Qatar, Gaza, New York

On this week’s episode, Israel Policy Forum Policy Advisor and Tel Aviv-based journalist Neri Zilber hosts Chief Policy Officer Michael Koplow and Distinguished RAND Israel Policy Chair Shira Efron. The trio discuss last week's Israeli strike on the Hamas headquarters in Doha, whether Donald Trump knew of the attack ahead of time, the start of the Israeli offensive into Gaza City, the fate of the Israeli hostages, next week's meetings at the U.N. on Palestinian statehood, reasons for optimism heading into a new Jewish year, and more.

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Episode Transcript

Neri (00:19):
Israel Policy Forum nearly upon us, so I thought it'd be a
perfect moment to do a bigoverview and catch up with our
regulars, israel Policy Forum'svery own Chief Policy Officer,
michael Koplow, and our dearfriend and former colleague
Shira Efron, a senior fellow atthe RAND Corporation and their
distinguished Israel PolicyChair.

(00:39):
We discussed last week'sstrikes in Qatar, the ongoing
IDF offensive in Gaza City, nextweek's very important meetings
in New York at the UN and some,dare we say, positive and
optimistic news heading into thenew Jewish year and much more
beyond all those.
Trust me, it was a terrificconversation, as always with

(01:02):
those two.
But just some housekeepingnotes before we start.
First, just a reminder we'renow a video podcast available on
YouTube, so check us out overthere if you want to watch us
and not just hear us, and dosubscribe and leave a nice
comment if the mood strikes you,both on the podcast platforms

(01:22):
and YouTube.
These things are important.
I've been told both on thepodcast platforms and YouTube.
These things are important,I've been told Also.
Second note since the holidaysare nearly upon us and things do
shut down, definitely here inIsrael, our schedule for the
next few weeks could be a biterratic.
We'll do our best to get a fewepisodes in, hopefully, but
especially if something dramaticdoes happen.
But fair warning for the comingfew weeks.

(01:44):
And with that let's get toShira and Michael.
Hi, michael, hi, shira.

Shira (01:49):
Thank you, shana.

Neri (01:50):
Tova and welcome back to the pod.
Thanks, neri Shana Tova.
So, as promised, I wanted youboth back on before the Jewish
High Holidays were upon us todiscuss a host of issues and
stories, although when we lastchatted a month ago I don't
think we quite appreciated whatwould be in store.
So there is a lot to talk abouttoday on this episode.

(02:10):
But I wanted to start ourconversation by looking back at
the big news from last week,obviously, the Israeli strike in
Doha, qatar, targeting Hamas'sheadquarters there.
Just by way of context for ourlisteners and viewers, the
strike was meant, obviously, totake out the entire top Hamas
political leadership.
That likely did not happen,which even Israeli officials are

(02:33):
now conceding and admitting.
Five lower level Hamas officialsand one Qatari security officer
were killed in the strike.
That's confirmed.
But, interestingly, a few ofthe very top Hamas guys have not
yet been seen in public.
So no confirmed proof of lifefor either Khalil al-Khayy or
Zahra Jabarin, people like that.
So it could mean that they wereinjured, but again, nobody

(02:56):
quite knows, but unlikely thatthey were killed outright.
And finally, well, qatar andthe entire Gulf and the entire
Middle East are not too happywith Israel.
So, with that being said, well,qatar and the entire Gulf and
the entire Middle East are nottoo happy with Israel.
So, with that being said,michael, let's start with you.
What did you think of thisunprecedented brazen choose your
adjective operation by Israeland Qatar?
And do you really buy the linecoming out of the White House,

(03:19):
the Trump administration, thatthey didn't know anything about
it beforehand?

Michael (03:23):
My initial reaction when it first happened was that
of course the administrationmust have known about it and it
must have been coordinated tosome extent, because Israel,
even this government, would nothave the brazenness to go after
Hamas mediators just a couple ofdays after a new US offer was

(03:47):
passed to those mediators andwhen Steve Woodcoff and company
were supposedly working veryhard on it, and, furthermore,
that even this Israeligovernment wouldn't have the
brazenness to attack on Qatariterritory, given that Qatar is a
major non-NATO US ally,officially designated as such,

(04:09):
and given the fact that thereare obviously very close ties
between the president and hisfamily and members of his team
with the Qataris.
So my initial reaction wasthere's no way that Israel just
did this without notifying, andit seems to me now, just based
on the reactions and we do haveBarak Rabid's most recent

(04:33):
reporting that actually it seemsthat that's precisely what
Israel did.
Now I'm sure the US knew aboutit before the missiles actually
struck, and there's thisquestion as to whether they only
found out about it once theplanes were in the air or if the
president found out about ittheoretically, with enough time

(04:53):
to tell them to turn the planesaround, and he didn't actually
do it, but it doesn't seem likethis was something where the US
was given a huge amount ofadvance notice, or that it was
even negotiated between Israeland the US as to whether this
was something they should do orcould do.
And, assuming that that isactually what happened and that
the reporting is correct, itsuggests two things to me.

(05:14):
One is that Prime MinisterNetanyahu and the Israeli
government seem extraordinarilyconfident that there's nothing
they can do that will run afoulof this administration.
Whether it be launchingmissiles on Qatari territory in
the middle of US brokerednegotiations, whether it be

(05:36):
something like West Bankannexation, whether it be not
really taking the negotiationseriously, which I don't think
this Israeli government has everreally done they seem to think
that they can pretty much doanything, and even if the
president doesn't like it, he'llgive Bibi a slap on the wrist

(05:56):
behind closed doors and thatwill be the end.
The second thing it suggests tome is that, as reckless and
risk-taking as I already thoughtthis Israeli government was,
it's well beyond that, and thisisn't like a little move.
I mean, it's not the same asattacking Iran.

(06:16):
We can talk all we want aboutthe rhetoric from Israelis and
from much of the American Jewishcommunity about Qatar and the
fact that Qatar is seen not asIran but almost as a foe.
That's just one notch below Inthe real world.
Attacking a Sunni Gulf statelike this is just a different
thing.
This is a GCC member.

(06:37):
The other Gulf states, even ifthey don't like the Qataris and
I don't think they really likethe Qataris they do not want
this happening in another Gulfcapital.
So this is just.
It's a much bigger move and asmuch as I always say the Israeli
government is off the rails,this seems to me they're even
more off the rails and even hadit worked, I think it would have
been risky.

(06:57):
The fact that it didn't is justa huge misstep in all sorts of
ways.

Neri (07:02):
So it's interesting, I'll get you in.
I'm very curious to hear whatShiri has to say, but I actually
disagree with you, michael.
I know that I like it.

Michael (07:11):
I like it when we have disagreement on this.

