September 9, 2025 • 63 mins
On this week’s episode, Israel Policy Forum Policy Advisor and Tel Aviv-based journalist Neri Zilber hosts Israel Fellow Nimrod Novik and Ibrahim Dalalsha, director of the Horizon Center think tank in Ramallah. They discuss the Israeli government's negative policies towards the West Bank, economic and political instability inside the Palestinian Authority, the benefits and pitfalls of the upcoming Palestinian statehood recognition bid in New York later this month, the latest proposal by Donald Trump for a Gaza ceasefire-hostage deal, various day-after postwar scenarios, strained Israel-Egypt ties, and more.
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Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:00):
Please note that this episode was recorded on Monday,
September 8th, one day beforethe Israeli strike targeting
Hamas officials in Doha.
Neri (00:13):
Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod.
I'm Neri Zilber, a journalistbased in Tel Aviv and a policy
advisor to Israel Policy Forum.
We have a very special episodethis week with two returning
guests and friends Israel PolicyForum's very own Israel fellow,
nimrod Novick, who for manyyears was a senior advisor to
the late Shimon Peres and iscurrently a senior leader in the
(00:36):
Commanders for Israel SecurityGroup, and Ibrahim Delalche, the
head of the Horizon Centerthink tank in Ramallah and a
longtime advisor at the USconsulate in Jerusalem.
So we're recording this Mondayevening, tel Aviv time.
Earlier today there was aserious terror attack in
Jerusalem where two Palestiniangunmen from the West Bank opened
(00:58):
fire at a major intersection,killing at least six people and
severely injuring several more.
It was a reminder as if weneeded one, that the quietest
front, relatively speaking, inthis two-year seven-front war,
the West Bank, shouldn't betaken for granted.
Not at all.
So that's why, among manyreasons, I wanted Nimrod and
(01:20):
Ibrahim on today to discuss theWest Bank, the Palestinian
Authority, the Palestinianstatehood, recognition at the UN
in New York later this monthand, of course, the current and
future state of play in the GazaWar.
It was a really greatconversation with them both.
That spanned a wide gamut,believe me, which, if you know
(01:41):
them both, shouldn't surpriseyou in the least.
Let's get to Nimrod and Ibrahim.
Hi Nimrod, hi Ibrahim.
Welcome back to the IsraelPolicy Pod.
Nimrod (01:51):
Nice to be here with you .
Neri (01:53):
Thank you.
Well, it's my pleasure to youboth.
It's been way too long sincelast time you both were on and
there's a lot to discuss well,in general, but especially this
week.
But I wanted to actually startwith the situation in the West
Bank.
In normal times this would betop of the agenda, it's fair to
say, especially over the pasttwo years.
(02:14):
But there are other frontsgoing on, obviously Gaza,
lebanon, iran, yemen, probably afew fronts that I've already
forgotten.
But in normal times, the WestBank, I think, would be top of
the agenda.
Definitely, media coverage,publicly, diplomatically.
But we got a tragic reminderthis morning that the West Bank,
despite being maybe the mostrelatively calm front over the
(02:37):
past two years, is not actuallycalm at all the tragic shooting
in Jerusalem that killed atleast six Israelis this morning.
So, basically, the lack ofattention doesn't mean that
things aren't happening in theWest Bank.
They are, I'd argue, most ofwhich are negative.
But, nimrod, let's start withyou.
(02:58):
The last few weeks we've seen aflurry of activity by the
Netanyahu government andspecifically Betel Esmotich, the
finance minister, and also theminister in the defense ministry
, pushing forward various plans,whether annexation of the West
Bank or construction in thestrategic E1 corridor between
Jerusalem and the Maladumim, andso on and so on.
(03:20):
Big picture.
It's a very broad question, butlet's start here.
How would you characterize ordescribe Netanyahu government's
policy vis-a-vis the West Bankreally over the past two plus
years?
Nimrod (03:50):
of going for legislated annexation in lieu of creeping
or indeed galloping annexationon the ground.
That has been going on andintensified over the last two,
three years, and the situationon the West Bank has become
quite explosive well before thehorrific incident of this
morning, well before thehorrific incident of this
morning.
As a matter of fact, a month ago, I published a piece in Time
(04:10):
magazine and CNN did thefollow-up on it, and the title
was the Violent Gazification ofthe West Bank, where I pointed
out several contributors to theexplosiveness of the situation.
But the bottom line was thatIsraeli violent settlers,
(04:33):
getting the back wind from theirleaders, who are now in
government, and radicalizedyoung Palestinians, who are
radicalized in response to theJewish violence and terrorism,
as well as to the two years warin Gaza.
The two groups are using eachother to justify violence,
(04:58):
feeding on each other and, inthe process, killing innocents,
destroying property and settingthe stage for a major explosion.
So I think that the fact thateyes were on Gaza, and also on
Syria, lebanon, iran, was a verygood cover for our messianic
(05:22):
annexationists to expedite theirambitions.
And I must say I never believedthat I will live to the day
where the US ambassador toIsrael, who is an enthusiastic
supporter of the settlements,will approach the Israeli
government and say watch it.
The PMA collapse and theconsequences are going to be
(05:44):
devastating.
Neri (05:46):
Sure, the US ambassador in Jerusalem, mike Huckabee, did
say that a few days ago.
I think an apt warning.
We'll get Ibrahim's thoughtsabout the PA's stability or not
in just a second.
But also, you both know as wellas I do that the Trump
administration has given a greenlight to a lot of the worst
impulses at the top of theIsraeli government vis-a-vis the
(06:07):
West Bank.
So there is a back window.
So I guess, going the other way, coming from Washington,
ibrahim, you're coming to usfrom your home in Ramallah.
Given all the above that Nimrodlaid out, what has it been like
in the West Bank over the past,especially two years, whether
socially, economically,politically, since the start of
(06:31):
the war?
Ibrahim (06:33):
Actually, the situation has really worsened in the past
.
I would say four to six months,but the situation has been bad
since October 7, 2023.
But I think you know, with thescale of violence in Gaza, also
(06:54):
the other fronts, exactly as myfriend and colleague Nimrod
pointed out, I think there wassome sort of like a cover, an
eclipse basically to what's beenhappening in the West Bank, but
I can basically describe it aslike it has been ampers under
ashes for nearly two years now,most recently, I think the way
(07:15):
to describe the West Bank isthat you know you have a
situation where the PA is goingthrough a crippling economic,
financial and economic crisis.
It started impacting people atdifferent levels those who are
employed by the PA, and herewe're talking about nearly
100,000 people in the West Bankwho are employed by the PA and,
(07:37):
with their families, have beenactually with no income for the
past three months, to bespecific, and on partial
salaries for the past few years.
So you know this has impactedservices.
The PA had to cut down onworking hours.
We're talking about health caresystem, that is, that has
(07:58):
shrunk in terms of serviceprovision.
Education barely the school yearhas started because of partial
strikes and divisions within theteachers sectors, commercial
activities have really gone down, real estate and all other sort
of like activities that were,you know, especially in an area
like Nablus or Ramallah had beena boom for many years now has
(08:23):
actually gone into some sort ofhad been a boom for many years
now has actually gone into somesort of recess where people do
not really recession, wherepeople do not really spend
anything because of their fearsand concerns.
And in addition to that, ofcourse, you have, like the
general situation of frustration, demoralization looking at
what's happening in Gaza, a warthat is not ending.
(08:44):
Demoralization looking atwhat's happening in Gaza, a war
that is not ending, and itsimpact on the PA.
I want to remind you thatduring the first two weeks after
October 7, and this was alsosomething that was not really, I
think, well noted duringclashes between the PA security
services and lots of youth andpeople here who wanted to go out
to the streets and protestingwhat was going on in Gaza, there
(09:08):
were 13 to 15 people who wereactually killed during those.
So the PA had to crush, you know, initial sort of like
mobilization to the street andthat same system, that is to say
, the PA, has actually beenweakened over the past two years
and now rendered almostirrelevant because of, again,
shrunken services provisions,weakness in terms of relevance
(09:30):
On the security front.
I think the PA continues to dowhat it takes in terms of
security coordination and all ofthat.
But the PA has been weakenedeven in a security sense by the
large Israeli army operation inTulk Aram and Jenin earlier this
year, where it was seen asredundant, irrelevant, cannot
protect citizens.
Settlers' violence, I think,also plays a very big role where
(09:55):
the PA is seen as only enablerof an occupier, not really a
protector of Palestiniancivilians who are being
subjected to settlers's violence, including in areas very close
to Ramallah, which is like theadministrative capital, if you
will, of the PalestinianAuthority.
(10:16):
All of those elements together,I think, has put the PA in a
very weak spot.
And I don't have to mention thefact that even when things do go
wrong and the PA tries to stopthem or tries to play a role
where they today condemned theattack in Jerusalem, for
instance I know the wordingmight not sound perfect to
Israeli ears, but still you knowthere was a condemnation from
(10:37):
the Palestinian Authority inRamallah Then you get yes, it
did, it issued a statement onthat.
But basically, again, you knowlike the idea is that you got
Smotrich, who is an Israeliminister, who basically time is
now to wipe out the Palestinianauthorities.
So it just shows that the PA andits narrative and its actually
line of working on a peacefulapproach, doing security
(10:57):
coordination, all of thesethings is not really resonating
and is not really making lifebetter for people in the West
Bank and this, I think, iscausing the PA to lose even on
writing a narrative when itcomes to its own strategy versus
Hamas's strategy.
With all the frustration withthe bankruptcy, insolvency of
(11:21):
the PA, not being able todeliver services, all of that,
it's becoming as irrelevant asthe Hamas governance in Gaza is.
Under the circumstances, if youknow what I mean.
There is nothing that the PAcan point to and say look, here
in the West Bank we're actuallybetter off under my policy.
It's going through all kinds ofpressures, including, you know,
(11:42):
the question of annexationpossible or not.
De facto annexation ishappening, such as violence is
continuing and therefore the PAlooks as completely irrelevant
and weak in the eyes of thegeneral public.
Neri (11:59):
Yeah, unfortunately, that's what I was expecting you
to say.
Yeah, unfortunately, that'swhat I was expecting you to say.
It's a very difficult situationin general, but also Israeli
government policy is making itactively worse.
Nimrod, you've been followingthis longer than I have Usually.
(12:25):
In years past you've had theIsraeli security establishment,
whether IDF, shin Bet and others, come to the government and say
look in the West Bank, you needto prioritize well economic
life, you need to move forwardon issues and policies that
promote stability and not try toactively undermine the PA and
make things worse.
Do you see a real shift?
Both, I guess, not only interms of Israeli government
(12:46):
policy, but also in the abilityof the Israeli security
establishment to actuallycounsel restraint to this
Israeli government?
Nimrod (12:55):
I would say that counseling restraint has not
changed to the point that whenvery senior levels of IDF and
Shin Bet well, let's go to whatis in the public domain or sort
of public domain, and that iswhen they go to the Knesset
Security Committee and speak onthe subject, and, given that our
(13:19):
Knesset Security Committee isalmost like a press conference,
everything leaks from there, andwe know that the IDF and the
Shin Bet praise the PalestinianAuthority for cooperating in
counter-terrorism against Hamasand others and credits the
(13:41):
Palestinian Authority withsaving countless of lives, and
the revertiv saving countless oflives and derivatives, of
course, watch it, treat itdifferently.
There is a change, though, andthat it's lower ranks, where
officers with a differentworldview are coming up to more
(14:03):
senior positions, and they sharethe smart, rich Ben Greer
approach, and we found elementsof that in internal arguments in
the security establishment, andalso, some people attribute
passivity on behalf of the IDF,relative passivity vis-à-vis
(14:25):
Jewish terrorism, to that factor.
With your permission, youmentioned earlier the American
elephant in the room.
You mentioned the sort of ginlight for the Netanyahu
government to do as it pleasesin Gaza, and now also, with
(14:47):
Rubio quoted as saying you wantto go for annexation.
It's your thing, not ourbusiness.
I have a feeling that thisWashington, unlike all
predecessors, doesn't understandthe game played in Jerusalem.
It is no accident thatNetanyahu's classical coalitions
(15:07):
save for the current one.
He was the center of thecoalition, there were people to
his right, there were people tohis left to make sure that
neither can drag him too far inany direction, and whenever he
was dragged, his favoritecountermeasure used to be but
(15:28):
the president of the UnitedStates doesn't agree.
