August 13, 2025 • 48 mins
On this week’s episode, Israel Policy Forum Policy Advisor and Tel Aviv-based journalist Neri Zilber hosts Col. (ret.) Dr. Michael Milshtein, former head of the Department for Palestinian Affairs in Israel’s Military Intelligence Directorate. They discuss the Netanyahu government's decision last week to expand the offensive against Hamas by re-invading Gaza City, the number of Israeli forces and time needed to prepare for such a major operation, what is left of Hamas to destroy, and the potential costs of the operation to Israel, as well as the lack of any realistic day after planning, the prospects for a ceasefire deal, and more.
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Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Neri (00:05):
Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod.
I'm Nery Zilber, a journalistbased in Tel Aviv and a policy
advisor to Israel Policy Forum.
It's boiling hot here in Israelthese days, and it's not just
the weather.
The Netanyahu government, asI'm sure many of you heard late
last week, decided to escalateand expand the military
offensive against Hamas in Gaza,starting with Gaza City.
(00:29):
To explain what it all means,including the very real costs if
and when it does happen, wehave our good friend back with
us, michal Milstein.
To break it all down for us,michal is, of course, a colonel
in the IDF reserves and theformer head of the Palestinian
arena in Israeli militaryintelligence, the advisor to the
(00:51):
IDF general responsible for thePalestinian territories and the
head of the Palestinian StudiesCenter at the Dayan Center at
Tel Aviv University.
This was, as always, a terrificconversation with Mikhail, tel
Aviv University.
This was, as always, a terrificconversation with Michael.
As you rightly pointed out,there are still a lot of
question marks, which we did ourbest to answer, don't worry,
(01:12):
but a lot of question marksnonetheless about the weeks and
months ahead.
But we also had to be honestwith you, our viewers and
listeners.
All of the likely answers arenot looking great, to say the
least.
So with that fair warning,let's get to Michael Milstein.
Hi, michael, welcome back tothe podcast.
Michael (01:32):
Hi, Nery, I'm glad, of course, once again that you are
having me.
Neri (01:39):
We always love to have you on the podcast, michael, and we
try not to abuse this privilege, but you may remember you were
on three months ago already, inearly May, and I'll remind you,
michael.
The introduction to that episodewas verbatim and I'll read it.
Our good friend, michaelMilstein is back with us to
(01:59):
discuss where the Gaza war isheading after the Israeli
government approved plans for amajor new offensive that it says
will finally defeat Hamas.
This was three months ago, inearly May, ahead of the Gideon's
Chariots offensive.
So now you're back with us,michael, today to discuss where
the Gaza war is likely headed,after the security cabinet early
(02:23):
Friday last week, ordered theIDF to quote unquote prepare to
take over Gaza City as part of anew offensive that Prime
Minister Netanyahu promises willfinally defeat Hamas.
So deja vu all over again.
But my first question to you,michael.
It's unbelievable, but beforewe dive into the actual details
(02:44):
of what this offensive uh maylook like, what were your first
general thoughts and impressionsabout what the cabinet decided
uh late last week and thislooming offensive uh into gaza
city?
Michael (02:54):
at the very least, and, if you remember, mary, actually
we heard the the first timeabout the decision, or the five
points of the decision, duringThursday night.
And you know, when I heard themor actually I read them my
first impression was that, youknow, I agree with everything.
(03:17):
You know, I read all the fivepoints and I think that you can
convince that it's really aboutthem.
But then you start to elaboratequestion marks and it seems
that you cannot implement evenone of the five points and that
they are kind of hollow points.
Is that we seek, or Israelseeks, the effort to defeat
(03:39):
Hamas and in the same time torelease the hostages?
And I'm asking myself, after 22months, didn't we learn that
you cannot really implement thetwo goals in one time?
And second, there was a kind ofa general argument, or actually
(04:03):
a slogan, that we want toestablish a new regime or a new
order in Gaza which will not beHamas but will not also be the
PA.
So it's a kind of a mystery whois this next future Palestinian
regime in Gaza?
And another point which is fullof questions is how are you
(04:26):
going really to convince almostone million people in Gaza City
to evacuate their homes and togo to other places in Gaza.
And what will be, for example,if only one or two or three
percent of those Palestinianswill say no, we resist, we
(04:47):
oppose the evacuation?
How are we going to solve thisproblem about the impression of
the government's decision isthat we are not being, or the
government doesn't really tellus the whole truth.
(05:13):
I mean, you know you decided totake control or to occupy Gaza
City.
That's okay, but in the sametime, you should explain to the
Israeli public what is the price, for example, the security From
the security.
As for the price, for example,the security from the security.
As for the economic and thepolitical aspect and we will
speak about it during our talk.
And you know, once again Ifound myself Thursday night in
(05:38):
the very sad, deep impressionthat here in Israel, our
government really prefers torely on slogans and sometimes on
sentences, instead of realisticstrategy, because otherwise you
cannot really understand whatis the plan or how are you going
really to implement all yourfive principles.
(06:00):
It seems that you know, onceagain we find ourselves like
when Israel promoted the GHF,the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation
, or the gangs, all the clansthat are being promoted by
Israel.
Once again, fantasies and notrealistic strategy.
Neri (06:21):
Yes, you and I have spoken at length I don't want to say
for 22 months, but throughoutabout the gap between Israeli
slogans from the leadership andeven war plans, and the reality
of what can be done and shouldbe done in the Gaza Strip.
We'll get into all that in justa second For our listeners and
viewers.
The five principles thatNetanyahu laid out, as he said
(06:44):
said, for the conclusion of thewar uh number one hamas has to
lay down its arms.
Uh number two the release ofall the hostages, so 50
remaining hostages, 20 of whomare still believed to be alive.
Uh number three, as he said,the demilitarization of the gaza
strip.
Uh number four this alternativeregime, uh civil administration
(07:06):
, that's, uh, not israeli, buthe only said not israeli in
english, not in hebrew, which isinteresting, but an alternative
regime, uh, that you said notis not hamas, not the
palestinian authority.
So what is left?
Uh, nobody knows.
Uh.
And then the fifth one I thinkuh gaza should no longer pose a
threat to Israel in future.
I think, if I'm not, mistakenyes.
(07:28):
Which we can also.
Michael (07:29):
And security control of Israel on Gaza.
Neri (07:32):
Not direct one, not on the civil affairs, but only on the
security level Right and, as yousaid, everyone can sign up for
that.
But it's a question of whetherthe current trajectory will
achieve any of those goals.
But it's a question of whetherthe current trajectory will
achieve any of those goals.
So, again, we'll get into thatdebate in just a minute, michael
(08:04):
.
Ok, aside from the grandstrategy and the principles for
ending the war, in the immediate, I guess, weeks or perhaps in
the coming two months, there maybe an IDF offensive into Gaza
City.
I think that's fair to say.
I mean, they've promised somuch, although there is maybe
one off ramp that we'll talkabout in terms of new
negotiations.
But OK, let's say thegovernment has to make good on
these threats and send the IDFinto Gaza City.
Professionally speaking, fromyour point of view, what is the
time frame the IDF needs toprepare both its forces and,
(08:24):
like you said, evacuating themillion people in Gaza City, the
humanitarian infrastructureoutside of Gaza City that needs
to be prepared?
What are we looking at in termsof just timeframe and
preparations needed for thisoffensive?
Michael (08:39):
As you described it correctly, nery.
Not only you know a militarymission, you know focused on
military operations much more acomplicated mission, because you
need also to take care aboutone million people.
You need to establish amilitary regime or a single
administration and take careabout the life of one million
(09:01):
people.
I assess and this is a verycautious assessment that first
of all, you will need betweensix to eight divisions in order
to promote the ground maneuverinto Gaza City, and it means
that you know it's actually muchbigger.
I mean, the number of the unitsof the soldiers is much bigger
(09:25):
than Israel had a year ago.
According to all kinds ofassessments here in Israel,
israel or IDF will need between250,000 to 350,000 soldiers,
which means that many reservearmy soldiers will be called
again to this mission.
Neri (09:46):
Mikhail, why so many soldiers?
You're talking not just GazaCity, but the entire strip.
Michael (09:52):
Yeah.
But, actually the next.
The coming operation is goingto concentrate on Gaza City, but
once again, you need toremember that inside Gaza City,
first of all, there are onemillion Palestinians, almost one
million Palestinians, accordingto my assessments, between
(10:13):
10,000 to 15,000 members of themilitary wing of Hamas and
dozens of thousands of membersof Hamas I mean not members of
(10:34):
the military wing, but you know,of all the civil and the
political departments of Hamas.
And this is going to be a verycomplicated mission because, at
the same time, idf alsoemphasized in a very clear
manner that General Zamiremphasized, that we want to make
sure that no one of thehostages will be hurt by the
(10:56):
operation.
