Where Does Iran Go From Here?

On this week’s episode, Israel Policy Forum Policy Advisor and Tel Aviv-based journalist Neri Zilber hosts Naysan Rafati, senior Iran analyst at the International Crisis Group. They discuss the ongoing protests across Iran against the regime, the strategic indecision by the Islamic Republic especially since last year's 12-day war with Israel, the prospects for miscalculation between Tehran and Jerusalem, President Trump's threats to 'come to the rescue' of the Iranian people, how the events in Venezuela impact Iran's thinking, and more. 

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Episode Transcript

Neri (00:04):
Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod.
I'm Neri Zilber, a journalistbased in Tel Aviv and a policy
advisor to Israel Policy Forum.
Happy New Year to all ourlisteners and viewers, and what
a new year it's already provingto be.
Hope the various holidays wereenjoyable for all of you, but
we're now back to regularprogramming.
And back with us this week isDr.

(00:26):
Nassan Rafati, the senior Irananalyst at the International
Crisis Group in Washington, totalk about what should have been
the biggest news of the currentmoment before Venezuela.
But trust me, it's still verybig news.
Nassan, of course, waspreviously a postdoc fellow at
the Iran Corporation, the U.S.
Institute of Peace, and theIFRI think tank in Paris.

(00:49):
He also holds a doctorate fromOxford University, and is, more
importantly, a friend of the podand a dear friend of mine.
But let's not hold that againsthim.
Nassan and I discussed theunrest rolling Iran with over a
week of protests anddemonstrations across the
country continuing against theregime.
And we tried to answer threequestions.

(01:11):
Basically, how serious of athreat is this really to the
Islamic Republic?
What does President DonaldTrump mean when he says he'll
come to the Iranian people'srescue?
And should we be worried thatanother Israel-Iran
confrontation is in the offen?
All that and much more comingup in what was a terrific
conversation.

(01:32):
But first, a few quick thoughtsfrom me.
So we're recording this onMonday night Tel Aviv time,
January 5th, 2026.
The start of a new year, andyou may be shocked to hear that
nothing has really been resolvedsince some of you went on
holiday a few weeks ago.
Trust me, I'm not bitter orjealous, but uh nothing has

(01:54):
really been resolved since uh,well, the end of 2025.
Benjamin Netanyahu had a greatvisit to Mar-a-Lago last week to
meet with President Trump, whoshowered him with praise.
Trump said Israel wouldn't havesurvived without Netanyahu at
the helm.
Fine.
Uh, and for Netanyahu and hiswife Sarah, uh, their big hit

(02:16):
and thrill was uh the invitationto Trump's New Year's Eve bash
at Mar-a-Lago.
So all of this was mana fromheaven, really, for Bibi as he
enters into an election yearback home here in Israel.
But the real question is whatwas decided between Netanyahu
and Trump, and between the USand Israel, with regard to the

(02:36):
various other fronts still inplay across the Middle East.
So, in particular, we'retalking about Gaza, where we're
expecting some kind ofannouncement in the next week or
two, so very soon, on theceasefire agreement and the
so-called phase two of the dealthat was struck back in October.
There's still a lot of thingsto uh work out, shall we say,

(02:57):
uh, with regards to phase twoand next steps in the ceasefire.
Um, believe me, there's still alot to work out, uh, but that
likely won't stop the Trumpadministration from announcing
some kind of movement and somekind of progress, including most
likely the announcement of aBoard of Peace and an executive
committee, and a committee ofPalestinian technocrats who are

(03:19):
all set to run the Gaza Strip.
Now, what these various bodieswill actually do on the ground
and what they'll be able to doon the ground, uh no one
actually knows yet.
Trust me, I've uh tried to findout.
Uh, that's number one.
Number two, in Lebanon, theceasefire isn't going all that
much better.
Uh, Hezbollah has yet to fullydisarm.

(03:42):
The Lebanese government isstill, for its part, treading
very lightly when it comes todisarming Hezbollah.
And Israel continues tobasically strike across the
country on a daily basis atwill, including earlier today.
Uh, Trump in Mar-a-Lago lastweek said something that
actually uh caught my ear andwas quite striking on this issue

(04:02):
of Lebanon.
Uh Trump said that Hezbollahwas, quote, behaving badly.
Not that Hezbollah may bebehaving badly, or that if
Hezbollah behaves badly, then X,Y, and Z will happen.
Trump stated it as fact.
Now, out of all the variousfronts currently still in play
in the Middle East and well, allacross the world, this is the

(04:25):
one that many, especially herein Israel, uh, are most
concerned about in terms ofpotential escalation uh in the
near term.
So just FYI, uh the pros herein Israel are uh, well,
everyone's talking about Gazaand other places, but Lebanon
may be the actual uhshoot-a-drop in the near term.

(04:47):
And finally, and obviouslythere's uh Iran, but for that,
let's get to Nasan Rafati.
Hi Nassan, welcome back to thepodcast.

Naysan (05:03):
Thank you, Derry.
It's great to be back.
Thanks for having me.

Neri (05:06):
Uh it's really our pleasure, especially this week
of all weeks, uh, Nesan.
Uh by the way, happy 2026 toyou, such as it is.

Naysan (05:13):
Uh such as it is, yes.
It's uh, you know, the Iranianyear uh runs through March, but
uh it's already been a rough onefor the uh Iranian government.

Neri (05:22):
Yeah, uh rough one for the Iranian government, uh I think
a rough one for the Venezuelangovernment as well, which we'll
uh obliquely touch on, I think,later on.
The Jewish New Year obviouslystarted a few months ago.
Uh I don't know if, you know,uh it's a better Jewish New
Year, I suppose.
So there is that silver lining.
But a lot to discuss on thisepisode.
And before we get into theIsrael and the Trump and the

(05:44):
maybe Venezuela of it all, uh, Ireally wanted to start here
with the most kind of basictable setting exercise uh to
explain to us, both me and ourlisteners and viewers, basically
what's been happening in Iranover the past week, since I
believe last Sunday, um, interms of the unrest, the
demonstrations that we've beenseeing uh on the streets of

(06:05):
Tehran and many other uh placesall across the country.
Uh what's been happening andalso why now?

Naysan (06:11):
Thanks.
Um well, as we're speakingright now, uh we've just entered
the second week of uh thesenationwide demonstrations that
started with an economic spark.
Um the Iranian economy writlarge has been in a very
difficult position, andparticularly towards uh late
December, there was essentiallya free fall of the national

(06:33):
currency with the the Iranianreal kind of tumbling through a
million real to the dollar to1.1 to 1.2, it's currently 1.4.
And for context, when thecurrent president of Iran,
President Pazesh Gyan tookoffice in mid-2024, it was
600,000.

Neri (06:49):
Oh wow.