It was Clinton, it was Obama,it was Trump won.
It was Biden.
And suddenly this presidentdeprives him of a very important
instrument to restrain theextremists, when the coalition
(15:48):
that he formed for the firsttime ever is extremists only.
Neri (15:57):
Yeah, it's true.
A former Israeli securityofficial told me the same thing
in the Gaza context right, thatusually the American president
would come in and say, look, youneed to stop this.
And then the Israeli primeminister, bibi for the past few
years, would say, come to hisgovernment and say, look, I have
no choice but to end the warbecause Washington is coming
(16:18):
down hard on me, as we all know,and we'll get into in just a
minute.
We all know and we'll get intoin just a minute vis-a-vis Gaza,
that has not happened yet, evenin the Gaza context.
Ibrahim, changing the topicsslightly, maybe a bit of good
(16:38):
news for the PalestinianAuthority?
Maybe In exactly two weekswe're going to have high-level
UN meetings in New York where abig part of the agenda will be
Palestinian statehoodrecognition.
At this point I've lost counthow many countries, but
definitely over a dozen,including some major countries
like the UK, france, australia,canada and the like, not small
(17:02):
players on the global stage andalso just in terms of their
relations with Israel.
How is this potentially goodnews going down in Palestinian
public opinion on the so-calledPalestinian street?
Is this a moment of joy?
Is it met with a shrug?
Ibrahim (17:24):
What are we expecting in two weeks in Ramallah it's a
smart question to ask aboutPalestinian public attitude
towards this, rather than thePalestinian Authority's response
or interaction with it, becauseclearly there are differences.
Neri (17:37):
I'll get to them in a second.
But yeah, I'm very curious howthe public is.
Ibrahim (17:40):
Yeah yeah, sure, no, no , I think the public in general.
It's actually two things torelate to the Palestinian public
.
One is that people areoverwhelmed with the situation.
Again, they watch Gaza, theylook at the economic distress
and hardships, the economic andfinancial problems.
(18:01):
I also forgot to mention thefact that about 150,000
Palestinian workers who used towork in Israel have been
basically jobless for the pasttwo years and this actually
constitutes more income to thePalestinian market and
Palestinian people andPalestinian public than actually
PA salaries, by the way.
I don't have the exact figures,but I think it's two times as
(18:24):
much.
Actually PA salaries, by theway.
I don't have the exact figures,but I think it's two times as
much.
The Palestinian public as suchis overwhelmed with the problems
of day-to-day that they see.
Recognitions of a Palestinianstate is something that people
watch, listen to in the news,but it doesn't really relate to
their day-to-day issues andconcerns, which have been
overwhelming for the past twoyears, and therefore I think
(18:46):
people are generally I'm notgoing to say indifferent, but
they don't really.
You know they're not jumping inthe streets of joy because of
those recognitions, or promisedrecognitions during the General
Assembly and the New York, youknow, the two-state conference
that will be held there.
On the other hand, I thinkthere is and you could actually
(19:07):
see that very clearly ininternal debates where there are
two narratives here, where thePA is basically trying to say
this is a result of my, you know, peaceful approach to the
conflict and basically sufficingwith a two-state solution, 1967
lines, et cetera, and our, youknow, quiet diplomacy and
working with without resortingto violence and armed struggle,
(19:30):
whereas you have those whoactually say, hey, without the
Gaza October, you know, attacks,none of this could have
happened.
And even if it does not reallyhave an immediate impact, it
will actually accumulate interms of international law and
international politics.
And there are those who actuallytalk about, you know, two
superpowers, two countries thatare permanent members of the UN
(19:50):
Security Council, who arejoining the recognitions.
These are not marginalcountries and, you know, key
question is what is it thatthey're going to do?
You know, after?
Israel, especially the currentIsraeli government, will totally
ignore their recognitions andany impact that it may have.
So you know, that debate, Ithink, to me is more important
than seeing, like, the immediatereaction of people to these
(20:12):
recognitions, because again,people are overwhelmed on one
hand, but again writing thenarrative and actually saying
and this is something that Ipersonally relate to, because if
people actually conclude thatarmed resistance is what brought
this, essentially we'reactually bringing in a new
generation believing, like Hamasdid write the narrative of the
(20:33):
second intifada it was only byforce that the Israelis pulled
out from Gaza.
They will do it again with anew generation and therefore
this is likely to plant theseeds of another conflict that
is yet to come, that we are notseeing even today, and you know
that, I think, is how tocharacterize or look at it.
You know.
So I'm one of those whobasically join and again, as I
(20:54):
mentioned earlier, the problemis that the relevance of the PA
is being weakened by the day.
So, even when you try toactually present that argument
that this is a result of amoderate, pragmatic, you know,
peaceful approach to thisconflict with israel, and
therefore you know we have a,you know, possibly, uh, um, an
opportunity to translate thatinto real, uh, uh, reality, sort
(21:18):
of like facts on the ground, uh, then you get, like this
motrich-Pingvir statements,where they were an agendas and
actual work on the ground.
It's not only about statementsthat we're going to destroy this
PA.
That is far more dangerous thanHamas, so people go, you know,
like in a different direction.
So, I'm sorry to say I wouldhave loved to say that this is
actually resonating, but it'snot.
(21:40):
It's a debate that iscontinuing and I'm hoping that
this would be the way to go interms of writing the narrative
and convincing people that thisis the right approach, rather
than the violent approach tothis country.
Nimrod (21:52):
May I jump in here, nery ?
Of course, of course.
Look, ibrahim described it aswell as anybody can from the
inside out.
I'm trying to look at it fromthe outside in.
I'm trying to look at it fromthe outside in, and here is a
not very popular position amongthose like us who are thoroughly
(22:13):
committed to an eventualtwo-state outcome.
I look at it.
I think that the Israelireaction, the Israeli hysteric
reaction, is a put-on.
I think that those involvedrealize that nothing is going to
(22:34):
change on the ground when thenumber of countries recognizing
Palestine is going to go from147 to 150 or whatever, even if
it includes two members of theSecurity Council.
In the lead up to this effort, Ihad the opportunity to discuss
this with people who wereinvolved on the French
(22:58):
presidency side and on the Saudiside that were driving this
initiative, and I made twopoints.
One was that it reminds me ofthe moment that the Palestinian
flag was raised for the firsttime at the UN Plaza, when the
PLO was invited as a I don'tremember the title to the
(23:20):
General Assembly.
The PA leadership did a hugeparty in the center of Ramallah
and the public was laughing atit.
It was laughable because theyfelt that nothing is changing
their lives in the morning after.
And what I argued with theSaudis and French and the others
(23:40):
was this is a feel-good measure, and French and the others was
this is a feel-good measure.
This is the easiest substitutefor actually fighting for that
cause, for doing the heavylifting of promoting the
two-state solution.
There's nothing easier thangoing to the UN raising your
(24:03):
head and say I recognize.
Easier than going to the UNraising your head and say I
recognize.
So I felt that out of context,it's at best not a great damage,
but I urged them to create acontext.
Where is the action plan forwhat you do from the morning
after and on in order to bringthat outcome about?
Neri (24:29):
And Nimrod, I know you must have written a memo laying
out the action plan.
What would some of thoseactions be?
So it's not just a symbolicmove with nothing changing.
Nimrod (24:42):
The day after they recognize Palestine move with
nothing changing the day afterthey recognized Palestine.
Yeah, the suspicion is wellgrounded in more than one memo,
and I wasn't the only one, andthere are dozens who were doing
it.
But no, I'd rather not go to itright now, in the hope that, at
(25:09):
hope that at least some of it,uh, will see the the the light
of day.
Neri (25:11):
Okay, this is the first time nimrod novik has not laid
out his vision.
No, I'm kidding you.
You've been.
You've been very uh uh.
Well, let me, I'll stop there,but you've been.
You know, usually don't holdback, but maybe in more, more
private settings and not on arecorded podcast that will go
around the world.
That's fine.
That's fine.
Not as a journalist, it's notfine, but as a discrete analyst,
(25:34):
that's fine.
Ibrahim, what do you thinkabout Nimrod's argument of the
case?
Ibrahim (25:40):
First of all, I think that there is a, you know,
general consensus that amongintellectuals from a Palestinian
perspective and among thePalestinian people in general,
that things do actually changewhen on the ground, when there
is a Palestinian-Israeliagreement.
And that's why, you know, likewe, for good or bad, we've been
(26:01):
through Oslo process and we havea Palestinian authority, a
Palestinian national identity,because the PLO and Israel did
agree on that 30 years ago.
It was not really thePalestinian, you know, like the
UN recognition, by the way,started in 1988 when the PLO
announced a state in Algeria andwe had, you know, 100 plus
(26:24):
recognitions at that time.
But you know, the situation didnot really change until we got
into an agreement with Israel.
So I think that there is aconsensus here that includes the
Palestinian leadership.
By the way, I don't reallythink that they are in a
euphoria over this.
The problem has been, from aPalestinian perspective, is that
there is no, currently there isno Israeli government to be a
partner with in order to get toa two state solution or even a
(26:47):
peaceful resolution to theconflict.
You've got an Israeli heavyright-wing agenda that talks
about the elimination of thePalestinian national character,
all of it.
So I think just todifferentiate between the
official position and the public.
The public I agree fully withNimrod, but people just don't
see that this is going to changeanything on the ground and
therefore they go almostindifferent about it.
(27:08):
When it comes to thePalestinian Authority, I think
they find a condolence to thefact that there is no room,
there is no political sort oflike maneuver, for many reasons.
The only thing that they got intheir hands is the connection
to Saudi Arabia, now the French,the international recognitions,
and that's the only thing thatthey have.
They do realize that this isnot going to translate into
(27:29):
concrete anything on the ground,but you know, at the end of the
day this is an accumulativeinternational law.
You know diplomacy.
What I'm concerned about, as Itold you, which is an internal
Palestinian debate, I understand, is who writes the narrative
for this.
Even if it's symbolic and doesnot really change people's lives
, it's still seen as a sort ofgain, and that is very crucial.
(27:52):
I think it's very important forus, as Palestinians, not to
give up on the line thatactually eventually takes us to
a peaceful resolution to theconflict and actually swear more
out of frustration and a beliefthat this was a result of armed
struggle and indeed it's a game.
That to me, is actually a muchmore crucial issue on the
(28:13):
internal Palestinian domesticpolitical landscape and debate.
Nimrod (28:17):
Another layer to this story Nery and Ibrahim which I
can't help but mention, is anAmerican decision to deprive Abu
Mazen and his team of visas tocome to the UN.
I must confess I don't remembera single more counterproductive
(28:38):
act by a US administration on acompletely secondary issue, not
war and peace.
I cannot remember a morecounter productive approach than
to send a message topalestinians that diplomacy is
(28:59):
not the right venue.
Neri (29:02):
This is insane so you beat me to it, nimrod.
I was going to ask Ibrahim howthat decision by the Trump
administration to essentiallynot allow the Palestinian
delegation to come to the UNmeetings in New York, including
President Mahmoud Abbas, howthat has gone over in Ramallah.
Ibrahim (29:22):
The PA PLO are very annoyed with this and, by the
way, this is actually the newthing in it is that first of all
, historically there has been aproblem with PAPLO visas to the
US official visas to the USbecause of the US laws that
designate the PLO as a terroristorganization.
So it has always been includingduring the heydays of Oslo that
(29:45):
people you know always beenincluding during the heydays of
Oslo that people you knowofficials will only get those
visas when they get a waiversystem which overrules the
application of or freezes orsuspends the application of law
and gives them an exceptionalbasis and usually it was like
confined in terms of time and interms of areas that they can go
to the US.
Now this is even the onlyexception to that was the visas
(30:08):
that they go to UNGA, which isthe UN General Assembly, because
of the UN agreement with the US, what is known as the
headquarters agreement.
So it didn't really come as amajor earth-shaking to the
Palestinian public, because tothe Palestinian public, to the
officials, it's extremelyannoying, but it's not the only
(30:29):
annoying thing that they reallyhad from this administration,
whether the Trump administrationor one or this one.
I mean even on a much largerscale.
