August 29, 2018 • 40 mins
In this episode, I speak with Hooman Majd, an Iranian-American journalist and author. Hooman and I talk about the current level of support the Islamic Republic has inside Iran, the Iranian revolution and the current struggles of the Iranian people, democracy and secularism within the Iranian context, the role of the US and the Iranian diaspora in regards to Iran, the criticism he has received because of his connections to the Islamic Republic and other topics.
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Episode Transcript
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Saman Askari (00:00):
Welcome to talk Iran! This is Saman Askari.
Today on the podcast (00:03):
Hooman Majd.
An Iranian American journalistand author, Hooman Majd was born
(00:26):
in Tehran, but lived abroad frominfancy with his family who were
in the diplomatic service.
He was educated in England andthe US and stayed in the United
States after the IslamicRevolution of 1979.
Hooman had a long career in theentertainment business before
devoting himself to writing andjournalism full-time.
His New York Times best-sellingbook, The Ayatollah Begs to
(00:46):
Differ, was published in 2008followed by his book, The
Ayatollah's democracy, which waspublished in the Fall of 2010.
His latest book, the Ministry ofGuidance Invites You to Not
Stay, was published in the USand the UK in November 2013.
He's also written for the NewYork Times, The New Yorker Time,
Vanity Fair, Foreign Policy andother publications too numerous
(01:10):
to list.
A keen observer of Iraniansociety, he details his
interactions with the Iranianpeople from all walks of life in
his writings, from supporters ofthe Islamic Republic and the
deeply pious to the wealthy andmore secular segments of
society.
He also has a knack for breakingdown the meaning of certain
Iranian concepts and words suchas'tarof' by providing
(01:32):
historical and anecdotalcontext.
Hooman has at times beencriticized for his connection to
various figures within theIslamic Republic and for having
been a translator to Iranianpresidents who have visited the
United States.
I asked for his response to thiscriticism in our conversation.
We also talk about the currentlevel of support the government
has inside Iran, the Iranianrevolution and the current
(01:54):
struggles of the Iranian people,democracy and secularism within
the Iranian context, the role ofthe US and the Iranian diaspora
in regards to Iran and othertopics.
So without further ado, let'slisten in to my conversation
with Hooman Majd.
(02:17):
So I just finished reading yourbook, The Ayatollah Begs to
Differ.
Yeah.
Your first book.
Uh, I know you have two morebooks.
They're on my reading list.
I found a couple of thingsreally striking.
The first thing was that you arereally good at mingling with all
types of different people.
It was amazing to see how youwent from hanging out with an
ultra conservative family in Qomand then you went to these
(02:39):
parties in North Tehran and thenyou came back to the US and
appeared on the Bill Maher showand all of that.
So that was really fascinating.
I always thought of myself asbeing really flexible in terms
of being able to be fullyIranian and fully American at
the same time.
But I think you take it to awhole new level.
Uh, I, my, my question for you,the first question here is,
(03:01):
given your knowledge of Iraniansociety, do you think there has
been a shift in the level ofsupport or in the landscape of
support for the regime?
Its framework and uh, all ofthat given recent developments.
For example, we had the recentprotests last month and a lot of
(03:22):
people were chanting anti-regimeslogans and these were people
that weren't necessarily fromnorth Tehran.
Right.
So I want to get your thoughtsaround, you know, how popular
the regime is currently and ifthe tides are sort of turning.
Hooman Majd (03:37):
Well, I don't know if the size attorney, I mean
certainly the regime has lost,would you want to call it a
regime, a system, whatever youwant to call it.
The Iranians don't like to becalled the regime because the
regime has a negativeconnotation that it's
undemocratic, but nonetheless inAmerica we call it a regime.
Most people do anyway.
Yeah, no, I would say I wouldsay that it's lost some credit,
but I mean it's lost credibilityamongst some of its supporters.
(03:58):
Starting in 2000, I began tolose credibility starting in
2009, the green movement and theprotests.
Um, even though the greenmovement specifically at least
the leaders of the greenmovement, we're not against the
regime per se, but more againstthe just the election and in a
more open system that were forit make it more open and more
democratic society.
(04:20):
But I think yes, over time, andcertainly in the recent, in
recent days and months there hasbeen, um, probably a cut, a
diminishing of support, althoughit's impossible to say how many
people actually do fully supportthe regime at any given time.
I think it was always impossibleto say because it hasn't been
(04:41):
since the referendum of 1979.
There hasn't been a referendumof free referendum saying, you
know, what kind of systempolitical system do you want?
So 40 years later, it's kind ofhard to say, but I would say
that there's still a substantialsupport.
When I say substantial, 25percent can be substantial in a
country like Iran.
It may not be the majority, butit can be substantial.
(05:04):
It's a, it's a hardcore group ofpeople who are dependent upon
the system or believed enough inthe theocratic, uh, aspects.
And believe that there shouldn'tbe a theocracy and accordance
with their beliefs that that's,uh, that they're, and they're
armed.
(05:24):
I mean, there are people who arethe best, the age and the
Revolutionary Guard and thesepeople are not that, that
support could be enough to keepthe system in tact for years and
years and years.
Um, that's also assuming that ithas to be some change.
I don't think there's anyquestion that there has to be
reformed in Iran in order for itto survive in the longterm
because without reform, withoutgetting rid of corruption with
(05:47):
that or at least reducing thelevel of corruption which has
gotten worse and worseapparently in recent years
according to what we read.
Um, and without fixing people's,you know, daily economic issues
and there on some of theirsocial issues, if not all of
their social issues, you know,no system can, can survive for
(06:09):
so long answer to your question.
But the answer to your questionis actually I don't know what
the level of support.
And I was trying to make myselfsound smart by giving all of
these.
Um, but you know, the answer isno one really knows because
there was, there wasn't a way togauge, but we're wrong to
believe that because there'sprotests or you know, a few
hundred or a few thousand peopleshout even if they're from the
(06:31):
different classes in society,I'm down with the regime or
whatever.
Or within those group ofprotesters, there are a number
of subset of protesters who wereshouting death with the regime.
That means they're, you know,the regime has lost his base of
support.
I don't think that's the case atthis point.
And we in the diaspora isparticularly those who've, you
know, you lived in Iran longerthan I did.
(06:51):
Um, and I've been abroad all mylife.
Um, it's easy for us to think,oh well, he, Iranians, you look
like you say the parties innorth Tehran.
You look at people who aresecular and you go, it's easy to
say, well, of course, you know,this regime is just going to,
not last.
People are going to want exactlywhat we have, we have in the
west.
But then you do go and witnessthe way people live and the
religiosity and, and the waythat there is a conservative
(07:14):
strain in Iran, which alwaysexisted during the what time?
And you say, well, it's not thatsimple.
There's also, I'm an Iranianstubbornness.
Um, and there's a, there's a,there's a credibility issue as
well for Iran.
If you have a revolution basedon not being subservient to
either east or west, then theminute you give into the West on
(07:38):
something or given to the east,in other words, the Communist
system where the capitalistsystem then your credibility as
a revolution is gone.
And Iran is a revolution.
It's still a revolution.
I mean, the supreme leader isnot the supreme leader of Iran.
He's the supreme leader of theIslamic Revolution.
That's his title.
Um, we still have a revolutionor revolutionary government.
Saman Askari (07:58):
So does that mean that the system always needs an
America or some other power forit to stand up against and for
it to define its characteragainst?
Hooman Majd (08:09):
If those great powers, whether it's Russia,
China, or America, demand ofIran, something that Iran
doesn't want to give up, and ifit does give it a given to
either any of those greaterpowers, whether it's an or even
European powers, then yes, no,it can no longer be the
(08:29):
revolution is over at thatpoint.
And I think among its ownpeople, the revolution is over.
I mean, look, even even on thisnuclear deal, I'm at the Uni
Judd, who was the previouspresident, um, derided the deal
and derided his successor forhaving given in to the
Americans.
Whereas, you know, trump thinksthat America gave into Iran.
(08:51):
People like Ahmadinejad whoconsidered themselves true
revolutionaries and followers ofKhomeini considered giving any
kind of a concession to theAmericans, uh, as, as giving it.
And it's, and, and as far as.
So now he's coming back into thepolitical series.
I don't know, you see he'stweeting, instagramming, all
this stuff.
Um, maybe he wants to run againfor president, who knows?
(09:12):
But anyway, the point beingthat, uh, yeah, the revolution
is over the minute, the majorityof the people who support the
revolution, let's say it's 20days, 25 or 30 percent of the
entire population support, um,the system still support the
system when the majority ofthose people think that Iran has
given it on the very basicprecept, which is to not be
(09:34):
subservient to any greaterpower, to have full independence
and rights and dignity of anation.
The great nation of Iran, asthey all consider, as Iranians
considered the minute that'sgone, the revolution has gone.
And then yes, it will collapse.
Saman Askari (09:49):
So if we can go back 40 years to when the
revolution happened and thoseprinciples, obviously it was a
very popular revolution at thetime.
People felt like they wereunshackling themselves from the
various powers, US especially.
Right?
Right.
And they were sort of reclaimingthe Iranian identity or the Shia
(10:12):
identity, which is sort ofinextricable from the Iranian
identity.
