October 9, 2025 • 58 mins
Note: This episode of Israel Policy Pod is an audio recording of a webinar Israel Policy Forum hosted today on Zoom. Yesterday, President Trump announced that Israel and Hamas have agreed to the first phase of a deal to end the war in Gaza, which will reportedly see all hostages freed in the coming days. In this Israel Policy Briefing, Chief Policy Officer Michael Koplow, Washington Managing Director and Senior Policy Analyst Rachel Brandenburg, Israel Fellow Nimrod Novik, and Policy Advisor Neri Zilber shed light on the factors that contributed to this diplomatic breakthrough, the contours of the reported agreement, what we can expect to see in Gaza in the coming weeks, and the impact of the deal for both Israelis and Palestinians.
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Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
SPEAKER_01 (00:14):
Hello, everyone.
Thank you so much for joiningus.
I'm David Halperin, CEO ofIsrael Policy Forum, and
appreciate your joining us onthis momentous and hopeful day.
734 days after Hamas's horrificassault on Israeli communities
on October 7, 2023, it appearswe have a deal, a deal at least
(00:39):
to see the Israeli hostages whohave been held in captivity by
Hamas in the Gaza Strip to bereleased in return for at least
the beginning of what could leadto a sustained end to this Gaza
war.
I want to thank you all forjoining us, where today we'll
(01:00):
have a chance to unpack thelatest developments, what
actually has happened, what doesit mean, and what might we
expect upcoming.
I will be joined by mycolleagues.
Throughout this conversation, Iencourage you to ask questions.
There will not be a QA session.
I encourage you to use the QAfunction to type your questions
(01:24):
at any moment in time.
I will try to get to as manyquestions throughout our
conversation as possible.
I want to thank all of those whoare joining us either on our
live stream or uh via recording.
With us is from Israel, with usis Neri Zilber, Israel Policy
Forum uh Policy Advisor, and ofcourse host of our podcast,
(01:48):
Israel Policy Pod.
Neri is an independentjournalist, regular, regular
contributor, reporter for theFinancial Times.
Uh, and so pleased, Neri, tohave you uh have you with us.
We're also joined by NimrodNovik, Israel Policy Forum
Distinguished Fellow, longtimeadvisor to the late uh uh
(02:09):
president and prime ministerShimon Perez, um, who has a
regular dialogue with colleaguesin the Arab world and will want
to unpack uh with Nimrod howthis is uh shaking out in the
regional contributions.
Uh and we're also thrilled tohave with us our colleagues from
Washington, uh RachelBrandenburg, our Washington
Managing Director and SeniorPolicy Analyst, and Michael
(02:30):
Koplau, our chief policyofficer.
It's a big panel, but reallythis is a conversation amongst
our team.
And as I was mentioning in thepre-call just a moment ago, it's
actually the first time thatwe've had a chance to all talk
about this momentous uh moment.
So uh I'm I'm eager to have thisuh public conversation in real
time and hear what you allthink.
(02:52):
And Neri, I want to start withyou.
Can you first just walk usthrough what is this agreement?
How did we get here in recentdays, and what should we expect
in the days to come?
SPEAKER_03 (03:05):
Sure thing, David.
Uh well, first of all, I'mhonored uh to be with you and
all of our colleagues, uh, alongwith all the uh watchers and
hopefully listeners in future.
Uh, but really uh a momentousday.
And we said this on, I believe,last week's uh webinarslash
podcast.
Uh, you know, a great day forcivilization and uh everyone
here in Israel and Gaza and theMiddle East.
(03:26):
But I think today is actuallythat's true.
Uh there was a just a surge ofoptimism overnight and this
morning in Israel, uh, a realsense of hope for the first time
in a long time that uh thehostages at least were coming
home, and like you said, apotential uh sliver of hope that
this war will come to an end.
Uh but in terms of the brasstax, I think we have to be clear
about what was agreed today inSharm al-Sheikh Egypt and what
(03:49):
the Israeli government is set toapprove uh in short order here
in Israel, uh, and what wasn'tagreed to.
Uh, we have to be clear what wasagreed to was really the first
stage of an overall uh deal uhput forward by Donald Trump uh a
week, week or so ago.
Uh and this first deal, firststage of the deal is really a
(04:09):
ceasefire for hostage andprisoner release.
Uh uh i.e., uh what is going tobe approved by the Israeli
government uh tonight isessentially a deal um that
commits Israel to halt thefighting.
It will pull back the IDF frommost of the population centers
in the Gaza Strip.
And in the coming days, see therelease of we hope all the 48
(04:32):
hostages uh still languishing inin captivity in Gaza, uh 20 of
whom are still believed to bealive, uh in return for nearly
2,000 Palestinian prisoners, uh250 of which are serving life
sentences for serious terror uhrelated offenses, uh i.e.
uh real blood on their hands.
So not a not a small price.
Uh but this is essentially thefirst stage uh of the deal uh
(04:54):
and should be completed, uh wehope, uh, in the coming days,
uh, with the added, shall wesay, news value of Donald Trump
himself likely coming to Israeluh on Sunday, uh at least to to
monitor developments, if not toactually greet the returning
hostages.
So that's what was agreed.
Uh what wasn't agreedessentially was everything else.
Uh the second stage of the ofthe overall deal, the 20-point
(05:16):
plan put forward by DonaldTrump, uh calls for a lot of
other longer-term objectives uhvis-a-vis Gaza and Hamas and
Israel, like Hamas'sdisarmament, like the
demilitarization of the GazaStrip, like if not the complete
withdrawal of the IDF from Gaza,then from pretty much all of it,
(05:36):
uh except for maybe the overallperimeter.
Um and coupled with uh settingup some future governance uh
system with international andPalestinian technocrats, I mean
essentially a new government forGaza that still needs to be
fleshed out and agreed to, uh,and on and on.
I mean, there is a lot of heavylifting to be done, uh, and
(05:57):
that's all in the second stage.
Uh, in terms for Israel, uh,that will be a heavy lift uh in
terms of actually agreeing tothis and agreeing and committing
itself to end the war.
Um to answer your question, Iknow we'll get into it, but what
happened?
Uh Donald Trump happened, truly.
Uh Donald Trump put the entireweight of the US presidency and
really his own US presidency uhon the various parties, but
(06:20):
especially on Prime MinisterBenjamin Tanyahu and on the
various Arab states, who Iassume uh my colleagues know
this better than I, appliedtheir own pressure on Hamas to
come to the table.
Uh so really uh Donald Trumphappened.
And I'll just say uh in terms ofwhat we may expect moving
forward, uh, I fully expect thecoming days to actually unfold
um relatively okay, with variouscaveats perhaps having to do
(06:43):
with um uh deceased Israelihostages uh whose bodies will
take a bit more time to find andrecover and rescue and bring
back for burial in Israel.
Uh but it's really two competingnarratives.
Uh, who do you want to believein terms of uh what happens
after the next few days in termsof this uh first stage and what
comes after?
Uh Benjamin Tanyahu, who says heand his you know various allies
(07:06):
here in Israel say, well, weonly agree to this first stage
and we'll see what happensafterwards, and there's no real
guarantee that we'll even get toagreement over the second stage.
And Hamas leader Khalil Haye,who said about two hours ago
that no, we got real guaranteesfrom the US and the various
other mediators, Egypt, Qatar,Turkey, and others, that this
(07:26):
will actually be a permanent endto the war.
So I leave it to uh to mycolleagues to decide who they
want to believe.
SPEAKER_01 (07:34):
Well, that's fascinating, Narry, because I I
think um it's it's very clearthat uh President Trump uh was
uh clearly a difference maker ingetting uh to this deal.
But we are seeing two otherkinds of narratives emerge.
One is that this deal happenedbecause Trump pressured Israel,
and another that this dealhappened because Trump was able
to pressure the regional playersto pressure Hamas.
(07:56):
Uh Nimrod, I wanted to bring youin to unpack this a little bit.
The question really is why now?
Uh how did, you know, why whydid it come about now?
And what role did Qatar, Egypt,and Turkey play in this 11th
hour in pressing Hamas toactually accept a deal, which,
as Neri outlined, doesn't have aguarantee there will be a phase
(08:18):
two?
SPEAKER_02 (08:20):
Um we uh are in the early months of the war, we
already heard uh from uhneighboring countries, uh
particularly those with uhsubstantial population like
Saudi Arabia, uh great concernthat what happens in Gaza
doesn't stay in Gaza.
(08:41):
Um and and their concern wastwofold.
One, the effect of the images,uh the visual images from Gaza
on their young population, andthey saw trends of
radicalization.
And the second one uh is theoverall impact of regional
instability on their veryambitious uh socioeconomic uh
(09:06):
transformation plans.
Uh, MBS's 2030, uh, and theothers have uh similar ones as
well.
Um as a result, um we saw themuh concerned with what's going
on, expressing that concern toWashington, and gradually, maybe
grudgingly, uh accepting a rolein the morning after when the
(09:30):
Biden administration was workingon it.
Uh but uh their impression wasthat the Biden administration
was doing a great job uh inplanning, uh, and a very poor
one in execution, uh, primarilybecause it was not willing to do
uh the one thing thateventually, in my judgment, uh
(09:51):
broke the ice, which was thepressure uh on uh on Netanyahu.
Um once Trump enters the WhiteHouse, and I will not presume to
talk about Trump from theAmerican perspective, but I'll
try from the original one.
Um once he entered the WhiteHouse, um, even before he
entered the White House, uh hedemonstrated uh what he can do.
(10:14):
And he took the uh Biden planand made it happen.
The ceasefire in January, um, onthe one hand.
On the other hand, um he uh gaveuh Netanyahu a pass uh when he
broke that deal in March, sixweeks later.
Um so they were looking at thepresident that can make it
happen.
(10:35):
Um, but the question is, willhe?
Um and when they were discussinguh how to pressure him, they
reached the conclusion that youdon't press President uh uh
Trump, you tempt him.
And you tempt him uh by uhproviding him the setting for a
win by doing yourself, byvolunteering to do much of the
(10:58):
heavy lifting.
Uh that coupled with his threatfrom the original perspective of
the uh Gaza Riviera and uhremoving two million uh Gazans
out of the strip and so on, gavebirth uh to the Egyptian
initiative that was embraced bythe Arab League in March.
And even more so and more uhambitious, uh the Saudi French
(11:23):
initiative uh of July that wasuh endorsed by 142 countries at
the UN uh in September.
Uh so they were uh signaling tohim uh that they are willing to
do much of the heavy lifting,they are willing to come into
Gaza, they are willing toshoulder responsibility to Gaza,
provided certain conditions aremet.
Now, all that uh got a boost, avery dramatic boost, with the
(11:48):
Israeli strike on Qatar.
And uh suddenly all thosecountries uh were watching
Israel becoming the originalbully, um uh striking Qatar with
Qatar with impunity.
Qatar, an ally of the UnitedStates with an American major
American base there.
Um and uh if Qatar can be uhtargeted, uh so can anyone
(12:11):
anyone else.
Um and that gave yet anotherboost to their willingness uh to
shoulder responsibility uh anddo the heavy lifting and tempt
the president uh to go for thefor the real deal.
So I think that uh uh from fromuh an Arab regional perspective,
(12:34):
uh that was the makings of theof the Trump uh effect.
Uh just one word on from anIsraeli perspective, the Trump
effect.
Uh and I think it started withZelensky.
Uh that is to say, um uh PrimeMinister Netanyahu uh prided
himself uh of having uh playedwith American presidents,
(12:54):
successive American presidents,uh unscarred.
Um and I think that the Zelenskyuh incident uh sent a certain
message to him.
Uh his eyes, of course, are onthe elections in Israel next
year.
Early next year, later nextyear, but next year.
Um and for that to happen, hecannot afford uh to have the
(13:17):
greatest friend Israel has everhad, uh, according to him, uh,
stand up and say uh Netanyahublew it.
Netanyahu uh is intransigent,Netanyahu is not uh is dragging
the war uh for his own purpose.
He couldn't afford that.
