H.R. McMaster on Why the Trump Administration Was “At War with Ourselves” | Uncommon Knowledge | Peter Robinson | Hoover Institution - Uncommon Knowledge

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>> Peter Robinson (00:00):
What was it like to work with President Donald Trump Day in,
day out in the White House down at Mara Lago, traveling around the world?
What was that like?
General HR McMaster onUncommon Knowledge now.
[MUSIC]

(00:27):
Welcome to Uncommon Knowledge, I'm Peter Robinson,
a retired Lieutenant Generalin the United States army and
a fellow at the Hoover Institution.
HR McMaster served from 2017to 2018 as national security
advisor to President Donald Trump.
General McMaster graduatedfrom West Point,
earned a doctorate from the University ofNorth Carolina at Chapel Hill, and played

(00:50):
important roles in the Gulf War, the warin Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq.
During the Gulf War, the tank unit hecommanded engaged in perhaps the most
decisive tank battle sincethe Second World War.
The outcome, 28 Iraqi tanks destroyed,
American casualties zero.

(01:11):
A warrior, but also a historian.
In 1997, General McMaster publishedDereliction of Duty, Lyndon Johnson,
Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, and the lies that led to Vietnam.
A book that remains essential readingin much of the officer corps today.
In 2020,
General McMaster published BattlegroundsThe Fight to Defend the Free World.

(01:36):
Which brings us to General McMaster'snew book, published just this summer,

At War with Ourselves (01:41):
My Tour of Duty in the Trump White House, HR, welcome.

>> H.R. McMaster (01:47):
Peter, it's great to be with you,
I'm a huge fan of Uncommon Knowledge.
Thanks for having me.

You and I could blow kisses to each other.

[LAUGH] >> Peter Robinson
time At War with Ourselves,I'm quoting from your book, HR.
A few months after I departed the WhiteHouse, President Trump called me.
This is taking place in 2018.
I miss you, General, the president said.
Thank you, Mr. President, I replied, if Ihad the opportunity, I would do it again.

(02:15):
We both knew, however,that we could never work together again.
Why not?
Well, Peter,
you just get kind of used upwith Donald Trump at some stage.
And I felt actually todo my duty effectively.
And I tell this many anecdotesrelated to this in the book,
that I often had to tell President Trumpwhat he didn't want to hear, and

(02:35):
I had to sort of try to guardhis independence of judgment.
And in doing so, I think that over time,alienated me from him.
And also our relationship was poisonedby those who really didn't appreciate
my role in trying to givehim multiple options.
There were those around me, andthere are many stories about this,
who would prefer to try to manipulatedecisions consistent with their agenda,

(02:57):
not Donald Trump's agenda,but their agenda.
And so we got kind of usedup in that whole maelstrom.
And so we parted ways actually,amicably when I departed.

But you were done?

But I was done, yeah, I was done.

All right, the job.
Let's just take a moment.
National Security Adviser, serves asthe principal advisor to the president on
national security and foreign policy andchairs the National Security Council.
The position of National Security Adviserwas founded during the Eisenhower
administration.
So we're talking about a role inthe government that goes back decades.

(03:33):
And the National Security Councilitself was founded during the Truman
administration.
Okay, all of that you'llfind in a textbook.
What does it mean in an age ofnuclear proliferation, cyber warfare?
What should Americans know about the jobyou held as national security advisor and

(03:53):
the National Security Councilthat you chaired to?

Well, it's important to understand those historical roots
because the National Security Council wasformed really as a reaction to the failure
of Pearl harbor, the intelligencefailure associated with Pearl harbor.
And the lessons of World War II,that we had to integrate all elements of
national power in an effort to mobilizeour society to fight that cataclysmic and

(04:19):
vitally important war for all humanity.
And so the National Security Councilinstitutionalizes some of those lessons,
the need for coordination and integrationacross the government to provide
the president with the best analysis,the best information.
And, I think,vitally important multiple options so

(04:39):
the elected president can determine his orher policy agenda.
And then the National Security Council,
who are mostly members ofthe president's cabinet who
are critical in the sensibleimplementation those decisions.

So could I, my historical insight onto this,
which I put you,correct me on this if necessary.
I knew a man who's now been dead forsome years, George Elsley,
was a young man in the Truman White House.
And he explained, in those days there'sno email and there's no fax machine.
And it was his job.

(05:18):
Reports would come in from StateDepartment to Pentagon and so forth and
it was his job.
He'd have paper all over his desk.
And it was his job tospeed read things and
decide what neededthe president's attention.
And before the National Security Council,you sat in the White House, and
the president really couldn't be quitesure what was happening over at state or

(05:40):
what was happening over at the Pentagon.
So the National Security Councilwas to bring,
the aim of the National Security Councilwas at a minimum,
to bring into the White House informationfor the president to see, correct?

That's correct.
So it started almost as an executivesecretary function, and it really was
invigorated after Truman under GeneralEisenhower, who brought Andrew Goodpaster,
a fantastic officer who should,I think, be better known by Americans.
But really, Truman,
he was very skeptical about the NationalSecurity Council in the beginning.

(06:15):
Truman was until the Korean war, andthen he realized it was vitally important.
And then he held numerous nationalSecurity Council meetings during the war
and saw the value of that organizationto coordinate and integrate efforts.

So again, my little understanding of the history,
which I think tracks with whatyou say in the book, but again,
I'm asking you to sharpen it up for me.
So it begins with, let's bring thisinformation into the White House.
And then Dwight David Eisenhowerwas a commander.
And one of the things I was always struckby when I was a young speechwriter in

(06:51):
the Reagan White House,there were still Eisenhower guys around.
And in the Reagan White House, the seniorstaff would meet at 7 o'clock and
then they'd go back to their andhold secondary staff meetings with Ibana.
And the guys in the Eisenhower White Housesaid, well, the man who presided at our 7
o'clock senior staff meetingwas Dwight David Eisenhower.
So Eisenhower uses this informationto start making decisions,

(07:15):
which is a slightly different thing.
First, you keep the presidentinformed of what's happening.
It's a tool of coordination, and
then under Eisenhower becomesa tool of decision making.
And the reason I'm being a littlebit elaborate with this is because
this sets up some of the strainsthat you write about in your book.

