Welcome to a breaking-event interview on the extraordinary and rapidly unfolding developments in Syria, covering late November to the present. In this special episode, we’re joined by retired CIA Senior Intelligence Service Officer and former State Department Diplomat Glenn Corn. This conversation is part of The Mad Minute — Glenn’s series delivering sharp geopolitical analysis and expert interviews on critical global issues.
Glenn brings unmatched expertise to this discussion, with over three decades of service in the US government, including assignments in Turkey, Russia, and extensive work on Middle Eastern affairs and counterterrorism. If you're curious about Glenn's remarkable career, we previously explored his experiences in both the CIA and State Department on Combat Story.
In today’s episode, we dive into the key events leading to Assad’s departure from Damascus, the swift advances of HTS and SDF forces toward the capital, the broader implications for regional players, and what strategic moves the US should consider next.
Now, let’s get into this essential analysis with Glenn Corn.
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Show Notes:
00:00 Introduction to the Breaking Event
01:16 Timeline of Recent Events in Syria
02:57 Key Players and Their Roles
03:52 Russia's Strategic Moves
04:44 Understanding Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)
07:17 Demographics and Historical Context
08:55 Implications for Regional Stability
13:10 Potential U.S. Strategies
17:59 Challenges and Opportunities
25:58 Global Interconnections and Final Thoughts
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
(00:01):
Welcome to a breaking event interviewon the extraordinary and rapidly
unfolding developments in syria coveringlate november to today december 8th
In this special episode, we're joinedby retired CIA senior intelligence
service officer and former StateDepartment diplomat, Glenn Corn.
This conversation is part of the MadMinute Glenn series, delivering sharp
geopolitical analysis and expertinterviews on critical global issues.
(00:24):
Glenn brings unmatched expertiseto the discussion with over three
decades of service in the U.
S.
government, including assignmentsin Turkey, Russia, and
extensive work on Middle Easternaffairs and counterterrorism.
If you're curious about Glenn'sremarkable career, we've previously
explored his experiences in both the CIAand State Department on Combat Story.
In today's episode, we dive into thekey events leading to Assad's departure
(00:47):
from Damascus, the swift advances ofHTS and STF forces toward the capital,
the broader implications for regionalplayers, and what strategic moves the U.
S.
should consider next.
With that, please enjoy.
This expert analysis with Glenn Korn.
All right, Glenn, thanks so much fortaking the time to sit down and walk
(01:07):
through some current events with us.
Thanks for having me.
It's great to see you, Ryan, and Ihope the family is well and everyone's
getting ready for the holidays.
Likewise, likewise.
And, uh, for people listening, I mean,we're filming this the evening of
Sunday, December 8th, which I feel isimportant just given, uh, some of the
events in Syria, so I just wanted tostart with a very high level timeline
(01:28):
for people who are tracking this.
Um, because things are unraveling soquickly, some of the dates might not be
perfect, but effectively late November,you've got Hayat Tahrir al Sham, which
will have HTS is moving south fromNorthwest, uh, Syria to take Aleppo,
Hama, Homs, um, Syria and Russia respondwith airstrikes about a week ago.
(01:53):
In early December, just a fewdays ago around December 6th, Iran
evacuates, it's diplomats citizensand could could force you've got the
SDF, the Syrian democratic forces inthe Northeast moving South as well.
They take Derazor and you have aconvergence, uh, outside of Damascus,
basically, uh, yesterday, the 7th,and then today, the 8th rebels entered
(02:17):
Damascus, Assad flees for Moscow.
Uh, Russia grants him asylumfrom what we can tell.
Um, Israel takes some airstrikes atIranian and Hezbollah positions in
Damascus, and then the U S makes someairstrikes about 75 or what are reported
targeting ISIS in central Syria.
(02:40):
What am I missing on that?
Glenn from a just high level timeline.
I know it's a very accurate timeline.
Uh, not a lot going on in Syriaor in the region, in the Levant.
Is your phone just lighting up withpeople asking you for what's going on?
Yeah.
I mean, the other, the other thingI would mention is just, you know,
on the eve of all this, the Israelisand the, and Lebanese Hezbollah,
(03:03):
uh, pushed by the Iranians cameto a ceasefire agreement, right?
And so this is an important topicbecause the Lebanese armed forces now
have to secure the southern border,their southern border with Israel, to
keep that ceasefire in place, althoughthere have already been violations.
So Hezbollah has continued tolaunch strikes into northern Israel
(03:24):
and the Israelis have responded.
They've made it clear they'regoing to continue to respond.
But the Lebanese armed forceshas got to secure the border
as part of that agreement.
But now they also have to worryabout their northern border.
So we can touch on all of that.
But of course, with everything happeningin Syria, a lot of questions now about
who is going to be in charge of whatpart of Syria with that, just before
(03:47):
we jump into Some of the playershere and in the different regions.
You also mentioned that you justread about Russia pulling out
from a couple of key locations.
Do you just speak to that realquick for a lay of the land?
Yeah.
If the open source reporting is correct,it looks like they're pulling out
their assets out of Tartu's naval base,which they've been in since the 1970s.
(04:09):
It's critical.
warm water port for, uh, Moscow becauseit's their only port on the Mediterranean.
Uh, and then, uh, my understanding is, uh,the Ottoman Air Base, um, in Syria, that
they're also moving assets out of there.
That is reporting coming from Ukrainiansources, if I read the article correctly.
(04:31):
So you have to be a little bit carefulthere because sometimes, you know, I
just say, as our great president, RonaldReagan, you say, trust, but verify.
But if it's true that the Russiansare pulling out of those bases,
that is very, very significantand extremely interesting.
What do we know about thisgroup, Hayat Tahrir al Sham?
Like, previously or formerlyknown as Nusra Front or Al Nusra?
(04:53):
Yeah, I mean, some elements wereNusra, uh, in the Syrian civil war.
You know, there's, there was a lotof back and forth changing of flags.
Um, some of the elements, some of thecore were, were connected with Nusra.
My understanding is Jolani, the leader.
Now, left, he had a falling out ordisagreement on policy with al Nusra,
(05:16):
uh, and he created, uh, HTS, uh, withsupport from the Turkish government.
Um, they are, they claim to be moremoderate, and I, my own assessment
is the Turks have been very,working very hard to moderate them.
The first thing that he announced whenhe entered Aleppo was that they were
(05:37):
not going to go after any minorities,they were not going to go after the
Alawites, they were not going to goafter Christians, that they wanted to,
you know, turn a page in Syrian history.
I'm sure that that is part of themessaging campaign that Ankara would
like them to deliver and hopefully it'ssincere if they want to stabilize Syria,
(06:00):
but there are a lot of elements that werepacked into HTS And of course, there's
a lot of concern now in the region.
And of course, I'm sure in Washingtonabout what's going to happen going
further whether some of the more extremistgroups are going to emerge because
if you remember Uh, in the heart, youknow, when the fighting was really going
on with the Syrian opposition, whatwas known as the Syrian opposition,
(06:22):
there were all kinds of elements,including what became ISIS, Nusra, uh,
variations of, you know, Nusra was AlQaeda, other variations of Al Qaeda.
You mentioned the, the Kurds, um, youknow, the, the Syrian Kurds, Which,
known as the SDFYPG, also known inthe Turkish view as the PKK, which
(06:42):
is a terrorist group for the Turks.
So, all kinds of activity, anduh, some of it very dangerous.
You bring up a good point.
So, we've got Jelani kind of leading HTS.
When he moves in today, he's announced,as you said, kind of transition government
and looking out for minority rights,and I think he appoints or is designated
(07:03):
former Prime Minister Mohammed Jalalias the transition, um, leader who has
also sounds like agreed to have, um,Elections and some transition period.
And the other thing you mentionedwith, uh, the Alawites that I do
think is important, Syria, and youknow, this better than anyone Glenn.
So like catch me if you feel this isoff 74 percent Sunni, 13 percent Shia,
(07:27):
which includes the Alawites who haveled under Assad, who have led Syria
for 50 years, and then 10 percentChristian and others in that area, which
is not insignificant, but as I'm surewe're going to touch on with Iran and
Israel and, and all the, the neighbors.