Naysan (06:50):
And so that sparked um the the initial round of of
demonstrations and and strikesin the in the Tehran bazaar.
But as has been the case inother rounds of Iranian protests
over the past uh decade, whatstarts from uh uh particular
agreements or a particular uhissue, whether it's economic or
social, um, it quickly kind ofevolves into a into a wider kind

(07:14):
of demonstration of protestsagainst the system,
demonstrations against uh theIslam Republic.
And so over the past uh week,we've seen um the rise of
protests around the country.
We've seen state securityforces respond um with force in
many instances, at least 20fatalities uh reported.

(07:35):
And uh I think your yourlisteners and viewers will will
know that Iran has uh not been astranger to these protests over
the past decade.
You know, in 2017, late 2018,19, and then again in 2022, uh
we've had you know variousrounds uh sparked by by
particular um incidents, butquickly kind of emerging into uh

(07:57):
significant kind of challengesagainst the state uh from below.

Neri (08:01):
And that's a good jumping off point.
I mean, give us some context,right?
So you're saying the currentunrest, the current
demonstrations are enteringtheir second week.
Um we're recording this againuh Monday night Tel Aviv time,
uh noonish DC time where you'resituated Nissan.
But uh how does these protestscompare to previous protests,

(08:21):
whether in 2022 or the previousones even to that, the economic
ones, or even the 2009 so-calledGreen Revolution or Green
Movement, which came after awell, stolen election in Iran,
which uh seemed you know fairlysignificant just in terms of the
size.

Naysan (08:38):
Yeah, I I don't think that at this point, as of
recording, uh, you know, thenumbers are are anywhere um
approaching 2009 levels, but Ithink that you know th there's
an element of uh a regimeplaybook whenever these protests
come up, which is on the onehand to say uh we recognize that
there are some grievances, andyou know, even in the past week,

(08:59):
uh President Pazeshkian, evenAyatul Khamenei uh Khamenei, the
Supreme Leader of Iran, etc.
have said, yeah, the economicsituation is not great.
We understand that we'll dowhat we can, we'll try to
increase uh handouts, we'll tryto address mismanagement and
corruption.
Um, but and and you know, in in2022, you know, even Khamenei
after the death of Masa Aminysaid, oh, you know, this was

(09:22):
terrible.
But that kind of uh rhetoricalflourish and and you know nod to
some of the grievances thatgive lie to uh these different
protests is also accompanied byuh drawing the iron fist and and
you know repressing these theseprotests.
And um for all of the rhetoricaround you know, the you know,

(09:42):
we we are we feel your pain typeof rhetoric coming from the
top, the the grievancesaccumulate, right?
They're not really addressed atany significant point.
So whether it's the economyright now, whether it's the
social and political umrepression that uh people have
um uh demonstrated against, um,the system doesn't really make

(10:02):
any major course adjustments.
It it uses uh repression andthen um essentially tries to buy
time and space.
And as a result, we see thesealmost metronomic um um ebb and
flow of these these protests,especially over the past decade,
where um you know the spark mayvary from time to time, but the

(10:23):
tinder just continues toaccumulate and the economic
grievances, the socialgrievances, the political
grievances, uh, you know, theythey continue to compound.

Neri (10:32):
Right.
And just for uh listeners,Marsa Amini uh was obviously the
Iranian Kurdish woman who wasuh detained back in 2022 and uh
well beaten to death in custodyby the Iranian security forces,
uh, and that sparked, well,nationwide protests uh that were
also, like you said, uh putdown eventually.
Um I'm curious, Nissan, youmentioned the real and the kind

(10:55):
of economic trigger for thecurrent unrest.
According to previous reports,kind of going back a few weeks
and a few months, there alsoseemed to be, I suppose, um, an
energy crisis in Iran, whichseems kind of remarkable given,
you know, the Iranian oil andgas deposits.
Uh it also seemed like therewas no water previously in the

(11:15):
summer.
I mean, give us some context interms of, you know, yes, there
is an economic trigger and aneconomic collapse, especially in
the currency, but uh, whatother societal and
infrastructure ills was ailingthe Islamic Republic?

Naysan (11:27):
Aaron Powell I mean, you can go down a uh fairly
significant list, right?
There's there's decades of ummismanagement, corruption, and
obviously there's a there's animpact from sanctions as well,
which you know limit the thegovernment exchequer.
Um but uh you know over theover the summer there were uh
water concerns due to the lackof rainfall, um, the

(11:50):
infrastructure grid is creaking,which uh has led to you know
power outages and things likethat.
And then the economy, you know,for the past since 2018 really,
uh when the US uh under thefirst Trump administration
introduced uh maximum pressure,the the Iranian government has
touted its ability to respondwith what it calls a resistance

(12:11):
economy.
And that um is like theblueprint for this idea is that
Iran, by conducting enough oilsales, building up uh trade with
regional allies andnon-sanctioned trade in goods
and things like that, developingdomestic capacity that it can
get by.

(12:31):
And what I think we've seen isthat it doesn't really work that
well.
Um inflation right now is uhabove 40%.
We talked about the the fall ofthe real.
Um unemployment remains um uhconsideration, investment into
things like the electricitygrid, um, water infrastructure,

(12:53):
sustainable resources, um, allof those things when Iran faces
kind of fairly acuteenvironmental uh um uh strains
as well.
All of these things um againcompound into a pretty uh dire
malaise, which again the systemdoesn't really have good answers
to.

(13:13):
At best it can it can muddlethrough, and you know, there are
countries that have worseinflation rates, there are
countries that have gone throughworse hyper uh you know uh
currency falls and things likethat.
But it really is a kind of uhaccumulation of you know
immediate triggers, but thenalso kind of medium and
long-term uh strains on theenvironment, on the economy, on

(13:35):
infrastructure that, again, haveno easy solutions and certainly
not ones that the system's beenable to find.

Neri (13:41):
Right.
Uh muddling through uh triedand true formula, not only in
Iran, uh until it becomes a lotharder to muddle through.
Nissan, as a close watcher ofIran, can you give us a sense
who is actually going out andprotesting on the streets?
So you mentioned initially itwas uh in the Tehran Bazaar.
Um I know there's some unrestand protests at various

(14:02):
universities.
I mean, who who is actuallygoing out and coming out?

