.
Ordinary Iranians realize thateven if they have to deal with
the Iranian threat, nuclearthreat and at the end of the day
(37:08):
the question will be whetherIsrael managed, if not to
destroy the nuclear threat, atleast to delay it in many years.
Speaker 1 (37:46):
Thanks, raz.
You mentioned window ofopportunity and some of that
window is born out of Israel'sability to degrade Iranian
proxies around its borderscapability.
We haven't seen much from Iraq.
The Houthi reaction has beenvery muted.
Hezbollah said you know we'renot going to get involved.
What are you thinking about asyou watch this?
Speaker 2 (37:59):
You know, rachel, I spent almost 25 years in the
Israeli military intelligenceand then about a decade at the
NSS.
I participated in dozens ofsimulations and war games and
discussions.
What will happen if and whenIsrael decides to strike the
nuclear facilities in Iran?
And, with all due respect toIran missiles capabilities,
(38:22):
which, of course, upgradedduring the recent years the
number one concern was alwaysHezbollah and the arsenal of
hundreds of thousands of rocketsand missiles, and I think that
there is no doubt that this wasnot the trigger for what Israel
did six days ago.
But we can't understand Israelidecision to do that without
(38:45):
understanding that, for thefirst time since the summer of
2024, when Israel was discussingthe possibility of striking
Iran, it didn't have to takeinto consideration the
possibility of Hezbollahretaliation.
Syria is out of the game.
I think I would guess that manyin Damascus today are actually
(39:06):
quite happy with what Israel isdoing in Iran.
Hezbollah is under majorpressure.
By the way, we still have thisconcern that at some point, if
the situation in Iran becomesalmost an existential threat to
the stability of the regime, wemight see some intervention by
Hezbollah, but it's not going tobe easy and it's certainly not
(39:28):
going to be as significant asbefore.
The Afghans, the Shabi, thepro-Iranian militias in Iraq,
are not in the business rightnow.
We've seen some clues ofperhaps activity against the US
forces there.
The Falis are already doingwhatever they do to support the
Palestinians in Gaza.
That's not significant.
So the bottom line is that thiscomes as perhaps the first real
(39:58):
indication for the direposition of Iran, which has lost
in recent months a very vitalcomponent of its deterrence
strategy against Israel.
And of course, we all hope thatthe voices inside Iran which
called in recent months to tryand compensate for the loss of
(40:21):
proxies and Iran's inability toforce a new equation of
deterrence against Israelthrough its missiles, both in
April and then in October, inthe two Iranian attacks against
Israel, and they called fortrying to change the nuclear
doctrine of Iran in order tocome up with the nuclear
(40:42):
solution I hope that thisnuclear option is going to get
out of the table up the tableand I think this will certainly
have a major impact not just onIran and on the Iranian-Israeli
confrontation, but on the MiddleEast as well.
Speaker 1 (40:58):
Thanks, Raz.
I want to come back to Gaza ina moment, which we've also
gotten a number of questions onas well, as sort of that new
Middle East architecture you'retalking about.
But first, Ken, sticking withother regional players, how do
you think about where golfpartners are in this scenario?
Speaker 3 (41:16):
Sure.
So I think this is an importantquestion because it's a little
bit complicated.
Gulf publics seem I'll put itthis way angry at Israel,
unhappy with Israel.
There seems to be a lot ofnegative public opinion toward
Israel within the Gulf and a bigchunk of that is a reflection
(41:37):
of their sympathies for thePalestinians.
A big chunk of that is aboutGaza and what's going on in Gaza
, and they don't like to see theIsraelis act with impunity and
throw around their uniquemilitary weight.
Their governments have a verydifferent perspective on these
things.
First, their governmentsabsolutely like to see, or want
(41:58):
to see, iran defanged.
Iran has been their number onethreat for decades, arguably
since the 1979 revolution.
Decades, arguably since the1979 revolution.