So you know it's not a kind ofa very limited command operation
.
It's something very, verycomplicated.
And you know we spoke onlyabout the military as how many
soldiers and how many units youwill need.
But we must understand, nery,that in the day after and we
(11:18):
mentioned that we will need to Imean Israel will have to
establish civil administrationfrom zero in Gaza City and you
need to control two millionpeople in total destroyed area,
by the way, two million peoplewho are full of hostility toward
you after this tough war.
(11:41):
And you know, we didn't start tospeak about the economic aspect
, the financial one, but it'sgoing to cost Israel, I think
you know, something between 30to 40, even 50 billion shekels,
because it seems that afterIsrael we occupy Gaza, or after
(12:03):
Israel we'll promote this newoperation.
Most of the world, and mainlythe donors, the Arab donors,
will say to Israel we will nottake part in reconstruction or
supporting, from the civilianpoint of view, the population in
Gaza point of view, is thepopulation in Gaza.
(12:30):
You are right now, the total,the only responsible for the
life of the people of Gaza andyou will pay for that.
So you know, we will findourselves, if we will implement
and finish this operation, witha very heavy price from the
military, economic and also fromthe international and the
regional political aspect.
Neri (12:51):
Without a doubt, harrowing analysis, Michael.
I wanted to unpack a few thingsyou just said Six to eight
divisions for this new offensive.
Michael (13:02):
No, between six to eight, I meant.
Neri (13:05):
Yeah, between six to eight divisions.
That's a lot of divisions Atthe height of the offensive, I
think.
What in late 2023, early 2024,I think there were six divisions
.
Michael (13:17):
Between five to six.
Neri (13:18):
yes, Five to six right, so this would be even more than
that, after 22 months of waracross multiple fronts, where
are these soldiers going to comefrom, michael?
Michael (13:29):
All over Israel.
I mean you know, of coursethere is the regular army and it
seems that you know almost allthe army, all IDF, will be
concentrated in Gaza, gaza andwhere right now we are lucky
enough that we don't haveanother front, you know, the
northern front in Lebanon andSyria.
(13:51):
Of course there is nothing calmover there, but there is no
really danger of a broadescalation and it seems that
also in the West Bank we are nota few moments before a broad
explosion.
So first of all you will need,of course, the army, but you
will need also the reserve armyand once again we speak about
(14:12):
hundreds of thousands ofcivilians who already paid
enormous price for their servicesince October the 7th, for
their service since October the7th.
And of course you know this kind, I mean once again enlisting so
many reserve army soldiers,this kind of decision has
(14:37):
economic and political impact onIsrael.
Impact on Israel, I mean theIsraeli market will not be so
stable if hundreds of thousandsof workers will get actually out
of this market for so manymonths.
And once again, you know wespoke also about the political
(14:58):
price we can.
I mean Israel is taking risksof sanctions.
You know the Europeans alreadydeclared, I mean Israel is
(15:26):
taking risks of sanctions.
You know the Europeans alreadydeclared.
I mean several.
I'm quite sure that we willhave to prepare ourselves to
much tougher challenges from theeconomic aspect.
Neri (15:35):
Without doubt.
Last week I had Jeremy Isakarov, a former Israeli senior
diplomat, and we talked aboutthe diplomatic tsunami.
So for anyone, I don't want tosay looking to make themselves
feel better, because you're notgoing to feel better after that
episode, but for an analysis ofthe international dimension,
(15:56):
also quite difficult these days,as we all know.
Okay, so I mean, michael, ifand when the government decides
to pull the trigger literally onthis operation, how long do you
think we have until that momentoccurs?
Right, the issue of thetimeframe.
So, even or especially, if youneed to call up thousands,
(16:17):
hundreds of thousands, tens ofthousands of reservists we're
still in the August summerholiday with all the kids of
reservists.
We're still in the Augustsummer holiday with all the kids
.
But then next month, late nextmonth, rosh Hashanah and the
High Holy Days.
Is he going to wait until afterRosh Hashanah?
Is he going to do it beforeRosh Hashanah?
Are soldiers going to befighting in Gaza City?
Erev Chag?
(16:38):
What?
Michael (16:39):
do you think?
Once again, one big question,mark.
You know I assist once againone big question mark.
You know I assist once again ina very cautious manner that the
procurations will takesomething between two to three
(16:59):
months.
Decision that was taken lastweek relies on the assumption
that this operation can bepromoted from october the 7th 25
.
Neri (17:11):
So we have something more than two, two months for
preparations although bb bb saidon sunday that he ordered the
idf to shorten the preparations,that this would happen fairly
quickly.
I mean again, we don't need totake what he says at face value.
But you're skeptical, this canget off the ground fairly
(17:31):
quickly.
Michael (17:31):
There are so many other considerations, by the way,
professional, regarding IDF andhis situation right now, but
also political and international.
So you know, I cannot reallyassess when exactly IDF will
declare we finished all thepreparations, we are ready to
(17:53):
promote the operation.
I assess, nery, regarding thequestion of how long will it
take, that from the militarypoint of view it will not be so
long event.
I mean something between weeksto several months.
I think that this is the timeto occupy Gaza City.
(18:18):
But, as we mentioned before,the main challenge and actually
the main risk is not during theground maneuver itself, but in
the day after, because it seemsthat and we will speak about it
immediately it seems that thebasic challenge will not be to
(18:38):
fight Hamas cells and Hamasunits during the ground maneuver
, but what will happen on theday after.
Because we know, and you know,I think, that in a very high
likelihood I can say that youcan predict that, yeah, yeah,
that in the day after we willfind ourselves in Gaza facing
(19:01):
guerrilla warfare and terrorwarfare, and it will be very
similar to the challenge thatthe American had in Iraq after
2003.
I mean, after Saddam's regimewas collapsed.
But you know, the adventureonly began after the collapse of
Saddam's regime.
Neri (19:21):
So I mean, I guess we're dancing around the major
question, and this is the majorquestion on literally everyone's
mind here in Israel andeverywhere else.
So when Netanyahu says, ok,this is the final battle with
Hamas, and we're going to gointo Gaza City, and then we're
going to go into the centralcamps, these remaining three
enclaves, basically, that arenot controlled by the IDF, and
(19:43):
we're going the IDF, and we'regoing to eliminate Hamas, we're
going to destroy Hamas, whatdoes that actually mean?
Is it every last person with aKalachnikov?
Again, how do you measure totaldefeat of Hamas?
Elimination of Hamas?
I mean, a guerrilla warfareinsurgency is almost a given,
but can that be eliminated,defeated, or how long will it
(20:05):
take to?
Michael (20:06):
Yeah, you know, it's not the first and not the second
time that we will use the termquestion mark.
We don't really know.
You know, I think that and thisis my personal assessment, mary
that if Netanyahu is seriousenough and if Netanyahu is
really eager to occupy all Gazabut also to stay in Gaza, so he
(20:29):
will be very close to theimplementation of the basic
goals of the war, I mean erasingthe governmental and the
military capacities of Hamas.
But at the same time and here Ithink that the government
doesn't really speak with thepublic in a very frank manner we
will not release the hostagesbecause Hamas will not be ready
(20:52):
to wave a white flag and torelease the hostages only
because of a broad groundmaneuver and even existential
threat because of the Israelioperation.
And it seems to me that youknow once again, in Gaza and
here we need to describe thingsin a very accurate manner Of
(21:16):
course, hamas is not the sameHamas.
I mean the same Hamas of Octoberthe 7th.
They don't have the samecapacities.
Most of the members, most ofthe leaders were killed during
the war, but and this is a veryimportant point they still have
a leadership, they still have aframe of decision making.
(21:36):
They still have enough membersand, by the way, they regret
always young Palestinians to beinstead of those who were killed
.
And right now and it's very sadfor many Israelis to admit that
, but you know, this is theright thing to say Hamas is
(21:59):
still the dominant player inGaza and if you want really to
cause this player damage, that'sokay.
You can occupy all Gaza, butyou must tell the Israeli public
in a very direct manner we willnot see any hostages and the
(22:19):
price is going to be very heavyand it's going to change your
life, the Israelis, for a longtime.
And unfortunately, the Israelisdo not hear such messages from
their leadership.
Neri (22:32):
Okay, we'll be right back after this brief message.
Speaker 3 (22:37):
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(22:57):
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(23:19):
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Neri (23:23):
If you rely on Israel Policy Forum for credible and
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ipfli slash supportthepodIsraeli soldiers on the hostages
, the Israeli taxpayer, theeconomic cost of it, and also it
(23:44):
will take a very long time,long time.
That would be an honeststatement by the government to
the public, as opposed to we'renow ahead of an offensive that
will bring us to victory inwhatever two or three months.