Um so uh between you knowbookended between Zelensky and
(13:39):
Netanyahu apologies to theQataris, uh also in the same uh
Oval Office, was thetransformation of Netanyahu in
terms of appreciating uh that hecannot play Trump.
SPEAKER_01 (13:51):
Rachel, I want to turn to you.
What what are the what are whatare the issues, what are the
questions that are sitting withyou right now that you think we
should be asking, and and whatare the developments that you
think we should be looking forin the days, uh if not weeks to
come?
SPEAKER_00 (14:06):
Thanks, David.
Well, Neri and Nimrod both bothalluded to a lot of these
things, and particularly thefact that as far as we know, all
that's been agreed is theinitial phase of this deal.
So hopefully we see everythinggo without a hitch between now.
And President Trump saidrecently, either Monday or
Tuesday, we're gonna see thehostages released.
Hopefully, we see all of thatcome to fruition without any
(14:27):
hangups or holdups or anybodyplaying messy games.
But then ostensibly, even harderwork begins to figure out the
details.
Neri outlined all the differentpieces of this deal that haven't
yet been agreed.
And the 20-point plan, whichI've said before was more like
20 principles, has uh somereally meaty meaty principles in
(14:47):
there that are gonna be bothvery difficult to figure out uh
what they look like, but evenmore difficult to figure out in
practice.
Who's responsible for governanceof Gaza?
Who is this international boardthat is going to govern Gaza, be
led by President Trump, includeTony Blair?
Who else is gonna be on thatboard?
What Palestinians are gonna beon that board?
(15:07):
What does a PA reform plan looklike?
And who is in the lead?
Who is financing any of this?
How do they go about thereconstruction of Gaza?
What is the plan for surginghumanitarian aid look like?
And how do we ensure that it'snot just food, but also shelter
and other basic humanitarianneeds?
Uh, what does the securityperimeter look like for Israel?
(15:29):
And then what is the long-termplan for Gaza and for the
pathway to a credible, or Ithink it was phrased a credible
pathway to a Palestinian statethat was mentioned in that 19th
point, if I remember correctly.
None of these have yet to beaddressed.
Uh, and as far as we know, thedetails have not been matched to
the principles.
(15:50):
Additionally, from what we'veseen over the last 10 months,
President Trump does not tend topay attention to any one thing
for very long.
So, right now, there'stremendous momentum behind him
and behind this plan.
And remarkably, pretty much theentire world is pushing, has
been pushing for this to happen.
Everyone praised the plan,supported it, even though it's
(16:10):
not really perfect for anyone.
Uh, but who's gonna keep his eyeon the ball?
Is he gonna keep attentive tothis?
Is it gonna be the weight of theUS president that's driving the
process forward to figure outthese details?
Is it gonna be the regional Arabstates that Nimrod was talking
about, who are both taking anactive role in the planning, but
also the implementation?
(16:31):
And uh, what role for theEuropeans who arguably have more
facility with some of thedetails that are required to go
about developing plans to matchthese principles, uh, and who's
gonna pay for it?
Um, and I would guess thatwhatever the answers to those
questions are, it's gonna be adifferent US role than we've
(16:53):
seen in the past, wheretraditionally diplomacy around
the Israeli-Palestinianconflict, around even the
Abraham Accords initially, um,were led by the United States.
And it was the United Statespulling the parties to the
table, the United States puttingpaper on the table.
I'm not sure this Americanadministration is gonna be the
ones doing either of thosethings.
(17:13):
So who will?
Who's gonna be in the lead forthis process?
SPEAKER_01 (17:18):
Uh Michael, I want to come around to you.
And um I I kind of have twoquestions for you, Michael.
One is is is what is your takeon, frankly, what Rachel just
mentioned, which is um Trump didsucceed, but can he sustain
momentum going forward?
And the second is of course, ourquestions are already flooding
(17:39):
in about what this means for theIsraeli coalition and for
Israeli politics.
And I wonder, Michael, if youcould help us uh help touch on
what you're watching in terms ofthe fallout on the Israeli side
as well.
SPEAKER_04 (17:50):
Sure.
So on the first, I agree withRachel.
The the hard part is gonna comeafter Monday or Tuesday when the
hostages come home, and theneverybody has to pivot to the
next thing.
And getting the hostages backand getting the end of the war,
though those are for PresidentTrump the big accomplishments.
(18:11):
You know, I think he said heeven said something earlier
today about you know that that'sgonna happen, and then we'll
we'll see what comes after that.
So it's not just about keepinghis attention focused, it's
keeping everybody's attentionfocused and marshaling all the
different actors that now haveto come to bear on making sure
that Gaza doesn't just go backto what it was before.
(18:34):
And that's definitely adifficult task when you have so
many spoilers out there.
You know, Hamas is gonna want topaint this as a victory, and
they're presumably going to, andhopefully going to give up all
the hostages in a few days.
And so the only way for them topaint this as a victory is to
wreck the next phase.
The same goes on the Israeliside, where Itamar Ben Grim
(18:57):
Batalas Motrich are going tovote against this deal in the
cabinet today, and they toodon't want to see an end to the
war and the pullout of the IDFfrom Gaza.
So keeping on top of all of thevarious actors that are going to
try and make sure that the nextphase doesn't get off the ground
(19:20):
is going to be difficult.
And as Rachel said, we'retalking about administration
that doesn't deal with thesethings in a traditional manner,
doesn't have the same type offoreign policy process, doesn't
have the same type of apparatusfor follow-through, quite
frankly.
And President Trump got thisdone basically through through
brute force, right?
He he wanted it done.
(19:41):
And so he put a plan out there,knowing that it was a plan that
had things that both sides hadcategorically ruled out.
After after Arab Arab statesapproved it, he then allowed the
Israelis to come in and justchange it.
And when the Arab statesobjected, he told them he didn't
care.
He was gonna he was gonna put itout anyway.
When Hamas responded with aqualified, very qualified yes,
(20:05):
and Netanyahu wanted to paint itas a rejection, Trump just said,
no, I'm gonna, I'm gonna paintit as a yes.
So he was able to bulldozeeverybody to get to this first
phase.
That's gonna be a lot harderafter this first phase.
And um, I hope he's successful,but uh and you know, let's let's
not mince words.
This first phase is a hugeaccomplishment.
People have been trying to getthis now for two years and it
(20:27):
wasn't done, including PresidentTrump himself, who I think
probably could have forced thisthrough in March when Israel
decided that it didn't want tomove to the next phase of the of
the January ceasefire.
But he decided now is the time,and he absolutely deserves all
the credit for it, uh includingsending Steve Woodkoff and Jared
(20:47):
Kushner to literally sit in theIsraeli cabinet meeting uh today
to make sure it gets approved.
But after after this phase,bulldozing everybody into the
next the next thing and the nextthing will be harder.
And so um he's gonna have toshow an inordinate degree of
focus that I don't think we'veseen from him up until this
(21:08):
point, and not just him, fromhis administration.
On the question of Israelipolitics, so it seems as if
Smutrich and Ben Vier are goingto jump through all sorts of
hoops to not leave thecoalition.
But it's hard for me to see howearly elections at this point
don't happen.
(21:29):
Uh if if they don't happen,there still has to be an
election a year from now.
And there's certainly a world inwhich the government can keep
things going for another year,and then it it falls based on
the uh based on the mandatorytimetable.
But you still have all theseissues out there.
You still have Smotrich andBangvir who are not happy, you
(21:49):
still have the Khari Diem, theultra-Orthodox, who want their
draft exemption, and I don'tthink they're getting it.
And you also have the fact thatNetanyahu at this point, he he
he knows the numbers.
They're they're not going tomagically recover for him so
much that he's that he is goingto win the next election
outright.
He's got to siphon off of just afew seats so that he can push
(22:12):
the current opposition block to60 or under without any Arab
parties.
Because if he does that, then hecan try to force a deadlock.
So he's only got to peel off acouple of seats to do that.
And waiting a year isn't the wayto do that.
The way to do that is, in my tomy mind, to take this deal and
to run on it and say, hey, look,I got the hostages back.
And guess what?
(22:33):
The IDF is still in Gaza.
And guess what?
The Palestinian Authority stillhas no real role.
And guess what?
We're not really gonna enterinto any sort of peace process
with the Palestinians.
And if he runs on that, heprobably, I shouldn't say
probably, he maybe can getanother one or two seats back to
his coalition from right-wingerswho have lost their patience
(22:53):
with him and try to force adeadlock.
So I think his best bet is totry to get to early elections.
You know, Nimrod said um earlynext year or later next year,
I'd be betting on early nextyear, and hope that that this
deal and the way that heportrays it and all the ways
that he's gonna try to make sureit doesn't move to the next
phases, run on that and see ifthat's enough to get him his
(23:16):
deadlock.
SPEAKER_01 (23:19):
And can he can he do that without uh running afield
of Trump's ire?
If Trump actually wants to seethis this advanced, I guess is
is will be the the question.
SPEAKER_04 (23:30):
Yeah, that that's the question.
And I I think this is inNetanyahu's favor in some ways
because it's not just aboutTrump's attention span, it's
about the fact that the nextphases do require more sustained
engagement than just putting outuh 20, effectively 20 bullet
points and telling everybodythat they have to say yes.
Uh and he and uh some of hisassociates are very practiced at
(23:54):
running circles around Americanadministrations and playing out
the clock and kicking the candown the road.
And uh I wouldn't bet againsthim being able to do that.
SPEAKER_01 (24:05):
Neri, I did want to ask there's a number of
questions in the chat about theterms of the uh hostage release
deal or the Palestinianprisoners to be released.
Um, questions about who arethese uh prisoners, what do we
know about the plan for therelease, and and what has been
the reaction response thus farinside Israel um to those uh to
(24:27):
to to that planned uh aspect ofthis deal.
SPEAKER_03 (24:31):
So it it won't go over uh that well publicly once
the names of like the reallyheavier uh life termers are
gonna come out.
Although I suspect, again, wedon't we don't know because it
hasn't been made public yet.
Some of the higher profileindividuals will not be part of
this deal.
Uh but you are still gonna get asizable number of um Marwan
(24:54):
Burgundy will not be part of thedeal.
Marwan Bargudy will not be partof the deal.
Um a few others will not be partof the deal, but some by
definition will have to be partof the deal.
Um again, it hasn't been madepublic, uh, but uh it's it's a
price that most of the Israelipublic is willing to pay.
Perhaps not uh Smotrich andBenvir themselves, but uh a
large majority of the Israelipublic.
(25:15):
So that's part of the 250 uh,shall we say, heavier
Palestinian prisoners that areset to be released.
Uh according to the terms of thedeal, by the way, uh they're
either going to be released toGaza or exiled outside of Israel
and not to the West Bank.
Uh that's uh a significant pointin and of itself.
And then the rest of uh the 1700Palestinian prisoners slash
(25:37):
detainees to be released are uhagain by definition those Gazans
who were picked up off thebattlefield of Gaza, but after
October 7th, i.e.
no one that actually took partin the October 7th massacre, uh
i.e.
not no Nukaba uh terrorists, andthat's also a significant point.
Uh and those 1700 will bereleased back to Gaza.
(26:00):
Um and that's uh I believe a fewhundred Palestinian um uh the
bodies of Palestinian uhprisoners also uh will be
released, uh, but not the Sinwarbrothers, uh to the best of my
information.
So again, that's that's theprice Israel will have to pay
initially in this first stage ofof the deal.
Um again, not Israel's mostfavorite uh uh action to take,
(26:22):
but a price most of this countryis willing to uh to pay uh to
get the hostages home.
SPEAKER_01 (26:28):
So uh uh Nimrod, I wanted to bring in uh Ben
Liebwood said asked a question,which uh he wrote, it remains
shocking to me that Hamas wouldreturn all hostages in one
tranche and eliminate one oftheir two sources of leverage
and power, the other being theirweapons.
Um, you know, I guess thequestion is if Hamas is not
(26:49):
getting these high profile uhprisoners released and um they
are removing their leverage,what changed in their
calculation?