Neri (07:12):
Yeah, it's rare, both on this pod and in real life, but I
think there's zero chance BibiNetanyahu greenlit the strike on
Doha without the Trumpadministration and the president
at least giving a yellow lightfor it to go ahead.
I think our friend andcolleague, Barack Rafi the
latest reporting backs that upthat they did notify at least
the president an hour beforehandand we've seen this president

(07:34):
turn around Israeli planes inmid-flight on the last day of
the Iran war, which I'm notgoing to repeat this is a family
podcast, but I'm not going torepeat what he said and those
planes did turn around rightquick.
We've seen this president andthis administration admonish
Ukrainian President Zelensky fornot wearing a suit, so you can
only imagine what this presidentwould have thought and actually

(07:56):
said and done if, out of theblue, Bibi Netanyahu bombed his
Qatari allies.
I think it's just not credible.
I'm happy that the spin thatinitially came out of both
Jerusalem and Washington waskind of pushed back on
eventually.
But yeah, I didn't buy it then.
I don't buy it now, especiallysince Bibi Netanyahu was so
beholden to Donald Trumppolitically, for domestic

(08:19):
reasons and internationally.
It's the only thing he hasgoing for him.
Donald Trump, Shira, what didyou think of this?
Well, it was still brazen,regardless of whether Donald
Trump greenlit it, butespecially as we know from
reporting here in Israel that alot of the security chiefs were
against bombing Qatar forvarious reasons.

Shira (08:42):
I don't know what the US administration knew or didn't
know, and it serves everyone tokeep a plausible deniability,
but really I don't think that'sthe issue that while I
understand that when Israelvowed to hunt the last Hamas

(09:07):
leader, this is not the way todo it, definitely not at this
timing and not at this location.
We have precedence right whenIsrael wanted to kill Ismail
Haniyeh, who was in Qatar allthe time, they waited until he
went to Tehran to do just thatabout a year ago and maybe
served another message vis-a-visthe Iranians, but still the

(09:29):
point is that there was a cleardecision to avoid hurting them
in Doha and we know that thisplan for this specific strike or
for alternative ways of gettingthem through ground operations
and others these plans haveexisted for a long time.
So the timing and the decisionhas to do with a horrifying

(09:50):
right terror attack in Jerusalemthe day before.
That created a lot of angerhere and desired dissent.
There are also obviously thecutter gate and political issues
here back home.
You think of the motivations todo it then I disagree with you a
little bit, neri, because I hadmeetings in Washington.
So it happened when I was inWashington, I was shocked and

(10:12):
then met with several Israeliofficials who happened to be in
Washington at the same time, andalso former officials, and I
have made some phone calls topeople working in this defense
establishment and initially,when they thought this was
successful, a lot of thosepeople were cheering for this.
I think.
When you say that there isopposition among the security

(10:33):
establishment, I think Mossadwent out of its way to explain
that they really were against itbecause of their ties with Doha
.
We know there was an objectionfrom military of doing it at
this time and they said let'swait another week.
But the merit of actually doingthis thing in this way, I don't
know if it was pushed back inthe same way that some people

(10:54):
have changed their mind postfailure, and I know some people
have not changed their minds.

Speaker 4 (11:00):
Post failure.

Shira (11:00):
They say this was still the right thing to do it.
We messed up for a variety ofreasons.
Some say that there was advancenotice by the US.
Again, I have no visibilityinto that information.
Why, actually, it wasn'tsuccessful from an operational
point of view?
But I think there's the mindsetin asking, analyzing the full
implications of Gulf countries,seeing this as an attack on them

(11:21):
, right, on GCC, on behavior inthe region.
What does it do to US posturein the region?
Right, we know the biggest USmilitary base is in Qatar.
What does it mean for them?
And I think it's bad either way, right, if the US approved it,
then if it didn't approve it?
So I think, in either way, liketo me, just like a failure or

(11:44):
not a failure, maybe adeliberate.
I'm sure there was a discussionon what this could mean and
where it can deteriorate.
I just don't think.
Uh, it may have reached theright conclusions and these
voices were not here.
Now, of course, there's thehostages and other things.
Right, negotiating on thehostages, and?
And what does he do?
And if?
If the war aim one of the twowar aims is still, even though

(12:06):
we're not hearing so much aboutit is to bring the hostages back
home.
We don't know how this servesus now.
What are the implications ofthis?
Obviously, it's being it's.
It's unsuccessful.
But even if it were successful,I mean clearly it only
strengthened Qatar rather thanundermined it.
It brought the Arabs together,not just the Gulf Right.
What we saw with Egypt and Iranwas there.

(12:26):
So, instead of you know, israelhas the fantasy of like a
Middle East NATO against Iran.
It almost sounds like a MiddleEast NATO against Israel.
Also, in Washington, theirviews and they were furious and

(12:51):
I got to tell you I was in acity in Europe, coming from
Washington, and there was aformer Qatari senior official.
This is a group that discussesGaza and I mean they were
shocked so to think that theyknew about it or didn't know
about it or had expected this.
They were shocked so to thinkthat they knew about it or
didn't know about it or hadexpected this.
They were shocked.
So, anyway, we're stillgrappling with this, with the
implications of this, but Ireally, even though I have no

(13:12):
sympathy for these guys in Dohaor obviously in anything that
has anyone that has to do withHamas, I wish they would think
of the strategic implications ofthis earlier.

Michael (13:24):
They would think of the strategic implications of this
earlier.
And I think it bears adding ontop of that that the summit in
Doha took place literally on thefifth anniversary of the
Abraham Accords and instead ofhaving the region celebrate that
and celebrate Israel'sintegration and think about how
it can be expanded, instead youliterally had the Abraham

(13:47):
Accords countries and Israel'speace treaty allies meeting in
Doha with Iran.
There, as Shira notes, to blastIsrael.
I mean, when we think about theAbraham Accords and the legacy
and what goes forward, I wouldargue that at the moment,
Israel's posture in the regionis worse than it was the day
before the Abraham Accords weresigned, and we're now in a

(14:08):
post-Abraham Accords world.
So I'm with Shira Not sheddingany tears for Hamas leaders who
may have been killed or ones whosurvived.
I'd rather that they're all sixfeet underground.
But when you look at theoverall implications, this
doesn't strike me as being verysmart.

Neri (14:25):
Yes, for the record, and we'll be clear, all those Hamas
quote unquote political leaders,the head of this vicious
terrorist organization, yes,they all deserve to die,
especially for their role inOctober 7th.
But it's a question of when,where and how.
And, like Shira and you,michael, we're talking about the
larger implications for Israelof doing it in this way in Qatar

(14:49):
and Doha.
It's not like it was a secretthat Hamas was headquartered in
Doha.
They've been headquarteredthere for years.
This building I know for a factbecause someone told me who has
been there.
Yes, that's their primaryheadquarters.
So it didn't exactly take thetop-notch Mossad capabilities to
figure out where theirheadquarters were.

(15:10):
And it's been like that too.
And, by the way, both Israeland the US have found it very
useful in the past to have Qatarhost Hamas even before October
7th.

Shira (15:22):
First of all, I have to say something.
I mean the fact that people aredeserved to die.
I don't know something.
I mean the fact that peopledeserve to die.
I don't know if it means Israelhas to go and kill everyone.
This is a question, right.
I mean I think you argue thatthere are a lot of people that
the US is upset with.
I mean there's an issue and wecan talk about Hamas and what

(15:43):
does Hamas mean?
And these people specificallyyeah, sure, did they know about
the October 7 attacks?
I don't know, they seemedpretty surprised.
Were they extremely happy aboutthat?