What I can tell you is that andI think Nimrod is right it's
not only insane, it basicallypushes people to actually
believe that such US policiesare making things worse for the
(30:50):
Israeli-Palestinian conflict,not only to Palestinians.
That's one.
Two.
You know what hit Palestinianpeople even more is that all
Palestinian passport holders areno longer allowed to enter into
the US.
It's not only the PA officialsor the PLO officials.
There was a New York Timesarticle about that and it's
(31:12):
substantiated.
There hasn't really been anofficial statement, but it has
been substantiated.
People apply for a US visa fortourism, for business, for
pleasure, for study, forwhatever, and they're not.
You know they are designated as20.
There's a special designationfor it, which is refusal, and as
such, not you know they aredesignated as 20, there's a
special designation for it whichis refusal and as such, you do
not really process it.
Now there is a practicalsolution.
I'm not sure whether I want tosay it on air, but basically
(31:35):
there's a practical solution tothis.
But you know it's a hit to thePalestinian Authority.
It's like you're basicallyrevoking the Palestinian
passport.
It says on it it was issued inaccordance with the agreement
that was signed in Washington.
So you're basically cancelingout everything, not only in the
eyes of the Palestinian people.
Generally speaking, you aretaking steps and I understand,
(31:58):
when you come to apply that onthe PAPLO because of Taylor
Force, atca, this, that they didcomply, they did not comply
with certain US regulations orwhatever, but when it comes to
the Palestinian people,canceling the whole passport,
I'm frankly I don't really knowwhat's the use of this or what
purpose does it serve, otherthan alienating people, creating
(32:21):
anti-American sentiments againacross the board, because you're
punishing everybody for noclear reason as to why you're
doing it.
There is no even explanationand the practical solution I'll
tell you off air.
I mean, you know we'll go backto pre-1993, basically not with
Israeli La Sefa citizen traveldocuments, but with other travel
documents that you knowPalestinians are given in the
(32:43):
region.
So what's the purpose of it?
It's like, basically,destroying the PA.
Speaker 1 (32:51):
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the show notes.
Neri (33:48):
Yeah, for the record.
I don't like when my guestswithhold information from well
our listeners and viewers, butespecially me.
Ibrahim (33:57):
No, no, no no no, I'm kidding.
Neri (33:59):
I know there's a reason why I'm just trying to create
some sort of a profile.
Ibrahim (34:04):
We all West bankers, are entitled to Jordanian
temporary passports,non-citizenship passports.
These are like travel documents, basically that the Jordanian
government has been giving toPalestinians since 1967, and is
Jerusalem, by the way and thismeans that when I go to the US
embassy in Amman or anywhereelse, I apply as a Palestinian.
(34:26):
They know that.
But on a Jordanian temporarypassport they know that and
therefore you know it just addsa burden on people to actually
go through a bureaucratic.
You know, travel to Amman andget a Jordanian passport and
individuals are then allowed,because what is being hit is the
Palestinian Authority and itsstature.
So you know it's not Now.
(34:48):
I'm not saying the PalestinianAuthority is like the angels of
all peace in the world.
I'm just saying you've gotoptions on the ground.
Now, as we talk about Gaza andthereafter and I've read some of
what Nimrod and many otherexperts, including Israelis, who
wrote on this You've got liketwo practical solutions or
options, you know one with Hamasand its cronies and the
(35:10):
remnants of Hamas in Gaza, andone with the weakened
Palestinian Authority that needsto be rehabilitated and you
know, and work in terms ofrecreating its governance in
Gaza within certain principlesand all of that.
So if you destroy both, what isit that you're going to do,
like immediate occupation?
If that is the case, I'mtelling youinian people cannot
really stop that from happening,but the situation would be
(35:31):
worse for both israelis andpalestinians a hundred percent
and we're going to get to gaza,trust me, in just a second, uh.
Neri (35:37):
But to tie up the issue of well, well, uh, us policy
vis-a-vis the palestinians andthe palestinian authority and
palestinian statehoodrecognition, I'll say it, the
craziest argument I've heardboth from the Israeli prime
minister and also senior Trumpadministration officials,
publicly over the past week ortwo as well.
The PA is taking unilateralsteps against Israel in the
(36:03):
national arena, icc and whatever.
So now Israel may takeunilateral steps against the
Palestinian Authority and, bythe way, the US administration
is within its rights to take,you know, to sanction the PA.
I've never heard of a moreridiculous argument, because you
know, this Israeli governmentnot only violates the Oslo
(36:25):
Accords, you have seniorministers saying that they want
to destroy the Oslo Accords.
Right, and it's just a circularlogic that I've heard from both
American and Israeli officials,and it's like you're living in
Fantasyland.
Nimrod (36:42):
It's even worse.
It's even worse because whatare the measures that the
Palestinian Authority is takingto do all this unilateral stuff
worse?
It's even worse because whatare the measures that the
Palestinian Authority is takingto do all this unilateral stuff?
Diplomacy.
So what do you want?
To shut the door on diplomacyin order for them to go where?
Ibrahim?
Ibrahim (37:04):
I just wanted to say, even when you have an insane
situation like this, governmentswho have, in my opinion, an
extremist position that truly isseeking to destroy the
Palestinian Authority Nimrodsaid it's diplomacy.
(37:24):
So if you really want toactually take countermeasures,
you resort to reciprocity.
If you will, you resort to, andit means but destroying the
entire, you know, politicalstature, financial, economic and
even impacting its own security.
I mean the PA as your partnerin the West Bank, because it is
(37:46):
still a partner in the West Bank, by the way, and I'm saying
this assertively because I doknow that security coordination
channels are still operating.
Therefore, you're not onlyhurting the Palestinian
Authority or the Palestinianpeople, you're also hurting
yourself.
By the way, with all due respect, I worked 20 years for the US
government and I do not mean toattack the US government, but I
(38:06):
do.
I'm one of the strong believersthat if we wait for the US to
come to fix our situation, bothPalestinians and Israelis, we
will be disappointed.
Let me say that I think we arethe ones who could actually make
things move and once we do, theUS will come to support that
(38:27):
approach, because otherwise theywill continue to support
whatever Israeli government isthere without really, you know,
going into the nuances of ourconflict, which are far more
confusing to you.
Know a number of individualsright now who are basically
dealing with this complicatedpolitical file and not alone
with many other files in theregion and the world actually.
Neri (38:48):
Yeah, but the problem is you have a US administration in
power now that is not only kindof abetting the worst impulses
of this Israeli government andIsraeli far right, but they're
actively pushing and promotingpolicies that make things worse.
Right, that's the problem.
Ibrahim (39:09):
Yes, that's exactly what's happening.
Neri (39:11):
yes, which, again, you don't have to convince me,
ibrahim.
As you know, I wrote a wholebook about the Palestinian
Authority Security Forces andthe cooperation between them and
Israel, dating back now over 15years at least.
Well, the Israeli governmentofficials, including this prime
(39:31):
minister, know that, the smartpeople in Washington know that,
and yet people act like it justdoesn't exist and take it for
granted until.
Well, one day it may notactually exist anymore.
We have to get to Gaza.
As we speak, the IDF iscontinuing its offensive into
(39:52):
Gaza City, primarily via the air, via airstrikes.
As you both know, netanyahu isdemanding nothing less than
Hamas's surrender, that it laysdown its arms, that it releases
the hostages.
Yesterday, sunday, donald Trumpannounced a ceasefire quote,
unquote deal that again wouldrequire Hamas to release all the
(40:15):
hostages, all 48 remaininghostages in Gaza, on day one and
then engage and promote talksto end the war between Israel
and Hamas, with some vague USguarantee that it would actually
end the war.
First question, I suppose, toyou, ibrahim, as someone who
follows Palestinian politicsquite closely, both in Gaza and
(40:38):
the West Bank is there any wayHamas can accept the Donald
Trump proposal as we understandit from yesterday?
Hamas?
Ibrahim (40:47):
has not rejected the Trump proposal but, as has been
the case for the past two years,inserted language in their
official public statement and,I'm sure, in their private
channels to the USadministration, that we need
guarantees that what thepresident is saying is actually
going to happen.
(41:08):
There will be no situation, inmy opinion, that Hamas will hand
over all the Israeli hostagesbecause they use them as
strategic security chips.
That's the only thing that theyactually have and sorry to use
that language in this context,but that's how it's framed and
you know they will not do thatand wait for the good intents of
Trump to actually come atIsrael with pressure that would,
(41:31):
you know, stop the war.
That's on one level.
On the other level, you know,like I think, one of the things
that went missing is that whenthey released the
Israeli-American soldier, therewere promises, reportedly, that
were made to Hamas that thiswill improve this and that, and
the terms will be different.
And what actually happened, youknow, was an intense Israeli
(41:55):
military campaign in theaftermath, israeli military
campaign in the aftermath.
So I think you know for them,because they are defending, they
are seeking survival at so manydifferent levels, whether it's
individual or organizational,the way that they look at it,
the only card that they have isthe hostages and therefore they
will not hand it over because,you know, because of a US offer.
Now they're smart enough not toactually come publicly and say,
(42:30):
hey, you know this is not goingto work.
They just use, you know,whatever advice they get from
other countries involved,mediators and others.
And's much easier to reach apartial agreement rather than an
end of war agreement where youhave with Hamas, where you have,
you know, demands likedisarmament, you know, end of
(42:55):
governance, although they hadactually approved that.
But I don't really think thatyou will see Hamas handing over
or disarmament to the Israeliarmy.
That's not going to happen.
You need another mechanismwhich is like Palestinian, arab,
international, differentgovernance, which are already
there.
We have plans for these, butthey have not really been
approved yet by the Israeligovernment.
(43:16):
So, in short, I think that theywill respond, and they already
responded publicly, but theywill do that privately.
There will be conditions andterms that they will be asking
which will complicate thesenegotiations.
Unless we have a situationwhere the Israeli government
does actually give guarantees tothe US president that they hand
us the hostages, we'll stop andnothing will happen, and I
(43:38):
don't really think that this isfeasible or realistic at this
point.
So I'm very skeptical that thisis going to take us to a
different zone in terms ofending the war.
Neri (43:47):
Yeah, I mean Hamas's statement, I don't know.
Yeah, no, I mean we'll getNimra I'm very curious to get
Nimra's opinion about this andalso the day after plans, if and
when they may become realistic.
But just for our listeners andviewers, hamas issued its
response.
Like Ibrahim said, they didn'treject the Trump proposal, if
(44:08):
you want to call it thatoutright, but they just
reiterated their longstandingdemands that, okay, they're
willing to release the hostagesin return for guarantees that it
would end the war, that itwould guarantee that the IDF
withdraw from Gaza and, like yousaid, they're willing to hand
over at least governance in Gazato a technocratic committee of
(44:30):
Palestinians and Arabs andinternationals.
But, yes, a reiteration oftheir longstanding position.
Ibrahim (44:36):
Yes, Neri, I just have one quick thought to throw out
there which I strongly believein.
When it comes to day afterarrangements in Gaza.
This, in my opinion, cannot benegotiated with Hamas, because
you're basically talking aboutcompletely dismantling the
military infrastructure.
Otherwise it wouldn't work inmy opinion, not for Israel and
(44:56):
not for the region.
Therefore, the ones who need toactually be engaged in that is
essentially the Arab mediators,the international community and
the PLO, as a replacement forwhat will actually no longer be
in Gaza, which is weapons, whichis Hamas' governance and all of
that, but negotiating that withHamas itself is a situation
(45:19):
that I think is nearlyimpossible.
It just won't work that way.
And since we have no approachyet that these kind of
negotiations on ending the warand post Gaza are not really
done with a valid Palestinianpartner, regional support,
including all the countriesinvolved in it, with
international and Israeliconsent, I just can't imagine,
(45:44):
even plausibly, intellectually,how are you going to talk to
Hamas and say you need todismantle yourself, you need to
exile yourself, you need to giveme all of your weapons?
They'd rather continue doing anddragging.
You know the situation in Gazaas is today, for as long as it
takes Just now, you know, theIsraeli army announced that four
soldiers were killed in Gazaduring combat today.
So they are still out theredoing their thing of guerrilla
(46:05):
warfare here and there andthinking that this way they
could at least survive.
And, by the way, hamas'sfighters in Gaza, I think, if
they are not provided the oneswho are not ideological if
they're not provided with analternative to being killed and
exterminated, they will continuefighting because there is no
choice.