Um what actually made them uhmake this decision um to
ultimately release the hostages?
SPEAKER_02 (27:05):
From everything we heard, um what used to be uh the
number one priority uh of Hamasuh under Sinwar um in this kind
of uh situation was uh releasinguh hostages.
I'm sorry, uh uh prisonersfreeing uh Palestinian
(27:26):
prisoners.
Uh there was a story of howcommitted he was to those who
stayed in in prison when he wasuh uh uh sent to Gaza after 23
years in Israeli prison.
Um from what we hear over thelast uh weeks, maybe even
months, uh since he's gone, um,the importance of that uh factor
(27:49):
uh is somewhat uh lesser, andorganizational survival uh is
far more important.
And for that to happen, um theyinsisted on guarantees, and we
all heard about it.
Uh we don't have the uh uhlanguage or format of what
guarantees they got, but evenwithin uh the uh uh Trump 20
(28:13):
points and an adjacent documentthat we all saw uh uh recently,
uh they have some of the uhguarantees that they need.
Uh one guarantee that they needis that if they go in exile, if
they decide to leave uh Gaza, uhthey get immunity.
And they got that uh when the UScommitted uh uh to Qatar that it
(28:38):
will not be attacked again, andwhen Israel undertook not to
attack again.
So Qatar is now a safe haven, uha foolproof safe haven uh for uh
Gaza terrorists, um, assuming uhthey are not involved in active
uh violence.
Uh so that's one.
(28:59):
The the second is end of war.
Um and from everything we heard,uh they received American
guarantees signed, uh, as wellas from Qatar, Egypt, and uh,
and Turkey.
Uh that that's it, that's theend of war.
Now Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey isnice, uh, but you US uh is is
(29:21):
far more uh significant.
Um so I think that what changedwas that Hamas military
capabilities have been sodegraded, uh its military
formations have been uhdemolished a year ago.
Uh its leadership uhdisappeared, was killed.
(29:44):
Uh first, second, and thirdlayer.
Uh and those remaining uh arenot the kind of powerful
leadership uh figures.
Uh, the ganking up of the Arabworld, and it was not just uh
the Three countries that we keepmentioning Egypt, Jordan, Egypt,
Qatar, and Turkey.
(30:06):
But also Saudi Arabia is there,and the UAE is there, and Jordan
is there.
It's a very powerful Arabconsensus.
And apparently they reached theconclusion that that's the best
they can get.
SPEAKER_01 (30:21):
What is the expectation around Hamas
disarmament?
I mean, clearly there's a lot ofskepticism that we're actually
going to see a process thatleads to full disarmament.
I know the Hamas response to uhthe deal made clear references
to their continued continuedrole in the future of the
(30:41):
Palestinian politics and thePalestinian National Project,
which I, of course, is not whatthe Israelis want to hear or or
or accept, let alone uh uh, ofcourse, BB has been opposed to
the Palestinian authoritiesreturn.
Um, so Nimrod, how how do you uhexpect this process to play out
in a way that would be uh in anyway uh acceptable?
SPEAKER_02 (31:02):
Well, assuming that the uh um the uh consensus of
pessimism about phase two uh inthis room uh proven is proven uh
overstated, and phase two doesget uh uh what uh launched.
Uh there was a lot of work doneuh primarily by Egypt, uh, but
(31:26):
uh Egypt was the driver, butthere were quite a few
passengers uh in the Arab worlduh that developed a two-phase
approach uh to uh Hamasdisarmament.
Uh in phase one, um uh theweapons are to be uh assembled
uh in uh deposits in Gaza underthe supervision of the so-called
(31:50):
Arab-Palestinian uh force thatis supposed to uh run security,
uh law and order, uh in thestrip in the interim phase.
Um in phase two, uh thoseweapons are to be exported to
Egypt, uh never to come back.
Um according to uh thoseinvolved, uh the Hamas public uh
(32:14):
posture on this um is not theprivate posture on this, uh, and
that uh they have Hamas consent,that if all else works in terms
of the morning after, the dayafter uh management, uh then uh
Hamas uh will not resist uh uhgiving up its strategic weapons.
(32:39):
Um to the question of whether itis uh confined uh to rockets and
missiles and uh RPGs, or does italso include the individual
Klachnikov?
They didn't go into those uhdetails, or at least they have
not shared it uh with with thirwith others.
Uh but uh the the principle isthere and it found expression in
(33:02):
the Saudi French initiative, umwhich calls for Hamas
disarmament, uh as well as uhthe Trump uh 20 points.
SPEAKER_01 (33:14):
Um Rachel, we we have a lot of questions about
whether this will enable theresumption of regional
diplomacy, Israel Saudinormalization, and the like.
But I wonder if you could speakhow, you know, what if any
impact does this have on whathas been happening between
Israel and Lebanon, betweenIsrael and Syria, between Israel
(33:34):
and Saudi, the sort of the widerregional picture and the ability
for the United States to engagein diplomacy?
Because as Donald Trump outlinedin the last couple of days, this
is not a hostage ceasefire deal,this is peace in the Middle
East, as he described.
This is uh this is uheverything.
Um what is your take on theregional opportunities?
SPEAKER_00 (33:54):
Yeah, I think he described it as the greatest day
in civilization.
I think Neri gave a nod to it inhis opening too.
Uh we may have a few months toyears to decades until we see uh
peace in all of our time, buthere's to hoping it moves fast.
I think for President Trump, hecertainly wants to continue
moving on to what we've longheard are his sort of grander
ambitions of expanding theAbraham Accords.
(34:16):
The Abraham Accords were hislegacy, they were his sort of
diplomatic baby.
Um, and in my assessment, one ofthe elements that really led to
the recent momentum to get tohis 20-point plan and to bring
everyone around the currentprocess was uh seeing a real
threat to the Abraham Accordswhen Israel was about to vote on
(34:38):
formal formally annexing theWest Bank and the UAE came out
and said, hey, this will notonly threaten the expansion of
the Abraham Accords, but itcould threaten current
agreements.
And then Saudi Arabia amplifiedthat.
Um, then the strikes, theIsraeli strikes in Doha led to
even greater unity among theGulf states around finding a
common way forward.
(34:59):
Uh, one of the things that'sbeen remarkable to me over the
past two years, and particularlyover the past year, have been
that the conversation aboutIsrael's Saudi normalization has
remained on the table.
Despite the war in Gaza, despitethe horrendous things that have
happened not only on October7th, but over the past six
(35:20):
months and the humanitariancrisis.
Nimrod talked about thechallenge that uh Arab leaders,
and particularly in the Gulf,have had with their populace,
the Arab street, sort ofsuddenly seeing images of
starving Gazans, of dyingchildren, of sort of the horrors
that have transpired in Gaza,uh, causing real domestic
(35:41):
challenges.
And I think there is a commonunderstanding that ultimately
greater regional integration,Israel's further integration
diplomatically, economically, inaddition to militarily, but a
lot of that has already beenhappening.
That will only lead to greaterstability.
And there is a real interest inregional stability for the sake
(36:02):
of their own domestic agendas.
Even more remarkable of the lastsix months has been the
processes that have begun withSyria and Lebanon.
And on all three of thesearenas, there is real opening at
the moment, but I think it'sgoing to take time.
And President Trump even seemedto understand when he spoke from
uh, was it Riyadh, Dubai?
(36:24):
I don't remember on his golftrip exactly where he was, but
he said, I still hope to seeSaudi Israel normalization
happen, but I understand theSaudis will need it to happen in
their own time.
Also, remarkably, we're not evena year into his administration.
So he still has time.
He still has time to get thisdeal, this initial deal done,
bring an end to the war, andthen begin the path toward uh
(36:47):
broader regional integration,whether it's Saudi Israel
normalization uh uh before theend of his term, or some sort of
Syria-Israel demilitarization,detente, diplomatic agreement
that comes sooner.
And in Lebanon, there really isa new government for the first
time in years, who are genuinelyinterested in not only
(37:11):
reclaiming their country fromHezbollah, but seemingly open to
a diplomatic process withIsrael.
None of this, I think, can beginin earnest until the war in Gaza
really comes to an end.
So hopefully we'll see thislatest initial deal come to
fruition on Monday.
And then along with everythingelse we've discussed, some of
(37:33):
this regional diplomacy cancommence again.
But there too, I think it's justthe beginning of reopening those
conversations, and it's stillgoing to take a little time to
see where they go.
SPEAKER_01 (37:42):
Just to follow up, Rachel, we had one question in
from Michael Rothstein thesimple question can Iran spoil
the Trump deal?
SPEAKER_00 (37:50):
Iran can spoil anything if they want to.
I don't think I neither thinkand I hope that we will not see
them spoil this initial phase.
Um just as the region wants tosee the war in Gaza end, nobody
wants to see another war withIran.
The Gulf states uh havedeveloped their own diplomatic
(38:12):
relationships with Iran, nobodywants to see a nuclear Iran, but
even less getting the constructwrong, even more, nobody wants
to see another round of war withIran.
So I think between the generalinterest in stability and the
real diminished capabilities oftheir proxies, there's not a ton
they can do to spoil the deal inthe near term.
(38:35):
That doesn't mean that theycan't reconstitute capabilities
in the medium term and figureout a way to spoil whatever
comes next in the forthcoming uhphases of this process.
SPEAKER_01 (38:45):
Yeah.
So, uh Michael, the last twoyears um of this war um has had
a profound impact on the natureof the US Israel relationship,
the views of Israel inside theUnited States.
Now that hopefully we are seeingthis come to a sustainable end
and the release of hostages andbeginning to rebuild from this
(39:07):
uh chapter, what are youwatching in terms of the
trajectory and the trends andthe future of US-Israel
relations?
SPEAKER_04 (39:17):
US Israel relations are going to shift.
There's there's no question tome about that.
It there we're seeing it on toomany different vectors.
Whether you look at electedofficials, where in the
Democratic Party, it's prettymuch now mainstream to be in
favor of some sort ofrestriction on security
assistance to Israel.
(39:39):
If you look at the RepublicanParty, uh, not as much the
politicians, but theinfluencers, for lack of a
better word, who are reallydriving MAGA culture, Tucker
Carlson and Steve Bannon andCandace Owens and uh and and a
whole host of others.
The relationship with Israel isis is being questioned.
(40:01):
And when you look at US publicopinion, in some ways that's
actually, I think, the the maybethe most impactful in the long
term because we now see pollsand it's not just one, it's it's
now pretty much any organizationthat does this, where for the
first time in the history ofpolling, people sympathize with
(40:23):
Palestinians more than theysympathize with Israelis.
For the first time in thehistory of the polling,
majorities of Americans want toend all assistance to Israel,
not place restrictions on it,but but end it.
We see pluralities of Americanswho think that Israel is
purposely killing civilians inGaza.
(40:46):
We see pluralities of Americans,and in one poll, actually, a
majority of Americans whobelieve that Israel is
committing genocide in Gaza.
These are not numbers that arejust going to stop with the end
of the war.
People now have imprinted ontheir in their minds a view of
what Israel is and how itbehaves and its value or lack of
(41:09):
value to the United States.
So the relationship is going toshift.
And I think it's going to bereally critical for policymakers
to understand the ways in whichit's going to shift and get
ahead of it.
Because insisting, as many havein the past, that the
(41:32):
relationship is absolutelyunshakable and unbreakable, I
don't think that that's trueanymore.
And relying on some of the oldtalking points uh about Israel
itself is also not going towork.
And just assuming that there'sgoing to be another 10-year MOU
with$3.8 billion a year or moreto Israel without it causing a
(41:56):
huge fight again in bothparties, I don't think that
that's a realistic assumptioneither.
So everybody's going to have torecalibrate.
And particularly for AmericanJewish organizations, including
ours, that support a strong U.S.
Israel relationship and um wantto see this relationship
continue at a high level,recognizing the importance of it
(42:18):
to both sides.