That's what they're selling.
Final point, just to touch onsomething you said earlier,
(24:06):
michael, the day after thisquestion, still the day after
Okay, let's say the IDF goes in,conquers the 25% of the Gaza
Strip, that it still doesn'thold Gaza City, like we said,
the central camps, the Mawassihumanitarian zone, quote-unquote
defeats Hamas, although whatthat means we just talked about
(24:26):
it will take a lot more timethan anyone imagines.
But then Netanyahu has said okay, we don't want to stay in Gaza,
although he usually says itonly in English, not in Hebrew.
But okay, we'll take him at hisword in English, american BB we
don't want to stay in Gaza, wewant to hand over control to an
alternative civil administration.
Is that to get deeper into thispoint?
(24:49):
Is that realistic?
I mean, how can Israel do that?
That, okay, conquers everythingand then hands it over to who,
to what?
Michael (24:58):
I'd like to surprise you, Nelly Question mark.
Mister we don't really know.
You know, I heard several ofNetanyahu's interviews to the
Western media.
Unfortunately, he didn't havetime to speak.
Several of Netanyahu'sinterviews to the Western media.
Unfortunately, he didn't havetime to speak only once with the
Israeli media.
And he said, by the way, hedidn't only mention the fact
(25:23):
that a kind of mysterious Arabplayer is going to take control
over Gaza.
He also said that Israel isgoing to free the people of Gaza
from Hamas.
Yes, and you know it's not acoincidence that he didn't speak
about the message in Hebrew,because I'm quite sure that
there is no one in Israel thatcan accept this measure or agree
(25:46):
to this message, and that if hewill elaborate this message in
Hebrew to the Israeli public, Ithink that he will make a lot of
Israelis very, very angry aboutthe mission.
Our goal purpose is to free thepeople of Gaza from Hamas.
(26:07):
I'm not sure that most of theIsraelis are convinced about
that.
Now, regarding the question ofthe alternative, you know who is
the next address in Gaza if wesay that it will not be Hamas,
but not also the PA.
So first there is the fantasyof a clan of chieftaincy.
Rely on clans and big familiesin Gaza and you know, there is a
(26:35):
kind of adventure during thelast year of supporting Abu
Shabab militia in the southernparts of Gaza, in Rafah area.
But you know, once again, weneed not only to accept all the
slogans that are beingelaborated from the leadership,
but also say what is ourprofessional opinion.
(26:58):
And I'm very critical of thisidea because, once again, I do
think that this is a kind of afantasy that, yeah, we can take
the palestinian society in gazaand instead of one political
national address, we can, we cancreate several traditional
chieftaincies, which you knowand the palestinians themselves
(27:20):
they call this situation.
But to town, you know, like allthe the artificial states that
they were created in southafrica, uh, during the 70s and
the 80s.
And you know, I don't think thatevery clan in Gaza is focused
on its own territory, its ownbusiness.
They don't care about what is,for example, a clan from Rafah,
(27:44):
will not take care, they willnot be very interested about
what is happening in thenorthern parts of Gaza, very
interested about what ishappening in the northern parts
of Gaza, and they cannot reallybe an address and they cannot
really be, you know, somethingthat the Israelis can rely on in
the day after.
There is the idea that is beingonce again elaborated in the
(28:04):
Israeli discourse, but actuallyyou cannot find any proof of
that, and this is the argumentthat an Arab state will come and
will take responsibility forGaza.
But you know, I didn't hearabout no one who is ready to
take this duty.
I mean Egyptians.
(28:27):
They already said no.
Uae, of course not.
Neri (28:31):
And especially not without a role for the Palestinian
Authority and some kind ofdiplomatic process vis-a-vis, I
guess, the Palestinian Authority, but also the bigger picture of
Palestinian self-determination.
Michael (28:45):
Exactly, absolutely.
And you know there is also akind of a rumor Nery about the
Dakhlan, muhammad Dakhlan, thatright now he lives in the UAE.
He's very close to MBZ Muhammadbin Zayed, but you know, I'm
not sure that he's powerfulenough to take control over Gaza
(29:07):
, that he's popular enough to bethe new ruler of Gaza.
So once again we find ourselvesin a kind of what you know, I
will be very gentle, it's a kindof an old situation with no
strategy and no plans for theday after and a lot of illusions
and a lot of slogans, but notrealistic strategy.
(29:29):
So this is a formula fordisaster.
Unfortunately, you know, we aretaking a jump into this
disaster and we know that we arefully aware of that.
Neri (29:46):
Well, some of us are fully aware of that, like the IDF and
security chiefs, like, I guess,a big proportion of the Israeli
public and a big proportion ofthe international community.
We'll get to that in just asecond.
With regard to Mohammad Dahlan,obviously the former security
intelligence chief in the GazaStrip under Yasser Arafat in the
(30:08):
Palestinian Authority, arafatin the Palestinian Authority
he's now been living in exilefrom the Palestinian Authority
in the UAE for many years, closeadvisor to the Emirati
leadership.
But I was told by someone whoknows about these things that
Dahlan has a very nice life inthe Gulf.
I don't think he and his peopleare going to volunteer to
(30:29):
return to what is left of Gaza,to rebuild it Again.
He may play a role, eitherpolitically or financially, but
from afar, remote control.
Michael (30:40):
And, by the way, nery, you know he has a lot of rivals
and enemies in Gaza because heis considered by many people in
Gaza by the way, not only Hamas,but many Palestinian citizens
as the prominent responsible formany violent events that took
place between the years of 2006to 2007.
(31:02):
You know there was a kind of acivil war between Fatah and
Hamas in the year before Hamastook control by force over Gaza
and Fatah and Dahlan.
They were responsible for thekilling of many Palestinians.
So you know, I am quite surethat he's aware that if he will
(31:26):
return to Gaza, there will be alot of Palestinians who would
like to take revenge of himbecause of all the horrible
things of the past.
Neri (31:38):
Yeah, I mean Palestinian politics being Palestinian
politics Also.
Dahlan and his menunfortunately lost that civil
war in 2006-2007.
And the people of Gaza and allof us here in Israel have been
dealing with the consequencesfor well 18 years now that
Dahlan and the PA lost Gaza toHamas.
(31:59):
Circling back, Michael, to thecriticism of this Israeli
government and Netanyahu plan,there was an alternative option
floated by the IDF and Chief ofStaff, Yael Zamir, for something
a bit more limited Say OK,we're going to expand the
offensive against Hamas in Gaza,but basically, instead of going
(32:24):
all in into Gaza City and theseother territories, we want to
encircle Gaza City and wage thiswar of attrition against Hamas.
Targeted raids, targetedairstrikes this was the
alternative option presented bythe generals in the security
cabinet meeting last week.
The security cabinet rejectedthat option, said it wouldn't
(32:45):
lead to victory over Hamas,wouldn't lead to the release of
the hostages.
What did you think, personally,of this alternative option
presented by the generals?
Michael (32:55):
Well, you know, I read about it and it seems to me that
it's more the same, like thecurrent situation.
You know it's something inbetween which doesn't really
bring us to a very clear point.
You know it's not a kind ofdecisive move and you know it
(33:17):
will only make the war longerand it will suck Israel in this
one of Gaza more and more, in akind of war of aggression.
I'm really afraid that even ifwe will promote a siege over
Gaza City and the other twoenclaves in Gaza and we will say
(33:38):
, from this time, we are goingto wait until Hamas will be
defeated, and we will findourselves after two, three, four
months, first of all that thereis enormous humanitarian crisis
over there and we will have tolet humanitarian aid to get into
those places, and that Hamasstill exists.
So what are you going to do?
(33:59):
What would be your next steps?
It seems that you know, likemany, many former cases during
this war, we always prefer akind of interim way instead of a
very clear way, and we standfor more than a year in front of
(34:21):
a T-junction, but instead oftaking one of the two ways of
this T-junction, we prefer akind of you know, a very bizarre
way, which actually stuck us ina war of attrition.
So I really believe that anykind of alternative to the idea
of occupying Gaza City or allGaza will not be really much
(34:46):
better than the idea of takingcontrol over all Gaza.
Once again, we need to decidebetween two things Taking
control over all Gaza or Edil.
That's all In between, onlyfantasies, yeah.
Neri (35:05):
Again, you and I have been talking about this.
I don't want to say for howlong.
I suppose the generals putforward this More than a year,
yeah, more than a year.
But I was going to say Isuppose the generals put forward
this alternative option becausethe costs of it are a lot less
than the full option of takingcontrol of all of Gaza City, all
(35:26):
of Gaza and all the thingswe've been talking about for
half an hour that they wereessentially trying to minimize
the cost to Israeldiplomatically, in terms of
Israeli lives, in terms of thethreat of the hostages, all the
things we know.