(07:38):
State would like to run foreign policy.

[LAUGH] Yes. >> Peter Robinson
to run defense.
And there's HR over there in the oldexecutive office building, and
we don't quite know what the heck hethinks he's doing, except that somehow or
other information goes in there and orderscome out for us, and we don't like that.
Roughly.
[LAUGH] Well, what I'm getting at is

(08:02):
there's an institutional tension.
There's tension there.

Okay. >> H.R. McMaster
the position of the national securityadvisor is the national security advisor
is the only person who has the presidentas his, or her only client in the area
of national security andin the area of foreign policy.
The other cabinet officials,they have other constituencies, their own
departments, maybe agendas within theirown departments, maybe some significant

(08:27):
bureaucratic inertia associated with->> Peter Robinson: Imagine that.

Pre existing policies.
So there is a natural tension there Itry to allay that this is a big part of
the story of the book.

I wanna spend another moment or two on the beginnings.

Right?

It's a staff job.

Yeah.

You were a commander.

Right? >> Peter Robinson
don't typically like staff jobs.
Yeah. >> Peter Robinson
this one?
Well, as Epictetus said, [LAUGH] this is what is most important to
play well, the role assigned you,right and so I knew that was my role.
My role was not to run foreign policy myrole was not to make decisions my role was
not to centralize decision making Irealized that the decision maker is

(09:07):
the president.
Nobody elected me, actually, nobodyelected the secretaries of defense or
state either.

Okay? >> H.R. McMaster
as helping the president determine hisforeign policy and national security
agenda and then assisting with thesensible implementation of his decisions.
Okay, one more piece of context as you begin and
that piece of context involvesMichael Flynn, Michael Flynn, like you,
three stars, United States army, retired,takes over his national security advisor,

(09:38):
first national security advisor,and lasts a glorious 22 days.

Yeah.

He's resigned over a controversy on information he may or
may not have given tothe Russian ambassador.

He was railroaded.

Exactly I was about to say,
I think it's very clear now thathe's been completely exonerated.

Yeah. >> Peter Robinson
the fact is, you replaced a man.
Yeah.

Who had lasted 22 days what did you,
walking into that job, intend to do?

What I wanted to do is stabilize the team and do the best job for
the president and as you know fromyour service in the White House,
it can be a very turbulent period inthe transition of administrations alone.
Now you have the added level ofcomplexity of a very fast change of
a national security advisor.
So what I wanted to do is to make surethe president was getting what he needed,

(10:28):
to determine his foreign policy and
national security agenda there'sa lot of work to do there.
And as I mentioned in the book,we had to put into place,
in many cases,180 degree changes to what were, I think,
destructive foreign policiesunder the Obama administration.
A lot of work to do no time for drama butthere had been a lot of drama so
what I was trying to dowas stabilize the team,
make sure everybody understood the missionof the National Security Council staff.

(10:53):
That's everybody on the nationalsecurity staff itself but
also I wanted to get around andsee all the cabinet secretaries,
all the principals on the NationalSecurity Council principles committee,
and forge a very effective workingrelationship to get the president best
analysis, best advice,and multiple options.

Okay so, again, I'm pushing a little bit here this
is all fascinating to me becausea military man serving the country,
and yetyou've got people who are colleagues.

Yeah.

Okay so there's a difference between what you've said so
far you almost sound asthough you're a butler and
you just bring him on a silversolver you bring him options.
And he says, I'll have options I'll havethis kind of tea and you say, very good,
sir, and you take it butthat's not quite the way it happens.

No, it's not the way it happens.

And because you're also, as a matter of statute,
the principal advisor.

Yes.

So you're permitted, indeed required, to develop opinions of
your own to advise him correctly on okay,so take us through a case study.
Donald Trump's instincts werethat the war in Afghanistan,
which by the time he got to it,had lasted for a decade and a half and
had cost hundreds of billions of dollars,was just going nowhere and he wanted out.

Right?

How did you handle that?

Well, the first thing you have to do,
you listen to the president right nobodyI didn't get elected nobody else got
elected you have to listento the elected president.
And then what I would tell the presidentis, I share your frustrations I agree
with your frustrations wanted to dowas to give him multiple options.
But to do that, I think you have tofirst lay a solid foundation for
decision making by having a commonunderstanding of the nature of

(12:47):
the challenge that we're facing,what is at stake.
President Trump wanted to know,why do we care about this?
Why do the Americanpeople care about this?
So what we did is we put into place whatwe called a principal small group framing
session to apply design, thinking andproblem framing to these
first order national security challenges,is what we called them.

(13:07):
And we put them all in the form ofa problem statement we convened
the principles around a five page paperthat framed this for the president.
And I would bring that framing to himbefore I asked him to make a decision
let's come to a common understandingof what the nature of the challenge is.

So Ajar well what that sounds like to me what it feels like
in your book, you had a particularproblem, and you're very respectful of
the president, even when you geta angry about those circumstances.

Absolutely.

By the way, this is just for viewers the book is fascinating,
and it is very clear that you gotvery angry at a number of points but
it is respectful of the president, evenof those people who become antagonists.
And it is overall, it's the tone ofa man who is attempting to analyze

(13:53):
his experience, to offer it toAmericans for the future that's
the tone the overall tone of the book is,here's what happened to me.
Let me tell you about it as calmly andanalytically as I can,
because there's another generationthat's got to carry this on.
Okay so granted all that,he didn't know anything.
Now I don't mean to sound as thoughI'm denigrating Donald Trump I

(14:17):
don't know how to get an officebuilding built in New York.
He knew how to do that.
I don't know how to run casinos inNew Jersey, he did know how to do that.
But he didn't know why we were inAfghanistan the first he didn't know,
so your first job is to provide a kindof rudimentary remedial education.

