Trump and the Middle East: Insights From Amb. Dennis Ross

On this week’s episode, Israel Policy Forum Policy Advisor and Tel Aviv-based journalist Neri Zilber hosts Ambassador Dennis Ross, lead Middle East peace process negotiator in the H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations and current counselor and William Davidson distinguished fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, to unpack President Trump's trip to the Middle East. They provide a high-level overview of U.S. foreign policy under the Trump administration and discuss the U.S.-Israel and Trump-Netanyahu relationships, the present and future of the Gaza war, prospects for a two-state outcome to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Dennis' new book, Statecraft 2.0: What America Needs to Lead in a Multipolar World.

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Episode Transcript

Neri (00:04):
Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod.
I'm Nery Zilber, a journalistbased in Tel Aviv and a policy
advisor to Israel Policy Forum.
We have a great episode for youthis week with Ambassador
Dennis Ross joining us todiscuss President Donald Trump's
visit to the Gulf, the statusof the Netanyahu-Trump
relationship, the present andfuture of the Gaza War, us

(00:25):
foreign policy big picture andDennis' reflections on the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict,which you definitely want to
hear.
Dennis Ross is, of course, theDavidson Distinguished Fellow at
the Washington Institute forNear East Policy, a former
senior official and Middle Eastenvoy in the Reagan Bush, I,
clinton and Obamaadministrations, including as a

(00:45):
lead envoy and negotiator duringthe Oslo peace process in the
1990s.
And finally, he is also theauthor of the new book called
Statecraft 2.0, what AmericaNeeds to Lead in a Multipolar
World.
Out now, in the interest offull disclosure, dennis was my
boss at the Washington Instituteback in the day twice.

(01:06):
There are few people who canmeld current affairs and
historical analysis and personalexperience trust me, like
Dennis can.
It was all on display in thecoming hour.
I hope you enjoy theconversation just as much as I
did.
Let's get into it, hi, dennis.
Welcome to the Israel Policy.
Pod Niri, great to be with you.

(01:27):
Thanks for having me.
It's really my pleasure.
Dennis, as we touched on beforewe started recording, been
meaning to do this for a whileand I thought I'd pick the
correct week, and I think thisweek, with everything going on,
is the correct week for ourlisteners.
They should know we'rerecording this Wednesday
afternoon, tel Aviv time, andPresident Trump is still in the
midst of his first officialoverseas trip to the Gulf Saudi

(01:50):
Arabia yesterday and earliertoday, qatar currently and then
the UAE tomorrow.
Pointedly, israel is not on theitinerary, unlike his first
maiden voyage as president inhis first term, which was Saudi,
to Israel.
That's not happening this time.
But I wanted to start here,dennis.
As a veteran of what I can onlyimagine are countless

(02:12):
presidential visits and summitsto and in the Middle East, what
do you think of this one, atleast so far?
The optics, the rhetoric, thepotentially trillion dollars in
business deals about to besigned.

Dennis (02:25):
One of the things that characterizes President Trump is
he is not.
This isn't a grossunderstatement.
He's not your typical president.
His approach to foreign policyrivets less on traditional
geopolitical interests, less onsecurity architecture questions,

(02:45):
less on alliances.
There is a worldview that isshaped very much by bilateral
ties and everything, with a hugeemphasis on the economy, on
deals.
He's a transactional president.
He understands that.
In his mind, what matters morethan anything else are business

(03:10):
deals with big numbers.
So we're seeing theannouncement of $142 billion in
terms of defense projects, andthen there's talk about $600
billion over the next four yearsof investments investments in
the US, american companyinvestments in the region.

(03:30):
The numbers right now, whateverthey're declared.
The reality of delivering thosenumbers it will probably never
completely match up.
But there is an interestingirony this time, I do think.
If you go back to his firstterm, where again he announced
huge numbers of deals that wouldbe struck as a result of his

(03:51):
visit to Saudi Arabia, then thegap between what he said and
what was actually delivered washuge.
This time there'll still be agap, just because it takes years
for some of these things tomaterialize and some will never
fully materialize.
I think the New York Times wassaying when they added
everything up at this point it's$283 billion.
But okay, let's say it goesbeyond that.

(04:12):
There is an irony Many of thedeals struck were prepared
during the Biden administration.
That's even more true when itwill come to the UAE, which is
talking about $1.4 trillion over10 years.
This is $600 billion over fouryears.
That $1.4 trillion grows verymuch out of discussions that
were done by the Bidenadministration to.

(04:33):
There was a concern about look,this is such a cutting edge
technology states who understandwith President Trump.
One way you build his stake inyou is by doing deals Again.

(05:21):
More traditional presidentsfocus more on a set of security
arrangements.
This is not a traditionalpresident.
But when you do $142 billion indefense contracts the largest
ever you are creating a realitywhere there's an American
presence in Saudi Arabia in thesecurity domain that will be
enduring and the investment inmajor parts of Saudi, different

(05:45):
Saudi sectors, including AI.
They have one virtue that theUAE doesn't have they have a lot
of space.
Data centers require a hugeamount of space.
The Saudis have that In thecase of the UAE.
They will be investing inAmerican companies here because
we have the space.
Here you have a case of in theSaudis.
You have a case of investmentof American companies in,
because we have the space here.

(06:05):
You have a case in the Saudis.
You have a case of investmentof American companies in Saudi
Arabia.
But that also from Trump'sstandpoint and he will say this
that builds our stake in themand they have an interest in us
having a stake, because thelikelihood of a defense treaty
between the Trump administrationand the Saudis, I think, is
very low for a variety ofreasons.

(06:26):
I don't think that he's a hugefan of defense alliances because
they imply a set of obligations.
As I say in my book, there isan American tradition that Trump
reflects.
America first is an Americantradition.
I don't mean from the 1930s, Imean from really the 19th
century is an American tradition.
I don't mean from the 1930s, Imean from really the 19th

(06:48):
century.
We were activistsinternationally, but not with
alliances, because allianceslimited our freedom of action
and that's very much kind of whoPresident Trump is.
So I look at this trip as he isachieving what he wants, but,
to be fair, the Gulf states alsobelieve that they are building
his stake in them and that willserve their security interests,

(07:18):
not just their economicinterests.

Neri (07:19):
The speech he gave what was it last night, wednesday or
Tuesday night in Riyadh, interms of Iran, the Gaza war,
even the issue of?
He went back and slammed theneocons and the interventionists
who, he said, you know, didnothing On those more
ideological issues.
Did anything stand out to you?