Naysan (14:06):
Well, it it started in the bazaar.
It it also then spread to someuniversity campuses.
It's spread, I mean, in termsof the the geographic uh scope
of it, it's it's dozens ofcities right now.
It's also um you know difficultto get a full picture.
You know, we are we we seevideos that come from abroad, we

(14:26):
do get reporting from humanrights organizations that have
uh sources that are that areable to share what they can uh
from what they see in Iran.
Um so in terms of geographicscope, it's it's dozens of
cities, it's a lot of youth umthat are out there.
Um the the you know thegovernment has tried to uh

(14:47):
staunch the flow by announcingvarious closures, saying that
campuses are moved online orshutting down businesses and
things like that.
So um they're trying to tolimit the the scale and the
scope of it.
Um and uh with these thingsit's obviously very difficult to
predict trajectories, right?
Like how does it um do thesethings, you know, does the

(15:08):
crackdown mean that over timethey start to ebb again?
Does it mean that it only fuelsyou know further outrage and
and and uh gives uh new waves ofprotests?
I mean, the Masa Aminiprotests, they started in
September um and they kept goingfor several months.
And in some cases, um, youknow, in in Sisan and
Balushistan province, you know,it it went on for you know close

(15:30):
to a year.
Every week people would comeout because that was one of the
places where the crackdown hadbeen uh the most severe,
especially in Zahedan.
So predicting the trajectory ofthese things is is extremely
difficult.
I mean, clearly it it speaks toa degree of dissatisfaction and
discontent that um is againstthe system writ large, but in

(15:51):
terms of whether you know wewill continue to see it grow or
whether we'll start to see itebb, that that's very difficult.
And there's obviously an Xfactor that's come in as well,
which is the system has, youknow, as we discussed, like
faced several instances of thesemajor uprisings from below.
Now we also have um an addedelement, uh, an X factor of

(16:12):
President Trump, at least twiceat the moment we've spoken, uh,
we're we're speaking right now,uh, warning the Iranians um that
there could be some sort of USintervention um if the if the
crackdown uh continues.
He he mentioned this in a in atruth social tweet a few days
ago, and again yesterday,Sunday, our time here in
Washington, right.

(16:33):
Uh during during a gaggle saidthat you know if the Iranians
continue to do this, we will hitthem hard.
So um what that necessarilylooks like, um whether we're
talking about uh gone.

Neri (16:45):
No, I was gonna say hold that thought, because we're
gonna get into uh thepresident's threats and what
that could actually mean inpractice.
And also um more intriguing forme is how these threats are
understood by the IslamicRepublic and the regime in
Tehran.
Um but I'm curious, just interms of the current moment and
to put a bow on on where we arebefore we kind of further

(17:07):
explain how we got here and thenlooking ahead, um, what has
been the actual response overthe past week by the Iranian
authorities?
So you said obviously the ironfist and casualties on the
streets and uh the use of force.
Have there been other, say,more conciliatory steps taken by
the Islamic Republic to try tomollify the public?

Naysan (17:27):
Um there have been both attempts at conciliatory
rhetoric and also you knowthreatening rhetoric.
Um so uh Khamenei himself uhaddressed this a few days ago.
He said, you know, uh peoplemight have some grievances that,
you know, and and if they'reprotesting, that's one thing.
If they're rioting, that's uhanother thing.

(17:48):
Now you can argue the extent towhich the Iranian system sees
those things as a distinctionwithout a difference.
And then Pezeshkian, who's beenpresident for the past uh year
and a half, um has kind ofharped on this a lot and and and
said, you know, we've we've weare facing uh uh difficulties.
We're facing economicdifficulties, we're facing
social and politicaldifficulties.

(18:10):
Uh he also then kind ofintimates that he can't do that
much about them.
Um, you know, like what do youdo with these kind of very
negative fundamentals?

Neri (18:18):
Aaron Ross Powell He basically said, What do you want
from me?
I'm just the president.

Naysan (18:22):
You're paraphrasing, but not not very far off.
But again, the question is soyou know, right now they can
they can do certain things,right?
Like they can try to increaseuh handouts and subsidies,
right, and and give peoplebasically a small cash infusion.
The risk there is that youraise inflation because you know
prices, prices will go up.
So you know the the the fact isthat these are these are not

(18:47):
problems that came up last week.
Uh I mean, and if we'refocusing only on the on the
economic side of the equation,forget about the the social and
political elements for a moment.
Um the the Iranian governmentis um under um kind of uh
suffering from internalmismanagement, internal

(19:07):
corruption, and externalfinancial pressure, where you
know it's able to export uh oil,it's not necessarily able to
repatriate all of that oil, orif it is, it it goes to you
know, at least a portion of theproceeds may go to to you know
various intermediaries thatdon't necessarily end up funding
public services.

Neri (19:27):
Um that's a very nice way of saying uh corruption.

Naysan (19:32):
Corruption, yes.
Um but and and you know thesethese notions of of uh regional
trade and things like that.
Again, uh trade with Europe isis basically nil.
Um uh a lot of Iran's uhregional uh neighbors um export
the same uh commodities thatIran exports.

(19:52):
Uh there's some you know fruitand vegetable trade.
There's obviously very activetrade between uh the UAE and
Iran.
Um But uh it's like thefundamentals on the economy are
have not been very good.
Um and, you know, when growthis projected to be negative this
year, when inflation is runningabove forty percent, um, when

(20:14):
you've got the the currencyvolatility that you have, you
need to make some pretty majoreither either be able to make
some very significant cuts um inhow much you're spending, or
have a major injection ofrevenue somehow.
And the f the first onerequires unhappiness, facing
unhappiness from whoever's moneyis being cut.

(20:35):
Even more.

Neri (20:36):
Even more unhappiness than the unhappiness being exhibited
on the streets right now.

Naysan (20:40):
Correct.
And and the second one wouldrequire some kind of uh lifting
of sanctions, normalization ofIran's trade, being able to
repatriate the funds that itactually gets, um, being able to
uh export oil again and againuh have access to the to the
revenue.
And you know, as far as that isconcerned, again, diplomacy

(21:02):
with with the U.S.
right now looks um more about.

Neri (21:06):
Right.
Uh and that's a very goodjumping off point uh to the next
topic I wanted to tackle, kindof um zooming out from the
current moment and the currentweek to uh the past well two
years, and really the past sixmonths since the 12-day war uh
between Israel and Iran.
Uh last time you were on thispodcast, Nasan, was way back in
April of 2025.

(21:26):
Uh seems like a differentworld, although in some respects
it's the same exact world.
Uh but you actually back thenwe we didn't quite uh know or
predict uh that a war was justuh over the horizon.
But what you did say was thatdiplomacy was going to prove be
proven very, very difficultbetween Iran and the US.

(21:48):
And that was uh back then inthe spring of 2025.
That was uh Trump's effortright after he re retook power
and retook office to kind ofengage Iran diplomatically.
That went nowhere, and thenTrump greenlit um Israel's
attack in June.
So I guess my first question toyou, Nassan, is okay, uh, what

(22:08):
impact did all, if any, have thepast two years of war across
the Middle East and alsodirectly between Iran and Israel
had on the Islamic Republicthat brought it to this point,
whether politically,economically, uh, or otherwise?

Naysan (22:23):
So if we spoke in in April of 2025, by that point the
um the trend line for Iran wasbad, and then it continued to
get worse.
So um, you know, starting inautumn of 2024, about a year
after uh the 7th of October andand Israel's kind of um uh uh

(22:44):
counter campaign uh firstagainst uh Hamas and and then
you know increasingly againstthe axis of resistance writ
large.
Um, you know, by that point, ifyou if you uh go back and think
of where things were in Aprilof 2025, Iran had essentially
lost Hamas, it had largely lostHezbollah, uh certainly as a

(23:05):
deterrent force uh againstIsrael, it had lost Assad and in
Syria.
Uh and so that was allessentially the autumn um of uh
2024.
And it uh came to uh thesenegotiations with the Trump
administration um in a positionthat you know it has a

(23:30):
significant degree of uh nuclearleverage remaining.
You know, it's still it wasenriching it 60 percent.
It had limited uh we hadlimited inspections from the
International Atomic EnergyAgency.
And uh Trump had basically uhcome in with both a you know
expansion of maximum pressuresanctions, but also this
diplomatic overture uh conductedthrough a special envoy.