So, again, if you do not reallyhave a different strategic
(46:27):
framework for these kinds ofnegotiations with an acceptable
partner, with regional supportand Israeli consent, I just
don't see how it will work interms of Hamas proposal versus
US trying to pass that withultimatums, like turning Gaza
into hell, has been done overthe past 20 plus months.
So I'm not sure you know whatis it that this kind of threat
(46:51):
is doing to Hamas' psyche interms of affecting its
negotiations tactics?
Neri (46:56):
Right, I don't think you're going to find
disagreement here.
Negotiations techniques Right,I don't think you're going to
find disagreement here.
By the way, the issue ofbasically negotiating an end to
the war, not with Hamas, butwith the PA and other Arab
actors we've had US officials,former US officials, on this
podcast, like Barbara Leaf, likeDan Shapiro, make that same
point, and yet it hasn't reallyhappened, I think for a variety
of reasons.
But Israel has, netanyahuspecifically, has said you know,
(47:20):
no Hamas, no PA.
In the day after the war,netanyahu also reiterates almost
on a daily basis his conditionsfor ending the war, very
(47:44):
maximalist conditions.
What, to your mind, would be,as Ibrahim started to lay out an
alternative, day after approachthat both obviously gets the
hostages back, ends the war,maybe sets Gaza on a better
trajectory in the day after thewar.
Nimrod (48:01):
I think that before the day after, I'd like to suggest a
different take on the Americanplan from yesterday, what it
entails and what it does not.
Ibrahim is right Negotiatingwith Hamas the morning after
makes absolutely no sense, andit is not there.
(48:21):
It is not Hamas that issupposed responsible for
disarming Hamas.
(48:41):
It's the job of the nextgovernment that will be formed.
There are elements there thatsurprised me me, given that my
(49:08):
conspiratorial mind doesn't letgo the thought that this
document is copyright Netanyahuand Dermer showing up in the
region via Washington, andtherefore I really was surprised
to see one clause there, whichis that the Israeli withdrawal,
once enacted and it is definedas in the shortest period of
(49:29):
time as possible, iscomprehensive, even no residual
presence in the so-calledparameters Perimeter, perimeter.
Perimeter Perimeter, yes,because it's a Hebrew word that
now we are using in English, youknow.
Neri (49:47):
It's the accent.
Yeah, yeah, but wait, nimrod,explain what is this one pager
that you speak of?
Nimrod (49:54):
Well, everybody is talking about the American plan.
So, the American plan, which isa bunch of principles governing
a deal.
Some of the elements havealready been published, like all
hostages on day one, end of war, declaration on day one.
(50:14):
And some have beenmisrepresented, such as that
there is in it the elements ofdemilitarization of Hamas.
No, these are to be negotiatednot negotiated, but to be tasked
(50:36):
with that mysterious governmentand I'm saying mysterious
because, like Ibrahim, I don'tbelieve that there can be a
third party government in Gazathat is not linked in one way or
another to the PalestinianAuthority and reinforced by
(51:00):
presence of several Arabcountries that will contribute
to its survival operationspotential success.
And these countries, who aresupposed to contribute to the
Gaza morning after, have theirown conditions and none of them
(51:20):
are met in that Americanproposal.
But that's because there is adistinction between ending the
war, bringing the hostages, onthe one hand, and the morning
after on the other.
So, just to sum up, looking atit from Jerusalem perspective,
(51:42):
whether it was written byNetanyahu or not, when I analyze
the components of the deal, Ican see three potential
scenarios shaping up, again froma Netanyahu perspective.
Scenario number one Hamasaccepts.
If that happens, that's theclosest equivalent to total
(52:05):
victory, and Netanyahu cancertainly claim total victory.
It's a huge win for Trump, evenin time for the Nobel Peace
Prize.
For Trump, even in time for theNobel Peace Prize, and that's,
you know, the best of all worlds.
(52:29):
Since I think it is not verylikely that this will be
accepted as is, by the way, aswe walked into Nery's studio,
hamas made a little more of itsposition known, and that was
something that we all alluded tobut didn't know.
It's coming so quickly andopenly.
And that is not all hostages onday one, yeah, hostages on day
(52:55):
one, and the remainder later on,at a date to be determined,
which obviously reflects theHamas logic that Ibrahim spoke
about.
The second scenario is thatHamas rejects and Trump is
trapped into greenlighting theIsraeli operation with no
(53:21):
expiration date.
Scenario three Hamas accepts.
All hostages are home.
The new government fails tosecure security, the war resumes
with no need to worry about thelives of the hostages.
So if I sit in the Balfourresidence of the Israeli prime
(53:45):
minister, I see these threescenarios, all of them, working
well for me, so let's go for it.
Neri (53:54):
Yeah, of course, it's almost cost-free for Israel,
because it's a Trump ultimatum.
A final warning, as he wroteyesterday to Hamas Another final
warning, another final warning.
You know what does he say?
Everything is in two weeks'time, so we'll see what happens
in two weeks.
Nimrod, just on the issue ofday after, but also just the
(54:17):
Arab government equities or rolein a post-war Gaza scenario.
We've seen, definitely over thepast two years, but even more
so in recent months, growingtensions between Jerusalem and
pretty much every other Arabcapital, but especially between
Jerusalem and Cairo, betweenIsrael and Egypt.
As somebody who follows thisrelationship quite closely, is
(54:44):
it concerning to you?
Where does it come from?
I mean, how angry is Cairo withwhat's happening in Gaza and
also the rhetoric coming out ofJerusalem?
Nimrod (54:55):
I would say, when you talk about President Sisi, very
angry.
When you talk about PresidentSisi, very angry.
When you talk about thesecurity establishment, very
worried in Egypt.
You know they are convinced andI'm not sure that they are
wrong that the anti-Egyptiancampaign comes from the top here
(55:19):
.
It is almost reminiscent.
You remember Yehuda Gil, theMossad officer who fed the
Israeli system with falseanalysis, false reports from a
fictional Syrian senior Syriansource that almost brought
(55:41):
Israel and Syria to go to war.
Yeah, it was so alarming.
What we're watching now is thaton steroids.
You know, since the peacetreaty was enacted, there is an
institution in the Sinai calledthe MFO, multilateral Force of
(56:02):
Observers, a few thousandinternational observers, and
this entity is owned, so tospeak, by the US, egypt and
Israel and has been monitoringcompliance with the peace treaty
.
That entity reports to thethree owners, to the three
stakeholders.
That entity reports to thethree owners, to the three
stakeholders, and their reportsand I think we all can check in
(56:26):
Jerusalem, in Washington and inCairo.
Their reports say that Israelimedia report day in and out,
including a public statement bythe Israeli ambassador to
Washington, that Egypt isviolating the peace treaty and
the messing forces in the Sinaiin violation of annex three to
(56:51):
the security annex to the peacetreaty are all fabricated, that
pictures of tank formations inthe Sinai are not from the Sinai
and the Egyptians.
Look at this PR campaign thatstarted with what we call in the
(57:14):
country RunGate I'm sorry,qatargate where people were
pumping Qatar as the onlyreliable mediator, smearing
Egypt as not doing its job andso on.
That's when it started and thesepeople are now under
(57:34):
investigation for treason andmushroomed into these
allegations false allegationsthat Egypt is getting ready for
war.
So that's one element.
The other element is they seeour policy, and the policy seems
to be driving Gazans furthersouth in the Strip, further
(57:57):
closer to the Egyptian border,with a declared intent of
several members of the cabinetof exporting millions of Gazans
to Egypt in violation of itssovereignty.
So, yeah, the Egyptians arevery worried, and you know,
because the only mature adultthat is responsible for calming
(58:22):
spirits at this time is out tolunch and that's Washington that
is too busy with so many otherthings and has no attention span
for marginal issues like Israeland Egypt going to war.
For marginal issues like Israeland Egypt going to war, nobody
(58:43):
stands up and says, hey, I havein front of me the MFO report.
Stop lying.
Neri (58:46):
Stop lying.
Indeed, and it's a real PRcampaign going on now for months
, about the growing threat fromthe Egyptian army towards Israel
, which seems ridiculous becauseit is ridiculous, towards
Israel.
Which seems ridiculous becauseit is ridiculous.
But you know, you don't need tobe a believer in conspiracy
theorists, because the Israeliprime minister said in a
interview to a local Telegramchannel late last week that well
(59:10):
, if the Egyptians would justplay ball and open the gates in
Rafah, then you know all thePalestinians could leave,
because you know they all wantto leave, which is obviously a
major threat to Egyptiannational security.
Nimrod (59:24):
An Egyptian friend responded to me privately on the
prime minister's suggestionthat Egypt open its border to
Gazans, and he asked me doesn'tIsrael control two of Egypt's
three land borders?
Why shouldn't Israel open itsborders to Gazans?
Neri (59:44):
Gaza's land borders, not Egypt's.
Yeah, yeah, because you knowwhy should we allow the Gazans
into Israel, or even the WestBank?
Of course not.
Yeah, but you know the Israeliposition.
Ibrahim is smiling.
You know it's voluntaryimmigration, so why can't they
voluntarily emigrate, you know,to Al-Quds, to Jerusalem?
Ibrahim (01:00:08):
Ibrahim.
I just had one comment on this,if I may.
You know what the radicals?
We have insane people on ourside too.
Do you know actually what theywhen they listen to these things
and these positions and theseattitudes basically destroying
all of Israeli sort of likestrategic allies in the region,
(01:00:30):
including Egypt, includingJordan, for God's sake, UK,
France, UAE you know what theysay.
They basically say look, thisis much better for us, Let them
destroy it.
Let them go to war with Egyptand with UAE and with Jordan.
This is a machine that producesthe perfect storm scenario for
(01:00:52):
all of us Like destroyeverything.
It's just unbelievable.
I'm just telling youwholeheartedly, because I'm a
very strong believer in my lifeand even death, in coexistence
and living together, and I seethings that if I were an Israeli
I would go mad in the streetsbecause this, what is happening,
is essentially pushing all ofIsraeli strategic interests and
(01:01:17):
achievements over the past 70plus years into a dustbin of
history like Egypt.
I mean anyway, sorry for theoutburst, you can take it out.
It's not, it's not me to say ortell that Israeli government
what to do, but it's just bad,Feels very bad.
Neri (01:01:35):
First of all, we love to tell the Israeli government what
to do on this podcast andyou're not wrong at all, ibrahim
.
Very bad.
First of all, we love to tellthe Israeli government what to
do on this podcast.
Uh, and you're not uh wrong atall, ibrahim.
There are a lot of Israelisgoing crazy on the streets
precisely due to the things thatyou layout, that on every level
.
Uh, this government is just, uh, you know, severing the
strategic uh infrastructure andachievements that have been
(01:01:58):
built up through decades in thiscountry, including in the US
and including in the US,including global public opinion,
including, soon to be economic,soon to be the stature and
position of the IDF, soon to bestability in the West Bank.
I mean, we can go on and on,but we won't.
Soon to be stability in theWest Bank.
I mean, we can go on and on,but we won't.
(01:02:22):
So hopefully cooler headsprevail, if not in Jerusalem,
then in Washington and, by theway, someone told me last week
that they looked into it,including at the highest levels
in Oslo, in Norway.
The deadline for submissions ofcandidates for the Nobel Peace
Prize this year has alreadypassed.
So if Donald Trump wants to bea candidate, it will have to be
(01:02:44):
for next year.
No, bibi already submitted him.
Well, I don't know.
Was it accepted?
Probably not, I don't know.
Nimrod (01:02:56):
With that, I don't think that the formality will stand
in the way.
Neri (01:03:01):
Look, I don't know much about Northern Europeans, but I
do know that rules are rules upthere.
It's not the Middle East,nimrod, it's not the Middle East
.
We're out of time both of you.
Great to see you both and thankyou so much and we'll chat
again soon.
Thank you, thanks, nery.
Good to see you, ibrahim.
Thanks, good Thanks.
Ibrahim (01:03:16):
Narek, good to see you.
Ibrahim.
Thanks, good to see you.
Bye-bye Narek.
Bye-bye Narek.
Neri (01:03:19):
Bye-bye, okay.
Thanks again to Nimrod Novikand Ibrahim Dallalshe for their
generous time and insights.