Right, yeah, correct.
I mean, I think those numbersare relatively accurate,
(07:48):
as best anyone can tell.
The Sunni were definitely the minority,but they were oppressed, uh, by
the Assad regime, by the Alawites.
Uh, of course, there is a Christiancommunity, there's an Armenian Christian
community, there are other Christians.
Um, and, um, you know, Syria waspart of the Ottoman Empire for
many years, then there was a Frenchmandate for control of Syria.
(08:11):
Yeah.
Uh, and like, you know, it's gonethrough a very tumultuous history,
let's say modern history, sinceit's got, it had its independence.
At one point it was, itformed an alliance with Iraq.
They were one country for a shortperiod, I'm sorry, Egypt, right?
And um, they also occupiedLebanon for years.
(08:35):
Um, you know, some people claim thatparts of Lebanon are actually Syria.
Which, you know, the word in Arabic,al sham, basically the Levant.
And so, uh, Syria's been in some kindof state of hostilities with, uh, war or
hostilities with Israel for many years.
Um, and, uh, then the civil war, which isa result of the Assad regime's oppression
(09:00):
of the Sunni community, population, andkind of dictatorial rule, Uh, there have
been different variations of uprisings,but when the civil war started in the
mid 2000s, it became very intense.
And there was a periodwhen Assad was in trouble.
He was bailed out by theIranians and their militias,
uh, mainly Lebanese Hezbollah.
(09:21):
And then the Russians who camein with a lot of noise and, you
know, this was Vladimir Putin's.
This is what I think is, you know, One ofthe significant points here, Ryan, this
was Putin's attempt or Putin's opportunityto kind of replace the Russian flag in
the Middle East and to demonstrate thatRussia was still at world power and the
United States was in decline because theadministration at the time, during the
(09:43):
Obama administration, there was a lot ofback and forth and let's say hesitancy
on what our policy in Syria should be.
Uh, we probably allowed avacuum to form, a void, and, uh,
Putin rushed in to fill that.
What's, you know, one, one native ofthe region told me two days ago that
now this demonstrates for, for yearsa lot of Syrians, Lebanese, you know,
(10:06):
residents of the region thought thatRussia was a very powerful country, but
now they're having second thoughts abouthow powerful Russia really is, right?
And, uh, of course, Iran.
Iran, which had created its, itsShia, the, you know, the axis of
resistance, uh, is now in retreat.
Uh, having serious problems, bothin Lebanon, Lebanese Hezbollah has
(10:29):
been seriously degraded, thank you.
Degraded by the Israelis, byIsraeli strikes and operations.
Uh, and of course strikes in Iran,which have showed that the Iranian
regime is also not as powerfulas people thought in the region.
And now what's happening in Syriais probably even more humiliating
for Tehran and for Moscow.
(10:49):
Is it surprising to you thatAssad went to Moscow instead
of one of those other allies?
No, it's not surprising at all.
I think it probably suits his lifestyleand his family's lifestyle, and I'm sure
Putin wants to do, salvage whatever hecan for his reputation by saying that,
showing he's a loyal, uh, friend tosomeone like Assad and a fellow dictator.
(11:12):
But I'm not surprised.
No, I'm sure he preferredliving in Moscow than Tehran.
Who, who do you think missed the, thatthis was building up and happening?
Like you mentioned the speedof how quickly this happened.
Obviously, Assad didn't have toleave the last time this got close
and he left within a week here.
Right.
I don't know who missed it.
(11:33):
I would say that we saw inOctober, 7 October of last year,
I think that probably the U.
S.
was behind the curve.
Uh, you know, there was a desire herein Washington to turn away from the
Middle East and focus on, you know, thefamous pivot to China, pivot to Asia.
Uh, at the time I said, Youknow, the Middle East is never
(11:57):
going to let that happen.
It's going to demand Washington'sattention and, you know, I don't know,
I don't know what was going on insidethe government here, what people saw,
didn't see, but I, we can definitelysay that the public has been surprised.
Uh, my guess is that the Turks mayinitially have been surprised with
the speed of, of HTS's progress,but probably better informed than
(12:19):
most people since they have a closerelationship with, you know, HTS.
And, uh, Based on discussions I've hadwith people in Lebanon, it sounds like
the Lebanese have also been surprisedat how quickly the regime fell.
I think some people felt that after Aleppofell that Assad would be able to hold on,
that the Russian and Iranian airstrikeswould help him, uh, but what we've seen
(12:42):
is that that was too little, not enough.
And, uh, the Iranians and theRussians are not in a position
to, to save Assad this time.
And Lebanese Hezbollah, which is again,thanks to Israel has been dealt a serious
blow, significantly degraded, as you said.
If you were still, you know, inthe government working and this
(13:03):
is happening right now and you'rekind of focused on the region.
I wouldn't be on your podcast.
true.
What are you thinking will happen next?
And what would you beadvising the administration?
Or a great question.
I think a couple of things,one, uh, we absolutely have
to watch how things develop.
You know, if the moderates hold on topower in Syria, this could be a great
(13:26):
moment for Syria and for the region.
A couple of strategic goals.
I think we have to have one is to denyIran the ability in the future to resupply
Hezbollah or rebuild Hezbollah in Lebanon.
So we have to watch Lebanon itself.
As I mentioned, you know, Lebanon,even before 7 October, was
struggling economically, socially.
(13:48):
It was the largest number of Syrianrefugees in the world per capita.
That was putting a strainon the Lebanese economy.
There's been no president in Lebanonsince October of 2022 and the Lebanese
have not been able to elect a president.
So the government has beena caretaker government.
which has not been as effective asyou would have if you had, you know, a
(14:09):
full time president, uh, and a cabinet.
Um, and Nasrallah made a strategicmistake when he decided to open up a
front against Israel on 7 October in,in, uh, alliance with Hamas, and now
we see that that was that, you know,some people said at the time it's a
mistake and he definitely made a mistake.
(14:30):
The Iranians made a mistake inmy assessment by letting him do
that and using him to do thatbecause they lost their best pawn
on the chess board in the region.
So we've got to watch Lebanon, you know, Iwrote an article about this at that time.
We don't want to see a void createdbecause, or if there's a void, we have
to help the legitimate authorities inLebanon fill that void, fill the vacuum.
(14:51):
So it's the same in Syria.
Uh, now there's going to be a scrambleto figure out who the legitimate forces
are and who's capable of filling thevacuum before groups like ISIS re
emerge in force or Nusra or some newform of extremists, either Shia or,
uh, Sunni extremists, you know, emerge.
(15:13):
And if you remember ISIS in 2014, itwas a non issue and all of a sudden
everybody was stunned by how quickly they.
Uh, we're able to spread theirinfluence in Syria and Iraq.
So we've got to watch that very carefully.
And we've got to work with, I believe,my own assessment is, Ryan, we've got
to work with the Turks very closely.
I've been saying for a longtime, Turkey is a critical ally.
(15:34):
Uh, we've got to work, that hasits own interests, and we've got to
take those interests, factor thoseinterests into our policy decisions.
Uh, and of course the Lebanese state.
We've got to help Lebanon now.
We've got to help them secure thesouthern border so we don't have any
more fighting with Israel, which is a keyally, and uh, the northern border in case
(15:55):
things get out of control in, in Syria.
We have of course a major ally in Jordan.
I'm sure they're concernedright now on the border.
And my understanding is that is theIsraelis have deployed troops not only
to their border with Syria but actuallyon the Syrian side of the border to
secure that side of the border becausethey're concerned and with the potential
spread of extremist groups into Israel.
(16:17):
And then the last policy piece,I think here, you know, my advice
is it's time to reassess ourrelationship with the SDF YPG.
And we need to ask ourselveswhether that relationship is, is
worth continued problems with ourbilateral relationship with Ankara.
At this time i've been arguing for awhile that turkey is a strategic partner
(16:38):
that we need to consider very carefullyWhen we make policy decisions if you if
you recall when we decided when the obamaadministration decided to support the
stf I think that the the comment or theclaim was it was temporary Transactional
and tactical that was 2014 and 10 yearslater For the turks, they'll tell you
(17:01):
it doesn't seem very temporary so youyou can You bet your bottom lira, uh,
that was a little joke there for theaudience, you can bet your bottom,
I don't know, your, that dollar thatthe Turks are now going to pressure
the incoming administration to endtheir, our support for the STF and YPG.