(23:53):
Yes.

Neri (23:54):
No, Steve Woodkoff was the envoy.

Naysan (23:56):
Steve Woodkoff, yes, yes.
And um, you know, uh initiallyit seemed like things were off
to the to a decent start, butthen we ran into the same
problems that have bedeviled uhinternational diplomacy over
Iran's nuclear program for morethan two decades, which is this
issue of enrichment.
Um the Iranians uh said thatyou know we're willing to

(24:17):
restrict the nuclear program,we're willing to increase
inspections, um, but we're notwilling to stop enrichment.
And the Trump administration'sposition consolidated itself on
zero enrichment being thestandard that the US would
accept.
Um the Iranians rejected that.
And so on the Friday, the 13thof June, uh we saw uh Israel uh

(24:39):
launch uh its military operationagainst Iran's nuclear program,
its ballistic missile program,senior IRGC officials, senior uh
Iranian Armed Forces officials,senior Iranian nuclear
scientists, and um later on uhthe U.S.
come in as well in an offensivecapacity with Operation
Midnight Hammer against Nathan'sFord and Isfahan.

Neri (25:01):
Right.

Naysan (25:02):
So if you if you look at it from a quasi-neutral
perspective, right, that warfirst of all showed that um, I
mean, first of all, it it leftthe upper ranks of Iran's
military and nuclear echelons uhfairly decimated.
It showed that Iran's airdefenses were extremely
vulnerable.
It showed that Iran's offensivecapacity in particularly in the

(25:24):
form of ballistic missiles andespecially drones, were largely
uh repellable by by Israeli andAllied defenses.
And um an utter um uh upperhand in terms of Israeli
intelligence capacity, right?
In terms of being able topinpoint where all of these
Iranian uh officials were, beingable to build drone factories

(25:45):
on Iranian soil and conductdrone operations from Iranian
territory.
Um but in the Iranian statenarrative, there is also a
victory there.
And the victory is that, firstof all, despite all of this, um,
the system survived.
The system was able to maintainthe chain of command, all of

(26:06):
the commanders who were killedwere quickly replaced, the
missile capacity was able tomuster two weeks' worth of
regular salvos against Israel.
And that, in their view, anattritional conflict that would
have lasted longer would havebeen to their advantage, which
is why the US and Israel agreedto an unconditional ceasefire.

(26:26):
That is the state narrative.
That is what Iranian officialsuh contend when they say that
actually, you know, if if if wehad been on the back foot,
Washington and Jerusalemwouldn't have agreed to a
ceasefire.

Neri (26:38):
Right.

Naysan (26:38):
And the fact that we are we were still standing by the
end of the 12 days um shows thatactually they they recognize
that we can play we were betterin the long game.
And um that the uh the damageto the nuclear facilities was
significant, but not to thetechnology, not to the
knowledge, and that theballistic missile capacity was

(26:59):
um uh the damage wasn't thatbad.

Neri (27:02):
Those are the narratives that come very interesting out
of the No, it's veryinteresting.
Okay, continue.
So that's this is theirnarrative coming out of last
June.

Naysan (27:11):
That's the narrative.
Now, narrative doesn't alwaysuh comport to reality.
And I think it also has put theIranians in a in a very
difficult position even beforethese protests.
And to a certain degree, umfacing uh a series of difficult
options, they've taken none ofthem.
So um from a certainperspective, like on the nuclear

(27:35):
program, for example, they havenot conducted anything that
would be regarded as a majorprovocation because one of the
things that they don't know iswhat is Israel's red line or
what is the U.S.
red line on nuclearreconstitution.
And so um de facto they havebeen at zero enrichment for
seven months.
As far as we know, Iran has notrebuilt uh or certainly resumed

(28:00):
uh uranium enrichment.
Now, there are a lot ofquestions around the status of
Iran's nuclear program.
We haven't had internationalinspectors on the ground since
mid-June.
Um we do not have um uhabsolute clarity.
We have we have uh a sense thatthe fissile material is
inaccessible and buried uh atthe various enrichment sites,

(28:21):
but we don't know that with anabsolute certainty.
That includes 400 kilograms of60% enriched uranium, which is
near weapons grade, and I thinkPrime Minister Netanyahu alluded
to today, speaking at theKnesset.
Um and then um, but you know,they not knowing both the degree
of continued intelligencepenetration um and the red lines

(28:43):
that could could prompt a a umresumption of strikes.
Yeah, they uh on on the nuclearfront, whether it's because of
the damage sustained or therisks that they could incur, um,
they have not really takendramatic steps to reconstitute
that that activity.
There's been cleanup effortsand things like that, but but as

(29:04):
far as we know, no resumptionof enrichment.
At the same time, they continueto insist that they would want
enrichment in a New Deal withthe United States.
The fact that the United Statesis saying there can be no zero
enrichment means that there's nopoint in negotiating.
So on the one hand, they're notuh they're essentially doing
what the U.S.

(29:24):
has asked, but on the otherhand, uh refusing to acknowledge
that as a diplomatic uhconcession.

Neri (29:29):
Aaron Powell Not reaping any of the any of the benefits
of this de facto policy they'veadopted over the past six
months.

Naysan (29:35):
Aaron Ross Powell That's right.
Um and then on the ballisticmissile side, we know, and and
Israeli intelligence has alsosaid, and IRGC officials uh you
know boast about it regularly,that they are trying to rebuild
the nuclear program.
They you know Iranian officialswill say that actually the
damage was sustained wasn't thatbig to begin with.
Um, but we've seen reportsciting Western intelligence

(29:59):
about um uh shipments coming infrom China that can be used
towards uh fueling ballisticmissiles.
Apparently the U.S.
interdicted a shipment a fewmonths ago that was coming from
China.
These are things that can uh beused towards uh ballistic
missile development.
And uh Prime MinisterNetanyahu, you know, when he was

(30:21):
visiting with President Trumpin Mar-a-Lago has mean you know
made the case that Iran'smissile program uh is
rehabilitating.
President Trump said thateither the nuclear or the
missile programs could be causefor a resumption of either
Israeli and or U.S.
uh strikes.

(30:42):
But again, we don't quite knowwhat the threshold is.
And I'm I'm I'm I I you know Iwould be surprised if the
Israelis made much effort topublicly enunciate what that red
line is, because if theIranians don't know, um they
they may err on the side of notcrossing it.
But either on the the thenuclear program or on the
ballistic missile program, thereis continued concern in Israel,

(31:05):
as you well know.
President Trump has indicatedthat it could very well be a uh
trigger for renewed strikes.
And on the Iranian side, umfairly coy in terms of nuclear
activity, but um trying to dowhat they can at the very
minimum to rehabilitate theballistic missile capacity,
which was really their only kindof tool against Israel during

(31:27):
the war.