Also, a special thanks to ourproducer, jacob Gilman, and to
all of you who support IsraelPolicy Forum's work.
Do consider making a donationto Israel Policy Forum so you
can keep being a credible sourceof analysis and ideas on issues
such as these that we all caredeeply about, including this
(01:03:45):
podcast and, most importantly,thank you for listening.
Please note that this episode was recorded on Monday,
September 8th, one day beforethe Israeli strike targeting
Hamas officials in Doha.
Neri (00:13):
Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod.
I'm Neri Zilber, a journalistbased in Tel Aviv and a policy
advisor to Israel Policy Forum.
We have a very special episodethis week with two returning
guests and friends Israel PolicyForum's very own Israel fellow,
nimrod Novick, who for manyyears was a senior advisor to
the late Shimon Peres and iscurrently a senior leader in the
(00:36):
Commanders for Israel SecurityGroup, and Ibrahim Delalche, the
head of the Horizon Centerthink tank in Ramallah and a
longtime advisor at the USconsulate in Jerusalem.
So we're recording this Mondayevening, tel Aviv time.
Earlier today there was aserious terror attack in
Jerusalem where two Palestiniangunmen from the West Bank opened
(00:58):
fire at a major intersection,killing at least six people and
severely injuring several more.
It was a reminder as if weneeded one, that the quietest
front, relatively speaking, inthis two-year seven-front war,
the West Bank, shouldn't betaken for granted.
Not at all.
So that's why, among manyreasons, I wanted Nimrod and
(01:20):
Ibrahim on today to discuss theWest Bank, the Palestinian
Authority, the Palestinianstatehood, recognition at the UN
in New York later this monthand, of course, the current and
future state of play in the GazaWar.
It was a really greatconversation with them both.
That spanned a wide gamut,believe me, which, if you know
(01:41):
them both, shouldn't surpriseyou in the least.
Let's get to Nimrod and Ibrahim.
Hi Nimrod, hi Ibrahim.
Welcome back to the IsraelPolicy Pod.
Nimrod (01:51):
Nice to be here with you .
Neri (01:53):
Thank you.
Well, it's my pleasure to youboth.
It's been way too long sincelast time you both were on and
there's a lot to discuss well,in general, but especially this
week.
But I wanted to actually startwith the situation in the West
Bank.
In normal times this would betop of the agenda, it's fair to
say, especially over the pasttwo years.
(02:14):
But there are other frontsgoing on, obviously Gaza,
lebanon, iran, yemen, probably afew fronts that I've already
forgotten.
But in normal times, the WestBank, I think, would be top of
the agenda.
Definitely, media coverage,publicly, diplomatically.
But we got a tragic reminderthis morning that the West Bank,
despite being maybe the mostrelatively calm front over the
(02:37):
past two years, is not actuallycalm at all the tragic shooting
in Jerusalem that killed atleast six Israelis this morning.
So, basically, the lack ofattention doesn't mean that
things aren't happening in theWest Bank.
They are, I'd argue, most ofwhich are negative.
But, nimrod, let's start withyou.
(02:58):
The last few weeks we've seen aflurry of activity by the
Netanyahu government andspecifically Betel Esmotich, the
finance minister, and also theminister in the defense ministry
, pushing forward various plans,whether annexation of the West
Bank or construction in thestrategic E1 corridor between
Jerusalem and the Maladumim, andso on and so on.
(03:20):
Big picture.
It's a very broad question, butlet's start here.
How would you characterize ordescribe Netanyahu government's
policy vis-a-vis the West Bankreally over the past two plus
years?
Nimrod (03:50):
of going for legislated annexation in lieu of creeping
or indeed galloping annexationon the ground.
That has been going on andintensified over the last two,
three years, and the situationon the West Bank has become
quite explosive well before thehorrific incident of this
morning, well before thehorrific incident of this
morning.
As a matter of fact, a month ago, I published a piece in Time
(04:10):
magazine and CNN did thefollow-up on it, and the title
was the Violent Gazification ofthe West Bank, where I pointed
out several contributors to theexplosiveness of the situation.
But the bottom line was thatIsraeli violent settlers,
(04:33):
getting the back wind from theirleaders, who are now in
government, and radicalizedyoung Palestinians, who are
radicalized in response to theJewish violence and terrorism,
as well as to the two years warin Gaza.
The two groups are using eachother to justify violence,
(04:58):
feeding on each other and, inthe process, killing innocents,
destroying property and settingthe stage for a major explosion.
So I think that the fact thateyes were on Gaza, and also on
Syria, lebanon, iran, was a verygood cover for our messianic
(05:22):
annexationists to expedite theirambitions.
And I must say I never believedthat I will live to the day
where the US ambassador toIsrael, who is an enthusiastic
supporter of the settlements,will approach the Israeli
government and say watch it.
The PMA collapse and theconsequences are going to be
(05:44):
devastating.
Neri (05:46):
Sure, the US ambassador in Jerusalem, mike Huckabee, did
say that a few days ago.
I think an apt warning.
We'll get Ibrahim's thoughtsabout the PA's stability or not
in just a second.
But also, you both know as wellas I do that the Trump
administration has given a greenlight to a lot of the worst
impulses at the top of theIsraeli government vis-a-vis the
(06:07):
West Bank.
So there is a back window.
So I guess, going the other way, coming from Washington,
ibrahim, you're coming to usfrom your home in Ramallah.
Given all the above that Nimrodlaid out, what has it been like
in the West Bank over the past,especially two years, whether
socially, economically,politically, since the start of
(06:31):
the war?
Ibrahim (06:33):
Actually, the situation has really worsened in the past
.
I would say four to six months,but the situation has been bad
since October 7, 2023.
But I think you know, with thescale of violence in Gaza, also
(06:54):
the other fronts, exactly as myfriend and colleague Nimrod
pointed out, I think there wassome sort of like a cover, an
eclipse basically to what's beenhappening in the West Bank, but
I can basically describe it aslike it has been ampers under
ashes for nearly two years now,most recently, I think the way
(07:15):
to describe the West Bank isthat you know you have a
situation where the PA is goingthrough a crippling economic,
financial and economic crisis.
It started impacting people atdifferent levels those who are
employed by the PA, and herewe're talking about nearly
100,000 people in the West Bankwho are employed by the PA and,
(07:37):
with their families, have beenactually with no income for the
past three months, to bespecific, and on partial
salaries for the past few years.
So you know this has impactedservices.
The PA had to cut down onworking hours.
We're talking about health caresystem, that is, that has
(07:58):
shrunk in terms of serviceprovision.
Education barely the school yearhas started because of partial
strikes and divisions within theteachers sectors, commercial
activities have really gone down, real estate and all other sort
of like activities that were,you know, especially in an area
like Nablus or Ramallah had beena boom for many years now has
(08:23):
actually gone into some sort ofhad been a boom for many years
now has actually gone into somesort of recess where people do
not really recession, wherepeople do not really spend
anything because of their fearsand concerns.
And in addition to that, ofcourse, you have, like the
general situation of frustration, demoralization looking at
what's happening in Gaza, a warthat is not ending.
(08:44):
Demoralization looking atwhat's happening in Gaza, a war
that is not ending, and itsimpact on the PA.
I want to remind you thatduring the first two weeks after
October 7, and this was alsosomething that was not really, I
think, well noted duringclashes between the PA security
services and lots of youth andpeople here who wanted to go out
to the streets and protestingwhat was going on in Gaza, there
(09:08):
were 13 to 15 people who wereactually killed during those.
So the PA had to crush, you know, initial sort of like
mobilization to the street andthat same system, that is to say
, the PA, has actually beenweakened over the past two years
and now rendered almostirrelevant because of, again,
shrunken services provisions,weakness in terms of relevance
(09:30):
On the security front.
I think the PA continues to dowhat it takes in terms of
security coordination and all ofthat.
But the PA has been weakenedeven in a security sense by the
large Israeli army operation inTulk Aram and Jenin earlier this
year, where it was seen asredundant, irrelevant, cannot
protect citizens.
Settlers' violence, I think,also plays a very big role where
(09:55):
the PA is seen as only enablerof an occupier, not really a
protector of Palestiniancivilians who are being
subjected to settlers's violence, including in areas very close
to Ramallah, which is like theadministrative capital, if you
will, of the PalestinianAuthority.
(10:16):
All of those elements together,I think, has put the PA in a
very weak spot.
And I don't have to mention thefact that even when things do go
wrong and the PA tries to stopthem or tries to play a role
where they today condemned theattack in Jerusalem, for
instance I know the wordingmight not sound perfect to
Israeli ears, but still you knowthere was a condemnation from
(10:37):
the Palestinian Authority inRamallah Then you get yes, it
did, it issued a statement onthat.
But basically, again, you knowlike the idea is that you got
Smotrich, who is an Israeliminister, who basically time is
now to wipe out the Palestinianauthorities.
So it just shows that the PA andits narrative and its actually
line of working on a peacefulapproach, doing security
(10:57):
coordination, all of thesethings is not really resonating
and is not really making lifebetter for people in the West
Bank and this, I think, iscausing the PA to lose even on
writing a narrative when itcomes to its own strategy versus
Hamas's strategy.
With all the frustration withthe bankruptcy, insolvency of
(11:21):
the PA, not being able todeliver services, all of that,
it's becoming as irrelevant asthe Hamas governance in Gaza is.
Under the circumstances, if youknow what I mean.
There is nothing that the PAcan point to and say look, here
in the West Bank we're actuallybetter off under my policy.
It's going through all kinds ofpressures, including, you know,
(11:42):
the question of annexationpossible or not.
De facto annexation ishappening, such as violence is
continuing and therefore the PAlooks as completely irrelevant
and weak in the eyes of thegeneral public.
Neri (11:59):
Yeah, unfortunately, that's what I was expecting you
to say.
Yeah, unfortunately, that'swhat I was expecting you to say.
It's a very difficult situationin general, but also Israeli
government policy is making itactively worse.
Nimrod, you've been followingthis longer than I have Usually.
(12:25):
In years past you've had theIsraeli security establishment,
whether IDF, shin Bet and others, come to the government and say
look in the West Bank, you needto prioritize well economic
life, you need to move forwardon issues and policies that
promote stability and not try toactively undermine the PA and
make things worse.
Do you see a real shift?
Both, I guess, not only interms of Israeli government
(12:46):
policy, but also in the abilityof the Israeli security
establishment to actuallycounsel restraint to this
Israeli government?
Nimrod (12:55):
I would say that counseling restraint has not
changed to the point that whenvery senior levels of IDF and
Shin Bet well, let's go to whatis in the public domain or sort
of public domain, and that iswhen they go to the Knesset
Security Committee and speak onthe subject, and, given that our
(13:19):
Knesset Security Committee isalmost like a press conference,
everything leaks from there, andwe know that the IDF and the
Shin Bet praise the PalestinianAuthority for cooperating in
counter-terrorism against Hamasand others and credits the
(13:41):
Palestinian Authority withsaving countless of lives, and
the revertiv saving countless oflives and derivatives, of
course, watch it, treat itdifferently.
There is a change, though, andthat it's lower ranks, where
officers with a differentworldview are coming up to more
(14:03):
senior positions, and they sharethe smart, rich Ben Greer
approach, and we found elementsof that in internal arguments in
the security establishment, andalso, some people attribute
passivity on behalf of the IDF,relative passivity vis-à-vis
(14:25):
Jewish terrorism, to that factor.
With your permission, youmentioned earlier the American
elephant in the room.
You mentioned the sort of ginlight for the Netanyahu
government to do as it pleasesin Gaza, and now also, with
(14:47):
Rubio quoted as saying you wantto go for annexation.
It's your thing, not ourbusiness.
I have a feeling that thisWashington, unlike all
predecessors, doesn't understandthe game played in Jerusalem.
It is no accident thatNetanyahu's classical coalitions
(15:07):
save for the current one.
He was the center of thecoalition, there were people to
his right, there were people tohis left to make sure that
neither can drag him too far inany direction, and whenever he
was dragged, his favoritecountermeasure used to be but
(15:28):
the president of the UnitedStates doesn't agree.
It was Clinton, it was Obama,it was Trump won.
It was Biden.
And suddenly this presidentdeprives him of a very important
instrument to restrain theextremists, when the coalition
(15:48):
that he formed for the firsttime ever is extremists only.
