The Diplomatic Tsunami

On this week’s episode, Israel Policy Forum Policy Advisor and Tel Aviv-based journalist Neri Zilber hosts Jeremy Issacharoff, Israel’s former ambassador to Germany. They discuss the growing "diplomatic tsunami" facing Israel, how Israel's current international standing compares to years and wars past, why and how Israel got to this low point, what can be done to remedy the situation, the craft of Israeli diplomacy, Iran's nuclear program after the 12-day war, and more.

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Episode Transcript

Neri (00:05):
Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod.
I'm Nery Zilber, a journalistbased in Tel Aviv and a policy
advisor to Israel Policy Forum.
We have a great episode for youthis week with former senior
Israeli diplomat, jeremyIsakarov with us to discuss
Israel's international standingnow, 22 months into the Gaza war
, the diplomatic tsunami nowgrowing in strength against

(00:26):
Israel, who's to blame for thestate of affairs and what, in
his opinion, can be done toreverse these negative trends?
Jeremy is, of course, theformer Israeli ambassador to
Germany, the vice directorgeneral of the Israeli foreign
ministry, as well as the formerhead of strategic affairs at the
ministry, the Israeli ForeignMinistry, as well as the former
head of strategic affairs at theministry, and also the former

(00:51):
number two at the embassy inWashington, amongst a host of
former senior posts.
He is currently a senior fellowat the Institute for Policy and
Strategy at ReichenmanUniversity in Herzliya and to my
mind, there are few peoplebetter placed than Jeremy to
explain how Israel got to thispoint in terms of global public
opinion and, for better or worse, where we may be headed going
forward.
But before we get to all that,a few thoughts from me.

(01:14):
So we're recording this, onTuesday afternoon, tel Aviv time
and I wanted to give a shortstate of play on where the Gaza
war stands at the moment, whichis really, to my mind, a hinge
moment and a critical moment inthe entire campaign, now nearly
two years after the horrible,horrible attacks of October 7th.
So let's be clear despite ourbest hopes and prognostications,

(01:36):
including on this podcast,negotiations to get a 60-day
ceasefire at at least half thehostages out of Gaza collapsed
about two weeks ago.
Yes, we got that wrong here,but not for lack of trying.
We don't need to get too deepinto the reasons why the talks
collapsed.
Hamas hardened some of itsdemands, which were then helped

(01:58):
along by the massiveinternational pressure campaign
on Israel due to thedeteriorating humanitarian
conditions inside Gaza, campaignon Israel due to the
deteriorating humanitarianconditions inside Gaza, and
Israel, for its part, of course,was still unwilling to fully
and finally commit to ending thewar.
Fine, that's what happened withthe negotiations over a partial
ceasefire for hostage deal, butthat left us in this precarious

(02:19):
position now where the Trumpadministration and Benjamin
Netanyahu then said OK, we can'tget a partial deal.
So now we're going to demand afull deal where Hamas has to
effectively surrender, disarmand release all the 50 remaining
hostages, or else, or else whatyou may ask or else we, israel,

(02:40):
are going to expand themilitary offensive into the
remaining 25% of Gaza that theIDF doesn't yet control,
including into places like GazaCity and the central camps of
the Strip.
Over the past week, we've beenhearing more and more of these
threats, including into today.
Hamas will either need tocapitulate or Israel could

(03:02):
emphasis on, could move toreoccupy the entire Gaza Strip.
A decision on this could bemade even in the coming days.
Let's be clear.
It's not potentially that faroff.
So, brass tacks.
Where does that leave us inpractice?
I'd argue we're looking at threeoptions, by the way, with the

(03:22):
full understanding that thethreats themselves being made by
Israel are a leverage play anda form of pressure tactic to get
Hamas to respond and do whatIsrael wants.
So option number one because ofthese Israeli threats, hamas
somehow softens its position andgoes back to negotiations over
the original partial deal.

(03:44):
Like I said, a 60-day ceasefire, half the hostages come out,
the IDF withdraws, maybe notfrom the entire Gaza Strip, but
parts of the Gaza Strip, etc.
That's option number one whichI think even Netanyahu would
agree to if and it's a big ifHamas was willing to go back and
play ball.
So option number two Hamasagain somehow caves, agrees to a

(04:10):
full deal, what US envoy SteveWoodcuff called an all or
nothing deal and some kind offormula is worked out that
actually ends the war.
The chances of this happening,I'd argue, not very high, let's
be honest.
But you never really knowwhat's happening in the shadows,
behind closed doors.

(04:31):
But to get to that kind offormula where both Israel and
Hamas somehow compromise andagree to a full end of the war
amongst various conditions thatboth sides are demanding and
have been demanding for a yearand a half, very high bar indeed
.
So that leaves us with optionnumber three.

(04:52):
In the absence of any kind ofdeal, partial, full or other
Israel has to actually make goodon its various threats to at
least do something militarily,and it expands its operations in
some way, something militarily,and it expands its operations
in some way, shape or form oranother into that last remaining
25% of Gaza.
The implications of this, I'dargue, could be profound,

(05:14):
extremely profound, which is thereason why I call this a major
hinge moment in the war.
Now, think about it there arenow 2 million people, million
people, gazans that are locatedin those three enclaves right on
the Mediterranean coast, whomay now have to be forcibly
evacuated outside and out of thefighting zones once again.

(05:36):
Or think about the humanitarianaid issue, which has only just
recently begun to be improved,after Israel what a week and a
half ago, reversed its policy onaid 180 degrees.
So that just recently started.
Or think about the reaction bythe international community,
which is already very, veryunhappy, to say the least, with

(05:58):
Israel, as I get into withJeremy.
So think about the reaction bythe international community to
such an expansion of the groundoffensive.
And then finally, and for manypeople, most importantly, think
about the fate of the 20 livinghostages that are still being
held by Hamas in precisely thoseareas that Israel is now

(06:19):
threatening to go into.
So all of the implications ofthis possible Israeli move are
bad and negative, I'd argue, allof them.
So begs the question why, youmay ask, is it even being
considered by Israel?
And really, the answer is that,after 22 months of war, bibi

(06:39):
Netanyahu and his governmentdon't have any better ideas.
They're out of ideas, they'reout of options and, first and
foremost and most importantly,because they're still promising
the Israeli public a fantasywith regard to the Gaza war.
So, with all that being said,let's get to Jeremy Isikarov.
Hi Jeremy, welcome to theIsrael Policy Pod.