(17:21):
Now if we do that, if we withdrawour troops from Syria, uh, I
think we probably have, what,600, they say, 800, I don't know.
But if President Trump decides to goforward and remove US forces from Syria,
uh, I, I would argue that we have to makea, uh, demand on Ankara that they, you
(17:41):
know, that no atrocities are committedagainst the, the Kurds, uh, and that
also that we have the right and wehave their full support and cooperation
to go after any extremist groups thatemerge or that present threats to
the US homeland or any of our allies.
What's the hardest of thoseobjectives politically to get through?
(18:04):
Over the next few months in the U.
S.
In the U.
S.
Uh, well, one, I think, you know, we'llhave to see how the cabinet is staffed,
you know, who, who President Trump hasin key positions, what their views are.
But I think, you know, there's aweariness about the Middle East.
There, there was in the previous Trumpadministration, there was a desire,
you know, President Trump was electedsaying he doesn't want any wars.
(18:27):
So I don't think anyone wantsto get into another conflict.
Uh, there may be, you know,there was major pushback within
the U.
S.
or at least within the beltway against,you know, abandoning the Kurds before
when President Trump made that decision,he reversed his decision later.
My understanding is underpressure both internally in the U.
(18:49):
S.
and from some of our Europeanallies who did not want us to
end that support for the SDF YPG.
So, you know, I think those, thoseare going to be policy challenges.
Uh, and of course, you know, um, again,how we deal with Lebanon, you know,
is there going to be a president?
(19:10):
It's interesting.
They, the, the speaker of parliamentin Lebanon called for elections on 9th,
January, uh, He, you know, he wantsto elect a president, which is a good
thing, but there are, I think, somemembers of the incoming administration
have asked the Lebanese not to rushbecause they want to get into office
and have some say in what's, what, youknow, the next four years is going to be.
(19:34):
So my understanding is the newspecial envoy, the special advisor
for the Middle East that PresidentTrump has named, you know, came
out publicly and said, don't rush.
And my my read of that is give us time toget into office and review the candidates
Because in in lebanon, it's importantwho the right to have to pick the right
(19:54):
candidate for president Now that should bea decision of the lebanese people, right?
but if they pick a cabinet who and thisis just my assessment my opinion if they
pick a pro hezbollah candidate or someonewho's too willing to uh Give up lebanon's
interest for an outside power then YouI don't, I don't, I would personally say
(20:16):
we shouldn't provide any reconstructionassistance um, to Lebanon, which would
be a shame because there's a lot wecould do and they need a lot of help.
Would any of this, the, the activitiesin the last week or two have been
possible without what happened inUkraine and Israel, like October
7th and, and Russia, Ukraine?
(20:36):
It's hard to imaginethat it, it could have.
I mean, I think the Israelis andthe Ukrainians, uh, and the Turks,
three important allies for theUnited States, have handed us a
potential for, like, a game changer.
in Syria, Lebanon.
So the Israelis, of course, a highlyeffective campaign, which, you know, any,
(21:00):
any military expert, any intelligenceexperts should, you know, hats off.
It was, it's been very, very impressive.
And you have to give the Israeliscredit for how effective they've been.
Uh, the Ukrainians for their resilienceand for, you know, Vladimir Putin has had
to expend a lot of resources, uh, afterfailing to take Kiev in three days like
(21:24):
he thought he would in February 2022.
And the battlefield remains very,very painful for the Russians.
Um, and the Turks who haveconsistently stayed with HTS.
And some of the Syrian opposition and Ithink you know My own assessment is some
of the success on the battlefield that htshas had has probably been because they've
(21:45):
been Uh, they've been helped by a veryprofessional military What what's your
take on how putin is feeling now and whatyou think he'll do next based on this?
Yeah uh It's putin's feelingI hope that's a good thing.
My guess is he's very worriedbecause one dictator has collapsed.
(22:07):
We have to watch Iran,by the way, internally.
How is this going to impactthings for the regime?
Which is also, okay, the Assad regime wasvery unpopular with the Syrian people.
I would argue even withmany of the Alawites.
Right.
But he, he maintained power withoutside support and the use of force.
Now Iran, the Iranian regime is veryunpopular with the Iranian people.
(22:27):
They, many, many Iranians want change.
Is this going to send this likea spark or a wave through Iran?
That's going to result insome kind of change in Iran.
And then of course in Russia itself.
I'm sure that Putin is very worriedbecause he doesn't look good right now.
Again, his promise to the Russian peoplewhen he came to power in the early
(22:48):
2000s, in late 1999, 1999, 2000, wasthat he was going to bring Russia up from
its knees after the chaos of the 90s.
He was going to give the Russian peoplethe respect, or Russia, the Russian
state, the respect that it deserved.
He was going to remind the world thatRussia was a superpower, equal to the
United States, if not stronger, andthat Russia needed to be contended with.
(23:13):
and he was going to fixthe Russian economy.
Well, I think what we're seeing now,especially after his mistaken policy in
Ukraine in 2014 and then 2022, is thatthe Russian economy is in the dumps.
The Russians are suffering as aresult of his strategic mistakes.
There are estimates between, I think,600, 000 to 700, 000 Russian casualties
(23:37):
on the battlefield in Ukraine.
Uh, I would argue that the amountof territory that they've taken is
not worth those number of lives.
And social problems are on the,on the rise inside of Russia.
Many people here in the States don'ttalk about that because Putin's
propaganda has been so effective.
And they've tried to prove, youknow, we're more resilient and
(23:57):
everything is fine in Russiaand the Ukrainians and the U.
S.
Everyone has problems.
But, uh, I think now, like, what'shappening in Syria shows that
that is actually, that's a myth.
It's a Potemkin village.
The Russians are not that powerful,Putin's not that strong, he doesn't
have that much, uh, influence, and,uh, I hope that our recent elections
(24:18):
here, too, have shown the Russiansthat the American people went out to
vote, they are politically active,and they made a choice, and, uh, and
hopefully we'll have unity in the U.
S.
government and a littlebit less polarization.
going forward, because that'sanother very, very strong message
to guys like Putin and the people inRussia who are definitely watching.
(24:40):
And they didn't see chaosduring the election in November.
There was no chaos in the United States.
God bless, thank God.
And now, you know, Putinwas hoping for that.
He was hoping he could show theRussian people that, that look,
the Americans are chaotic, butat least we have stability here.
Now it's the opposite.
Does Russia try to keep a toe.
(25:00):
in, in the region.
Again, if they're really pulling outof, um, like, um, you know, Tartus,
that is very, very interesting.
It says where they want to, butthe question is, can they, right.
They may have to retract and thentry and reassert themselves later.
Uh, and of course we have tovet the information if it's true
(25:23):
that they're really doing it.
I haven't I've only seen one articleand I have to stress that they're
they could be trying to hold on youknow, there were meetings in Qatar
between the russians the iranians andum, and uh, who else was there russia
iran and turkey And I'm sure they'retrying to forge some kind of agreement.
The Russians are going to try and makethe best, do the best they can to hold
(25:45):
on to some influence and save face.
Um, so we'll see.
But if it's true that theRussians are skedaddling,
they're going to have ahard time getting back.
So we've seen, uh, obviously Arab springchanges over decade and a half plus now.
(26:08):
Is there anything we should be learningfrom those that we might see play out
in Syria that you would be advising?
Yeah.
Another great question.
I mean, one, we have to be realistic.
We have to understand thehistory and the culture.
I personally think we shouldn't demandfrom the people, let's say in Syria,
that Let's just look at the example ofAfghanistan, where we unrealistically, in
(26:30):
my assessment, thought that we could turnAfghanistan into another United States or
European country in 10 years or 20 years.
I historically, you know,realistically, culturally, uh,
socially, that was not realistic.
So we need to be very, verysensitive to the cultural
realities in the, in the region.
Uh, we, I think we have to manage ourexpectations and be willing to be patient.