But if we look at what'shappening today, Iran is not
exactly a bastion of freedom andopportunity and people are not
necessarily happy.
We can go down the list ofstatistics and all of that and
(10:34):
I'm sure you're familiar withall of those.
I mean, women's rights standsout.
Women can't leave the countrywithout the permission of her
husband and you know, a wholehost of things that people in
other places would findridiculous.
Right.
And even on the economic side,people are struggling.
Has, we can lay the blame at thefeet of America and the
(10:55):
sanctions and we can go on andon about that.
But at some point somethingstarted not going right.
Is that what happened?
Hooman Majd (11:05):
No, I don't think it's something not going right.
I think that, um, you know, therevolution was popular not only
because of Islam and she is um,and uh, the people who support
and continue to the states andconservatives who support that
system.
It was popular because the vastmajority of Iranians at that
time, living inside Iran, theywanted exactly what you said to
(11:27):
get rid of being, you know, agreater power being subservient,
degraded, in which case, in thatcase it was as the US, but also
a dictator where they felt therewas no political freedom and
they couldn't express themselvespolitically.
They were afraid of the secretpolice.
Um, social rights were allthere.
They all had all the socialfreedoms they wanted, but they
didn't have political freedoms.
They didn't necessarily wantwhat this system is.
(11:48):
I mean, as we know from theinfighting after the, after the
revolution, we know that Deanwere part of the revolution.
Then Raj, it broke off, brokefrom, from Khomeini.
I'm so not everybody was, washoping for an Islamic system as
it is today.
In fact, there was huge protestby women at the very beginning
of the revolution.
(12:08):
Women, we're not obligated towear headscarves.
And then when the, when theydecided, the system decided that
they were obligated, there was ahuge protest.
Millions of women came out onthe streets.
So what the system evolved into,um, is not what people at the
time necessarily want it.
Some people did, but noteverybody who, who fought
(12:28):
against the shah or was againstthe Shah or sat back and said,
yeah, the shock.
Yeah.
I'm not necessarily political,but if the chagos maybe there'll
be a better democratic system.
Well, why not?
Why wouldn't we want a betterdemocratic system?
Why would anybody want a betterdemocratic system?
And so those people aredisappointed obviously, and many
of them such as your family leftIran because they were
(12:49):
disappointed otherwise theywouldn't stay.
Um, as we know, the$2, millionplus of lyft left Iran anyway.
Point being is that I, you know,uh, the system today is not
what, what, what many peoplethought it was including many
women.
Um, some of the restrictiverules on women existed during
(13:09):
the Shah's time not being ableto leave the country without her
husband's permission.
That was a law that was in theShah's time as well, not just so
some of the laws, justinheritance laws, which were
against the, a woman.
Those were also from the Shah'stime, these are ancient rules,
uh, that, that the Islamicsystem didn't change, but the
(13:30):
Islamic system changed for womenwas the obligatory obligatory
head covering and not just tapecovering hijab and modest dress
in general.
Plus I'm not having the abilityto have certain positions,
although some people are arguingagainst.
I like, for example, a womancan't be president, although
there's not clear if that'sactually a law or not, but um,
(13:50):
or a judge or stuff like that.
So, um, yes, there was adiminution of, of women's
rights, no question about it,but some of those rights that
today people will argue, um,feminists will argue those also
existed under the Shah's time.
Why didn't they protest then?
Saman Askari (14:04):
Yeah.
Just out of curiosity,
Hooman Majd (14:05):
why didn't foreigners protests?
I don't mean Iranians.
They're running has alwaysprotested.
Yeah,
Saman Askari (14:09):
right.
Out of curiosity that, uh, thetestimony of a woman, was it
worth half a man's during theShah's team as well?
Hooman Majd (14:16):
That I don't know.
I don't think so.
That's an Islamic thing, right?
Right, right.
I see.
Although the Shaws, the Shaws,uh, I don't mean particularly
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, I meanthe shah's plural shaw's a rule,
then rains took into account intheir constitution or in their,
(14:36):
whether they had a constitutionor not in their laws took into
account she, uh, she, uh, Sherryand without actually calling it
sherry along.
Saman Askari (14:44):
Interesting.
So you've often argued that assort of presumptuous for us in
the West to assume the bestsystem for Iran would be, uh, a
liberal democracy akin tosystems that exist in Europe and
us and that democratic rule canbe possible within an Islamic
framework.
And you've sort of alluded tothe fact that currently we do
(15:07):
have a democracy in Iran, right?
Right.
Can you, can you elaborate onthat?
Because a lot of people, whenthey look at a system like that,
they say, okay, fine, you haveelections, but then at the end
of the day you are, you know,operating under a system that
has an unelected body that hasabsolute say on everything has
(15:30):
veto power on everything, caneliminate anybody from running
for office.
And I mean, what does democracymean then?
Right?
Hooman Majd (15:39):
No, absolutely correct.
I mean, I don't think there'sany doubt what I say that there
is a.
it's a form of democratic rulecompared to let's say, Saudi
Arabia or compared to some othercountries.
It's not as democratic as evenTurkey where we were even
Turkey, which is not justbacksliding, but Iran is not
even as democratic.
That grant.
(16:00):
Anybody would have to grant youthat.
But then again, you look at themillions of people who come out
and vote enthusiasticallycheering and being happy about
like for example, Ronnie's toelections both elections and you
go, well those people aren'tstupid.
It's not like they don't knowthat there's a supreme, the.
It's not like they don't knowthere's a guardian counsel and
yet they, they, they sincerely.
(16:21):
Or at least they believe enoughthat that the system can
moderate change reform bedifferent than a previous
president, for example, in orderfor them to come out and
participating in those votes.
So that's why I say there issome form of democracy.
It's some form of democratic.
Well, because the system has totake into account the people's
(16:42):
will as well.
For example, in the time ofRohani there may have been, I'm,
there's a lot of infightingobviously, and there's like
foreigners and dual nationalswho were in prison and stuff
like that, which were alsoduring, how about the time, but
I think you would, other thanthe difficulty of the economic
difficulties and other than theJCPO way issues that exist with
(17:02):
trump and Iran, you'd be hardpressed to find an Iranian who
doesn't prefer having thissystem than to the Ahmadinejad
years, although maybe that'schanging now because of all the
JCPA stuff that's happening.
But certainly the enthusiasm forRouhani was there and I think
there was a, uh, a more open.
I haven't been to Iran since2013 since he was elected.
(17:25):
Um, but from what I hear frompeople who are there or do come
in and they're, their biggestcomplaints tend to be economic
and less so on social issues.
There's more cafes, morerestaurants, more, you know,
liberalization in the, in thesocial space.
Um, then during the shot.
So I, I, I won't, I won't callit a democracy, that would be
foolish to call on a puredemocracy, but compared to many
(17:49):
the other countries aroundsurrounding it and compared to
certainly many Muslim countries,uh, it is, it is perhaps more
democratic.
The supreme leader, theRevolutionary Guard.
They all have to take intoconsideration the person that
the people voted for.
I don't think you'd have anyquestion that if Jenny Lee had
become president instead ofRouhani, the atmosphere inside
rob would be very different.
Saman Askari (18:10):
But aren't we just splitting hairs at this point?
I mean, when you compare Rohanito Ahmadinejad, obviously there
are differences in everyday lifeand all of that, but if people
were to be completely free andthey could absolutely vote
anybody into office, who do youthink that person would be?
Would it be someone?
(18:32):
I guess my point is, do youthink that people may vote for
someone who is secular that atthe same time would give them a
religious freedom and all ofthat, but at the same time would
be sort of like, okay, everybodylive their own lives.
You know,
Hooman Majd (18:49):
yeah, I think at this point people would vote for
whoever they felt would givethem economic economic benefits
rather than anything else atthis point because people are,
are, are actually suffering andwant to see, you know, sanctions
and, and stuff like that morethan anything else.
Right now, any protest tend tobe about, about sanctions, not
about the economy more thananything else.
(19:11):
Um, I don't know.
I mean it's hard to say inAmerica if we were, you know, if
we didn't have a primary systemand we didn't have to choose
between Democrats andRepublicans every single time
because that's just the way itworks.
Now there's two party system.
Would Americans vote for someonefrom the outside?
I mean, I think, you know, maybeBernie Sanders proved that
people might be willing to goout and vote for someone who
(19:33):
doesn't come from inside thatpolitical system.
Um, I, yeah, I would imagine.
Yes.
Because I don't think the vastmajority of Iranians are 100
percent satisfied with thestatus quo and Iran.
I would have to imagine thatpeople would, would vote for
someone who, who, who saysthey're secular.
I think under the current systemthat can't happen because if
(19:54):
someone says their secretary ofthe account, they'd be
disqualified from running ifthey want a secretary republic
people like hot Tammy who don'tsay they want a second
Republican but are as close tobeing secular in the sense that
they themselves are religiousbut don't believe in imposing
the religion.
Other people, um, he probablywon't be allowed to run again if
you tried, you know, to, youknow, I don't know.
(20:16):
I, I don't know the answer.
It's a very difficult questionto answer because we don't
really know.
It's hard to judge, but I thinkwithin the system it wouldn't be
possible because someone can'tcome out and say we need a
secretary.
Then you're talking about arevolution not, not reform
within the system.