Jeremy (07:03):
Thank you, Nery.
Thank you for inviting me.

Neri (07:06):
It's really my pleasure, jeremy.
I really wanted to have you onthis week.
I thought you'd be the rightguest at the right moment.
Really a difficult moment herein Israel, with what we call the
diplomatic tsunami crashingover the country due to the
ongoing Gaza war.
It really does seem likerelentless waves coming in from

(07:29):
all over.
We don't need to belabor thepoint and list every single
country in action, but needlessto say that we've seen over a
dozen countries just over thepast week or two saying that
they're likely to recognize aPalestinian state next month, in
September.
The European Union isconsidering additional steps and

(07:52):
sanctions against Israel.
Israeli tourists and businesspeople almost on a daily basis,
we hear in the media find itdifficult to travel to many
places in Europe and LatinAmerica, et cetera, et cetera.
Even in America, as I'm sureyou're aware, jeremy, opinion
polling about people'sperception of Israel has gone

(08:12):
way down into the negative, bothamongst Republicans and
Democrats.
So, with all that being said,jeremy, the first and most
obvious question to you, assomeone who has been doing this
a bit longer than I have haveyou ever seen it this bad for
Israel in the court of bothglobal public opinion and just

(08:32):
diplomatically around the world?

Jeremy (08:35):
Well, I think it's as far.
I've been in the Foreign Servicefor over 40 years and I retired
three years ago and I do notremember a situation that has
been so critical in terms of ourinternational standing, attacks
on our legitimacy and criticismagainst the government.

(08:55):
When I was in the ForeignService, I found it perfectly
legitimate to have a debate withpeople who disagree with you,
to have a debate with people whodisagree with you, but I think
this is creating an atmosphereof isolation of Israel.
I was also in America over thelast three weeks and I was
actually quite taken back by themedia outlets, which are

(09:19):
generally pretty favorabletowards Israel, or at least fair
and objective, favorabletowards Israel, or at least fair
and objective and seeing thatthey had also assumed a pretty
negative attitude to all thepictures that have been flowing
in over the last weeks from Gazasituation, the humanitarian
situation there, and I think youknow this is having clearly an

(09:42):
impact on many different levels,not just on the media, not just
how it's seen in the publicdiscourse, but also on the
various political systems invarious countries in which the
media is playing out.
But beyond that, I think it's asense that people are not sure
where Israel is heading for,when this war will end, how the

(10:06):
present fighting will achieveits goals, and I think that's
one of the things that I thinkis missing and creating very
major question marks and leading, therefore, to actions and
measures that countries areconsidering in the light of this

(10:26):
uncertainty.

Neri (10:29):
And so is it a sense reading between the lines of
your answer.
Is it a sense that manycountries and governments and
people around the world don'tunderstand where Israel is
heading in this war, or is itmore of a sense that they're I
don't want to say anti-Israel,but they have a predisposition
to be critical, because, youeven said, even favorable or

(10:51):
friendly media outlets inAmerica are even asking the
question now.

Jeremy (10:56):
Right and obviously in America, you can see that we're
losing to a great extent theDemocratic Party.
But even on the right, on theright of the Republicans and
some of the MAGA proponents,like Marjorie Greene, talking
about genocide, and there'sother talk on the Hill regarding

(11:20):
arms or limiting of arms salesto Israel, arms embargoes, in
addition to what's happening inEurope, which is also a period
in which many differentproposals have been raised that
would restrict Israel.
But I think it's not just thefact that this government hasn't

(11:42):
enunciated any sort of dayafter policy, or even I don't
like the idea of the day after,because I think we need a policy
now and that's one of thereasons we need to get out of
this crisis and I just I thinkit's a very clear perception in

(12:03):
these countries, which, whichare not automatically
anti-Israel, they're notanti-Semitic, they're concerned
about Israel and its nationalsecurity.
They are concerned that Israelis moving towards taking the
whole of Gaza and assuming, youknow, full military control over
Gaza and also extending Israelilaw to the rest of the

(12:28):
territories in the West Bank.
And this is a very clearperception that not only they
disagree with, because it's, ina way, totally undermines any
possibility of a two statesolution or any political
horizon with the Palestinians.
And as much as many of thesecountries support Israel I mean,

(12:49):
I was ambassador to Germany andthe support of Germany for
Israel's survival self-defenseis being absolutely rock solid
but they have also a very clearposition regarding the need for
a two-state solution.
Now, a two-state solution,whether you support it or not,

(13:13):
it's not going to happen in amonth or in a year.
It'll take time, and I speak toPalestinians and they understand
regular, moderate Palestiniansunderstand that this is a
process that could take anywherebetween five to ten years.
So what I'm trying to say isthat not only is there no vision

(13:37):
of a political horizon with thePalestinians, but what the
Israeli government is doing nowin Gaza and in the West Bank is
undermining any possibility ofthat ever happening, and I think
that's a very crucial factor.
This is, you know, this is aperiod of time where, as I said
before, some of our best friendsare sending us very critical

(14:00):
signals, and I, you know I, as adiplomat, I obviously care
about what happens in theinternational arena, how
countries relate to Israel, butfirst and foremost, I want to do
things that are important forour national security, and today
, I believe that our nationalsecurity, for us, for the

(14:21):
Israeli people, demands that weconcentrate on ending this war,
bringing our hostages back andalso considering how we create
not only a political horizonwith the Palestinians, but how
we create a broader politicalhorizon with the region as a
whole, with our countries thatwe have peace with, like Egypt,

(14:42):
jordan, the Abraham Accords.
How can we bring Saudi Arabiainto the picture?
Is there a possibility ofbringing Syria eventually into
the circle that could be not acircle of fire, but a circle of
peace around Israel and evenLebanon?
So these are the things that Ithink about, and I think this is

(15:03):
the sort of path that we shouldpursue.

Neri (15:08):
You're not going to find any differences of opinion on
this podcast, as you know, andamongst Israel Policy Forum, we
wholeheartedly support thatlong-term vision for Israel and,
like you said, for Israel'sinterests and for Israel's
national security, and not as afavor to this or that foreign
government or even this or thatneighbor.

