May 8, 2025 • 50 mins
On this week’s episode, Israel Policy Forum Policy Advisor and Tel Aviv-based journalist Neri Zilber hosts Col. (res.) Dr. Michael Milshtein, former head of the Palestinian arena in Israeli Military Intelligence. They discuss the looming new Israeli military offensive in Gaza, the huge danger it entails not just for the Palestinians but also for Israelis, what will happen to the hostages, the need for a full ceasefire-hostage deal, the prospect that President Trump is able to broker a new truce before the Israeli operation gets underway, and more.
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Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Neri (00:03):
Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod.
I'm Neri Zilber, a journalistbased in Tel Aviv and a policy
advisor to Israel Policy Forum.
Our good friend MichaelMilstein is back with us this
week to discuss where the Gazawar is heading after the Israeli
government approved plans for amajor new offensive in the
Strip that it says will finallydefeat Hamas in the Strip that
(00:25):
it says will finally defeatHamas.
Mikhail is, of course, acolonel in the IDF reserves and
the former head of thePalestinian arena in Israeli
military intelligence, anadvisor to the IDF general
responsible for the Palestinianterritories and the head of the
Palestinian Studies Center atthe Delayan Center at Tel Aviv
University.
This was a really important andtimely episode After 19 months
(00:46):
of difficult war.
Many people here and in manyother places are concerned that
the situation may only get worsein the coming weeks and months
and, dare I say, years, asMichal and I get into in our
conversation.
The only hope perhaps is somediplomatic intervention at the
last minute by the Trumpadministration, but barring that
(01:07):
, we're likely looking atescalation.
Let's get to Mikhail Nishnet.
Hi Mikhail, welcome back to thepodcast.
Michael (01:20):
Hi Nery, Thank you for having me again.
Neri (01:24):
It's my pleasure, mikhail.
If you remember, last time youwere on was way back in
September, yeah, so it was botha very different time and also a
lot of the same issues still atplay, but it was definitely an
inflection point in the war, andI think we're now at another
inflection point in the war, soI very much wanted to have you
on For the record for ourlisteners.
(01:46):
We're recording this Thursdaymorning, tel Aviv time.
President Donald Trump lastnight said there may be some big
announcements about Gaza comingin the next 24 hours.
No one quite knows what hemeant and what it could be and,
believe me, I've checked, but Ipersonally don't think it's
going to be a big ceasefire of ahostage deal.
It might be something smaller,hopefully, but as always, our
(02:08):
listeners may be smarter than weare by the time this episode
comes out.
So just bear that in mind.
But leaving aside the USPresident Mikhail, the Israeli
cabinet earlier this week took abig decision.
It approved plans for a newmassive and expanded offensive
into Gaza, which wouldpotentially see the IDF reoccupy
(02:31):
, reconquer the entirety of theStrip and, according to the
government, finally finallydestroy Hamas once and for all
and force it into submissionafter 19 months of war, no less.
We'll get into the details ofthe plan in just a bit, trust me
.
But first question to you,mishael what was your initial
reaction to the cabinet'sdecision and this looming new
(02:55):
offensive?
Michael (02:57):
Well, you know, I cannot say nearly that I was
surprised, but me as a lot ofIsraelis, maybe the majority of
Israelis we elaborated twopoints.
First of all, and we will speakabout it, I'm not sure at all
that I, you know, in a veryclear manner, I do understand
(03:17):
the whole concept of thisoperation.
And second, and this is moreimportant for most of the
Israelis, we do not understandwhat will be with the hostages.
You know, it seems that thisterm in Israel, very popular
conceptia, the misconceptionthat was actually, you know, the
(03:42):
background or the roots of thefailure of October the 7th,
actually repeat itself.
And the new concept is that wecan defeat Hamas, occupy all
Gaza, but on the same time, alsorelease all the hostages.
And you know, it's really it's.
I don't think that there isanyone in Israel who really
(04:03):
believes that you can implementthat, and we want the leadership
to speak with us in a veryclear manner.
If you decided to prefer thewar in Gaza or the goal of
defeating Hamas, say that in avery clear manner and also admit
that actually, actually, yousacrifice the, the, the hostages
(04:26):
.
But you know, right now, we, we, we do not really know what,
what is the purpose, or theexact purpose, and we'll speak
immediately about the meaning ofoccupying, or gaza and uh.
That's why, you know, even aweek after, after the almost a
week after the announcement, itseems that there are much more
(04:49):
question marks than answers.
Neri (04:53):
Definitely question marks, including, well, all the things
you talked about the fate ofthe hostages, what happens after
you reconquer Gaza, the costand the price not only for
Gazans but also Israeli soldierswho are going to be tasked with
doing this.
But I may disagree slightlywith you, mithail.
I think this government hastold us what they prefer, right,
(05:17):
bibi Netanyahu?
Two weeks ago, he said, I thinkmaybe for the first time,
getting the hostages back isimportant.
But what do you say?
Ultimate victory over Hamas,over our enemies is more
important, yeah, and uh, betelSmotrich has been uh, our
finance minister has been sayingthis, uh, for for weeks, if not
months.
Uh, there are even reports thatthe IDF, under the new chief of
(05:41):
staff, theael Zamir, has madethe return of the hostages a
lower priority.
Again, I disagree with thatprioritization.
I think you disagree with thatprioritization.
Like you said, 60, 70% of theIsraeli public disagrees.
But they may be doing whatyou've been talking about.
Mikhail and you and I have hadconversations since the
(06:03):
beginning of the war and evenbefore the war, as listeners of
this podcast know, thisT-junction, that Israel was
faced with throughout much ofthe war Not all the war, but
throughout much of the war where, on the one hand, you were
talking about taking a left turn, shall we say, and cutting a
deal, ending the war and gettingall the hostages back, and the
(06:26):
right-hand turn in thisT-junction is going for full
reoccupation of the Strip.
Are they not taking your advice?
Are they not choosing to make adecision at this T-junction?
Or have I missed something?
Michael (06:42):
Yeah, I think that we both missed a lot of things.
You know, you said in severalannouncements there is what was
(07:09):
the definition?
Oh, okay, that we are not goingto occupy all Gaza.
There will be an area that willbe controlled I don't know if
by the Palestinians, but it willbe an area that IDF will not
control, mainly the area thatall the population of Gaza will
be concentrated in, and we willoccupy or control other areas.
(07:31):
So you know, once again, Iagree with you, nery, that the
messages of last week wereclearer than ever, but still
there are a lot of questionmarks.
By the way, many people inIsrael still or let's say that
like that they are not sure thatNetanyahu is serious enough
(07:53):
about occupying all Gaza andthey say that maybe it's a
threat, you know, to Hamas tofeel more pressure, to Hamas to
feel more pressure.
And they also are trying toanalyze why there are clear
messages that the occupation orthe operation will start only
after Trump's visit.
(08:14):
Maybe there is an attempt or awillingness that this operation
will not take place.
And you, nery, you spoke aboutthe T-junction and we both we
are spoke about the T-junctionand we both, we are speaking
about this T-junction for, Ithink, more than a year since
the first steps of the war, andyou know, I think, that for most
(08:38):
of the Israelis it's very clearthere are only two options.
All the fantasies of clans, of,you know, UAE that will control
Gaza, total illusions.
There is the option foroccupation of Gaza, if you
really want to defeat Hamas.
My main argument is that thisis not a bad idea and maybe
(09:02):
Israel, by the way, in thefuture will have to implement it
.
But the timing right now, I'mnot sure that it won't lead
Israel to disaster, tocatastrophe.
I mean a war with no plans, noclear purpose, no legitimacy, no
(09:22):
consensus inside.
You know, we have a very crisisamong the reserve army soldiers
.
We're not sure that all of themagree right now to take part in
the current operation and youknow we didn't speak, and maybe
we will speak, about theconsequences.
I mean the effect of this waron the relations between Israel
(09:45):
and the Arab world, maybe on theWest Bank.
So I say that in this T-junction, we must also look at the other
alternative.
I mean the other bad option,but the least worst alternative,
which is to promote the dealright now.
I mean to release the hostages,by the way, I think that you
(10:12):
cannot release hostages.
If you will decide to defeatHamas or to occupy all Gaza, you
will have to put an end to thewar right now and you will have
to commit withdrawal, fullwithdrawal, from Gaza.
Otherwise there is no chancethat you will be able really to
make Hamas present more flexibleopinions.
(10:34):
And, as I told you before, mary, I do think and I'm not naive
at this point I know that ifHamas will stay in Gaza, of
course, even if they won'tcontrol formally Gaza, they will
be the dominant player in Gazaand you will have in the future
to promote a broad operationagainst Hamas, but it will be
(10:57):
with serious plans and withlegitimacy, and right now we
have no way I mean thegovernment doesn't have any
legitimacy to this war.
Neri (11:09):
All very good points.
And yes, this may be a threatand a leverage play trying to
get Hamas to finally cave.
I'm skeptical and we'll maybeget your opinion in just a
second.
And yes, even according to theIsraeli government, the
offensive won't start untilafter Donald Trump finishes his
trip to the region to SaudiArabia, the UAE and Qatar next
(11:33):
week.
So there is still at leastanother week for something else
to happen More than a week,something like that.