(26:55):
as long as whoever takes over inSyria abides by some kind of, uh,
standard of, you know, not doing tothe population what the Assad regime
had been doing to the population.
Uh, and you know, we're just goingto have to watch very carefully.
I'm, I hate to say it, butI'm, I am concerned that some
extremist groups will emerge.
(27:16):
But I'm also concerned that Moscow, uh,and Tehran and whatever remnants are
of the Assad regime, the Ba'ath partynow in Moscow or outside the country,
are going to try and use the Sunniextremist threat to reassert their power,
which I would argue they did before.
(27:37):
And they, that's what they did before andthey got everyone's attention and everyone
nervous about the Sunni extremist threat.
So they reduced the pressure on them on.
themselves.
So we've got to watch that very carefully.
And we need to be very, very, in myopinion, patient and thoughtful when
we respond, uh, to information aboutpotential SUNY threats and really dig
(28:00):
and figure out where they're coming from.
If we want to disrupt the real source.
Is there a way that we really screwthis up in the next few months?
Is there something we do that really,like, this is a huge opportunity, like
you said, that we've basically been handedan opportunity in a very volatile region?
I would argue.
The way that we could screw it up is to beindecisive, to just try and ignore it, not
(28:23):
to take advantage of opportunities, and orto ignore the interests of our allies in
the region, and assume that they just willaccept our, you know, policy decisions,
which I don't think they are going to do.
If that makes sense, we're going tohave to compromise with our allies.
How do you see the countrybeing broken up if at all?
(28:44):
And I don't mean like into separateentities or countries or regions, but
just, you kind of alluded to it as wewere, we were kicking off and we've got
some effort in the Northwest with HTS,we've got SDF in the Northeast, we've got
Alawites, um, we've got Sunni majority.
Do you, do you see any of that breaking?
(29:04):
slightly within Syria?
I guess there's a potential, but Ithink what's so complicated is they're
all intermixed and intertwined.
So it's not, you know,simple, like one whole region.
I mean, I guess, you know,like Idlib could split away.
Uh, but even there, it's very complicatedbecause you have the Kurds, you have the
Sunnis, you have pockets of, of Alawites.
(29:26):
So I hope the country doesn't break apart.
Um, You know, some people have suggestedthere may be some parts of Lebanon
may cede and go to Syria, and theremay be some new form of Syrian state.
Uh, and then other parts of Lebanon would,would, you know, become Lebanon or state,
like they've talked about Mount Lebanon.
(29:47):
I hope that doesn't happen.
Um, I don't think that we wantthe whole region fracturing.
And again, this is where we'regoing to need our allies.
To help us and to advise us because someof them know the region better than we do.
I got basically two more questionsthat I just wanted to hit you with
and one is About who understands theregion best and clearly the allied
(30:08):
picture makes complete sense From yourtime in government many decades there.
Is there somebody who you thinkshould be really advising?
Leadership on what's happening here todayWell, I mean I would say we have a lot
of people that are very well educatedvery smart They spend a lot of time in
the region I worked with two ambassadors.
They were excellent, excellentexperts in the region.
(30:30):
Hopefully, they'll, they'll turn tothose people and ask them to play some
role in the future administration.
You know, we have a lot of talent, andwe have a lot of, you know, unfortunately
because of the war on terror andeverything that happened in the region,
we have a lot of people from the militaryside and the intelligence community side
that spent a lot of time on the groundand developed a lot of relationships.
(30:51):
I hope the new administration taps intothat, and one thing I would say is I
hope that we don't, sometimes I thinkour, the way that we approach, like,
staffing key positions is a little myopic.
We either go to business peopleor we go to just State Department.
But there's a lot more talent outthere in the talent pool, people that
spend a lot of time on the ground.
And then lastly, I think I knowthe answer to this, but I am
(31:14):
curious, does the UN have a roleto play in what's going on now?
Sure, of course the UN does.
Uh, very complicated question because ofall the challenges associated with the un,
and you know, I, I would suggest that USpublic opinion of the UN is not very high.
Of course, we saw some of the stuffthat was happening in, in Gaza and
(31:38):
some of the accusations that I thinkactually, you know, concerns that
the Israeli had, Israelis had aboutthe way the UN was handling things.
Uh, let's say people involved inor part of the UN missions that
were too close to groups likeHamas are actually supporting them.
So not objective, not, youknow, uh, neutral parties.
(32:00):
So the UN has challenges.
But the UN, I guess, can play a role,especially in the humanitarian aid area.
You know, if you look like theUN forces, the UNIFIL forces
in Lebanon, you know, they'resupposed to be securing the border.
But if you read the reporting,they were unable to do their job.
You know, Hezbollah was building basesand tunnels right next to the UN bases.
(32:24):
They were, you know, seizingUN troops when they were trying
to patrol the border area.
harassing them.
And, you know, in the future, aspart of this agreement between Israel
and Lebanon for the ceasefire, theLAF should be able to rely on the UN
forces there to actually do their job.
(32:45):
and they should beempowered to do their job.
You know, sometimes I think we,we forget that a lot, like the UN
forces, they're often not given thepolitical support they need to actually
execute mission that they're given.
Right.
And so none of us would envythem to be put on the ground.
You know, we remember in the Balkans andin other places where they're put on the
(33:07):
ground, but they're not allowed to useforce to protect themselves or execute
mission for very political reasons.
So, you know, personally, I don'tthink the UN is going to play the
lead role, and we shouldn't counton that for many, many reasons, but
there's probably a role they can play.
Anything else we should be coveringfor this kind of breaking event?
(33:28):
We talked about a lot of players, right?
I mean, Iran, Israel,Russia, Turkey, the Kurds.
We haven't mentioned Saudi and some ofthe other bigger players in the region.
Yeah, the Gulf statesare key players, right?
They, they, they are goingto have to have a say.
They have a lot of the financingneeded to help rebuild the region.
Uh, they have a lot of influencefor other reasons, you know,
religious reasons, cultural reasons.
(33:50):
So yeah, I mean the Gulf countriesshould have a say and they're some of
the key allies I'm talking about thatwe're going to have to work very closely
with and consider their, their input.
We're going to have to watch Iraq ofcourse, because Iraq is another part of
the potential domino If things get out ofcontrol and we still have forces there.
Uh, and then, you know, Ryan, Iwould just say this to like, who's
(34:12):
shifting around the world, but look,it was all, this was happening.
We had a South Korean presidentdeclare martial law, right.
And that, you know, I have a friend who'sin the crypto market and he was going
crazy, trying to figure out how thatwas going to impact the crypto market.
Uh, and, you know, we just have somany issues to track all the time,
(34:33):
and I say this all the time, butthe world is very, very complex
now, and a lot of this stuff is allinterconnected in one way or another.
So as, as South Korea is having thispolitical crisis, we have 10, 000
North Korean troops in, in Kursk.
You know, fighting with the Russians, wehave the Ukrainian Minister of Defense
going to Seoul to try and secure supportfrom the South Korean government,
(34:55):
which would be great for Ukraine.
So there's, it's all interconnected.
And of course, Iranian drones being,you know, killing Ukrainian civilians
that are being launched by the Russians.
By the way, I hope that allthese events will help us also.
Pressure, make it clear to Iran.
They're going to stop thatsupport for, for Moscow.
And if they don't, they'llbe at more price to pay.
(35:15):
This is my personal opinion, but youknow, the Iranians have been killing,
facilitating the murder of civiliansfor too long and it's got to stop.
Right.
As we bring this to a close, Glenn,is there anything else you ask people
to watch or, or you think shouldbe top of mind as we go another
week or two into the future here?
Uh, well, I think again,we're going to have to watch.
The stability issue in Syria, thepotential for a reemergence of, you
(35:40):
know, very extremist groups that aregoing to cause a lot of havoc, the
spread of that into Europe or into,you know, towards our allies, including
Israel, which we should be ready to helpour allies stop that from happening.
You know, even the Turks have to beworried about some kind of backlash,
because they also have a very largeSyrian population in Turkey, and
(36:00):
they have a long common border.