And also want to see a secureJewish democratic Israel,
leaving aside the particulars ofUS Israel relations, um,
American Jewish organizationsare gonna have to really think
long and hard about how theymake the case for Israel and to
not take things for granted thatthey always took for granted,
(42:38):
such as rock solid Americanpopular support almost no matter
what Israel does.
SPEAKER_01 (42:43):
Yeah, the end of the war does not necessarily mean to
end to the the trends that we'veseen.
SPEAKER_04 (42:48):
No.
SPEAKER_01 (42:48):
Um Neri, I did want to ask you this we've talked a
lot about Gaza, but there'snothing, as far as I understand,
about the West Bank.
I'm curious how the PA has beenresponding and if we should
anticipate, um, as has been inthe past, um, Netanyahu making
arrangements with far-rightcoalition partners to agree to
(43:11):
um one set of policies andessentially uh uh be compensated
with developments, whether thatbe settlements or or the like on
the West Bank.
I'm curious if we have anythinguh afoot of that nature or or
what you're watching in thatarena.
SPEAKER_03 (43:26):
Sure.
I mean, obviously all focus fora long time now has been on
Gaza, but the West Bank um, youknow, equally important and not
getting enough attention.
Uh look, the PalestinianAuthority and President uh Ahmud
Abbas, Abu Mazin, is is playingball like like every other
country in the region and cameout in support of the agreement
and uh ceasefire and enter thewar.
Uh and that's all well and good.
(43:47):
I think they will have tocalibrate their own steps in the
coming weeks and months uh aboutwhat they need to do to put
themselves in the best positionto play an active role in in
post-war Gaza um if if if andwhen we get to it.
Uh i.e.
uh genuine reforms uh that theycommitted to, by the way,
irrespective of this uh Gazadeal brokered by Trump, but even
(44:10):
as commitments to the French andthe Saudis as part of the
overall push uh a few weeks ago,uh who remembers now, uh for
recognition of Palestinianstatehood.
Uh that's all steps that AbuMazan committed to.
Uh we got word a few days ago,and I conferred it to be true,
that they they've started, shallwe say, an internal Fatah reform
process, uh bringing in peoplethat were uh kicked out and
(44:34):
physically and politicallyexiled, bringing them back into
the fold, uh that could infuture perhaps play a role uh in
in the Gaza Strip.
I think that's all for the good.
Uh I think uh promised electionsfor next year I think would go a
long way, uh, not only inbolstering the legitimacy of the
Palestinian Authority, butperhaps even uh working to hold
elections in Gaza as well, uh,and trying to coalesce uh the
(44:57):
Palestinian Authority um acrossboth territories.
That's again irrespective reallyof Israel and its own policies.
Uh to your second question,David, I expect the worst.
I expect the worst.
Um tried and true Netanyahuformula, uh divide and rule,
literally kind of divide uh theWest Bank from Gaza.
Uh if you're kind of propping upGaza on some level, you're
(45:20):
putting down the West Bank onanother level.
Uh and really people like BetzelSmotrich um have done a lot of
uh negative things on the WestBank, uh especially under cover
of the overall Gaza war.
Uh again, I don't I don't expectthat to to stop uh tomorrow if
there's a stop in the Gaza war.
Uh the only thing that may kindof slow it down or halt it uh is
(45:43):
Smotric and Benvere actuallyleaving the government, the
government being toppled, uhheading to snap elections, and
in future, uh a different uhIsraeli government.
Again, we can all hope.
Uh and by the way, going back towhat Michael laid out uh
previously, I I also think thatearly elections in the first
quarter of 2026 is a more likelyscenario than not.
(46:06):
Um I think Netanyahu took thatinto account when he was uh,
let's say, pushed and prodded byTrump into this agreement.
Uh the difference between sayMarch when he restarted the war
and now, uh many things, but A,he didn't bomb Iran just yet.
Um he hadn't yet taken over thevast, vast majority of the Gaza
(46:26):
Strip, uh, either to stay thereor to give it back.
Um and he wasn't entering anelection year anyway.
Right.
We're we've already entered intoan election year in Israel, and
so he has a lot less to lose interms of uh heading into
elections.
Uh, and he always likes tochoose the timing and the the
issues that he goes into anelection with.
Uh and so there are worse thingsto do than uh uh kind of tout
(46:50):
your achievements on thebattlefield over the past two
years and get all the hostagesback, and oh, by the way, uh
have the most powerful man uh inthe world uh you know, giving a
speech in the Knesset, toutinghow great your diplomatic and
political prowess is, which islikely to happen on Sunday.
SPEAKER_01 (47:07):
All very good points.
Um, I want to bring in aquestion from Howard Lafranchi,
one of Neri's old colleagues atChristian Science Monitor, uh,
for for Nimrod, which comes backto this question of disarmament,
which is how to get around, ashe describes, the chicken and
egg dilemma of Hamas needing todisarm uh and the guarantees
that Hamas wants first thatIsrael will not restart the war.
SPEAKER_02 (47:32):
Look, if we want to be optimistic and and assume for
a minute uh that uh phase two ofthe plan uh gets going.
Um much work has been done.
Um I will even backtrack a bit.
Uh much of what we hear in theSaudi um uh French plan, uh in
(47:54):
the Trump 20 plans, uh in thepreviously Egyptian plan, uh all
draw on very thorough staff workthat was done on the subject uh
during the last year of theBiden administration.
Um and a lot of work was done uhon uh on uh DDR uh as well as on
(48:15):
all other elements uh of theplan to the point of even the
real-time communicationdeconflicting uh the terms of
engagement of the uh Israeliphasing out and the third party
force phasing in.
How do you prevent uh friction?
(48:37):
And how what does it mean thatyou respect Israel's right of
self-defer defense when Israelis out and someone else is in?
Yeah, all this was worked out.
SPEAKER_01 (48:47):
No, sorry, I was just gonna jump in to explain
DDR to the audience.
SPEAKER_02 (48:51):
Um it's uh uh decommissioning uh of weapons
and and how do you uh integrateum former Hamas uh employees uh
into the new structure so youdon't have end up uh in a uh
Iraqi situation uh where peoplewere left with no uh source of
(49:15):
income and ended up with ISIS.
SPEAKER_01 (49:17):
I apologize.
SPEAKER_02 (49:18):
Um yeah.
Um so uh the the the the um andand uh on top of it, I'm sorry I
forgot, forgot to mention itearlier, a lot of work was done
uh uh by the uh um uh Tony Blairteam, um, and the plan that they
(49:42):
have uh put together also drawson previous work done by others.
Um so the the mechanics of it uhand the politics of it uh will
work um should the two partiesplay ball.
Um if indeed we're gonna have uhforces uh from uh five uh six
(50:09):
Arab countries plus Indonesia,uh Italy and France just
announced that they are willingto contribute their forces to
it.
Um if you're gonna have thebillions of dollars from the
Saudis and the Emiratis and theQataris and the others, uh if
all that mechanism of uh of a umuh Palestinian um indigenous um
(50:31):
governance by experts uhoverseen by uh the World Peace
uh Institute uh chaired by uhPresident Trump and uh managed
by uh Tony Blair.
If all that comes to fruition,um I think that uh squaring uh
(50:53):
uh the uh commitment of Israeli,Israel, uh Israel will have less
incentive uh to uh resume thewar, uh and uh and Hamas will
have little option uh but uh toaccept.
Uh but uh I don't want to saythat this is in fantasy land,
uh, because we saw uh PresidentTrump uh within a week uh like a
(51:16):
powerful uh particlesaccelerator uh forcing everybody
uh to move at the hypersonicspeed and produce an agreement
that most of us assumed wasunreachable.
So who knows?
SPEAKER_01 (51:30):
I'm actually curious, Rachel, your take on
this as well, because you havethis experience working at the
Pentagon and uh post uh Iraq andISIS challenge and and and
recovering uh territory that hasreally been decimated and
thinking about um how do yourecover from these zones of
conflict.
What are the sort of lessonslearned that should be brought
(51:53):
into in this conversation?
SPEAKER_00 (51:57):
There are a lot of comparisons, but a whole lot
more differences.
Um I think the first one is ittakes time and it takes
sustained attention, and ittakes a whole lot of actors
committing to continue growingin the same direction for quite
a while.
Uh in the case of Iraq, you hadthe UN at the center in a way
that is different from now.
(52:19):
And there were entities, uh,including particularly the UN,
that followed very standardprocedures of sort of how do you
go from conflict status toreconstruction?
There's an initial stabilizationphase, then there's sort of the,
you know, how do you get peopleto a point where they can live
day to day with the basic, basicneeds, and then the
(52:39):
infrastructure enough that youcan reconstitute your life in
the medium term, and then sortof what does the economy look
like in all of those things.
Um disarmament is even harder.
Uh I won't add to or um Nimroknows far more than I do about
that process and also what'sbeen done in the context of
(53:00):
Hamas, they all need to becoordinated and there has to be
a governing structure.
Uh, in the case of Iraq, theUnited States and the entire
counter-ISIS coalition wasworking with the central
government.
Having a central governingstructure in Gaza, whether it's
initially this internationalboard institute of world peace,
(53:23):
what Nimrod described, what Idescribed earlier, or some other
entity will be critical toensure that any process put
forward, whether humanitariandisarmament, just fulfilling
people's basic needs, actuallygets stood up and then
sustained.
You have the added challenge inthe case of Gaza that is
ensuring Israel's security andthe safety and stability not
(53:48):
only for Gaza, but for whateverconstitutes the border zone, the
demilitarization zone, the noman's land between uh Israel and
Gaza.
And Gaza is not a very bigplace.
So the layered challenges aretremendous.
I think uh an initial indicatorwill be who are the countries,
(54:08):
not only who pledge tocontribute to this effort, but
then who follow through, whetherit's with material, with
personnel, with money, so thateach of these layers can get um
established and then sustained.
SPEAKER_01 (54:22):
Michael, uh, we're gonna give you the last word.
What uh what's what's on yourmind as we go into this
momentous weekend?
SPEAKER_04 (54:33):
So um I'm I I'm slightly, very slightly, uh
optimistic that we'll get tosome part of phase two.
I I don't think we're gonna seethe 20-point plan, you know,
exactly as envisioned and laidout.
But I'm, as I said, slightlyoptimistic that things are not
just going to get completelystalled after phase one.
(54:56):
And the thing on my mind is ifit if it gets a little bit down
the road and then it stalls, andit becomes clear that Hamas
still retains power in Gaza, andthere's no international
stabilization force that'sactually going to be stood up,
and Gaza basically turns into alow-grade civil war between
(55:18):
Hamas and Kans.
What's the follow-through goingto be at that point?
Is are the US and and otheractors in the international
community going to kind of standback and watch and say, okay,
well, you know, at least this isbetter than what we had before.
Um, is Israel going to going tostick to its new doctrine, which
(55:40):
is it sees any threat and it andit rushes in?
Um, or is it also going to sitback?
What's going to be the impact ofa different government, which I
think, you know, a year, a yearfrom now there probably will be.
Um so looking at the deal andseeing how it gets implemented,
I think is important.
But uh the the more interestingand and may end up being more
(56:04):
relevant question to me is howdo all these actors respond if
phase two doesn't start orbreaks down?
Is everybody gonna have a see noevil, hear no evil, speak no
evil type thing?
Or are people going to actuallyhave the have the wherewithal to
actively jump in and try to dosomething about it?
SPEAKER_01 (56:25):
Yeah.
Thank you, Michael, Rachel,Neri, and Nimrod.
And thank you, everyone, forjoining us.
Uh, we encourage you to tune into Israel Policy Pod, of course,
the podcast that Neri uh hostsuh each and every week, um with
conversations with news makersand opinion shapers, and of
course, Michael's weekly Kaplacolumn each uh Thursday.
(56:48):
Uh I, for one, am excited totravel uh next week to Israel
and see both Neri and Nimrod uhuh on this uh momentous week.
Uh thank you all again forjoining us.
Um we encourage you to uh followus on social media and consider
supporting Israel Policy andForum's work um at
Israelpolicyforum.org slash uhsupport.