Okay, interesting, but yes,it'll take time for the IDF to
prepare, to call up enoughreservists, et cetera, et cetera
.
So maybe it's a leverage play,although on this issue I take
the government at its word.
(11:53):
I don't believe them on manyother issues, but on this issue
I do believe that they'reserious about this offensive and
in terms of how shall we putthis, the cost and the price,
I'll say so.
You don't have to, but you gavean interview on Channel 12 two
nights ago and you said thatthis coming offensive could be
(12:17):
the most disastrous war possiblyin Israeli history and that it
will change the lives ofIsraelis and the character of
the country for a long time tocome economically, security,
diplomatically and socially.
Could you get into maybe someof the more concerning parts of
this?
That's a serious statement,it's a strong statement.
(12:38):
So what did you mean by it whenyou gave that interview to
Channel 12?
Michael (12:46):
You know, first of all, nery, not only in Channel 12,
but in other interviews.
I consider these interviewsimportant, not because I'm a
(13:07):
part of them, but because it's apart of public discourse, which
is very important because thepublic must demand from the
government a very clear pictureabout the purpose, about the
targets of the war.
And first of all, I oppose theyou know the term operation
Gideon chariots operation.
You cannot call this moveoperation.
This is a broad war, historicone, and occupying all Gaza, or
(13:28):
the majority of Gaza, it'ssomething that will change the
life of the Israelis for decades.
And I'm not afraid.
I'm concerned and I demand thegovernment to explain to the
people what is the meaning ofoccupying all Gaza, for example.
First of all, the governmentmust explain the people that
(13:50):
actually all the toughest,bitter fighting between us and
Hamas, they are in front of usright now.
Hamas is waiting in thepopulated urban areas of Gaza
and they prefer not to exposethemselves right now but to wait
for IDF.
And it means that when IDF willstart the ground maneuver into
(14:14):
Gaza, derenbala, hamunis, otherplaces, then you will see a very
tough fighting, clashes betweenus and Hamas and, of course, no
doubt it will be followed by alot of casualties.
The other point, which is moreimportant you know Smotrich, the
Minister of Finance.
(14:34):
He announced that he's notafraid from civil administration
, military regime occupying allGaza.
That's okay, you know this ishis opinion and that's okay.
But you need to explain topeople what is the price, what
is the meaning of occupying allGaza, for example, you are the
(14:54):
minister of finance.
How much will it cost us?
You know we're speaking aboutthe control over 2 million
people in destroyed areas, bythe way, 2 million people who
really hate you.
They hate you before the warand now even the hostility got
(15:15):
in.
And you know there are manyterms in Israel, many people in
Israel.
Now we will go until the end.
Okay, let's say that you willoccupy all Gaza.
You will kill dozens ofthousands of Hamas members and
no doubt at all, it will besevere damage to Hamas.
But do you understand that inthe day after, israel will face
(15:38):
terror and guerrilla.
And you know the same thingsthat the Americans knew in Iraq
after 2003, after the collapseof Saddam's regime.
And you know one more importantthing what will be the impact
on the relations between Israeland the Arab world?
First of all, the idea ofnormalization between us and
(15:59):
Saudi Arabia we can forget about.
You know, I really cannotimagine the Saudis promoting
normalization if there will be afull occupation of Gaza, of
course, if Israel will decide toreestablish settlements in Gaza
.
And second, I'm afraid thateven the relations between us
(16:19):
and Jordan, and mainly Egypt,will be damaged because of this
step, and that's why, you know,we are waiting for explanation
from the government.
Neri (16:35):
Yes, a major price, as I mentioned, and that's a lot of
the fears that I share with you,Mifal that it's very easy to
say, ok, this time we're going,like you said, for the final
victory over Hamas.
We're going to reoccupy.
Very easy to say, but whatwould that look like in practice
(16:55):
, on the ground, and what wouldit look like around the world If
the past 19 months have beendifficult?
I think, if and when thisoffensive starts, it could even
be worse.
It's hard to believe, but itcould be worse.
It could even be worse.
It's hard to believe, but itcould be worse.
And again, we'll maybe get intothe more granular details in
(17:18):
just a moment.
Mithail, in terms of what youcall the least worst option, a
full deal to get all thehostages back, even at the cost
of quote unquote, ending the warand then preparing, planning,
strategizing for likely the nextround, the real final victory
over Hamas, as we mentioned.
And, to be clear, netanyahu andhis government have rejected
(17:40):
that option.
The Prime Minister isn'twilling to end the war for
various reasons, both politicaland strategic, at least in his
own mind, but in terms of the USpresident, that may be the only
(18:01):
how should you put it get outof jail free card that we have
to avoid this offensive, andobviously Trump is going to be
meeting with many Arab leadersnext week.
So do you think there is apossibility that the Arab
leaders pressure Trump, topressure Israel to hopefully not
begin this offensive?
Michael (18:20):
Yeah, you know, we both know, nery that when we speak
about Trump so it is very, veryhard to predict something.
Sometimes it's easier to guessthings about it.
But you know, this is myimpression, my assessment.
(18:40):
I, of course, I read, I followthe Arab media, I speak with
people from my colleagues fromthe Arab world, speak with
people from the my colleaguesfrom the arab world and I am I
have very, uh, generalimpression that there are
serious talks between arabplayers, arab states and the
american administration inwashington.
(19:00):
I speak mainly about theegyptians, qatar and saudi
arabia and the uae.
I think that they all understand, you know, they knew, they
learned how to speak in Trump'slanguage I think that better
than most of the Israelis andthey do understand that he wants
(19:21):
the Arab world to present theinitiative, something creative,
something new, something new,and they are trying to.
I think that they plan topresent him actually the
Egyptian or the Arab initiative,which says that, okay, you
asked us to present you a planthat Hamas will not control Gaza
(19:42):
.
So we have a plan about a localcommittee or a kind of
Palestinian council that willmanage Gaza, and you know it's a
kind of cosmetic solution, butHamas will not rule Gaza but
will be one of the players.
And of course, you know, onceagain, we are not naive.
We do know that they will keeptheir weapons.
(20:07):
But when we deal with Trump,maybe and of course we need to
understand that there are a lotof economic, strategic
considerations for the Americanadministration, mainly with
Saudi Arabia and the rest of theGulf states Maybe they will say
listen, it seems okay, it seemsokay, it seems okay, it seems
(20:27):
okay.
And my main fear is that Israelwill be imaged, or the image of
Israel will be, as the stubbornplayer that always knows.
And you know, we may findourselves very soon, maybe next
week, in front of a newinitiative and in front of
(20:48):
Trump's announcement that itseems to him okay and we will
touch it in a minute.
We'll learn something from thecase of the negotiations between
the Americans and the Yemenitesand the Houthis, so I will not
surprise if there will besurprises at this point.
Neri (21:09):
Yes, look, it was true even before the second Trump
term and it's definitely trueover the past 100 days.
Nobody knows what he's liableto say or do, and it could
change tomorrow.
You and I were talking before.
We started recording that herein Israel, after Trump was
elected, the Israeli right andthis government were rejoicing.
(21:33):
They were saying you know theB'nai celebrating yes, the
Messiah is coming.
He's going to give useverything we want.
Michael (21:40):
And then in January, you can implement all the
fantasies you have.
Neri (21:44):
Everything, everything you know.
Just hand a list to Washingtonand they'll just green light it
Sure.
And then in January the mood onthe Israeli right changed
dramatically when Trump forcedNetanyahu to accept the six week
ceasefire to get the hostagesback.
They weren't happy with that.
They're like you know why is hepressuring us to stop the war?
(22:06):
That he was going to give us acarte blanche.
And then the mood got evenbetter in March when the
Americans let Netanyahu andIsrael, shall we say, not live
up to the commitment in theceasefire agreement, as our
listeners know.
So the Israeli right was veryhappy about that.
(22:29):
And then, more recently, likeyou said, the Houthis, the deal
that was struck behind Israel'sback and they were surprised.
It's confirmed.
Israel was surprised by thefact that Trump stopped the
military campaign against theHouthis.
The negotiations directly withIran over the nuclear program
also came as a surprise.
Direct talks between Trumpadministration officials at
Hamas over the hostages also asurprise.
Between Trump administrationofficials and Hamas over the
hostages also a surprise.
(22:49):
And I mean it's not a minorpoint.
Trump is not going to bevisiting, as far as we know,
israel on this trip to theMiddle East, unlike in his first
term.
I'm sure you remember Mifed,because it was a two-day circus
here.
Trump visited Saudi Arabia andmet with the Arab leaders and
then he flew directly to Israeland, at least for right now,
(23:15):
that's unlikely to happen.
Getting back to Gaza, mikhail,and just in terms of the least
worst option, I have to playdevil's advocate, because I hear
the counter-argument just aswell as you do, I'm sure, from
friends and colleagues.
They say we can't stop the warnow, colleagues.
They say we can't stop the warnow Strategically if we don't
fully defeat Hamas quote,unquote, whatever that may mean,
(23:36):
then the next October 7th isonly a matter of time, and that
it would be military malpractice, strategic malpractice, to
actually agree to a deal thatends the war without getting all
the job done.
How do you react to thosearguments which you hear from
even?