So we're gonna have to watch all that,and I would just appeal to all Americans,
like, this is the time where we needto show unity, and, um, stick together,
because that is the most powerful message,I think, that these dictators, when they
see that, they get very nervous, that theUnited States is not going to be divided,
(36:21):
and it's not going to be conquered.
And then the last thing I will say is,uh, this gives Giants fans hope because
a couple of years ago, no one thoughtthe Syrian opposition was going to
take their country back and they did.
So has it been the greatest coupleof years, but where are my Giants at?
For those listening, that's the New YorkGiants, not the San Francisco Giants.
(36:42):
For your San Francisco Giantsfan too, we'll support you, but.
Thanks a lot, Glenn.
Appreciate it.
Thank you.
Great seeing you.
Thanks for having me.
Welcome to a breaking event interviewon the extraordinary and rapidly
unfolding developments in syria coveringlate november to today december 8th
In this special episode, we're joinedby retired CIA senior intelligence
service officer and former StateDepartment diplomat, Glenn Corn.
This conversation is part of the MadMinute Glenn series, delivering sharp
geopolitical analysis and expertinterviews on critical global issues.
(00:24):
Glenn brings unmatched expertiseto the discussion with over three
decades of service in the U.
S.
government, including assignmentsin Turkey, Russia, and
extensive work on Middle Easternaffairs and counterterrorism.
If you're curious about Glenn'sremarkable career, we've previously
explored his experiences in both the CIAand State Department on Combat Story.
In today's episode, we dive into thekey events leading to Assad's departure
(00:47):
from Damascus, the swift advances ofHTS and STF forces toward the capital,
the broader implications for regionalplayers, and what strategic moves the U.
S.
should consider next.
With that, please enjoy.
This expert analysis with Glenn Korn.
All right, Glenn, thanks so much fortaking the time to sit down and walk
(01:07):
through some current events with us.
Thanks for having me.
It's great to see you, Ryan, and Ihope the family is well and everyone's
getting ready for the holidays.
Likewise, likewise.
And, uh, for people listening, I mean,we're filming this the evening of
Sunday, December 8th, which I feel isimportant just given, uh, some of the
events in Syria, so I just wanted tostart with a very high level timeline
(01:28):
for people who are tracking this.
Um, because things are unraveling soquickly, some of the dates might not be
perfect, but effectively late November,you've got Hayat Tahrir al Sham, which
will have HTS is moving south fromNorthwest, uh, Syria to take Aleppo,
Hama, Homs, um, Syria and Russia respondwith airstrikes about a week ago.
(01:53):
In early December, just a fewdays ago around December 6th, Iran
evacuates, it's diplomats citizensand could could force you've got the
SDF, the Syrian democratic forces inthe Northeast moving South as well.
They take Derazor and you have aconvergence, uh, outside of Damascus,
basically, uh, yesterday, the 7th,and then today, the 8th rebels entered
(02:17):
Damascus, Assad flees for Moscow.
Uh, Russia grants him asylumfrom what we can tell.
Um, Israel takes some airstrikes atIranian and Hezbollah positions in
Damascus, and then the U S makes someairstrikes about 75 or what are reported
targeting ISIS in central Syria.
(02:40):
What am I missing on that?
Glenn from a just high level timeline.
I know it's a very accurate timeline.
Uh, not a lot going on in Syriaor in the region, in the Levant.
Is your phone just lighting up withpeople asking you for what's going on?
Yeah.
I mean, the other, the other thingI would mention is just, you know,
on the eve of all this, the Israelisand the, and Lebanese Hezbollah,
(03:03):
uh, pushed by the Iranians cameto a ceasefire agreement, right?
And so this is an important topicbecause the Lebanese armed forces now
have to secure the southern border,their southern border with Israel, to
keep that ceasefire in place, althoughthere have already been violations.
So Hezbollah has continued tolaunch strikes into northern Israel
(03:24):
and the Israelis have responded.
They've made it clear they'regoing to continue to respond.
But the Lebanese armed forceshas got to secure the border
as part of that agreement.
But now they also have to worryabout their northern border.
So we can touch on all of that.
But of course, with everything happeningin Syria, a lot of questions now about
who is going to be in charge of whatpart of Syria with that, just before
(03:47):
we jump into Some of the playershere and in the different regions.
You also mentioned that you justread about Russia pulling out
from a couple of key locations.
Do you just speak to that realquick for a lay of the land?
Yeah.
If the open source reporting is correct,it looks like they're pulling out
their assets out of Tartu's naval base,which they've been in since the 1970s.
(04:09):
It's critical.
warm water port for, uh, Moscow becauseit's their only port on the Mediterranean.
Uh, and then, uh, my understanding is, uh,the Ottoman Air Base, um, in Syria, that
they're also moving assets out of there.
That is reporting coming from Ukrainiansources, if I read the article correctly.
(04:31):
So you have to be a little bit carefulthere because sometimes, you know, I
just say, as our great president, RonaldReagan, you say, trust, but verify.
But if it's true that the Russiansare pulling out of those bases,
that is very, very significantand extremely interesting.
What do we know about thisgroup, Hayat Tahrir al Sham?
Like, previously or formerlyknown as Nusra Front or Al Nusra?
(04:53):
Yeah, I mean, some elements wereNusra, uh, in the Syrian civil war.
You know, there's, there was a lotof back and forth changing of flags.
Um, some of the elements, some of thecore were, were connected with Nusra.
My understanding is Jolani, the leader.
Now, left, he had a falling out ordisagreement on policy with al Nusra,
(05:16):
uh, and he created, uh, HTS, uh, withsupport from the Turkish government.
Um, they are, they claim to be moremoderate, and I, my own assessment
is the Turks have been very,working very hard to moderate them.
The first thing that he announced whenhe entered Aleppo was that they were
(05:37):
not going to go after any minorities,they were not going to go after the
Alawites, they were not going to goafter Christians, that they wanted to,
you know, turn a page in Syrian history.
I'm sure that that is part of themessaging campaign that Ankara would
like them to deliver and hopefully it'ssincere if they want to stabilize Syria,
(06:00):
but there are a lot of elements that werepacked into HTS And of course, there's
a lot of concern now in the region.
And of course, I'm sure in Washingtonabout what's going to happen going
further whether some of the more extremistgroups are going to emerge because
if you remember Uh, in the heart, youknow, when the fighting was really going
on with the Syrian opposition, whatwas known as the Syrian opposition,
(06:22):
there were all kinds of elements,including what became ISIS, Nusra, uh,
variations of, you know, Nusra was AlQaeda, other variations of Al Qaeda.
You mentioned the, the Kurds, um, youknow, the, the Syrian Kurds, Which,
known as the SDFYPG, also known inthe Turkish view as the PKK, which
(06:42):
is a terrorist group for the Turks.
So, all kinds of activity, anduh, some of it very dangerous.
You bring up a good point.
So, we've got Jelani kind of leading HTS.
When he moves in today, he's announced,as you said, kind of transition government
and looking out for minority rights,and I think he appoints or is designated
(07:03):
former Prime Minister Mohammed Jalalias the transition, um, leader who has
also sounds like agreed to have, um,Elections and some transition period.
And the other thing you mentionedwith, uh, the Alawites that I do
think is important, Syria, and youknow, this better than anyone Glenn.
So like catch me if you feel this isoff 74 percent Sunni, 13 percent Shia,
(07:27):
which includes the Alawites who haveled under Assad, who have led Syria
for 50 years, and then 10 percentChristian and others in that area, which
is not insignificant, but as I'm surewe're going to touch on with Iran and
Israel and, and all the, the neighbors.
Right, yeah, correct.
I mean, I think those numbersare relatively accurate,
(07:48):
as best anyone can tell.
The Sunni were definitely the minority,but they were oppressed, uh, by
the Assad regime, by the Alawites.
Uh, of course, there is a Christiancommunity, there's an Armenian Christian
community, there are other Christians.
Um, and, um, you know, Syria waspart of the Ottoman Empire for
many years, then there was a Frenchmandate for control of Syria.
(08:11):
Yeah.
Uh, and like, you know, it's gonethrough a very tumultuous history,
let's say modern history, sinceit's got, it had its independence.
At one point it was, itformed an alliance with Iraq.