Well, actually,
he knew a lot he's not an incuriousperson he's not familiar with history,
and he's given to certain impulses,and he's a disruptive personality.
I'll tell you, that was very positive inmany cases because he was right about
a lot of what had become sort of a routineapproach to some of the most significant

(14:58):
challenges we faced.
So, for example,[LAUGH] he thinks it's a bad idea that we
should underwrite our own demise withinvestments in China, for example,
while China is weaponizing its status,mercantilist economy against us right.
So he, because of him questioningwould have become conventional wisdom,
right that China having been welcomedinto the international order,

(15:20):
as China prospects prospered,it would liberalize its economy and
liberalize its form of governancehe didn't believe that.

So Donald Trump shows up willing to break furniture and
part of HR is thinking,
yeah, because there's a lot offurniture that really should be broken.

Absolutely and
to help him understand better how tobreak the furniture effectively and
put something in its place right soit's not just about disrupting.
It's about putting into place policies andapproaches that will advance American
interests, that will strengthen oursecurity and foster prosperity and
extend our influence in the world that'swhat I was trying to help them do.

Okay, we'll return to Afghanistan in a moment, but
let's get to so the subject.
The title of the book isAt War with Ourselves.
And you refer a number of times tothe circular firing squad inside
the White House, instead of helping eachother out there's a lot of backbiting and
interference, okay.
So you've got two themes here.

(16:16):
One, of course, is the person,the character and
temperament of Donald Trump himself,and we'll come back to that.
He's running for president again.
Of course, we'll come back to that.
But the other theme here isthe backbiting, the self promotion,
the leaking to the press, the dealingsin bad faith among Trump's own staff and
cabinet.
Let's start with the staff.
Reince Priebus, the chief of staffuntil Trump fired him in July 2017,

(16:40):
Steve Bannon, now serving four months forcontempt of Congress.
Steve Bannon, who held the titlechief strategist and senior
counselor until leaving the White Housein August 2018, at war with ourselves.
Quote, Bannon, Priebus, and
others employed the same principaltactic as Iago, close quote.

(17:02):
Iago is the villain, and
he is a very darkly drawn villainin Shakespeare, in Othello.
Explain.

Well, what they would do, to use the Shakespearean phrase,
is poison his ear.
Poison the president's ear with innuendo,
with all kinds of false reportsof disloyalty and so forth,
because what they wanted to do is solidifytheir influence with Donald Trump.
And the best way to do that would beto kind of play to his insecurities,

(17:31):
his sense of beleaguerment associated withthe Mueller investigation, for example.
And so they wanted to create thiskind of almost bunker mentality,
and they convinced the president, hey,
we're the two reliable peoplein the bunker with you.

We're your only guys.

We're your only guys.
And so when I was advocating forproviding the president with options,
not trying to manipulate him intothe decisions associated with
maybe Steve Bannon's agenda,there was a lot of friction there.
And what they decided to do at one point,Bannon in particular,
was to try to essentially kneecap me andjust get me out of the picture.

Okay, so this is tricky material,
because how did theyget in the White House?
The President of the United Statesabsolutely put them there.
Why did he put them there?
I can't read Donald Trump's mind, but
at least in part because they representeda part of his governing coalition.

Sure. >> Peter Robinson
to the alt right, and I think that'sthe term that's generally popular.
I'm not super enthusiastic about any of these labels.

Yeah, right.
You've got to get it.
But they had a certain kind oflegitimacy in that White House.
They were there because the chiefexecutive wanted them there.
And you say to yourself, I got todeal with these guys up to a point.
How do you draw the lines at which->> H.R. McMaster: Well, yeah,

(18:52):
the line that I draw->> Peter Robinson: You see what
I'm saying?

I can take any kind of disparagement,
I can take any kind of leak.
I mean, it doesn't matter to me.
That's noise to me.
When they begin to affect policy, whenthey begin to affect national security,
when they begin to affect, really, thepresident's job in a way that's negative,
that's when I became concerned about it.
And I'll tell you, Peters,this is into the book.

(19:15):
[LAUGH] There are many instances where Itried to foster a working relationship
with them.
At one point, I invited Steve Bannon todinner, and then he texted me, I'm sorry,
I'm really busy.
I'm like, okay, well,I'm national security advisor,
I don't know what your portfolio is, Matt.
[LAUGH] I guess he wasclearly blowing me off.
But I tried.
But what they would rather do, I think,is to continue to play these games,

(19:36):
power games.
And I just didn't play those games.
I just tried to focus on myresponsibility to the president.
When they began to impinge on decisions,
when they began to try to manipulate thepresident to make premature decisions or
decisions that might cut against ournational interests, that's when I became,
concerned about their tactics andtheir approach.

All right, they both end up leaving the cabinet.
This is serious.
These are people who holdstatutory offices, once again,
at war with ourselves.
Secretary of Defense James Mattis andSecretary of State Rex Tillerson
seems to have concluded thatTrump was an emergency,

(20:19):
and that anyone at bettinghim was an adversary.
That means you because youwere trying to help the guy.
While Bannon had viewed my efforts togive Trump options as constraining
the president from the alt right agenda,Madison Tillerson viewed
my efforts as enabling a presidentwho was a danger to the Constitution.

(20:44):
Explain that.

So I think, essentially- >> Peter Robinson
let's just stipulate>> H.R. McMaster: Right.

This is tricky for both of us.
In part, I've never met Rick Tillerson.
You know both of these men.
But Jim Mattis is a colleague ofours at the Hoover Institution.
And I think it's fair to say thatalthough the two of you have had big boy
disagreements, you viewyourselves as friend.
I certainly view Jimas a very good friend.

Absolutely.

But you had a disability professional disagreement.

I have respect both of those gentlemen.

Okay. >> H.R. McMaster
I think people are motivated in threefundamentally different ways in
the White House.
And I'd be administration.

What you're in the administration, any administration.

In other words, you're including the cabinet.

I wonder if this resonates with your
experience in the White House.
So group a are people who are there tohelp the elected president determine his
own agenda, right.
And they're there to give best analysis,a wide range of perspectives and
to develop multiple options forthe president to make his choice,
because he's the one who got elected then.