Dennis (07:39):
Yeah, let's start with the ideological issues, because
again it kind of fits who he is.
We will not be interventionists.
We will not be nation builders.
We will focus on sovereignty.
What countries do internally istheir own business.
This is not an administration ofvalues, this is an
administration of interests.

(07:59):
Every administration to be fair, every president there's a
continuum of interests andvalues.
Some presidents tilt moreheavily towards interests, but
they never give up values.
Others tilt more heavilytowards value but they never
give up interests.
And in this case there's notreally a spectrum.
And that's who he is.

(08:21):
So it's important to recognize.
That's who he is, so it'simportant to recognize so that's
my first observation that thiswas an opportunity for him to
again repeat what his philosophyis for foreign policy, which is
you know, he said it in hisinaugural address, especially
when he said we will measuresuccess not by battles won, but

(08:42):
by the wars ended and the warswe don't get into.
So what you heard yesterday wasthe interventionism we're
against that and the neocons,because they basically produce
the interventionism and thenation builders and those who
wanted to export democracy.
This is not who he is.
So we got a very clear reminderof that number one.

(09:04):
Number two, his style ofapproach.
No permanent enemies.
This relates to interests andnot just interests.
This relates to values.
No permanent enemies.
That means you can pretty muchtalk to anybody.
This administration that, asyou know, talked directly to
Hamas.
No administration has done thatRight Because, in a sense, you

(09:27):
know nobody is, in a sense, offlimits and so you talk directly
to Hamas.
In addition, I would say, withthe Iranians, he staked out two
positions You're not going tohave a nuclear weapon.
You got to stop supportingtroublemakers in the region.
Okay, I want to do a deal withyou, but you can't have a

(09:50):
nuclear weapon.
Now, not having a nuclearweapon gives you a lot of space
for an outcome.
You don't have a nuclear weapontoday.
The issue will become alreadyhas become will they have
enrichment, domestic enrichment?
The administration sent mixedsignals before.
Now it's sending a signal nodomestic enrichment.

(10:10):
That will become a veryinteresting test.
Iran needs a deal Again, one ofthe interesting things in the
new book which we'll get into.
I have a long chapter on Iran,going through the whole history
of every administration, fromCarter to today, their approach
to the Iranians, what tended towork, what didn't tend to work,
and Iran did.
Make tactical.

(10:31):
The Islamic Republic madetactical adjustments and
concessions when they felt itwas important for them to do so,
almost always under pressure.
Those who say pressure doesn'twork on Iran, they ignore Iran's
actual behavior.
Actually, pressure does work.
It doesn't mean it works if youdon't give them a way out.

(10:52):
It doesn't mean you always getexactly what you want, but they
will adjust their behavior.
Will they go along withabsolutely no enrichment?
My guess is probably not,unless they think the
consequence could be that theylose their entire nuclear
infrastructure that they'veinvested in for the last almost
40 years with more than a half atrillion dollars.
Maybe they might do that.
I suspect still probably not,because it's too much of a

(11:15):
surrender for them.
There's a lot of ways, evenshort of that.
I mean, for example, you couldbe allowed to enrich, but then
everything you enrich has to beshipped out of the country, so
you get your fuel rods fromoutside.
The virtue of that is theywould have a face saver in terms
of being able to enrich, butthey couldn't accumulate any.
They couldn't accumulate anyfissionable material, and you'd

(11:39):
have to have that completelymonitored and verified.
But if they can't accumulateany fissionable materials, then
they can't build a bomb.
So the objective again thiscomes back to good statecraft is
marrying objectives and means.
The objective needs to be thatIran is giving up its nuclear
weapon option.
It's not enough saying youwon't have a nuclear weapon.

(11:59):
You want the Iranians todemonstrate, not because they
say it, but because either thestructure of their program or
the way you've set it up interms of shipping out, or
because there's no enrichment,means they're giving up the
option.
So he what he's saying, nonuclear weapons is a kind of
interesting elastic standard.
There's a lot of different waysto achieve that.

(12:22):
There's a lot of different waysto achieve that and we'll have
to see.
Does Steve Witkoff, if he comesto Trump and he says, look, we
can get a deal if we allow thiskind of enrichment and this kind
of ship out, but we can't get adeal if we allow no enrichment,
does he then say that's it nodeal?
If you look at the way henegotiates on tariffs, stakes
out maximal positions and thenmakes adjustments that seems to
be the character of how henegotiates on tariffs stakes out

(12:42):
maximal positions and thenmakes adjustments.
That seems to be the characterof how he negotiates.
So I would be, I guess,surprised if we didn't see
something similar in this case,but we'll have to see.
The only other thing thatstruck me is you know he clearly

(13:02):
wants to warn Gaza to end, butwe're not yet seeing actions
that reflect that.
Now maybe we may be on thebrink of it the release of Edan
Alexander, the fact that it wasdone by us, that it was done
without Israeli involvement, andnow you have Witkoff telling

(13:22):
the families that he'soptimistic, there can be a deal.
We'll see If there's going tobe a deal.
My guess is it probably almosthas to happen while Trump is
still in the region or almostimmediately afterwards.

Neri (13:36):
Because of the looming threat of the Israeli offensive
into Gaza or other reasons.

Dennis (13:41):
No, I think it's because Trump would like to demonstrate
his successes and so getting adeal while he's there is another
manifestation of his success.
He can claim it as a triumph.
Or, if it happens immediatelyafterwards, where he can come
out and say I went to the region, look what we did.
So I think that's it.
I think the looming Israelithreat certainly it has an

(14:05):
impact on the countries, on theEgyptians as well, on Hamas, I'm
less certain.
If Hamas cared at all about thePalestinian public, they would
have found a way out of this wara long time ago.
Their readiness to sacrificethe Palestinians in Gaza has
been demonstrated over and overand over again.

(14:26):
Not only do they see thesacrifice as serving their
interests, because itstigmatizes Israel and they're
no longer a military, butthey're still a terrorist
organization and they can engagein an insurgency.
In Gaza there's a lot ofunexploded ordnance which they
turn into IEDs.
So you've seen Israel losesoldiers last week.

(14:47):
So they can function as aterrorist group in an insurgency
.
Yeah, they fired three missilesyesterday.
As a military, they havebasically been destroyed.
The question is, can you producean outcome where they can't
reconstitute or rebuildthemselves?
I think you can, but what weneed to see is does the Trump

(15:07):
administration have an approachto the day after?
And we haven't really seen it.
We've seen the emergence of aplan for how to distribute aid,
humanitarian aid.
We haven't seen all the allies,but we've seen something begin
to emerge.
We haven't seen anything.