They were one country for a shortperiod, I'm sorry, Egypt, right?
And um, they also occupiedLebanon for years.
(08:35):
Um, you know, some people claim thatparts of Lebanon are actually Syria.
Which, you know, the word in Arabic,al sham, basically the Levant.
And so, uh, Syria's been in some kindof state of hostilities with, uh, war or
hostilities with Israel for many years.
Um, and, uh, then the civil war, which isa result of the Assad regime's oppression
(09:00):
of the Sunni community, population, andkind of dictatorial rule, Uh, there have
been different variations of uprisings,but when the civil war started in the
mid 2000s, it became very intense.
And there was a periodwhen Assad was in trouble.
He was bailed out by theIranians and their militias,
uh, mainly Lebanese Hezbollah.
(09:21):
And then the Russians who camein with a lot of noise and, you
know, this was Vladimir Putin's.
This is what I think is, you know, One ofthe significant points here, Ryan, this
was Putin's attempt or Putin's opportunityto kind of replace the Russian flag in
the Middle East and to demonstrate thatRussia was still at world power and the
United States was in decline because theadministration at the time, during the
(09:43):
Obama administration, there was a lot ofback and forth and let's say hesitancy
on what our policy in Syria should be.
Uh, we probably allowed avacuum to form, a void, and, uh,
Putin rushed in to fill that.
What's, you know, one, one native ofthe region told me two days ago that
now this demonstrates for, for yearsa lot of Syrians, Lebanese, you know,
(10:06):
residents of the region thought thatRussia was a very powerful country, but
now they're having second thoughts abouthow powerful Russia really is, right?
And, uh, of course, Iran.
Iran, which had created its, itsShia, the, you know, the axis of
resistance, uh, is now in retreat.
Uh, having serious problems, bothin Lebanon, Lebanese Hezbollah has
(10:29):
been seriously degraded, thank you.
Degraded by the Israelis, byIsraeli strikes and operations.
Uh, and of course strikes in Iran,which have showed that the Iranian
regime is also not as powerfulas people thought in the region.
And now what's happening in Syriais probably even more humiliating
for Tehran and for Moscow.
(10:49):
Is it surprising to you thatAssad went to Moscow instead
of one of those other allies?
No, it's not surprising at all.
I think it probably suits his lifestyleand his family's lifestyle, and I'm sure
Putin wants to do, salvage whatever hecan for his reputation by saying that,
showing he's a loyal, uh, friend tosomeone like Assad and a fellow dictator.
(11:12):
But I'm not surprised.
No, I'm sure he preferredliving in Moscow than Tehran.
Who, who do you think missed the, thatthis was building up and happening?
Like you mentioned the speedof how quickly this happened.
Obviously, Assad didn't have toleave the last time this got close
and he left within a week here.
Right.
I don't know who missed it.
(11:33):
I would say that we saw inOctober, 7 October of last year,
I think that probably the U.
S.
was behind the curve.
Uh, you know, there was a desire herein Washington to turn away from the
Middle East and focus on, you know, thefamous pivot to China, pivot to Asia.
Uh, at the time I said, Youknow, the Middle East is never
(11:57):
going to let that happen.
It's going to demand Washington'sattention and, you know, I don't know,
I don't know what was going on insidethe government here, what people saw,
didn't see, but I, we can definitelysay that the public has been surprised.
Uh, my guess is that the Turks mayinitially have been surprised with
the speed of, of HTS's progress,but probably better informed than
(12:19):
most people since they have a closerelationship with, you know, HTS.
And, uh, Based on discussions I've hadwith people in Lebanon, it sounds like
the Lebanese have also been surprisedat how quickly the regime fell.
I think some people felt that after Aleppofell that Assad would be able to hold on,
that the Russian and Iranian airstrikeswould help him, uh, but what we've seen
(12:42):
is that that was too little, not enough.
And, uh, the Iranians and theRussians are not in a position
to, to save Assad this time.
And Lebanese Hezbollah, which is again,thanks to Israel has been dealt a serious
blow, significantly degraded, as you said.
If you were still, you know, inthe government working and this
(13:03):
is happening right now and you'rekind of focused on the region.
I wouldn't be on your podcast.
true.
What are you thinking will happen next?
And what would you beadvising the administration?
Or a great question.
I think a couple of things,one, uh, we absolutely have
to watch how things develop.
You know, if the moderates hold on topower in Syria, this could be a great
(13:26):
moment for Syria and for the region.
A couple of strategic goals.
I think we have to have one is to denyIran the ability in the future to resupply
Hezbollah or rebuild Hezbollah in Lebanon.
So we have to watch Lebanon itself.
As I mentioned, you know, Lebanon,even before 7 October, was
struggling economically, socially.
(13:48):
It was the largest number of Syrianrefugees in the world per capita.
That was putting a strainon the Lebanese economy.
There's been no president in Lebanonsince October of 2022 and the Lebanese
have not been able to elect a president.
So the government has beena caretaker government.
which has not been as effective asyou would have if you had, you know, a
(14:09):
full time president, uh, and a cabinet.
Um, and Nasrallah made a strategicmistake when he decided to open up a
front against Israel on 7 October in,in, uh, alliance with Hamas, and now
we see that that was that, you know,some people said at the time it's a
mistake and he definitely made a mistake.
(14:30):
The Iranians made a mistake inmy assessment by letting him do
that and using him to do thatbecause they lost their best pawn
on the chess board in the region.
So we've got to watch Lebanon, you know, Iwrote an article about this at that time.
We don't want to see a void createdbecause, or if there's a void, we have
to help the legitimate authorities inLebanon fill that void, fill the vacuum.
(14:51):
So it's the same in Syria.
Uh, now there's going to be a scrambleto figure out who the legitimate forces
are and who's capable of filling thevacuum before groups like ISIS re
emerge in force or Nusra or some newform of extremists, either Shia or,
uh, Sunni extremists, you know, emerge.
(15:13):
And if you remember ISIS in 2014, itwas a non issue and all of a sudden
everybody was stunned by how quickly they.
Uh, we're able to spread theirinfluence in Syria and Iraq.
So we've got to watch that very carefully.
And we've got to work with, I believe,my own assessment is, Ryan, we've got
to work with the Turks very closely.
I've been saying for a longtime, Turkey is a critical ally.
(15:34):
Uh, we've got to work, that hasits own interests, and we've got to
take those interests, factor thoseinterests into our policy decisions.
Uh, and of course the Lebanese state.
We've got to help Lebanon now.
We've got to help them secure thesouthern border so we don't have any
more fighting with Israel, which is a keyally, and uh, the northern border in case
(15:55):
things get out of control in, in Syria.
We have of course a major ally in Jordan.
I'm sure they're concernedright now on the border.
And my understanding is that is theIsraelis have deployed troops not only
to their border with Syria but actuallyon the Syrian side of the border to
secure that side of the border becausethey're concerned and with the potential
spread of extremist groups into Israel.
(16:17):
And then the last policy piece,I think here, you know, my advice
is it's time to reassess ourrelationship with the SDF YPG.
And we need to ask ourselveswhether that relationship is, is
worth continued problems with ourbilateral relationship with Ankara.
At this time i've been arguing for awhile that turkey is a strategic partner
(16:38):
that we need to consider very carefullyWhen we make policy decisions if you if
you recall when we decided when the obamaadministration decided to support the
stf I think that the the comment or theclaim was it was temporary Transactional
and tactical that was 2014 and 10 yearslater For the turks, they'll tell you
(17:01):
it doesn't seem very temporary so youyou can You bet your bottom lira, uh,
that was a little joke there for theaudience, you can bet your bottom,
I don't know, your, that dollar thatthe Turks are now going to pressure
the incoming administration to endtheir, our support for the STF and YPG.
(17:21):
Now if we do that, if we withdrawour troops from Syria, uh, I
think we probably have, what,600, they say, 800, I don't know.
But if President Trump decides to goforward and remove US forces from Syria,
uh, I, I would argue that we have to makea, uh, demand on Ankara that they, you
(17:41):
know, that no atrocities are committedagainst the, the Kurds, uh, and that
also that we have the right and wehave their full support and cooperation
to go after any extremist groups thatemerge or that present threats to
the US homeland or any of our allies.