(15:29):
We wholeheartedly agree, jeremy.
Just a quick follow-up in termsof the historical context, at
least, in the beginning of thewar, I tried to calm some of my
friends and family down.
I said look, there may be a lotof criticism of Israel after
October 7th and the launch ofthe war in Gaza specifically,

(15:50):
but it wasn't, you know,necessarily a picnic back in the
days of the Second Intifada inthe early 2000.
It wasn't a picnic during theFirst Intifada in the late 80s,
early 90s or even the FirstLebanon War in the early 80s.
Do you personally, or even thefirst Lebanon war in the early
80s?
Do you personally feel adifference now in terms of the
international discourse and theinternational criticism of

(16:11):
Israel after 22 months of war?
I mean, is it really different?
Or is it just that our world isdifferent, our social media
ecosystem is different, or isthere actually more criticism of
Israel objectively now thanthere was ever in the past.

Jeremy (16:25):
Look, it's always difficult to make comparisons
between different times anddifferent contexts, but I do
feel that we are in a veryparticular moment now where
we're not only confronted bydangers continuing, of the

(16:45):
situation getting worse, butwhat I'm scared about is that
we're losing valuableopportunities.
When I look at the, you know, Idon't think you can compare.
We've had previous rounds,whether the second Lebanese war,
the second intifada, firstintifada, whether the second
Lebanese war, the secondIntifada, first Intifada, all of
these things.
But what happened after October7th was a multi-front war and I

(17:10):
believe that, while thatindicated a very basic collapse
of Israeli national security,its deterrence, its intelligence
, on October 7th we at leasttook us a few days, but we
contained the situation andbegan to reverse it.

(17:32):
And if I look back and compareIsraeli situation, in January of
this year we had shattered, inessence, the leadership and the
capabilities of Hamas.
We had really damaged in a veryprofound way Hamas' Hezbollah's

(17:53):
leadership and its capabilities.
We had also rebuffed two majormassive missile attacks from
Iran and basically it foiled the.
You know the impact that theycould have had and we responded,
I think, in a very measured way.
We'd contained the Houthithreat and continued to have

(18:15):
missiles going off, even overthe last few evenings, and one
of the things that I think was avery profound change was the
collapse of the Assad regime inDecember of last year.
So, when you get to January, inmy opinion Israel had, to a

(18:37):
certain extent, rehabilitatedits deterrence, which I think is
a very vital, which I think isa very vitally important issue,
regardless of what one has apolitical opinion about.
We had seen very dramaticchanges, not only in Iran's

(19:15):
capabilities strategicallyagainst Israel, which were used
by Iran and shown to beindications of strategic
weakness rather than strategicstrength.
We also showed that the proxiesof Iran that had undermined our
stability, whether in Hezbollah, hamas or Houthis or Islamic
Jihad, were, you know, severelycurtailed.
Now, why I say this is a verydifferent situation to what we'd
seen in previous wars is thatthis had in fact really begun to

(19:36):
change the strategic realityand created a massive
opportunity for Israel.
And this was January where Ithink I think the present
government, netanyahu coalition,should have declared victory,
gotten the hostage remove, hadto make a deal to get all of the

(19:58):
hostages out, not in stages,but in one in one go, and then
begin to consider how we dealwith this new strategic context
in a regional sense, and how wego forward in dealing with Iran,
and so that would have been thepreferred option from my point

(20:20):
of view.
So I don't think you can reallykind of compare previous
situations Now, unfortunately,we did not stop the war and we
went into a hostage exchangewhich was supposed to have more
than one stage, and by March wedecided to continue the fighting

(20:40):
in order to shatter Hamas evenmore and also get out our
hostages.
Now this did not achieve itsgoals period, I mean so far.
You know, the amount ofhostages that have been freed
through military force is verylow.
The amount of hostages we'vereceived through negotiation and

(21:04):
deals that have been made,whether through Egypt or Qatar
with the help of the UnitedStates, has been far greater,
and therefore I think that was avery vital mistake.
And the real problem was thatwe had, in January, major
strategic gains and, as a resultof continuing the war, those

(21:24):
gains began to be weakened anddeteriorated and basically
brushed aside.
And the whole point of militaryforce is that you take the
military force, you use it, butyou use it in order to achieve
political goals, and thepolitical goals are what you

(21:45):
need in order to consolidateyour position, and essentially,
that really is the reason why weare in the situation today that
we are going.
In a sense, if I was Hamas now,a very weakened, brutal
terrorist organization, I wouldsay look at how we're putting

(22:08):
the pressure on Israel, howthey're feeling isolated, how
they're feeling pressured.
This should not be happening.
And again, I think that anypossibility of widening the war
and pursuing total occupation ofGaza, with all that implies, is
going to make the situationmuch, much worse.
So there's a whole differentsituation in the Middle East,

(22:33):
looking at the dangers, but alsolooking at the opportunities
which we could be losing.

Neri (22:39):
Definite dangers, definite cost to Israel, not just in
terms of eroding the militarygains, but, as we know,
diplomatically, politically,economically, the cost is going
up and, yes, I think theNetanyahu government squandered
an opportunity to close this warearlier this year and now

(23:00):
Israel is in a much moredifficult negotiating position
because we've lost a lot of theleverage that we had.
Jeremy, I wanted to take a stepback a little bit.
Obviously, a big part of why wegot here is the decisions taken
, and not taken, by this currentIsraeli government and the
current Israeli leadership, butI wanted to talk about the

(23:24):
international contextspecifically and, as a veteran
member of the Israeli diplomaticcorps and the Israeli
government and really thiswhatever you want to call it the
pro-Israel media ecosystem,everyone wants to know who's to
blame, right?
How is it that 22 months afterOctober 7th, after the worst

(23:46):
massacre of Jews since theHolocaust, and after really much
of the entire world did rallyaround us and around Israel and
supportive of Israel's war aims,how do we reach this low point,
this low ebb, 22 months later?
Is it strictly, like you hearin most Israeli TV studios, a

(24:07):
Hasbara problem, a messagingproblem, a PR problem, or does
it go to your mind much deeperthan that, leaving aside the
actual policy of the governmentand the conduct of the war.