And HR McMaster is captain of Group A.

I think I'm in Group A.
And I think,I think Group B are those who are not
interested in givingthe president options,
not interested in giving him a wide rangeof views, because what they want to do
is they want to manipulate decisionsconsistent with their own agenda.
That's where they cameinto the White House.
They viewed Donald Trump as a cipher,right?

(22:05):
Somebody who they could use fortheir own agenda.
The third group of people are those whoviewed the president as a danger and
wanted to, again, limit the informationthat he got, limit the options,
because they saw it as their job toprotect the country and the world from,
from Donald Trump.
And so based on what, your motivation,that would determine kind of your behavior

(22:27):
and created natural tension between me andthose who fell into the other two groups.
And so that's how I've sortof analyzed it in retrospect,
I think these groups existin any administration.
But I think,like everything with Donald Trump,
it's just amplified to maybe a hot,>> Peter Robinson: You get this
frustration in you and Jim.
For military men, we're one of theprincipal doctrines is unity of command.

(22:52):
We may fight things out, butthe commander says, go and we go.
Sure.

And in a White House with as much backbiting and
as many factions asthe Donald Trump administration,
it's the strangest thing, because who,where could you find greater unity of
command than on the staffof the chief executive?
But in fact, it doesn't exist.
Is that correct?

Yeah, I think that's correct.
And then also, you have other tasks->> Peter Robinson: So
you're temperamentally unprepared forit as a military man.
Well, you know, I'll tell you,
I've worked in some complex environments,you know, with,
working with foreign partners andwho have different agendas.
I've had to command multi, I've hadthe privilege of, privilege of commanding
multinational civil military task forcesin places like Afghanistan and Iraq.

(23:37):
So I was used to that.
I was used to trying to lead andreally, in this case,
coordinate really,efforts and build a team.
And I'll tell you, despite all thisfriction, Peter, and this is friction
associated with the question you askedearlier, it has a lot to do with
just what is your understanding ofthe role of the national security advisor?
What is the natural tension between thatrole and the role of cabinet officials.

(24:00):
Then you have the addeddimension of Donald Trump, and
the degree to which Donald Trump createsthese sort of other motivations.
[LAUGH] And there are those whocome in with their own agenda, so
it's a very complicated situation.
But I think the story generally is reallymy effort to try to transcend that and
to do the best job I could forthe president.
And I do think that we succeeded,

(24:23):
in effecting some fundamental andlong overdue shifts in policy.
So anyway, my attitude was, [LAUGH] hey,
bring it on,I've been in real combat, Peter.
And Bannon, he used to love to use a warmetaphor and a battle metaphor for
everything, but I was not really concernedby any of this, I mean, I thought,
okay, just bring it on,is that all you have?

Let tank shells whistling past you?

Well, let's get the mission done.

I want to get back to the president, and
then we'll come to Afghanistan,
what I'd like to do is talk untilthrough lunchtime, if you don't mind.
But you mentioned that early on,
you went across the street in Washingtonto the office of Brent Scowcroft,
who had served as national securityadvisor to President George HW Bush and
had held a number of positions,national security staff, Pentagon and so

(25:14):
forth, during the Reagan administration.
And Brent Scowcroft said,you think you've got a bat?
And here's a quotation from at warwith ourselves, Scowcroft described
Reagan's White House while James A Bakerwas chief of staff, that's the first term,
as a witches' brew of intrigue,elbows and separate agendas, close quote.

(25:34):
As it happens I was there, right?

I think you must have been six years old, Peter.
[LAUGH] I can't believeyou're in the right.

I can confirm that it was a witch's brew.

Yeah.

Let me give you my thinking on that, and then,
because I think this,in a way, it does illustrate.

And remember Poindexter, too, who was national security advisor.

Yeah, poindexter, second term.

Second term- >> Peter Robinson
But the title at war with ourselves comes from him telling me,
we were at war with ourselvesin this earlier period,
he was referring to the earlier period.

Okay, So you've got Jim Baker and Mike Deaver,
essentially in an alliance, you've got EdMeese, who's more conservative, and then
you've got Bill Clark as national securityadvisor, and he's overseeing a staff
that doesn't have that much confidencein him, that includes Bud McFarlane.
And you get this first term,and because I believe,

(26:29):
because of this jostling,that first term is extremely creative.

Right. >> Peter Robinson
which lays out.
Which lays out,>> H.R. McMaster: Which I read when
I took over and you read.

Refer to here the Strategic Defense Initiative,
which is a research program,and the president didn't.

That looks pretty darn relevant now.

It looks relevant now and the way,
that worked was the president didn't trustthe speech writing office, he wanted
that very close hold, so he had BillClark, my source on this is Bill Clark.

Right. >> Peter Robinson
are dead, so you're just gonnahave to take my word for it.
But Bill Clark had budMcFarlane drafted and
when Bud McFarlane recognized it wasn'tjust an exercise, it was actually gonna be
inserted in a speech from the Oval Office,he begged Bill Clark to take it out.
And the president went ahead with itanyway and just informed the secretary of

(27:23):
state and secretary of defense a couple ofhours beforehand, they were not consulted,
they were informed.
So this loose jointedness,the Westminster address of 1981,
the evil empire address of 1983,the Berlin Wall address,
which I wrote of 1987, Reagan's seniorstaff tried to stop all three of those,

(27:44):
but because there was enoughchaos in the White House,
you could get things to the presidentaround it was creative.
Why?
Because the man at the centerof it all was Ronald Reagan, and
he knew what he was doing.
All right.

So is that the difference?
The chaos in your White Houseis more unsettling,
because the president himselfhas a less settled view.

I would say, what I would say.

You're not gonna go for that, though.

No, I'm not gonna go for that.
No, what I would say is, the presidenthad settled views on a lot of issues, and
he was dead right about them.
And so what I was trying to do wasprovide him with multiple options, again,
I used the title, one of the chapters isguarding his independence of judgment,
I saw that as my role.
And I think->> Peter Robinson: And
it would literally end up with a piece ofpaper with option A, option B, option C,

(28:34):
and you talk these through with him,correct?
Yes, and not just me, but
sometimes in a small group format in theOval office or in the back dining room or
a formal NSC meeting, where he madea series of very important decisions on
policies from 180 degree switchto our Cuba policy, for example.
180 degree switch to ourapproach toward Venezuela.