Although I do think someone whogoes further away from
religiosity, if you want to callit, um, which is something that
(20:39):
even raw raw honey has saidpublicly on occasion that, you
know, we shouldn't imposereligion.
We should impose people, ourbeliefs, other people, which I
think is part of the reason he'spopular, whether he's sincere
about it is another question orwhether he, even if he is
sincere, if he has the abilityto change it to the point where
you know, a woman can walk downthe street without a headscarf
(21:00):
or that a boy and girl can holdhands or do a happy video, you
know, and, and not get arrestedor, or do an instagram where
they're dancing and not getarrested.
Obviously Rohani, the Ronniegovernment, this government that
the people voted for is forthose freedoms.
It has said so many times.
It's come up against thejudiciary many times.
(21:22):
So I think the answer to yourquestion is in the answer to how
Ronnie got elected and how thoseyoung women and young men, boys
and girls really came out andvoted for him and celebrated on
the streets of Iran.
I think they because theythought within this system he
was the best alternative toprovide them with those freedoms
and rights that, that they,that, that they desire.
No question.
(21:43):
Yeah.
So what would progress look likeat this point?
I don't know.
I don't know the answer.
Where can the system go fromhere?
I mean Iran is now facing abunch of issues and problems
that it didn't anticipate.
And this is the removal of theUnited States from the JCPA, the
imposition of sanctions.
Um, the very harsh languagecoming from the United States.
(22:06):
John Bolton is national securityadvisor for me policy on Iran,
which is an aggressive policy.
Um, and these are things thatneither the government nor the
people of Iran expected.
Uh, and they said that's onething.
Where can it go from your, ifnone of those things existed, if
the JCP I was delivering, if newairport craft were being
delivered to Iran, if all thesecompanies were doing business in
(22:29):
Iran, these foreign companies,if you know, you could have an
apple store and interferon, Imean, then where would it go
from there?
I naturally the progress, theprogression would be towards a,
a more, um, liberal society overtime.
And I think had the JCPAdelivered what was promised and
probably over promised by, bythis government, the raw honey
(22:49):
government to the people.
I think that it was just naturalthat, uh, even some of the
people who would be againstliberalization, it would be
against opening up to the Westbecause of the fear of Western
influence would, would be forcedto stand back and recognize that
progress for Iran.
This was progress for Iran and,and, and would have to continue.
(23:11):
Where does it go now?
I mean, I think whatunfortunately what we're doing
is we're empowering the mosthard line people in Iran right
now saying told you so you can'ttrust the Americans.
Now we got to buckle up and justget you unify and stand against
America and anybody who objectsas a trader.
Saman Askari (23:29):
But don't people see through that a little bit
because yeah, of course Americahas something to do with it...
Hooman Majd (23:36):
sure a lot of people do.
But it also gives an excuse topeople, whether it's the
Revolutionary Guard, butmessenger, whatever, to crack
down and, and in the namenational security in America.
We do things in the name ofnational security that a lot of
people object to that we didafter nine slash 11, you know,
in the name of nationalsecurity, you can do a lot of
shit and get away with.
(23:57):
It was.
That's the main thing.
You get away with it.
It doesn't matter whether themajority of Iranians don't see,
see through it or don't seethrough it.
What matters is whether you canget away with it.
Saman Askari (24:06):
Yeah, so let's talk about the current
administration and its Iranpolicy.
Obviously Iranians are againstforeign intervention.
Part of the character of therevolution was this standing up
to America and to the West as wetalked about.
So looking at what the Trumpadministration wants to do, it
reinstituted a new round ofsanctions, new sanctions going
(24:28):
to effect later in the year.
What is its ultimate goal withthese activities?
Hooman Majd (24:34):
Well, I think there's probably.
I mean, just just my guessbecause I don't know that we
know.
On the one hand you've got thetrump administration spokesman,
all of them, including JohnBolton, say regime change is not
right.
They would thereafter, whetherafter is changing the behavior
and then, you know, but I thinkthere's different things.
I think Donald Trump himselfprobably wants to make a deal
(24:55):
with you.
I don't think he cares very muchabout social freedoms.
I don't think he cares aboutdemocracy that much.
Uh, he, he liked to make a dealthat he considers his deal a
nuclear deal with Iran and wouldbe happy to have relations with
Iran.
I'm talking about Donald Trump,the person, right?
Right.
Then you've got anadministration, then you've got
people like Mike Pompeo and,and, and, and John Bolton who
(25:19):
probably would like to seeregime change whether they would
like to see that happen withAmerican interference or
naturally organically by puttingso much pressure on the regime
that it, that it collapses.
Um, I don't know.
I mean they say that they're notafter regime change, but what
they're demanding of Iran isessentially regime change
(25:39):
because this regime would nevergive.
This system would never giveinto the demands, the demands of
Peo that would be giving up yoursovereignty as far as, as far as
the regime men, many of it'seven non supporters would, would
argue, um, and wouldn't want toIran to give up its sovereignty,
but I suspect based on thelanguage that they've used in
(26:01):
the past before joining thisadministration that people like
pump peo and like Bolton wouldlike to see regime change and
would be happy to have Americabe involved in, in bringing that
about.
Um, but I think the system, theAmerican system doesn't allow
that at this time.
There isn't a.
I mean, if trump said that's mypolicy regime change, like, you
know, Obama's saying Assad mustgo, then suddenly the United
(26:24):
States can start arming rebelsin Syria.
It can do the same thing inIran.
But that hasn't been the policyand I don't think there's an
agreement on that yet.
Um, so in answer to yourquestion, I think, I think the
administration hasn't figuredout on Iran policy yet.
I think there are people in theadministration who would like to
see a policy and we're goingdown a road which is leading to
(26:45):
that, and then trump throws awrench into the whole thing by
saying, oh, I'll talk to realhoney one on one with no
preconditions.
So that just, you know, is awhole big, is a whole other
issue.
Um, so that's why I think thattrump himself may not have a
specific goal in mind with theIran other than the fact he
thinks the nuclear deal is anawful deal and you can do a
(27:07):
better one.
Saman Askari (27:08):
Yeah.
Yeah.
That's interesting.
Let's switch gears to the roleof the diaspora.
You've written that thinkingthat the Iranian diaspora holds
the solution to Iran's politicalproblem is laughable to most
people.
And that sort of resonates withme because when I was in Iran in
2015 and when I would talk topeople and try to understand
(27:32):
their problems, I felt like Ilived on a different planet.
And for me to sort of say, no,this is.
I mean, this is what you need todo and this is what you need
would be really misguided
Hooman Majd (27:46):
well, the first thing, yeah, the first thing I
would say is that, um, you know,this is largely a voluntary
diaspora.
People who bought barely leftIran large and there are people
who left for political reasonsobviously, and we're, you know,
we would get arrested if theywent back, but largely it's a
political, it's a, it's a, it'sa voluntary diaspora who left,
not a necessarily a civil war.
(28:09):
We're not really refugees.
Iranians came here slowly,opportunity work, whatever, and
I'm slowly built a life outsideof Iran and their kids like
yourself are pretty, pretty muchAmerican and I just don't feel
I.
and I've lived abroad, you know,over 60 years old and I've lived
abroad my entire life.
Practically.
(28:29):
I don't give myself a right totell the Iranian people who live
there and have suffered throughwar, through sanctions, economic
problems, you know, all thosethings that they have had to
deal with.
I owned myself a right to tellthem what I think they the way
they should live.
That's the first thing.
The second thing is people havetalked to in Iran, people, some
(28:50):
of them are like, you know, eventhe ones who despise this regime
and wanted gone, if you tellthem that, that you can talk
about the and say if thesepeople in La and these people in
Washington, Iranians, they meanthink that there were going to
make a revolution and they'regoing to come here and suddenly
get their old houses back andget all their life back.
And you know, having lived inluxury over that, of course they
(29:11):
don't know that people don'tnecessarily have a luxury in the
west.
But there's this perception, youguys are like, you think you're
going to come back and rule thiscountry?
No Way.
You know, we're gonna, we'regonna.
This is gonna be a closed placefor you guys.
You guys have chosen to go now,we who we, who have suffered
year, we who will fight forreform change revolution,
(29:33):
wherever you want to call it.
Um, we're the beneficiaries, notyou.
And I understand that.
I understand that.
Why?
Why should we think that we'regoing to go back and have a say
in the affairs of, of Iranians?
Saman Askari (29:46):
Yeah, but does that mean that we just can't do
anything to help Iranians?
Hooman Majd (29:51):
No.
That doesn't mean that at all.
It means we can do a lot to helpIranians, but we can do things
that I think at least I'm not amember of organization, any
organization actually I'm not amember of, for example, Nyack, I
know they get a lot of criticismfrom Iranians who believe in
democracy and all that, but Ithink that they do some good
work because their purpose is tolobby the American government or
(30:15):
whatever you want to call it,two to in support of Iranian
Americans.
And it happens that IranianAmericans, many of them have
family in Iran and want to helpthe Iranians and don't want to
see them suffer.
Shortage of medicine, all thosekinds of stuff.
So I think there is stuff we cando to, to, to, to help, um, Iran
by putting pressure on ourgovernments and if you're
European, but putting pressureon your government to, to not do
(30:39):
things that affect the ordinarypeople, if even if you hate the
regime, do you really wantordinary Iranians to suffer?