Neri (15:54):
Of course, no, but Khalil Khaya.
He was Yahya Sinwar's numbertwo.
Sinwar sent him out of Gaza,right, right, I'm with you on
that, khalil.

Shira (16:04):
Khaya and those people and I'm afraid.
No, I'm with you on that andKhalil Khayyam and those people,
and really I mean from thestandpoint of Israeli mentality
and where Israel is and October7th, they have to pay a price.
But this Qatar thing, first ofall, we also need to know that,
as a sort of unintendedconsequence, as a Qatari
security guy was killed and thisperson by the way, I don't know
if, if you know, but apparentlyhe's from a very important

(16:26):
Qatari family, so that doesn'tadd anything to it.
This is also something that iscomplicated because you're not
supposed to hurt Qataris andwhat you said now about Qatar
and it was convenient for Israeland the US.
I mean we spoke about it somany times and we were critical
of this policy even before.
Israel can blame Qatar allalong as much as they want for

(16:47):
propelling Hamas, for helpingHamas, but I mean we have
friends in the IDF that countedthe Qatari dollars, the
suitcases, the money, therequests to pay.
This was all conceived here inJerusalem.

Neri (17:05):
That were physically brought in before October 7th,
obviously by a Qatari envoy.
Physically, you had heads ofMossad, heads of whatever
military intelligence, flying toQatar to negotiate with the
Qataris to calm Gaza down againbefore October 7th.
So sorry, I was going to say.
When Bibi Desniahu, yesterdayhe gave a press conference which

(17:26):
we'll get to in just a bit,another press conference he was
asked about Qatar and he saidyou know, qatar hosts funds,
supports Hamas, etc.
Etc.
It's like, of course, you knewthis, you promoted this policy.
Obviously, he was asked aboutthe strike that he grinlit no,
no, no, sorry, shira, I cut youoff.

Shira (17:45):
But that's part of the, I think, the issue in Israel, I
think the mentality in Israeland also now the people, all the
people that support this, thatit's.
Yeah, we can talk about theQatari position, which many
countries in the region and theworld have issues with, and
Israel should also, but in thecontext of Hamas, the one who
enabled, encouraged, facilitated, led this, liked this, loved

(18:09):
this, went to the World Cup insoccer in Qatar, like we're the
Israelis and this is pre-October7, but we pay for mistakes.
What can we do so?

Neri (18:20):
on Qatar, yeah, yeah, all right.
Enough about Qatar.
So ongoing Gaza issues, gazaproper.
As I'm sure our listeners know,israel late Monday, early
Tuesday, launched itslong-threatened ground offensive
into Gaza City.
Again, shouldn't come as asurprise to listeners and

(18:42):
viewers of this podcast, becausewe took those plans and those
threats very seriously over thepast month.
But, michael, well, I thinkboth of all of us have spoken
about this, but, michael, youwere very negative, to say the
least, about this looming IDFoperation.
Has your opinion changed at allnow that it's underway, and are

(19:05):
you still pessimistic that itwill lead to Hamas's either full
elimination or fullcapitulation, as some people
here in Israel are still sayingit will actually succeed in
doing so?

Michael (19:18):
It has not changed even one iota.
I do not think that this isgoing to lead to Hamas's full
capitulation or defeat, any morethan the previous operations,
and we've discussed this adnauseum in the past, so no need
to be repetitive.
And as it is unfolding, we'reseeing the fallout.

(19:39):
I mean, the Europeans arecontemplating all sorts of new
measures to I don't know if thecorrect word is retaliate or
deter, but whatever it is allsorts of new measures against
Israel, effectively in responseto this very operation.
And even if you don't careabout any of that, even if you

(20:01):
take the Netanyahu view thatIsrael is now an island unto
itself and, as he said the otherday, it has to become a super
Sparta.
In super Sparta, the IDF chiefof staff, yael Zamir who in a
super Sparta maybe should be themost important person he is
warning about this operation andhe wants to know why Ron Dermer

(20:25):
and David Barnea are sitting incabinet meetings rather than
going out and negotiating a dealto get the hostages back.
So I fail to see why anybodystill thinks this is a good idea
.
Lovely aspiration to go intoGaza City, the alleged last
Hamas stronghold, even though weall know it's not really the

(20:46):
last Hamas stronghold and clearthem all out.
Lovely ambition.
I support that in theorywholeheartedly.
In the real world, the one thatwe're actually living in, this
is not going to defeat Hamas.
It's going to cause an enormousamount of destruction and
suffering for non-HamasPalestinians.
It's going to put Israel in aneven more precarious position

(21:08):
and if it goes forward, thenchances are six months from now
we'll be sitting here discussingthe next operation in the
refugee camps in central Gaza.
That is going to be the onethat finally defeats Hamas and
gets the hostages back andbrings total victory.
It's a farce and, like I said,I fail to understand how people

(21:30):
can talk about it as if it'sgoing to be decisive or
successful with a straight face.

Neri (21:36):
Just by way of both anecdote and data point.
So we're recording this onWednesday afternoon, tel Aviv
time.
The grand offensive startedearly Tuesday.
So we were briefed by the IDFand, according to the IDF's own
estimate, there are probably2,500 Hamas fighters in Gaza
City and there are stillprobably 600,000 people in Gaza

(21:59):
City right, and there's a lotmore than 2,000 to 3,000 Hamas
fighters in the Gaza Strip still, and there's a lot more than
2,000 to 3,000 Hamas fighters inthe Gaza Strip still.
So it's definitely not the laststronghold, just on a literal
basis.
It's not the last strongholdbecause that's not where the
majority of Hamas is Shira.

(22:19):
What do you think about the newground offensive?
And I mean, is the charade over?

Shira (22:36):
I mean, this government isn't even kind of pretending
like it cares about the fate ofthe hostages on vacations and
stuff, and he was truly tryingto to prevent this from
happening.
And we hear constant leaks fromcabinet meetings where he says
why are you telling the heads ofthe Mossad and the negotiation
team, why are you even here?
Why are you not flying aroundthe world trying to get a deal?

Neri (23:00):
To Doha, to Doha.
Why are you not?
Why are you not in Dohanegotiating a deal?
Yes, not anymore.