Jeremy (24:18):
Look, I don't to be frank with you, after 40 years
in the foreign ministry, I donot believe in Hasbara.
I believe in adopting seriouspolicies that serve your
national security interests.
And I'm saying this from pureanalytical perspective, not a

(24:39):
political perspective, eitherfrom the left or the right.
And you cannot explain a policythat, to my mind, if I was an
ambassador today, I know what Iwould say.
I would say personally this iswhat I think, and any
coincidence between that and thegovernment policy would be
entirely coincidental.

(24:59):
And so, from that point of viewyou know, you you need to
understand the policy that isbeing pursued.
I think it is going to beabsolutely impossible to defend
a policy that you don't knowwhat it is, but definitely a
policy that in a sense advancesthe process of annexation of

(25:20):
gaza and the west bank and thenegation of any possibility of a
settlement with thePalestinians.
I just don't see how youexplain that.
And again, it's not because ofthe explanation for other
countries, rather it's for ourown, for our own national
security benefits.
You know, in the absence of anysort of political solution with

(25:42):
the Palestinians, we're justgliding into a one state reality
between the river and the sea,and you know I believe in a
Jewish democratic state and Isimply do not understand how
that can be maintained with.
You know, additional areas inwhich you have anywhere between

(26:03):
seven to eight millionPalestinians that either have
rights or don't have rights, andI think you understand.
You know where I'm coming from.
But having said that, wherewe've gotten here today, let's
not forget and sometimes we canbe critical of ourselves but

(26:23):
also the October 7th war wasinitiated, started by Hamas.
This was obviously the factthat we weren't prepared for it,
weren't there to block theattack was something that it
showed that deep in the psycheof Israel's mind, or at least in
the mind of the people who werein charge, that Hamas had been

(26:48):
deterred and they were lookingin a different direction.
We failed, there's no doubtabout it, but we were also
dealing with one of the mosthorrific attacks against
Israelis that killed around1,200 people on the day and took
, as you know, 250 hostages.

(27:08):
And you know, I franklycouldn't see a lot of the.
I didn't have the strength tosee the videos of the horrific
attacks because, in a way,israelis are still in trauma.
We're not in a post-traumasituation, and I wouldn't wish

(27:29):
it on anyone to have tonegotiate with such an
organization.
I mean, hamas did not go to thiswar in order to make peace with
Israel.
This wasn't a Sadat move tocross the canal in order to get
the Sinai back and have apolitical process.
This was a massive terrorattack.
If they could have gone all theway, even further north, they

(27:51):
would have done that.
This was also to undermine thePalestinian authority and show
that Hamas is the leader of thePalestinian people, which I
don't believe they are leader ofthe Palestinian people, which I
don't believe they are.
And thirdly, it was also toprevent any possibility of
normalization between Israel andSaudi Arabia, which would have

(28:13):
meant that Saudi Arabia wouldhave entered the picture, been
much more supportive of thePalestinian authority and
created a much stronger dynamicto have a Palestinian-Israeli
situation.
And again, I come to the pointthat if we come out of this,
after two years of war, out ofalmost 2,000 people that have

(28:35):
been killed, soldiers andcivilians, without a political
horizon, and not to mentionwhat's going on on the other
side, which is, you know,horizon, and not to mention
what's going on on the otherside, which is, you know I don't
diminish what's going on therein terms of its severity.
If we come out of this withoutany possibility of a political
horizon between Israel and thePalestinians, in my view, hamas

(28:59):
has won.
That is the victory.
That is what they sought.
They do not have a politicalagenda.
So you know, I think Israel hasgot a great deal of
responsibility in making theright decisions, taking the
right course of action.
But we need to also make aserious assessment of what we're

(29:21):
dealing with.
How do we move forward and howthe possible?
You know, up till now, we couldhave peace with Egypt and with
Jordan, and you have the AbrahamAccords and there wasn't a
final deal on the Palestinianissue.
That's changed.
That's changed and you knowwe're going to need to have a

(29:41):
very serious Palestiniancomponent if we want to maintain
a good relationship or a stablerelationship with Jordan and
Egypt.
And believe me, as somebodywho's worked very quietly and
effectively with both theJordanians and the Egyptians,
believe me the importance of ourrelationship with those two

(30:04):
countries cannot be overstated.
People will say it's a coldpiece or that.
Okay, it's one thing.
Believe me, there are thingsthat happen out of the public
eye that are very much morecrucial, plus the issue of the
Abraham Accords.
Issue of the Abraham Accords.
If you go towards, like I say,full annexation, the Abraham

(30:29):
Accords will not expand and Iworry about what?

Neri (30:35):
They may even shrink.

Jeremy (30:37):
They could even kind of regress, and I think these are
vital interests of how Israellives in an area and how we
begin to seize positiveopportunities and not lose them.
And not to mention the factthat if there is no solution
with the Palestinians, then Iguess we are condemning

(31:00):
ourselves to you know.
We are condemning ourselves toyou know, and not only us but
our children, to another futurewith more possible October 7th,
and this is something which Ifind impossible to accept.

Neri (31:15):
So I wanted to unpack a few things you just mentioned,
jeremy.
Number one and maybe ourlisteners and viewers are
yelling at their phones or theirscreens while you were saying
it, but you know if these issues, in terms of Israel's necessary
future trajectory, is soimportant for Israel's own

(31:37):
national security.
How is it that this governmentis pursuing the exact opposite
course?
Doesn't your former colleagueat the United Nations back in
the 1980s, bibi Netanyahu?
Doesn't he understand and seeall of this?
Is he blind to it?
Does he think that he can moldreality to his own purposes?
Is it strictly short-termpolitical considerations?

(31:57):
I mean, how do you explain thedecisions taken, and not taken
by this Israeli government overthe past?
It's now more than two years.

Jeremy (32:06):
As you said, I worked with Benjamin Netanyahu in the
past.
He was my ambassador in the UNand also I worked with him when
he was foreign minister, and Ialso worked with him on a range
of important issues when he wasprime minister that were in the
purview of my work in terms ofdisarmament issues with the Arab
world.