What's the hardest of thoseobjectives politically to get through?
(18:04):
Over the next few months in the U.
S.
In the U.
S.
Uh, well, one, I think, you know, we'llhave to see how the cabinet is staffed,
you know, who, who President Trump hasin key positions, what their views are.
But I think, you know, there's aweariness about the Middle East.
There, there was in the previous Trumpadministration, there was a desire,
you know, President Trump was electedsaying he doesn't want any wars.
(18:27):
So I don't think anyone wantsto get into another conflict.
Uh, there may be, you know,there was major pushback within
the U.
S.
or at least within the beltway against,you know, abandoning the Kurds before
when President Trump made that decision,he reversed his decision later.
My understanding is underpressure both internally in the U.
(18:49):
S.
and from some of our Europeanallies who did not want us to
end that support for the SDF YPG.
So, you know, I think those, thoseare going to be policy challenges.
Uh, and of course, you know, um, again,how we deal with Lebanon, you know,
is there going to be a president?
(19:10):
It's interesting.
They, the, the speaker of parliamentin Lebanon called for elections on 9th,
January, uh, He, you know, he wantsto elect a president, which is a good
thing, but there are, I think, somemembers of the incoming administration
have asked the Lebanese not to rushbecause they want to get into office
and have some say in what's, what, youknow, the next four years is going to be.
(19:34):
So my understanding is the newspecial envoy, the special advisor
for the Middle East that PresidentTrump has named, you know, came
out publicly and said, don't rush.
And my my read of that is give us time toget into office and review the candidates
Because in in lebanon, it's importantwho the right to have to pick the right
(19:54):
candidate for president Now that should bea decision of the lebanese people, right?
but if they pick a cabinet who and thisis just my assessment my opinion if they
pick a pro hezbollah candidate or someonewho's too willing to uh Give up lebanon's
interest for an outside power then YouI don't, I don't, I would personally say
(20:16):
we shouldn't provide any reconstructionassistance um, to Lebanon, which would
be a shame because there's a lot wecould do and they need a lot of help.
Would any of this, the, the activitiesin the last week or two have been
possible without what happened inUkraine and Israel, like October
7th and, and Russia, Ukraine?
(20:36):
It's hard to imaginethat it, it could have.
I mean, I think the Israelis andthe Ukrainians, uh, and the Turks,
three important allies for theUnited States, have handed us a
potential for, like, a game changer.
in Syria, Lebanon.
So the Israelis, of course, a highlyeffective campaign, which, you know, any,
(21:00):
any military expert, any intelligenceexperts should, you know, hats off.
It was, it's been very, very impressive.
And you have to give the Israeliscredit for how effective they've been.
Uh, the Ukrainians for their resilienceand for, you know, Vladimir Putin has had
to expend a lot of resources, uh, afterfailing to take Kiev in three days like
(21:24):
he thought he would in February 2022.
And the battlefield remains very,very painful for the Russians.
Um, and the Turks who haveconsistently stayed with HTS.
And some of the Syrian opposition and Ithink you know My own assessment is some
of the success on the battlefield that htshas had has probably been because they've
(21:45):
been Uh, they've been helped by a veryprofessional military What what's your
take on how putin is feeling now and whatyou think he'll do next based on this?
Yeah uh It's putin's feelingI hope that's a good thing.
My guess is he's very worriedbecause one dictator has collapsed.
(22:07):
We have to watch Iran,by the way, internally.
How is this going to impactthings for the regime?
Which is also, okay, the Assad regime wasvery unpopular with the Syrian people.
I would argue even withmany of the Alawites.
Right.
But he, he maintained power withoutside support and the use of force.
Now Iran, the Iranian regime is veryunpopular with the Iranian people.
(22:27):
They, many, many Iranians want change.
Is this going to send this likea spark or a wave through Iran?
That's going to result insome kind of change in Iran.
And then of course in Russia itself.
I'm sure that Putin is very worriedbecause he doesn't look good right now.
Again, his promise to the Russian peoplewhen he came to power in the early
(22:48):
2000s, in late 1999, 1999, 2000, wasthat he was going to bring Russia up from
its knees after the chaos of the 90s.
He was going to give the Russian peoplethe respect, or Russia, the Russian
state, the respect that it deserved.
He was going to remind the world thatRussia was a superpower, equal to the
United States, if not stronger, andthat Russia needed to be contended with.
(23:13):
and he was going to fixthe Russian economy.
Well, I think what we're seeing now,especially after his mistaken policy in
Ukraine in 2014 and then 2022, is thatthe Russian economy is in the dumps.
The Russians are suffering as aresult of his strategic mistakes.
There are estimates between, I think,600, 000 to 700, 000 Russian casualties
(23:37):
on the battlefield in Ukraine.
Uh, I would argue that the amountof territory that they've taken is
not worth those number of lives.
And social problems are on the,on the rise inside of Russia.
Many people here in the States don'ttalk about that because Putin's
propaganda has been so effective.
And they've tried to prove, youknow, we're more resilient and
(23:57):
everything is fine in Russiaand the Ukrainians and the U.
S.
Everyone has problems.
But, uh, I think now, like, what'shappening in Syria shows that
that is actually, that's a myth.
It's a Potemkin village.
The Russians are not that powerful,Putin's not that strong, he doesn't
have that much, uh, influence, and,uh, I hope that our recent elections
(24:18):
here, too, have shown the Russiansthat the American people went out to
vote, they are politically active,and they made a choice, and, uh, and
hopefully we'll have unity in the U.
S.
government and a littlebit less polarization.
going forward, because that'sanother very, very strong message
to guys like Putin and the people inRussia who are definitely watching.
(24:40):
And they didn't see chaosduring the election in November.
There was no chaos in the United States.
God bless, thank God.
And now, you know, Putinwas hoping for that.
He was hoping he could show theRussian people that, that look,
the Americans are chaotic, butat least we have stability here.
Now it's the opposite.
Does Russia try to keep a toe.
(25:00):
in, in the region.
Again, if they're really pulling outof, um, like, um, you know, Tartus,
that is very, very interesting.
It says where they want to, butthe question is, can they, right.
They may have to retract and thentry and reassert themselves later.
Uh, and of course we have tovet the information if it's true
(25:23):
that they're really doing it.
I haven't I've only seen one articleand I have to stress that they're
they could be trying to hold on youknow, there were meetings in Qatar
between the russians the iranians andum, and uh, who else was there russia
iran and turkey And I'm sure they'retrying to forge some kind of agreement.
The Russians are going to try and makethe best, do the best they can to hold
(25:45):
on to some influence and save face.
Um, so we'll see.
But if it's true that theRussians are skedaddling,
they're going to have ahard time getting back.
So we've seen, uh, obviously Arab springchanges over decade and a half plus now.
(26:08):
Is there anything we should be learningfrom those that we might see play out
in Syria that you would be advising?
Yeah.
Another great question.
I mean, one, we have to be realistic.
We have to understand thehistory and the culture.
I personally think we shouldn't demandfrom the people, let's say in Syria,
that Let's just look at the example ofAfghanistan, where we unrealistically, in
(26:30):
my assessment, thought that we could turnAfghanistan into another United States or
European country in 10 years or 20 years.
I historically, you know,realistically, culturally, uh,
socially, that was not realistic.
So we need to be very, verysensitive to the cultural
realities in the, in the region.
Uh, we, I think we have to manage ourexpectations and be willing to be patient.
(26:55):
as long as whoever takes over inSyria abides by some kind of, uh,
standard of, you know, not doing tothe population what the Assad regime
had been doing to the population.
Uh, and you know, we're just goingto have to watch very carefully.
I'm, I hate to say it, butI'm, I am concerned that some
extremist groups will emerge.
(27:16):
But I'm also concerned that Moscow, uh,and Tehran and whatever remnants are
of the Assad regime, the Ba'ath partynow in Moscow or outside the country,
are going to try and use the Sunniextremist threat to reassert their power,
which I would argue they did before.
(27:37):
And they, that's what they did before andthey got everyone's attention and everyone
nervous about the Sunni extremist threat.