Cutting down Iran to size isvery, very helpful and very
positive for them.
There seems to be some concern.
My own conversations with Gulfofficials.
They certainly are somewhatconcerned about the potential
(42:20):
for horizontal escalation, thatis, escalation beyond Israel and
Iran to encompass othercountries.
There is some degree of a senseof you know this could get out
of hand.
You know the Israelis might dothis, that might cause the
Iranians to do that.
That's certainly out there,that's certainly on the table.
But, as I said earlier, we'veactually we have not seen that
(42:43):
and we've seen both sides tryingvery hard not to move in that
direction so far.
But that's a consideration forthem as well, I think for the
gulf states.
Um, if this war ends with theuh destruction, I'll put it that
way.
But we really mean raz madethis point earlier, he's
absolutely right setting backthe iranian program very
(43:03):
severely right, and then add onto it the point that I keep
making, which is that theoutcome of the war results in
this Iranian regime neveracquiring nuclear weapons.
However that happens, whetherit's all military or diplomatic
or some combination of the two,that would be a very good
outcome for the Gulf states.
(43:24):
That said, I do want to add awrinkle to it which I think is
important to understand.
We saw this already after thedismantling of Hezbollah by
Israel, which is we need torecognize that the major driver
behind the Abraham Accords, withthe exception of the Emirates.
(43:44):
The Emirates are in a somewhatdifferent area because they're
looking for genuine economiccooperation with Israel for
their own reasons.
It's just a different kind ofcountry.
For the majority of the Arabstates, even Saudi Arabia as it
was considering it, the majordriver for normalization with
Israel was the Iranian threatsright and before October 7,
(44:06):
2023,.
The Gulf States were veryconcerned about that, in
particular, because the UnitedStates, under three successive
administrations Obama, trump,won, and Biden had been
progressively disengaging fromthe Middle East.
All of that created fears ontheir part, which drove them
into the arms of the Israelis.
(44:26):
With the destruction of Hamasand Hezbollah began to see the
Gulf states pulling back alittle bit, no longer feeling
the need.
It wasn't essential to haveIsrael as an ally, as they once
did, and, of course, it wasn'tjust Hezbollah and Hamas.
It was also the damage thatIsrael had inflicted directly on
(44:47):
Iran right, demonstratingIsrael's military superiority
over Iran.
This war because it is, I think,going to result in an even far
worse diminution of Iranianmilitary power, of Iran's
military capability, not justwithin Iran but around the
region, and, of course, inmassive diminution of Iran's
(45:08):
reputation to be able to wieldinfluence in the region.
I suspect, and I think we'realready starting to see it again
many of these Gulf states aregoing to be less desirous of
normalization with Israel.
They won't feel the need theway that they once did, and the
fact that they all have publicswho are antagonistic toward
(45:33):
Israel, not sympathetic towardIsrael, that will weigh more
heavily for them, right, and sothis is kind of a perverse
outcome for the Israelis.
Potentially I don't think thatit's you know should change
their minds about this, but I dothink that it's worth thinking
about that.
Whereas before this war andbefore October 7, 2023, we saw
(45:54):
this convergence of the moderateArab states and Israel in a new
alliance against Iran, messessince October 7, 2023, are
causing many of the Gulf states,many of the moderate Arab
states, to say you know what?
We don't need that alliancewith Israel as much as we once
did, and therefore our public'sunhappiness with the situation
(46:17):
in Gaza, with Israel's treatmentof the Palestinians more
broadly, that will weigh moreheavily in their calculations.
Speaker 1 (46:26):
Thanks.
I want to push on that for amoment and wonder if you think
the same logic applies or it'sjust a totally different
scenario for Lebanon and Syria.
Speaker 3 (46:35):
Yeah.
So I do think that it's verydifferent for both Lebanon and
Syria, because the stakes aremuch more immediate, right?
In fact, it's kind of thereverse of the incentives for
the Gulf States and, to someextent, jordan as well, although
, again, jordan is literally themiddle ground in all of this.