You really want them to not beable to fly and safe airplanes.
If you want them to not havemedicine, do you want them to
die of cancer because they can'tget radiation?
I mean, if you're an Iranian wholives in Germany, put pressure
on your government.
If you look, if you're reallyrodney who lives in America, you
should be able to put pressureon your government.
(31:01):
And I think Iranians do actuallyappreciate that who live in
Iran.
And most of us have some familyeither distance or, or, or close
family who still live in Iranand we don't want to see them
suffer either.
And I think when we go out anddemonstrate in supportive
Iranians, whether it was for thegreen movement in Iranians,
(31:21):
right, to elect the president,they want.
And if they believe that there'sfraud that they, that, that
should be investigated properlyrather than throwing the leaders
into prison or house arrest,then those are the kinds of
support I think that Iraniansabroad can do.
But what I don't think we can dois say, um, let's, let's have,
you know, the show return, let'shave the MDK takeover, let's
(31:44):
have whom I managed to bepresident as much as I was like
to be.
Um, I and I welcome all supportas much.
I don't think I have the rightto ask for that.
Nor do I have the right to tellthe Iranian people that there
should be some system that Idevise or, and I say, I mean,
you know, the, the Iraniandiaspora devices for.
Saman Askari (32:05):
Yeah, as you know, the diaspora is really divided,
right?
You mentioned Reza Pahlavi, youmentioned the MEK and then there
are people that are pro reform,and they sort of go at it.
Um, you've received your fairshare of criticism.
People point to your familyconnection to Mohammad Khatami.
You've been open about that.
(32:26):
Uh, you've been a translator forIranian presidents that have
come to the US.
You talk about how you sort offell into that.
You never received any paymentsfrom the government.
Your grandfather was a prominentayatollah.
that all of that sort of makesyou biased.
That you may think more highlyof the Islamic republic as a
system than it deserves to bethought of.
(32:49):
And you've certainly beencritical of the regime at times
when you need it to be.
But what is your response tothat kind of criticism?
Hooman Majd (32:56):
Are you going to be criticized?
No matter what you do, onceyou're a public figure?
Um, no matter what you say, uh,I can't, I can't help that I'm,
am I more willing to give theIslamic system of break?
No, I'm, I'm, I'm an observer.
That's what I am.
I don't, I don't claim to be anacademic.
I'm not, I'm not defending theelectronic system.
I'm, I do defend Iran as anation.
(33:17):
I believe they have a right tobe.
Iran has a right to be anindependent nation and to be
independent from, to be notdependent on another, a greater
powers, but Netherlands.
Um, listen, I mean in terms offamily, yes, I've had family,
like many Iranians, we hadfamily on both sides of the
revolution.
My father was, was a, was adismissed as an ambassador of
(33:37):
the show.
He was ambassador to Tokyo atthe time of the revolution.
We lost everything.
My Dad never got another job inhis life.
He died, not, not penniless, butnot a wealthy man at all.
Living in a small bedroom, smallone bedroom apartment in London,
former ambassador of the shot.
So if I was going to be, if Iwant it to be critical of the
regime, the regime that fired myfather never paid his retirement
(34:00):
money.
You never paid his pension?
Nothing.
When he worked for 40 years forthe, for the government of the
Chavez government or 30 years orwhatever it was.
Um, yeah.
I have every right to be angryat the system.
But you have to put aside yourpersonal feelings.
If you going to be an observer,at least in my opinion, I was
going to be an observer when Istarted writing about Iranians
(34:20):
can be an observer of theIranian seen inside your rod
mostly, and I do happen to haveconnections with some of the
people in the revolutionarygovernment because part of my
family were revolutionaries.
I'm not my father, obviously.
He was on the opposite side.
My uncle had to escape Iran,dressed as a woman and was, had
a death sentence to get someSony, you know, we have have
(34:43):
that history to.
This is not an excuse for whatI've written because I stand by
everything I've written, but Isaid as someone who grew up in
the west, I don't give myselfthe right to say, oh, the
Islamic system is horrible.
The Islamic system has been verybad for my immediate family, my
mom, my dad, my brother and mysister and me.
When I say that in terms of.
(35:04):
But it's been fine for some ofmy other family, including
people like, you know, autonomyand people like that.
Um, but I, I just don't givemyself the right to, to decide
what is correct for Iran.
It goes without saying the factthat I live here and not in
Iran.
The life I live as an Americanin America, in Brooklyn, as you
(35:24):
point out, means that I preferthis system.
Right.
Otherwise I'd go back to Iran.
So my preference is to live in asecular democracy.
That doesn't mean just becauseit's my preference.
It should, it has to be thepreference of every Irani.
So that's the only thing I cansay.
(35:44):
But no, in terms of criticism,sure.
It gives people in there, youknow, lobby supporters who troll
me or Mek troll me on, on, ontwitter and you know, say how
awful I am on the regimeapologists.
That's a nice thing they sayabout you apologize.
Otherwise I'm an agent who's gotmoney and you know, drives a
(36:05):
Ferrari courtesy of the foreignminister of Iran, stuff like
that.
I mean, what can you say tothose people?
I can't say anything to them.
They're just as intolerant asfar as I'm concerned.
They're just as intolerant ofany other opinion as some people
back in Iran are in thegovernment, are intolerant of
other people's opinion.
Um, I've just tried throughoutthe time that I've either done
(36:25):
journalism or been an author ofbooks on Iran.
I've just tried to, um, present,you know, what I see more than
the girls wouldn't.
You said earlier on, you askedme earlier on.
It's interesting how I have allkinds of people that go and see.
And Iran is because I want toshow all of Iran, not just one
side, you know, I don't want tojust see the people in Guam are,
don't just want to see only thepolitical figures and then talk
(36:48):
about how great the politicalsystem is.
I want to say this is Iran withall its, you know, the title,
the subtitle of my book was theparadox of your own.
I don't like that word that muchbecause too many people use it
like Iranian paradox and allthat.
Um, and I didn't come up withthat title is publisher always
comes up with a subtitle.
Um, but, um, my editors did,but, but my point is that, you
(37:10):
know, I just want to show what,what, what I want it to show
with my first book, what Iran,Iran was from that sort of
social and political aspect.
And then, you know, my secondbook was highly critical and
around Islamic democracy was um,uh, the isos democracy was very
critical of because it waswritten about the green movement
more than anything else.
(37:31):
Very critical of the system.
So, but I can't help it ifpeople don't like what I say.
Saman Askari (37:36):
Yeah.
So you mentioned that youhaven't been back since 2013.
Is there a reason for that?
Hooman Majd (37:41):
I can't go, yeah.
Can you share why not?
I don't know.
W I think you'd have to ask theauthorities.
Um, yeah, I've been told Ishouldn't go.
I shouldn't say it that waybecause of the, because of
books.
Yeah.
And writings and I'm, you know,I'm, I'm accused of the same
(38:04):
thing.
So the, in the Iranian diasporaaccused me of being an agent of
the Islamic republic.
Some people in Iran accused mebeing an agent of the United
States, so that's a good sign.
You get it from all sides.
One does get it from all sides,you know, when they start
accusing Jason Rezaian being anagent of the Islamic republic,
can you really know what kind ofpeople we're dealing with in the
(38:24):
US?
In the diaspora?
Um, but no, uh, yeah, it'sprobably, I mean, I, I don't
know.
I've been interrogated in thepast.
I've written about it in my bookthat I've been interrogated the
neuron.
I've had situations in Iran, butI've been told I shouldn't go.
Saman Askari (38:41):
Yeah.
So before I let you go, any newprojects you're working on now?
Hooman Majd (38:46):
Specific projects you're working on.
I'm working on a nonfictionfiction books, so I've written
some nonfiction.
I do, I've written shortstories, have been published,
but this will be a hopefully alonger form, but yeah, that's
it.
You Jack of all trades.
We're quite a fashion icon aswell.
(39:07):
A master master of none.
I'm not a fashion icon.
Saman Askari (39:13):
Alright, Hooman, you've been very generous with
your time.
Really appreciate it.
Hooman Majd (39:19):
Nice to talk to you.
Good to meet you as well.
Good luck with this.
Thank you.
I appreciate it.
Take care.
Hope to run into you again.
Saman Askari (39:35):
All right.
I hope you enjoyed thatconversation.
Before we end the episode, Iwanted to ask something of those
of you who listened in today.
In order for me to keep workingon this podcast and for it to be
sustainable, I would need it toreach a critical mass of
listeners, so if you in factfind it to be interesting and
productive and would like to seeit grow and evolve, please share
(39:55):
it on social media, blog aboutit, review it, or simply tell
others about it.
My goal is to keep thingsinteresting and not just focus
on current events.
That is what I'm focusing onright now because there's a lot
happening with Iran as you know,but at some point I would like
to invite people with differentbackgrounds to discuss Iran and
Iranians from cultural,historical, and other
perspectives as well.
So your support in sharing andtalking about this project would
(40:18):
be highly appreciated and itwould really help me along that
path.
So, thanks again for yourcontinued support and take care.
Welcome to talk Iran! This is Saman Askari.
Today on the podcast (00:03):
Hooman Majd.
An Iranian American journalistand author, Hooman Majd was born
(00:26):
in Tehran, but lived abroad frominfancy with his family who were
in the diplomatic service.