(32:26):
So I dealt with him on issuesof sensitivity and I always felt
that he saw the bigger pictureand was able to take into
account various strategicconsiderations way above any
political considerations, and Ithink that that was something

(32:50):
that I feel is in danger nowBecause, for example, in 2020,
there was the possibilityfloated of extending sovereignty
to the West Bank and in the end, there were many different
issues that were pursued.
The UAE ambassador fromWashington wrote an article

(33:14):
about the need to stop thisprocess and move towards
normalization with Israel and,as a result of that, we signed
the Abraham Accords.
I mean, netanyahu walked backfrom this, and whether it was a
threat that wouldn't bematerialized or not I don't know

(33:34):
, but in the end, the benefitsof not doing this were
absolutely vital and it was asigning ceremony which I
attended on the White House lawnwith the President of the
United States and Israel andrepresentative of the UAE and
the representative of Moroccoand Bahrain.
You know so.

(33:54):
To me that's.
You know that is what I wouldexpect of Prime Minister
Netanyahu to take stock of thepresent situation.
Now there's a lot ofspeculation I'm not an expert in
Israeli politics of how much heis beholding to these ministers
Ben-Gvir and Smotrich B'Tselel,smotrich these are people that

(34:18):
I do not admire and I'm beingvery, very diplomatic at this
point and, to my mind, arepushing very clearly into a
situation where we reoccupy thewhole of the Palestinian
territories and I just thinkthat is, again for the reasons
I've said before, is a disaster,and I would hope that in the

(34:42):
moment, before we make anyfurther decision of going
expanding the war in Gaza, thatthe prime minister will
reconsider this.
Have asked and addressedPresident Trump to try and get
him to engage with Netanyahu tostop the war, release the

(35:06):
hostages and move towards apolitical horizon.
This is something that I hopehe would still consider and move
towards, but I can't say I'moptimistic at this point.

Neri (35:23):
I was going to add.
One can only hope, but Ipersonally have seen no
indication that he's going toprepare the ground for some kind
of move like that.
Quite the opposite.
I think we're both aware thesedays that he's looking to, more
than likely, expand the militaryoffensive in Gaza.
To what end, I don't know.

Jeremy (35:46):
It could also be the possibility that you know things
are being said and things arebeing put out, because usually
you know governments whenthey're going to do something
like that, they do it, theydon't talk about them happening
and they obviously understandthis is not going to be, you
know, the most popular act byIsrael at this point in time.

(36:08):
So, you know, I live in hopethat maybe this is done in order
to maybe engage and if I couldjust add a very critical point I
mentioned it before because wetalked about how you know, the
issue of the hostages isimpacting us and I think that
you know it's so critical tobring this back front and center

(36:32):
because, you know, one of thethings I've been mentioning in
interviews with German, Frenchand British outlets is the need
not only to concentrate on thisissue of recognizing the
Palestinian state before theGeneral Assembly, but to appear

(36:54):
to be pressuring Israel to stopthe war.
If you're really interested instopping this war, the key
factor is going to be gettingout the hostages, and that these
European governments theAmericans and I'm sure they're
doing it should use everyelement of influence they have
on their Arab counterparts inorder to secure a release of all

(37:18):
the hostages in one go, as soonas possible.
In my opinion, opinion, thiswould be the game changer that
could stop this war, which wouldagain barring other extremist
opinions.
This would serve the broaderstrategic interest of israel, of
the united states and of theeuropean countries, plus our

(37:41):
arab neighbors.

Neri (37:44):
So I mean get out all the hostages as part of a deal to
end the war between Israel andHamas.
Because, you know, at the endof the day.

Jeremy (37:54):
What's happening now is that the you know the European
statement of the 30 countriesthat want to recognize, first of
all, you know, let's fastforward.
If they recognize the state ofPalestine, is that going to
change the reality on the ground?
No, it's a state of mind, it'snot a state that actually exists

(38:17):
and it's not going to stop thewar.
And again, the key factor hereis to remember it's not just a
factor of pressuring Israel,which is one element of the game
, but the other element, and themore crucial element, in my
opinion, is the issue ofhostages, because as long as
these hostages stay in Gazaunder Hamas's captivity,

(38:40):
especially after these picturesof emaciated Israeli hostages,
it's just, these are images, andI was ambassador to Germany and
you never, ever, thought you'dsee emaciated Israelis and Jews
in this fashion.
This is something, again, as Isaid, we're not out of the

(39:01):
trauma, we're not in apost-trauma situation, and this
is one of the things I thinkwill be critical to changing the
mindset in Israel to say, ok,if we get the hostages out,
that's it.
We need to move forward and weneed to move into a different
vector.

Neri (39:20):
OK, we'll be right back after this brief message.

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(40:19):
show notes.

Neri (40:21):
Absolutely and hopefully someone's listening, including
on the Israeli government side.
The other question thatoccurred to me, jeremy, you know
you've served all over, likeyou said, germany, washington
and the like.
If the Israeli government ispursuing a policy that you

(40:43):
personally may not be, shall wesay, fully supportive of,
whether this government,previous governments, whatever
government, how do you navigatethat as a professional diplomat,
especially a professionalIsraeli diplomat?
I mean, you go in there and youhave to, I imagine, defend
whatever it is the Israeligovernment just did or said.
How does one do that?

(41:04):
Defend whatever it is theIsraeli government just did or
said.