(28:56):
How about toward Iran and the Iranstrategy, which was a radical shift and
an overdue corrective to the unwisepolicies of the Obama years.
So we put all of these in placein a very formal way with him.
The South Asia strategywhich you mentioned,
which involved the war in Afghanistan,that was done at Camp David, in a setting
that was conducive to the kind ofdeliberations that you would want to have,

(29:18):
over decisions that involve life anddeath in wartime.
And he heard from all of his cabinet,so I would.

We need to dwell on that one for just a moment,
because that actually is almost a casestudy of the way it ought to work.

Absolutely. >> Peter Robinson
people who know a lot about their fields,and you go up to Camp David and
you fight it out in frontof the chief executive.
Sure.

And he makes the decision at the end, and everybody says,
got it correct?

And you know what?

It worked that way, it doesn't sound like chaos, does it?

No, and my editor wanted chaos in the title,
I don't want chaos in the title,that's the conventional wisdom.
And of course, it was chaotic, andof course, it was at a certain level.
And you're mentioning all the kind of thefrictions and interpersonal difficulties.
But I think we succeededin that first year,
I can't really talk to definitivelyabout what happened after that,
in transcending that chaos andgetting the president best advice.

(30:07):
And in that first three weeks on the job,
I talked to every living formernational security adviser.

>> Peter Robinson: Including Henry Kissinger? (30:13):
undefined

>> H.R. McMaster: Including Henry Kissinger. (30:14):
undefined
And I tried to understand my role andthen play that role for the president.
I think what was difficult is at times,President Trump maybe didn't really fully
understand my role andI mentioned this in the book.
I wish I'd spent more time with himat the very beginning saying, hey,
this is my role relative,to your secretaries of state defense.

And let's be explicit one more time about Jim Mattis and
Rex Tillerson.
What did the secretary of defense and whatdid the secretary of state want you to do?

What they wanted me to do, is to help them control Donald Trump,
I think.
And soI was trying to foster collaboration,
to give him options they want to control.
And there was a fundamental tension,
between those goals of collaboration andcontrol.

Okay, now to the man himself, although, of course, a portrait
of Donald Trump emerges from everythingyou say here, at war with ourselves.
I saw in Trump traits similarto those in Lyndon Johnson.
And later you write of a visit toCalifornia during which you found yourself
contrasting Trump with Reagan,
the differences between the two presidentswho came into office with similar agendas,

(31:25):
including tax cuts, deregulation,increased military spending.
Whereas Stark has the contrastbetween Reagan's rustic ranch and
Trump's lavish Mar a Lago.
Donald Trump and LBJ, Donald Trump andRonald Reagan, right?
Explain this.

[LAUGH] So, Lyndon Johnson had some profound insecurities,
especially the way he came into office.
And I, I think.

After an assassination.

After assassination in November 1963, and so Johnson,
especially in the 64 period,and, I wrote a book about this.
And I'll tell you, I mean, so
much of [LAUGH] whatever ability I hadto do this job came from history, right?
And my ability to be kinda stoic in thejob and understand that the frictions I
was encountering,these were not unprecedented, right?
So I really was grateful for the giftthat the United States Army gave me,

(32:15):
which was to study history and to read->> Peter Robinson: George Marshall,
Dwight Eisenhower,these men put up with a lot.
a lot, right?
Absolutely.
But Johnson was insecure for a number ofreasons, including that he was really
preoccupied with trying to getelected in his own right in 1964.
And then he also had a sense ofbeleaguerment around him by the press,

(32:38):
much like President Trump.
President Trump, I think,has his own insecurities,
I'm not [LAUGH] a psychologist, but hefelt beleaguered by the false Russiagate
collusion claims andthe Mar-a-Lago investigation.
And so, these insecurities and thissense of beleaguerment allowed people to
kinda manipulate both presidents, right?

(32:59):
Johnson was very distrustful ofthose around him, so was Trump.
So if somebody wants to kneecap me orsomebody else, label them a globalist or
say that they're not supporting thepresident's agenda or they're disloyal, or
they called him a name or,ridiculous claims, right?
All of those in connection with me,he actually had a bit of

(33:20):
a vulnerability there,because of that sense of beleaguerment.
So I think that was kind of a similaritythere between those two presidents.
And then with Reagan, I really talkabout them both being extraordinary
communicators in the relatively newmedia of television for Reagan, and
social media for Trump.
And while Trump, I would say,

(33:42):
was not maybe as elegant in his formof communication as Reagan was, and
he didn't->> Peter Robinson: He
got the points across.
He got the points across, but also,
if you look at his speeches,I think they're pretty darn good.

Yes, his speeches are underappreciated.

They're underappreciated.
But there are big differences betweenthe two of them as well, obviously.
And I think Reagan had the selfdeprecating sense of humor,
I talk about how importanthumor is in leadership, right?
And Trump has a sense of humor,I mean, some of the nicknames and
everything else, you have toadmit they're kind of funny, but
not really a selfdeprecating sense of humor.

(34:15):
And I think where Reagan was sort of,
he really understood kindof the ethic of service.
It's more maybe about Trump,that's not a revelation, right?

Right. >> H.R. McMaster
I try to compare and
contrast those presidents as a way to getat the subject of presidential character,
and what are the traits we ought tolook for in any presidential candidate.
If I may say so, you may have noticed this, HR,
that the man is running forpresident again.

Absolutely.

And your book represents a handbook for
the serious reader who wantsa dispassionate account according to
which you can judge this man,in my opinion.

I hope it's that.
[CROSSTALK] This is notan attack on Donald Trump, and
this is not [INAUDIBLE] by Joe Biden orany.

Right, absolutely.