He was educated in England andthe US and stayed in the United
States after the IslamicRevolution of 1979.
Hooman had a long career in theentertainment business before
devoting himself to writing andjournalism full-time.
His New York Times best-sellingbook, The Ayatollah Begs to
(00:46):
Differ, was published in 2008followed by his book, The
Ayatollah's democracy, which waspublished in the Fall of 2010.
His latest book, the Ministry ofGuidance Invites You to Not
Stay, was published in the USand the UK in November 2013.
He's also written for the NewYork Times, The New Yorker Time,
Vanity Fair, Foreign Policy andother publications too numerous
(01:10):
to list.
A keen observer of Iraniansociety, he details his
interactions with the Iranianpeople from all walks of life in
his writings, from supporters ofthe Islamic Republic and the
deeply pious to the wealthy andmore secular segments of
society.
He also has a knack for breakingdown the meaning of certain
Iranian concepts and words suchas'tarof' by providing
(01:32):
historical and anecdotalcontext.
Hooman has at times beencriticized for his connection to
various figures within theIslamic Republic and for having
been a translator to Iranianpresidents who have visited the
United States.
I asked for his response to thiscriticism in our conversation.
We also talk about the currentlevel of support the government
has inside Iran, the Iranianrevolution and the current
(01:54):
struggles of the Iranian people,democracy and secularism within
the Iranian context, the role ofthe US and the Iranian diaspora
in regards to Iran and othertopics.
So without further ado, let'slisten in to my conversation
with Hooman Majd.
(02:17):
So I just finished reading yourbook, The Ayatollah Begs to
Differ.
Yeah.
Your first book.
Uh, I know you have two morebooks.
They're on my reading list.
I found a couple of thingsreally striking.
The first thing was that you arereally good at mingling with all
types of different people.
It was amazing to see how youwent from hanging out with an
ultra conservative family in Qomand then you went to these
(02:39):
parties in North Tehran and thenyou came back to the US and
appeared on the Bill Maher showand all of that.
So that was really fascinating.
I always thought of myself asbeing really flexible in terms
of being able to be fullyIranian and fully American at
the same time.
But I think you take it to awhole new level.
Uh, I, my, my question for you,the first question here is,
(03:01):
given your knowledge of Iraniansociety, do you think there has
been a shift in the level ofsupport or in the landscape of
support for the regime?
Its framework and uh, all ofthat given recent developments.
For example, we had the recentprotests last month and a lot of
(03:22):
people were chanting anti-regimeslogans and these were people
that weren't necessarily fromnorth Tehran.
Right.
So I want to get your thoughtsaround, you know, how popular
the regime is currently and ifthe tides are sort of turning.
Hooman Majd (03:37):
Well, I don't know if the size attorney, I mean
certainly the regime has lost,would you want to call it a
regime, a system, whatever youwant to call it.
The Iranians don't like to becalled the regime because the
regime has a negativeconnotation that it's
undemocratic, but nonetheless inAmerica we call it a regime.
Most people do anyway.
Yeah, no, I would say I wouldsay that it's lost some credit,
but I mean it's lost credibilityamongst some of its supporters.
(03:58):
Starting in 2000, I began tolose credibility starting in
2009, the green movement and theprotests.
Um, even though the greenmovement specifically at least
the leaders of the greenmovement, we're not against the
regime per se, but more againstthe just the election and in a
more open system that were forit make it more open and more
democratic society.
(04:20):
But I think yes, over time, andcertainly in the recent, in
recent days and months there hasbeen, um, probably a cut, a
diminishing of support, althoughit's impossible to say how many
people actually do fully supportthe regime at any given time.
I think it was always impossibleto say because it hasn't been
(04:41):
since the referendum of 1979.
There hasn't been a referendumof free referendum saying, you
know, what kind of systempolitical system do you want?
So 40 years later, it's kind ofhard to say, but I would say
that there's still a substantialsupport.
When I say substantial, 25percent can be substantial in a
country like Iran.
It may not be the majority, butit can be substantial.
(05:04):
It's a, it's a hardcore group ofpeople who are dependent upon
the system or believed enough inthe theocratic, uh, aspects.
And believe that there shouldn'tbe a theocracy and accordance
with their beliefs that that's,uh, that they're, and they're
armed.
(05:24):
I mean, there are people who arethe best, the age and the
Revolutionary Guard and thesepeople are not that, that
support could be enough to keepthe system in tact for years and
years and years.
Um, that's also assuming that ithas to be some change.
I don't think there's anyquestion that there has to be
reformed in Iran in order for itto survive in the longterm
because without reform, withoutgetting rid of corruption with
(05:47):
that or at least reducing thelevel of corruption which has
gotten worse and worseapparently in recent years
according to what we read.
Um, and without fixing people's,you know, daily economic issues
and there on some of theirsocial issues, if not all of
their social issues, you know,no system can, can survive for
(06:09):
so long answer to your question.
But the answer to your questionis actually I don't know what
the level of support.
And I was trying to make myselfsound smart by giving all of
these.
Um, but you know, the answer isno one really knows because
there was, there wasn't a way togauge, but we're wrong to
believe that because there'sprotests or you know, a few
hundred or a few thousand peopleshout even if they're from the
(06:31):
different classes in society,I'm down with the regime or
whatever.
Or within those group ofprotesters, there are a number
of subset of protesters who wereshouting death with the regime.
That means they're, you know,the regime has lost his base of
support.
I don't think that's the case atthis point.
And we in the diaspora isparticularly those who've, you
know, you lived in Iran longerthan I did.
(06:51):
Um, and I've been abroad all mylife.
Um, it's easy for us to think,oh well, he, Iranians, you look
like you say the parties innorth Tehran.
You look at people who aresecular and you go, it's easy to
say, well, of course, you know,this regime is just going to,
not last.
People are going to want exactlywhat we have, we have in the
west.
But then you do go and witnessthe way people live and the
religiosity and, and the waythat there is a conservative
(07:14):
strain in Iran, which alwaysexisted during the what time?
And you say, well, it's not thatsimple.
There's also, I'm an Iranianstubbornness.
Um, and there's a, there's a,there's a credibility issue as
well for Iran.
If you have a revolution basedon not being subservient to
either east or west, then theminute you give into the West on
(07:38):
something or given to the east,in other words, the Communist
system where the capitalistsystem then your credibility as
a revolution is gone.
And Iran is a revolution.
It's still a revolution.
I mean, the supreme leader isnot the supreme leader of Iran.
He's the supreme leader of theIslamic Revolution.
That's his title.
Um, we still have a revolutionor revolutionary government.
Saman Askari (07:58):
So does that mean that the system always needs an
America or some other power forit to stand up against and for
it to define its characteragainst?
Hooman Majd (08:09):
If those great powers, whether it's Russia,
China, or America, demand ofIran, something that Iran
doesn't want to give up, and ifit does give it a given to
either any of those greaterpowers, whether it's an or even
European powers, then yes, no,it can no longer be the
(08:29):
revolution is over at thatpoint.
And I think among its ownpeople, the revolution is over.
I mean, look, even even on thisnuclear deal, I'm at the Uni
Judd, who was the previouspresident, um, derided the deal
and derided his successor forhaving given in to the
Americans.
Whereas, you know, trump thinksthat America gave into Iran.
(08:51):
People like Ahmadinejad whoconsidered themselves true
revolutionaries and followers ofKhomeini considered giving any
kind of a concession to theAmericans, uh, as, as giving it.
And it's, and, and as far as.
So now he's coming back into thepolitical series.
I don't know, you see he'stweeting, instagramming, all
this stuff.
Um, maybe he wants to run againfor president, who knows?
(09:12):
But anyway, the point beingthat, uh, yeah, the revolution
is over the minute, the majorityof the people who support the
revolution, let's say it's 20days, 25 or 30 percent of the
entire population support, um,the system still support the
system when the majority ofthose people think that Iran has
given it on the very basicprecept, which is to not be
(09:34):
subservient to any greaterpower, to have full independence
and rights and dignity of anation.
The great nation of Iran, asthey all consider, as Iranians
considered the minute that'sgone, the revolution has gone.
And then yes, it will collapse.
Saman Askari (09:49):
So if we can go back 40 years to when the
revolution happened and thoseprinciples, obviously it was a
very popular revolution at thetime.
People felt like they wereunshackling themselves from the
various powers, US especially.
Right?
Right.
And they were sort of reclaimingthe Iranian identity or the Shia
(10:12):
identity, which is sort ofinextricable from the Iranian
identity.
But if we look at what'shappening today, Iran is not
exactly a bastion of freedom andopportunity and people are not
necessarily happy.
We can go down the list ofstatistics and all of that and
(10:34):
I'm sure you're familiar withall of those.
I mean, women's rights standsout.
Women can't leave the countrywithout the permission of her
husband and you know, a wholehost of things that people in
other places would findridiculous.
Right.
And even on the economic side,people are struggling.
Has, we can lay the blame at thefeet of America and the
(10:55):
sanctions and we can go on andon about that.
But at some point somethingstarted not going right.
Is that what happened?
Hooman Majd (11:05):
No, I don't think it's something not going right.
I think that, um, you know, therevolution was popular not only
because of Islam and she is um,and uh, the people who support
and continue to the states andconservatives who support that
system.