Jeremy (41:09):
How does one do that?
Well, up till now, as long as Iwas in the foreign ministry
till April of 2022, I was ableto basically, you know, deal
with the policy of thegovernment of Israel and able to
understand it.
It was a policy whether I likedit or not, was pretty clear in
different elements and therewere, frankly, times that I said

(41:30):
, look, my personal opinion issuch and such Because, look, the
truth is, when you're anambassador, you have to maintain
your credibility and if you'rejust going to be an ambassador
that recites, you knowites, thegovernment line that people see
in the press and officialstatements, in the end people
aren't going to talk to you andyou don't say things in order to

(41:53):
make people like you.
You say things because you needto analyze aspects of the
dilemmas we face, of thechallenges we face, that they
don't necessarily always see.
So I always try to take anemphasis on the analysis and not
just on the policy, and I thinkpeople appreciated that and I

(42:16):
think that's what we need.
Now.
Our ambassadors are in a verydifficult situation because, as
I said, the policy that peoplesee are growing efforts to annex
the territories, as opposed toa serious Israeli at least
declared desire to move towardsa Palestinian-Israeli political

(42:39):
settlement and that's why Ithink that I think it's going to
be an incredibly difficultsituation for the ambassadors.
I've seen some interviews withvarious officials from the
government abroad which havebeen frankly disastrous, and you
know, it's just we're look,when you're on the battlefield,

(43:03):
you need guns, you need F-35s,you need every form of military
equipment in order to defendyourselves and whatever.
When you're in the diplomaticcontext, you need tools, you
need diplomatic tools.
You need to fight with words,with policies, with ideas, with

(43:27):
visions.
And the truth is our diplomacynot out of fault for the Foreign
Service of Israel, but out offault for the government that
doesn't provide a coherentpolicy.
We're just simply not on theplaying field and that situation
is virtually impossible, bothfor Israel and also for

(43:48):
diplomats abroad.

Neri (43:51):
So you beat me to my next question, jeremy Israeli
diplomacy.
Again, I'm not going to use theword hasbara, which you don't
like, we've established that butin terms of just the craft of
diplomacy, the craft ofstrategic communications with
the world and I'm obviouslybiased, but with the foreign
media, right From where I sit,from my vantage point, to use

(44:16):
your analogy, it's like bringinga rusty knife to a ballistic
missile fight.
That Israel is either, I don'twant to say on purpose, but even
just kind of professionalmalpractice.
They're not equipping theirpeople to go and fight that
battle in the global informationspace.

(44:40):
Now my question to you, assomeone who has seen it from the
inside why is that?
Why is Israel so poorlyequipping its people to fight
that fight?

Jeremy (44:51):
I wish I could answer that I probably could, but I
would feel awkward aboutcriticizing the previous
organization which I worked forfor over 40 years.
And still, I was very lucky tohave an amazingly interesting
career and be involved fromeverything from peace

(45:16):
negotiations with the Egyptiansto work with the Jordanians on
sensitive issues and also onfirst contacts with the Gulf,
with the Emirates, with the UAEin 1994, dealing with Iran,
nuclear issues, etc.
Etc.
And I was incredibly.

(45:37):
But you know, for that you needto have, you need leadership
and you need vision.
And again, I can't emphasizethat enough you need, you know,
the, the, the, the governmenthas to provide a vision that
people can relay, can reinforceand can use.

(46:02):
You know, in all of thesedifferent media.
Well, again, don't get me wrong, I think Hasbara is important,
but it's simply not a substitutefor policy.
You know you can't not have apolicy, bomb Gaza to smithereens
and expect it just to explainitself, not going to happen, and

(46:25):
that's why, in the end, youhave to find, think of a better
solution.
But look, I, you know there'sone thing, for example, as we
I'm also thinking about whathappened recently with Iran
we're in a 12-day war with Iranand after everything, with all

(46:45):
the situation that was happening, israel decided to take action
against Iran and I think it'simportant to note that.
You could have seen at thatpoint, you know, given the
overall situation, the tsunamiand everything else, that Israel

(47:06):
would have been condemned inthe Security Council, condemned
here, condemned there.
Interesting that theinternational reaction was
actually more understanding andit was actually coming in the
wake of the border governors, ofthe IAEA in Vienna, the UN
watchdog on nuclear affairs thathad a very tough decision

(47:29):
against Iran, and even theAmerican, british, french and
German saying policy of Iran hasbeen one of deception,
obfuscation, obstruction andconcealment, very tough words
which you don't always hear.
And so you know I was interested.
I mean the action against Iran,I think, has been important.

(47:53):
It might have been chosen to bedone at a different time, but
let's not get into that.
But again, the reaction numberone.
The reaction was actually notnegative.
Number two in that situation,ambassadors have clear talking
points and ability to be able toexplain why you're doing this

(48:16):
against a country that hastotally ignored its obligations
under the non-proliferationtreaty, continued to enrich
uranium way above levels neededfor civilian purposes and
continued to develop advancedballistic missiles and also

(48:37):
proliferate these to theirclients in the area.
So you had a framework in whichyou could talk and you could
present the issues, I think, ina favorable way.
And that's a good example.
Now, if I could take that onestep further.
And we diplomacy today is notjust crucial vis-a-vis Gaza, the

(49:01):
West Bank, our relations withEgypt and Jordan and with the
Abraham Accords.
It's also vital because of Iran.
Now we, we did what we did, theAmericans joined the attack on
Iran, but but we're still notbeyond the point where we don't

(49:22):
have to worry about Iran anymore.

Neri (49:25):
So we're going to get to Iran in just a minute.
Trust me, jeremy, we're goingto deploy your expertise on that
issue.
You were diplomatic because youare a diplomat.
I'll be less diplomatic becauseI'm not a diplomat.
People don't know this, becausewhy would they?
Israel, ie, the primeminister's office, doesn't have

(49:46):
a foreign spokesman other thanthe IDF, other than the military
, which is both shocking and notshocking, and I think also,
from what I've been toldrelative to previous Israeli

(50:06):
governments, was not the case,right?
So this is par for the courseunder Prime Minister Netanyahu,
and Netanyahu has been PrimeMinister for many years, pretty
much as long as I've been doingthis, and I think that also
explains at least a bit of whyIsrael is losing globally.

Jeremy (50:28):
Yeah, I can't disagree with you.
It's actually weird because,you know, over the last few days
I'm being approached by so manymedia outlets, you know, from
all over the place, from Indiathrough to Europe, through to
America, and it's quite.
You know, I feel almost.
You know one is filling a void,which is clearly there, because

(50:48):
people don't want to have aHasbara conversation.
They want to understand whatthe Israeli mind is thinking
about, what the Israeli mind isthinking about.
And while I can't justify it,at least I can try and explain
it.
And, you know, unwrap it as yousay, unpack it as much to the
best of my ability.
But you know, as I said, I'm aretired ambassador and not an

(51:13):
official spokesman.