Neri (15:57):
Yeah, it's true.
A former Israeli securityofficial told me the same thing
in the Gaza context right, thatusually the American president
would come in and say, look, youneed to stop this.
And then the Israeli primeminister, bibi for the past few
years, would say, come to hisgovernment and say, look, I have
no choice but to end the warbecause Washington is coming
(16:18):
down hard on me, as we all know,and we'll get into in just a
minute.
We all know and we'll get intoin just a minute vis-a-vis Gaza,
that has not happened yet, evenin the Gaza context.
Ibrahim, changing the topicsslightly, maybe a bit of good
(16:38):
news for the PalestinianAuthority?
Maybe In exactly two weekswe're going to have high-level
UN meetings in New York where abig part of the agenda will be
Palestinian statehoodrecognition.
At this point I've lost counthow many countries, but
definitely over a dozen,including some major countries
like the UK, france, australia,canada and the like, not small
(17:02):
players on the global stage andalso just in terms of their
relations with Israel.
How is this potentially goodnews going down in Palestinian
public opinion on the so-calledPalestinian street?
Is this a moment of joy?
Is it met with a shrug?
Ibrahim (17:24):
What are we expecting in two weeks in Ramallah it's a
smart question to ask aboutPalestinian public attitude
towards this, rather than thePalestinian Authority's response
or interaction with it, becauseclearly there are differences.
Neri (17:37):
I'll get to them in a second.
But yeah, I'm very curious howthe public is.
Ibrahim (17:40):
Yeah yeah, sure, no, no , I think the public in general.
It's actually two things torelate to the Palestinian public
.
One is that people areoverwhelmed with the situation.
Again, they watch Gaza, theylook at the economic distress
and hardships, the economic andfinancial problems.
(18:01):
I also forgot to mention thefact that about 150,000
Palestinian workers who used towork in Israel have been
basically jobless for the pasttwo years and this actually
constitutes more income to thePalestinian market and
Palestinian people andPalestinian public than actually
PA salaries, by the way.
I don't have the exact figures,but I think it's two times as
(18:24):
much.
Actually PA salaries, by theway.
I don't have the exact figures,but I think it's two times as
much.
The Palestinian public as suchis overwhelmed with the problems
of day-to-day that they see.
Recognitions of a Palestinianstate is something that people
watch, listen to in the news,but it doesn't really relate to
their day-to-day issues andconcerns, which have been
overwhelming for the past twoyears, and therefore I think
(18:46):
people are generally I'm notgoing to say indifferent, but
they don't really.
You know they're not jumping inthe streets of joy because of
those recognitions, or promisedrecognitions during the General
Assembly and the New York, youknow, the two-state conference
that will be held there.
On the other hand, I thinkthere is and you could actually
(19:07):
see that very clearly ininternal debates where there are
two narratives here, where thePA is basically trying to say
this is a result of my, you know, peaceful approach to the
conflict and basically sufficingwith a two-state solution, 1967
lines, et cetera, and our, youknow, quiet diplomacy and
working with without resortingto violence and armed struggle,
(19:30):
whereas you have those whoactually say, hey, without the
Gaza October, you know, attacks,none of this could have
happened.
And even if it does not reallyhave an immediate impact, it
will actually accumulate interms of international law and
international politics.
And there are those who actuallytalk about, you know, two
superpowers, two countries thatare permanent members of the UN
(19:50):
Security Council, who arejoining the recognitions.
These are not marginalcountries and, you know, key
question is what is it thatthey're going to do?
You know, after?
Israel, especially the currentIsraeli government, will totally
ignore their recognitions andany impact that it may have.
So you know, that debate, Ithink, to me is more important
than seeing, like, the immediatereaction of people to these
(20:12):
recognitions, because again,people are overwhelmed on one
hand, but again writing thenarrative and actually saying
and this is something that Ipersonally relate to, because if
people actually conclude thatarmed resistance is what brought
this, essentially we'reactually bringing in a new
generation believing, like Hamasdid write the narrative of the
(20:33):
second intifada it was only byforce that the Israelis pulled
out from Gaza.
They will do it again with anew generation and therefore
this is likely to plant theseeds of another conflict that
is yet to come, that we are notseeing even today, and you know
that, I think, is how tocharacterize or look at it.
You know.
So I'm one of those whobasically join and again, as I
(20:54):
mentioned earlier, the problemis that the relevance of the PA
is being weakened by the day.
So, even when you try toactually present that argument
that this is a result of amoderate, pragmatic, you know,
peaceful approach to thisconflict with israel, and
therefore you know we have a,you know, possibly, uh, um, an
opportunity to translate thatinto real, uh, uh, reality, sort
(21:18):
of like facts on the ground, uh, then you get, like this
motrich-Pingvir statements,where they were an agendas and
actual work on the ground.
It's not only about statementsthat we're going to destroy this
PA.
That is far more dangerous thanHamas, so people go, you know,
like in a different direction.
So, I'm sorry to say I wouldhave loved to say that this is
actually resonating, but it'snot.
(21:40):
It's a debate that iscontinuing and I'm hoping that
this would be the way to go interms of writing the narrative
and convincing people that thisis the right approach, rather
than the violent approach tothis country.
Nimrod (21:52):
May I jump in here, nery ?
Of course, of course.
Look, ibrahim described it aswell as anybody can from the
inside out.
I'm trying to look at it fromthe outside in.
I'm trying to look at it fromthe outside in, and here is a
not very popular position amongthose like us who are thoroughly
(22:13):
committed to an eventualtwo-state outcome.
I look at it.
I think that the Israelireaction, the Israeli hysteric
reaction, is a put-on.
I think that those involvedrealize that nothing is going to
(22:34):
change on the ground when thenumber of countries recognizing
Palestine is going to go from147 to 150 or whatever, even if
it includes two members of theSecurity Council.
In the lead up to this effort, Ihad the opportunity to discuss
this with people who wereinvolved on the French
(22:58):
presidency side and on the Saudiside that were driving this
initiative, and I made twopoints.
One was that it reminds me ofthe moment that the Palestinian
flag was raised for the firsttime at the UN Plaza, when the
PLO was invited as a I don'tremember the title to the
(23:20):
General Assembly.
The PA leadership did a hugeparty in the center of Ramallah
and the public was laughing atit.
It was laughable because theyfelt that nothing is changing
their lives in the morning after.
And what I argued with theSaudis and French and the others
(23:40):
was this is a feel-good measure, and French and the others was
this is a feel-good measure.
This is the easiest substitutefor actually fighting for that
cause, for doing the heavylifting of promoting the
two-state solution.
There's nothing easier thangoing to the UN raising your
(24:03):
head and say I recognize.
Easier than going to the UNraising your head and say I
recognize.
So I felt that out of context,it's at best not a great damage,
but I urged them to create acontext.
Where is the action plan forwhat you do from the morning
after and on in order to bringthat outcome about?
Neri (24:29):
And Nimrod, I know you must have written a memo laying
out the action plan.
What would some of thoseactions be?
So it's not just a symbolicmove with nothing changing.
Nimrod (24:42):
The day after they recognize Palestine move with
nothing changing the day afterthey recognized Palestine.
Yeah, the suspicion is wellgrounded in more than one memo,
and I wasn't the only one, andthere are dozens who were doing
it.
But no, I'd rather not go to itright now, in the hope that, at
(25:09):
hope that at least some of it,uh, will see the the the light
of day.
Neri (25:11):
Okay, this is the first time nimrod novik has not laid
out his vision.
No, I'm kidding you.
You've been.
You've been very uh uh.
Well, let me, I'll stop there,but you've been.
You know, usually don't holdback, but maybe in more, more
private settings and not on arecorded podcast that will go
around the world.
That's fine.
That's fine.
Not as a journalist, it's notfine, but as a discrete analyst,
(25:34):
that's fine.
Ibrahim, what do you thinkabout Nimrod's argument of the
case?
Ibrahim (25:40):
First of all, I think that there is a, you know,
general consensus that amongintellectuals from a Palestinian
perspective and among thePalestinian people in general,
that things do actually changewhen on the ground, when there
is a Palestinian-Israeliagreement.
And that's why, you know, likewe, for good or bad, we've been
(26:01):
through Oslo process and we havea Palestinian authority, a
Palestinian national identity,because the PLO and Israel did
agree on that 30 years ago.
It was not really thePalestinian, you know, like the
UN recognition, by the way,started in 1988 when the PLO
announced a state in Algeria andwe had, you know, 100 plus
(26:24):
recognitions at that time.
But you know, the situation didnot really change until we got
into an agreement with Israel.
So I think that there is aconsensus here that includes the
Palestinian leadership.
By the way, I don't reallythink that they are in a
euphoria over this.
The problem has been, from aPalestinian perspective, is that
there is no, currently there isno Israeli government to be a
partner with in order to get toa two state solution or even a
(26:47):
peaceful resolution to theconflict.
You've got an Israeli heavyright-wing agenda that talks
about the elimination of thePalestinian national character,
all of it.
So I think just todifferentiate between the
official position and the public.
The public I agree fully withNimrod, but people just don't
see that this is going to changeanything on the ground and
therefore they go almostindifferent about it.
(27:08):
When it comes to thePalestinian Authority, I think
they find a condolence to thefact that there is no room,
there is no political sort oflike maneuver, for many reasons.
The only thing that they got intheir hands is the connection
to Saudi Arabia, now the French,the international recognitions,
and that's the only thing thatthey have.
They do realize that this isnot going to translate into
(27:29):
concrete anything on the ground,but you know, at the end of the
day this is an accumulativeinternational law.
You know diplomacy.
What I'm concerned about, as Itold you, which is an internal
Palestinian debate, I understand, is who writes the narrative
for this.
Even if it's symbolic and doesnot really change people's lives
, it's still seen as a sort ofgain, and that is very crucial.
(27:52):
I think it's very important forus, as Palestinians, not to
give up on the line thatactually eventually takes us to
a peaceful resolution to theconflict and actually swear more
out of frustration and a beliefthat this was a result of armed
struggle and indeed it's a game.
That to me, is actually a muchmore crucial issue on the
(28:13):
internal Palestinian domesticpolitical landscape and debate.
Nimrod (28:17):
Another layer to this story Nery and Ibrahim which I
can't help but mention, is anAmerican decision to deprive Abu
Mazen and his team of visas tocome to the UN.
I must confess I don't remembera single more counterproductive
(28:38):
act by a US administration on acompletely secondary issue, not
war and peace.
I cannot remember a morecounter productive approach than
to send a message topalestinians that diplomacy is
(28:59):
not the right venue.
Neri (29:02):
This is insane so you beat me to it, nimrod.
I was going to ask Ibrahim howthat decision by the Trump
administration to essentiallynot allow the Palestinian
delegation to come to the UNmeetings in New York, including
President Mahmoud Abbas, howthat has gone over in Ramallah.
Ibrahim (29:22):
The PA PLO are very annoyed with this and, by the
way, this is actually the newthing in it is that first of all
, historically there has been aproblem with PAPLO visas to the
US official visas to the USbecause of the US laws that
designate the PLO as a terroristorganization.
So it has always been includingduring the heydays of Oslo that
(29:45):
people you know always beenincluding during the heydays of
Oslo that people you knowofficials will only get those
visas when they get a waiversystem which overrules the
application of or freezes orsuspends the application of law
and gives them an exceptionalbasis and usually it was like
confined in terms of time and interms of areas that they can go
to the US.
Now this is even the onlyexception to that was the visas
(30:08):
that they go to UNGA, which isthe UN General Assembly, because
of the UN agreement with the US, what is known as the
headquarters agreement.
So it didn't really come as amajor earth-shaking to the
Palestinian public, because tothe Palestinian public, to the
officials, it's extremelyannoying, but it's not the only
(30:29):
annoying thing that they reallyhad from this administration,
whether the Trump administrationor one or this one.
I mean even on a much largerscale.
What I can tell you is that andI think Nimrod is right it's
not only insane, it basicallypushes people to actually
believe that such US policiesare making things worse for the
(30:50):
Israeli-Palestinian conflict,not only to Palestinians.
That's one.
Two.
You know what hit Palestinianpeople even more is that all
Palestinian passport holders areno longer allowed to enter into
the US.
It's not only the PA officialsor the PLO officials.