It was popular because the vastmajority of Iranians at that
time, living inside Iran, theywanted exactly what you said to
(11:27):
get rid of being, you know, agreater power being subservient,
degraded, in which case, in thatcase it was as the US, but also
a dictator where they felt therewas no political freedom and
they couldn't express themselvespolitically.
They were afraid of the secretpolice.
Um, social rights were allthere.
They all had all the socialfreedoms they wanted, but they
didn't have political freedoms.
They didn't necessarily wantwhat this system is.
(11:48):
I mean, as we know from theinfighting after the, after the
revolution, we know that Deanwere part of the revolution.
Then Raj, it broke off, brokefrom, from Khomeini.
I'm so not everybody was, washoping for an Islamic system as
it is today.
In fact, there was huge protestby women at the very beginning
of the revolution.
(12:08):
Women, we're not obligated towear headscarves.
And then when the, when theydecided, the system decided that
they were obligated, there was ahuge protest.
Millions of women came out onthe streets.
So what the system evolved into,um, is not what people at the
time necessarily want it.
Some people did, but noteverybody who, who fought
(12:28):
against the shah or was againstthe Shah or sat back and said,
yeah, the shock.
Yeah.
I'm not necessarily political,but if the chagos maybe there'll
be a better democratic system.
Well, why not?
Why wouldn't we want a betterdemocratic system?
Why would anybody want a betterdemocratic system?
And so those people aredisappointed obviously, and many
of them such as your family leftIran because they were
(12:49):
disappointed otherwise theywouldn't stay.
Um, as we know, the$2, millionplus of lyft left Iran anyway.
Point being is that I, you know,uh, the system today is not
what, what, what many peoplethought it was including many
women.
Um, some of the restrictiverules on women existed during
(13:09):
the Shah's time not being ableto leave the country without her
husband's permission.
That was a law that was in theShah's time as well, not just so
some of the laws, justinheritance laws, which were
against the, a woman.
Those were also from the Shah'stime, these are ancient rules,
uh, that, that the Islamicsystem didn't change, but the
(13:30):
Islamic system changed for womenwas the obligatory obligatory
head covering and not just tapecovering hijab and modest dress
in general.
Plus I'm not having the abilityto have certain positions,
although some people are arguingagainst.
I like, for example, a womancan't be president, although
there's not clear if that'sactually a law or not, but um,
(13:50):
or a judge or stuff like that.
So, um, yes, there was adiminution of, of women's
rights, no question about it,but some of those rights that
today people will argue, um,feminists will argue those also
existed under the Shah's time.
Why didn't they protest then?
Saman Askari (14:04):
Yeah.
Just out of curiosity,
Hooman Majd (14:05):
why didn't foreigners protests?
I don't mean Iranians.
They're running has alwaysprotested.
Yeah,
Saman Askari (14:09):
right.
Out of curiosity that, uh, thetestimony of a woman, was it
worth half a man's during theShah's team as well?
Hooman Majd (14:16):
That I don't know.
I don't think so.
That's an Islamic thing, right?
Right, right.
I see.
Although the Shaws, the Shaws,uh, I don't mean particularly
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, I meanthe shah's plural shaw's a rule,
then rains took into account intheir constitution or in their,
(14:36):
whether they had a constitutionor not in their laws took into
account she, uh, she, uh, Sherryand without actually calling it
sherry along.
Saman Askari (14:44):
Interesting.
So you've often argued that assort of presumptuous for us in
the West to assume the bestsystem for Iran would be, uh, a
liberal democracy akin tosystems that exist in Europe and
us and that democratic rule canbe possible within an Islamic
framework.
And you've sort of alluded tothe fact that currently we do
(15:07):
have a democracy in Iran, right?
Right.
Can you, can you elaborate onthat?
Because a lot of people, whenthey look at a system like that,
they say, okay, fine, you haveelections, but then at the end
of the day you are, you know,operating under a system that
has an unelected body that hasabsolute say on everything has
(15:30):
veto power on everything, caneliminate anybody from running
for office.
And I mean, what does democracymean then?
Right?
Hooman Majd (15:39):
No, absolutely correct.
I mean, I don't think there'sany doubt what I say that there
is a.
it's a form of democratic rulecompared to let's say, Saudi
Arabia or compared to some othercountries.
It's not as democratic as evenTurkey where we were even
Turkey, which is not justbacksliding, but Iran is not
even as democratic.
That grant.
(16:00):
Anybody would have to grant youthat.
But then again, you look at themillions of people who come out
and vote enthusiasticallycheering and being happy about
like for example, Ronnie's toelections both elections and you
go, well those people aren'tstupid.
It's not like they don't knowthat there's a supreme, the.
It's not like they don't knowthere's a guardian counsel and
yet they, they, they sincerely.
(16:21):
Or at least they believe enoughthat that the system can
moderate change reform bedifferent than a previous
president, for example, in orderfor them to come out and
participating in those votes.
So that's why I say there issome form of democracy.
It's some form of democratic.
Well, because the system has totake into account the people's
(16:42):
will as well.
For example, in the time ofRohani there may have been, I'm,
there's a lot of infightingobviously, and there's like
foreigners and dual nationalswho were in prison and stuff
like that, which were alsoduring, how about the time, but
I think you would, other thanthe difficulty of the economic
difficulties and other than theJCPO way issues that exist with
(17:02):
trump and Iran, you'd be hardpressed to find an Iranian who
doesn't prefer having thissystem than to the Ahmadinejad
years, although maybe that'schanging now because of all the
JCPA stuff that's happening.
But certainly the enthusiasm forRouhani was there and I think
there was a, uh, a more open.
I haven't been to Iran since2013 since he was elected.
(17:25):
Um, but from what I hear frompeople who are there or do come
in and they're, their biggestcomplaints tend to be economic
and less so on social issues.
There's more cafes, morerestaurants, more, you know,
liberalization in the, in thesocial space.
Um, then during the shot.
So I, I, I won't, I won't callit a democracy, that would be
foolish to call on a puredemocracy, but compared to many
(17:49):
the other countries aroundsurrounding it and compared to
certainly many Muslim countries,uh, it is, it is perhaps more
democratic.
The supreme leader, theRevolutionary Guard.
They all have to take intoconsideration the person that
the people voted for.
I don't think you'd have anyquestion that if Jenny Lee had
become president instead ofRouhani, the atmosphere inside
rob would be very different.
Saman Askari (18:10):
But aren't we just splitting hairs at this point?
I mean, when you compare Rohanito Ahmadinejad, obviously there
are differences in everyday lifeand all of that, but if people
were to be completely free andthey could absolutely vote
anybody into office, who do youthink that person would be?
Would it be someone?
(18:32):
I guess my point is, do youthink that people may vote for
someone who is secular that atthe same time would give them a
religious freedom and all ofthat, but at the same time would
be sort of like, okay, everybodylive their own lives.
You know,
Hooman Majd (18:49):
yeah, I think at this point people would vote for
whoever they felt would givethem economic economic benefits
rather than anything else atthis point because people are,
are, are actually suffering andwant to see, you know, sanctions
and, and stuff like that morethan anything else.
Right now, any protest tend tobe about, about sanctions, not
about the economy more thananything else.
(19:11):
Um, I don't know.
I mean it's hard to say inAmerica if we were, you know, if
we didn't have a primary systemand we didn't have to choose
between Democrats andRepublicans every single time
because that's just the way itworks.
Now there's two party system.
Would Americans vote for someonefrom the outside?
I mean, I think, you know, maybeBernie Sanders proved that
people might be willing to goout and vote for someone who
(19:33):
doesn't come from inside thatpolitical system.
Um, I, yeah, I would imagine.
Yes.
Because I don't think the vastmajority of Iranians are 100
percent satisfied with thestatus quo and Iran.
I would have to imagine thatpeople would, would vote for
someone who, who, who saysthey're secular.
I think under the current systemthat can't happen because if
(19:54):
someone says their secretary ofthe account, they'd be
disqualified from running ifthey want a secretary republic
people like hot Tammy who don'tsay they want a second
Republican but are as close tobeing secular in the sense that
they themselves are religiousbut don't believe in imposing
the religion.
Other people, um, he probablywon't be allowed to run again if
you tried, you know, to, youknow, I don't know.
(20:16):
I, I don't know the answer.
It's a very difficult questionto answer because we don't
really know.
It's hard to judge, but I thinkwithin the system it wouldn't be
possible because someone can'tcome out and say we need a
secretary.
Then you're talking about arevolution not, not reform
within the system.
Although I do think someone whogoes further away from
religiosity, if you want to callit, um, which is something that
(20:39):
even raw raw honey has saidpublicly on occasion that, you
know, we shouldn't imposereligion.
We should impose people, ourbeliefs, other people, which I
think is part of the reason he'spopular, whether he's sincere
about it is another question orwhether he, even if he is
sincere, if he has the abilityto change it to the point where
you know, a woman can walk downthe street without a headscarf
(21:00):
or that a boy and girl can holdhands or do a happy video, you
know, and, and not get arrestedor, or do an instagram where
they're dancing and not getarrested.
Obviously Rohani, the Ronniegovernment, this government that
the people voted for is forthose freedoms.
It has said so many times.