Lebanon wants Hezbollahdefanged and it wants peace with
(46:57):
Israel.
Right?
The vast majority of Lebanese,as we can tell, seem absolutely
sick of the constant conflictwith Israel.
I think they've been sick of itfor decades.
They see this now as anopportunity to end that.
Obviously, the Shia populationof Lebanon is the big unknown
out there.
(47:17):
Just how supportive will theybe of Hezbollah?
How much does Hezbollah have aprotection racket over them?
But yes, I think in the case ofLebanon, it's pretty clear.
The new government and many ofits constituents absolutely want
a normalization with Israel,defanging Hezbollah and end to
this conflict which has justbeen so ruinous for them for
(47:40):
decades.
And Syria, the same thing, atleast insofar as what many
Syrians seem to want.
Same thing, at least insofar aswhat many Syrians seem to want
and what Ahmed al-Shara wants,the now leader of Syria.
Now, again, there are bigquestion marks surrounding other
members of his government, andparticularly his military
(48:00):
leaders, who seem to be muchmore kind of radical jihadi in
their orientation, don't reallyknow how they think about Israel
.
But you know, shara has goneout of his way to indicate that
he too wants normalization andpeace with Israel.
And again, that puts them in avery different set of
circumstances, and I will saythat in both of those cases,
(48:24):
israel's further destruction ofIranian military power, I think,
makes that even easier.
Right, it's going to make iteven harder for Hezbollah to
fight back.
It is going to make it eveneasier for Shara to convince his
people hey, we want to makepeace with Israel.
We don't want to get in anotherfight with these guys.
We want a better, peaceful,more prosperous future, and that
(48:46):
means making peace.
Speaker 1 (48:49):
Thanks, ken Raz.
I welcome any of your reactionto what Ken just put on the
table and sort of what thiscould all mean for the region.
And then I would ask that youtouch on any implications that
this war has on Israel's war inGaza.
Speaker 2 (49:20):
Yeah, so I get the sense in Israel that the war
against Iran is the last phaseof the Israeli efforts to create
a new environment in the MiddleEast, after dealing with Gaza,
hezbollah, then of course, syriawas not our operation, but that
was clearly a result of whatIsrael did in Lebanon.
And I think that until the warin Iran erupted there was a
sense of some kind of okay, westill missed something.
We managed to deal with Gaza,with Hamas of course not
(49:40):
entirely, we still remember thatwe have more than 50 hostages
in Gaza.
We managed to deal withHezbollah.
That was a major Israelisuccess, which actually
surprised even the Israelis thelevel of success against
Hezbollah.
A Syrian regime collapsed.
But there was this bitterness,knowing that the number one
(50:04):
threat on the security of thestate of Israel has always been
Iran.
That was the head of the snake,as some Israeli politicians
refer to.
And I think that if and when andI want to be very cautious
about that because we stilldon't know how this war is going
to end we certainly hope thatit won't turn into some kind of
(50:25):
war of attrition with manycasualties and damage caused,
but, if this war is over,dealing very successfully with
Iran's nuclear and othermilitary threats.
I think it can certainlyincrease not just the
(50:46):
opportunities to move forwardwith Syria and perhaps to
complete trying to get this newarchitecture with Hezbollah and
with Lebanon as well, but italso can convince even the more
hardliners in Israel of coursenot Smotrich and Ben-Gur, but
perhaps the more self-right inIsrael.
(51:09):
Okay, we managed to do that,and the meaning of that is that
we have to put an end to the warin Gaza as quickly as possible
and then move forward, perhapsto create better conditions for
Israel.
I still think that, despite allthe problems and I certainly
agree with Ken that it's muchmore problematic to resume talks
(51:35):
with Saudi Arabia onnormalization of progress not
towards Palestinian states, buttowards a kind of settlement
with the Palestinians this byitself will be enough to
(51:57):
reignite the possibility ofnormalization with the Saudis,
and that would certainly be anhistorical turnout.