(15:31):
The only way this war canreally end is not only with the
release of hostages, but if youalso have an alternative to
Hamas, something the Israeligovernment has.
This Israeli coalition hasshied away from developing or
wanting to develop.

Neri (15:41):
Yes, listeners of this podcast are well-versed on that
issue in terms of no day-afterplan, no post-war plan and, well
, the looming offensive and whatit could mean.
We had our friend MichaelMilstein on last week and he's
not a dove and, as he likes tosay, he's not naive, and even he
says this could be a disasterfor Israel if it goes ahead.
I assume we'll find out in thecoming days.

(16:03):
Dennis, you kind of beat me tothe punch.
I wanted to get into more ofUS-Israel relations but, fair to
say, it's more Trump-Bibirelations.
You have more Bibi hours, as itwere, than probably most
non-Americans, going back to atleast the 1990s.
I think Conventional wisdom, atleast on my end here in Israel,

(16:24):
is that Netanyahu and Trump arenow on the outs, or at the very
least not as close as they usedto be.
Definitely on a slew of policyissues.
You mentioned negotiatingdirectly with Hamas by American
officials.
I can't imagine what thereaction would have been if you
had tried something like that orBiden administration official
had tried something like that.
But that's a different issuethe Iran nuclear talks, ending

(16:46):
the military campaign againstthe Houthis even as of yesterday
and even today, liftingsanctions over Syria and meeting
with the new Syrian president,jalani al-Shara.
So how would you assess, as aveteran BB watcher and also as a
veteran US diplomat, therelationship between Bibi and
Trump today?

Dennis (17:05):
I think the notion that they were really close was
always a misperception, amischaracterization.
I think Bibi did have influenceon Trump in the first term, but
every place where he hadinfluence on Trump in the first
term was a place where Trumpwanted to go anyway.
Trump said the JCPOA was theworst deal ever done, and so the

(17:28):
idea he would walk away from ithe didn't need Bibi's
encouragement to do it.
Bibi might have helped enableit.
Basically, being able to ferretout of Tehran, in one of
Mossad's amazing coups, theentire nuclear archive and then
being able to say show what wasin it to Trump in advance gave
him an excuse or a pretext to dowhat he wanted to do anyway.

(17:52):
Did he need that pretext?
Probably not because he wantedto do it anyway.
I mean, he overruled hisSecretary of State and his
National Security Advisor andhis Secretary of Defense, who
didn't want to do that.
So it wasn't because of Bibi,it's because of where he was
coming in.
So you know what he wrote aboutwith regard to the killing of

(18:14):
Soleimani, how he said that Bibihad backed out of it.
So he is someone who has had aposition towards Israel that is
certainly favorable in terms offundamentally supporting Israel.
But I think what one needs tounderstand with Trump is he will

(18:34):
always do what he considers tobe in his interest, and his
interests and America first aresort of synonymous, and where
there's a Trump interest or anAmerican interest, what he's
demonstrated, that comes first.
So the idea of striking a dealwith the Houthis, even though,

(18:55):
within less than 48 hoursbeforehand, ben Gurion Airport
at least the environments aroundBen Gurion Airport are hit by a
ballistic missile.
The deal has nothing to do withwhat Hudi does towards Israel,
including towards Israeli ships,which, by the way, the way they
define anything connected toIsrael ships, it is the most

(19:16):
elastic definition I've everseen.
So anybody who has anon-American flagged ship, which
is a very small minority of theships that use the Red Sea, is
probably not going to test thatproposition.
So, number one, this was donewithout the slightest concern
for the Israelis, as we said,talking to Hamas, not done by

(19:38):
any previous administrationwithout the slightest concern
for the Israelis.
Shara, who does he?
He says he talks to Erdogan, hetalks to MBS and he decides
he's going to meet him and he'sgoing to lift all the sanctions.
I didn't hear Bibi's namementioned in that, so we have a
litany of moves that demonstratethat doesn't mean he's hostile

(20:00):
to Israel I don't believe that.
I don't think he is but it doesmean he makes his decisions on
what he considers to be inAmerica's interest.
It is America first.
It's not America and Israelfirst.
It's America first.
And obviously, ostensibly, hewas coming for the tariffs,

(20:24):
which he achieved nothing on, bythe way, Right, he said he was
coming for Iran and he wassurprised that in his presence
the president went ahead andannounced that there would be
direct talks with Iran thecoming Saturday this was a
Monday but even on the issue ofthe tariffs, how did he respond?
Didn't give him anything.
He said we give you $4 billiona year.

(20:44):
So you know, I think one needsto have a clear-eyed view of
this.
He can have a.
I believe he will continue tobe generally supportive of
Israel, but when something is inwhat he sees as American

(21:09):
interests, those come first.
One really interesting measurehe wants to win the Nobel Prize.
He's not going to get it forRussia-Ukraine.
He's not going to get it forIran deal, because I think in
the best case, what you're goingto see is a framework agreement
, something that could beequivalent.
Now, I don't mean, it's notanalogous to it in a literal

(21:34):
sense, but a framework agreementlike the JPOA, where you had a
precursor, negotiated what wasthe precursor to what became the
JCPOA.
You could get a frameworkagreement that is similar in the
sense.
Maybe it's a freeze, maybe theydown, blend all their 60%,
maybe we lift a few sanctionsand this is done to sort of buy
time to do a larger deal so thatthe immediacy of the threat is
dealt with.
I wouldn't be surprised by that.

(21:57):
So you might see that.
But what will that mean?
It will mean Israel can't actmilitarily against the Iranian
nuclear program.
And there is a window herebecause Iran doesn't have an air
defense today, at least an airdefense that can be effective
against Israel, and it isfeeling a real crunch

(22:19):
economically, effective againstIsrael.
And it is feeling a real cruncheconomically.
The devaluation of the currencyis extraordinary.
They have electricity shortageswhich require blackouts,
rolling blackouts Sometimes.
You know 24 of 31 provinceshave had to close the schools,
close businesses and closegovernment offices because of
shortage of electricity.

(22:39):
This is a country that producesnatural gas and oil and yet it
has shortages of electricity.
This is a country that isrunning out of water and at some
point that will be a majorsource of instability.
It needs a deal.
So if it gets a frameworkagreement which removes the
military threat, gives them timeto rebuild their air defense,

(23:03):
gives them time, gives them somesanctions relief, it won't be a
panacea for them even if theyhad a full-fledged deal, because
banks will still be reluctantto do business in Iran so long
as there are anti-terrorism lawson the books, anti-laundering
laws on the books, and theydon't address that, they don't
open up their banking system.