Okay, absolutely, so what I hope to do in this book is to give
readers my perspective on, I think, whatwas a pivotal year in American history,
for readers to understand betterwhat we've been discussing.
What the heck isthe National Security Council staff?
What is the role ofa national security advisor?
What does an effective national securitydecision making process look like?

(35:27):
What are some of the frictions youencounter in terms of personalities and
relationships and roles andresponsibilities, and
how do you overcome those ortry to overcome those?
And then, of course, to get at thisissue of presidential character as well.

Okay, can I, I wanna stick with Donald Trump for
just another moment or two here andthen kind of get to larger lessons.
But there's a fascinatingpassage in which you and
Stephen Miller,a member of the Trump circle,
are working on a speech that the presidentis about to deliver to the United Nations.
And you become reflective in this passage,Miller and

(36:00):
I had labored to reconcilecontradictions in Trump's worldview.
Some of these were confounding.
And then you go on to listhalf a dozen paradoxes or
contradictions in Trump's views.
Let me just read a couple.
Trump believed that the United Stateswas a force for good in the world,
but he often manifested moral equivalence.

So, Trump does believe America is a force for good in the world,
but he then has this moral equivalencewhere he turns maybe sometimes a blind eye
to some of the abuses of power.
And, I would say, criminal activityon the part of Putin, for example.
And I used a quote from him in 2016,where he said, we have killers too,
and that sort of thing.

(36:43):
So I think that whereas Reaganwas really elegant in his
kind of portrayal of Americaas a city on the hill, right?
And whereas Trump at times engagesin moral equivalence in a way that
confuses maybe international audiencesabout how he views America itself.

(37:07):
And you have also this narrativeof all the negativity,
the maladies in our society, andoftentimes those are not balanced
with an optimistic view of the future,as Reagan did.

He was viscerally, I'm quoting you again,
he was viscerally opposed to communist andsocialist dictatorships but
was ambivalent at best aboutthe dictators of Russia and China.

Right, right.

He hated those systems, but he sort of admired those strong guys.

Absolutely, yeah.

And that comes from what, that comes from growing up in
Queens, that comes fromNew York Real Estate, is it tough world?
And the strong men who he admires that,where does this come from?

I think in some ways he wanted to be viewed as people view them,
as strong leaders.
And I quote, actually, President Trump onthis later in the booklll where I talk
about, [LAUGH] he said, sometimes I haveproblems with people who are our friends.
But our adversaries, if they're toughguys, I kinda get along with them well.
Somebody will have to explain thatto me someday, it's what he said.
[LAUGH]>> Peter Robinson: Okay, so, HR, you said,

(38:14):
he takes office,this is the Russia hoax thing.
Right.

He takes office and there's this Russia, Russia,
Russia, as he describes it,And we now know that it
begins as a dirty trick inthe Hillary Clinton campaign.

These are the findings of the Department of Justice.

Correct. >> H.R. McMaster
We now know that the press pursued a story that was bunk,
he was right that it was fake news.
He was right that he was beingmade a victim of the deep state.

Absolutely. >> Peter Robinson
the Federal Bureau of Investigationdummied up requests for
the FISA Court,that there was a grotesque abuse of power
taking place all around him,that he was the target.
That Robert Mueller, the investigationties up official Washington for two years,

(39:12):
dominates the news, and then it presentsits findings and it's got nothing on him.
There was no Russian collusion whatsoever.
So here's the question,
suppose the Clinton campaignhadn't pulled dirty tricks.
Suppose that Donald Trump's electionas president had been accepted,

(39:36):
that even people who disagreedwith him reposed a little faith in
the constitution, took the historicalview, you win some, you lose some.
That side gets the chanceto enact its agenda for
four years at a time, we win back.
This is a game, we all learn to livewith each other across decades.

(39:56):
Suppose the Democrats,the intel community, and
journalists had Just given the guy a fairshake, what would have been different?
I think the environment would have been completely different, and
I think he would have beenmuch more secure in his
ability to discharge his duties.
He wouldn't have had maybe thatsevere sense of belearment.
The press would never like him orbe fair to him.

I mean, honestly, if you're sitting in the Oval Office and
you realize you can't trust the FBI,and the next thing,
the man who comes through the door isHMR McMaster, you look up at HR and say,
wait a minute,he's been in Washington for years.
How do I know I can trust him?
In other words, it poisons everything.

Actually, Peter,
that was my only assignment inWashington across my entire career,
was his national security advisor.
[LAUGH] I had never->> Peter Robinson: Only non military.
Yeah, yeah.

I got it.

No, I had never even been assigned to the Pentagon.
So I had never, never lived inWashington in my entire career.
[LAUGH]>> Peter Robinson: Congratulations.
Okay.
So I think there was a sense of him distrusting not just
the Department of Justice or FBI, but
that carried over to the entireintelligence community as well.

(41:05):
And I think that this really->> Peter Robinson: That is outrageous what
they did, because the intel community, ifCongress passes a budget on some domestic
issue, you get hearings, you get tosee the amount of money being spent.
Intel, the actual budgetof the CIA is secret.
It relies entirely on trust amongoffice holders and among the public.

(41:29):
And they violated that trust again andagain and again.
Am I wrong about that?
Well, I don't think in the intelligence agencies, it was the same
kind of egregious misconduct asthere was in the FBI, for example.
But for->> Peter Robinson: Distinctions matter.
But I was just talking from Donald Trump's perspective,
there was a great dealof a lot of distrust.
Enough distrust to go around.

Enough to go around.

To go around, yeah.
And so I think his whole mentalitywould have been different.
This is one of the things I'm concernedabout, too, Peter, with whatever
the outcome of this election is, is that,really, January 6th was terrible.
I think the president encouraging thatassault on the Capitol was terrible, and
I criticize him for that.
But we have to also remember,not that these are equivalent cases, but

(42:13):
there were election deniers in 2016, 2017.
Remember the not my president movement,then the declarations saying that
this guy is not a legitimate presidentfrom Nancy Pelosi and others.
So I think what we have to stopdoing in both political parties is
compromising our confidence inour democratic institutions and

(42:33):
processes to scorepartisan political points.
Both parties are guilty of that,and we just need to stop.