Shira (23:09):
So this is really an issue with the fact that this is
probably I mean, no one wantsthis in Israel.
We have to acknowledge the fact.
The IDF does not want this.
The vast majority of theIsraeli public doesn't want this
and still the governmentdecided against it and the
Israelis don't want this becauseI think, like Michael said and

(23:31):
we've been in this for almosttwo years and we've been in this
when we talk about Rafah and wetalk about other things, it's
right, like by military mightalone, you're not gonna make I
don't know that you can makeHamas capitulate.
We can talk about this.
What does it mean?
Capitulation by an organizationlike Hamas?
But you know, military mightalone is not going to solve our

(23:52):
problem in Gaza.
In this case, I would argue isgoing to make it worse.
It's also the fact that, right,the IDF is the fighters, the
combatants.
They need arrest.
I just heard the statistics thatone million Israelis suffer
from PTSD, from post traumastress disorder.
1 million.
Now, it's more than 10% of thepopulation, because if you talk
about PTSD, it's the grown up,right, it's mostly the adults

(24:16):
about the age of 18.
So it's probably even more than10% of the population, not to
mention what Michael, you know,spoke about in terms of the
growing isolation of Israel, andthe prime minister even is
aware of that, as we talkedabout his speech yesterday, so
that, in regard, I think whatwe're seeing now is an operation

(24:36):
that the IDF is reluctantlygoing into.
We're seeing displacement ofPalestinians again.
The images from Gaza arehorrible and sad and they're
going to hunt us for years.
People have nowhere to go.
I have reasons to believe thatthe numbers reported on how many
have left are not accurate.
It's actually more people havestayed in Gaza, so it's probably

(24:59):
more than 600,000 that stayed.

Neri (25:01):
Do you think the numbers that we have heard that have
left are inflated?
I think so, it's almost areinflated.

Shira (25:06):
I think it's almost 400,000.

Neri (25:09):
I think so, I don't know for sure.

Shira (25:12):
I think there are no accurate counts of these and you
know, still we're talking about, there were over, according to
estimates, over 1 million peoplein Gaza City before.
So even if it's 370,000,whatever they said yesterday,
it's still over 700,000.
And it's very and really wherethere's nowhere to go.
And, at the end of the day,you're going to do all that and
what?
What do you think is going tohappen to?

(25:33):
Is it didn't Haddad, who is nowsort of the military leader?
Uh, gaza and the various peoplethat even us, as people who
follow this, don't even remembertheir names because they are,
you know, majors turned generals, right?
And what's going to happen?
They're going to be like ohwell, you know what You're right
, this was really a bad idea.
Bye, we're leaving, we give up,we raise the white flag.

(25:55):
No, what you're seeing here istwo actors that are both
doubling down.
It's like gamblers and thecasino.
Both of them are doubling downand Hamas is not.
There is definitely a militaryachievement, right, because
Israel, a year ago, alreadybroke down Hamas as a governing
and as an organized militaryforce.
Right, but it still has.

(26:16):
It went back to its roots.
Right, there's a guerrillamovement and with more agency
and independence for thedifferent cells that are working
and operating, at least in thelast few months, we know that
they recruited higher numbersthan Israel kills.
Right, they're doing expeditedtraining for 14-year-olds and

(26:36):
what you need is someone tolearn how to put an IED
somewhere or fire an RPG or firea car.
I mean, you don't need thisadvanced to be the training and,
according to all estimates theyare preparing you know, what
they're preparing for the IDF inGaza is very dangerous
dangerous for the soldiers anddangerous for the hostages also,
of course.
And in terms of the hostages,yes, we're not even hearing

(26:58):
about the hostages.
In the last, there've been alot of press releases and
statements, but we don't hearanything about the hostages.
So it does seem that this goal,this war aim, which was really
important, is pushed back intothe back burner.
I think it would be nice if weget them, but less.
And you know it's important,because Netanyahu said in a

(27:19):
speech that he tried to mend thedamage.
But speaking about what'scoming, probably he had inside
information on what's coming.
Probably he had a uh insideinformation what's coming from
europe, but it's not just gonnabe from europe, right, he spoke
about israel needing to be supersparta, and if you look at
sparta today, it's a dustylittle town, right, yeah.
And athens?

(27:39):
is a thriving metropolis with, Idon't think, 5 million people.
People don't remember.
Sparta lost.

Speaker 4 (27:54):
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supportthepod or at the supportthe show link in the show notes.

Neri (28:50):
This is why I have PhDs on this podcast to remind us.
Yes, Sparta did lose.

Shira (28:58):
They're like the Greek islands.

Neri (29:01):
Yes, yes, 100%.
And just touching on what yousaid, shira, I don't even think
the hostages are put on the backburner.
I think they've been taking offthe grill and this government
pretends like they don't exist,like almost.
I mean, I hate to say it, Ihate to put it in these terms,
but they're fighting a war as ifthe hostages don't exist.

(29:21):
And I know that probably manyministers and their political
supporters are happy about that,because total victory is more
important than the lives of 20living Israelis.
But I think the majority ofIsraelis would disagree with
that, especially two years intoa war.
And the second point you said,shira yeah, it's like two

(29:41):
gamblers doubling down, butHamas has a lot less to lose
than Israel.
So Hamas is betting its last$50, and Israel is betting all
of its $50 million.
I mean, that's the pokeranalogy, michael.
I was struck this week by thefact that Marco Rubio was here

(30:02):
and in his press conference withNetanyahu on Monday in
Jerusalem it could have been, Idon't want to say Betel Osmotri
standing next to Netanyahu, butNetanyahu standing next to
Netanyahu and on the issue ofthe Gaza war specifically, there
was zero daylight.
Zero daylight.
Marco Rubio said basically well, it would be nice to get a deal

(30:23):
that got all the 48 remaininghostages, including the deceased
ones, out, and that Ham wouldbe nice to get a deal that got
all the 48 remaining hostages,including the deceased ones, out
and that Hamas basically ceasedto exist, as he said, and lay
down its weapons and get thatthrough a negotiation.
But even Rubio said, oh, that'slikely not going to happen, so
we'll probably need a what hesaid, a concise military
operation to achieve these goals.

(30:44):
So obviously you don't thinkthose goals are achievable
through this military operationto achieve these goals.
So obviously you don't thinkthose goals are achievable
through this military operation,concise as it may or likely
won't be, and even the IDFadmits it'll take months.
But were you surprised thatTrump and his people are so on
board with this Israeli policy?

Michael (31:03):
No, I'm not surprised and I agree with you policy.
No, I'm not surprised and Iagree with you.
Somebody should have let Rubioknow ahead of time that the IDF
thinks it's going to take months, and possibly an entire year,
to actually accomplish what itwants to accomplish in this
operation militarily.
I'm not surprised.
I think that Rubio is echoingwhat we tend to hear publicly

(31:25):
from President Trump too, youknow, which is warnings to Hamas
that they have to release allthe hostages now, or you know
the gates of hell will openRight, or else you know, israel
Katz and Donald Trump tend topost on social media about this.
And, in similar fashion, youknow, this week it was President

(31:46):
Trump warning Hamas not to usehostages as human shields, which
you know.
I would hope that we all hopethat.
But do we think that Hamasisn't going to do that?
I think that they almostcertainly are going to do that.
So I'm not surprised, and we'veseen sometimes kind of
ambivalence from administrationofficials on certain things,

(32:09):
right.
So you know, you hearadministration officials both
publicly and privately.
When the question of annexationcomes up, they'll say they
won't, say do it or don't do it.
They'll say, oh, we don't havea policy, right, whatever,
whatever is wrong, and rubio,effectively, he effectively
communicated that this week andI think Mike Huckabee reportedly
said it, you know, said itpublicly that it's up to up to

(32:31):
Israel right when it comes toannexation, up to Israel when it
comes to the war and whether togo ahead, up to Israel.
So it's green lights or, youknow, sometimes maybe a kind of
flashing, flashing yellow light,maybe not even yellow,
somewhere between yellow andgreen, that's kind of the most