Neri (51:15):
Right, which is why we've seen, really from the first days
of the war, even up until now,you have kind of unofficial
ambassadors of Israel,influencers, people who have
taken it upon themselves to tryto fill that void.
So it's, I guess, anunfortunate state of affairs,
because it should be a Israeliofficial in a suit and not a

(51:36):
uniform getting up there andexplaining Israelrael's policy
to the world absolutely.

Jeremy (51:40):
And again, I think it's one of the things like watching
israeli television over thelast year and a half and I I I'm
trying to watch as little aspossible it's like make note
that most of the spokesmen onall these panels are generals
and, uh, people from you know,whether intelligence background
or anything, and you knowdiplomacy has made look, even

(52:04):
again, you don't you want totalk later about iran, but you
know is the diplomacy of theforeign ministry over the last
30, 40 years has dealt withvital strategic issues from from
of the highest order, anddiplomacy is a vital tool in
dealing with all of thedifferent challenges that we
face.

(52:24):
And that's one of the reasonswhy you can't just think
militarily and you know, in away, you know we can win.
We have a kind of like apattern where we win the war but
we lose the peace, and that iswhy it happens, because we don't
employ and give enoughimportance to diplomatic tools

(52:47):
and diplomatic thinking Right.

Neri (52:51):
So that's a good transition to my next question,
jeremy, and it's one on manypeople's minds.
That's a good transition to mynext question, jeremy, and it's
one on many people's minds,given the diplomatic tsunami in

(53:11):
Israel's current internationalstanding it is kind of a
temporary state of being whichwill kind of dissipate if and
when the Gaza war ends thatthere's going to be a longer
tail and more permanent damagevis-a-vis people's perception of
Israel around the world.
The brand of Israel,anti-israel sentiment I don't
want to say kind of anti-Jewishsentiment, but just let's keep
it on anti-Israel sentiment Doyou think it'll be?
It'll have lasting damage, whatwe've seen now in recent months

(53:32):
.

Jeremy (53:32):
I think very clearly that what happens in the coming
hours and days regarding thedecision of the government
either to expand the war in Gazaor not and to move towards
stabilization of the situation,as I've suggested, I think
that's going to be critical inanswering your question and I

(53:53):
think that if we don't see thismove to stopping the war, then I
think this process will onlyget much worse.
And again, I don't think it's anirreversible process.
I think we can impact it.
I think obviously the Israeligovernment can curtail a lot of

(54:18):
these pressures.
They can address the issues ofconcern that countries have said
very clearly, whether in termsof the humanitarian situation in
Gaza or other aspects of thispresent situation.
So I think we can reverse it.

(54:38):
But again, it needs a veryresolute Israeli government to
take stock of the overallsituation and to make the right
decisions.
And it also means that we needour partners now not to
concentrate on issues which, inmy mind, are less important,
like the issue of recognition,and concentrate on actually

(55:02):
doing something which can reallytake away the justification for
any continuation of the war, iefreeing the hostages.

Neri (55:10):
Gotcha Well understood, but I have to posit the
counterfactual or the naturalfollow-up question, jeremy If
the Israeli government makes thequote of Iran, and how Britain
and France are going to be socritical in the possibility of

(55:44):
snapping back sanctions beforeOctober on Iran.

Jeremy (55:49):
If you don't do it by October, you've lost that option
number one.
Number two I'm worried aboutvarious measures that are being
floated in the context of theEuropean Union in which they
want to reassess the associationagreement between Israel and
the EU.
Let's not forget, the EuropeanUnion is one of, is not the most

(56:12):
important, trading partner forIsrael, and, and one of the main
countries that is stoppingthese calls either for changing
the association agreement orchanging or even adopting an
arms embargo vis-a-vis Israel isGermany.
Germany has been very staunchin making its positions known

(56:35):
privately, even if it's criticalof Israel, rather than taking
steps that can isolate Israel.
Another factor in the contextof Europe is, for example,
mention has been made of theHorizon Programme 2020, which is
, as ambassador in Germany weworked very closely with the
Germans in order to upgradeIsrael's partnership.

(56:58):
This is one of the mostimportant scientific
collaborative organizations inthe world.
It's something that hasbenefited Israeli technology in
a very scientific infrastructurein a very broad sense, and I'm
not just talking about billionsof dollars, but I'm talking

(57:19):
about knowledge, and it's notjust a one-way street of us
getting help from Europe, butalso how we contribute as the
startup nation to the Europeanexpertise in these areas, to the
European expertise in theseareas.
So those things are worrying meand also the fact, as I said

(57:40):
before, we are in a situationwith the British and the French
and instead of engaging them andbringing down the flames, as it
were, these are two members ofthe UN Security Council and if
they go through with theirdecision to recognize the state

(58:00):
of Palestine, this could come tothe Security Council, and then
we would be dependent also onwhether the Americans will veto
or not.
And I'm sure, an expert of theUnited States, you will know to
predict exactly how PresidentTrump will decide.

(58:20):
You know, I hope and I want tobe confident that he will
support Israel.
But OK, I'm just saying theseare things.
This is a process which can getvery bad in many different
directions.
Not only to mention the areasof sport, collaboration,

(58:42):
israelis going abroad.
All of a sudden I hear an operais not coming to Israel.
It's taking Israel off the list.
Cultural exchanges, youthexchanges you name the different
areas of cooperation that acountry has, and we have many.

(59:05):
In fact.
These are areas which could bevery badly affected.
And just coming down to thefact of an Israeli going abroad
and not being allowed in acertain restaurant or in a
certain hotel, again, these arethings that can happen.
And again, I wouldn't changenational security policy of

(59:27):
Israel that I believe isimportant and crucial for our
security.
But, on the other hand, youknow we have to take into
account these factors.
We live in a global world.
No man and no country is anisland and we need to live in
this, in this world israel does.

Neri (59:47):
Uh, from the very beginning right, we wanted to be
a part of the world, a nationintegrated into the world and
not isolated, and certainly nota pariah.
But obviously, as you laid out,jeremy, the cost and the price
of continuing and even possiblyexpanding the war grow with each

(01:00:08):
passing day.
The benefit not not clear?
Not clear to my mind, not clearto many people's minds,
especially given the fact thatthere are still 50 hostages, 20
of whom are living still in Gaza.