You know don't have to be acrazy BBist and right-winger to
(24:00):
say it, even though I personallydisagree with.
Michael (24:02):
What do you?
Neri (24:03):
think.
Michael (24:05):
I agree with you.
Actually, this is the basicstrategic argument of anyone who
really supports the idea oflet's give priority to the war,
this idea.
(24:26):
First of all, I tell them thatI think that this, you know,
hamas presents, or if Hamas willstay on the defense, is not the
worst alternative, becausegetting into a war with no
consensus, with a very toughrift in the Israeli society, I
(24:48):
think this is the worst scenario.
I'm asking a lot of people whowave this slogan there is a
nuclear program of Iran.
I think that this is the realexistential threat for Israel.
According to this opinion, oraccording to this logic, we had
(25:09):
to attack the nuclear program ofIran yesterday, a year ago, 10
years ago, we didn't do it anddescribing Yemen, the Houthis
and Qatar, natalio himself, hedescribed them as very
complicated challenges.
So, when it comes to Gaza, itmust be now, it must be
(25:32):
immediately and totally.
And I'm afraid Nery thatreligious and ideological
considerations are mainly fromthe Smotich point of view and
the other religious Zionismleaders.
This is the main reason fromtheir point of view, and not any
(25:54):
other strategic considerationwhich is actually a cover.
For example, this argument ofwe will not leave Hamas sitting
on the fence?
Okay, and what you will do withSyria?
Will you occupy Damascus?
What you will do with Hezbollah?
Are you ready to occupy Beirut?
(26:15):
So there will be no Hezbollahin Lebanon.
Enough this argument, and onceagain, when we are getting
deeper into this swamp calledGaza, it means that we will not
be focused on other, moreimportant threats, mainly Iran.
(26:40):
So I find that going right now,directly to occupy all Gaza
right now, it's much more damagethan any achievement that we
will see.
Neri (26:56):
Yeah, I happen to agree with you, michal, and I've also
said, both publicly andprivately, that if, after 19
months of war and the damagethat's already been inflicted on
Hamas, that the IDF can'tprotect southern Israel from
whatever may come out of Gaza,then you might as well fold up
the IDF the idea that they'regoing to be surprised again by a
(27:20):
massive cross-border operation,like we saw on October 7th.
Then what are we doing here?
Michael (27:26):
honestly.
Yeah, by the way, you know,nery, this is also a result of
the fact that there was nocommission of inquiry, because
if there is no commission,serious one of inquiry, it means
that all the things that werewrong, all the mistakes, all the
failures, you actually preservethem and you are going to
(27:47):
repeat them, and you arerepeating them right now, and
one of them is this slogan ofmore and more power will lead us
to a white flag over Gaza.
Once again, a conception.
Neri (28:05):
Okay, we'll be right back after this brief message.
Okay, we'll be right back afterthis brief message, an impact.
(28:45):
Donate now at ipfli slashsupportthepod or at the support
the show link in the show notes.
We'll get into Hamas's thinking, which I know you tried very
closely, and again in just asecond.
But I have to get into theweeds with you, the brass tacks
of what this offensive actuallymeans, what it will look like.
To the best of our understanding, it's a multi-stage offensive,
from the ground primarily so,sending in masses of armor and
(29:08):
infantry, also coveringfirepower from the air and the
sea, very aggressive, and theIDF says that in territory that
it moves into and I'm curious toget your sense of where that
territory may be, at least inthe beginning the IDF won't
leave.
It's going to hold theterritory.
It won't leave.
No more raids.
(29:28):
This in and out operations.
That was part of the originalwar plan.
Also, the humanitarian aiddistribution system is also
supposed to change.
What else?
They want?
To move most of the 2 millionpeople in Gaza down south, south
of Famunis also not a smallissue, that's right.
(29:50):
So what should we understand aslaypeople and not colonels in
the IDF about this new offensive?
What will it look like when,once, or if, the IDF gets a
green light?
Michael (30:06):
You know you described it in a very accurate manner and
I must say, nery, that after 25years in the army, 20 years in
Amman in the militaryintelligence and five years in
Kogat, I do aware the fact thatthings that seem wonderful in
papers and in presentation, onground it's totally different.
(30:28):
And you know, I'm quite afraidfrom this.
You know kind of engineering, awar.
That will be very clear.
First of all, we will occupythe territory, then we will
evacuate all the northern partsand the central parts of Gaza,
which means all the refugeecamps like Mugazi, userat,
(30:50):
al-buraj and Gaza City itself,and we will create a tiny area,
as you mentioned, between thesouthern parts of Khan Yunis to
the Egyptian border, and then wewill put two million people
Actually there are no civilinfrastructure over there.
And what will happen?
(31:10):
Okay, is it going to be arepublic, I mean this tiny
entity which will be ruled bywhom and who will give the
humanitarian supply?
And what will happen on theother parts that were occupied?
(31:32):
Because, motlich, if you willask him, he will say immediately
to establish or reestablishsettlements over there.
And once again, you know we saidthat in the beginning, we will
emphasize it again there must bea clear message of the
government.
We said that in the beginningand we will emphasize it again
(31:57):
there must be a clear message ofthe government and a very clear
discourse of the governmentwith the public.
And right now, unfortunately,it's not surprising that there
is such a deep turmoil.
Deep turmoil, and you know theconfidence.
I would define it in a verygentle manner.
There is no big confidence ofthe public in what the
(32:17):
government thinks, plans,promotes, and it's not
surprising, because no onereally speaks in a very clear
manner with the public.
Neri (32:27):
And confidence in the IDF, this new general staff, because
no one really speaks in a veryclear manner with the public and
confidence in the IDF, this newgeneral staff.
They've already started callingup thousands and potentially it
will be tens of thousands ofreservists and, to be clear, I
think the plan is to have themsecure the borders in the north
Lebanon, syria, and secure theWest Bank and free up the
regular army, the heavyoffensive divisions, to actually
(32:50):
go and do the bulk of thefighting in Gaza.
What do you think the mood is,or what do you know the mood is,
in terms of the reservists andthe confidence in the generals?
Michael (33:02):
You know, first of all, mary, of course most of the
data, most of the reports aboutit are clandestine.
The IDF considered them and ofcourse it's right to consider
them as a secret about how manyReserve Army soldiers had
(33:25):
already requited, reserve armysoldiers had already requited.
But it seems to me and I willbe very cautious that of course
there is a problem Because, youknow, a year ago people were
ready to sacrifice their life ina very justified war and they
felt that, you know, they got abroad support from the people.
(33:48):
This time I'm not sure at all.
And you know you mentioned thetalk between Eyal Zamil, the new
chief of staff, and thegovernment and we saw that
during the last two weeks therewere at least twice there were
all kinds of clashes betweenthem.
First of all when there werenegotiations in the government
(34:12):
about who will be responsiblefor the humanitarian aid and
Samir was very clear and he saidno, he resisted the idea that
IDF will be responsible for that.
And you know we heard Smotricheven he elaborated the threat
(34:33):
that your end will be like ahealthy one.
Neri (34:38):
Healthy LNV.
Yeah, the previous chief ofstaff.
Michael (34:42):
And, by the way, two days ago we witnessed an
announcement of the new IDFspokesman and he said the most
important target is to releasethe hostages, Only after that to
defeat Hamas.
And, of course, there were verycritic voices among the
(35:04):
government, among the ministers,were very critic voices among
the government, among theministers, who said, hey, once
again you repeat the same voicesor you elaborate the same
opinions like a year ago.
Neri (35:18):
Yeah, I think the IDF spokesman may have been doing
damage control, because I thinkthe night before there were
certain leaks attributed toYaviz Zamil, the new chief of
staff, to the effect that theoperation will kill hostages.
Yeah, yeah, I think thespokesman, he was a warning
(35:38):
actually.
Michael (35:41):
He warned the government that the broad
operation he can commit, he canpromote broad operation, but the
price will be the life of thehostages.
So you know, at least for me,I'm not optimistic, but I think
that we need to hear such afrank voice which says you
(36:04):
cannot do both things in thesame time.
You need to understand or toexplain that if you want full
occupation of Gaza, it meansthat zero hostages will be
released from the hands of Hamas.
Neri (36:19):
So on that point, that's both a very good and very bad
transition to my next question,Michal.
But when the government and notjust the government, also IDF
officials say you know, no, thegoal of the operation, like the
IDF spokesman said, you knowstill to relieve hostages, we're
going to pressure Hamas withthis new offensive to relieve
(36:42):
hostages.
I mean, isn't it more likelythat the hostages will be either
killed, murdered by Hamas or,inadvertently of course, by IDF
bombs?
And, by the way, follow on tothat, will it work?
Michael (37:06):
You know, will Hamas actually be pressured enough to
release the hostages if they seethe IDF tanks coming, or the
opposite?
You know, we are in a kind ofyou know experiment.
For 19 months, we stick thisslogan of more and more and more
power, and this time we say no,now it's serious.
It will be very, very strongpower against Hamas and this
will lead, this will push themto give up and to be much more
(37:29):
flexible.
And you know, nery, this is myopinion.
I think that, first of all, ifyou fail again and again and
again, you need to, you know,check.
Neri (37:40):
Reassess.