But, yes, I don't even know ifthey believe that it will
actually resolve the war.
But maybe and this brings us tomy next question maybe it's as
(35:49):
a form of leverage to get Hamasback to the negotiating table.
So I guess my question to you,michael, if we're talking about
alternative options to well,this full offensive that Niaow
and his government arethreatening, is there still a
prospect for Israel and Hamas toget back to negotiations, if
(36:10):
not to end the war fully, atleast a partial deal that we all
know about six-day ceasefire,half the hostages?
There's obviously speculationthat all of these kind of
threats and leaks andpreparations for the offensive
is just a way to pressure Hamasto get back to the negotiating
table and that Netanyahu himselfwould take a deal.
(36:31):
So do you think there is stilla prospect to get back to that
option before we go and invadeGaza City?
Michael (36:41):
Yeah, you know the answer is very clear and, yes,
sure, the question is doesNetanyahu or does the government
really want to, you know, toadopt this alternative?
Because, you know, let's saythings in a very clear manner
once, say things in a very clearmanner, once again, a very
frank manner, if you want toreturn to the negotiations.
(37:03):
And, by the way, hamasannounces about that, about the
policy and about its basicreadiness to return to
negotiations in a very clearmanner.
But and here we must be veryrealistic Hamas still demands,
or still seeks, two basic or twored lines First of all, that
(37:27):
any kind of negotiations willlead to the end of the war and,
second, that any agreement willbe followed by a full withdrawal
of Israel from most of Gaza.
And you know, it seems that weprefer, or the government prefer
, to seek this formula, or thisassumption that if we will only
(37:53):
promote more and more and morepressure on Hamas, so finally
they will be more flexible andfinally they will give up and
finally they will be ready towave white flags or to evacuate
Gaza or dismantle themselves.
And you know, it seems to methat again and again and again,
(38:15):
we return to the same square andyou know, we find that we you
know it's ironic we feel, after22 months, we do not understand
the basic nature of this enemy,of this organization.
This organization is ready tocommit suicide, is ready to kill
(38:35):
all the people of Gaza and, ofcourse, to kill the hostages,
but not to wave white flags.
So, you know, it seems to methat the answer is yeah, of
course you can return to thenegotiations and you know, I
think, that Hamas doesn't careif it will be partial or full,
(38:57):
then, you know, as long as itwill lead to the end of the war.
And it seems to me that thebasic key right now to any
progress or any development inthe negotiations will be
President Trump, because itseems that, you know, he was the
one who really succeeded a yearago to promote the former
(39:22):
ceasefire, and it seems to meand to many Israelis that he's
the only one that can reallyforce both sides, and mainly
Netanyahu, to end the war and toaccept any kind of a ceasefire,
even if it will be followed bya full withdrawal and an
announcement about the end ofthe war.
Neri (39:46):
It's all dependent on Trump, almost all dependent on
Trump, but the problem is thatTrump and his people have shown
no inclination to actually forceNetanyahu to end the war.
When Trump was asked about this, I think last week, he said
well, it's up to Israel.
Michael (40:01):
That's right.
Neri (40:02):
Whether they invade Gaza City or not, and that's not a
red light.
Michael (40:08):
It seems like a green light.
And we both know, nery, thatwhen was it?
It was about a month ago, whenNetanyahu had this visit to
Washington and here in Israelthere was even myself.
We really had an impressionthat, maybe a hope, maybe a
wishful thinking that this wouldlead to the next ceasefire
(40:31):
trade agreement, and we foundout that actually Netanyahu and
Trump they hold the same opinion, or actually Trump holds the
same opinion like Netanyahu andTrump they hold the same opinion
, or actually Trump holds thesame opinion like Netanyahu.
So right now, once again, itseems that he's the only one who
can really change the currentsituation.
Neri (40:51):
Yeah, sadly, it's mostly up to him, to Donald Trump, but
I think he also has been led tobelieve that with a little bit
more pressure and a little bitmore force, that they can get
Hamas back to the negotiatingtable and make them capitulate,
make them surrender, and, likeyou said, for 22 months.
(41:11):
It's not that people don'tunderstand it, it's that people
here don't want to understandthat that will almost certainly
not happen.
Final question, Michael, beforeI let you leave the big picture
question.
I think, okay, let's say thatNetanyahu is forced or chooses
(41:32):
to go to a deal that ends thewar.
Obviously he's refusing to dothat, but let's say that happens
, Hopefully.
The argument you hear fromNetanyahu and the reason why he
refuses to do that is because hesays that if Israel ends the
war now, before Hamas is quoteunquote totally defeated, that
(41:55):
the next October 7th is only amatter of time.
Basically, it's like a black orwhite proposition, one or zero.
You either go all the way andfinish the job, or you end the
war now, retreat and then catchanother October 7th down the
line.
Professionally speaking, whatdo you think about that?
That argument put forward byNetanyahu and his government and
(42:17):
his supporters, that everyonewho says that the war needs to
end in whatever shape or way orfashion is a defeatist that will
pave the way for anothermassacre.
Michael (42:30):
Well, you know, I think that Netanyahu's analysis is
right.
And Netanyahu's analysis isright I mean, it's not something
that I can argue, that.
You know.
You elaborate all kinds offantasies, they will never try
to commit once again October the7th, not at all.
(42:52):
But I think that this answer isquite biased and actually a
partial answer, because you know, nery, when you check the other
front, that Israel had duringthe current war, I mean since
October the 7th, this argumentof we will not let the Nazis,
the Hamas, to be once again onour fence and we will eradicate
(43:15):
them from earth, you know you donot implement the same argument
with the other fronts.
For example, in Lebanon, thereis a kind of ceasefire.
Your wish is not to eradicateHezbollah from earth.
And also in the West Bank,regarding Iran, which I consider
(43:38):
as the basic challenge, thebasic mission, the basic threat
for Israel.
So I'm asking myself, why do weneed to be so dogmatic and so
tough when it comes to Gaza?
And of course, there arepolitical and ideological
considerations mixed in thecurrent policy about gas, and I
(44:04):
think that you know we okay, weadopted or we prefer taking
control over all Gaza andstaying Gaza.
(44:26):
By the way, there will be somemembers of the.
There are some members of thegovernment who announced that
their vision is not only tocontrol Gaza, but also to
evacuate the people of Gaza.
You know, very similar to whatthey translate as Trump's vision
(44:46):
and also to reestablish thesettlements in Gaza, but please
only tell us in a direct mannerwhat are the prices?
I mean the economy, theisolation, the sanctions, the
internal rift that will bedeveloped and, of course, the
fact that there are no hostages.
(45:07):
You cannot release the hostagesif we take their full
occupation, or we can adopt theother option, which is the deal,
and we are not naive.
We know that if Israel willprefer the agreement, it means
that we will have to announceabout the end of the war and we
(45:29):
will have to commit almost fullwithdrawal from Gaza.
Maybe Hamas will be relativelyflexible regarding the
perimeters you know theterritory around the borderline
between Israel and Gaza.
And I think that if Israel willadopt the same policy, like the
(45:52):
policy that is being promoted inLebanon since the end of 2024,
I mean then, okay, there is aceasefire, there is an agreement
, but that is being promoted inLebanon since the end of 2024.
I mean, ok, there is aceasefire, there is an agreement
, but every time when yourecognize a violation, when you
recognize any plan to attackIsrael or to smuggle weapons
into Lebanon, you attack.
(46:14):
And you know, in Lebanon thereis almost every day all kinds of
aerial and other attacks.
So why can't we adopt thisformula also in Gaza?
And I must admit and this is mypersonal opinion, nery that
when I'm trying to compare thetwo alternatives and to ask
(46:36):
myself what are the prizes ofthe two alternatives, I do think
that the agreement, theceasefire, of course it's a
painful option, but it's theleast worse alternative.
When I'm comparing thisalternative to the option of
taking control over part or allGaza, which is really an option
(46:58):
that is going to changedramatically our life for a long
time.
Neri (47:05):
I don't have anything to add.
I think you put it reallyreally well the cost versus,
well, the current trajectory.
It boggles the mind andhopefully either Donald Trump or
some other outside power endsthis war before, before things
get worse Again.
(47:26):
We can only hope, and to getthe hostages out, of course.
With that, Michael, thank youas always, and hopefully, when
you come on in another threemonths, there isn't another
threatened Israeli offensivethat this time for real, will
actually win the war and end thewar.
Hopefully they don't try tosell the same rhetoric and
(47:48):
theory to us three months fromnow.
So let's hope.
Michael (47:51):
Let's hope, take care.
Thank you, nery, bye, goodbye.
Neri (47:57):
Okay, thanks again to Michael Milstein, as always, for
his generous time and insights.