HR, a couple of pairs of quotations.
Last questions here are aboutDonald Trump, of course, and a couple of
questions about you, but I'd like to beginwith a couple of pairs of quotations.
Here's columnist Mark Thiessen inthe Washington Post in 2020, what if we've
turned off our tvs and stopped lookingat Twitter and looked at what he's done?

(43:03):
This is before COVID hits, with the soundoff, Trump is one of the greatest
conservative presidents in modernAmerican history, close quote.
Here's former vice president Dick Cheney.
In our nation's 246-year history,there has never been an individual
who posed a greater threat toour republic than Donald Trump.

(43:24):
Here's another pair,political consultant Roger Stone.
Roger knows politics,he worked with Nixon and
Reagan, quote, the only->> H.R. McMaster: He also came out
against me very aggressively.
He would have been- >> H.R. McMaster
Alex Jones, yeah, right.
Okay.

a friend a lunatic, but Roger would bepleased with it, so I won't bother.
consultant Roger Stone.
The only thing Trump is guilty of isbeing the greatest president since
Abraham Lincoln, close quote.
That's preposterous.
Sorry, that's my view.
We'll see what the Economistmagazine Donald Trump poses

(44:03):
the biggest danger to the world in 2024,close quote.
Why does this man havethis effect on people?
Well, I think he enjoysp-

Both sides of this
are preposterous, aren't they?

No, I mean,
I think hopefully what my book doesis reconcile all those perspectives,
because I do say it's the good,the bad, and the ugly of that year.
And I do try to place Trump's four years,
his four year presidency in context ofthe eight Obama years that preceded it and
the four, going on four Biden years that->> Peter Robinson: Is he a threat to

(44:39):
democracy?
Is he the greatest dangerof the world in 2024?
No, he's not the greatest danger of the world.
I think what happens is Donald Trumpis inflammatory, right?
He's offensive to people.
And what he does is he actually elicitsa reaction to him that is oftentimes more
destructive than anything he says ordoes himself.

(45:00):
And so what Im really concernedabout is this kind of vortex,
these centripetal forces that we unleashbased on the interaction of Trump and
his most loyal followers andthe people who hate him the most.
And I wish that Donald Trump couldget to the politics of addition.
I wish he could, instead of doublingdown on his most loyal base,

(45:25):
that he could extend that base more andappeal to more Americans.

Did you ever talk politics like this with him?

I talked to him in an international context about this.
And especially I've got stories in hereabout NATO, his skepticism about NATO,
the Paris accord and so forth.
And what I would try to say is,you can pursue your agenda in a way that
can bring more people with you, and thenwe can have a bigger impact as a result,

(45:51):
and we can make more rapid progresstoward our goals and objectives.

Summing up here, how did Donald Trump do, and
how did HR McMaster do?
First, Donald Trump at war with ourselves.
Despite the chaos in the White House,
Trump administered long-overduecorrectives to unwise policies.
Results included a fundamentalshift in national security and
new policies toward China,Russia, North Korea, Iran.

(46:18):
Youve talked about Iran here already.
Venezuela, Cuba.
That's pretty impressive.

Impressivre, yeah.
All within one year.

All within one year.
And yet you go on to accuseTrump of inconsistency,
taking one thing with another.
Did Donald Trump do his job,
do the job of the president ofthe United States in foreign policy?
Did he protect the republic?

I think that was his motivation.
I mean, I dont think he set out inany way to compromise our security.
But whereas he could makevery tough decisions,
oftentimes he would make decisionsthat went against his predilections.
Once he heard different views and learnedmore about a subject, oftentimes he
found it difficult to keep that decision,to hang on to that decision.

(47:09):
Especially when faced withcriticism from his political base,
his most stalwart supporters, who I thinkat times thought of him as an easy mark,
somebody who they could say,this makes you look weak or
you're abandoning yourbase if you do this.
So I think that was the reallimitation in his ability to
effect presidential command,to use Peter Robbins phrase,

(47:34):
was his difficulty in hangingon to a tough decision.
In the book, what I do is I give him,I give him credit,
due credit for making really toughdecisions, but also I criticize him for
going back on some of those decisions,especially those that had clear
consequences to cut againstour vital interests.

All right, now to evaluate the performance of
Herbert Raymond McMaster,let's begin with your
1995 appearance on Firing Linewith Bill Buckley.

>> Bill Buckley (48:07):
We talked, in 1964, you're telling me that the Joint Chiefs
estimated we needed 500,000men to correct the situation?

Yes. >> Bill Buckley
you think that he was obligedto pass along that estimate to
the American people?
Well, he was obliged by law to give his best,
the Joint Chiefs were, to give theirbest military advice to the president,
the secretary of defense, andthe National Security Council.
They failed to do that because whatthe Joint Chiefs of Staff do in
this period is they compromiseprinciple for expediency themselves.

So, HR, there you are talking with Bill Buckley about your book,
Dereliction of Duty.
Principle and expediency,the duty of the soldier when dealing
with civilian authorities,with politicians.
So, skilled professionals,Jim Mattis, Rex Tillerson,
the man who succeeded you as nationalsecurity adviser, John Bolton,

(49:04):
all came, they may want to,well, they're on their own.
They can correct me anytime they want to,
I hereby extend an invitation toall three of them to this show.
But, it seems to me fair to say thatthey all concluded that they knew
better than Trump.
They knew policy better than Trump,they knew what was right for

(49:25):
the country in foreignaffairs better than Trump.
And they all decided it was their duty,their principal duty,
to protect the rest of us from Trump'sinexperience and unpredictability.
And HR McMaster made a different decision,any regrets?

No regrets at all, no regrets at all, I mean, I'll tell you,
Peter, did you see that clip?
[LAUGH] Gosh, it was funny, I mean, I wentinto the job on my first day thinking,
this is really a surreal circumstancehere, to be walking into the office of
the National Security Advisor inthe west wing of the White House, and
now being responsible for the nationalsecurity decision-making process I

(50:04):
criticized from the perspectiveas a historian.
So, I wrote down five things that I wouldnot make sure that I did not make the same
mistakes, right?
And the first is, we would take moretime thinking about the nature of
the challenges we're facing andnot rush into action.
The second thing that we would dois we establish clear goals and
objectives, right?
There were no clear goals and objectivesand I did this with President Trump.