(57:12):
Um thank you very much, and welook forward to meeting on uh uh
future days with the same levelof hope uh that we will see
better days to come.
This is indeed a momentousmoment, um, which we will
celebrate even as we recognizethe significant pitfalls ahead
with the additional phases ofthis deal.
(57:33):
And we will um be thinking ofour friends and colleagues in
Israel in the days to come inanticipation for uh the release
of those hostages.
Thank you all once again, andthanks, thanks, team.
Hello, everyone.
Thank you so much for joiningus.
I'm David Halperin, CEO ofIsrael Policy Forum, and
appreciate your joining us onthis momentous and hopeful day.
734 days after Hamas's horrificassault on Israeli communities
on October 7, 2023, it appearswe have a deal, a deal at least
(00:39):
to see the Israeli hostages whohave been held in captivity by
Hamas in the Gaza Strip to bereleased in return for at least
the beginning of what could leadto a sustained end to this Gaza
war.
I want to thank you all forjoining us, where today we'll
(01:00):
have a chance to unpack thelatest developments, what
actually has happened, what doesit mean, and what might we
expect upcoming.
I will be joined by mycolleagues.
Throughout this conversation, Iencourage you to ask questions.
There will not be a QA session.
I encourage you to use the QAfunction to type your questions
(01:24):
at any moment in time.
I will try to get to as manyquestions throughout our
conversation as possible.
I want to thank all of those whoare joining us either on our
live stream or uh via recording.
With us is from Israel, with usis Neri Zilber, Israel Policy
Forum uh Policy Advisor, and ofcourse host of our podcast,
(01:48):
Israel Policy Pod.
Neri is an independentjournalist, regular, regular
contributor, reporter for theFinancial Times.
Uh, and so pleased, Neri, tohave you uh have you with us.
We're also joined by NimrodNovik, Israel Policy Forum
Distinguished Fellow, longtimeadvisor to the late uh uh
(02:09):
president and prime ministerShimon Perez, um, who has a
regular dialogue with colleaguesin the Arab world and will want
to unpack uh with Nimrod howthis is uh shaking out in the
regional contributions.
Uh and we're also thrilled tohave with us our colleagues from
Washington, uh RachelBrandenburg, our Washington
Managing Director and SeniorPolicy Analyst, and Michael
(02:30):
Koplau, our chief policyofficer.
It's a big panel, but reallythis is a conversation amongst
our team.
And as I was mentioning in thepre-call just a moment ago, it's
actually the first time thatwe've had a chance to all talk
about this momentous uh moment.
So uh I'm I'm eager to have thisuh public conversation in real
time and hear what you allthink.
(02:52):
And Neri, I want to start withyou.
Can you first just walk usthrough what is this agreement?
How did we get here in recentdays, and what should we expect
in the days to come?
SPEAKER_03 (03:05):
Sure thing, David.
Uh well, first of all, I'mhonored uh to be with you and
all of our colleagues, uh, alongwith all the uh watchers and
hopefully listeners in future.
Uh, but really uh a momentousday.
And we said this on, I believe,last week's uh webinarslash
podcast.
Uh, you know, a great day forcivilization and uh everyone
here in Israel and Gaza and theMiddle East.
(03:26):
But I think today is actuallythat's true.
Uh there was a just a surge ofoptimism overnight and this
morning in Israel, uh, a realsense of hope for the first time
in a long time that uh thehostages at least were coming
home, and like you said, apotential uh sliver of hope that
this war will come to an end.
Uh but in terms of the brasstax, I think we have to be clear
about what was agreed today inSharm al-Sheikh Egypt and what
(03:49):
the Israeli government is set toapprove uh in short order here
in Israel, uh, and what wasn'tagreed to.
Uh, we have to be clear what wasagreed to was really the first
stage of an overall uh deal uhput forward by Donald Trump uh a
week, week or so ago.
Uh and this first deal, firststage of the deal is really a
(04:09):
ceasefire for hostage andprisoner release.
Uh uh i.e., uh what is going tobe approved by the Israeli
government uh tonight isessentially a deal um that
commits Israel to halt thefighting.
It will pull back the IDF frommost of the population centers
in the Gaza Strip.
And in the coming days, see therelease of we hope all the 48
(04:32):
hostages uh still languishing inin captivity in Gaza, uh 20 of
whom are still believed to bealive, uh in return for nearly
2,000 Palestinian prisoners, uh250 of which are serving life
sentences for serious terror uhrelated offenses, uh i.e.
uh real blood on their hands.
So not a not a small price.
Uh but this is essentially thefirst stage uh of the deal uh
(04:54):
and should be completed, uh wehope, uh, in the coming days,
uh, with the added, shall wesay, news value of Donald Trump
himself likely coming to Israeluh on Sunday, uh at least to to
monitor developments, if not toactually greet the returning
hostages.
So that's what was agreed.
Uh what wasn't agreedessentially was everything else.
Uh the second stage of the ofthe overall deal, the 20-point
(05:16):
plan put forward by DonaldTrump, uh calls for a lot of
other longer-term objectives uhvis-a-vis Gaza and Hamas and
Israel, like Hamas'sdisarmament, like the
demilitarization of the GazaStrip, like if not the complete
withdrawal of the IDF from Gaza,then from pretty much all of it,
(05:36):
uh except for maybe the overallperimeter.
Um and coupled with uh settingup some future governance uh
system with international andPalestinian technocrats, I mean
essentially a new government forGaza that still needs to be
fleshed out and agreed to, uh,and on and on.
I mean, there is a lot of heavylifting to be done, uh, and
(05:57):
that's all in the second stage.
Uh, in terms for Israel, uh,that will be a heavy lift uh in
terms of actually agreeing tothis and agreeing and committing
itself to end the war.
Um to answer your question, Iknow we'll get into it, but what
happened?
Uh Donald Trump happened, truly.
Uh Donald Trump put the entireweight of the US presidency and
really his own US presidency uhon the various parties, but
(06:20):
especially on Prime MinisterBenjamin Tanyahu and on the
various Arab states, who Iassume uh my colleagues know
this better than I, appliedtheir own pressure on Hamas to
come to the table.
Uh so really uh Donald Trumphappened.
And I'll just say uh in terms ofwhat we may expect moving
forward, uh, I fully expect thecoming days to actually unfold
um relatively okay, with variouscaveats perhaps having to do
(06:43):
with um uh deceased Israelihostages uh whose bodies will
take a bit more time to find andrecover and rescue and bring
back for burial in Israel.
Uh but it's really two competingnarratives.
Uh, who do you want to believein terms of uh what happens
after the next few days in termsof this uh first stage and what
comes after?
Uh Benjamin Tanyahu, who says heand his you know various allies
(07:06):
here in Israel say, well, weonly agree to this first stage
and we'll see what happensafterwards, and there's no real
guarantee that we'll even get toagreement over the second stage.
And Hamas leader Khalil Haye,who said about two hours ago
that no, we got real guaranteesfrom the US and the various
other mediators, Egypt, Qatar,Turkey, and others, that this
(07:26):
will actually be a permanent endto the war.
So I leave it to uh to mycolleagues to decide who they
want to believe.
SPEAKER_01 (07:34):
Well, that's fascinating, Narry, because I I
think um it's it's very clearthat uh President Trump uh was
uh clearly a difference maker ingetting uh to this deal.
But we are seeing two otherkinds of narratives emerge.
One is that this deal happenedbecause Trump pressured Israel,
and another that this dealhappened because Trump was able
to pressure the regional playersto pressure Hamas.
(07:56):
Uh Nimrod, I wanted to bring youin to unpack this a little bit.
The question really is why now?
Uh how did, you know, why whydid it come about now?
And what role did Qatar, Egypt,and Turkey play in this 11th
hour in pressing Hamas toactually accept a deal, which,
as Neri outlined, doesn't have aguarantee there will be a phase
(08:18):
two?
SPEAKER_02 (08:20):
Um we uh are in the early months of the war, we
already heard uh from uhneighboring countries, uh
particularly those with uhsubstantial population like
Saudi Arabia, uh great concernthat what happens in Gaza
doesn't stay in Gaza.
(08:41):
Um and and their concern wastwofold.
One, the effect of the images,uh the visual images from Gaza
on their young population, andthey saw trends of
radicalization.
And the second one uh is theoverall impact of regional
instability on their veryambitious uh socioeconomic uh
(09:06):
transformation plans.
Uh, MBS's 2030, uh, and theothers have uh similar ones as
well.
Um as a result, um we saw themuh concerned with what's going
on, expressing that concern toWashington, and gradually, maybe
grudgingly, uh accepting a rolein the morning after when the
(09:30):
Biden administration was workingon it.
Uh but uh their impression wasthat the Biden administration
was doing a great job uh inplanning, uh, and a very poor
one in execution, uh, primarilybecause it was not willing to do
uh the one thing thateventually, in my judgment, uh
(09:51):
broke the ice, which was thepressure uh on uh on Netanyahu.
Um once Trump enters the WhiteHouse, and I will not presume to
talk about Trump from theAmerican perspective, but I'll
try from the original one.
Um once he entered the WhiteHouse, um, even before he
entered the White House, uh hedemonstrated uh what he can do.
(10:14):
And he took the uh Biden planand made it happen.
The ceasefire in January, um, onthe one hand.
On the other hand, um he uh gaveuh Netanyahu a pass uh when he
broke that deal in March, sixweeks later.
Um so they were looking at thepresident that can make it
happen.
(10:35):
Um, but the question is, willhe?
Um and when they were discussinguh how to pressure him, they
reached the conclusion that youdon't press President uh uh
Trump, you tempt him.
And you tempt him uh by uhproviding him the setting for a
win by doing yourself, byvolunteering to do much of the
(10:58):
heavy lifting.
Uh that coupled with his threatfrom the original perspective of
the uh Gaza Riviera and uhremoving two million uh Gazans
out of the strip and so on, gavebirth uh to the Egyptian
initiative that was embraced bythe Arab League in March.
And even more so and more uhambitious, uh the Saudi French
(11:23):
initiative uh of July that wasuh endorsed by 142 countries at
the UN uh in September.
Uh so they were uh signaling tohim uh that they are willing to
do much of the heavy lifting,they are willing to come into
Gaza, they are willing toshoulder responsibility to Gaza,
provided certain conditions aremet.
Now, all that uh got a boost, avery dramatic boost, with the
(11:48):
Israeli strike on Qatar.
And uh suddenly all thosecountries uh were watching
Israel becoming the originalbully, um uh striking Qatar with
Qatar with impunity.
Qatar, an ally of the UnitedStates with an American major
American base there.
Um and uh if Qatar can be uhtargeted, uh so can anyone
(12:11):
anyone else.
Um and that gave yet anotherboost to their willingness uh to
shoulder responsibility uh anddo the heavy lifting and tempt
the president uh to go for thefor the real deal.
So I think that uh uh from fromuh an Arab regional perspective,
(12:34):
uh that was the makings of theof the Trump uh effect.
Uh just one word on from anIsraeli perspective, the Trump
effect.
Uh and I think it started withZelensky.
Uh that is to say, um uh PrimeMinister Netanyahu uh prided
himself uh of having uh playedwith American presidents,
(12:54):
successive American presidents,uh unscarred.
Um and I think that the Zelenskyuh incident uh sent a certain
message to him.
Uh his eyes, of course, are onthe elections in Israel next
year.
Early next year, later nextyear, but next year.
Um and for that to happen, hecannot afford uh to have the
(13:17):
greatest friend Israel has everhad, uh, according to him, uh,
stand up and say uh Netanyahublew it.
Netanyahu uh is intransigent,Netanyahu is not uh is dragging
the war uh for his own purpose.
He couldn't afford that.
Um so uh between you knowbookended between Zelensky and
(13:39):
Netanyahu apologies to theQataris, uh also in the same uh
Oval Office, was thetransformation of Netanyahu in
terms of appreciating uh that hecannot play Trump.
SPEAKER_01 (13:51):
Rachel, I want to turn to you.
What what are the what are whatare the issues, what are the
questions that are sitting withyou right now that you think we
should be asking, and and whatare the developments that you
think we should be looking forin the days, uh if not weeks to
come?