Michael (37:42):
As Einstein said, something is wrong if you repeat
the same experiment and itfails all the time.
So, first of all, I think thatthere is something deeply wrong
with this assumption and, second, I'm asking myself is it
possible that most of those whosupport this idea do not really
(38:06):
improve their understandingabout Hamas?
Because, you know, we had thefailure of October the 7th and
most of the people of thegovernment who were responsible
for this failure.
Now they announced we learnedthe lesson and now we will not
repeat the same mistake.
And it seems that you didn'tunderstand nothing about Hamas,
(38:26):
the nature, the DNA of Hamas.
Didn't you understand thatwe're speaking about radical
ideological organization that isready to sacrifice the life of
his people, to commit a suicideand, of course, to kill the
hostages, but not to give up orwave a white flag?
(38:47):
And I cannot.
You know, I'm surprised by thevoices here in Israel that
repeat once again the idea of wewill push Hamas to evacuate
Gaza, like Arafat did in 1982.
You know, we're speaking aboutit for 19 months and we didn't
(39:08):
see even one clue that Hamas isready to consider this idea.
So why think that it willhappen now?
Neri (39:18):
Or pressuring Hamas to lay down its arms.
Michael (39:21):
Yeah, sure.
And you know, I spoke with oneof my Palestinian colleagues and
he said to me listen, the termHamas is Harkat Ha resistance,
and if you will take this M outof Hamas, there is no Hamas.
It's like taking the heart outof the body.
And you know, once again, youneed to understand Hamas in
(39:44):
order to really realize thatthey will never give up their
weapons.
They will be ready to fightuntil death, but they will not
give up their weapons.
If you will continue creatingfantasies and relying on
assumptions or illusionsactually not assumptions do you
really want to promotesuccessful moves?
(40:08):
I think that it will lead us tocatastrophe.
Neri (40:12):
Yeah, and it's not a theoretical experiment.
If this goes ahead, thisoffensive, then we're talking
about the lives of over 20 stillliving Israeli hostages, 59
total and that's also a primarywar goal.
It has been from the beginning.
Maybe now a secondary war goalaccording to this government,
(40:35):
but not according to themajority of the Israeli public.
Mithail, final two questionsfor you.
Number one, in terms of theoffensive specifically, we've
seen reports, assessments thatthe IDF thinks they can reoccupy
most of the strip in threemonths and clear it and clean it
of Hamas in nine months.
(40:56):
So basically another 12 monthsof fighting.
What do you think when you hearand see that kind of assessment
?
Michael (41:04):
You know, regarding the three months, it seems to me
likely, nery, you know, if IDFwill get between five to six
divisions, I think that thistarget of occupying all Gaza
within three months and onceagain the price will be very
heavy in the Palestinian side,but of course also in the
(41:26):
Israeli one.
But regarding the rest of thetime, I mean nine months of
cleaning, once again I do notlike this term, you know.
Cleaning Gaza, okay, it meansthat of course you will cause
Hamas dramatic damage.
But what will happen afterthese nine months?
You know I assess that therewill be terror and guerrilla
(41:50):
fighting against Israel, I thinkthat, against IDF, I mean.
So I really wish that IDF, butalso the government, will not
use such scientific cleanmessages or terms.
And once again, I think thatthe government should explain to
(42:14):
people that we are getting intoa very tough period.
If Gaza Strip will be occupiedby IDF and they cannot commit or
they cannot promise that itwill take only a year and after
that, you know, we will live ina harmonic situation.
Not at all.
We are getting into a gate andbehind this gate or after this
(42:38):
gate, I'm not sure that I canreally draw in a very accurate
manner.
What will happen?
I do know that nothing verygood will happen and once again,
harry, we spoke about it.
If the Israeli society rightnow is split, there is a very
(42:58):
deep split about this war.
I'm quite sure that it willcontinue and maybe even get
wider.
After the operation, the warwill start.
Neri (43:12):
It'll get wider because of the lack of consensus over the
offensive, the fate of thehostages and also, we should
mention casualties, sureCasualty, and the more
casualties that you're going totake as the IDF, the more it's
going to be felt on the homefront.
I agree 24, and since the uhceasefire collapsed in march,
(43:47):
the idf has been working toexpand from the philadelphia
corridor, from uh, the egyptianborder up, and to basically
clear out all of rafa up to thisnew corridor just south of of
hanunis, the morag corridor, anduh, if you talk to reservists
who are down there, they say, um, there's almost nothing
standing, there's almost nothingstanding.
Uh, if there's a structure, ifthere's a structure standing,
(44:10):
it's probably because the IDF isusing it, and yet my point
being the IDF still, evenyesterday, a Golani soldier was
severely injured by IED inRafi'af.
Yeah right.
There was the ALom, the combatengineering forces, a few days
before.
So even in this area that'ssupposedly quote unquote cleared
(44:32):
and clean, you're still takingcasualties.
I don't know how Hamas fightersare still there.
That's, I think, a questionmaybe for another episode.
So, yes, if you replicate theRAF-RAF model across the entire
Gaza Strip with thousands, ifnot 10, 20 thousand, remaining
(44:54):
Hamas fighters, very difficult,mithan.
Actual final question to you.
I'd be remiss if I didn't bringit all back to the US President
, donald J Trump and the Trumpplan for the quote unquote
voluntary immigration, oressentially, the expulsion of
(45:14):
Gazans from the Gaza Strip.
The Israeli officials say, oncethe bulk of the population of
Gaza is down south, it'll beeasier to quote-unquote convince
them I hate to use that wordbecause it's not voluntary, I
(45:35):
don't think but easier toconvince them to leave via Egypt
or the sea, or even via Israel.
The Israeli right, as you know,loves this idea.
Other people don't like it, forvery good reasons as well.
So how realistic, how practicaldo you think this plan actually
is?
Michael (45:54):
You know, first of all, nery, you know, we must all be
aware that the term used by allthe Arab world and, of course,
the Palestinians, for this planis tahjir transfer, not anything
else.
This is how they consider thisvision.
And you know, it's quiteamazing that right now, almost I
think, between more than threemonths after it was elaborated
(46:17):
actually Israel is the onlystate on earth which supports
this idea.
It seems that you know, thereis no, no, not even one state
that announced that they will beready to open the gates for
Palestinians from Gaza or toassist in the implementation of
(46:42):
this vision.
And you know, it's quiteamazing because when you follow
the Israeli media and theIsraeli discourse, we are full
of fake news, all kinds ofillusions.
You know, people speak hereabout Somaliland, puntland and
all other.
They're not states at all thatwe'll be ready to open the gates
(47:03):
for Palestinians.
And you know, a lot of numbersare being elaborated in the
Israeli discos about thousandsof Palestinians who are ready to
leave.
And you know, I really feelthat the illusions, or the
fantasies are much more strongerthan professional, realistic
(47:24):
assessments.
And you know, right now I thinkthat there are two basic
problems.
First of all, as you mentionedbefore Neri, during the last
half a year a lot of let's callthem red alarms were elaborated
in front of Israel about thepolicy of Trump.
(47:46):
I mean the first ceasefire, thenegotiations with Iran, border
talks with Hamas, the Houthi andeven Trump himself.
It seems that he's not there.
He doesn't really support thisidea today.
You haven't heard him talkingabout it for weeks, and you know
, when he speaks about Gaza, hesays they are very poor people,
(48:09):
we should help them.
He doesn't say we should takethem out of Gaza.
And, by the way, also Witka, inthe podcast he had a month ago,
he didn't speak about thetransfer from Gaza.
So it seems to me that rightnow, first of all, even without
promoting this idea, israelalready causes itself damage, I
(48:31):
mean damage regarding therelations between us and the
Arab world.
Saudi Arabia said no, nonormalization if you will
continue with this plan.
And of course, you know Egyptand Jordan are very concerned
about it.
And second, and this is a veryimportant point for you know,
(48:52):
all the Israelis, mainly thedecision makers since the
beginning of the war, it seemsthat we didn't really learn all
the lessons of October the 7th.
We still prefer fantasies,illusions instead of realistic,
sometimes very pessimisticassessments or facts, and I
(49:16):
really hope that you know ourgovernment will be more
realistic, not only regardingTrump's vision, but regarding
everything that is happeningsince the beginning of the war.
Neri (49:29):
I hope so too, mithel.
We can only hope Not toooptimistic with this government,
but you can only hope.
But this is why we love to haveyou on, to not feed us
illusions and fantasies, butactual, realistic analysis and
assessments, the degree facts.
And we can only hope for thebest.
(49:52):
And as you told me last timeyou were on the podcast back in
September, hopefully we won't behere in another six months,
neri, talking about the samedilemma whether to continue the
war or to get the hostages back.
So I'll say it again, so youdon't have to.
Hopefully, michel, we're nothere another six months talking
(50:13):
about the offensive and thehostages.
And well, what a disaster thisnew clan is.
We'll be a lot smarter then.
So thank you again.
Michael (50:25):
Thank you for having me .
Nery, Take care, Okay.
Thanks again to Michael.
Neri (50:26):
You for having me, nery, take care, okay.
Thanks again to MikhailMilishin, as always, for his
generous time and insights.