Also, a special thanks to ourproducer, jacob Gilman, and to
all of you who support IsraelPolicy Forum's work.
Do consider making a donationto Israel Policy Forum, so
keeping a credible source ofanalysis and ideas on issues
such as these that we all caredeeply about, including this
(48:17):
podcast and, most importantly,thank you for listening.
Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod.
I'm Nery Zilber, a journalistbased in Tel Aviv and a policy
advisor to Israel Policy Forum.
It's boiling hot here in Israelthese days, and it's not just
the weather.
The Netanyahu government, asI'm sure many of you heard late
last week, decided to escalateand expand the military
offensive against Hamas in Gaza,starting with Gaza City.
(00:29):
To explain what it all means,including the very real costs if
and when it does happen, wehave our good friend back with
us, michal Milstein.
To break it all down for us,michal is, of course, a colonel
in the IDF reserves and theformer head of the Palestinian
arena in Israeli militaryintelligence, the advisor to the
(00:51):
IDF general responsible for thePalestinian territories and the
head of the Palestinian StudiesCenter at the Dayan Center at
Tel Aviv University.
This was, as always, a terrificconversation with Mikhail, tel
Aviv University.
This was, as always, a terrificconversation with Michael.
As you rightly pointed out,there are still a lot of
question marks, which we did ourbest to answer, don't worry,
(01:12):
but a lot of question marksnonetheless about the weeks and
months ahead.
But we also had to be honestwith you, our viewers and
listeners.
All of the likely answers arenot looking great, to say the
least.
So with that fair warning,let's get to Michael Milstein.
Hi, michael, welcome back tothe podcast.
Michael (01:32):
Hi, Nery, I'm glad, of course, once again that you are
having me.
Neri (01:39):
We always love to have you on the podcast, michael, and we
try not to abuse this privilege, but you may remember you were
on three months ago already, inearly May, and I'll remind you,
michael.
The introduction to that episodewas verbatim and I'll read it.
Our good friend, michaelMilstein is back with us to
(01:59):
discuss where the Gaza war isheading after the Israeli
government approved plans for amajor new offensive that it says
will finally defeat Hamas.
This was three months ago, inearly May, ahead of the Gideon's
Chariots offensive.
So now you're back with us,michael, today to discuss where
the Gaza war is likely headed,after the security cabinet early
(02:23):
Friday last week, ordered theIDF to quote unquote prepare to
take over Gaza City as part of anew offensive that Prime
Minister Netanyahu promises willfinally defeat Hamas.
So deja vu all over again.
But my first question to you,michael.
It's unbelievable, but beforewe dive into the actual details
(02:44):
of what this offensive uh maylook like, what were your first
general thoughts and impressionsabout what the cabinet decided
uh late last week and thislooming offensive uh into gaza
city?
Michael (02:54):
at the very least, and, if you remember, mary, actually
we heard the the first timeabout the decision, or the five
points of the decision, duringThursday night.
And you know, when I heard themor actually I read them my
first impression was that, youknow, I agree with everything.
(03:17):
You know, I read all the fivepoints and I think that you can
convince that it's really aboutthem.
But then you start to elaboratequestion marks and it seems
that you cannot implement evenone of the five points and that
they are kind of hollow points.
Is that we seek, or Israelseeks, the effort to defeat
(03:39):
Hamas and in the same time torelease the hostages?
And I'm asking myself, after 22months, didn't we learn that
you cannot really implement thetwo goals in one time?
And second, there was a kind ofa general argument, or actually
(04:03):
a slogan, that we want toestablish a new regime or a new
order in Gaza which will not beHamas but will not also be the
PA.
So it's a kind of a mystery whois this next future Palestinian
regime in Gaza?
And another point which is fullof questions is how are you
(04:26):
going really to convince almostone million people in Gaza City
to evacuate their homes and togo to other places in Gaza.
And what will be, for example,if only one or two or three
percent of those Palestinianswill say no, we resist, we
(04:47):
oppose the evacuation?
How are we going to solve thisproblem about the impression of
the government's decision isthat we are not being, or the
government doesn't really tellus the whole truth.
(05:13):
I mean, you know you decided totake control or to occupy Gaza
City.
That's okay, but in the sametime, you should explain to the
Israeli public what is the price, for example, the security From
the security.
As for the price, for example,the security from the security.
As for the economic and thepolitical aspect and we will
speak about it during our talk.
And you know, once again Ifound myself Thursday night in
(05:38):
the very sad, deep impressionthat here in Israel, our
government really prefers torely on slogans and sometimes on
sentences, instead of realisticstrategy, because otherwise you
cannot really understand whatis the plan or how are you going
really to implement all yourfive principles.
(06:00):
It seems that you know, onceagain we find ourselves like
when Israel promoted the GHF,the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation
, or the gangs, all the clansthat are being promoted by
Israel.
Once again, fantasies and notrealistic strategy.
Neri (06:21):
Yes, you and I have spoken at length I don't want to say
for 22 months, but throughoutabout the gap between Israeli
slogans from the leadership andeven war plans, and the reality
of what can be done and shouldbe done in the Gaza Strip.
We'll get into all that in justa second For our listeners and
viewers.
The five principles thatNetanyahu laid out, as he said
(06:44):
said, for the conclusion of thewar uh number one hamas has to
lay down its arms.
Uh number two the release ofall the hostages, so 50
remaining hostages, 20 of whomare still believed to be alive.
Uh number three, as he said,the demilitarization of the gaza
strip.
Uh number four this alternativeregime, uh civil administration
(07:06):
, that's, uh, not israeli, buthe only said not israeli in
english, not in hebrew, which isinteresting, but an alternative
regime, uh, that you said notis not hamas, not the
palestinian authority.
So what is left?
Uh, nobody knows.
Uh.
And then the fifth one I thinkuh gaza should no longer pose a
threat to Israel in future.
I think, if I'm not, mistakenyes.
(07:28):
Which we can also.
Michael (07:29):
And security control of Israel on Gaza.
Neri (07:32):
Not direct one, not on the civil affairs, but only on the
security level Right and, as yousaid, everyone can sign up for
that.
But it's a question of whetherthe current trajectory will
achieve any of those goals.
But it's a question of whetherthe current trajectory will
achieve any of those goals.
So, again, we'll get into thatdebate in just a minute, michael
(08:04):
.
Ok, aside from the grandstrategy and the principles for
ending the war, in the immediate, I guess, weeks or perhaps in
the coming two months, there maybe an IDF offensive into Gaza
City.
I think that's fair to say.
I mean, they've promised somuch, although there is maybe
one off ramp that we'll talkabout in terms of new
negotiations.
But OK, let's say thegovernment has to make good on
these threats and send the IDFinto Gaza City.
Professionally speaking, fromyour point of view, what is the
time frame the IDF needs toprepare both its forces and,
(08:24):
like you said, evacuating themillion people in Gaza City, the
humanitarian infrastructureoutside of Gaza City that needs
to be prepared?
What are we looking at in termsof just timeframe and
preparations needed for thisoffensive?
Michael (08:39):
As you described it correctly, nery.
Not only you know a militarymission, you know focused on
military operations much more acomplicated mission, because you
need also to take care aboutone million people.
You need to establish amilitary regime or a single
administration and take careabout the life of one million
(09:01):
people.
I assess and this is a verycautious assessment that first
of all, you will need betweensix to eight divisions in order
to promote the ground maneuverinto Gaza City, and it means
that you know it's actually muchbigger.
I mean, the number of the unitsof the soldiers is much bigger
(09:25):
than Israel had a year ago.
According to all kinds ofassessments here in Israel,
israel or IDF will need between250,000 to 350,000 soldiers,
which means that many reservearmy soldiers will be called
again to this mission.
Neri (09:46):
Mikhail, why so many soldiers?
You're talking not just GazaCity, but the entire strip.
Michael (09:52):
Yeah.
But, actually the next.
The coming operation is goingto concentrate on Gaza City, but
once again, you need toremember that inside Gaza City,
first of all, there are onemillion Palestinians, almost one
million Palestinians, accordingto my assessments, between
(10:13):
10,000 to 15,000 members of themilitary wing of Hamas and
dozens of thousands of membersof Hamas I mean not members of
(10:34):
the military wing, but you know,of all the civil and the
political departments of Hamas.
And this is going to be a verycomplicated mission because, at
the same time, idf alsoemphasized in a very clear
manner that General Zamiremphasized, that we want to make
sure that no one of thehostages will be hurt by the
(10:56):
operation.
So you know it's not a kind ofa very limited command operation
.
It's something very, verycomplicated.
And you know we spoke onlyabout the military as how many
soldiers and how many units youwill need.
But we must understand, nery,that in the day after and we
(11:18):
mentioned that we will need to Imean Israel will have to
establish civil administrationfrom zero in Gaza City and you
need to control two millionpeople in total destroyed area,
by the way, two million peoplewho are full of hostility toward
you after this tough war.