SPEAKER_00 (14:06):
Thanks, David.
Well, Neri and Nimrod both bothalluded to a lot of these
things, and particularly thefact that as far as we know, all
that's been agreed is theinitial phase of this deal.
So hopefully we see everythinggo without a hitch between now.
And President Trump saidrecently, either Monday or
Tuesday, we're gonna see thehostages released.
Hopefully, we see all of thatcome to fruition without any
(14:27):
hangups or holdups or anybodyplaying messy games.
But then ostensibly, even harderwork begins to figure out the
details.
Neri outlined all the differentpieces of this deal that haven't
yet been agreed.
And the 20-point plan, whichI've said before was more like
20 principles, has uh somereally meaty meaty principles in
(14:47):
there that are gonna be bothvery difficult to figure out uh
what they look like, but evenmore difficult to figure out in
practice.
Who's responsible for governanceof Gaza?
Who is this international boardthat is going to govern Gaza, be
led by President Trump, includeTony Blair?
Who else is gonna be on thatboard?
What Palestinians are gonna beon that board?
(15:07):
What does a PA reform plan looklike?
And who is in the lead?
Who is financing any of this?
How do they go about thereconstruction of Gaza?
What is the plan for surginghumanitarian aid look like?
And how do we ensure that it'snot just food, but also shelter
and other basic humanitarianneeds?
Uh, what does the securityperimeter look like for Israel?
(15:29):
And then what is the long-termplan for Gaza and for the
pathway to a credible, or Ithink it was phrased a credible
pathway to a Palestinian statethat was mentioned in that 19th
point, if I remember correctly.
None of these have yet to beaddressed.
Uh, and as far as we know, thedetails have not been matched to
the principles.
(15:50):
Additionally, from what we'veseen over the last 10 months,
President Trump does not tend topay attention to any one thing
for very long.
So, right now, there'stremendous momentum behind him
and behind this plan.
And remarkably, pretty much theentire world is pushing, has
been pushing for this to happen.
Everyone praised the plan,supported it, even though it's
(16:10):
not really perfect for anyone.
Uh, but who's gonna keep his eyeon the ball?
Is he gonna keep attentive tothis?
Is it gonna be the weight of theUS president that's driving the
process forward to figure outthese details?
Is it gonna be the regional Arabstates that Nimrod was talking
about, who are both taking anactive role in the planning, but
also the implementation?
(16:31):
And uh, what role for theEuropeans who arguably have more
facility with some of thedetails that are required to go
about developing plans to matchthese principles, uh, and who's
gonna pay for it?
Um, and I would guess thatwhatever the answers to those
questions are, it's gonna be adifferent US role than we've
(16:53):
seen in the past, wheretraditionally diplomacy around
the Israeli-Palestinianconflict, around even the
Abraham Accords initially, um,were led by the United States.
And it was the United Statespulling the parties to the
table, the United States puttingpaper on the table.
I'm not sure this Americanadministration is gonna be the
ones doing either of thosethings.
(17:13):
So who will?
Who's gonna be in the lead forthis process?
SPEAKER_01 (17:18):
Uh Michael, I want to come around to you.
And um I I kind of have twoquestions for you, Michael.
One is is is what is your takeon, frankly, what Rachel just
mentioned, which is um Trump didsucceed, but can he sustain
momentum going forward?
And the second is of course, ourquestions are already flooding
(17:39):
in about what this means for theIsraeli coalition and for
Israeli politics.
And I wonder, Michael, if youcould help us uh help touch on
what you're watching in terms ofthe fallout on the Israeli side
as well.
SPEAKER_04 (17:50):
Sure.
So on the first, I agree withRachel.
The the hard part is gonna comeafter Monday or Tuesday when the
hostages come home, and theneverybody has to pivot to the
next thing.
And getting the hostages backand getting the end of the war,
though those are for PresidentTrump the big accomplishments.
(18:11):
You know, I think he said heeven said something earlier
today about you know that that'sgonna happen, and then we'll
we'll see what comes after that.
So it's not just about keepinghis attention focused, it's
keeping everybody's attentionfocused and marshaling all the
different actors that now haveto come to bear on making sure
that Gaza doesn't just go backto what it was before.
(18:34):
And that's definitely adifficult task when you have so
many spoilers out there.
You know, Hamas is gonna want topaint this as a victory, and
they're presumably going to, andhopefully going to give up all
the hostages in a few days.
And so the only way for them topaint this as a victory is to
wreck the next phase.
The same goes on the Israeliside, where Itamar Ben Grim
(18:57):
Batalas Motrich are going tovote against this deal in the
cabinet today, and they toodon't want to see an end to the
war and the pullout of the IDFfrom Gaza.
So keeping on top of all of thevarious actors that are going to
try and make sure that the nextphase doesn't get off the ground
(19:20):
is going to be difficult.
And as Rachel said, we'retalking about administration
that doesn't deal with thesethings in a traditional manner,
doesn't have the same type offoreign policy process, doesn't
have the same type of apparatusfor follow-through, quite
frankly.
And President Trump got thisdone basically through through
brute force, right?
He he wanted it done.
(19:41):
And so he put a plan out there,knowing that it was a plan that
had things that both sides hadcategorically ruled out.
After after Arab Arab statesapproved it, he then allowed the
Israelis to come in and justchange it.
And when the Arab statesobjected, he told them he didn't
care.
He was gonna he was gonna put itout anyway.
When Hamas responded with aqualified, very qualified yes,
(20:05):
and Netanyahu wanted to paint itas a rejection, Trump just said,
no, I'm gonna, I'm gonna paintit as a yes.
So he was able to bulldozeeverybody to get to this first
phase.
That's gonna be a lot harderafter this first phase.
And um, I hope he's successful,but uh and you know, let's let's
not mince words.
This first phase is a hugeaccomplishment.
People have been trying to getthis now for two years and it
(20:27):
wasn't done, including PresidentTrump himself, who I think
probably could have forced thisthrough in March when Israel
decided that it didn't want tomove to the next phase of the of
the January ceasefire.
But he decided now is the time,and he absolutely deserves all
the credit for it, uh includingsending Steve Woodkoff and Jared
(20:47):
Kushner to literally sit in theIsraeli cabinet meeting uh today
to make sure it gets approved.
But after after this phase,bulldozing everybody into the
next the next thing and the nextthing will be harder.
And so um he's gonna have toshow an inordinate degree of
focus that I don't think we'veseen from him up until this
(21:08):
point, and not just him, fromhis administration.
On the question of Israelipolitics, so it seems as if
Smutrich and Ben Vier are goingto jump through all sorts of
hoops to not leave thecoalition.
But it's hard for me to see howearly elections at this point
don't happen.
(21:29):
Uh if if they don't happen,there still has to be an
election a year from now.
And there's certainly a world inwhich the government can keep
things going for another year,and then it it falls based on
the uh based on the mandatorytimetable.
But you still have all theseissues out there.
You still have Smotrich andBangvir who are not happy, you
(21:49):
still have the Khari Diem, theultra-Orthodox, who want their
draft exemption, and I don'tthink they're getting it.
And you also have the fact thatNetanyahu at this point, he he
he knows the numbers.
They're they're not going tomagically recover for him so
much that he's that he is goingto win the next election
outright.
He's got to siphon off of just afew seats so that he can push
(22:12):
the current opposition block to60 or under without any Arab
parties.
Because if he does that, then hecan try to force a deadlock.
So he's only got to peel off acouple of seats to do that.
And waiting a year isn't the wayto do that.
The way to do that is, in my tomy mind, to take this deal and
to run on it and say, hey, look,I got the hostages back.
And guess what?
(22:33):
The IDF is still in Gaza.
And guess what?
The Palestinian Authority stillhas no real role.
And guess what?
We're not really gonna enterinto any sort of peace process
with the Palestinians.
And if he runs on that, heprobably, I shouldn't say
probably, he maybe can getanother one or two seats back to
his coalition from right-wingerswho have lost their patience
(22:53):
with him and try to force adeadlock.
So I think his best bet is totry to get to early elections.
You know, Nimrod said um earlynext year or later next year,
I'd be betting on early nextyear, and hope that that this
deal and the way that heportrays it and all the ways
that he's gonna try to make sureit doesn't move to the next
phases, run on that and see ifthat's enough to get him his
(23:16):
deadlock.
SPEAKER_01 (23:19):
And can he can he do that without uh running afield
of Trump's ire?
If Trump actually wants to seethis this advanced, I guess is
is will be the the question.
SPEAKER_04 (23:30):
Yeah, that that's the question.
And I I think this is inNetanyahu's favor in some ways
because it's not just aboutTrump's attention span, it's
about the fact that the nextphases do require more sustained
engagement than just putting outuh 20, effectively 20 bullet
points and telling everybodythat they have to say yes.
Uh and he and uh some of hisassociates are very practiced at
(23:54):
running circles around Americanadministrations and playing out
the clock and kicking the candown the road.
And uh I wouldn't bet againsthim being able to do that.
SPEAKER_01 (24:05):
Neri, I did want to ask there's a number of
questions in the chat about theterms of the uh hostage release
deal or the Palestinianprisoners to be released.
Um, questions about who arethese uh prisoners, what do we
know about the plan for therelease, and and what has been
the reaction response thus farinside Israel um to those uh to
(24:27):
to to that planned uh aspect ofthis deal.
SPEAKER_03 (24:31):
So it it won't go over uh that well publicly once
the names of like the reallyheavier uh life termers are
gonna come out.
Although I suspect, again, wedon't we don't know because it
hasn't been made public yet.
Some of the higher profileindividuals will not be part of
this deal.
Uh but you are still gonna get asizable number of um Marwan
(24:54):
Burgundy will not be part of thedeal.
Marwan Bargudy will not be partof the deal.
Um a few others will not be partof the deal, but some by
definition will have to be partof the deal.
Um again, it hasn't been madepublic, uh, but uh it's it's a
price that most of the Israelipublic is willing to pay.
Perhaps not uh Smotrich andBenvir themselves, but uh a
large majority of the Israelipublic.
(25:15):
So that's part of the 250 uh,shall we say, heavier
Palestinian prisoners that areset to be released.
Uh according to the terms of thedeal, by the way, uh they're
either going to be released toGaza or exiled outside of Israel
and not to the West Bank.
Uh that's uh a significant pointin and of itself.
And then the rest of uh the 1700Palestinian prisoners slash
(25:37):
detainees to be released are uhagain by definition those Gazans
who were picked up off thebattlefield of Gaza, but after
October 7th, i.e.
no one that actually took partin the October 7th massacre, uh
i.e.
not no Nukaba uh terrorists, andthat's also a significant point.
Uh and those 1700 will bereleased back to Gaza.
(26:00):
Um and that's uh I believe a fewhundred Palestinian um uh the
bodies of Palestinian uhprisoners also uh will be
released, uh, but not the Sinwarbrothers, uh to the best of my
information.
So again, that's that's theprice Israel will have to pay
initially in this first stage ofof the deal.
Um again, not Israel's mostfavorite uh uh action to take,
(26:22):
but a price most of this countryis willing to uh to pay uh to
get the hostages home.
SPEAKER_01 (26:28):
So uh uh Nimrod, I wanted to bring in uh Ben
Liebwood said asked a question,which uh he wrote, it remains
shocking to me that Hamas wouldreturn all hostages in one
tranche and eliminate one oftheir two sources of leverage
and power, the other being theirweapons.
Um, you know, I guess thequestion is if Hamas is not
(26:49):
getting these high profile uhprisoners released and um they
are removing their leverage,what changed in their
calculation?
Um what actually made them uhmake this decision um to
ultimately release the hostages?
SPEAKER_02 (27:05):
From everything we heard, um what used to be uh the
number one priority uh of Hamasuh under Sinwar um in this kind
of uh situation was uh releasinguh hostages.
I'm sorry, uh uh prisonersfreeing uh Palestinian
(27:26):
prisoners.