(32:52):
you get.
Right, an orange light.
Well, well done with theprimary colors there.
That's kind of the best thatyou really get.
And listeners to this podcastknow I really believed between
the time that President Trumpwon the election and took office
and even early on in this Trumpterm, that there was a chance

(33:16):
things would be differentbecause of the influence of the
Gulf, and all the more so whenPresident Trump came to the
region and went to the Gulf andskipped right over Israel.
But it's hard to see theinfluence of the Gulf in this
stuff.
So either the administration isignoring what they're hearing,

(33:37):
and I think there's evidence forthat.
There's no way that the Gulfieswanted strikes on Iran before
they happened.
I think they're probably finewith the results, given that it
was short and successful to someextent without much blowback,
but I don't think they wantedthat ahead of time and it
happened anyway.
I'm certain that they wouldn'thave wanted a strike on Qatar,
but that happened anyway.
We all know they want the warto end, but there isn't a lot of

(33:59):
administration pressure onIsrael at least to do that.
So maybe Trump just doesn'tcare about what he's hearing
from them.
And maybe they're not actuallyspeaking up.
Maybe at this point they'rekind of content to wall this off
as much as possible.
But I'm now beyond the pointwhere I'm going to be surprised
by green lights from thepresident and top administration

(34:22):
officials.
I just don't think we're goingto see any effective pressure or
even a sign of genuine anger orfrustration or loss of patience
with this Israeli government.

Neri (34:34):
And I think all of us who would like to see a bit more US
pressure on this Israeligovernment, maybe we need to
give up that ghost and I madethis joke with Shira, I think,
the other night.
We have a very good friend who,in almost every column for
probably the past six months,definitely the past six months

(34:55):
either starts the column or endsthe column with well, you know,
it's really up to Donald Trumpto stop this war in every column
, and he's right, becausethere's very little levers other
than maybe, you know, theIsraeli public, which we also
haven't seen, to get thisgovernment to change course.
It's that, or Donald Trump andneither have kind of risen to

(35:17):
the moment.
Moving ahead and looking aheadto next week, which will likely
be a big one, as if the previousweeks have not been big ones,
but it will be, I think, alandmark week, especially in New
York.
We have the UN General Assembly, meetings and speeches,
including by Netanyahu and Trump, but, by the way, not
Palestinian President MahmoudAbbas, who was not given a visa

(35:41):
to attend the UN meetings in NewYork Unprecedented.
But leaving that aside, roshHashanah Eve, monday evening,
we're going to have the bigmeeting on Palestinian statehood
recognition hosted by SaudiArabia and France, where we
expect movement by a host ofstates, including, well, france,
the UK, canada, australia andothers, to recognize the state

(36:03):
of Palestine, shira.
What do you think of thisdiplomatic gambit next week?
Good idea, bad idea, shrug.

Shira (36:12):
Let's put it in context.
First of all, after assumingrecognition is going to play out
like we think it will, by nextweek there'll be over 150
countries that recognize thestate of Palestine.
164 countries recognize thestate of Israel.
So we're at near parity andpractically I think this does

(36:36):
not mean much.
Michael and I wrote an articlein Foreign Affairs, I think a
year ago when the previous waveof recognition it was like I
think it's thinking ninecountries and it started.
Actually, what was interestinglast time it was that broke the
taboo on European countries.
Right, all these othercountries that have recognized
the state of Palestinepreviously were from Latin
America and Africa.

(36:56):
This is Spain and Sweden, anddon't remember which one.
The others were the first onesto be the European countries or
major European countries to haverecognized Western Palestine.
What we have here is we'retalking about permanent members
of the Security Council, right,we're talking about France.
We're talking about the UK,england, which I'm hearing Again

(37:19):
.
It's not like scoops of what Ijust heard today, they could be
even recognizing before UNGA,which is, you know, it's a big
issue.
And then there's Canada andBelgium and other countries.
So we're talking about adifferent group and even though
we know that this in practice isnot going to move the
Palestinian state ahead, and weknow that the Palestinians, you

(37:41):
know, in the making, right, thePA sort of the government, is
closer than collapse to actual,than being in a government that
has effective control overterritory and it is probably
going to revoke an Israeliretaliation that is going to
penalize the Palestinians,setting them back even more.
Right, I think it reflectssomething that we are seeing

(38:03):
with an international communityin these countries that are
frustrated, they don't know whatelse they can do, and sort of
like the fear, right, there wasalways a deterrent from doing
such things, and now they'relike if Israel is going against,
as I it's, it's like if israelis gonna foreclose any political
horizon for the palestinians,we are going to foreclose, you

(38:26):
know, the horizon on israelbeing part of the western
country, part of the westernworld, and I mean we can play
with it also because the horizon, uh, research program, which
israel is losing access to also.
But I mean this is.
This is the idea.
It's like they lost thedeterrence.
We're seeing active sanctions.
It's true that the critics arein Israel and other places are

(38:46):
saying that it's motivated bypolitical considerations back at
home, but of course they havepolitics too and that is true
and where it can haveimplications that I think
Israelis are serious about orconcerned about, beyond this
sort of like hyperbolic andreward for Hamas and all these
things that most Israelis do seeit like that right, and the

(39:07):
question is if this is thetiming.
There's an issue right Untilnow, we're under this concept
that the Palestinian territoriesare disputed and they're
disputed, which means thatIsraeli operations in areas
controlled by the PA right areconsidered legitimate, given
Israel's security concerns.
We can talk about the raidsinto Area A, but just if Wait,

(39:31):
I'll get?

Neri (39:31):
What about the settlements ?
The?

Shira (39:33):
settlements and incursions into Area A and Air
Trabi can be considered asaggression against a fellow UN
member states.
So this is much more likeRussia-Ukraine than a different
status.
It will also accelerate legalprocesses against Israel in the
Hague right, icc, icj.

(39:54):
This is something that is moredangerous and, of course, in
terms of the sanctions, this issomething that is more dangerous
and, of course, in terms of thesanctions.
So I think we're seeing Israel.
Was this diplomatic tsunami, aneconomic tsunami against Israel?
A lot of the things you saw,the quiet embargo and the sort
of reluctance to do stuff withIsrael without the formal
sanctions.
But this can bring actually theformal sanctions.
So it's going to have realimplications.
And how do we we don't havemuch time if this is not

(40:20):
something that we, I think allsupport, thinking it's the
wisest uh, step forward.
I told this to europeanofficials, but I think at this
point, at this point, it's faitaccompli.
What needs to happen is somesort of like how do we mitigate
against the damages?
And this can be done if this wasuh framed in terms of like, I
think, the new york declarationof the saudis and the french

(40:40):
right, or saying some sort oflike we, you know if the uk and
the belgium approach that sayswe are recognized the state of
palestine, but this recognitionis going to come to effect only
when the hostages return andthere's the end of the war and
hamas is gone, so when it meetsthe conditions that israel
requests and if it's framed inexplaining that this is a
recognition of or re-recognitionof the Palestinian rights for

(41:04):
self-determination, rather thanpretending this is a state in
the making.
This would be hopeful.
Also, and I think it would beuseful also if there's a
reminder to Israelis that youknow, Israel itself was
recognized by the UN and in thatdecision there was a
recognition also of an Arabstate.
So it's difficult, you know,it's very convenient for us to
take just our part and ignorethe other state that was also

(41:25):
supposed to be establishedthrough this framework.
After October 7, trauma, zerotolerance, you know this really
very risk averse mentality.
It's all justified, but at thispoint I just don't think Israel
can fight it in a viable wayand therefore it's better to
think how you manage it andleverage it and maybe even use

(41:45):
it to say okay, you acknowledgePalestine, how about you
acknowledge us as a Jewish state?