(11:41):
And you know, we didn't start tospeak about the economic aspect
, the financial one, but it'sgoing to cost Israel, I think
you know, something between 30to 40, even 50 billion shekels,
because it seems that afterIsrael we occupy Gaza, or after
(12:03):
Israel we'll promote this newoperation.
Most of the world, and mainlythe donors, the Arab donors,
will say to Israel we will nottake part in reconstruction or
supporting, from the civilianpoint of view, the population in
Gaza point of view, is thepopulation in Gaza.
(12:30):
You are right now, the total,the only responsible for the
life of the people of Gaza andyou will pay for that.
So you know, we will findourselves, if we will implement
and finish this operation, witha very heavy price from the
military, economic and also fromthe international and the
regional political aspect.
Neri (12:51):
Without a doubt, harrowing analysis, Michael.
I wanted to unpack a few thingsyou just said Six to eight
divisions for this new offensive.
Michael (13:02):
No, between six to eight, I meant.
Neri (13:05):
Yeah, between six to eight divisions.
That's a lot of divisions Atthe height of the offensive, I
think.
What in late 2023, early 2024,I think there were six divisions
.
Michael (13:17):
Between five to six.
Neri (13:18):
yes, Five to six right, so this would be even more than
that, after 22 months of waracross multiple fronts, where
are these soldiers going to comefrom, michael?
Michael (13:29):
All over Israel.
I mean you know, of coursethere is the regular army and it
seems that you know almost allthe army, all IDF, will be
concentrated in Gaza, gaza andwhere right now we are lucky
enough that we don't haveanother front, you know, the
northern front in Lebanon andSyria.
(13:51):
Of course there is nothing calmover there, but there is no
really danger of a broadescalation and it seems that
also in the West Bank we are nota few moments before a broad
explosion.
So first of all you will need,of course, the army, but you
will need also the reserve armyand once again we speak about
(14:12):
hundreds of thousands ofcivilians who already paid
enormous price for their servicesince October the 7th, for
their service since October the7th.
And of course you know this kind, I mean once again enlisting so
many reserve army soldiers,this kind of decision has
(14:37):
economic and political impact onIsrael.
Impact on Israel, I mean theIsraeli market will not be so
stable if hundreds of thousandsof workers will get actually out
of this market for so manymonths.
And once again, you know wespoke also about the political
(14:58):
price we can.
I mean Israel is taking risksof sanctions.
You know the Europeans alreadydeclared, I mean Israel is
(15:26):
taking risks of sanctions.
You know the Europeans alreadydeclared.
I mean several.
I'm quite sure that we willhave to prepare ourselves to
much tougher challenges from theeconomic aspect.
Neri (15:35):
Without doubt.
Last week I had Jeremy Isakarov, a former Israeli senior
diplomat, and we talked aboutthe diplomatic tsunami.
So for anyone, I don't want tosay looking to make themselves
feel better, because you're notgoing to feel better after that
episode, but for an analysis ofthe international dimension,
(15:56):
also quite difficult these days,as we all know.
Okay, so I mean, michael, ifand when the government decides
to pull the trigger literally onthis operation, how long do you
think we have until that momentoccurs?
Right, the issue of thetimeframe.
So, even or especially, if youneed to call up thousands,
(16:17):
hundreds of thousands, tens ofthousands of reservists we're
still in the August summerholiday with all the kids of
reservists.
We're still in the Augustsummer holiday with all the kids
.
But then next month, late nextmonth, rosh Hashanah and the
High Holy Days.
Is he going to wait until afterRosh Hashanah?
Is he going to do it beforeRosh Hashanah?
Are soldiers going to befighting in Gaza City?
Erev Chag?
(16:38):
What?
Michael (16:39):
do you think?
Once again, one big question,mark.
You know I assist once againone big question mark.
You know I assist once again ina very cautious manner that the
procurations will takesomething between two to three
(16:59):
months.
Decision that was taken lastweek relies on the assumption
that this operation can bepromoted from october the 7th 25
.
Neri (17:11):
So we have something more than two, two months for
preparations although bb bb saidon sunday that he ordered the
idf to shorten the preparations,that this would happen fairly
quickly.
I mean again, we don't need totake what he says at face value.
But you're skeptical, this canget off the ground fairly
(17:31):
quickly.
Michael (17:31):
There are so many other considerations, by the way,
professional, regarding IDF andhis situation right now, but
also political and international.
So you know, I cannot reallyassess when exactly IDF will
declare we finished all thepreparations, we are ready to
(17:53):
promote the operation.
I assess, nery, regarding thequestion of how long will it
take, that from the militarypoint of view it will not be so
long event.
I mean something between weeksto several months.
I think that this is the timeto occupy Gaza City.
(18:18):
But, as we mentioned before,the main challenge and actually
the main risk is not during theground maneuver itself, but in
the day after, because it seemsthat and we will speak about it
immediately it seems that thebasic challenge will not be to
(18:38):
fight Hamas cells and Hamasunits during the ground maneuver
, but what will happen on theday after.
Because we know, and you know,I think, that in a very high
likelihood I can say that youcan predict that, yeah, yeah,
that in the day after we willfind ourselves in Gaza facing
(19:01):
guerrilla warfare and terrorwarfare, and it will be very
similar to the challenge thatthe American had in Iraq after
2003.
I mean, after Saddam's regimewas collapsed.
But you know, the adventureonly began after the collapse of
Saddam's regime.
Neri (19:21):
So I mean, I guess we're dancing around the major
question, and this is the majorquestion on literally everyone's
mind here in Israel andeverywhere else.
So when Netanyahu says, ok,this is the final battle with
Hamas, and we're going to gointo Gaza City, and then we're
going to go into the centralcamps, these remaining three
enclaves, basically, that arenot controlled by the IDF, and
(19:43):
we're going the IDF, and we'regoing to eliminate Hamas, we're
going to destroy Hamas, whatdoes that actually mean?
Is it every last person with aKalachnikov?
Again, how do you measure totaldefeat of Hamas?
Elimination of Hamas?
I mean, a guerrilla warfareinsurgency is almost a given,
but can that be eliminated,defeated, or how long will it
(20:05):
take to?
Michael (20:06):
Yeah, you know, it's not the first and not the second
time that we will use the termquestion mark.
We don't really know.
You know, I think that and thisis my personal assessment, mary
that if Netanyahu is seriousenough and if Netanyahu is
really eager to occupy all Gazabut also to stay in Gaza, so he
(20:29):
will be very close to theimplementation of the basic
goals of the war, I mean erasingthe governmental and the
military capacities of Hamas.
But at the same time and here Ithink that the government
doesn't really speak with thepublic in a very frank manner we
will not release the hostagesbecause Hamas will not be ready
(20:52):
to wave a white flag and torelease the hostages only
because of a broad groundmaneuver and even existential
threat because of the Israelioperation.
And it seems to me that youknow once again, in Gaza and
here we need to describe thingsin a very accurate manner Of
(21:16):
course, hamas is not the sameHamas.
I mean the same Hamas of Octoberthe 7th.
They don't have the samecapacities.
Most of the members, most ofthe leaders were killed during
the war, but and this is a veryimportant point they still have
a leadership, they still have aframe of decision making.
(21:36):
They still have enough membersand, by the way, they regret
always young Palestinians to beinstead of those who were killed
.
And right now and it's very sadfor many Israelis to admit that
, but you know, this is theright thing to say Hamas is
(21:59):
still the dominant player inGaza and if you want really to
cause this player damage, that'sokay.
You can occupy all Gaza, butyou must tell the Israeli public
in a very direct manner we willnot see any hostages and the
(22:19):
price is going to be very heavyand it's going to change your
life, the Israelis, for a longtime.
And unfortunately, the Israelisdo not hear such messages from
their leadership.
Neri (22:32):
Okay, we'll be right back after this brief message.
Speaker 3 (22:37):
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Our mission is to build supportfor a secure Jewish democratic
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(23:19):
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Neri (23:23):
If you rely on Israel Policy Forum for credible and
nuanced analysis, please make atax-deductible gift today at
ipfli slash supportthepodIsraeli soldiers on the hostages
, the Israeli taxpayer, theeconomic cost of it, and also it
(23:44):
will take a very long time,long time.
That would be an honeststatement by the government to
the public, as opposed to we'renow ahead of an offensive that
will bring us to victory inwhatever two or three months.
That's what they're selling.
Final point, just to touch onsomething you said earlier,
(24:06):
michael, the day after thisquestion, still the day after
Okay, let's say the IDF goes in,conquers the 25% of the Gaza
Strip, that it still doesn'thold Gaza City, like we said,
the central camps, the Mawassihumanitarian zone, quote-unquote
defeats Hamas, although whatthat means we just talked about
(24:26):
it will take a lot more timethan anyone imagines.