Neri (31:27):
Right.
So uh I'm gonna get back to themissiles in in just a second.
Uh believe me, I'm very curiousto get your your take on one
particular aspect of that.
But from the sounds of it,you're basically saying that,
especially after the 12-day warlast June, the Iranian
leadership has essentiallydecided not to decide.
Right?
Not on diplomacy with the U.S.,not on economic reforms, uh,

(31:50):
not on proactive aggressionagainst Israel or not.
I mean, basically a whole hostof issues that they've
essentially not either wanted todecide on or been able to
decide on.
Is that fair?

Naysan (32:02):
I mean, non-decision is a form of decision in and of
itself.
Um, but uh yeah, I think thatthere's an element of um
paralysis facing very difficultchoices um of just not of trying
to, again, like with theeconomy, uh, muddle through and
and keep your head down and umtry to try to get by.

(32:25):
You know, the the um thediplomacy with the US um is uh a
case in point.
You know, they they uh despitethe war in June, they really
haven't shifted any of theirpositions um and in terms of
what they want out of a uh whatthey're willing to offer in a

(32:45):
deal with the U.S.
the the insistence on adomestic enrichment capacity,
notwithstanding the fact thatfor six plus months there has
been no domestic enrichmentcapacity remains something that
they won't budge on.
And for them, it's also um, youknow, they they say and um that

(33:06):
the the US is also demandingmuch more than that.
They're they're demandinglimits on on missiles, they're
demanding limits on proxies, soyou know if you concede on one,
it becomes a slippery slope thateven then may not satisfy the
administration.
Flip side of it is that if youdon't agree to that, um, you
know, the economic situation, aswe have seen, uh doesn't get

(33:28):
any better.
And uh while you can try torehabilitate your conventional
systems, um they too could runget you to a point where the
Israelis are sufficiently umseeing threat and opportunity
because Iran's air defenses didnot turn out to be a ringing

(33:48):
endorsement for the S-300systems in June or in October of
2024.
And um, so again, that thatvulnerability may be something
that bears bearing bearing inmind, I suppose, for what the
calculus is in in Israel and andand the U.S.

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Neri (35:06):
I mean, I had two questions before before I get to
the missiles, trust me, I'mgoing to get back to the
missiles.
But um, how much of a problemis it inside the Iranian system
in terms of their lack ofability to take decisions?
Um, is related to the fact thatthe Supreme Leader is both
quite old already, um, and alsoperhaps diminished, if not

(35:30):
personally, then publicly andpolitically, after the
humiliation of the Twelve-DayWar, where he essentially just
kind of disappeared.
In other words, uh SupremeLeader Ali Khamenei, who's been
in power since uh the lateeighties, after he took over
from Khomeini, is he uh now partof the problem?
Is he not uh I mean, sorry forthe pun, is he not so supreme

(35:52):
anymore?

Naysan (35:52):
Aaron Ross Powell Well, I think, you know, it's
interesting because uh, youknow, the his title is Supreme
Leader, and there are people whowork on Iran that that that
will make the argument, I thinkwith some merit, that supreme
decision makers is a bit more ofan accurate title, right?
He doesn't make decisionswithout context.
There is a there's a uh thereis a policy process within the

(36:13):
system.
There's a Supreme NationalSecurity Council in the system
that brings together thepresident and the head of the
parliament and the the variousum uh uh eminences, grees of of
of the system.
And then they presentessentially a set of
recommendations to him that hegives a thumbs up or thumbs down
to.
And for the most part, he takestheir recommendations every

(36:34):
once in a while.
He might cast a veto on it.

Neri (36:37):
But uh Does he only not have one working hand?
So it would only be really oneone thumb heading upright.
Sure.
Okay.
You didn't you didn't youdidn't like that.
You didn't like that joke.

Naysan (36:49):
Uh no, it's it's yeah, he he he he does have an injury
in one of his hands uh as aresult of a bombing in the early
80s.

Neri (36:56):
Right.

Naysan (36:57):
Um but um the the fact is that I I think with it you
know, so the problem such as itis in terms of decision making
is that there's you know abigger systemic uh paralysis,
right?
And you know, you have um somepeople in in the system you know
who are more hardline who say,you know, the problem with June

(37:19):
is that we didn't go big enough.
Uh and the problem with thenuclear program is that we
hedged and and we should haveyou know gone uh bigger, faster,
quicker.

Neri (37:29):
Full breakout.

Naysan (37:30):
Um full breakout when, you know, because what you know,
what has been the point of youknow being at 60%, which is
enough to pose a threat, but notenough to actually have the
nuclear deterrent.
Um and then there are otherpeople who you know will say
that look, you know, how doesthis end essentially?
Like what is you know, how dowe get this economic reprieve?

(37:52):
How do we de-escalate tensionsum with the US, not necessarily
with Israel, because that is anideological uh foundation that
very few will be willing toopenly question.
But uh again, you know, theseare all, you know, if if if a
deal with the US requirescompromising on this issue that

(38:13):
the Iranian system has made afundamental point of principle
for 23, 24 years of nucleardiplomacy.
And even then you don't knowwhether the US would accept it.
And even if the US accepts it,you don't know if the US would
follow through.
It leads to a, I think, adegree of uh systemic paralysis

(38:34):
and Khamenei being Khamenei andbeing the age he is and being um
uh in the position he's beenin, um, you know, is is probably
not you know uh pushing forradical ideas at this point.
But when you're dealing withfairly unprecedented conditions
in terms of the uh the abilityof Iran to project power through

(38:56):
the axis of resistance, thefailure of its deterrence
through uh conventionalmissiles, the the fact that the
nuclear leverage is now not inwhat Iran has in terms of
nuclear capacity, but what wedon't know about its nuclear
capacity, right?
It used to be that the leveragewas the growth, the expansion
of its nuclear program.

(39:16):
Right now it's the opacity ofthe program.
It's the fact that we don'tknow with absolute certainty
where those 400 kilograms of 60%are.
Are there centrifuges squirledaway because the IAA hasn't had
access for a couple of years tocentrifuge production sites?
And the Israelis targeted someof the known production sites,
right?
It's not just Natans Fordo andIsvan, it's not just the

(39:38):
enrichment sites, it's also thebigger nuclear infrastructure
where you're actually buildingparts and putting together
centrifuges and all of thatstuff.
So that is essentially whatthey um are playing with on the
uh on the on the nuclear side ofthe equation.
Um, but what they also don'tknow is how much the Israelis

(39:59):
were The Americans or Alliedintelligencies, uh intelligence
agencies are able to see uhright now.
So if there was a cliquesaying, you know, we need to
take some of that 400 uhkilograms of 60% enrichment
uranium and marry it with someof the centrifuges that may not
have been accounted for, may nothave been destroyed, um, and

(40:21):
then essentially uh, you know,try to uh uh have a crash
program, um, they have, I think,zero confidence or should have
zero confidence in their abilityto do that in a covert and
undetected manner.