Jeremy (01:00:23):
Final question Before I say that there's also the other
factor of if we do continue thewar in Gaza is the amount of
how many more soldiers are goingto be killed.
Amount of how many moresoldiers are going to be killed.
That's one of the reasons why Iwould have stopped the war and
not introduced five divisionsinto Gaza that become targets in

(01:00:46):
the shooting range for Hamas,and that's one of the things
that worries me a lot, becauseyou need to have a clear vision
of what you want to do if you'regoing to put our soldiers in
harm's way.
And losing three, five, sevensoldiers and a number of others
that have been killed over thisperiod of time is again.

(01:01:09):
It's a trauma we have to getout of.

Neri (01:01:14):
Right.
I mean it's more of the cost ofcontinuing with the war.
It almost goes without saying.
But yes, not just the hostages,but also the Israeli soldiers,
not to mention Palestiniancivilians.
On the other side, on and onand on, jeremy, in your area of

(01:01:40):
special expertise, iran so weteased it a little bit you
mentioned the potential snapbacksanctions to be maybe
introduced at the UN in October,but big picture coming out of
the 12-day war in June betweenIsrael and Iran.
I mean, how do you assess thecurrent state of the Iranian
nuclear program and what are welooking at potentially, either
militarily or, more likely,diplomatically, in the months

(01:02:02):
ahead to hopefully fully resolvethis problem set as the experts
call it?

Jeremy (01:02:09):
Okay.
Well, I see this as a verycrucial time, not only because
of the two months before itwould be possible to snap back
the sanctions according toSecurity Council Resolution 2231
.
It is also a crucial timebecause we don't know the exact

(01:02:29):
extent of damage that was madeto the Iranian capabilities
during the 12-day war.
Now, I would assume that afterthe bombing of the B-2s in
Isfahan, and also Fordow andNatanz and Awa military actions

(01:02:52):
against these facilities, thatserious damage was done to the
program.
Now to what extent does?
How do you define seriousdamage?
Do you have a clearintelligence picture of 408
kilos of uranium enriched to 60percent?
I don't know what has happenedand there are different opinions

(01:03:16):
.
Know what has happened andtheir different opinions.
Some Americans have said thatit has been destroyed.
The IAEA have said that it wasremoved and then the American
intelligence said well, maybe wehave been able to put back the
program by one to two years.
Do we know what's the level ofthe advanced centrifuges and the

(01:03:37):
capability of Iran to producethem?
Do we know what's happeningwith their weaponization efforts
?
Also, given the fact that onceyou have enriched uranium to 60%
and if you still have advancedcentrifuges, you could and also
have weaponization capabilities,you could move very quickly to

(01:03:59):
an operative nuclear device, andthe fact that there are no
inspections now in Iran, this isthe time to have that.
Israel should insist and evenreally make this a major point
with the American administration.
We need to have an agreement, arenewed agreement that America

(01:04:20):
should lead with Iran thatprevents enrichment on Iranian
soil, prevents production ofadvanced centrifuges and also
curtails the Iranian missileprogram, which has become very
advanced and despite the factthat we intercepted many Iranian
missiles.
There were missiles that gotthrough and of a more

(01:04:42):
sophisticated nature that didcreate a lot of damage, not to
mention 30 or so Israelis thatwere killed, and also to bring
about the possibility of, youknow, clear, intrusive
inspections by the IAEA in Iranon the various sites.
But at the end of the day, we donot have a clear intelligence

(01:05:04):
picture of what capabilitieshave remained in the Iranian
hands and as long as we don'thave that picture, we cannot
assume that we have succeeded indestroying the Iranian nuclear
program or its missilecapabilities.
And that is why I think this isa critical time to insist on a

(01:05:25):
renewed agreement, using theleverage of snapback of
sanctions to bring Iran to thenegotiation table.
By the way, even Vladimir Putin, the way even Vladimir Putin,
there were reports that he evensupports the fact that there
would be no enrichment onuranium soil on Iranians, no
enrichment of uranium onIranians.

(01:05:50):
So I think this is a time wherewe have leverage still on Iran,
but you need to use it.
And right now the presentsituation is not optimal for
using that diplomacy on one ofthe key strategic issues that
Israel faces.
That I even would say, you know, far outweigh Hamas as a threat

(01:06:12):
.

Neri (01:06:19):
But that's my take on it, and do you think there's a high
or low probability that theIranians will be willing to
enter into renewed negotiationsand to cut a new deal after the?

Jeremy (01:06:31):
Iranians will be happy to have a conversation with the
Americans, with the Europeans,for the next six years and do
whatever and to give a sensethat they're being serious,
they're listening, they're beingmoderate, but they don't have
all the cards.
And after we did what we did,they threatened to leave the NPT

(01:06:54):
, to blockade the Strait ofHormuz, to attack American
targets and in the end there wasthis kind of like Hollywood
production of a missile attackon Qatar that was kind of pretty
much foiled completely.
You know the Iranians listen.

(01:07:17):
There hasn't been regime changein Iran, but in my opinion,
Iran has come out of thisconflict with Israel a changed
country.
It's gone through very seriouschallenges.
It's lost a lot of its assets,its capabilities have been
severely impaired, and that'ssomething we should take into

(01:07:39):
account.
We have at this point and it'snot going to be for an endless
amount of time we have seriousdiplomatic leverage and all I'm
saying is let's use it.

Neri (01:07:51):
Very interesting, Jeremy.
We're going to have to leave itthere.
We could continue on just aboutIran for another half an hour,
but we won't.
Thank you so much for yourinsights and let's hope that the
Israeli government is listeningand that it chooses the wise
and correct course in Gaza andobviously, as we've talked about
over the past hour, widerreverberations beyond Gaza.

(01:08:13):
So we can only hope.
But thank you, Jeremy.

Jeremy (01:08:17):
Thank you, it's been a pleasure, my pleasure.

Neri (01:08:20):
Okay, thanks again to Jeremy Izakarov for his generous
time and insights.
Also, a special thanks to ourproducer, jacob Gilman, and to
all of you who support IsraelPolicy Forum's work.
Do consider making a donationto Israel Policy Forum so you
can keep being a credible sourceof analysis and ideas on issues
such as these that we all caredeeply about, including this
podcast.
And, most importantly, thankyou for listening.