(23:23):
As long as there are humanrights sanctions on the books, a
lot of the financialinstitutions will be very
hesitant to go ahead and go intoIran.
We saw that, by the way, afterthe JCPOA.
We literally had John Kerrygoing to Europe trying to
encourage businesses to go intoIran.
That's right, but the real, thekind of tremendous benefits

(23:45):
economically they're not goingto get.
Although the Iranians seem toknow how to try to appeal to
President Trump, they're sayingyou can build up our nuclear
industry here, you know there'strillions to it.
So again, I say all thisquestion because what he defines
as being an America interest isgoing to come first.
Come back to the issue of theGaza war.

(24:06):
One thing he heard in SaudiArabia was we're not against
doing normalization.
Nothing can even begin untilthe war in Gaza ends and the IDF
is out.
And even then we're going torequire something credible.
On the Palestinians, they'refairly those who say they know
what they want.
On the Palestinians, there'sroom to negotiate on that, but

(24:31):
it is a factor.
So for Trump, if the only placehe can get a Nobel Prize is here
at some point, his attitude onthe Gaza war is going to express
itself in a more direct way andI suspect he will say at some
point to Bibi you know, I gaveyou a lot of time, I gave you
kind of a blank check, but Ididn't give you forever.

(24:55):
So I think that comes.
Maybe we'll see.
Maybe we'll see a deal doneright during the end of this
trip or immediately after itthat produces what Witkoff has
been proposing be conveying atleast this is the impression of
the Egyptians and the Qataristhat he will do everything he

(25:24):
can to try to then produce anend to the war in that 45-day
period.
Maybe we'll see this soonerrather than later.
I'm just not sure about that.
But I do think at some pointTrump's position is going to be
okay.
I gave you the time.
Now it has to end.
So the basic issue here comingback to the heart of your
question, where it becomes anissue of what is in Trump's

(25:47):
interest and those that don'talign with Bibi's interest, then
there'll be a problem and Trumpwill go ahead and do what he
sees as being in America'sinterest.

Neri (25:57):
There'll definitely be a problem for Bibi Netanyahu and
the Israeli right, who pinned alot, if not everything, their
hopes and dreams on the outcomeof last November's general
election and the re-election ofDonald Trump.
Take it from me the Israeliright here is already soured,
turned on Donald Trump in someremarkably very frank and direct

(26:18):
language on their part ontelevision and the usual
mouthpieces.
Yeah, he's disappointed them.

Dennis (26:23):
I don't think Donald Trump probably cares, maybe with
a Democratic president, healways had the Republicans that
he could go to, and theRepublicans would also.
They would shore up parts ofthe Jewish community as well.
He does not have that now.
He doesn't have someone he cango to to create a pressure on

(26:45):
Trump.
He may sink the evangelicalsToday that would be his natural
community but they don'tdominate the Republicans on the
Hill.
There's no joint session ofCongress that's going to be open
and available for him to comeand castigate or challenge the
policies of the Americanpresident.

(27:05):
That's not an option.
So the context is verydifferent.

Neri (27:10):
That's a great point.
There's no out to leverage oneside of the aisle against the
other, like Bibi has done formany years.
And just on finishing up theGaza question, dennis, trump
wants the war done, concludedsooner rather than later.
It's a question of how longTrump gives Bibi and Trump's

(27:31):
patience effectively.
And Woodcock is trying tobroker this deal.
And I think Netanyahu himselfsays I'll take the deal,
multi-week ceasefire, maybe fiveor six weeks, get half the
living hostages out.
But even Netanyahu saidyesterday after the deal runs
its course, we're going torestart the war and go all the
way to the end.
We're not stopping.
So how you know him better thanI do, how does Bibi reconcile

(27:53):
those two pressures, what he'spromising his public here and
what the American president maywant?

Dennis (28:04):
One of the things that I think has always characterized
Bibi is the capacity to play fortime and something comes along
and he figures something out orsomething helps to change the
circumstance.
I think he says everybody, evenSmotrich and Ben-Gabir, will
accept this right now becauseit's not an end to the war.
And he's saying it's not an endto the war and we're going to
go back in so they can acceptthis.

(28:25):
And he can say look, at leastwe can get maybe 10 or 11 more
hostages out.
So he can say that the cruxwill come if there's a real
seriousness on the part ofPresident Trump and Whitcough to
say we can end the war at 45days.

(28:46):
This is what it requires.
If he says no to that, thenhe's saying no to them and then
he has to worry about what theimplications of that will be.
Now, if they say to him okay,it's up to you, it's out of our
hands, you know, and we'rewashing our hands of it, one
also needs to be thinking aboutwhat does it mean if the US
washes its hands of it?
You know, I was worried when onUkraine, when the threat was we

(29:10):
might walk away.
Well, if you walk away in onecircumstance where you're also
no longer supporting Ukraine,then that's a.
You're giving Putin a big win.
But if walking away means, okay, we're going to continue to
support Ukraine, then you'rebasically saying to Putin okay,
let's see if time is really onyour side after all.
So it depends on if they decideto wash their hands of it.

(29:33):
Does that affect some of whatthey're doing with Israel?
I don't know the answer to that, but Bibi will have to make
that choice.
Assuming they say, okay, youcan continue this, but we're not
going to be involved anymore.
I'm not sure.
As I said, I'm not sure what itmeans In the end.
A lot will depend upon.

(29:55):
Is the message that war has toend at 45 days, regardless of
what Bibi's saying now?
And he has 45 days to come upwith to position himself
differently?
If it's going to end that way,maybe coming to the
administration and say, allright, look, produce something
for me with Saudi Arabia, orproduce something, produce a
determination one way or theother on Iran, iran, so that you

(30:22):
know.
If at the end of that 45-dayperiod, you say the Iranians are
not responding, then give methe green light to go against
Iran.
Then I could see him.
At that point I could see himsaying okay, iran is the bigger
issue, to have the right kind ofsupport for that, to do what we
need to do, to focus everyone'sattention on that.
We've been in the war in Gaza.
You could see there's a varietyof different kinds of scenarios
here.

(30:42):
A lot depends upon where theTrump administration is in its
negotiations with the Iranians,how much it wants to move on
Saudi normalization, how quickly.
That will heavily affect, Ithink, what Trump decides to do.

Neri (31:06):
Okay, we'll be right back after this brief message.

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ipfli slash supportthepod or atthe support the show link in the
show notes that's a greattransition to my next question

(32:30):
about your book about statecraft.