It's come up against thejudiciary many times.
(21:22):
So I think the answer to yourquestion is in the answer to how
Ronnie got elected and how thoseyoung women and young men, boys
and girls really came out andvoted for him and celebrated on
the streets of Iran.
I think they because theythought within this system he
was the best alternative toprovide them with those freedoms
and rights that, that they,that, that they desire.
No question.
(21:43):
Yeah.
So what would progress look likeat this point?
I don't know.
I don't know the answer.
Where can the system go fromhere?
I mean Iran is now facing abunch of issues and problems
that it didn't anticipate.
And this is the removal of theUnited States from the JCPA, the
imposition of sanctions.
Um, the very harsh languagecoming from the United States.
(22:06):
John Bolton is national securityadvisor for me policy on Iran,
which is an aggressive policy.
Um, and these are things thatneither the government nor the
people of Iran expected.
Uh, and they said that's onething.
Where can it go from your, ifnone of those things existed, if
the JCP I was delivering, if newairport craft were being
delivered to Iran, if all thesecompanies were doing business in
(22:29):
Iran, these foreign companies,if you know, you could have an
apple store and interferon, Imean, then where would it go
from there?
I naturally the progress, theprogression would be towards a,
a more, um, liberal society overtime.
And I think had the JCPAdelivered what was promised and
probably over promised by, bythis government, the raw honey
(22:49):
government to the people.
I think that it was just naturalthat, uh, even some of the
people who would be againstliberalization, it would be
against opening up to the Westbecause of the fear of Western
influence would, would be forcedto stand back and recognize that
progress for Iran.
This was progress for Iran and,and, and would have to continue.
(23:11):
Where does it go now?
I mean, I think whatunfortunately what we're doing
is we're empowering the mosthard line people in Iran right
now saying told you so you can'ttrust the Americans.
Now we got to buckle up and justget you unify and stand against
America and anybody who objectsas a trader.
Saman Askari (23:29):
But don't people see through that a little bit
because yeah, of course Americahas something to do with it...
Hooman Majd (23:36):
sure a lot of people do.
But it also gives an excuse topeople, whether it's the
Revolutionary Guard, butmessenger, whatever, to crack
down and, and in the namenational security in America.
We do things in the name ofnational security that a lot of
people object to that we didafter nine slash 11, you know,
in the name of nationalsecurity, you can do a lot of
shit and get away with.
(23:57):
It was.
That's the main thing.
You get away with it.
It doesn't matter whether themajority of Iranians don't see,
see through it or don't seethrough it.
What matters is whether you canget away with it.
Saman Askari (24:06):
Yeah, so let's talk about the current
administration and its Iranpolicy.
Obviously Iranians are againstforeign intervention.
Part of the character of therevolution was this standing up
to America and to the West as wetalked about.
So looking at what the Trumpadministration wants to do, it
reinstituted a new round ofsanctions, new sanctions going
(24:28):
to effect later in the year.
What is its ultimate goal withthese activities?
Hooman Majd (24:34):
Well, I think there's probably.
I mean, just just my guessbecause I don't know that we
know.
On the one hand you've got thetrump administration spokesman,
all of them, including JohnBolton, say regime change is not
right.
They would thereafter, whetherafter is changing the behavior
and then, you know, but I thinkthere's different things.
I think Donald Trump himselfprobably wants to make a deal
(24:55):
with you.
I don't think he cares very muchabout social freedoms.
I don't think he cares aboutdemocracy that much.
Uh, he, he liked to make a dealthat he considers his deal a
nuclear deal with Iran and wouldbe happy to have relations with
Iran.
I'm talking about Donald Trump,the person, right?
Right.
Then you've got anadministration, then you've got
people like Mike Pompeo and,and, and, and John Bolton who
(25:19):
probably would like to seeregime change whether they would
like to see that happen withAmerican interference or
naturally organically by puttingso much pressure on the regime
that it, that it collapses.
Um, I don't know.
I mean they say that they're notafter regime change, but what
they're demanding of Iran isessentially regime change
(25:39):
because this regime would nevergive.
This system would never giveinto the demands, the demands of
Peo that would be giving up yoursovereignty as far as, as far as
the regime men, many of it'seven non supporters would, would
argue, um, and wouldn't want toIran to give up its sovereignty,
but I suspect based on thelanguage that they've used in
(26:01):
the past before joining thisadministration that people like
pump peo and like Bolton wouldlike to see regime change and
would be happy to have Americabe involved in, in bringing that
about.
Um, but I think the system, theAmerican system doesn't allow
that at this time.
There isn't a.
I mean, if trump said that's mypolicy regime change, like, you
know, Obama's saying Assad mustgo, then suddenly the United
(26:24):
States can start arming rebelsin Syria.
It can do the same thing inIran.
But that hasn't been the policyand I don't think there's an
agreement on that yet.
Um, so in answer to yourquestion, I think, I think the
administration hasn't figuredout on Iran policy yet.
I think there are people in theadministration who would like to
see a policy and we're goingdown a road which is leading to
(26:45):
that, and then trump throws awrench into the whole thing by
saying, oh, I'll talk to realhoney one on one with no
preconditions.
So that just, you know, is awhole big, is a whole other
issue.
Um, so that's why I think thattrump himself may not have a
specific goal in mind with theIran other than the fact he
thinks the nuclear deal is anawful deal and you can do a
(27:07):
better one.
Saman Askari (27:08):
Yeah.
Yeah.
That's interesting.
Let's switch gears to the roleof the diaspora.
You've written that thinkingthat the Iranian diaspora holds
the solution to Iran's politicalproblem is laughable to most
people.
And that sort of resonates withme because when I was in Iran in
2015 and when I would talk topeople and try to understand
(27:32):
their problems, I felt like Ilived on a different planet.
And for me to sort of say, no,this is.
I mean, this is what you need todo and this is what you need
would be really misguided
Hooman Majd (27:46):
well, the first thing, yeah, the first thing I
would say is that, um, you know,this is largely a voluntary
diaspora.
People who bought barely leftIran large and there are people
who left for political reasonsobviously, and we're, you know,
we would get arrested if theywent back, but largely it's a
political, it's a, it's a, it'sa voluntary diaspora who left,
not a necessarily a civil war.
(28:09):
We're not really refugees.
Iranians came here slowly,opportunity work, whatever, and
I'm slowly built a life outsideof Iran and their kids like
yourself are pretty, pretty muchAmerican and I just don't feel
I.
and I've lived abroad, you know,over 60 years old and I've lived
abroad my entire life.
Practically.
(28:29):
I don't give myself a right totell the Iranian people who live
there and have suffered throughwar, through sanctions, economic
problems, you know, all thosethings that they have had to
deal with.
I owned myself a right to tellthem what I think they the way
they should live.
That's the first thing.
The second thing is people havetalked to in Iran, people, some
(28:50):
of them are like, you know, eventhe ones who despise this regime
and wanted gone, if you tellthem that, that you can talk
about the and say if thesepeople in La and these people in
Washington, Iranians, they meanthink that there were going to
make a revolution and they'regoing to come here and suddenly
get their old houses back andget all their life back.
And you know, having lived inluxury over that, of course they
(29:11):
don't know that people don'tnecessarily have a luxury in the
west.
But there's this perception, youguys are like, you think you're
going to come back and rule thiscountry?
No Way.
You know, we're gonna, we'regonna.
This is gonna be a closed placefor you guys.
You guys have chosen to go now,we who we, who have suffered
year, we who will fight forreform change revolution,
(29:33):
wherever you want to call it.
Um, we're the beneficiaries, notyou.
And I understand that.
I understand that.
Why?
Why should we think that we'regoing to go back and have a say
in the affairs of, of Iranians?
Saman Askari (29:46):
Yeah, but does that mean that we just can't do
anything to help Iranians?
Hooman Majd (29:51):
No.
That doesn't mean that at all.
It means we can do a lot to helpIranians, but we can do things
that I think at least I'm not amember of organization, any
organization actually I'm not amember of, for example, Nyack, I
know they get a lot of criticismfrom Iranians who believe in
democracy and all that, but Ithink that they do some good
work because their purpose is tolobby the American government or
(30:15):
whatever you want to call it,two to in support of Iranian
Americans.
And it happens that IranianAmericans, many of them have
family in Iran and want to helpthe Iranians and don't want to
see them suffer.
Shortage of medicine, all thosekinds of stuff.
So I think there is stuff we cando to, to, to, to help, um, Iran
by putting pressure on ourgovernments and if you're
European, but putting pressureon your government to, to not do
(30:39):
things that affect the ordinarypeople, if even if you hate the
regime, do you really wantordinary Iranians to suffer?
You really want them to not beable to fly and safe airplanes.
If you want them to not havemedicine, do you want them to
die of cancer because they can'tget radiation?
I mean, if you're an Iranian wholives in Germany, put pressure
on your government.
If you look, if you're reallyrodney who lives in America, you
should be able to put pressureon your government.
(31:01):
And I think Iranians do actuallyappreciate that who live in
Iran.
And most of us have some familyeither distance or, or, or close
family who still live in Iranand we don't want to see them
suffer either.
And I think when we go out anddemonstrate in supportive
Iranians, whether it was for thegreen movement in Iranians,
(31:21):
right, to elect the president,they want.