Uh there was a story of howcommitted he was to those who
stayed in in prison when he wasuh uh uh sent to Gaza after 23
years in Israeli prison.
Um from what we hear over thelast uh weeks, maybe even
months, uh since he's gone, um,the importance of that uh factor
(27:49):
uh is somewhat uh lesser, andorganizational survival uh is
far more important.
And for that to happen, um theyinsisted on guarantees, and we
all heard about it.
Uh we don't have the uh uhlanguage or format of what
guarantees they got, but evenwithin uh the uh uh Trump 20
(28:13):
points and an adjacent documentthat we all saw uh uh recently,
uh they have some of the uhguarantees that they need.
Uh one guarantee that they needis that if they go in exile, if
they decide to leave uh Gaza, uhthey get immunity.
And they got that uh when the UScommitted uh uh to Qatar that it
(28:38):
will not be attacked again, andwhen Israel undertook not to
attack again.
So Qatar is now a safe haven, uha foolproof safe haven uh for uh
Gaza terrorists, um, assuming uhthey are not involved in active
uh violence.
Uh so that's one.
(28:59):
The the second is end of war.
Um and from everything we heard,uh they received American
guarantees signed, uh, as wellas from Qatar, Egypt, and uh,
and Turkey.
Uh that that's it, that's theend of war.
Now Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey isnice, uh, but you US uh is is
(29:21):
far more uh significant.
Um so I think that what changedwas that Hamas military
capabilities have been sodegraded, uh its military
formations have been uhdemolished a year ago.
Uh its leadership uhdisappeared, was killed.
(29:44):
Uh first, second, and thirdlayer.
Uh and those remaining uh arenot the kind of powerful
leadership uh figures.
Uh, the ganking up of the Arabworld, and it was not just uh
the Three countries that we keepmentioning Egypt, Jordan, Egypt,
Qatar, and Turkey.
(30:06):
But also Saudi Arabia is there,and the UAE is there, and Jordan
is there.
It's a very powerful Arabconsensus.
And apparently they reached theconclusion that that's the best
they can get.
SPEAKER_01 (30:21):
What is the expectation around Hamas
disarmament?
I mean, clearly there's a lot ofskepticism that we're actually
going to see a process thatleads to full disarmament.
I know the Hamas response to uhthe deal made clear references
to their continued continuedrole in the future of the
(30:41):
Palestinian politics and thePalestinian National Project,
which I, of course, is not whatthe Israelis want to hear or or
or accept, let alone uh uh, ofcourse, BB has been opposed to
the Palestinian authoritiesreturn.
Um, so Nimrod, how how do you uhexpect this process to play out
in a way that would be uh in anyway uh acceptable?
SPEAKER_02 (31:02):
Well, assuming that the uh um the uh consensus of
pessimism about phase two uh inthis room uh proven is proven uh
overstated, and phase two doesget uh uh what uh launched.
Uh there was a lot of work doneuh primarily by Egypt, uh, but
(31:26):
uh Egypt was the driver, butthere were quite a few
passengers uh in the Arab worlduh that developed a two-phase
approach uh to uh Hamasdisarmament.
Uh in phase one, um uh theweapons are to be uh assembled
uh in uh deposits in Gaza underthe supervision of the so-called
(31:50):
Arab-Palestinian uh force thatis supposed to uh run security,
uh law and order, uh in thestrip in the interim phase.
Um in phase two, uh thoseweapons are to be exported to
Egypt, uh never to come back.
Um according to uh thoseinvolved, uh the Hamas public uh
(32:14):
posture on this um is not theprivate posture on this, uh, and
that uh they have Hamas consent,that if all else works in terms
of the morning after, the dayafter uh management, uh then uh
Hamas uh will not resist uh uhgiving up its strategic weapons.
(32:39):
Um to the question of whether itis uh confined uh to rockets and
missiles and uh RPGs, or does italso include the individual
Klachnikov?
They didn't go into those uhdetails, or at least they have
not shared it uh with with thirwith others.
Uh but uh the the principle isthere and it found expression in
(33:02):
the Saudi French initiative, umwhich calls for Hamas
disarmament, uh as well as uhthe Trump uh 20 points.
SPEAKER_01 (33:14):
Um Rachel, we we have a lot of questions about
whether this will enable theresumption of regional
diplomacy, Israel Saudinormalization, and the like.
But I wonder if you could speakhow, you know, what if any
impact does this have on whathas been happening between
Israel and Lebanon, betweenIsrael and Syria, between Israel
(33:34):
and Saudi, the sort of the widerregional picture and the ability
for the United States to engagein diplomacy?
Because as Donald Trump outlinedin the last couple of days, this
is not a hostage ceasefire deal,this is peace in the Middle
East, as he described.
This is uh this is uheverything.
Um what is your take on theregional opportunities?
SPEAKER_00 (33:54):
Yeah, I think he described it as the greatest day
in civilization.
I think Neri gave a nod to it inhis opening too.
Uh we may have a few months toyears to decades until we see uh
peace in all of our time, buthere's to hoping it moves fast.
I think for President Trump, hecertainly wants to continue
moving on to what we've longheard are his sort of grander
ambitions of expanding theAbraham Accords.
(34:16):
The Abraham Accords were hislegacy, they were his sort of
diplomatic baby.
Um, and in my assessment, one ofthe elements that really led to
the recent momentum to get tohis 20-point plan and to bring
everyone around the currentprocess was uh seeing a real
threat to the Abraham Accordswhen Israel was about to vote on
(34:38):
formal formally annexing theWest Bank and the UAE came out
and said, hey, this will notonly threaten the expansion of
the Abraham Accords, but itcould threaten current
agreements.
And then Saudi Arabia amplifiedthat.
Um, then the strikes, theIsraeli strikes in Doha led to
even greater unity among theGulf states around finding a
common way forward.
(34:59):
Uh, one of the things that'sbeen remarkable to me over the
past two years, and particularlyover the past year, have been
that the conversation aboutIsrael's Saudi normalization has
remained on the table.
Despite the war in Gaza, despitethe horrendous things that have
happened not only on October7th, but over the past six
(35:20):
months and the humanitariancrisis.
Nimrod talked about thechallenge that uh Arab leaders,
and particularly in the Gulf,have had with their populace,
the Arab street, sort ofsuddenly seeing images of
starving Gazans, of dyingchildren, of sort of the horrors
that have transpired in Gaza,uh, causing real domestic
(35:41):
challenges.
And I think there is a commonunderstanding that ultimately
greater regional integration,Israel's further integration
diplomatically, economically, inaddition to militarily, but a
lot of that has already beenhappening.
That will only lead to greaterstability.
And there is a real interest inregional stability for the sake
(36:02):
of their own domestic agendas.
Even more remarkable of the lastsix months has been the
processes that have begun withSyria and Lebanon.
And on all three of thesearenas, there is real opening at
the moment, but I think it'sgoing to take time.
And President Trump even seemedto understand when he spoke from
uh, was it Riyadh, Dubai?
(36:24):
I don't remember on his golftrip exactly where he was, but
he said, I still hope to seeSaudi Israel normalization
happen, but I understand theSaudis will need it to happen in
their own time.
Also, remarkably, we're not evena year into his administration.
So he still has time.
He still has time to get thisdeal, this initial deal done,
bring an end to the war, andthen begin the path toward uh
(36:47):
broader regional integration,whether it's Saudi Israel
normalization uh uh before theend of his term, or some sort of
Syria-Israel demilitarization,detente, diplomatic agreement
that comes sooner.
And in Lebanon, there really isa new government for the first
time in years, who are genuinelyinterested in not only
(37:11):
reclaiming their country fromHezbollah, but seemingly open to
a diplomatic process withIsrael.
None of this, I think, can beginin earnest until the war in Gaza
really comes to an end.
So hopefully we'll see thislatest initial deal come to
fruition on Monday.
And then along with everythingelse we've discussed, some of
(37:33):
this regional diplomacy cancommence again.
But there too, I think it's justthe beginning of reopening those
conversations, and it's stillgoing to take a little time to
see where they go.
SPEAKER_01 (37:42):
Just to follow up, Rachel, we had one question in
from Michael Rothstein thesimple question can Iran spoil
the Trump deal?
SPEAKER_00 (37:50):
Iran can spoil anything if they want to.
I don't think I neither thinkand I hope that we will not see
them spoil this initial phase.
Um just as the region wants tosee the war in Gaza end, nobody
wants to see another war withIran.
The Gulf states uh havedeveloped their own diplomatic
(38:12):
relationships with Iran, nobodywants to see a nuclear Iran, but
even less getting the constructwrong, even more, nobody wants
to see another round of war withIran.
So I think between the generalinterest in stability and the
real diminished capabilities oftheir proxies, there's not a ton
they can do to spoil the deal inthe near term.
(38:35):
That doesn't mean that theycan't reconstitute capabilities
in the medium term and figureout a way to spoil whatever
comes next in the forthcoming uhphases of this process.
SPEAKER_01 (38:45):
Yeah.
So, uh Michael, the last twoyears um of this war um has had
a profound impact on the natureof the US Israel relationship,
the views of Israel inside theUnited States.
Now that hopefully we are seeingthis come to a sustainable end
and the release of hostages andbeginning to rebuild from this
(39:07):
uh chapter, what are youwatching in terms of the
trajectory and the trends andthe future of US-Israel
relations?
SPEAKER_04 (39:17):
US Israel relations are going to shift.
There's there's no question tome about that.
It there we're seeing it on toomany different vectors.
Whether you look at electedofficials, where in the
Democratic Party, it's prettymuch now mainstream to be in
favor of some sort ofrestriction on security
assistance to Israel.
(39:39):
If you look at the RepublicanParty, uh, not as much the
politicians, but theinfluencers, for lack of a
better word, who are reallydriving MAGA culture, Tucker
Carlson and Steve Bannon andCandace Owens and uh and and a
whole host of others.
The relationship with Israel isis is being questioned.
(40:01):
And when you look at US publicopinion, in some ways that's
actually, I think, the the maybethe most impactful in the long
term because we now see pollsand it's not just one, it's it's
now pretty much any organizationthat does this, where for the
first time in the history ofpolling, people sympathize with
(40:23):
Palestinians more than theysympathize with Israelis.
For the first time in thehistory of the polling,
majorities of Americans want toend all assistance to Israel,
not place restrictions on it,but but end it.
We see pluralities of Americanswho think that Israel is
purposely killing civilians inGaza.
(40:46):
We see pluralities of Americans,and in one poll, actually, a
majority of Americans whobelieve that Israel is
committing genocide in Gaza.
These are not numbers that arejust going to stop with the end
of the war.
People now have imprinted ontheir in their minds a view of
what Israel is and how itbehaves and its value or lack of
(41:09):
value to the United States.
So the relationship is going toshift.
And I think it's going to bereally critical for policymakers
to understand the ways in whichit's going to shift and get
ahead of it.
Because insisting, as many havein the past, that the
(41:32):
relationship is absolutelyunshakable and unbreakable, I
don't think that that's trueanymore.
And relying on some of the oldtalking points uh about Israel
itself is also not going towork.
And just assuming that there'sgoing to be another 10-year MOU
with$3.8 billion a year or moreto Israel without it causing a
(41:56):
huge fight again in bothparties, I don't think that
that's a realistic assumptioneither.
So everybody's going to have torecalibrate.
And particularly for AmericanJewish organizations, including
ours, that support a strong U.S.
Israel relationship and um wantto see this relationship
continue at a high level,recognizing the importance of it
(42:18):
to both sides.
And also want to see a secureJewish democratic Israel,
leaving aside the particulars ofUS Israel relations, um,
American Jewish organizationsare gonna have to really think
long and hard about how theymake the case for Israel and to
not take things for granted thatthey always took for granted,
(42:38):
such as rock solid Americanpopular support almost no matter
what Israel does.
SPEAKER_01 (42:43):
Yeah, the end of the war does not necessarily mean to
end to the the trends that we'veseen.
SPEAKER_04 (42:48):
No.