Neri (41:48):
right, it's something that was very important for Israel,
so maybe you use it to extractleverage and put pressure on
what Israel cares about itdoesn't seem like this Israeli
government is heading down themore constructive path, heading
down the well more destructivepath, which we'll get into in a
second.
You said fait accompli.
I think these governments arefed up completely.

Shira (42:11):
I will avoid speaking about political stuff.

Neri (42:18):
I got a smile from Michael Koplow.

Shira (42:21):
He smiles a lot.

Neri (42:22):
My day is done.

Michael (42:25):
I mean, it's a smile of disgust.

Neri (42:29):
Yeah, my day is over.
It was a productive day,Michael.
What do you think of what we'regoing to see next week and what
do you imagine, like we said,the reaction from Israel will be
?

Michael (42:40):
I agree with you.
We're going to see this wave ofrecognitions.
I think it's a very bad idea onthe part of these countries.
You know we talk about magicalthinking on the Israeli side
with regard to the operation inGaza City and what military
pressure can actually accomplish.
This is just complete magicalthinking from the Europeans and

(43:02):
others about what declaringPalestine into being is going to
actually accomplish on theground is going to accomplish
nothing.
And our our friend, samarSinjolawi, who has been on this
podcast and who Shira and I wereboth supposed to see in person
last week in the US but couldn'tbecause he was denied a visa to
come to the United States, hehas a very effective yes,

(43:25):
incredibly unbelievable.
It's not just Mahmoud Abbaswho's being kept out.
It's literally any Palestinian,including Samer, who is one of
the most quote unquoteresponsible Palestinians that
exists in terms of his rhetoricand his willingness to talk to
Israelis and engage with them.
It's criminal that he's keptout of the United States simply

(43:49):
because he's Palestinian, but hehas a very effective line on
this, which is that you can have190 countries recognize
Palestine, but only one mattersand that's Israel.
And until Israel recognizesPalestine, then this is all
feeder, and that's exactly whatit is.
It's all feeder and there'sgoing to be some sort of Israeli
response.
No question Now what that willlook like.
I'm not sure.
It seems to me that thediscussions with Rubio and

(44:14):
Huckabee over annexation areclearly related to this in some
way.
Not to suggest that Israeliministers didn't want annexation
anyway, but they're veryseriously, I think, discussing
whether the US will back themannexing something as a
purported response to countriesrecognizing Palestine.
There will almost certainly besome sort of sanctions against

(44:39):
the Palestinian authority thatwill be designed to weaken, if
not collapse it entirely.
I think that whatever fundsBatala Smotrich has been
transferring, that's probablygoing to end, and maybe there
will be some sort of stepped upIDF campaign in the West Bank in
symbolic places, right.

(44:59):
More IDF activity, let's say,in like Ramallah.
I think that's certainly apossibility.
There will probably be someform of Israeli diplomatic
response against Europeancountries.
There's been talk of shutteringthe French consulate in
Jerusalem.
Maybe Israel will pullambassadors or downgrade

(45:21):
relations in some way.
We'll probably see somecombination of this.
The other thing that reallyworries me is that the Europeans
talk about this as if it'sgoing to change something for
Palestinians, as if this issomething that should be
celebrated by Palestinians, andit's going to change nothing.

(45:41):
Not only is it going to changenothing for the better.
If it does change something,it'll probably be for the worse,
as we're contemplating whatIsrael might do in response, and
you elevate the hopes ofPalestinians and then you dash
them, and that's going to have along tail because it's going to
impact Palestinian attitudesabout a peaceful, diplomatic

(46:05):
process.
I mean, like I said, I thinkthis is a silly move and I'm
opposed to it and I don't thinkit's smart.
But whatever it is, it'scertainly not armed conflict and
intifada.
So I think you discredit theapproach.
That is not armed conflict andintifada.
I think that you even go so faras to perhaps let's drop
Palestinian statehood, just pushfor Israeli citizenship, turn

(46:40):
this into a straight civilrights campaign to become
Israelis, which is.
I don't know if that happens,especially given the world we
live in.
I don't know how Israelovercomes that.
So I think that there's a realpotential downside to this and I
wish that if Europeans wereserious about Palestinian
statehood.

(47:01):
So keep on holding Israel'sfeet to the fire in different
ways that may be appropriate,but also restore some
Palestinian agency.
Tell them that you supportstatehood, but it's not going to
be contingent on the Gaza warending and Hamas being out of
the picture.
It should be contingent ongenuine PA reforms,

(47:23):
institutional reforms andsecurity sector reforms and
democratic reforms, as opposedto acting as if the Palestinians
will get this thing thatthey're not actually going to
get and that somehow they'rejust bystanders to all of it.
It's a deeply mistaken andmisguided move that.

Shira (47:38):
I agree with Shira that at this point there's no way to
stop it.
You know that's what and theway that I think Israel could
backfire.
Right, one of my fears is interms of like downgrading ties
or maybe kicking out diplomatshere.
What does it mean about the USsecurity coordinator?
Right, if you look at theofficers working there, there

(48:00):
are many Canadians and Brits.
Actually, the largest part ofthe mission is Canadian.
I mean, are they going to goout?

Michael (48:08):
If we're talking about the number two officials are
Canadian, you know.

Shira (48:11):
If we're talking about, by the way, you know, aboumazen.
He didn't get a visa to NewYork, to the United States, but
will Israel let him return?
He's away now.
This is also a question, right?
Can he return here?
We don't know where it's goingto go and I think, after this
circus next week and admittedlyit's going to be a circus we're

(48:31):
going to all stumble into thesame issues.
Oh, by the way, on annexation, Ijust want to make a point there
.
Annexation, you know there'sthe US allowing this or not
allowing this, or approving this, but I think where you see most
leverage actually on Israel iscoming from the United Arab
Emirates, who have and this iswhere you see that one statement
from them.

(48:51):
But continued pressure now onbasically threatening almost to
cancel the Abraham Accords orusing very harsh language that
they've never used before, is, Ithink, affecting calculations
here and this, and together withthe failed Doha strike, I
actually think this is more of amight be the thing that could
prevent annexation and theremight be a statement on

(49:12):
annexation and there's de factoannexation, but an actual change
measure we'll see.
Right, you had E1 already,which is the settlement part
between Maladumim and Jerusalem,which is perfectly the West
Bank, right.
So there have been somemeasures already expressed as a
response, as a sort of like anearly response to the
recognition, and maybe these allwill be framed on this.