Also, a special thanks to ourproducer, jacob Gilman, and to
all of you who support IsraelPolicy Forum's work.
Do consider making a donationto Israel Policy Forum so you
can keep being a credible sourceof analysis and ideas on issues
such as these that we all caredeeply about, including this
(50:46):
podcast and, most importantly,thank you for listening.
Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod.
I'm Neri Zilber, a journalistbased in Tel Aviv and a policy
advisor to Israel Policy Forum.
Our good friend MichaelMilstein is back with us this
week to discuss where the Gazawar is heading after the Israeli
government approved plans for amajor new offensive in the
Strip that it says will finallydefeat Hamas in the Strip that
(00:25):
it says will finally defeatHamas.
Mikhail is, of course, acolonel in the IDF reserves and
the former head of thePalestinian arena in Israeli
military intelligence, anadvisor to the IDF general
responsible for the Palestinianterritories and the head of the
Palestinian Studies Center atthe Delayan Center at Tel Aviv
University.
This was a really important andtimely episode After 19 months
(00:46):
of difficult war.
Many people here and in manyother places are concerned that
the situation may only get worsein the coming weeks and months
and, dare I say, years, asMichal and I get into in our
conversation.
The only hope perhaps is somediplomatic intervention at the
last minute by the Trumpadministration, but barring that
(01:07):
, we're likely looking atescalation.
Let's get to Mikhail Nishnet.
Hi Mikhail, welcome back to thepodcast.
Michael (01:20):
Hi Nery, Thank you for having me again.
Neri (01:24):
It's my pleasure, mikhail.
If you remember, last time youwere on was way back in
September, yeah, so it was botha very different time and also a
lot of the same issues still atplay, but it was definitely an
inflection point in the war, andI think we're now at another
inflection point in the war, soI very much wanted to have you
on For the record for ourlisteners.
(01:46):
We're recording this Thursdaymorning, tel Aviv time.
President Donald Trump lastnight said there may be some big
announcements about Gaza comingin the next 24 hours.
No one quite knows what hemeant and what it could be and,
believe me, I've checked, but Ipersonally don't think it's
going to be a big ceasefire of ahostage deal.
It might be something smaller,hopefully, but as always, our
(02:08):
listeners may be smarter than weare by the time this episode
comes out.
So just bear that in mind.
But leaving aside the USPresident Mikhail, the Israeli
cabinet earlier this week took abig decision.
It approved plans for a newmassive and expanded offensive
into Gaza, which wouldpotentially see the IDF reoccupy
(02:31):
, reconquer the entirety of theStrip and, according to the
government, finally finallydestroy Hamas once and for all
and force it into submissionafter 19 months of war, no less.
We'll get into the details ofthe plan in just a bit, trust me
.
But first question to you,mishael what was your initial
reaction to the cabinet'sdecision and this looming new
(02:55):
offensive?
Michael (02:57):
Well, you know, I cannot say nearly that I was
surprised, but me as a lot ofIsraelis, maybe the majority of
Israelis we elaborated twopoints.
First of all, and we will speakabout it, I'm not sure at all
that I, you know, in a veryclear manner, I do understand
(03:17):
the whole concept of thisoperation.
And second, and this is moreimportant for most of the
Israelis, we do not understandwhat will be with the hostages.
You know, it seems that thisterm in Israel, very popular
conceptia, the misconceptionthat was actually, you know, the
(03:42):
background or the roots of thefailure of October the 7th,
actually repeat itself.
And the new concept is that wecan defeat Hamas, occupy all
Gaza, but on the same time, alsorelease all the hostages.
And you know, it's really it's.
I don't think that there isanyone in Israel who really
(04:03):
believes that you can implementthat, and we want the leadership
to speak with us in a veryclear manner.
If you decided to prefer thewar in Gaza or the goal of
defeating Hamas, say that in avery clear manner and also admit
that actually, actually, yousacrifice the, the, the hostages
(04:26):
.
But you know, right now, we, we, we do not really know what,
what is the purpose, or theexact purpose, and we'll speak
immediately about the meaning ofoccupying, or gaza and uh.
That's why, you know, even aweek after, after the almost a
week after the announcement, itseems that there are much more
(04:49):
question marks than answers.
Neri (04:53):
Definitely question marks, including, well, all the things
you talked about the fate ofthe hostages, what happens after
you reconquer Gaza, the costand the price not only for
Gazans but also Israeli soldierswho are going to be tasked with
doing this.
But I may disagree slightlywith you, mithail.
I think this government hastold us what they prefer, right,
(05:17):
bibi Netanyahu?
Two weeks ago, he said, I thinkmaybe for the first time,
getting the hostages back isimportant.
But what do you say?
Ultimate victory over Hamas,over our enemies is more
important, yeah, and uh, betelSmotrich has been uh, our
finance minister has been sayingthis, uh, for for weeks, if not
months.
Uh, there are even reports thatthe IDF, under the new chief of
(05:41):
staff, theael Zamir, has madethe return of the hostages a
lower priority.
Again, I disagree with thatprioritization.
I think you disagree with thatprioritization.
Like you said, 60, 70% of theIsraeli public disagrees.
But they may be doing whatyou've been talking about.
Mikhail and you and I have hadconversations since the
(06:03):
beginning of the war and evenbefore the war, as listeners of
this podcast know, thisT-junction, that Israel was
faced with throughout much ofthe war Not all the war, but
throughout much of the war where, on the one hand, you were
talking about taking a left turn, shall we say, and cutting a
deal, ending the war and gettingall the hostages back, and the
(06:26):
right-hand turn in thisT-junction is going for full
reoccupation of the Strip.
Are they not taking your advice?
Are they not choosing to make adecision at this T-junction?
Or have I missed something?
Michael (06:42):
Yeah, I think that we both missed a lot of things.
You know, you said in severalannouncements there is what was
(07:09):
the definition?
Oh, okay, that we are not goingto occupy all Gaza.
There will be an area that willbe controlled I don't know if
by the Palestinians, but it willbe an area that IDF will not
control, mainly the area thatall the population of Gaza will
be concentrated in, and we willoccupy or control other areas.
(07:31):
So you know, once again, Iagree with you, nery, that the
messages of last week wereclearer than ever, but still
there are a lot of questionmarks.
By the way, many people inIsrael still or let's say that
like that they are not sure thatNetanyahu is serious enough
(07:53):
about occupying all Gaza andthey say that maybe it's a
threat, you know, to Hamas tofeel more pressure, to Hamas to
feel more pressure.
And they also are trying toanalyze why there are clear
messages that the occupation orthe operation will start only
after Trump's visit.
(08:14):
Maybe there is an attempt or awillingness that this operation
will not take place.
And you, nery, you spoke aboutthe T-junction and we both we
are spoke about the T-junctionand we both, we are speaking
about this T-junction for, Ithink, more than a year since
the first steps of the war, andyou know, I think, that for most
(08:38):
of the Israelis it's very clearthere are only two options.
All the fantasies of clans, of,you know, UAE that will control
Gaza, total illusions.
There is the option foroccupation of Gaza, if you
really want to defeat Hamas.
My main argument is that thisis not a bad idea and maybe
(09:02):
Israel, by the way, in thefuture will have to implement it
.
But the timing right now, I'mnot sure that it won't lead
Israel to disaster, tocatastrophe.
I mean a war with no plans, noclear purpose, no legitimacy, no
(09:22):
consensus inside.
You know, we have a very crisisamong the reserve army soldiers
.
We're not sure that all of themagree right now to take part in
the current operation and youknow we didn't speak, and maybe
we will speak, about theconsequences.
I mean the effect of this waron the relations between Israel
(09:45):
and the Arab world, maybe on theWest Bank.
So I say that in this T-junction, we must also look at the other
alternative.
I mean the other bad option,but the least worst alternative,
which is to promote the dealright now.
I mean to release the hostages,by the way, I think that you
(10:12):
cannot release hostages.
If you will decide to defeatHamas or to occupy all Gaza, you
will have to put an end to thewar right now and you will have
to commit withdrawal, fullwithdrawal, from Gaza.
Otherwise there is no chancethat you will be able really to
make Hamas present more flexibleopinions.
(10:34):
And, as I told you before, mary, I do think and I'm not naive
at this point I know that ifHamas will stay in Gaza, of
course, even if they won'tcontrol formally Gaza, they will
be the dominant player in Gazaand you will have in the future
to promote a broad operationagainst Hamas, but it will be
(10:57):
with serious plans and withlegitimacy, and right now we
have no way I mean thegovernment doesn't have any
legitimacy to this war.
Neri (11:09):
All very good points.
And yes, this may be a threatand a leverage play trying to
get Hamas to finally cave.
I'm skeptical and we'll maybeget your opinion in just a
second.
And yes, even according to theIsraeli government, the
offensive won't start untilafter Donald Trump finishes his
trip to the region to SaudiArabia, the UAE and Qatar next
(11:33):
week.
So there is still at leastanother week for something else
to happen More than a week,something like that.
Okay, interesting, but yes,it'll take time for the IDF to
prepare, to call up enoughreservists, et cetera, et cetera
.
So maybe it's a leverage play,although on this issue I take
the government at its word.