Neri (40:33):
Right.
Uh so risks any way you look,and hence the paralysis,
especially in the form of thesupreme decision maker who is
not making any real decisionsexcept not making decisions.

Naysan (40:47):
That's right.

Neri (40:47):
Okay.
Glad I glad I got that all allworked out.
Uh and which, you know, is agood explanation for how the
Islamic Republic finds itself inthe current situation it is.
Um As promised, I wanted tojust circle back really quick to
the issue of Iran's ballisticmissiles.
So I went back into my notesfrom last summer uh and I looked

(41:09):
at the various pieces ofinformation I got from various
sources uh on my end here inIsrael, and I wanted to kind of
do some back of the envelopemath with you, Nasan, uh, and
then kind of try to understandwhere we are in terms of
specifically the missile programand the missile threat that um
we've been hearing now fordefinitely a month, if not

(41:29):
longer, from the Israeli sidesaying, you know, this is a real
threat.
Iran is uh rebuilding andreconstituting its ballistic
missile arsenal, and that as youmentioned, uh it could be a
trigger for future and furthermilitary action, uh whether
whether by Israel alone or youknow with a green light or
active support of Donald Trump.
Um but again, uh on the eve ofthe June 2025 12-day war, Iran

(41:56):
had, according to Israeliintelligence, 2,000 ballistic
missiles in its arsenal, right?
They fired 550 of them atIsrael during the war.
I think three dozen, maybe,maybe more, got through uh and
caused a lot of damage, but itcould have been a lot worse, as
listeners of this podcast arefully aware.
Um, and that the post-warassessments by Israeli

(42:18):
intelligence uh said thatbasically either half to
two-thirds of Iran's missilestockpile was destroyed during
the war.
So between half and two-thirdsof the stockpile destroyed, um
200 missile launchers were hit.
So distinct from the actualmissiles, you need launchers,
and that's real, that's a realbottleneck uh in terms of just

(42:38):
military operations.
So 200 launchers were hit byIsrael during the war.
Um, that's two-thirds,according to the IDF, of the
total number of launchers thatIran had.
Um, and that's not evenincluding kind of the missile
production facilities and otherequipment.
So, my question to you, Nasan,I don't know if there's a real

(42:59):
answer, but I'm raising all ofthese numbers and data points to
query whether it's actuallycredible that Iran reconstituted
its entire ballistic missilearsenal over the past six months
since the June war.

Naysan (43:13):
Um I think part of the question would be how accurate
were those assessments prior tothe war?
I mean, you will remember,because I'm pretty sure you
reported on it, that you know,after the Israeli strikes in
October of 2024, there was asuggestion that Iran's capacity
to create ballistic missiles,um, certainly some of the more
uh advanced solid fuel variantshad been substantially

(43:35):
curtailed, right?
Um and then in June, um, youknow, the the um the we we've
gone from there's been asignificant degradation of
Iran's capacity to produceballistic missiles to Iran is
actively and and successfullyramping up its ballistic missile
production.
So um uh we we know that theIranians certainly are claiming

(44:02):
to be rebuilding their ballisticmissile capacity.
We know that there's evidenceof uh you know sodium percolate
imports from from China that canbe used for um uh ballistic
missile development.
Um it's also a question um ofyou know which variants of which
missiles did they use?
You know, did they did theyfire their top-tier stuff or how

(44:23):
much of their top-tier stuffdid they fire versus the kind of
medium-term stuff?
The drones were almost entirelyum ineffectual.

Neri (44:32):
Right.

Naysan (44:33):
Um and um but you know, it's also, and and you know this
far better than I do, that youknow, the if you look at it
numerically, the Israelidefenses were extremely robust.
I think 86% intercept rates,um, you know, it was running 90
plus uh throughout the firstseveral days of the war, kind of
dropped off a little bittowards the end.

(44:53):
Um and you know, there wereimpacts at a at a few places.
There was, you know, the therefinery in Haifa, the Weizmann
Institute, um, a few other um,you know, the hospital in
Bersheba.
Um, but um, you know, the factthat um you know they were able
to maintain this uh pace um uheven if it ebbed and flowed in

(45:15):
terms of actual numbers andactual damage for two weeks, is
um, I think uh Israeli officialswould would probably say that
under the circumstances it wasas robust a defense as as could
have been hoped for, and interms of offensive capacity,
neutralized as much as as couldhave been done.
Um question is in isolation,how much of a threat does it

(45:39):
pose, right?
And especially if it's separatefrom the nuclear program.
Um and that's a judgment foryou know Israeli officials of uh
and and and their assessmentsbecause you know the Iranians
will say that they arerebuilding at a at a rapid pace
and that their you knowballistic missile capacity and
their defensive capacity, if youbelieve that, is better off

(46:00):
today than it was on the 12th ofJune.
Um whether that is actuallytrue uh is is a very open
question.

Neri (46:08):
Do you believe it to be true?

Naysan (46:10):
I don't know.

Neri (46:11):
Okay.

Naysan (46:12):
Um I don't know.
I think it's it's the elementof the Iranian national security
doctrine that they have themost control over because the
Axis is um not in the conditionit was before, certainly in
terms of Hezbollah, certainly interms of Hamas.
Um the Houthis probably fareduh rather rather better than the

(46:35):
rest of the Axis did.
The nuclear program is asleveraged right now, again, is
mostly in terms of its opacity,not its growth.
So the uh ballistic missiles,and and given that Iran doesn't
really have a functioning airforce, certainly not one that
could threaten Israel, um meansthat by process of elimination,
if you're going to invest inreconstituting something, the

(46:58):
ballistic missile capacity isthe only one that you really
have at your disposal.
And a lot of it,notwithstanding the reliance on
Chinese uh imports for sodiumpercolate and elements in that
that are used in part of thefleet, it is the one that they
have the most control over,arguably.
So it stands to reason that ifthey were looking to

(47:20):
rehabilitate one element, themissile element would be the one
that they would put thequickest and and fastest
investment in.
Um so that that all stands toreason.
How um effective they've been,uh, they would be, how much the
balance is against Israel'sdefensive capabilities, you

(47:41):
know, the you know, we know thatthe the US burned through a lot
of munitions, we know that theIsraelis burned through a lot of
defensive munitions duringduring the course of the war as
well.
Um so um if there were to be anIranian salvo on the orders
that it were um in in June,would the Israeli uh defenses be

(48:02):
as robust and for how long asthey were in June?
Those are those are technicalquestions to military experts
that would have to have you knowat better access to information
than than I necessarily do.
But um, you know, I think thatthe uh at the very least, the
the rehabilitation trend lineseems to be on the missile front
um something that there's aconvergence of what the Iranians

(48:24):
say and what the Israelisbelieve.

