394 Pasadena PD Helicopter Crash Analysis and Cirrus SR22 Safety Lessons

Max talks about a dramatic ground collision between two Pasadena Police Department helicopters and the wide-ranging lessons pilots can draw from it. On November 17, 2012, two Bell OH-58 helicopters collided at the Pasadena PD Benedict Heliport when one returned from a flight and struck another that was sitting on the pad with its rotors turning. Six people suffered minor injuries, but the accident destroyed both aircraft and revealed systemic issues far beyond a single pilot error.

Max uses the NTSB report and audio clips from the Rotary Wing Show—where host Mick Cullen interviewed Dan Parsons—to examine how this accident unfolded and why different people interpret it so differently. Initial reactions, including Max’s own when first hearing the episode, tended to blame the landing pilot. However, as Dan points out, there were organizational and procedural factors that made this an accident waiting to happen.

One major factor was the normalization of deviance. Due to poor drainage on Pad 1, it was common for helicopters to be parked slightly outside the designated landing box to avoid puddles. On the day of the accident, N96BM was positioned completely outside the pad’s markings. When N911FA returned to land in light rain with a wet windscreen, the landing pilot assumed the parked helicopter was within its box and focused on positioning her own aircraft properly on Pad 2. The two rotor systems intersected just as she lowered the collective to land.

The lack of a monitored UNICOM frequency and formal radio procedures compounded the hazard. At the time of the accident, no standard protocol existed for announcing arrivals or departures beyond what ground personnel could hear. The parked helicopter’s radios were not yet on, so the pilots had no communication link. Combined with rain-obscured visibility and non-standard pad markings, these conditions created a perfect storm.

Max highlights how this accident illustrates core principles of Safety Management Systems (SMS), even for pilots outside of airline or charter operations. SMS emphasizes proactively identifying hazards, implementing mitigations, and creating feedback mechanisms to prevent unsafe practices from becoming normalized. The Pasadena PD air unit responded after the accident by redesigning their heliport layout to increase pad separation, establishing monitored UNICOM procedures, and instituting regular safety meetings to address hazards before they could lead to incidents.

The episode also touches on pilot psychology. As Mick Cullen points out in one clip, the markings on the ground or guidance from a marshaller are just that—guidance. Ultimately, the pilot in command decides where to place the aircraft and is responsible for ensuring clearance. This is a valuable lesson not just for helicopter pilots but for fixed-wing pilots taxiing around crowded ramps. Max connects this to a story of a low-time pilot at his club who taxied into a fuel truck and insisted it wasn’t his fault—a reminder that responsibility always lies with the PIC.

In the Updates segment, Max turns to two sobering Cirrus SR22 accidents. The first, in Jesup, Georgia, involved an experienced pilot attempting to land in near-zero visibility without flying the published instrument approach. Track data showed low-speed, high-bank maneuvers just before the airplane stalled and crashed short of the runway. The pilot’s tendency to avoid being late for appointments may have contributed to self-induced pressure, leading to a poor decision to attempt a visual arrival in IMC.

The second accident, in Oxbow, Oregon, involved a newly certificated pilot who encountered forecast icing conditions at altitude. The airplane entered IMC, likely accumulated ice, and descended rapidly. The pilot deployed the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System, but at a speed far above the published deployment limit, causing structural failure of the parachute system. The accident underscores the critical importance of understanding aircraft limitations, respecting icing forecasts, and recognizing that CAPS is not a magic shield if operated outside design parameters.

Max ties both Cirrus accidents back to the SMS theme. In each case, small decisions compounded into catastrophic outcomes. An absence of previous incidents can create a false sense of security, but SMS teaches that safety is not the absence of accidents—it’s the presence of robust defenses and hazard awarenes