(11:53):
I don't believe them on manyother issues, but on this issue
I do believe that they'reserious about this offensive and
in terms of how shall we putthis, the cost and the price,
I'll say so.
You don't have to, but you gavean interview on Channel 12 two
nights ago and you said thatthis coming offensive could be
(12:17):
the most disastrous war possiblyin Israeli history and that it
will change the lives ofIsraelis and the character of
the country for a long time tocome economically, security,
diplomatically and socially.
Could you get into maybe someof the more concerning parts of
this?
That's a serious statement,it's a strong statement.
(12:38):
So what did you mean by it whenyou gave that interview to
Channel 12?
Michael (12:46):
You know, first of all, nery, not only in Channel 12,
but in other interviews.
I consider these interviewsimportant, not because I'm a
(13:07):
part of them, but because it's apart of public discourse, which
is very important because thepublic must demand from the
government a very clear pictureabout the purpose, about the
targets of the war.
And first of all, I oppose theyou know the term operation
Gideon chariots operation.
You cannot call this moveoperation.
This is a broad war, historicone, and occupying all Gaza, or
(13:28):
the majority of Gaza, it'ssomething that will change the
life of the Israelis for decades.
And I'm not afraid.
I'm concerned and I demand thegovernment to explain to the
people what is the meaning ofoccupying all Gaza, for example.
First of all, the governmentmust explain the people that
(13:50):
actually all the toughest,bitter fighting between us and
Hamas, they are in front of usright now.
Hamas is waiting in thepopulated urban areas of Gaza
and they prefer not to exposethemselves right now but to wait
for IDF.
And it means that when IDF willstart the ground maneuver into
(14:14):
Gaza, derenbala, hamunis, otherplaces, then you will see a very
tough fighting, clashes betweenus and Hamas and, of course, no
doubt it will be followed by alot of casualties.
The other point, which is moreimportant you know Smotrich, the
Minister of Finance.
(14:34):
He announced that he's notafraid from civil administration
, military regime occupying allGaza.
That's okay, you know this ishis opinion and that's okay.
But you need to explain topeople what is the price, what
is the meaning of occupying allGaza, for example, you are the
(14:54):
minister of finance.
How much will it cost us?
You know we're speaking aboutthe control over 2 million
people in destroyed areas, bythe way, 2 million people who
really hate you.
They hate you before the warand now even the hostility got
(15:15):
in.
And you know there are manyterms in Israel, many people in
Israel.
Now we will go until the end.
Okay, let's say that you willoccupy all Gaza.
You will kill dozens ofthousands of Hamas members and
no doubt at all, it will besevere damage to Hamas.
But do you understand that inthe day after, israel will face
(15:38):
terror and guerrilla.
And you know the same thingsthat the Americans knew in Iraq
after 2003, after the collapseof Saddam's regime.
And you know one more importantthing what will be the impact
on the relations between Israeland the Arab world?
First of all, the idea ofnormalization between us and
(15:59):
Saudi Arabia we can forget about.
You know, I really cannotimagine the Saudis promoting
normalization if there will be afull occupation of Gaza, of
course, if Israel will decide toreestablish settlements in Gaza
.
And second, I'm afraid thateven the relations between us
(16:19):
and Jordan, and mainly Egypt,will be damaged because of this
step, and that's why, you know,we are waiting for explanation
from the government.
Neri (16:35):
Yes, a major price, as I mentioned, and that's a lot of
the fears that I share with you,Mifal that it's very easy to
say, ok, this time we're going,like you said, for the final
victory over Hamas.
We're going to reoccupy.
Very easy to say, but whatwould that look like in practice
(16:55):
, on the ground, and what wouldit look like around the world If
the past 19 months have beendifficult?
I think, if and when thisoffensive starts, it could even
be worse.
It's hard to believe, but itcould be worse.
It could even be worse.
It's hard to believe, but itcould be worse.
And again, we'll maybe get intothe more granular details in
(17:18):
just a moment.
Mithail, in terms of what youcall the least worst option, a
full deal to get all thehostages back, even at the cost
of quote unquote, ending the warand then preparing, planning,
strategizing for likely the nextround, the real final victory
over Hamas, as we mentioned.
And, to be clear, netanyahu andhis government have rejected
(17:40):
that option.
The Prime Minister isn'twilling to end the war for
various reasons, both politicaland strategic, at least in his
own mind, but in terms of the USpresident, that may be the only
(18:01):
how should you put it get outof jail free card that we have
to avoid this offensive, andobviously Trump is going to be
meeting with many Arab leadersnext week.
So do you think there is apossibility that the Arab
leaders pressure Trump, topressure Israel to hopefully not
begin this offensive?
Michael (18:20):
Yeah, you know, we both know, nery that when we speak
about Trump so it is very, veryhard to predict something.
Sometimes it's easier to guessthings about it.
But you know, this is myimpression, my assessment.
(18:40):
I, of course, I read, I followthe Arab media, I speak with
people from my colleagues fromthe Arab world, speak with
people from the my colleaguesfrom the arab world and I am I
have very, uh, generalimpression that there are
serious talks between arabplayers, arab states and the
american administration inwashington.
(19:00):
I speak mainly about theegyptians, qatar and saudi
arabia and the uae.
I think that they all understand, you know, they knew, they
learned how to speak in Trump'slanguage I think that better
than most of the Israelis andthey do understand that he wants
(19:21):
the Arab world to present theinitiative, something creative,
something new, something new,and they are trying to.
I think that they plan topresent him actually the
Egyptian or the Arab initiative,which says that, okay, you
asked us to present you a planthat Hamas will not control Gaza
(19:42):
.
So we have a plan about a localcommittee or a kind of
Palestinian council that willmanage Gaza, and you know it's a
kind of cosmetic solution, butHamas will not rule Gaza but
will be one of the players.
And of course, you know, onceagain, we are not naive.
We do know that they will keeptheir weapons.
(20:07):
But when we deal with Trump,maybe and of course we need to
understand that there are a lotof economic, strategic
considerations for the Americanadministration, mainly with
Saudi Arabia and the rest of theGulf states Maybe they will say
listen, it seems okay, it seemsokay, it seems okay, it seems
(20:27):
okay.
And my main fear is that Israelwill be imaged, or the image of
Israel will be, as the stubbornplayer that always knows.
And you know, we may findourselves very soon, maybe next
week, in front of a newinitiative and in front of
(20:48):
Trump's announcement that itseems to him okay and we will
touch it in a minute.
We'll learn something from thecase of the negotiations between
the Americans and the Yemenitesand the Houthis, so I will not
surprise if there will besurprises at this point.
Neri (21:09):
Yes, look, it was true even before the second Trump
term and it's definitely trueover the past 100 days.
Nobody knows what he's liableto say or do, and it could
change tomorrow.
You and I were talking before.
We started recording that herein Israel, after Trump was
elected, the Israeli right andthis government were rejoicing.
(21:33):
They were saying you know theB'nai celebrating yes, the
Messiah is coming.
He's going to give useverything we want.
Michael (21:40):
And then in January, you can implement all the
fantasies you have.
Neri (21:44):
Everything, everything you know.
Just hand a list to Washingtonand they'll just green light it
Sure.
And then in January the mood onthe Israeli right changed
dramatically when Trump forcedNetanyahu to accept the six week
ceasefire to get the hostagesback.
They weren't happy with that.
They're like you know why is hepressuring us to stop the war?
(22:06):
That he was going to give us acarte blanche.
And then the mood got evenbetter in March when the
Americans let Netanyahu andIsrael, shall we say, not live
up to the commitment in theceasefire agreement, as our
listeners know.
So the Israeli right was veryhappy about that.
(22:29):
And then, more recently, likeyou said, the Houthis, the deal
that was struck behind Israel'sback and they were surprised.
It's confirmed.
Israel was surprised by thefact that Trump stopped the
military campaign against theHouthis.
The negotiations directly withIran over the nuclear program
also came as a surprise.
Direct talks between Trumpadministration officials at
Hamas over the hostages also asurprise.
Between Trump administrationofficials and Hamas over the
hostages also a surprise.
(22:49):
And I mean it's not a minorpoint.
Trump is not going to bevisiting, as far as we know,
israel on this trip to theMiddle East, unlike in his first
term.
I'm sure you remember Mifed,because it was a two-day circus
here.
Trump visited Saudi Arabia andmet with the Arab leaders and
then he flew directly to Israeland, at least for right now,
(23:15):
that's unlikely to happen.
Getting back to Gaza, mikhail,and just in terms of the least
worst option, I have to playdevil's advocate, because I hear
the counter-argument just aswell as you do, I'm sure, from
friends and colleagues.
They say we can't stop the warnow, colleagues.
They say we can't stop the warnow Strategically if we don't
fully defeat Hamas quote,unquote, whatever that may mean,
(23:36):
then the next October 7th isonly a matter of time, and that
it would be military malpractice, strategic malpractice, to
actually agree to a deal thatends the war without getting all
the job done.
How do you react to thosearguments which you hear from
even?
You know don't have to be acrazy BBist and right-winger to
(24:00):
say it, even though I personallydisagree with.
Michael (24:02):
What do you?
Neri (24:03):
think.
Michael (24:05):
I agree with you.
Actually, this is the basicstrategic argument of anyone who
really supports the idea oflet's give priority to the war,
this idea.