Neri (48:26):
Yeah, and there's also um major scope in that Venn diagram
for miscalculation, that theIranians play up the numbers and
capabilities.
The Israelis either believe itor see something that spooks
them.
Uh, and then maybe someone hereon this end uh decides that
it's a big enough risk or a bigenough threat rather, uh, to

(48:47):
pull the trigger with U.S.
support.
Um by the way, I don't thinkthis is a likely scenario in the
coming months, so just to kindof calm everybody down, but but
there is a risk here ofmiscalculation.

Naysan (48:59):
I think that's very true, and it it's it's funny
because you know we think of theUS and Iran as you know having
no diplomatic relations and andyou know, oftentimes being at
loggerheads, but there aremediators, there are
intermediaries, there there is ayou know special interest
section.
There's a back channel, the thethere's a break glass in terms
in case of emergency uh at theSwiss embassy in Tehran, which

(49:22):
is, you know, serves um the USuh as the U.S.
special interest section.
We know that over the course ofthe negotiations um between the
Trump administration and andand Iran, you know, Special
Envoy Witkoff and um uh IranianForeign Minister Abbas Air Shu
were in touch directly.
We know that the Iraniansapparently gave the U.S.
uh heads up uh when they wereretaliating at um for the uh

(49:47):
against Qatar.
Um with the Israelis, none ofthat really exists, which is
which makes interesting the factthat there have been multiple
reports over the past few monthsabout messages going through
Moscow.

Neri (49:59):
Exactly.

Naysan (50:00):
Which again, and you know this because you've you've
you've covered it, you know,there was an element of
deconfliction indirectly uh inSyria when when you know the we
had the war between the warcampaign um uh you know about a
decade ago.
Um and again, you know, if theIsraelis are are um if the
Iranians, for example, are doingmilitary exercises and and

(50:22):
you're an Israeli planner, yousee a lot of things moving into
place and and you might beconcerned.
And if you're the um Iraniansand you see the Israelis doing
military exercises or you know,statements, or you know, the the
fact that, you know, from fromthe Iranian perspective, uh the
13th of June uh had a majorelement of surprise, right?

(50:44):
Because they they thought thatthey were still going to
negotiate with the Americans onthe Sunday when the the attack
was conducted on Friday.
Um so there is uh you knowpotentially always an element of
a ruse uh or or misdirection.
Um and and you know, Israel hasuh an ability to mount a fairly
significant campaign on fairlyshort order.

(51:06):
So uh I think that's right.
You know, even if um neitherside necessarily wants to start
off a second round, or dependingon how you count it, a fourth
round, um, this is one of theperennial questions when you
have two uh adversaries with, Imean, forget about any trust,

(51:27):
but any you know basic uhcommunication or deconfliction
lines as well.

Neri (51:32):
Aaron Ross Powell And the scenario that we hear,
especially in recent days onthis end, um, by uh certain
reporters and certain leaks ofIran actually itself launching a
surprise preemptive attack, uhwhether due to Israeli moves or
U.S.
moves, um, either at Israeldirectly or U.S.
bases, that they're gonna kindof shoot off what they have, as

(51:55):
you mentioned, ballisticmissiles and other kind of
projectiles.
Uh and then I don't know, hopefor the best, I suppose.
I mean, how incredible do youthink that scenario is?

Naysan (52:06):
I think hoping for the best, if if that's the thinking,
is is uh is uh potentiallyquite disastrous.
Um I mean the Iranians have,you know, for example, um they
have in the context of attacksuh you know by by ISIS in Syria,
they they've they've bombedSyria.

(52:27):
Um uh attacks by ISIS in Iran,they they bombed Syria.
Um when there were Jaishul Adlattacks, like separatist attacks
in the in the southeast ofTehran, they bombed uh Pakistan.
They have bombed uh uh Kurdishbases, I mean they bombed Urbil,
you know, claiming that youknow these were Israeli
intelligence hubs, Mossad hubs,without obviously offering much

(52:50):
evidence to that extent.
So there is precedent in Iranconducting extraterritorial
strikes in response to domesticdevelopments.
Certainly some people in thesystem are saying that the
current round of protests isorchestrated by the US and
Israel as they as they alwaysdo.
But I mean, it would be hugelyuh risky given that uh their air

(53:17):
defenses, as far as we know,are not better off um than they
were in June.

Neri (53:22):
Um it's a nice way of putting putting it, yeah.

Naysan (53:27):
I mean, uh the the vulnerabilities are are are are
pretty stark, right?
So if if if that if thoseanalyses that that you're
referencing are correct, and Iwouldn't be surprised if there
are some people in Tehran whowho are either arguing that you
know next time it has to be uswho goes first or see signals

(53:48):
that they take to mean animmediate Israeli or US strike,
um, which again comes to thepoint about potential
miscalculations.
Um but I think you know it onceyou get the first move off, you
have to anticipate the the theother side's first move.
And Iran, given what we saw inJune, um would take uh a

(54:10):
significant hit in the event ofa of a second round.

Neri (54:13):
Right.
Um I should have just sharpenedmy question to you.
Uh the scenarios that are beingleaked here, uh the concern on
this end in Israel is that um asa result of the domestic unrest
in Iran, that Iran may choosefor whatever reason to try to
divert attention externally andf and start firing missiles at

(54:34):
whoever.
Um which again, um I don't knowhow that would work as well,
because then you run the risk ofa real a real response by
Israel, the Americans, someoneelse.

Naysan (54:45):
And I would just say, because I think it bears to the
point that we started on, um,which is that you know, after
June, one of the things theIranian state really tried to
cultivate um was this sense of,you know, rally around the flag,
you know, or if not even the ifnot even the flag, like if not
even in support of the system,then at least in the name of the

(55:06):
soil, right, in the name ofterritorial integrity, that you
know, even if you're against usas the regime, you know, you
shouldn't be happy about thecountry being bombed type of
thing.
Right.
And to the extent that that mayhave taken some route, I think
the protests now that we've seenover the past kind of uh seven,

(55:26):
eight, nine days show that thatdoesn't really work when the
fundamentals are still so poor,right?
So kind of uh pleading unity umdoes not resonate all that well
when the economic, political,and social discontent is

(55:47):
unaddressed.
And you see some commentatorsin Iran that have kind of said,
well, you know, we should haveused this moment to actually
start to make some adaptationsand maybe start to, you know,
talk to the Americans in adifferent way, or use that
moment to make difficult callson the economy and things like
that.
Um hindsight is 2020, but Ithink that it does show that

(56:08):
this, like, if the state triedto use that and if it would try
to use that logic again per whatthese um uh leaked reports uh
suggest, even then it would be avery finite resource, I think,
without shifts in the the issuesthat people are actually
protesting about.