So they reduced the pressure on them on.
themselves.
So we've got to watch that very carefully.
And we need to be very, very, in myopinion, patient and thoughtful when
we respond, uh, to information aboutpotential SUNY threats and really dig
(28:00):
and figure out where they're coming from.
If we want to disrupt the real source.
Is there a way that we really screwthis up in the next few months?
Is there something we do that really,like, this is a huge opportunity, like
you said, that we've basically been handedan opportunity in a very volatile region?
I would argue.
The way that we could screw it up is to beindecisive, to just try and ignore it, not
(28:23):
to take advantage of opportunities, and orto ignore the interests of our allies in
the region, and assume that they just willaccept our, you know, policy decisions,
which I don't think they are going to do.
If that makes sense, we're going tohave to compromise with our allies.
How do you see the countrybeing broken up if at all?
(28:44):
And I don't mean like into separateentities or countries or regions, but
just, you kind of alluded to it as wewere, we were kicking off and we've got
some effort in the Northwest with HTS,we've got SDF in the Northeast, we've got
Alawites, um, we've got Sunni majority.
Do you, do you see any of that breaking?
(29:04):
slightly within Syria?
I guess there's a potential, but Ithink what's so complicated is they're
all intermixed and intertwined.
So it's not, you know,simple, like one whole region.
I mean, I guess, you know,like Idlib could split away.
Uh, but even there, it's very complicatedbecause you have the Kurds, you have the
Sunnis, you have pockets of, of Alawites.
(29:26):
So I hope the country doesn't break apart.
Um, You know, some people have suggestedthere may be some parts of Lebanon
may cede and go to Syria, and theremay be some new form of Syrian state.
Uh, and then other parts of Lebanon would,would, you know, become Lebanon or state,
like they've talked about Mount Lebanon.
(29:47):
I hope that doesn't happen.
Um, I don't think that we wantthe whole region fracturing.
And again, this is where we'regoing to need our allies.
To help us and to advise us because someof them know the region better than we do.
I got basically two more questionsthat I just wanted to hit you with
and one is About who understands theregion best and clearly the allied
(30:08):
picture makes complete sense From yourtime in government many decades there.
Is there somebody who you thinkshould be really advising?
Leadership on what's happening here todayWell, I mean I would say we have a lot
of people that are very well educatedvery smart They spend a lot of time in
the region I worked with two ambassadors.
They were excellent, excellentexperts in the region.
(30:30):
Hopefully, they'll, they'll turn tothose people and ask them to play some
role in the future administration.
You know, we have a lot of talent, andwe have a lot of, you know, unfortunately
because of the war on terror andeverything that happened in the region,
we have a lot of people from the militaryside and the intelligence community side
that spent a lot of time on the groundand developed a lot of relationships.
(30:51):
I hope the new administration taps intothat, and one thing I would say is I
hope that we don't, sometimes I thinkour, the way that we approach, like,
staffing key positions is a little myopic.
We either go to business peopleor we go to just State Department.
But there's a lot more talent outthere in the talent pool, people that
spend a lot of time on the ground.
And then lastly, I think I knowthe answer to this, but I am
(31:14):
curious, does the UN have a roleto play in what's going on now?
Sure, of course the UN does.
Uh, very complicated question because ofall the challenges associated with the un,
and you know, I, I would suggest that USpublic opinion of the UN is not very high.
Of course, we saw some of the stuffthat was happening in, in Gaza and
(31:38):
some of the accusations that I thinkactually, you know, concerns that
the Israeli had, Israelis had aboutthe way the UN was handling things.
Uh, let's say people involved inor part of the UN missions that
were too close to groups likeHamas are actually supporting them.
So not objective, not, youknow, uh, neutral parties.
(32:00):
So the UN has challenges.
But the UN, I guess, can play a role,especially in the humanitarian aid area.
You know, if you look like theUN forces, the UNIFIL forces
in Lebanon, you know, they'resupposed to be securing the border.
But if you read the reporting,they were unable to do their job.
You know, Hezbollah was building basesand tunnels right next to the UN bases.
(32:24):
They were, you know, seizingUN troops when they were trying
to patrol the border area.
harassing them.
And, you know, in the future, aspart of this agreement between Israel
and Lebanon for the ceasefire, theLAF should be able to rely on the UN
forces there to actually do their job.
(32:45):
and they should beempowered to do their job.
You know, sometimes I think we,we forget that a lot, like the UN
forces, they're often not given thepolitical support they need to actually
execute mission that they're given.
Right.
And so none of us would envythem to be put on the ground.
You know, we remember in the Balkans andin other places where they're put on the
(33:07):
ground, but they're not allowed to useforce to protect themselves or execute
mission for very political reasons.
So, you know, personally, I don'tthink the UN is going to play the
lead role, and we shouldn't counton that for many, many reasons, but
there's probably a role they can play.
Anything else we should be coveringfor this kind of breaking event?
(33:28):
We talked about a lot of players, right?
I mean, Iran, Israel,Russia, Turkey, the Kurds.
We haven't mentioned Saudi and some ofthe other bigger players in the region.
Yeah, the Gulf statesare key players, right?
They, they, they are goingto have to have a say.
They have a lot of the financingneeded to help rebuild the region.
Uh, they have a lot of influencefor other reasons, you know,
religious reasons, cultural reasons.
(33:50):
So yeah, I mean the Gulf countriesshould have a say and they're some of
the key allies I'm talking about thatwe're going to have to work very closely
with and consider their, their input.
We're going to have to watch Iraq ofcourse, because Iraq is another part of
the potential domino If things get out ofcontrol and we still have forces there.
Uh, and then, you know, Ryan, Iwould just say this to like, who's
(34:12):
shifting around the world, but look,it was all, this was happening.
We had a South Korean presidentdeclare martial law, right.
And that, you know, I have a friend who'sin the crypto market and he was going
crazy, trying to figure out how thatwas going to impact the crypto market.
Uh, and, you know, we just have somany issues to track all the time,
(34:33):
and I say this all the time, butthe world is very, very complex
now, and a lot of this stuff is allinterconnected in one way or another.
So as, as South Korea is having thispolitical crisis, we have 10, 000
North Korean troops in, in Kursk.
You know, fighting with the Russians, wehave the Ukrainian Minister of Defense
going to Seoul to try and secure supportfrom the South Korean government,
(34:55):
which would be great for Ukraine.
So there's, it's all interconnected.
And of course, Iranian drones being,you know, killing Ukrainian civilians
that are being launched by the Russians.
By the way, I hope that allthese events will help us also.
Pressure, make it clear to Iran.
They're going to stop thatsupport for, for Moscow.
And if they don't, they'llbe at more price to pay.
(35:15):
This is my personal opinion, but youknow, the Iranians have been killing,
facilitating the murder of civiliansfor too long and it's got to stop.
Right.
As we bring this to a close, Glenn,is there anything else you ask people
to watch or, or you think shouldbe top of mind as we go another
week or two into the future here?
Uh, well, I think again,we're going to have to watch.
The stability issue in Syria, thepotential for a reemergence of, you
(35:40):
know, very extremist groups that aregoing to cause a lot of havoc, the
spread of that into Europe or into,you know, towards our allies, including
Israel, which we should be ready to helpour allies stop that from happening.
You know, even the Turks have to beworried about some kind of backlash,
because they also have a very largeSyrian population in Turkey, and
(36:00):
they have a long common border.
So we're gonna have to watch all that,and I would just appeal to all Americans,
like, this is the time where we needto show unity, and, um, stick together,
because that is the most powerful message,I think, that these dictators, when they
see that, they get very nervous, that theUnited States is not going to be divided,
(36:21):
and it's not going to be conquered.
And then the last thing I will say is,uh, this gives Giants fans hope because
a couple of years ago, no one thoughtthe Syrian opposition was going to
take their country back and they did.
So has it been the greatest coupleof years, but where are my Giants at?
For those listening, that's the New YorkGiants, not the San Francisco Giants.
(36:42):
For your San Francisco Giantsfan too, we'll support you, but.
Thanks a lot, Glenn.
Appreciate it.
Thank you.
Great seeing you.
Thanks for having me.
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