(50:25):
Before we ever talked aboutwhat we were gonna do,
I made sure that these were his goals andobjectives, what he wanted to achieve.
The third thing that we would do, is wewould provide him with multiple options so
that he actually had a say in his own->> Peter Robinson: You were never gonna
put him in a box?
Never gonna put him in a box.
The fourth thing is I would never holdanything back from him even if I knew I

(50:47):
was telling him what he didn't want tohear, and it might limit my influence.
Advisors, [LAUGH] during the period inwhich Vietnam became an American war,
they concluded that I have to tell LyndonJohnson what he wants to hear, otherwise,
it will diminish my influence with him.
Well, what the hell goodis your influence anyway?
And then the final lesson wasto try to insulate national
security decision-making frompartisan political concerns.

(51:11):
Now, there are gonna be people whohave voices about the partisan kind
of political ramifications of decisions,and
they're gonna have a naturalconduit to the president.
But, in the development of those options,
I didn't want them infected by how is thisgonna play from a partisan perspective.
And I think we succeeded,maybe I made some new mistakes, but
I didn't make those five mistakes.

You didn't make those five

Those five mistakes?

Okay, so back to Trump with one last question and
back to you with what I promisewill be the last question.
Here he is running for president again,
a lot can happen between now andelection day in November.
He may win, this is not a crazy idea.

(51:55):
And what could voters reasonably expectin a second Trump administration?

Yeah, Peter, I mean, I really don't know, I mean, I hope,
[CROSSTALK]>> Peter Robinson: This is just not
your portfolio.
No, I think what I do in the book is I explain that you could get
any number of Donald Trumps, right?
And I think if he does get elected,
we all hope its the Donald Trumpwhos most effective for the country.
And that's somebody who doesn't care aboutretribution, who cares about his duty.
It's somebody who understands that hehas authorities under Article Two of

(52:24):
the Constitution that are balanced bythose that exist in Article One and
Article Three.
It's somebody who I think leans moretoward the peace through strength,
Reagan's approach to the world ratherthan succumbs to this sort of impulse
to retrench under the belief thatthat's good for American security.
So, all of this kind of dissonanceI describe in the book,

(52:47):
he could go either way, right?
And a lot of that will depend, I think,on who he has as his advisors.
And in those threecategories we talked about,
I hope they're in category one, right?
Because if he gets elected,dammit, he got elected!
So, those who serve him should be thereto help him determine his own agenda,
right, andfulfill his duties under the Constitution.

What we all need is a little more faith in the constitution of
the United States,the system will work itself out.

Yeah, we have to stop tearing down our confidence in our
institutions, we have to bolster ourconfidence and reform these constitutions,
I mean, reform these institutions in a waythat restores our faith and confidence.
And I hope that if Donald Trump iselected, that he comes in with that
agenda, not to remake everything or teareverything down in this sort of approach

(53:38):
that also sounds kinda like the new leftor postcolonial, postmodernist approach.
[LAUGH] I think what we really need todo is do the hard work of restoring
the American people'sconfidence in our government.

All right, last question, I'm gonna end with
the same quotation I used to open, but aska slightly different question about it.
At war with ourselves, a few monthsafter I departed the White House,
President Trump called me.
I miss you, general, the president said.
Thank you, Mr. President,I replied, if I had the opportunity,

(54:12):
I would do it again, close quote.
You knew he'd never invite you back,but I know you well enough to know that
when you said, if I had the opportunity,I'd do it again, you meant it.
Endless hours,countless frustrations, a staff job,
which is torture in itself toa man who's used to command.

(54:34):
Constant backbiting,politics of every description, and
at the center of it all, a very,very difficult chief executive.
And yet you found it all worthwhile, why?

Well, I hope that one of the themes in the book is gratitude,
gratitude for the opportunity to serve.
And, that is a fantastic job,national security advisor, it really is.
And you can have a positive influenceon the course of the nation and
the nation's security and prosperity andthat is a tremendous privilege and
I hope another theme thatcomes out through the book.
I worked with some fantastic people,Peter, I mean,

(55:09):
these were really dedicated,talented people.
Some of them are colleagues now at Hoover,Matt Pottinger, for example.
I mean, the National Security Councilstaff, I think, was running
extremely well after my first few monthsand doing a good job for the president.
I think maybe the president didn't alwaysappreciate that because we were always
getting disparaged by those who wantedto sort of drive a wedge between him and

(55:33):
me and the NSC staff broadly.
But it was a privilege to workwith the people I worked with and
a privilege to help the president.
Now, the reason I wouldn't go back now isI do think I'm used up with Donald Trump,
and that's, I'm at peace with that.
And I had conversations with him,
which I recount in the bookmonths before I departed.
And I said, hey, Mr. President, listen,
I want nothing out of this job exceptto do it well until my last day and

(55:56):
when we're no longer effectiveworking together, I want to leave.

Just said so?

Yeah, right, so we left, which is unusual for
most people leave Trump in the WhiteHouse, [LAUGH] with a good relationship.
I think he doesn't appreciate some of thecriticisms that I've levied at him in my
previous book and here andafter January 6th and so forth.
But I just try to be honest about,here's how I view his presidency and

(56:21):
I hope that that's what readerscan come out of this with.
And, Peter,just one last thing ill just say is,
I know people are gonna ask me this,do you endorse anybody here?
And that's not my role, I don't think,my role as a historian,
as somebody who had the privilege ofserving as national security advisor is
to do the best job I can at telling thestory as I saw it, as I experienced it.

(56:45):
And that's what I hope readerswill take away from it.

HR McMaster, author of At War with Ourselves
the Trump White House, HR thank you.

Thank you, Peter.

For Uncommon Knowledge, the Hoover Institution,
and Fox Nation, I'm Peter Robinson.
[MUSIC]

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