There was a New York Timesarticle about that and it's
(31:12):
substantiated.
There hasn't really been anofficial statement, but it has
been substantiated.
People apply for a US visa fortourism, for business, for
pleasure, for study, forwhatever, and they're not.
You know they are designated as20.
There's a special designationfor it, which is refusal, and as
such, not you know they aredesignated as 20, there's a
special designation for it whichis refusal and as such, you do
not really process it.
Now there is a practicalsolution.
I'm not sure whether I want tosay it on air, but basically
(31:35):
there's a practical solution tothis.
But you know it's a hit to thePalestinian Authority.
It's like you're basicallyrevoking the Palestinian
passport.
It says on it it was issued inaccordance with the agreement
that was signed in Washington.
So you're basically cancelingout everything, not only in the
eyes of the Palestinian people.
Generally speaking, you aretaking steps and I understand,
(31:58):
when you come to apply that onthe PAPLO because of Taylor
Force, atca, this, that they didcomply, they did not comply
with certain US regulations orwhatever, but when it comes to
the Palestinian people,canceling the whole passport,
I'm frankly I don't really knowwhat's the use of this or what
purpose does it serve, otherthan alienating people, creating
(32:21):
anti-American sentiments againacross the board, because you're
punishing everybody for noclear reason as to why you're
doing it.
There is no even explanationand the practical solution I'll
tell you off air.
I mean, you know we'll go backto pre-1993, basically not with
Israeli La Sefa citizen traveldocuments, but with other travel
documents that you knowPalestinians are given in the
(32:43):
region.
So what's the purpose of it?
It's like, basically,destroying the PA.
Speaker 1 (32:51):
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the show notes.
Neri (33:48):
Yeah, for the record.
I don't like when my guestswithhold information from well
our listeners and viewers, butespecially me.
Ibrahim (33:57):
No, no, no no no, I'm kidding.
Neri (33:59):
I know there's a reason why I'm just trying to create
some sort of a profile.
Ibrahim (34:04):
We all West bankers, are entitled to Jordanian
temporary passports,non-citizenship passports.
These are like travel documents, basically that the Jordanian
government has been giving toPalestinians since 1967, and is
Jerusalem, by the way and thismeans that when I go to the US
embassy in Amman or anywhereelse, I apply as a Palestinian.
(34:26):
They know that.
But on a Jordanian temporarypassport they know that and
therefore you know it just addsa burden on people to actually
go through a bureaucratic.
You know, travel to Amman andget a Jordanian passport and
individuals are then allowed,because what is being hit is the
Palestinian Authority and itsstature.
So you know it's not Now.
(34:48):
I'm not saying the PalestinianAuthority is like the angels of
all peace in the world.
I'm just saying you've gotoptions on the ground.
Now, as we talk about Gaza andthereafter and I've read some of
what Nimrod and many otherexperts, including Israelis, who
wrote on this You've got liketwo practical solutions or
options, you know one with Hamasand its cronies and the
(35:10):
remnants of Hamas in Gaza, andone with the weakened
Palestinian Authority that needsto be rehabilitated and you
know, and work in terms ofrecreating its governance in
Gaza within certain principlesand all of that.
So if you destroy both, what isit that you're going to do,
like immediate occupation?
If that is the case, I'mtelling youinian people cannot
really stop that from happening,but the situation would be
(35:31):
worse for both israelis andpalestinians a hundred percent
and we're going to get to gaza,trust me, in just a second, uh.
Neri (35:37):
But to tie up the issue of well, well, uh, us policy
vis-a-vis the palestinians andthe palestinian authority and
palestinian statehoodrecognition, I'll say it, the
craziest argument I've heardboth from the Israeli prime
minister and also senior Trumpadministration officials,
publicly over the past week ortwo as well.
The PA is taking unilateralsteps against Israel in the
(36:03):
national arena, icc and whatever.
So now Israel may takeunilateral steps against the
Palestinian Authority and, bythe way, the US administration
is within its rights to take,you know, to sanction the PA.
I've never heard of a moreridiculous argument, because you
know, this Israeli governmentnot only violates the Oslo
(36:25):
Accords, you have seniorministers saying that they want
to destroy the Oslo Accords.
Right, and it's just a circularlogic that I've heard from both
American and Israeli officials,and it's like you're living in
Fantasyland.
Nimrod (36:42):
It's even worse.
It's even worse because whatare the measures that the
Palestinian Authority is takingto do all this unilateral stuff
worse?
It's even worse because whatare the measures that the
Palestinian Authority is takingto do all this unilateral stuff?
Diplomacy.
So what do you want?
To shut the door on diplomacyin order for them to go where?
Ibrahim?
Ibrahim (37:04):
I just wanted to say, even when you have an insane
situation like this, governmentswho have, in my opinion, an
extremist position that truly isseeking to destroy the
Palestinian Authority Nimrodsaid it's diplomacy.
(37:24):
So if you really want toactually take countermeasures,
you resort to reciprocity.
If you will, you resort to, andit means but destroying the
entire, you know, politicalstature, financial, economic and
even impacting its own security.
I mean the PA as your partnerin the West Bank, because it is
(37:46):
still a partner in the West Bank, by the way, and I'm saying
this assertively because I doknow that security coordination
channels are still operating.
Therefore, you're not onlyhurting the Palestinian
Authority or the Palestinianpeople, you're also hurting
yourself.
By the way, with all due respect, I worked 20 years for the US
government and I do not mean toattack the US government, but I
(38:06):
do.
I'm one of the strong believersthat if we wait for the US to
come to fix our situation, bothPalestinians and Israelis, we
will be disappointed.
Let me say that I think we arethe ones who could actually make
things move and once we do, theUS will come to support that
(38:27):
approach, because otherwise theywill continue to support
whatever Israeli government isthere without really, you know,
going into the nuances of ourconflict, which are far more
confusing to you.
Know a number of individualsright now who are basically
dealing with this complicatedpolitical file and not alone
with many other files in theregion and the world actually.
Neri (38:48):
Yeah, but the problem is you have a US administration in
power now that is not only kindof abetting the worst impulses
of this Israeli government andIsraeli far right, but they're
actively pushing and promotingpolicies that make things worse.
Right, that's the problem.
Ibrahim (39:09):
Yes, that's exactly what's happening.
Neri (39:11):
yes, which, again, you don't have to convince me,
ibrahim.
As you know, I wrote a wholebook about the Palestinian
Authority Security Forces andthe cooperation between them and
Israel, dating back now over 15years at least.
Well, the Israeli governmentofficials, including this prime
(39:31):
minister, know that, the smartpeople in Washington know that,
and yet people act like it justdoesn't exist and take it for
granted until.
Well, one day it may notactually exist anymore.
We have to get to Gaza.
As we speak, the IDF iscontinuing its offensive into
(39:52):
Gaza City, primarily via the air, via airstrikes.
As you both know, netanyahu isdemanding nothing less than
Hamas's surrender, that it laysdown its arms, that it releases
the hostages.
Yesterday, sunday, donald Trumpannounced a ceasefire quote,
unquote deal that again wouldrequire Hamas to release all the
(40:15):
hostages, all 48 remaininghostages in Gaza, on day one and
then engage and promote talksto end the war between Israel
and Hamas, with some vague USguarantee that it would actually
end the war.
First question, I suppose, toyou, ibrahim, as someone who
follows Palestinian politicsquite closely, both in Gaza and
(40:38):
the West Bank is there any wayHamas can accept the Donald
Trump proposal as we understandit from yesterday?
Hamas?
Ibrahim (40:47):
has not rejected the Trump proposal but, as has been
the case for the past two years,inserted language in their
official public statement and,I'm sure, in their private
channels to the USadministration, that we need
guarantees that what thepresident is saying is actually
going to happen.
(41:08):
There will be no situation, inmy opinion, that Hamas will hand
over all the Israeli hostagesbecause they use them as
strategic security chips.
That's the only thing that theyactually have and sorry to use
that language in this context,but that's how it's framed and
you know they will not do thatand wait for the good intents of
Trump to actually come atIsrael with pressure that would,
(41:31):
you know, stop the war.
That's on one level.
On the other level, you know,like I think, one of the things
that went missing is that whenthey released the
Israeli-American soldier, therewere promises, reportedly, that
were made to Hamas that thiswill improve this and that, and
the terms will be different.
And what actually happened, youknow, was an intense Israeli
(41:55):
military campaign in theaftermath, israeli military
campaign in the aftermath.
So I think you know for them,because they are defending, they
are seeking survival at so manydifferent levels, whether it's
individual or organizational,the way that they look at it,
the only card that they have isthe hostages and therefore they
will not hand it over because,you know, because of a US offer.
Now they're smart enough not toactually come publicly and say,
(42:30):
hey, you know this is not goingto work.
They just use, you know,whatever advice they get from
other countries involved,mediators and others.
And's much easier to reach apartial agreement rather than an
end of war agreement where youhave with Hamas, where you have,
you know, demands likedisarmament, you know, end of
(42:55):
governance, although they hadactually approved that.
But I don't really think thatyou will see Hamas handing over
or disarmament to the Israeliarmy.
That's not going to happen.
You need another mechanismwhich is like Palestinian, arab,
international, differentgovernance, which are already
there.
We have plans for these, butthey have not really been
approved yet by the Israeligovernment.
(43:16):
So, in short, I think that theywill respond, and they already
responded publicly, but theywill do that privately.
There will be conditions andterms that they will be asking
which will complicate thesenegotiations.
Unless we have a situationwhere the Israeli government
does actually give guarantees tothe US president that they hand
us the hostages, we'll stop andnothing will happen, and I
(43:38):
don't really think that this isfeasible or realistic at this
point.
So I'm very skeptical that thisis going to take us to a
different zone in terms ofending the war.
Neri (43:47):
Yeah, I mean Hamas's statement, I don't know.
Yeah, no, I mean we'll getNimra I'm very curious to get
Nimra's opinion about this andalso the day after plans, if and
when they may become realistic.
But just for our listeners andviewers, hamas issued its
response.
Like Ibrahim said, they didn'treject the Trump proposal, if
(44:08):
you want to call it thatoutright, but they just
reiterated their longstandingdemands that, okay, they're
willing to release the hostagesin return for guarantees that it
would end the war, that itwould guarantee that the IDF
withdraw from Gaza and, like yousaid, they're willing to hand
over at least governance in Gazato a technocratic committee of
(44:30):
Palestinians and Arabs andinternationals.
But, yes, a reiteration oftheir longstanding position.
Ibrahim (44:36):
Yes, Neri, I just have one quick thought to throw out
there which I strongly believein.
When it comes to day afterarrangements in Gaza.
This, in my opinion, cannot benegotiated with Hamas, because
you're basically talking aboutcompletely dismantling the
military infrastructure.
Otherwise it wouldn't work inmy opinion, not for Israel and
(44:56):
not for the region.
Therefore, the ones who need toactually be engaged in that is
essentially the Arab mediators,the international community and
the PLO, as a replacement forwhat will actually no longer be
in Gaza, which is weapons, whichis Hamas' governance and all of
that, but negotiating that withHamas itself is a situation
(45:19):
that I think is nearlyimpossible.
It just won't work that way.
And since we have no approachyet that these kind of
negotiations on ending the warand post Gaza are not really
done with a valid Palestinianpartner, regional support,
including all the countriesinvolved in it, with
international and Israeliconsent, I just can't imagine,
(45:44):
even plausibly, intellectually,how are you going to talk to
Hamas and say you need todismantle yourself, you need to
exile yourself, you need to giveme all of your weapons?
They'd rather continue doing anddragging.
You know the situation in Gazaas is today, for as long as it
takes Just now, you know, theIsraeli army announced that four
soldiers were killed in Gazaduring combat today.
So they are still out theredoing their thing of guerrilla
(46:05):
warfare here and there andthinking that this way they
could at least survive.
And, by the way, hamas'sfighters in Gaza, I think, if
they are not provided the oneswho are not ideological if
they're not provided with analternative to being killed and
exterminated, they will continuefighting because there is no
choice.
So, again, if you do not reallyhave a different strategic
(46:27):
framework for these kinds ofnegotiations with an acceptable
partner, with regional supportand Israeli consent, I just
don't see how it will work interms of Hamas proposal versus
US trying to pass that withultimatums, like turning Gaza
into hell, has been done overthe past 20 plus months.