But then Netanyahu has said okay, we don't want to stay in Gaza,
although he usually says itonly in English, not in Hebrew.
But okay, we'll take him at hisword in English, american BB we
don't want to stay in Gaza, wewant to hand over control to an
alternative civil administration.
Is that to get deeper into thispoint?
(24:49):
Is that realistic?
I mean, how can Israel do that?
That, okay, conquers everythingand then hands it over to who,
to what?
Michael (24:58):
I'd like to surprise you, Nelly Question mark.
Mister we don't really know.
You know, I heard several ofNetanyahu's interviews to the
Western media.
Unfortunately, he didn't havetime to speak.
Several of Netanyahu'sinterviews to the Western media.
Unfortunately, he didn't havetime to speak only once with the
Israeli media.
And he said, by the way, hedidn't only mention the fact
(25:23):
that a kind of mysterious Arabplayer is going to take control
over Gaza.
He also said that Israel isgoing to free the people of Gaza
from Hamas.
Yes, and you know it's not acoincidence that he didn't speak
about the message in Hebrew,because I'm quite sure that
there is no one in Israel thatcan accept this measure or agree
(25:46):
to this message, and that if hewill elaborate this message in
Hebrew to the Israeli public, Ithink that he will make a lot of
Israelis very, very angry aboutthe mission.
Our goal purpose is to free thepeople of Gaza from Hamas.
(26:07):
I'm not sure that most of theIsraelis are convinced about
that.
Now, regarding the question ofthe alternative, you know who is
the next address in Gaza if wesay that it will not be Hamas,
but not also the PA.
So first there is the fantasyof a clan of chieftaincy.
Rely on clans and big familiesin Gaza and you know, there is a
(26:35):
kind of adventure during thelast year of supporting Abu
Shabab militia in the southernparts of Gaza, in Rafah area.
But you know, once again, weneed not only to accept all the
slogans that are beingelaborated from the leadership,
but also say what is ourprofessional opinion.
(26:58):
And I'm very critical of thisidea because, once again, I do
think that this is a kind of afantasy that, yeah, we can take
the palestinian society in gazaand instead of one political
national address, we can, we cancreate several traditional
chieftaincies, which you knowand the palestinians themselves
(27:20):
they call this situation.
But to town, you know, like allthe the artificial states that
they were created in southafrica, uh, during the 70s and
the 80s.
And you know, I don't think thatevery clan in Gaza is focused
on its own territory, its ownbusiness.
They don't care about what is,for example, a clan from Rafah,
(27:44):
will not take care, they willnot be very interested about
what is happening in thenorthern parts of Gaza, very
interested about what ishappening in the northern parts
of Gaza, and they cannot reallybe an address and they cannot
really be, you know, somethingthat the Israelis can rely on in
the day after.
There is the idea that is beingonce again elaborated in the
(28:04):
Israeli discourse, but actuallyyou cannot find any proof of
that, and this is the argumentthat an Arab state will come and
will take responsibility forGaza.
But you know, I didn't hearabout no one who is ready to
take this duty.
I mean Egyptians.
(28:27):
They already said no.
Uae, of course not.
Neri (28:31):
And especially not without a role for the Palestinian
Authority and some kind ofdiplomatic process vis-a-vis, I
guess, the Palestinian Authority, but also the bigger picture of
Palestinian self-determination.
Michael (28:45):
Exactly, absolutely.
And you know there is also akind of a rumor Nery about the
Dakhlan, muhammad Dakhlan, thatright now he lives in the UAE.
He's very close to MBZ Muhammadbin Zayed, but you know, I'm
not sure that he's powerfulenough to take control over Gaza
(29:07):
, that he's popular enough to bethe new ruler of Gaza.
So once again we find ourselvesin a kind of what you know, I
will be very gentle, it's a kindof an old situation with no
strategy and no plans for theday after and a lot of illusions
and a lot of slogans, but notrealistic strategy.
(29:29):
So this is a formula fordisaster.
Unfortunately, you know, we aretaking a jump into this
disaster and we know that we arefully aware of that.
Neri (29:46):
Well, some of us are fully aware of that, like the IDF and
security chiefs, like, I guess,a big proportion of the Israeli
public and a big proportion ofthe international community.
We'll get to that in just asecond.
With regard to Mohammad Dahlan,obviously the former security
intelligence chief in the GazaStrip under Yasser Arafat in the
(30:08):
Palestinian Authority, arafatin the Palestinian Authority
he's now been living in exilefrom the Palestinian Authority
in the UAE for many years, closeadvisor to the Emirati
leadership.
But I was told by someone whoknows about these things that
Dahlan has a very nice life inthe Gulf.
I don't think he and his peopleare going to volunteer to
(30:29):
return to what is left of Gaza,to rebuild it Again.
He may play a role, eitherpolitically or financially, but
from afar, remote control.
Michael (30:40):
And, by the way, nery, you know he has a lot of rivals
and enemies in Gaza because heis considered by many people in
Gaza by the way, not only Hamas,but many Palestinian citizens
as the prominent responsible formany violent events that took
place between the years of 2006to 2007.
(31:02):
You know there was a kind of acivil war between Fatah and
Hamas in the year before Hamastook control by force over Gaza
and Fatah and Dahlan.
They were responsible for thekilling of many Palestinians.
So you know, I am quite surethat he's aware that if he will
(31:26):
return to Gaza, there will be alot of Palestinians who would
like to take revenge of himbecause of all the horrible
things of the past.
Neri (31:38):
Yeah, I mean Palestinian politics being Palestinian
politics Also.
Dahlan and his menunfortunately lost that civil
war in 2006-2007.
And the people of Gaza and allof us here in Israel have been
dealing with the consequencesfor well 18 years now that
Dahlan and the PA lost Gaza toHamas.
(31:59):
Circling back, Michael, to thecriticism of this Israeli
government and Netanyahu plan,there was an alternative option
floated by the IDF and Chief ofStaff, Yael Zamir, for something
a bit more limited Say OK,we're going to expand the
offensive against Hamas in Gaza,but basically, instead of going
(32:24):
all in into Gaza City and theseother territories, we want to
encircle Gaza City and wage thiswar of attrition against Hamas.
Targeted raids, targetedairstrikes this was the
alternative option presented bythe generals in the security
cabinet meeting last week.
The security cabinet rejectedthat option, said it wouldn't
(32:45):
lead to victory over Hamas,wouldn't lead to the release of
the hostages.
What did you think, personally,of this alternative option
presented by the generals?
Michael (32:55):
Well, you know, I read about it and it seems to me that
it's more the same, like thecurrent situation.
You know it's something inbetween which doesn't really
bring us to a very clear point.
You know it's not a kind ofdecisive move and you know it
(33:17):
will only make the war longerand it will suck Israel in this
one of Gaza more and more, in akind of war of aggression.
I'm really afraid that even ifwe will promote a siege over
Gaza City and the other twoenclaves in Gaza and we will say
(33:38):
, from this time, we are goingto wait until Hamas will be
defeated, and we will findourselves after two, three, four
months, first of all that thereis enormous humanitarian crisis
over there and we will have tolet humanitarian aid to get into
those places, and that Hamasstill exists.
So what are you going to do?
(33:59):
What would be your next steps?
It seems that you know, likemany, many former cases during
this war, we always prefer akind of interim way instead of a
very clear way, and we standfor more than a year in front of
(34:21):
a T-junction, but instead oftaking one of the two ways of
this T-junction, we prefer akind of you know, a very bizarre
way, which actually stuck us ina war of attrition.
So I really believe that anykind of alternative to the idea
of occupying Gaza City or allGaza will not be really much
(34:46):
better than the idea of takingcontrol over all Gaza.
Once again, we need to decidebetween two things Taking
control over all Gaza or Edil.
That's all In between, onlyfantasies, yeah.
Neri (35:05):
Again, you and I have been talking about this.
I don't want to say for howlong.
I suppose the generals putforward this More than a year,
yeah, more than a year.
But I was going to say Isuppose the generals put forward
this alternative option becausethe costs of it are a lot less
than the full option of takingcontrol of all of Gaza City, all
(35:26):
of Gaza and all the thingswe've been talking about for
half an hour that they wereessentially trying to minimize
the cost to Israeldiplomatically, in terms of
Israeli lives, in terms of thethreat of the hostages, all the
things we know.
But, yes, I don't even know ifthey believe that it will
actually resolve the war.
But maybe and this brings us tomy next question maybe it's as
(35:49):
a form of leverage to get Hamasback to the negotiating table.