Neri (56:28):
Okay.
Fair enough.
Um final question to you,Nasan, before uh before I let
you go.
Uh, and it's about the DonaldTrump of it all.
So the first part of thequestion, uh, when you hear the
US President make these commentsand make these threats, uh
saying that uh, how did he putit overnight?
If they start killing peoplelike they have in the past, I

(56:51):
think they're going to get hitvery hard by the United States.
Um what tools does Trumpactually have in his toolbox to
make good on those threats, ifif he does actually make good on
them?
Uh that's the first part of thequestion.
And then the second part of thequestion, I think you already
know what it is, right?
Uh stemming from thisSaturday's events in Caracas in

(57:13):
Venezuela, the Nicolas Madurosnatch and grab, the Supreme
Leader, the other officials ofthe Islamic Republic saw it,
like everyone else around theworld saw it.
Um what's going through theirmind, what impact does the event
in Venezuela have on theirthinking, again, if at all?

Naysan (57:32):
I think it does and should, um, because look, it it
w I and I think that the the twoelements of the question are
very much complementary becauseI think rendition of a head of
state is you know one end of thespectrum of you know potential
um uh responses, right?
So when the when the presidentsays um you know if Iran

(57:55):
continues down this path ofrepressing, you know, the they
could be hit hard, um, I mean weknow what precedents exist.
We know that there's sanctions,designations um that could be
done.
Um we know that there's youknow after after uh you know the
there could be increasedsupport to like you know
satellite communication andthings like that to in case the

(58:15):
government tries to curtail umuh access to the internet again
and and um you know uh under inthe mas A mini protests, Iran
was kicked out of some you knowinternational human rights fora
um and and things like that.
Then you get into you knowperhaps uh covert or or overt
operations.

(58:35):
And you know, for the Iranians,if I I think what what happens
in uh Caracas kind ofunderscores a point.
It doesn't really make a newone.
I mean, Trump is the one whomade the decision to kill Qasem
Soleimani six years ago, he'sthe one who uh agreed to carry

(58:56):
out strikes on Iran's nuclearfacilities in in June.
So he is not averse to makingbig calls um with big
consequences.

Neri (59:06):
Right.

Naysan (59:06):
And I I think um, you know, uh, from if you're in
Tehran, I think the the theissue is you don't know um
what's bluster, what's bluff,what's threat, um, and what
options are on the table becausehis nature is uh has this un
unpredictable element to it.

(59:27):
Now, there are other lessonspeople in Tehran might might
take as well, right?
We know that Maduro was talkingto Trump, right?
They were trying to negotiatewith Trump.
And uh whatever Maduro waswilling to offer clearly wasn't
sufficient for what Trump uhexpected.
And so there are people inTehran, I assume, who will all

(59:47):
also make that argument thatsee, like this is entirely
futile, like don't even thinkabout talking to this guy
because it won't go anywhere.
Um that's one element of it.
And the other element of it isthat he doesn't Necessarily
bluff.
And you know, to come back tothe June war, we know that

(01:00:08):
Iranian leadership was inIsraeli crosshairs.
Both Khamenei, who I think someIsraeli officials said, you
know, he'd gone underground, andif we if we'd had him in our
sights, we probably would havetaken him out, to apparently,
you know, striking the SupremeNational Security Council, you
know, with President Pazesh Ionbeing injured.
So, you know, the an effort atleast towards decapitating not

(01:00:34):
just the military and nuclearechelons of Irania, of the of
the Iranian system, but also itspolitical echelon, was not
entirely untried in June.
And so that means that again,in the context of what a um US
and or Israeli uh operationcould could look like down the

(01:00:55):
ground, like we've already kindof crossed some of these
thresholds, not just in Caracas,but in Tehran itself over the
past few months.

Neri (01:01:03):
So nothing new but the Caracas president combined with
a domestic unrest shouldincrease the paranoia in Tehran.
And as uh someone once said,you know, uh paranoia it's just
another word for being uh mildlyobservant.
So they've they've beenobserving uh these threats and

(01:01:23):
the US president making good onthese threats for quite some
time.
So in their minds, I supposeyou're saying that it could it
could actually get to adecapitation attempt.

Naysan (01:01:31):
I'm not saying that it could get to a decapitation
attempt.
I'm saying that what theIranians certainly can't take
away is ruling any of thesethings out at this point.
And when it comes to theprotests, I mean to you know put
it put a bow on on theconversation and going back to
where we started, you know, wewe've talked about the playbook
that the Iranian system usuallyuses, which is a little bit of

(01:01:52):
conciliatory language and a veryheavy iron fist.
And what the president has saidis that I'm not gonna let you
get away with with an iron fist.
I mean, they already have to acertain extent, right?
There's been at least 20fatalities and and um you know
continued uh uh as we speak,there's still uh clashes and and
uh repression that is ongoing.

(01:02:13):
So, what exactly the thresholdwould be um uh for the president
to contemplate some kind of umhitting them hard remains to be
seen.
But I think again, if you're anIranian decision maker and you
have this playbook that you'veused in multiple rounds of press
protests, which is if you crackdown hard enough, strong

(01:02:35):
enough, long enough, it willeventually peter out in terms of
an immediate security concern,if not a governance problem,
which I think just continues toget worse, then um you have this
um way that you've approachedthreats from below, but now you
have this um X factor whereusing that playbook now

(01:02:56):
potentially invites anintervention from abroad, which
wasn't the case in 2017, 18, 19,2022, right?
Like at no point in any ofthose uh protests was there a
serious probability, let alonelikelihood, that there would be
some kind of potential militaryintervention against those
protests.

(01:03:17):
And now, at the very least,it's something that they have to
have in back of mind.

Neri (01:03:22):
Aaron Powell And that could lead them to a bit of
pause with regard to theirresponse if these protests
continue and grow.

Naysan (01:03:29):
Aaron Powell And then it becomes a catch-22.
If if the if if you're holdingon the repression and the
protests continue to get worse,but repressing further could
lead to uh an interventionthat's uh you know coming from
outside, you really are in a bitof a quandary.
Um and I think again, you know,I think if you look at this

(01:03:51):
dilemma and the other dilemmasthat we've mentioned in terms of
Iran's you know wider securityconcerns and its diplomatic
impasse, um, it really has beena trend line of um bad choices
that continue to get worse.

Neri (01:04:04):
Um indeed.
Indeed.
Uh bad choices, uh most ofwhich are are self-inflicted.
So uh maybe maybe they willchange course, although I'm not
holding my breath.
Nissan, as always, thank youvery much for your time and your
insights.
Best of luck this season withArsenal Football Club.
I don't really mean that, butuh I suppose I have to say that

(01:04:26):
just for the record.

Naysan (01:04:28):
Uh and we'll I don't believe it, but anyway.

Neri (01:04:31):
Right.
Uh and uh I'll chat with you uhhopefully very soon.
Take care.
Thanks very much.
Okay, thanks again to NasonRafati as always for his
generous time and insights onceagain.
Also, a special thanks to ourproducer, Jacob Gilman, our
editor, Tracy Levy, and ourassistant producer Eden
Jesselson, as always, and to allof you who support Israel

(01:04:53):
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