So I'm not sure you know whatis it that this kind of threat
(46:51):
is doing to Hamas' psyche interms of affecting its
negotiations tactics?
Neri (46:56):
Right, I don't think you're going to find
disagreement here.
Negotiations techniques Right,I don't think you're going to
find disagreement here.
By the way, the issue ofbasically negotiating an end to
the war, not with Hamas, butwith the PA and other Arab
actors we've had US officials,former US officials, on this
podcast, like Barbara Leaf, likeDan Shapiro, make that same
point, and yet it hasn't reallyhappened, I think for a variety
of reasons.
But Israel has, netanyahuspecifically, has said you know,
(47:20):
no Hamas, no PA.
In the day after the war,netanyahu also reiterates almost
on a daily basis his conditionsfor ending the war, very
(47:44):
maximalist conditions.
What, to your mind, would be,as Ibrahim started to lay out an
alternative, day after approachthat both obviously gets the
hostages back, ends the war,maybe sets Gaza on a better
trajectory in the day after thewar.
Nimrod (48:01):
I think that before the day after, I'd like to suggest a
different take on the Americanplan from yesterday, what it
entails and what it does not.
Ibrahim is right Negotiatingwith Hamas the morning after
makes absolutely no sense, andit is not there.
(48:21):
It is not Hamas that issupposed responsible for
disarming Hamas.
(48:41):
It's the job of the nextgovernment that will be formed.
There are elements there thatsurprised me me, given that my
(49:08):
conspiratorial mind doesn't letgo the thought that this
document is copyright Netanyahuand Dermer showing up in the
region via Washington, andtherefore I really was surprised
to see one clause there, whichis that the Israeli withdrawal,
once enacted and it is definedas in the shortest period of
(49:29):
time as possible, iscomprehensive, even no residual
presence in the so-calledparameters Perimeter, perimeter.
Perimeter Perimeter, yes,because it's a Hebrew word that
now we are using in English, youknow.
Neri (49:47):
It's the accent.
Yeah, yeah, but wait, nimrod,explain what is this one pager
that you speak of?
Nimrod (49:54):
Well, everybody is talking about the American plan.
So, the American plan, which isa bunch of principles governing
a deal.
Some of the elements havealready been published, like all
hostages on day one, end of war, declaration on day one.
(50:14):
And some have beenmisrepresented, such as that
there is in it the elements ofdemilitarization of Hamas.
No, these are to be negotiatednot negotiated, but to be tasked
(50:36):
with that mysterious governmentand I'm saying mysterious
because, like Ibrahim, I don'tbelieve that there can be a
third party government in Gazathat is not linked in one way or
another to the PalestinianAuthority and reinforced by
(51:00):
presence of several Arabcountries that will contribute
to its survival operationspotential success.
And these countries, who aresupposed to contribute to the
Gaza morning after, have theirown conditions and none of them
(51:20):
are met in that Americanproposal.
But that's because there is adistinction between ending the
war, bringing the hostages, onthe one hand, and the morning
after on the other.
So, just to sum up, looking atit from Jerusalem perspective,
(51:42):
whether it was written byNetanyahu or not, when I analyze
the components of the deal, Ican see three potential
scenarios shaping up, again froma Netanyahu perspective.
Scenario number one Hamasaccepts.
If that happens, that's theclosest equivalent to total
(52:05):
victory, and Netanyahu cancertainly claim total victory.
It's a huge win for Trump, evenin time for the Nobel Peace
Prize.
For Trump, even in time for theNobel Peace Prize, and that's,
you know, the best of all worlds.
(52:29):
Since I think it is not verylikely that this will be
accepted as is, by the way, aswe walked into Nery's studio,
hamas made a little more of itsposition known, and that was
something that we all alluded tobut didn't know.
It's coming so quickly andopenly.
And that is not all hostages onday one, yeah, hostages on day
(52:55):
one, and the remainder later on,at a date to be determined,
which obviously reflects theHamas logic that Ibrahim spoke
about.
The second scenario is thatHamas rejects and Trump is
trapped into greenlighting theIsraeli operation with no
(53:21):
expiration date.
Scenario three Hamas accepts.
All hostages are home.
The new government fails tosecure security, the war resumes
with no need to worry about thelives of the hostages.
So if I sit in the Balfourresidence of the Israeli prime
(53:45):
minister, I see these threescenarios, all of them, working
well for me, so let's go for it.
Neri (53:54):
Yeah, of course, it's almost cost-free for Israel,
because it's a Trump ultimatum.
A final warning, as he wroteyesterday to Hamas Another final
warning, another final warning.
You know what does he say?
Everything is in two weeks'time, so we'll see what happens
in two weeks.
Nimrod, just on the issue ofday after, but also just the
(54:17):
Arab government equities or rolein a post-war Gaza scenario.
We've seen, definitely over thepast two years, but even more
so in recent months, growingtensions between Jerusalem and
pretty much every other Arabcapital, but especially between
Jerusalem and Cairo, betweenIsrael and Egypt.
As somebody who follows thisrelationship quite closely, is
(54:44):
it concerning to you?
Where does it come from?
I mean, how angry is Cairo withwhat's happening in Gaza and
also the rhetoric coming out ofJerusalem?
Nimrod (54:55):
I would say, when you talk about President Sisi, very
angry.
When you talk about PresidentSisi, very angry.
When you talk about thesecurity establishment, very
worried in Egypt.
You know they are convinced andI'm not sure that they are
wrong that the anti-Egyptiancampaign comes from the top here
(55:19):
.
It is almost reminiscent.
You remember Yehuda Gil, theMossad officer who fed the
Israeli system with falseanalysis, false reports from a
fictional Syrian senior Syriansource that almost brought
(55:41):
Israel and Syria to go to war.
Yeah, it was so alarming.
What we're watching now is thaton steroids.
You know, since the peacetreaty was enacted, there is an
institution in the Sinai calledthe MFO, multilateral Force of
(56:02):
Observers, a few thousandinternational observers, and
this entity is owned, so tospeak, by the US, egypt and
Israel and has been monitoringcompliance with the peace treaty
.
That entity reports to thethree owners, to the three
stakeholders.
That entity reports to thethree owners, to the three
stakeholders, and their reportsand I think we all can check in
(56:26):
Jerusalem, in Washington and inCairo.
Their reports say that Israelimedia report day in and out,
including a public statement bythe Israeli ambassador to
Washington, that Egypt isviolating the peace treaty and
the messing forces in the Sinaiin violation of annex three to
(56:51):
the security annex to the peacetreaty are all fabricated, that
pictures of tank formations inthe Sinai are not from the Sinai
and the Egyptians.
Look at this PR campaign thatstarted with what we call in the
(57:14):
country RunGate I'm sorry,qatargate where people were
pumping Qatar as the onlyreliable mediator, smearing
Egypt as not doing its job andso on.
That's when it started and thesepeople are now under
(57:34):
investigation for treason andmushroomed into these
allegations false allegationsthat Egypt is getting ready for
war.
So that's one element.
The other element is they seeour policy, and the policy seems
to be driving Gazans furthersouth in the Strip, further
(57:57):
closer to the Egyptian border,with a declared intent of
several members of the cabinetof exporting millions of Gazans
to Egypt in violation of itssovereignty.
So, yeah, the Egyptians arevery worried, and you know,
because the only mature adultthat is responsible for calming
(58:22):
spirits at this time is out tolunch and that's Washington that
is too busy with so many otherthings and has no attention span
for marginal issues like Israeland Egypt going to war.
For marginal issues like Israeland Egypt going to war, nobody
(58:43):
stands up and says, hey, I havein front of me the MFO report.
Stop lying.
Neri (58:46):
Stop lying.
Indeed, and it's a real PRcampaign going on now for months
, about the growing threat fromthe Egyptian army towards Israel
, which seems ridiculous becauseit is ridiculous, towards
Israel.
Which seems ridiculous becauseit is ridiculous.
But you know, you don't need tobe a believer in conspiracy
theorists, because the Israeliprime minister said in a
interview to a local Telegramchannel late last week that well
(59:10):
, if the Egyptians would justplay ball and open the gates in
Rafah, then you know all thePalestinians could leave,
because you know they all wantto leave, which is obviously a
major threat to Egyptiannational security.
Nimrod (59:24):
An Egyptian friend responded to me privately on the
prime minister's suggestionthat Egypt open its border to
Gazans, and he asked me doesn'tIsrael control two of Egypt's
three land borders?
Why shouldn't Israel open itsborders to Gazans?
Neri (59:44):
Gaza's land borders, not Egypt's.
Yeah, yeah, because you knowwhy should we allow the Gazans
into Israel, or even the WestBank?
Of course not.
Yeah, but you know the Israeliposition.
Ibrahim is smiling.
You know it's voluntaryimmigration, so why can't they
voluntarily emigrate, you know,to Al-Quds, to Jerusalem?
Ibrahim (01:00:08):
Ibrahim.
I just had one comment on this,if I may.
You know what the radicals?
We have insane people on ourside too.
Do you know actually what theywhen they listen to these things
and these positions and theseattitudes basically destroying
all of Israeli sort of likestrategic allies in the region,
(01:00:30):
including Egypt, includingJordan, for God's sake, UK,
France, UAE you know what theysay.
They basically say look, thisis much better for us, Let them
destroy it.
Let them go to war with Egyptand with UAE and with Jordan.
This is a machine that producesthe perfect storm scenario for
(01:00:52):
all of us Like destroyeverything.
It's just unbelievable.
I'm just telling youwholeheartedly, because I'm a
very strong believer in my lifeand even death, in coexistence
and living together, and I seethings that if I were an Israeli
I would go mad in the streetsbecause this, what is happening,
is essentially pushing all ofIsraeli strategic interests and
(01:01:17):
achievements over the past 70plus years into a dustbin of
history like Egypt.
I mean anyway, sorry for theoutburst, you can take it out.
It's not, it's not me to say ortell that Israeli government
what to do, but it's just bad,Feels very bad.
Neri (01:01:35):
First of all, we love to tell the Israeli government what
to do on this podcast andyou're not wrong at all, ibrahim
.
Very bad.
First of all, we love to tellthe Israeli government what to
do on this podcast.
Uh, and you're not uh wrong atall, ibrahim.
There are a lot of Israelisgoing crazy on the streets
precisely due to the things thatyou layout, that on every level
.
Uh, this government is just, uh, you know, severing the
strategic uh infrastructure andachievements that have been
(01:01:58):
built up through decades in thiscountry, including in the US
and including in the US,including global public opinion,
including, soon to be economic,soon to be the stature and
position of the IDF, soon to bestability in the West Bank.
I mean, we can go on and on,but we won't.
Soon to be stability in theWest Bank.
I mean, we can go on and on,but we won't.
(01:02:22):
So hopefully cooler headsprevail, if not in Jerusalem,
then in Washington and, by theway, someone told me last week
that they looked into it,including at the highest levels
in Oslo, in Norway.
The deadline for submissions ofcandidates for the Nobel Peace
Prize this year has alreadypassed.
So if Donald Trump wants to bea candidate, it will have to be
(01:02:44):
for next year.
No, bibi already submitted him.
Well, I don't know.
Was it accepted?
Probably not, I don't know.
Nimrod (01:02:56):
With that, I don't think that the formality will stand
in the way.
Neri (01:03:01):
Look, I don't know much about Northern Europeans, but I
do know that rules are rules upthere.
It's not the Middle East,nimrod, it's not the Middle East
.
We're out of time both of you.
Great to see you both and thankyou so much and we'll chat
again soon.
Thank you, thanks, nery.
Good to see you, ibrahim.
Thanks, good Thanks.
Ibrahim (01:03:16):
Narek, good to see you.
Ibrahim.
Thanks, good to see you.
Bye-bye Narek.
Bye-bye Narek.
Neri (01:03:19):
Bye-bye, okay.
Thanks again to Nimrod Novikand Ibrahim Dallalshe for their
generous time and insights.
Also, a special thanks to ourproducer, jacob Gilman, and to
all of you who support IsraelPolicy Forum's work.
Do consider making a donationto Israel Policy Forum so you
can keep being a credible sourceof analysis and ideas on issues
such as these that we all caredeeply about, including this
(01:03:45):
podcast and, most importantly,thank you for listening.
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