Neri (32:31):
Explain to us I can hold it up if it helps, it could.
We're also a video podcast.
Yes, statecraft 2.0, becausethere was an original statecraft
book.
This is new new, not only justupdated, but new about the new
moment in global affairs themultipolar world order.
I'm curious just give us asense how you define Statecraft,
why it's important, and thenI'll ask you the kind of obvious

(32:54):
question where does the Trumpadministration fit in into this
rubric of Statecraft?

Dennis (32:59):
So let me say look, the essence of Statecraft is using
all the tools you have at yourdisposal.
Statecraft is not diplomacy.
Diplomacy is a tool ofstatecraft.
The military is a tool ofstatecraft.
Economics are a tool ofstatecraft.
Intelligence is a tool ofstatecraft.
Information managing theinformation space is a tool of
statecraft.
Statecraft Information managingthe information space is a tool

(33:23):
of statecraft.
So all the tools you have atyour disposal.
That makes up statecraft numberone.
What makes for good statecraft?
You marry objectives and means.
That sounds completely obvious.
I teach on this and I alwaysstart the class off by saying
okay, that's a given right.
My students nod and say it's agiven.
And then I point out it almostnever happens.
And then I point out it almostnever happens.
Why does it almost never happen?
Because we don't adopt theright objectives, and we don't

(33:46):
adopt the right objectives for avariety of reasons.
Sometimes we have no idea whatwe're getting into.
Actually, trump was saying thisyesterday about the
interventionism that weintervened and we had no idea of
what we were getting into.
He was right.
Interventionism, that weintervened and we had no idea of
what we were getting into.
He was right.
Sometimes that happens.

(34:07):
We certainly saw it in Iraq.
Sometimes it's politicalfactors that drive an objective.
Lyndon Johnson in Vietnamdidn't understand what he was
getting into, but he had apolitical consideration above
all others.
He felt that the Republicansseized the loss of China and
used it to gain enormouspolitical advantage against the
Democrats.
He feared if Vietnam was lost,the same thing would happen.

(34:27):
What he didn't realize is andthis is a classic example of
understanding you know, there'salways a tendency to understand
the cost of action but never thecost of inaction.
You'd understand the cost ofaction but never the cost of
inaction.
That was really true, I think,for President Obama in Syria.
He understood the cost ofaction but he never understood
the cost of inaction.
In any case, there arepolitical factors that sometimes

(34:48):
determine an objective, andthat should never be.
It is always a factor, but itshould never be the only factor.
Sometimes you get into asituation with one objective and
then you change.
In Somalia, george HW Bush, whogenerally practiced statecraft
quite well along with Jim Baker,we start off with we're going

(35:11):
to intervene militarily to endthe famine there, and that was
no, and we succeeded.
And then we decided to expandthe objective from ending the
famine to taking on warlordsthere.
Well, that suddenly put us inthe middle of what was a civil
war.
So you know, we changed theobjective.

(35:32):
There's a variety of reasons.
You end up adopting the wrongobjective, but if you adopt the
wrong objective, you're nevergoing to be able to match the
right set of means to it.
In any case, one of the reasonsI just want to say one of the
reasons I wrote the book.
You're quite right, I wrote abook on statecraft in 2006.
It was a completely differentworld.
It was a unipolar world.
The Russians didn't resist us.

(35:53):
The Chinese were still tryingto build themselves up.
They were still under the aegisof Deng Xiaoping, whose adage
was bide your time and hide yourstrength.
Don't be provocative.
It was before President Xi, whocomes along and says dare to
struggle.
So we have a different world.

(36:14):
We have a different world onthe outside.
We also have a different worldon the inside.
Even though there was divisionand debate over Iraq in 2006,
when I was writing, there wasn'ta fundamental debate over what
our role in the world should be.
There was a fundamental senseAmerica needs to lead in the
world.
That's no longer the case.
One of the chapters I have I gothrough the five different kind

(36:36):
of arguments that are made aboutwhat our role in the world
should be, including, I startoff with the American first view
, quoting extensively fromTrump's speeches in his first
term, which we saw a replay ofthat in the speech in Riyadh,
where he goes after, in a sense,the interventionists, the
nation builders, those who, ineffect, are trying to promote

(36:58):
democracy.
All of that was in that speech,just like it was in his speeches
from 2017, 2018.
So it's a different world, andI was writing to say okay, in a
world where we're moreconstrained on the outside and
we don't have a consensus on theinside, we have to use all of
our tools more effectively,because we won't be able to

(37:19):
sustain a rule, however wedefine it, if we aren't seen as
being more successful, and thatrequires you to apply everything
successfully.
So, then, the book has a lot ofhistory where I draw out
examples of statecraft donebadly and also examples of
statecraft done well, to distillthe lessons, and then I apply
it to China, iran and theIsraeli-Chalistinian issue.

Neri (37:42):
Fascinating, important issues, all One of them closer
to near and dear to our hearts,which we'll get into in just a
moment.
And in terms of Trumppracticing, or not, statecraft
how unorthodox, how out of thenorm is he in relation to
previous US presidents?
Not just ideologically, he'sdifferent, he's different.

Dennis (38:02):
But look, an element of statecraft is leverage.
For sure, he understands theprinciple of leverage, that's
clear.
But he defines it narrowly.
When you give up soft powerwhich is the power of attraction
, that's one of your tools whenyou give up alliances, he sees
alliances as a drag on us, butalliances actually constrain us.

(38:25):
You look at every coalitionwe've created.
First Gulf War, we had acoalition and it was quite
successful.
The Obama administration didn'twant to involve itself in Syria,
but then, when ISIS forced itshand, it put together a
remarkable.
So alliances and coalitions area source of strength.

(38:46):
He tends to define things in amuch more narrow way.
Does he engage in statecraft?
Yeah, because he does set outobjectives.
The question is how clear arethe objectives?
It gets back to what I wassaying before.
Sometimes, if the objectivesare stated at such a high level
of generality, you can'ttranslate them into action.
Level of generality, you can'ttranslate them into action.

(39:09):
Take the Riviera and Gaza.
Were there the means to be ableto do that?
No, but was he using that totry to force the Arabs to come
up with something?
Maybe the only thing is, egyptdid come up with a plan.
The problem was it was a half aplan.
They answered the part of couldyou do reconstruction without
having to move all thePalestinians out of Gaza?
They answered that yes, youcould, and here's how you would
do it, and there was aplausibility to it.