Speaker 1 (52:06):
Thanks, Raz.
I want to remind the audiencewe have about five minutes left,
so please continue putting anyquestions into the chat.
I've been trying to incorporatea number of them into our
discussion, but I'm going to aska couple very discreet ones now
before I turn to anotherclosing question.
One for Raz Do you have anysense of why Israel allegedly
(52:28):
targeted Shamkhani?
Speaker 2 (52:32):
That's a difficult question.
I have a thesis, but it'swithout being exposed to any
kind of intelligence.
That might have something to dowith the position held by
Shomkhani concerning theso-called nuclear file in Iran
(52:52):
and not just responsibility forsome of the talks.
But perhaps he had otherassignments from the Supreme
Leader Khamenei, dealing notjust with this political or
diplomatic angle of Iran'snuclear program.
Of course he was very close toKhamenei as well, as we know,
but unlike the high-rankinggenerals, this was the exception
(53:17):
and I'm not sure that, otherthan his connection to the
nuclear issue or the nuclearfile, we could find a better
explanation for that.
Speaker 1 (53:26):
Thank you, and another very discreet question
for Ken.
We got a question from formerboard chair and longtime IPF
supporter and board member,Susie Gellman, about Congress.
What is the mood in Congressthese days?
There are those primarily onthe Democratic side maybe a
Republican or two who are veryfocused on the authorization of
(53:47):
use of military force andcongressional oversight over the
US path to war.
There are those who areadvocating that the US needs to
get involved because Iran'snuclear program is a threat to
us too.
What are you seeing and whatare you hearing?
Speaker 3 (54:01):
Sure, and I love the fact that Susie is asking me,
because I could just as easilyask Susie, but I'll give my
answer since I'm the one on thescreen.
So first, I suspect that youwere going to find a great many
Democrats voting against anyauthorization to use force
simply because it is PresidentTrump who wants it.
Obviously, there will besupporters of Israel there and I
(54:25):
think that some of them mightdefect and vote in favor of it,
but you know the partisanship isso rancorous at this moment
that you know I do suspect thatthere will be a very significant
Democratic opposition and let'srecognize that.
You know big chunks of theDemocratic Party have turned
(54:45):
against Israel and I think thatthey will enthusiastically
oppose any kind of anauthorization for the use of
military force.
In many ways, I think that theissues within the Republican
Party are the much moreinteresting ones.
You've got this split nowbetween and in some ways it's
(55:07):
not a clean split, it's athree-way break.
Most people think of it interms of a break between the
neo-isolationists and thetraditional internationalists
within the Republican Party, andI think that division is out
there and we have seen it on anynumber of occasions where you
do have the kind of Rand PaulTucker, carlson wing of the
(55:29):
Republican Party that JD Vancealso in that category, not
interested in the world, notinterested in what's happening
out there, not particularlyinterested in supporting Israel.
And then, of course, you've gotmore traditional Republicans
Lindsey Graham, tom Cotton,marco Rubio would have once
fallen into that category I'mnot sure he still does, but he
(55:50):
once did who I think will bevery supportive of the use of
military force in Israel's favor.
But, as I said, I think there isa third group that we're not
really thinking about too much,which is a group of Republicans
who will simply do whateverPresident Trump wants them to do
right.
These are the true MAGA folkswho you know.
Whatever President Trump wantsthem to do right, these are the
true MAGA folks who you know.
Whatever President Trump tellsthem to do, they will do it.
(56:12):
And so on, one day they may bein favor of a war and the next
day they may be opposed to it,depending on what the
president's position is.
And what that obviously suggestsis that if the president does
decide one way or the other,whatever it may be, you'll get a
split.
You know the Republican Partywill split, but that MAGA group
will be with the president, andthen the president will pick up
(56:34):
either the traditionalconservatives, traditional
internationalist Republicans orthe neo-isolationist
conservatives, depending on whathe does Now.