(24:26):
First of all, I tell them thatI think that this, you know,
hamas presents, or if Hamas willstay on the defense, is not the
worst alternative, becausegetting into a war with no
consensus, with a very toughrift in the Israeli society, I
(24:48):
think this is the worst scenario.
I'm asking a lot of people whowave this slogan there is a
nuclear program of Iran.
I think that this is the realexistential threat for Israel.
According to this opinion, oraccording to this logic, we had
(25:09):
to attack the nuclear program ofIran yesterday, a year ago, 10
years ago, we didn't do it anddescribing Yemen, the Houthis
and Qatar, natalio himself, hedescribed them as very
complicated challenges.
So, when it comes to Gaza, itmust be now, it must be
(25:32):
immediately and totally.
And I'm afraid Nery thatreligious and ideological
considerations are mainly fromthe Smotich point of view and
the other religious Zionismleaders.
This is the main reason fromtheir point of view, and not any
(25:54):
other strategic considerationwhich is actually a cover.
For example, this argument ofwe will not leave Hamas sitting
on the fence?
Okay, and what you will do withSyria?
Will you occupy Damascus?
What you will do with Hezbollah?
Are you ready to occupy Beirut?
(26:15):
So there will be no Hezbollahin Lebanon.
Enough this argument, and onceagain, when we are getting
deeper into this swamp calledGaza, it means that we will not
be focused on other, moreimportant threats, mainly Iran.
(26:40):
So I find that going right now,directly to occupy all Gaza
right now, it's much more damagethan any achievement that we
will see.
Neri (26:56):
Yeah, I happen to agree with you, michal, and I've also
said, both publicly andprivately, that if, after 19
months of war and the damagethat's already been inflicted on
Hamas, that the IDF can'tprotect southern Israel from
whatever may come out of Gaza,then you might as well fold up
the IDF the idea that they'regoing to be surprised again by a
(27:20):
massive cross-border operation,like we saw on October 7th.
Then what are we doing here?
Michael (27:26):
honestly.
Yeah, by the way, you know,nery, this is also a result of
the fact that there was nocommission of inquiry, because
if there is no commission,serious one of inquiry, it means
that all the things that werewrong, all the mistakes, all the
failures, you actually preservethem and you are going to
(27:47):
repeat them, and you arerepeating them right now, and
one of them is this slogan ofmore and more power will lead us
to a white flag over Gaza.
Once again, a conception.
Neri (28:05):
Okay, we'll be right back after this brief message.
Okay, we'll be right back afterthis brief message, an impact.
(28:45):
Donate now at ipfli slashsupportthepod or at the support
the show link in the show notes.
We'll get into Hamas's thinking, which I know you tried very
closely, and again in just asecond.
But I have to get into theweeds with you, the brass tacks
of what this offensive actuallymeans, what it will look like.
To the best of our understanding, it's a multi-stage offensive,
from the ground primarily so,sending in masses of armor and
(29:08):
infantry, also coveringfirepower from the air and the
sea, very aggressive, and theIDF says that in territory that
it moves into and I'm curious toget your sense of where that
territory may be, at least inthe beginning the IDF won't
leave.
It's going to hold theterritory.
It won't leave.
No more raids.
(29:28):
This in and out operations.
That was part of the originalwar plan.
Also, the humanitarian aiddistribution system is also
supposed to change.
What else?
They want?
To move most of the 2 millionpeople in Gaza down south, south
of Famunis also not a smallissue, that's right.
(29:50):
So what should we understand aslaypeople and not colonels in
the IDF about this new offensive?
What will it look like when,once, or if, the IDF gets a
green light?
Michael (30:06):
You know you described it in a very accurate manner and
I must say, nery, that after 25years in the army, 20 years in
Amman in the militaryintelligence and five years in
Kogat, I do aware the fact thatthings that seem wonderful in
papers and in presentation, onground it's totally different.
(30:28):
And you know, I'm quite afraidfrom this.
You know kind of engineering, awar.
That will be very clear.
First of all, we will occupythe territory, then we will
evacuate all the northern partsand the central parts of Gaza,
which means all the refugeecamps like Mugazi, userat,
(30:50):
al-buraj and Gaza City itself,and we will create a tiny area,
as you mentioned, between thesouthern parts of Khan Yunis to
the Egyptian border, and then wewill put two million people
Actually there are no civilinfrastructure over there.
And what will happen?
(31:10):
Okay, is it going to be arepublic, I mean this tiny
entity which will be ruled bywhom and who will give the
humanitarian supply?
And what will happen on theother parts that were occupied?
(31:32):
Because, motlich, if you willask him, he will say immediately
to establish or reestablishsettlements over there.
And once again, you know we saidthat in the beginning, we will
emphasize it again there must bea clear message of the
government.
We said that in the beginningand we will emphasize it again
(31:57):
there must be a clear message ofthe government and a very clear
discourse of the governmentwith the public.
And right now, unfortunately,it's not surprising that there
is such a deep turmoil.
Deep turmoil, and you know theconfidence.
I would define it in a verygentle manner.
There is no big confidence ofthe public in what the
(32:17):
government thinks, plans,promotes, and it's not
surprising, because no onereally speaks in a very clear
manner with the public.
Neri (32:27):
And confidence in the IDF, this new general staff, because
no one really speaks in a veryclear manner with the public and
confidence in the IDF, this newgeneral staff.
They've already started callingup thousands and potentially it
will be tens of thousands ofreservists and, to be clear, I
think the plan is to have themsecure the borders in the north
Lebanon, syria, and secure theWest Bank and free up the
regular army, the heavyoffensive divisions, to actually
(32:50):
go and do the bulk of thefighting in Gaza.
What do you think the mood is,or what do you know the mood is,
in terms of the reservists andthe confidence in the generals?
Michael (33:02):
You know, first of all, mary, of course most of the
data, most of the reports aboutit are clandestine.
The IDF considered them and ofcourse it's right to consider
them as a secret about how manyReserve Army soldiers had
(33:25):
already requited, reserve armysoldiers had already requited.
But it seems to me and I willbe very cautious that of course
there is a problem Because, youknow, a year ago people were
ready to sacrifice their life ina very justified war and they
felt that, you know, they got abroad support from the people.
(33:48):
This time I'm not sure at all.
And you know you mentioned thetalk between Eyal Zamil, the new
chief of staff, and thegovernment and we saw that
during the last two weeks therewere at least twice there were
all kinds of clashes betweenthem.
First of all when there werenegotiations in the government
(34:12):
about who will be responsiblefor the humanitarian aid and
Samir was very clear and he saidno, he resisted the idea that
IDF will be responsible for that.
And you know we heard Smotricheven he elaborated the threat
(34:33):
that your end will be like ahealthy one.
Neri (34:38):
Healthy LNV.
Yeah, the previous chief ofstaff.
Michael (34:42):
And, by the way, two days ago we witnessed an
announcement of the new IDFspokesman and he said the most
important target is to releasethe hostages, Only after that to
defeat Hamas.
And, of course, there were verycritic voices among the
(35:04):
government, among the ministers,were very critic voices among
the government, among theministers, who said, hey, once
again you repeat the same voicesor you elaborate the same
opinions like a year ago.
Neri (35:18):
Yeah, I think the IDF spokesman may have been doing
damage control, because I thinkthe night before there were
certain leaks attributed toYaviz Zamil, the new chief of
staff, to the effect that theoperation will kill hostages.
Yeah, yeah, I think thespokesman, he was a warning
(35:38):
actually.
Michael (35:41):
He warned the government that the broad
operation he can commit, he canpromote broad operation, but the
price will be the life of thehostages.
So you know, at least for me,I'm not optimistic, but I think
that we need to hear such afrank voice which says you
(36:04):
cannot do both things in thesame time.
You need to understand or toexplain that if you want full
occupation of Gaza, it meansthat zero hostages will be
released from the hands of Hamas.
Neri (36:19):
So on that point, that's both a very good and very bad
transition to my next question,Michal.
But when the government and notjust the government, also IDF
officials say you know, no, thegoal of the operation, like the
IDF spokesman said, you knowstill to relieve hostages, we're
going to pressure Hamas withthis new offensive to relieve
(36:42):
hostages.
I mean, isn't it more likelythat the hostages will be either
killed, murdered by Hamas or,inadvertently of course, by IDF
bombs?
And, by the way, follow on tothat, will it work?
Michael (37:06):
You know, will Hamas actually be pressured enough to
release the hostages if they seethe IDF tanks coming, or the
opposite?
You know, we are in a kind ofyou know experiment.
For 19 months, we stick thisslogan of more and more and more
power, and this time we say no,now it's serious.
It will be very, very strongpower against Hamas and this
will lead, this will push themto give up and to be much more
(37:29):
flexible.
And you know, nery, this is myopinion.
I think that, first of all, ifyou fail again and again and
again, you need to, you know,check.
Neri (37:40):
Reassess.
Michael (37:42):
As Einstein said, something is wrong if you repeat
the same experiment and itfails all the time.
So, first of all, I think thatthere is something deeply wrong
with this assumption and, second, I'm asking myself is it
possible that most of those whosupport this idea do not really
(38:06):
improve their understandingabout Hamas?