(39:30):
The problem was Hamas has nevermentioned it in the plan.
That's right.
And there wasn't an approach todemilitarization.
There'll be no reconstructionin Gaza if there isn't
demilitarization.
If Hamas remains in control,even indirectly, who's going to
invest in Gaza?
Remains in control, evenindirectly.
Who's going to invest in Gaza?
Because they know Hamas willtry to do this again.
So if he wants to end the warin Gaza, this comes back.

(39:51):
What's your objective?
The Riviera and the Gaza wastoo high a level of generality
and there were no means to beable to produce it.
But was it designed to be alever?
Just like tariffs, tariffs area means, they're not an end.
So what is the end he seeks?
Is it to change the terms oftrade?
Is it to change the structureof the American economy?
So did you bring backmanufacturing here?

(40:13):
Is it to generate more revenue,because you're doing tax cuts
and you need to generate morerevenue to deal with our budget
deficits?
Those could be all three of theobjectives.
I think today you couldn't saywhich of those are the real
objectives.
I would say, if you ask me, Iwould say there are two of three
.
I think it is to change theterms of trade and I think it's

(40:35):
probably also to generate somerevenue.
It could be quite appropriateas a means to achieve those
objectives.
So he would be acting onstatecraft there.
If he wants to produceSaudi-Israeli normalization, if
that's his objective, thenthere's a number of things he
has to do to be able to achieveit.
In other words, you can stakeout an objective, but then you

(40:56):
have to think through okay, whatare the means that you have to
be able to produce it?
What are the tools you have?
Sometimes how you frame anissue is actually critical.
It's a critical means Becauseagain, it draws others in.
Sometimes taking the initiativeis essential.
Here, he heard, in Saudi Arabiayou want to do normalization

(41:16):
and the warm Gaza.
It's not the sum of everything,but it's a start.
Look every president, no matterwhat they say, they're engaging
in some kind of statecraftbecause they spell out
objectives and you can judgethem by how well they do in
terms of achieving theirobjectives.
You can give them.
When it comes to giving gradeson statecraft, you can say, okay
, you know you can.

(41:37):
That was an A, that was a B,that was a C, that was a fail.
So we can judge him based onthe objectives that he's spelled
out how he does.

Neri (41:48):
So I want to take you to a more personal space now with
the time remaining.
Don't worry, it'll still focuson policy, but I'm going to use
our time wisely.
First question to you, dennisif you were being sent by this
US president or maybe any one ofyour former bosses and there
were many former bosses toJerusalem for a late night
meeting with Netanyahu at theprime minister's office, what

(42:11):
would you advise the Israeliprime minister in this current
moment in time, 19 months afterOctober 7th, 58 hostages still
in captivity in Gaza.
Now he's threatening a renewedoffensive, as we talked about.
What would you go there tocounsel him?
Obviously with the caveat that,as envoy and diplomat, you
serve at the what do you call it?

(42:32):
The pleasure, not the leisure,but the pleasure of the US
president?

Dennis (42:36):
Yes, Not the pleasure of the president.

Neri (42:39):
The pleasure of the president.
But leaving that aside, whatwould you actually tell this
Israeli prime minister if he hadto go meet them right now?

Dennis (42:46):
I think there's two things I would go with.
The first I would go with wouldbe what's the most important
issue for Israel today in yourmind?
I mean, I would want him todefine it to begin with and then
I would respond based on whathe said.
If he were to ask me what Iwould regard as being most
important which is not how youdo it I mean, you go see an

(43:09):
Israeli prime minister.
You're saying, ok, tell me,what is it you're really trying
to achieve now?
Or what is the most importantthing, I would think in his mind
it's still Iran, because that'sstill an existential issue.
But if he were to say I have tohave, you know, I have to
succeed in Gaza, then I wouldsay, well, let's talk about what
is success.
One of the problems is again agood example of the political

(43:32):
pressures when Bibi first saidthe objective was total victory.
Total victory is a slogan, it'snot an objective.
So you'd have to break it downand say all right, what does
that mean?
How do you define it?
If the criteria of success isthe hostages, you have to cover
all the hostages, which shouldbe, because that's a social

(43:52):
compact that every Israeligovernment has had with the
Israeli public.
You're all collectively, we canget into the issue of the
Haredi.
You're all collectively served,but our obligation to you is
we'll do whatever it takes toget you back, and so that is an
overriding priority.
It is also an essential realitythat you don't want the outcome

(44:16):
of this to leave Hamas in aposition where it still controls
Gaza, even if it's indirect.
And I would say here, you know,to achieve that objective, you
need to be able to have analternative of FAMAS, and at
this point we're 600 days in.
Yeah, you had one short lot oftime to achieve the objectives.

(44:45):
You didn't follow the advice ofDavid Petraeus, which was to
clear, hold and build.
I'm not quite sure what you'retrying to do right now.
I'm not quite sure how it looksdifferent from what you've done
before, but it looks likeyou're going to set yourself up
for an insurgency that has noend to it, unless you are

(45:07):
prepared to work to create analternative.
Now the interesting thing is,the Egyptians came with a plan.
What I would say is let's turnthat plan into something that
produces the outcome.
You want not just the releaseof the hostages, but also an
approach that guarantees thatHamas will not be in control.
You have succeeded.

(45:27):
They're no longer a military,they are no longer organized as
a military, they no longer havethe capabilities of a military.
It doesn't mean they're with noarms.
On a transitional basis thatcould probably be an Arab-led
with some other outsideinvolvement, with some

(45:55):
Palestinian involvement, somefrom the PA.
A transitional basis, but witha ground rule that for those who
want there to be a Palestinianstate over time even if you're
not prepared to accept that atthis moment, there has to be
change on the Palestinian sidethe Saudis, for example.
I would say the Saudis can saywe need a credible pathway to a
state.
But a credible pathway to astate has a series of actions by
Israel, but also has actions bythe Palestinians.

(46:16):
If there's no reform, you'reproducing a failed state.
If there's no fundamentalchange in the structure, there's
no guarantee that this is astate that couldn't align with
Iran, no guarantee that itcouldn't have independent
militias.
So there's a series of thingsthat would have to be worked out
that address not just Israel'sneeds but the collective needs
of everyone.
But I would focus heavily onlet's take that Egyptian plan.

(46:40):
Use the American ready tosupport you on the kind of
outcome.
Where Hamas is not in control,empower this interim
administration that would be atransitional administration, say
, for at least two years.
Let's choke off the oxygen forHamas.
So, with the Egyptians, therehas to be a regime that

(47:01):
guarantees no smuggling and youget the US to say this is a
fundamental American interest,that there's no smuggling, and
you give them an incentive.
At the same time, you get to beresponsible for doing a lot of
the reconstruction in Gaza,which would be a huge economic
boon for Egypt, but it means nosmuggling.