So I guess my question to you,michael, if we're talking about
alternative options to well,this full offensive that Niaow
and his government arethreatening, is there still a
prospect for Israel and Hamas toget back to negotiations, if
(36:10):
not to end the war fully, atleast a partial deal that we all
know about six-day ceasefire,half the hostages?
There's obviously speculationthat all of these kind of
threats and leaks andpreparations for the offensive
is just a way to pressure Hamasto get back to the negotiating
table and that Netanyahu himselfwould take a deal.
(36:31):
So do you think there is stilla prospect to get back to that
option before we go and invadeGaza City?
Michael (36:41):
Yeah, you know the answer is very clear and, yes,
sure, the question is doesNetanyahu or does the government
really want to, you know, toadopt this alternative?
Because, you know, let's saythings in a very clear manner
once, say things in a very clearmanner, once again, a very
frank manner, if you want toreturn to the negotiations.
(37:03):
And, by the way, hamasannounces about that, about the
policy and about its basicreadiness to return to
negotiations in a very clearmanner.
But and here we must be veryrealistic Hamas still demands,
or still seeks, two basic or twored lines First of all, that
(37:27):
any kind of negotiations willlead to the end of the war and,
second, that any agreement willbe followed by a full withdrawal
of Israel from most of Gaza.
And you know, it seems that weprefer, or the government prefer
, to seek this formula, or thisassumption that if we will only
(37:53):
promote more and more and morepressure on Hamas, so finally
they will be more flexible andfinally they will give up and
finally they will be ready towave white flags or to evacuate
Gaza or dismantle themselves.
And you know, it seems to methat again and again and again,
(38:15):
we return to the same square andyou know, we find that we you
know it's ironic we feel, after22 months, we do not understand
the basic nature of this enemy,of this organization.
This organization is ready tocommit suicide, is ready to kill
(38:35):
all the people of Gaza and, ofcourse, to kill the hostages,
but not to wave white flags.
So, you know, it seems to methat the answer is yeah, of
course you can return to thenegotiations and you know, I
think, that Hamas doesn't careif it will be partial or full,
(38:57):
then, you know, as long as itwill lead to the end of the war.
And it seems to me that thebasic key right now to any
progress or any development inthe negotiations will be
President Trump, because itseems that, you know, he was the
one who really succeeded a yearago to promote the former
(39:22):
ceasefire, and it seems to meand to many Israelis that he's
the only one that can reallyforce both sides, and mainly
Netanyahu, to end the war and toaccept any kind of a ceasefire,
even if it will be followed bya full withdrawal and an
announcement about the end ofthe war.
Neri (39:46):
It's all dependent on Trump, almost all dependent on
Trump, but the problem is thatTrump and his people have shown
no inclination to actually forceNetanyahu to end the war.
When Trump was asked about this, I think last week, he said
well, it's up to Israel.
Michael (40:01):
That's right.
Neri (40:02):
Whether they invade Gaza City or not, and that's not a
red light.
Michael (40:08):
It seems like a green light.
And we both know, nery, thatwhen was it?
It was about a month ago, whenNetanyahu had this visit to
Washington and here in Israelthere was even myself.
We really had an impressionthat, maybe a hope, maybe a
wishful thinking that this wouldlead to the next ceasefire
(40:31):
trade agreement, and we foundout that actually Netanyahu and
Trump they hold the same opinion, or actually Trump holds the
same opinion like Netanyahu andTrump they hold the same opinion
, or actually Trump holds thesame opinion like Netanyahu.
So right now, once again, itseems that he's the only one who
can really change the currentsituation.
Neri (40:51):
Yeah, sadly, it's mostly up to him, to Donald Trump, but
I think he also has been led tobelieve that with a little bit
more pressure and a little bitmore force, that they can get
Hamas back to the negotiatingtable and make them capitulate,
make them surrender, and, likeyou said, for 22 months.
(41:11):
It's not that people don'tunderstand it, it's that people
here don't want to understandthat that will almost certainly
not happen.
Final question, Michael, beforeI let you leave the big picture
question.
I think, okay, let's say thatNetanyahu is forced or chooses
(41:32):
to go to a deal that ends thewar.
Obviously he's refusing to dothat, but let's say that happens
, Hopefully.
The argument you hear fromNetanyahu and the reason why he
refuses to do that is because hesays that if Israel ends the
war now, before Hamas is quoteunquote totally defeated, that
(41:55):
the next October 7th is only amatter of time.
Basically, it's like a black orwhite proposition, one or zero.
You either go all the way andfinish the job, or you end the
war now, retreat and then catchanother October 7th down the
line.
Professionally speaking, whatdo you think about that?
That argument put forward byNetanyahu and his government and
(42:17):
his supporters, that everyonewho says that the war needs to
end in whatever shape or way orfashion is a defeatist that will
pave the way for anothermassacre.
Michael (42:30):
Well, you know, I think that Netanyahu's analysis is
right.
And Netanyahu's analysis isright I mean, it's not something
that I can argue, that.
You know.
You elaborate all kinds offantasies, they will never try
to commit once again October the7th, not at all.
(42:52):
But I think that this answer isquite biased and actually a
partial answer, because you know, nery, when you check the other
front, that Israel had duringthe current war, I mean since
October the 7th, this argumentof we will not let the Nazis,
the Hamas, to be once again onour fence and we will eradicate
(43:15):
them from earth, you know you donot implement the same argument
with the other fronts.
For example, in Lebanon, thereis a kind of ceasefire.
Your wish is not to eradicateHezbollah from earth.
And also in the West Bank,regarding Iran, which I consider
(43:38):
as the basic challenge, thebasic mission, the basic threat
for Israel.
So I'm asking myself, why do weneed to be so dogmatic and so
tough when it comes to Gaza?
And of course, there arepolitical and ideological
considerations mixed in thecurrent policy about gas, and I
(44:04):
think that you know we okay, weadopted or we prefer taking
control over all Gaza andstaying Gaza.
(44:26):
By the way, there will be somemembers of the.
There are some members of thegovernment who announced that
their vision is not only tocontrol Gaza, but also to
evacuate the people of Gaza.
You know, very similar to whatthey translate as Trump's vision
(44:46):
and also to reestablish thesettlements in Gaza, but please
only tell us in a direct mannerwhat are the prices?
I mean the economy, theisolation, the sanctions, the
internal rift that will bedeveloped and, of course, the
fact that there are no hostages.
(45:07):
You cannot release the hostagesif we take their full
occupation, or we can adopt theother option, which is the deal,
and we are not naive.
We know that if Israel willprefer the agreement, it means
that we will have to announceabout the end of the war and we
(45:29):
will have to commit almost fullwithdrawal from Gaza.
Maybe Hamas will be relativelyflexible regarding the
perimeters you know theterritory around the borderline
between Israel and Gaza.
And I think that if Israel willadopt the same policy, like the
(45:52):
policy that is being promoted inLebanon since the end of 2024,
I mean then, okay, there is aceasefire, there is an agreement
, but that is being promoted inLebanon since the end of 2024.
I mean, ok, there is aceasefire, there is an agreement
, but every time when yourecognize a violation, when you
recognize any plan to attackIsrael or to smuggle weapons
into Lebanon, you attack.
(46:14):
And you know, in Lebanon thereis almost every day all kinds of
aerial and other attacks.
So why can't we adopt thisformula also in Gaza?
And I must admit and this is mypersonal opinion, nery that
when I'm trying to compare thetwo alternatives and to ask
(46:36):
myself what are the prizes ofthe two alternatives, I do think
that the agreement, theceasefire, of course it's a
painful option, but it's theleast worse alternative.
When I'm comparing thisalternative to the option of
taking control over part or allGaza, which is really an option
(46:58):
that is going to changedramatically our life for a long
time.
Neri (47:05):
I don't have anything to add.
I think you put it reallyreally well the cost versus,
well, the current trajectory.
It boggles the mind andhopefully either Donald Trump or
some other outside power endsthis war before, before things
get worse Again.
(47:26):
We can only hope, and to getthe hostages out, of course.
With that, Michael, thank youas always, and hopefully, when
you come on in another threemonths, there isn't another
threatened Israeli offensivethat this time for real, will
actually win the war and end thewar.
Hopefully they don't try tosell the same rhetoric and
(47:48):
theory to us three months fromnow.
So let's hope.
Michael (47:51):
Let's hope, take care.
Thank you, nery, bye, goodbye.
Neri (47:57):
Okay, thanks again to Michael Milstein, as always, for
his generous time and insights.
Also, a special thanks to ourproducer, jacob Gilman, and to
all of you who support IsraelPolicy Forum's work.
Do consider making a donationto Israel Policy Forum, so
keeping a credible source ofanalysis and ideas on issues
such as these that we all caredeeply about, including this
(48:17):
podcast and, most importantly,thank you for listening.
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