(49:35):
But you know, on the biggerpicture right, we're all going
to come to the same issues howto end the war in Gaza.
This can be through an agreementand I think that the state of
Israel there are people here I'mnot talking about Mitzal
Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Fir, butthere are people here
reportedly close to the primeminister itself that understand
that a transitional authoritythat has to do with some

(49:58):
Palestinians and internationalplayers and the regional
government.
I mean, this is sort of theonly possible viable way.
And because the regional actorswant an invite from the
Palestinian Authority and wantsome Palestinian Authority stake
in this, and because Israelunderstands that and because
they can say it's not PA butit's Fatah and have a dotted

(50:19):
line to the PA or whatever, weneed to ask ourselves how these
policies and this includes allthe actors right how do they
serve us?
And can we force the PA or makesure that the PA does what it
needs to do through engagementand not through sanctioning them
?
You know, this is where I thinkwe hope to come to come to
senses, because I agree with you.

(50:39):
I think that this idea of like,oh, the Palestinians said that
they will engage in reforms andthey appointed the deputy Abbas,
appointed deputy, done deal.
That's not true.
And, on the other hand, canthey really engage in reforms
given the policy of the Israeligovernment at the moment?
Right, that does everything toundermine them.
So we are really in an issuethat you know.
Yeah, we'll have Anga next weekand Rosh Hashanah, but then

(51:00):
we're going to come to the sameissues and the same issues that
are actually there is a way out,right?
It's the same way I've we'vebeen talking about for almost
two years, but what you havehere is what you need is the
leadership to agree to go onthis path, and clearly the
reality is going in a verydifferent way at the moment.

Neri (51:20):
That's what I was going to say, that, yes, you could
sketch out a very reasonablepath forward that resolves both
Gaza and stabilizes the WestBank.
I see no indication of thisIsraeli government and this
Israeli prime minister that thisis the direction they're
heading in.
They're heading in the oppositedirection.
Now, maybe that'll change atsome point, maybe on the other

(51:42):
side.
But israel, but israelvoluntarily.

Shira (51:44):
It will be hard, hard pressed to do this.
You think about internationalplayers with leverage, right,
and you know we've been poundingon israel it's.
We don't have expectations ofhamas, but maybe, maybe this is
Hamas has not been helpful.
Maybe there is a way of wiselythinking of what this
capitulation looks like.
When you talk about terroristorganization, right that they're
saying, okay, we're willing toretreat for the Palestinian

(52:08):
people.
It requires a tolerance withthis idea that it would have to
have inter-Palestinianunderstandings.
I mean, this is like verycomplicated stuff that someone
in the international communityneeds to help.

Neri (52:19):
Yeah, but I think there are multiple actors in the
international community thathave thought about it.
We know that for a fact.
I think, again, not to pick onthe Israeli government, but I'll
pick on the Israeli government.
Yes, you could create a formulato have both sides kind of save
face and bring this to a close.
But, like you said, you needinput or equity from the PA,

(52:43):
from the Palestinian Authority.
But this Israeli governmentdoesn't want to hear the words
Palestinian Authority, right, itwould cause a coalition crisis.
So how do you square that circle?
And then you know thePalestinian Authority should be
supported in the West Bankbecause it is actually
cooperating with Israel onsecurity, as we all know, and
has kept it remarkably quiet andstable over the past two years

(53:03):
of war.
And yet, sorry again, thisIsraeli government is actively
undermining that entity and thatstability and that cooperation.
So again, I hate to pick on myown side, but I will, and I will
pick on my other own side aswell.
Rubio as well, early this week,standing next to Bibi Netanyahu
, said if these Westerngovernments take unilateral

(53:26):
steps against Israel quote,unquote by recognizing a
Palestinian state, then don't besurprised if Israel takes
unilateral actions in turn onthe West Bank, which is complete
gaslighting because Israel isalready taking many unilateral
actions against the PA, and onthe West Bank.

Michael (53:45):
And it's also not doing Israel any favors to push it or
encourage that decision.
But you know, mary, that wasn'tmy favorite US official comment
this week.
The best one was Mike Huckabeesaying that European countries
can't recognize the Palestinianstate because to do so would
violate Oslo.

Neri (54:05):
Yeah, nimrod and Ibrahim and I last week got into that.
Ask Mike Huckabee if hesupports the Oslo Accords.
Yeah, well, apparently he does.
Well, that's news, I think, toMike Huckabee.
Final question and topic to youboth I gave you a bit of
homework before we startedrecording.
Obviously, you know difficulttimes here in Israel and across

(54:30):
the region, and also in Gaza, wehave to mention.
We touched on a few of theissues, especially for here in
Israel, for our kinds of peoplethe growing international
isolation of Israel, politically, diplomatically, economically
and the like.
Not great times.
But this podcast is known formany things, but above all for

(54:53):
being the purveyor of good newsand positive vibes, as the kids
say.
So your homework was to findone piece of positive, feel-good
, optimistic issues, points,news that you can share with us
coming into this new year, thisnew Jewish year.
Michael, should we start withyou?

Michael (55:16):
Sure, but let's also note that Dr Scheer-Effron did
not think I'd be able to do this.
She referred to me, I believe,as Dr Doom right.
So I'm going to show you,scheer, that I so I'm going to
demonstrate that I can be not sodoomy and not so gloomy.
This actually wasn't difficultfor me, because I do think that

(55:38):
we're seeing something that forme, is super optimistic, which
is that, setting aside the pushto unilaterally recognize a
Palestinian state, we're alsoseeing this effort on the part
of states in the entire ArabLeague in the guise of the New
York Declaration that says wewant two states, but that also

(56:03):
is including this laundry listof things that Israel has wanted
for a very long time.
The New York Declaration isn'tonly about two states.
It also condemns October 7thwithout reservations.
It calls for the return of allthe hostages.
It demands that Hamas disarmcompletely.
It calls for thedemilitarization of Gaza.
It calls for the return of allthe hostages.
It demands that Hamas disarmcompletely.
It calls for thedemilitarization of Gaza.
It calls for a futurePalestinian state to be
demilitarized.
It calls for the PalestinianAuthority to take reforms on

(56:25):
their education system, to endincitement as conditions for
statehood.
These are things that Israelishave wanted forever, and the
idea that two years ago, if I'dsaid to you hey, the entire Arab
League is going to sign on tothese things that Israel is
asking for.
We would say, wow, what afantastic position Israel must

(56:51):
be in in the world for the ArabLeague and the European Union to
be endorsing these core andextremely legitimate and
understandable and justifiableIsraeli demands.
And that's what's happening.
So you know, the conversationright now around recognition of
Palestine is as we had on thispodcast.

(57:11):
It's not a great one, butalongside that, we do see these
trends that I think are actuallyvery favorable for Israel and
demonstrate that things thatIsraelis want the rest of the
world is coming around to andsaying, yeah, you know what
those things make sense to us.
We can't argue with thosethings.