Is that enough for an AUMF?
No idea.
What he does Now, is thatenough for an AUMF?
No idea.
We've also seen the Republicansfall in line behind the
president, simply because theyare afraid of all the different
powers that he has and the gripthat he has on the Republican
(56:58):
base.
That might carry the day, butit's also a reason why we might
not see a request for anauthorization for the use of
military force from thisadministration.
They may choose to avoid theissue altogether.
Speaker 1 (57:13):
Thanks, ken.
We have about two minutes left.
In that Uncertainty about whatwe'll see here at home in the
United States is a good segue tothe uncertainty in all of this.
I think it is still very muchan evolving situation.
So what are you each watchingfor in 60 seconds or less, over
the coming days?
What are the indicators, whatare the signs, what are the
(57:33):
things that will be on your mind, raz, go ahead.
Speaker 2 (57:37):
I think that we'll have to see in the next 24 or 48
hours whether the United Statesis involved in this war.
This will have a major impacton the way the war is being
conducted.
If there is no US involvement,my sense is that in about a week
or so, israel will probablyreach the conclusion that most
(58:03):
of the goals or the objectivescould be achieved and then
strive to get either a ceasefireeven a unilateral ceasefire or
some kind of a regime whichcould put an end to the war.
But, as I said before, my mainconcern today is that you know,
(58:25):
if there is too much appetiteand if there are too many
successes in the next few days,there could be some voices in
Israel saying, ok, we've doneremarkably well, let's try this
as an opportunity to look forother objectives, including
perhaps regime change, and this,in my view, could be
catastrophic.
(58:45):
Thank you, ken.
Speaker 3 (58:48):
Just very quickly.
I completely agree with Raz.
What the US decides to do ishugely important.
I'll put Raz's second pointslightly differently Changes in
the Israeli target set.
Again, I think that Israel hasbeen very focused and very
successful in going after those.
There's still more to be done.
I am watching for Ferdow butyes, like Raz, my big question
(59:08):
mark is does Israel start goingafter additional target sets,
either because it feels like theopportunity is there or, to an
earlier point that Raz made,because Israel believes that the
only way to bring the war to aclose, because the Iranians
won't give up, is by going afterother targets to inflict
greater pain on the Iranians?
Speaker 1 (59:30):
Thank you.
While our time is up, I couldcontinue this conversation for
hours, but we will stop.
Ken Raz, thank you again forjoining us To our audience and
participants.
Thank you for joining us, forsending in your questions.
I think this has been a veryinformative, timely and
insightful conversation.
For those who want more fromIsrael Policy Forum, please
visit our website,israelpolicyforumorg.
(59:52):
You can sign up for moreanalysis, emails, webinar
announcements, podcasts and allthat we offer.
So thank you again and wishingeveryone a safe night.
Bye, thank you.
Popular Podcasts
Stuff You Should Know
If you've ever wanted to know about champagne, satanism, the Stonewall Uprising, chaos theory, LSD, El Nino, true crime and Rosa Parks, then look no further. Josh and Chuck have you covered.
24/7 News: The Latest
The latest news in 4 minutes updated every hour, every day.
Crime Junkie
Does hearing about a true crime case always leave you scouring the internet for the truth behind the story? Dive into your next mystery with Crime Junkie. Every Monday, join your host Ashley Flowers as she unravels all the details of infamous and underreported true crime cases with her best friend Brit Prawat. From cold cases to missing persons and heroes in our community who seek justice, Crime Junkie is your destination for theories and stories you won’t hear anywhere else. Whether you're a seasoned true crime enthusiast or new to the genre, you'll find yourself on the edge of your seat awaiting a new episode every Monday. If you can never get enough true crime... Congratulations, you’ve found your people. Follow to join a community of Crime Junkies! Crime Junkie is presented by audiochuck Media Company.