(47:22):
There has to be also a mechanismcreated to ensure any material
coming into Gaza forreconstruction, rehabilitation,
there is a mechanism to track itevery step of the way to ensure
no diversion of materials.
And if there's any diversion ofmaterials, it all stops.
And you should be asking us tocome up with a multilateral
device to choke off the money toHamas.

(47:44):
The era of Qatash supportingHamas financially has to be over
.
So you can produce the outcomeof the twin objectives of you
get the recovery of all theHashis alive and dead and you do
it sooner rather than later andwe work out what is an approach

(48:07):
that guarantees Hamas will notbe in control of Gaza.
That's what I would be saying.
I would focus very heavily onthat and I'd try to be very
precise.
Let's talk through exactly whatguarantees that Hamas is not in
control.

Neri (48:21):
It all sounds reasonable to me and to many other people,
but you know as well as I dothat this Israeli prime minister
and this Israeli governmentdoesn't want to hear the words
PA, Palestinian Authority, andagain, correct me if I'm wrong,
but the Arab states won't go infor this kind of plan without
some kind of PalestinianAuthority input.
And it's been a bottlenecksince I don't want to say day

(48:43):
one, but very early in the war.

Dennis (48:46):
I would say two things.
One I think there's anunderstanding Bibi in the end,
isn't going to oppose the PAinviting.
You know that's no Arab statesgoing in without some sort of
Palestinian invitation.
They're not going in.
And there I'll tell you what Iheard from those who actually
prepared to play a role we'renot going in to rescue Israel.
We're not going in to rescueIsrael, we're going in to rescue

(49:06):
Palestinians.
We don't want Hamas.
The Saudis and the Emiratismaybe not the Qataris, but the
Saudis and the Emiratis will bevery clear with Trump they don't
want Hamas in control of Gaza.
The argument in Israel we needto eliminate them and they will
want that too.
That will prove to them.
They understand you can'teliminate Hamas, any more than

(49:27):
we were able to eliminate ISIS.
We defeated ISIS.
We couldn't eliminate it.
It's an ideology.
It's an idea.
When you defeat it, you weakenthe ideology, but you don't
eliminate it.
They don't want Hamas in there.
And if you ask them theargument that they'll be more
impressed by us eliminating them, they will not be more
impressed by it.

(49:48):
If you're going to be thereanother five years, if you're
going to be there several moreyears, you have no normalization
with Saudi Arabia and if youreally want to have an effective
counter against the Iranians.
People say you neednormalization to have effective
counter against the Iranians.
It's true, but you have toexplain it in greater detail.

(50:10):
What does it mean?
It means the Central Commandhas built an infrastructure for
regional integration of defenses.
It's an infrastructure but itcan't be fully implemented.
It is today.
You have a common sort of radarnetwork but it still takes
calls.
They're not connected.
It still takes a phone callliterally to say, okay, there's

(50:30):
been a launch, they have commonconsoles but they're not
connected because there arelimitations.
You can create an integratedregional defense system where
you create a division of laborso that you have a real defense.
You have a set of defensesagainst missiles, drones and
cruise missiles.
That infrastructure is therebut it won't be fully

(50:51):
implemented unless you havenormalization between Saudi
Arabia and Israel.
I'm focusing right now only onthe security side, not even the
economic infrastructure side,this whole.
You know the deal that wasstruck to connect India with the
Gulf, with Europe, and it wouldhave run through Israel.
That has dramatic implicationsfor the well-being of the region

(51:13):
as a whole, including theIsraelis.
So to get to regional peoplehear slogans and they're not
persuaded by it.
October 7th, I don't need totell you, sitting in Israel,
israel still suffers from thetrauma of October 7th.
7th, I don't need to tell you.
Sitting in Israel, israel stillsuffers from the trauma of
October 7th.
And as long as the hostages arethere and as long as there's no
accountability for whathappened on October 7th, that
trauma is not going away.

(51:34):
There has to be the worstdisaster in Israel's history.
There has to be a state inquirycommission and that state
inquiry commission will look atwhat was the concepcia and the
role of thinking hey, we canbuild up Hamas as an alternative
to the PA, the notion that youcan have calm with Hamas.
And this was just the securityestablishment.

(51:55):
It wasn't just a securityestablishment, it was a
political establishment.
Go back and read Libby's bookhow he says that both Bennett
and Lieberman they wanted tocarry the war, they wanted to
try to wipe out Hamas and hissober understanding prevented
that.
Shin Bet leaders will report,not just Ronan Barr.

(52:16):
The Shin Bet leaders willreport that they wanted, they
saw this as a strategic mistake,right, so the conceptual will
be that will be exposed, but itwill also allow you to get at
the issue.
Okay, what should therelationship be with the
Palestinians?
We have never had really about.

(52:36):
From June 14th to June 19th1967, you had an interesting
secret cabinet debate over whatto do in the West Bank and you
know it was literally everythingyou could imagine was sort of
thrown out there for five daysand in the end they decided to
defer the issue.

(52:57):
Classic Israeli they did nothave a serious.
Well, you can.
It's not hard to understand.
I'll put it this way.
There's no political leader Iever worked for who looked
forward to making a decisionthey knew was going to produce
an enormous political backlash.
It's not unique to Israel into aone-state reality and if you

(53:29):
pass the point where you can'treverse it, that one-state
reality is going to guaranteethat Israel lives in a perpetual
conflict, with beingincreasingly isolated.
You look at the polling in thiscountry Democrats right now, a
majority of Democrats are notsympathetic to Israel.
It's extraordinary that that'sthe case.
Sympathetic to Israel.
It's extraordinary that that'sthe case.
And I'll tell you, if you pullthe younger evangelicals, the

(53:51):
numbers, the older evangelicalsare dramatically in favor and
support of Israel.
The younger evangelicals arenot.
They tend to reflect theyounger demographic.
So if you have a long-termone-state reality, it's going to
have an impact not just in therest of the world.
It's going to have an impacthere as well.
And it's an enduring conflictbecause the Palestinians A are

(54:12):
not going away and they're notgoing to give up their national
identity.
They have a national identity,just as Israel, palestinians and
rejections who think Israel isgoing to disappear.
They're wrong.
They never understood the depthof the nature of the Israeli
national identity, the civicculture.
I look at the depth of thatcivic culture and I say this

(54:33):
when I go to campuses.
I say you know what Iran,hezbollah and Hamas never
understood?
How deep is the sense ofidentity and the civic culture
in Israel?
And the best example of it isit wasn't just government that
responded to the needs of peoplein the South and people in the
North.
It was individual communitiesin Israel organizing themselves

(54:54):
to basically meet the needs ofpeople.
I was up in Metula in Januaryand there were volunteers from
all over the country cleaning up.
They weren't connected to thegovernment.
The government did nothing.
That sense of civic culture isso inbred, it is so much part of
the psychology and thesociology and that's what the

(55:15):
rejectionists have no idea of,partly because they don't have
it.
The Iranian regime knows theydon't have that kind of
fundamental support.
You know, hezbollah may hopethey have it.
Maybe they had it before, atleast with the Shia, but with no
one else.
You know they look at their owncircumstance and they project
it onto Israel.
That's why when they see thedivision they think we couldn't

(55:37):
tolerate that, we couldn't livewith that.