(57:31):
So to me it's optimistic.
It's optimistic in the guise oftwo states, because I think
that once the two-stateconversation turns serious again
which certainly won't happenwhile the war is going on and
certainly won't happen withoutthe benefit of some time for
Israelis to heal, bothphysically and emotionally when
the conversation picks up again,if this is any indication it's

(57:53):
going to pick up again from amuch better place and from a
place that does take Israeliconcerns seriously.
And even if we set aside thetwo-state conversation, the fact
that we do have every singleArab League state condemning
Hamas and calling for theirexclusion from Palestinian
politics and their disarmamentin such unambiguous terms.

(58:15):
That's a really good thing, andI think we should celebrate it
and lift it up and use it as acause to be hopeful, going
forward Very well said, so theremay be well good news Michael
good vibes.

Shira (58:28):
Michael good vibes.

Neri (58:29):
This coming year.

Shira (58:30):
Exactly.

Neri (58:33):
Sunshine and butterflies With sprinkles.

Michael (58:35):
Exactly, that's my new nickname Sunshine and Butterfly
With sprinkles.
Exactly.

Shira (58:36):
That's my new nickname.
First of all, I agree 100% withMichael and just to say I wrote
something about it in anarticle supposed to be at
Foreign Affairs the other day,because I do say, as I said
before, I think it's faitaccompli, like the recognition
is a done deal.
But if you look at the largercontext, there are positive
elements and the problem is thateven Israelis that know the
positive elements, they don'tunderstand that you can't just

(58:59):
get the good without getting thestuff.
That gives you a pause and with, I think, a blind spot when it
comes to Palestinian nationalism, because it's fine to say a
Palestinian state is not goingto be like now, but this idea of
never, ever right and in wordand in deed, and it's not just
by the Israeli government, right, it's opposition, and we know
there's a motion in the Knessetthat passed with a large

(59:22):
majority.
So anyway, but I'm in positive.
Let's pause.

(59:44):
Yeah, no, no, I'm going back tolike my rainbow mood.
Actually, I'm not.
That was way too negative.
I'm not, I am positive.
Why am I positive?
I think that, despite where thecurrent trajectory is going,
there was a sense of revenge andeveryone's coming to terms.
There's a clear society herethat, despite the trauma,
despite the difficulties, doesnot want to be Sparta, wants to

(01:00:06):
be Athens that understand andsee with very.
It's not eyes wide shut, right,it's like eyes wide open.
Where are we heading?
And protesting the government'spolicies?
And I think you know, I thinkthat's really important because
at the end of the day I mean ina few months, whatever this Gaza

(01:00:26):
city incursion going to end andbefore it rolls into, oh, now
we need to Moassi and thecentral camps, and I agree with
Michael, they're like it's hardto see this ending, but
hopefully one day I'm going tocome to a place where, like, we
have to make a decision and Ithink the israeli public now
will push to the right decisionand that is is important.

(01:00:47):
We often talk about thepalestinians of having no agency
and sort of the leadership andstuff.
But you see a new politicalactivism by different party
parts of the israeli society.
But you see new politicalactivism by different parts of
the Israeli society, right, yousee the parties themselves.
You see young generationthinking about going into
politics.
And you know there's this songhere, maybe really cliché, but
there's this.
You know, for ourHebrew-speaking listeners, it's

(01:01:12):
it's always darkest beforesunrises, and so I think we will
see next year will be better,see Sort of optimistic.

Neri (01:01:27):
Very well done, shira, you did it.

Shira (01:01:31):
Meanwhile we came with the Giants.

Neri (01:01:34):
I'm going to pick up on your optimistic yeah.
I mean, it sounds like a good,that would be very positive trip
to Greece.
But all kidding aside, I'llpick up on your point, shira,
and then I'll make my optimisticpoint.
I thought one of you was goingto be more explicit, but I think
this coming year, even theJewish year, will be an election

(01:01:57):
year and with elections, hopesprings eternal even in Israel.
And I think there will beobviously it'll be a momentous
and fateful and historic andI've used this word before, but
existential election for thestate of Israel.

(01:02:19):
But I think, well, if theopposition gets its act together
, it could be actually a verypositive and optimistic election
that could actually usher in anew Israeli government.
So, politically, I think thatis my optimistic note that this
coming year we'll see anelection.
Think that is my optimisticnote that this coming year we'll
see an election, if nottriggered, then actually held,

(01:02:45):
which I think will be momentousand will give us a lot of
content for this podcast.
So that's also an optimisticand positive note.
And then my other optimisticand positive note for this
coming year.
So we're recording this onWednesday, september 17th, for
this coming year.

Shira (01:02:59):
So we're recording this on Wednesday, september 17th.
Do you both know what today is?
Oh, yeah, yeah, I knew that.
Yeah, it is, I saw Naim KassemHappy Beeper Day.

Neri (01:03:04):
To you both.
So a year ago, yeah well, heI'm sure he was spitting it as a
great victory for Hezbollah,but in reality it marked the
beginning of Israel's real kindof full-out offensive against
Hezbollah.
And this happened a year ago.
And when those beepers went off, and before I foolishly kept
packing for my foolish trip backto the States, we didn't know

(01:03:27):
how the coming weeks and months,and indeed the coming year,
would play out.
And it actually turned outbetter than anyone had any hope
to expect, because Hezbollah wasalways even more than Iran was
always kind of this realdangerous threat to Israel.
But it was very, very well doneby the Israeli intelligence
services and the IDF.

(01:03:48):
On September 17th 2024, a yearago, the ground invasion hadn't
begun yet.
Yes, hassan Nasrallah was stillalive, et cetera, et cetera, et
cetera.
And extrapolating from that, ayear ago Yahya Sanwar was still
alive.
He is no longer, thankfully,with us.
Iran had yet to be struckrather successfully, the 12-day

(01:04:12):
war this past summer.
So again, my point is that,especially looking back but also
looking forward, israel's kindof security and military
position in the region hasimproved tremendously over the
past year.
Now the negative side,obviously, is that this Gaza war
is continuing for no apparentreason and it could have very

(01:04:33):
easily ended, probably end oflast year, definitely by earlier
this year, but it has not.
But really, I think, in termsof the actual security of the
state of Israel and the Israelipeople, night and day different
from a year ago.
So that is something, I think,an optimistic point to take into
the new year and not somethingwell, not something A that we

(01:04:56):
should take for granted and, bwe should acknowledge that right
, that, in all the doom andgloom, politically,
diplomatically, internationally,et cetera, et cetera, in real
terms, in military and securityterms, israel is safer.
Remains to be seen whether thisprime minister and this
government can actually leverageit for enduring stability and

(01:05:19):
enduring positivity.
Okay, thanks again to michaelcoppola and sharaf ron, as
always, for their generous timeand insights.
Also, a special thanks to ourproducer, jacob gilman, and to
all of you who support israelpolicy forums work.
Do consider making a donationto israel policy forum, so
keeping a credible source ofanalysis and ideas on issues

(01:05:40):
such as these that we all caredeeply about, including this
podcast and, most importantly,shana Tova and Chag Sameach to
all those celebrating and, ofcourse, thank you.
Thank you for listening, thankyou.