Because, you know, we had thefailure of October the 7th and
most of the people of thegovernment who were responsible
for this failure.
Now they announced we learnedthe lesson and now we will not
repeat the same mistake.
And it seems that you didn'tunderstand nothing about Hamas,
(38:26):
the nature, the DNA of Hamas.
Didn't you understand thatwe're speaking about radical
ideological organization that isready to sacrifice the life of
his people, to commit a suicideand, of course, to kill the
hostages, but not to give up orwave a white flag?
(38:47):
And I cannot.
You know, I'm surprised by thevoices here in Israel that
repeat once again the idea of wewill push Hamas to evacuate
Gaza, like Arafat did in 1982.
You know, we're speaking aboutit for 19 months and we didn't
(39:08):
see even one clue that Hamas isready to consider this idea.
So why think that it willhappen now?
Neri (39:18):
Or pressuring Hamas to lay down its arms.
Michael (39:21):
Yeah, sure.
And you know, I spoke with oneof my Palestinian colleagues and
he said to me listen, the termHamas is Harkat Ha resistance,
and if you will take this M outof Hamas, there is no Hamas.
It's like taking the heart outof the body.
And you know, once again, youneed to understand Hamas in
(39:44):
order to really realize thatthey will never give up their
weapons.
They will be ready to fightuntil death, but they will not
give up their weapons.
If you will continue creatingfantasies and relying on
assumptions or illusionsactually not assumptions do you
really want to promotesuccessful moves?
(40:08):
I think that it will lead us tocatastrophe.
Neri (40:12):
Yeah, and it's not a theoretical experiment.
If this goes ahead, thisoffensive, then we're talking
about the lives of over 20 stillliving Israeli hostages, 59
total and that's also a primarywar goal.
It has been from the beginning.
Maybe now a secondary war goalaccording to this government,
(40:35):
but not according to themajority of the Israeli public.
Mithail, final two questionsfor you.
Number one, in terms of theoffensive specifically, we've
seen reports, assessments thatthe IDF thinks they can reoccupy
most of the strip in threemonths and clear it and clean it
of Hamas in nine months.
(40:56):
So basically another 12 monthsof fighting.
What do you think when you hearand see that kind of assessment
?
Michael (41:04):
You know, regarding the three months, it seems to me
likely, nery, you know, if IDFwill get between five to six
divisions, I think that thistarget of occupying all Gaza
within three months and onceagain the price will be very
heavy in the Palestinian side,but of course also in the
(41:26):
Israeli one.
But regarding the rest of thetime, I mean nine months of
cleaning, once again I do notlike this term, you know.
Cleaning Gaza, okay, it meansthat of course you will cause
Hamas dramatic damage.
But what will happen afterthese nine months?
You know I assess that therewill be terror and guerrilla
(41:50):
fighting against Israel, I thinkthat, against IDF, I mean.
So I really wish that IDF, butalso the government, will not
use such scientific cleanmessages or terms.
And once again, I think thatthe government should explain to
(42:14):
people that we are getting intoa very tough period.
If Gaza Strip will be occupiedby IDF and they cannot commit or
they cannot promise that itwill take only a year and after
that, you know, we will live ina harmonic situation.
Not at all.
We are getting into a gate andbehind this gate or after this
(42:38):
gate, I'm not sure that I canreally draw in a very accurate
manner.
What will happen?
I do know that nothing verygood will happen and once again,
harry, we spoke about it.
If the Israeli society rightnow is split, there is a very
(42:58):
deep split about this war.
I'm quite sure that it willcontinue and maybe even get
wider.
After the operation, the warwill start.
Neri (43:12):
It'll get wider because of the lack of consensus over the
offensive, the fate of thehostages and also, we should
mention casualties, sureCasualty, and the more
casualties that you're going totake as the IDF, the more it's
going to be felt on the homefront.
I agree 24, and since the uhceasefire collapsed in march,
(43:47):
the idf has been working toexpand from the philadelphia
corridor, from uh, the egyptianborder up, and to basically
clear out all of rafa up to thisnew corridor just south of of
hanunis, the morag corridor, anduh, if you talk to reservists
who are down there, they say, um, there's almost nothing
standing, there's almost nothingstanding.
Uh, if there's a structure, ifthere's a structure standing,
(44:10):
it's probably because the IDF isusing it, and yet my point
being the IDF still, evenyesterday, a Golani soldier was
severely injured by IED inRafi'af.
Yeah right.
There was the ALom, the combatengineering forces, a few days
before.
So even in this area that'ssupposedly quote unquote cleared
(44:32):
and clean, you're still takingcasualties.
I don't know how Hamas fightersare still there.
That's, I think, a questionmaybe for another episode.
So, yes, if you replicate theRAF-RAF model across the entire
Gaza Strip with thousands, ifnot 10, 20 thousand, remaining
(44:54):
Hamas fighters, very difficult,mithan.
Actual final question to you.
I'd be remiss if I didn't bringit all back to the US President
, donald J Trump and the Trumpplan for the quote unquote
voluntary immigration, oressentially, the expulsion of
(45:14):
Gazans from the Gaza Strip.
The Israeli officials say, oncethe bulk of the population of
Gaza is down south, it'll beeasier to quote-unquote convince
them I hate to use that wordbecause it's not voluntary, I
(45:35):
don't think but easier toconvince them to leave via Egypt
or the sea, or even via Israel.
The Israeli right, as you know,loves this idea.
Other people don't like it, forvery good reasons as well.
So how realistic, how practicaldo you think this plan actually
is?
Michael (45:54):
You know, first of all, nery, you know, we must all be
aware that the term used by allthe Arab world and, of course,
the Palestinians, for this planis tahjir transfer, not anything
else.
This is how they consider thisvision.
And you know, it's quiteamazing that right now, almost I
think, between more than threemonths after it was elaborated
(46:17):
actually Israel is the onlystate on earth which supports
this idea.
It seems that you know, thereis no, no, not even one state
that announced that they will beready to open the gates for
Palestinians from Gaza or toassist in the implementation of
(46:42):
this vision.
And you know, it's quiteamazing because when you follow
the Israeli media and theIsraeli discourse, we are full
of fake news, all kinds ofillusions.
You know, people speak hereabout Somaliland, puntland and
all other.
They're not states at all thatwe'll be ready to open the gates
(47:03):
for Palestinians.
And you know, a lot of numbersare being elaborated in the
Israeli discos about thousandsof Palestinians who are ready to
leave.
And you know, I really feelthat the illusions, or the
fantasies are much more strongerthan professional, realistic
(47:24):
assessments.
And you know, right now I thinkthat there are two basic
problems.
First of all, as you mentionedbefore Neri, during the last
half a year a lot of let's callthem red alarms were elaborated
in front of Israel about thepolicy of Trump.
(47:46):
I mean the first ceasefire, thenegotiations with Iran, border
talks with Hamas, the Houthi andeven Trump himself.
It seems that he's not there.
He doesn't really support thisidea today.
You haven't heard him talkingabout it for weeks, and you know
, when he speaks about Gaza, hesays they are very poor people,
(48:09):
we should help them.
He doesn't say we should takethem out of Gaza.
And, by the way, also Witka, inthe podcast he had a month ago,
he didn't speak about thetransfer from Gaza.
So it seems to me that rightnow, first of all, even without
promoting this idea, israelalready causes itself damage, I
(48:31):
mean damage regarding therelations between us and the
Arab world.
Saudi Arabia said no, nonormalization if you will
continue with this plan.
And of course, you know Egyptand Jordan are very concerned
about it.
And second, and this is a veryimportant point for you know,
(48:52):
all the Israelis, mainly thedecision makers since the
beginning of the war, it seemsthat we didn't really learn all
the lessons of October the 7th.
We still prefer fantasies,illusions instead of realistic,
sometimes very pessimisticassessments or facts, and I
(49:16):
really hope that you know ourgovernment will be more
realistic, not only regardingTrump's vision, but regarding
everything that is happeningsince the beginning of the war.
Neri (49:29):
I hope so too, mithel.
We can only hope Not toooptimistic with this government,
but you can only hope.
But this is why we love to haveyou on, to not feed us
illusions and fantasies, butactual, realistic analysis and
assessments, the degree facts.
And we can only hope for thebest.
(49:52):
And as you told me last timeyou were on the podcast back in
September, hopefully we won't behere in another six months,
neri, talking about the samedilemma whether to continue the
war or to get the hostages back.
So I'll say it again, so youdon't have to.
Hopefully, michel, we're nothere another six months talking
(50:13):
about the offensive and thehostages.
And well, what a disaster thisnew clan is.
We'll be a lot smarter then.
So thank you again.
Michael (50:25):
Thank you for having me .
Nery, Take care, Okay.
Thanks again to Michael.
Neri (50:26):
You for having me, nery, take care, okay.
Thanks again to MikhailMilishin, as always, for his
generous time and insights.
Also, a special thanks to ourproducer, jacob Gilman, and to
all of you who support IsraelPolicy Forum's work.
Do consider making a donationto Israel Policy Forum so you
can keep being a credible sourceof analysis and ideas on issues
such as these that we all caredeeply about, including this
(50:46):
podcast and, most importantly,thank you for listening.
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