Neri (55:39):
But Israel could.
And real final question to you,dennis, on that point, on that
issue, for all of us who caredeeply about not just a peace
process but also, ultimately, atwo-state outcome, because it
really likely is the onlyrealistic and plausible option
what do you tell people when youspeak to them, either privately
or publicly, about prospectsfor the future, for attaining a

(56:01):
two-state solution?
Attaining a two-state solution?

Dennis (56:03):
There's a long haul.
That it's not.
You know, I've worked on this,you know, for 40 years.
In terms of the Israelis andPalestinians, I would say we're
at the lowest ed during thewhole period I worked on this
because a complete loss of faith.
You know, israelis areconvinced that if you had a
Palestinian state, it would beled by Hamas.
Palestinians are convinced thatIsraelis are completely

(56:25):
indifferent to them.
They look at the loss, thedeath and destruction in Gaza
and they think Israelis arecompletely indifferent to them.
So it's a long haul.
I'll tell you what I think hasto be done.
First, you have to understand aone-state outcome is a
guarantee for perpetual conflictbecause these two national
identities there's always been aconflict over two national

(56:47):
movements competing for the samespace and they're not going to
coexist in one space.
So I say where we have to startnow, given the trauma on each
side and trauma on each sidemeans each side can identify and
absorb and identify only withtheir own pain, not with the
other sides First, we have toreestablish the idea that

(57:07):
cooperation, functionalcooperation, can be done in a
way that offers benefits,because you have to reestablish
that the reality is.
There are areas wherefunctional cooperation, whether
it's on environment, water,health, they take place anyway,
but they have no exposure.
There needs to be visibility toit so people can begin to see

(57:28):
okay, we can cooperate.
That's number one.
Number two you need to use theArabs, because the Saudi
normalization is a lever,frankly, on the Israelis and the
Palestinians.
Because the Saudis can say look, we're not going to allow you
to dictate to us effectively.

(57:49):
If you look at Abraham Accord,what was the UAE saying?
They're saying you know what?
We're not forgetting thePalestinians, but we have things
that are fundamentally in ourinterests, because there's a lot
to be gained by ourrelationship with Israel in
areas that matter to us andwe're not going to deny
ourselves what's in our interest, because you have a leadership
that's incapable of ever makingpeace with Israelis.

(58:10):
So you need them to use thelever.
But also on Israel and say,look, this is what we require
from you and the Palestinians.
That allows you to begin tomove forward.
So, practical cooperation, usethe herbs, and there needs to be
.
Use the herbs also.
You look at the educationalsystems in the UAE and Saudi
Arabia, how they've beenfundamentally transformed.

(58:30):
That does need to be appliedalso to the Palestinians From
the standpoint of them allowingturning, if they're going to be
a state, turning them into astate that can be a 21st century
state as well, first centurystate as well.
So those are.
I mean when I lay this out itmeans it's a long timeline.

(58:52):
I would create, in addition towhat I said, a parallel set of
obligations on the Palestinianside and the Israeli side.
And I'll close with this, oneof the failures I think in the
past, including in my time I canget into failures.
I should have thought before wewent to Camp David about
creating a common script whereeach leader was going to spell

(59:12):
out publicly the concessionsthey would, the broad
concessions they would make onthe core issues, before going.
Once they did that, thepressures against them, the
backlash against them would havegiven them an enormous stake to
reach an agreement quickly, toshow the payoffs.
There's things you have to dofrom a negotiating standpoint,
but fundamentally, one thing wedidn't do.
When I said there's twomovements competing for the same

(59:35):
space, there was mutualrecognition in 1993, but it was
never an exchange of acceptingthe legitimacy of the other side
.
It was accepting the fact ofthe other side.
The Palestinians never acceptedthis historic Jewish connection
to the land and the Israelisnever accepted.
The Palestinians are a peoplewho have a right to
self-determination, but beforethey can act on that right, they

(59:58):
have to demonstrate certainthings, and Israel, for its part
, it can't act on the ground ina way that makes a Palestinian
state impossible, even if we'remaybe a generation away from
being able to produce aPalestinian state.
You can't have actions now thatmake it impossible in the
future.
You can't have actions now thatguarantee a one-state reality
and you can't undo it.
That's what Minister Smotrichis trying to do.

Neri (01:00:22):
He certainly is, dennis.
We'll leave it there.
We could have gone for anotherhour, trust me.
The book is called Statecraft2.0, what America Needs to Lead
in a Multipolar World.
Where can people find the book?

Dennis (01:00:35):
Probably the easiest way is just to go online.
You can get it from Amazon,okay, and they deliver very
quickly, okay, so people shoulddo that.

Neri (01:00:43):
And next time you come on, dennis, we'll talk about the
NBA playoffs and the GoldenState Warriors More positive
things than Betula Smotrich andhis plans for the West Bank.

Dennis (01:00:50):
I would just say if Steph Curry hadn't been hurt, he
definitely would have reachedit to the conference finals and
who knows from there.
I believe that's the truth, Notthat I'm too pained by it but
okay.

Neri (01:01:01):
Well, we are recording this Wednesday evening, so we'll
find out what happens latertoday.
I think right.

Dennis (01:01:06):
Yeah, tonight.
I think I'm not optimistictonight because I still don't
have Curry.

Neri (01:01:11):
Right With that, dennis, take care.
It's good to see you.
Take care, bye-bye.
Okay.
Thanks again to Dennis Ross forhis generous time and insights.
Also, special thanks to ourproducer, jacob Gilman, and to
all of you who support IsraelPolicy Forum's work.
Do consider making a donationto Israel Policy Forum so it can
keep being a credible source ofanalysis and ideas on issues

(01:01:33):
such as these that we all caredeeply about, including this
podcast and, most importantly,thank you for listening.
Thank you.