SPEAKER_01 (42:48):
Um Neri, I did want to ask you this we've talked a
lot about Gaza, but there'snothing, as far as I understand,
about the West Bank.
I'm curious how the PA has beenresponding and if we should
anticipate, um, as has been inthe past, um, Netanyahu making
arrangements with far-rightcoalition partners to agree to
(43:11):
um one set of policies andessentially uh uh be compensated
with developments, whether thatbe settlements or or the like on
the West Bank.
I'm curious if we have anythinguh afoot of that nature or or
what you're watching in thatarena.
SPEAKER_03 (43:26):
Sure.
I mean, obviously all focus fora long time now has been on
Gaza, but the West Bank um, youknow, equally important and not
getting enough attention.
Uh look, the PalestinianAuthority and President uh Ahmud
Abbas, Abu Mazin, is is playingball like like every other
country in the region and cameout in support of the agreement
and uh ceasefire and enter thewar.
Uh and that's all well and good.
(43:47):
I think they will have tocalibrate their own steps in the
coming weeks and months uh aboutwhat they need to do to put
themselves in the best positionto play an active role in in
post-war Gaza um if if if andwhen we get to it.
Uh i.e.
uh genuine reforms uh that theycommitted to, by the way,
irrespective of this uh Gazadeal brokered by Trump, but even
(44:10):
as commitments to the French andthe Saudis as part of the
overall push uh a few weeks ago,uh who remembers now, uh for
recognition of Palestinianstatehood.
Uh that's all steps that AbuMazan committed to.
Uh we got word a few days ago,and I conferred it to be true,
that they they've started, shallwe say, an internal Fatah reform
process, uh bringing in peoplethat were uh kicked out and
(44:34):
physically and politicallyexiled, bringing them back into
the fold, uh that could infuture perhaps play a role uh in
in the Gaza Strip.
I think that's all for the good.
Uh I think uh promised electionsfor next year I think would go a
long way, uh, not only inbolstering the legitimacy of the
Palestinian Authority, butperhaps even uh working to hold
elections in Gaza as well, uh,and trying to coalesce uh the
(44:57):
Palestinian Authority um acrossboth territories.
That's again irrespective reallyof Israel and its own policies.
Uh to your second question,David, I expect the worst.
I expect the worst.
Um tried and true Netanyahuformula, uh divide and rule,
literally kind of divide uh theWest Bank from Gaza.
Uh if you're kind of propping upGaza on some level, you're
(45:20):
putting down the West Bank onanother level.
Uh and really people like BetzelSmotrich um have done a lot of
uh negative things on the WestBank, uh especially under cover
of the overall Gaza war.
Uh again, I don't I don't expectthat to to stop uh tomorrow if
there's a stop in the Gaza war.
Uh the only thing that may kindof slow it down or halt it uh is
(45:43):
Smotric and Benvere actuallyleaving the government, the
government being toppled, uhheading to snap elections, and
in future, uh a different uhIsraeli government.
Again, we can all hope.
Uh and by the way, going back towhat Michael laid out uh
previously, I I also think thatearly elections in the first
quarter of 2026 is a more likelyscenario than not.
(46:06):
Um I think Netanyahu took thatinto account when he was uh,
let's say, pushed and prodded byTrump into this agreement.
Uh the difference between sayMarch when he restarted the war
and now, uh many things, but A,he didn't bomb Iran just yet.
Um he hadn't yet taken over thevast, vast majority of the Gaza
(46:26):
Strip, uh, either to stay thereor to give it back.
Um and he wasn't entering anelection year anyway.
Right.
We're we've already entered intoan election year in Israel, and
so he has a lot less to lose interms of uh heading into
elections.
Uh, and he always likes tochoose the timing and the the
issues that he goes into anelection with.
Uh and so there are worse thingsto do than uh uh kind of tout
(46:50):
your achievements on thebattlefield over the past two
years and get all the hostagesback, and oh, by the way, uh
have the most powerful man uh inthe world uh you know, giving a
speech in the Knesset, toutinghow great your diplomatic and
political prowess is, which islikely to happen on Sunday.
SPEAKER_01 (47:07):
All very good points.
Um, I want to bring in aquestion from Howard Lafranchi,
one of Neri's old colleagues atChristian Science Monitor, uh,
for for Nimrod, which comes backto this question of disarmament,
which is how to get around, ashe describes, the chicken and
egg dilemma of Hamas needing todisarm uh and the guarantees
that Hamas wants first thatIsrael will not restart the war.
SPEAKER_02 (47:32):
Look, if we want to be optimistic and and assume for
a minute uh that uh phase two ofthe plan uh gets going.
Um much work has been done.
Um I will even backtrack a bit.
Uh much of what we hear in theSaudi um uh French plan, uh in
(47:54):
the Trump 20 plans, uh in thepreviously Egyptian plan, uh all
draw on very thorough staff workthat was done on the subject uh
during the last year of theBiden administration.
Um and a lot of work was done uhon uh on uh DDR uh as well as on
(48:15):
all other elements uh of theplan to the point of even the
real-time communicationdeconflicting uh the terms of
engagement of the uh Israeliphasing out and the third party
force phasing in.
How do you prevent uh friction?
(48:37):
And how what does it mean thatyou respect Israel's right of
self-defer defense when Israelis out and someone else is in?
Yeah, all this was worked out.
SPEAKER_01 (48:47):
No, sorry, I was just gonna jump in to explain
DDR to the audience.
SPEAKER_02 (48:51):
Um it's uh uh decommissioning uh of weapons
and and how do you uh integrateum former Hamas uh employees uh
into the new structure so youdon't have end up uh in a uh
Iraqi situation uh where peoplewere left with no uh source of
(49:15):
income and ended up with ISIS.
SPEAKER_01 (49:17):
I apologize.
SPEAKER_02 (49:18):
Um yeah.
Um so uh the the the the um andand uh on top of it, I'm sorry I
forgot, forgot to mention itearlier, a lot of work was done
uh uh by the uh um uh Tony Blairteam, um, and the plan that they
(49:42):
have uh put together also drawson previous work done by others.
Um so the the mechanics of it uhand the politics of it uh will
work um should the two partiesplay ball.
Um if indeed we're gonna have uhforces uh from uh five uh six
(50:09):
Arab countries plus Indonesia,uh Italy and France just
announced that they are willingto contribute their forces to
it.
Um if you're gonna have thebillions of dollars from the
Saudis and the Emiratis and theQataris and the others, uh if
all that mechanism of uh of a umuh Palestinian um indigenous um
(50:31):
governance by experts uhoverseen by uh the World Peace
uh Institute uh chaired by uhPresident Trump and uh managed
by uh Tony Blair.
If all that comes to fruition,um I think that uh squaring uh
(50:53):
uh the uh commitment of Israeli,Israel, uh Israel will have less
incentive uh to uh resume thewar, uh and uh and Hamas will
have little option uh but uh toaccept.
Uh but uh I don't want to saythat this is in fantasy land,
uh, because we saw uh PresidentTrump uh within a week uh like a
(51:16):
powerful uh particlesaccelerator uh forcing everybody
uh to move at the hypersonicspeed and produce an agreement
that most of us assumed wasunreachable.
So who knows?
SPEAKER_01 (51:30):
I'm actually curious, Rachel, your take on
this as well, because you havethis experience working at the
Pentagon and uh post uh Iraq andISIS challenge and and and
recovering uh territory that hasreally been decimated and
thinking about um how do yourecover from these zones of
conflict.
What are the sort of lessonslearned that should be brought
(51:53):
into in this conversation?
SPEAKER_00 (51:57):
There are a lot of comparisons, but a whole lot
more differences.
Um I think the first one is ittakes time and it takes
sustained attention, and ittakes a whole lot of actors
committing to continue growingin the same direction for quite
a while.
Uh in the case of Iraq, you hadthe UN at the center in a way
that is different from now.
(52:19):
And there were entities, uh,including particularly the UN,
that followed very standardprocedures of sort of how do you
go from conflict status toreconstruction?
There's an initial stabilizationphase, then there's sort of the,
you know, how do you get peopleto a point where they can live
day to day with the basic, basicneeds, and then the
(52:39):
infrastructure enough that youcan reconstitute your life in
the medium term, and then sortof what does the economy look
like in all of those things.
Um disarmament is even harder.
Uh I won't add to or um Nimroknows far more than I do about
that process and also what'sbeen done in the context of
(53:00):
Hamas, they all need to becoordinated and there has to be
a governing structure.
Uh, in the case of Iraq, theUnited States and the entire
counter-ISIS coalition wasworking with the central
government.
Having a central governingstructure in Gaza, whether it's
initially this internationalboard institute of world peace,
(53:23):
what Nimrod described, what Idescribed earlier, or some other
entity will be critical toensure that any process put
forward, whether humanitariandisarmament, just fulfilling
people's basic needs, actuallygets stood up and then
sustained.
You have the added challenge inthe case of Gaza that is
ensuring Israel's security andthe safety and stability not
(53:48):
only for Gaza, but for whateverconstitutes the border zone, the
demilitarization zone, the noman's land between uh Israel and
Gaza.
And Gaza is not a very bigplace.
So the layered challenges aretremendous.
I think uh an initial indicatorwill be who are the countries,
(54:08):
not only who pledge tocontribute to this effort, but
then who follow through, whetherit's with material, with
personnel, with money, so thateach of these layers can get um
established and then sustained.
SPEAKER_01 (54:22):
Michael, uh, we're gonna give you the last word.
What uh what's what's on yourmind as we go into this
momentous weekend?
SPEAKER_04 (54:33):
So um I'm I I'm slightly, very slightly, uh
optimistic that we'll get tosome part of phase two.
I I don't think we're gonna seethe 20-point plan, you know,
exactly as envisioned and laidout.
But I'm, as I said, slightlyoptimistic that things are not
just going to get completelystalled after phase one.
(54:56):
And the thing on my mind is ifit if it gets a little bit down
the road and then it stalls, andit becomes clear that Hamas
still retains power in Gaza, andthere's no international
stabilization force that'sactually going to be stood up,
and Gaza basically turns into alow-grade civil war between
(55:18):
Hamas and Kans.
What's the follow-through goingto be at that point?
Is are the US and and otheractors in the international
community going to kind of standback and watch and say, okay,
well, you know, at least this isbetter than what we had before.
Um, is Israel going to going tostick to its new doctrine, which
(55:40):
is it sees any threat and it andit rushes in?
Um, or is it also going to sitback?
What's going to be the impact ofa different government, which I
think, you know, a year, a yearfrom now there probably will be.
Um so looking at the deal andseeing how it gets implemented,
I think is important.
But uh the the more interestingand and may end up being more
(56:04):
relevant question to me is howdo all these actors respond if
phase two doesn't start orbreaks down?
Is everybody gonna have a see noevil, hear no evil, speak no
evil type thing?
Or are people going to actuallyhave the have the wherewithal to
actively jump in and try to dosomething about it?
SPEAKER_01 (56:25):
Yeah.
Thank you, Michael, Rachel,Neri, and Nimrod.
And thank you, everyone, forjoining us.
Uh, we encourage you to tune into Israel Policy Pod, of course,
the podcast that Neri uh hostsuh each and every week, um with
conversations with news makersand opinion shapers, and of
course, Michael's weekly Kaplacolumn each uh Thursday.
(56:48):
Uh I, for one, am excited totravel uh next week to Israel
and see both Neri and Nimrod uhuh on this uh momentous week.
Uh thank you all again forjoining us.
Um we encourage you to uh followus on social media and consider
supporting Israel Policy andForum's work um at
Israelpolicyforum.org slash uhsupport.
(57:12):
Um thank you very much, and welook forward to meeting on uh uh
future days with the same levelof hope uh that we will see
better days to come.
This is indeed a momentousmoment, um, which we will
celebrate even as we recognizethe significant pitfalls ahead
with the additional phases ofthis deal.
(57:33):
And we will um be thinking ofour friends and colleagues in
Israel in the days to come inanticipation for uh the release
of those hostages.
Thank you all once again, andthanks, thanks, team.
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