And if they believe that there'sfraud that they, that, that
should be investigated properlyrather than throwing the leaders
into prison or house arrest,then those are the kinds of
support I think that Iraniansabroad can do.
But what I don't think we can dois say, um, let's, let's have,
you know, the show return, let'shave the MDK takeover, let's
(31:44):
have whom I managed to bepresident as much as I was like
to be.
Um, I and I welcome all supportas much.
I don't think I have the rightto ask for that.
Nor do I have the right to tellthe Iranian people that there
should be some system that Idevise or, and I say, I mean,
you know, the, the Iraniandiaspora devices for.
Saman Askari (32:05):
Yeah, as you know, the diaspora is really divided,
right?
You mentioned Reza Pahlavi, youmentioned the MEK and then there
are people that are pro reform,and they sort of go at it.
Um, you've received your fairshare of criticism.
People point to your familyconnection to Mohammad Khatami.
You've been open about that.
(32:26):
Uh, you've been a translator forIranian presidents that have
come to the US.
You talk about how you sort offell into that.
You never received any paymentsfrom the government.
Your grandfather was a prominentayatollah.
that all of that sort of makesyou biased.
That you may think more highlyof the Islamic republic as a
system than it deserves to bethought of.
(32:49):
And you've certainly beencritical of the regime at times
when you need it to be.
But what is your response tothat kind of criticism?
Hooman Majd (32:56):
Are you going to be criticized?
No matter what you do, onceyou're a public figure?
Um, no matter what you say, uh,I can't, I can't help that I'm,
am I more willing to give theIslamic system of break?
No, I'm, I'm, I'm an observer.
That's what I am.
I don't, I don't claim to be anacademic.
I'm not, I'm not defending theelectronic system.
I'm, I do defend Iran as anation.
(33:17):
I believe they have a right tobe.
Iran has a right to be anindependent nation and to be
independent from, to be notdependent on another, a greater
powers, but Netherlands.
Um, listen, I mean in terms offamily, yes, I've had family,
like many Iranians, we hadfamily on both sides of the
revolution.
My father was, was a, was adismissed as an ambassador of
(33:37):
the show.
He was ambassador to Tokyo atthe time of the revolution.
We lost everything.
My Dad never got another job inhis life.
He died, not, not penniless, butnot a wealthy man at all.
Living in a small bedroom, smallone bedroom apartment in London,
former ambassador of the shot.
So if I was going to be, if Iwant it to be critical of the
regime, the regime that fired myfather never paid his retirement
(34:00):
money.
You never paid his pension?
Nothing.
When he worked for 40 years forthe, for the government of the
Chavez government or 30 years orwhatever it was.
Um, yeah.
I have every right to be angryat the system.
But you have to put aside yourpersonal feelings.
If you going to be an observer,at least in my opinion, I was
going to be an observer when Istarted writing about Iranians
(34:20):
can be an observer of theIranian seen inside your rod
mostly, and I do happen to haveconnections with some of the
people in the revolutionarygovernment because part of my
family were revolutionaries.
I'm not my father, obviously.
He was on the opposite side.
My uncle had to escape Iran,dressed as a woman and was, had
a death sentence to get someSony, you know, we have have
(34:43):
that history to.
This is not an excuse for whatI've written because I stand by
everything I've written, but Isaid as someone who grew up in
the west, I don't give myselfthe right to say, oh, the
Islamic system is horrible.
The Islamic system has been verybad for my immediate family, my
mom, my dad, my brother and mysister and me.
When I say that in terms of.
(35:04):
But it's been fine for some ofmy other family, including
people like, you know, autonomyand people like that.
Um, but I, I just don't givemyself the right to, to decide
what is correct for Iran.
It goes without saying the factthat I live here and not in
Iran.
The life I live as an Americanin America, in Brooklyn, as you
(35:24):
point out, means that I preferthis system.
Right.
Otherwise I'd go back to Iran.
So my preference is to live in asecular democracy.
That doesn't mean just becauseit's my preference.
It should, it has to be thepreference of every Irani.
So that's the only thing I cansay.
(35:44):
But no, in terms of criticism,sure.
It gives people in there, youknow, lobby supporters who troll
me or Mek troll me on, on, ontwitter and you know, say how
awful I am on the regimeapologists.
That's a nice thing they sayabout you apologize.
Otherwise I'm an agent who's gotmoney and you know, drives a
(36:05):
Ferrari courtesy of the foreignminister of Iran, stuff like
that.
I mean, what can you say tothose people?
I can't say anything to them.
They're just as intolerant asfar as I'm concerned.
They're just as intolerant ofany other opinion as some people
back in Iran are in thegovernment, are intolerant of
other people's opinion.
Um, I've just tried throughoutthe time that I've either done
(36:25):
journalism or been an author ofbooks on Iran.
I've just tried to, um, present,you know, what I see more than
the girls wouldn't.
You said earlier on, you askedme earlier on.
It's interesting how I have allkinds of people that go and see.
And Iran is because I want toshow all of Iran, not just one
side, you know, I don't want tojust see the people in Guam are,
don't just want to see only thepolitical figures and then talk
(36:48):
about how great the politicalsystem is.
I want to say this is Iran withall its, you know, the title,
the subtitle of my book was theparadox of your own.
I don't like that word that muchbecause too many people use it
like Iranian paradox and allthat.
Um, and I didn't come up withthat title is publisher always
comes up with a subtitle.
Um, but, um, my editors did,but, but my point is that, you
(37:10):
know, I just want to show what,what, what I want it to show
with my first book, what Iran,Iran was from that sort of
social and political aspect.
And then, you know, my secondbook was highly critical and
around Islamic democracy was um,uh, the isos democracy was very
critical of because it waswritten about the green movement
more than anything else.
(37:31):
Very critical of the system.
So, but I can't help it ifpeople don't like what I say.
Saman Askari (37:36):
Yeah.
So you mentioned that youhaven't been back since 2013.
Is there a reason for that?
Hooman Majd (37:41):
I can't go, yeah.
Can you share why not?
I don't know.
W I think you'd have to ask theauthorities.
Um, yeah, I've been told Ishouldn't go.
I shouldn't say it that waybecause of the, because of
books.
Yeah.
And writings and I'm, you know,I'm, I'm accused of the same
(38:04):
thing.
So the, in the Iranian diasporaaccused me of being an agent of
the Islamic republic.
Some people in Iran accused mebeing an agent of the United
States, so that's a good sign.
You get it from all sides.
One does get it from all sides,you know, when they start
accusing Jason Rezaian being anagent of the Islamic republic,
can you really know what kind ofpeople we're dealing with in the
(38:24):
US?
In the diaspora?
Um, but no, uh, yeah, it'sprobably, I mean, I, I don't
know.
I've been interrogated in thepast.
I've written about it in my bookthat I've been interrogated the
neuron.
I've had situations in Iran, butI've been told I shouldn't go.
Saman Askari (38:41):
Yeah.
So before I let you go, any newprojects you're working on now?
Hooman Majd (38:46):
Specific projects you're working on.
I'm working on a nonfictionfiction books, so I've written
some nonfiction.
I do, I've written shortstories, have been published,
but this will be a hopefully alonger form, but yeah, that's
it.
You Jack of all trades.
We're quite a fashion icon aswell.
(39:07):
A master master of none.
I'm not a fashion icon.
Saman Askari (39:13):
Alright, Hooman, you've been very generous with
your time.
Really appreciate it.
Hooman Majd (39:19):
Nice to talk to you.
Good to meet you as well.
Good luck with this.
Thank you.
I appreciate it.
Take care.
Hope to run into you again.
Saman Askari (39:35):
All right.
I hope you enjoyed thatconversation.
Before we end the episode, Iwanted to ask something of those
of you who listened in today.
In order for me to keep workingon this podcast and for it to be
sustainable, I would need it toreach a critical mass of
listeners, so if you in factfind it to be interesting and
productive and would like to seeit grow and evolve, please share
(39:55):
it on social media, blog aboutit, review it, or simply tell
others about it.
My goal is to keep thingsinteresting and not just focus
on current events.
That is what I'm focusing onright now because there's a lot
happening with Iran as you know,but at some point I would like
to invite people with differentbackgrounds to discuss Iran and
Iranians from cultural,historical, and other
perspectives as well.
So your support in sharing andtalking about this project would
(40:18):
be highly appreciated and itwould really help me along that
path.
So, thanks again for yourcontinued support and take care.
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If you've ever wanted to know about champagne, satanism, the Stonewall Uprising, chaos theory, LSD, El Nino, true crime and Rosa Parks, then look no further. Josh and Chuck have you covered.
Dateline NBC
Current and classic episodes, featuring compelling true-crime mysteries, powerful documentaries and in-depth investigations. Follow now to get the latest episodes of Dateline NBC completely free, or subscribe to Dateline Premium for ad-free listening and exclusive bonus content: DatelinePremium.com
Las Culturistas with Matt Rogers and Bowen Yang
Ding dong! Join your culture consultants, Matt Rogers and Bowen Yang, on an unforgettable journey into the beating heart of CULTURE. Alongside sizzling special guests, they GET INTO the hottest pop-culture moments of the day and the formative cultural experiences that turned them into Culturistas. Produced by the Big Money Players Network and iHeartRadio.