Episode Transcript
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(00:00):
OLSON (00:03):
President Trump, ha ha has been, we've,
we've, he's been a protectee of the Secret
Service since approximately 20 15, 20 16 when hedeclared his presidency for the first time. Ever
since then, he has had a routine behavior andpredictability, and the fact that he lives
between Mar-a-Lago in West Palm, Florida, andBedminster New Jersey during other months and
(00:26):
occasionally early on, he was in, in New York aswell. But when he comes to Mar-a-Lago, for
example, he plays golf regularly. And it doesn'ttake a, a, a, a brain surgeon to watch the news
to wa do very little work and determine thathe's regularly appearing at golf courses and
golfing when he is in Mar-a-Lago,
ROWE (00:53):
I have ordered a paradigm shift, the
Secret Services Protective Methodologies work,
and they are sound, and we saw that yesterday.But the way we are positioned right now in this
dynamic threat environment, it has given meguidance to say, you know what? We need to look
at what our protective methodology is. We needto get out of a reactive model and get to a
(01:17):
readiness model.
PROFT (01:18):
Welcome to another episode of
Counterculture, the show that stands that the
intersection of reason and faith in the battleagainst sentimentality, it's deja vu all over
again. After President Trump survived anotherassassination plot where a would-be Shooter was
able to get within 500 yards of Trump before aSecret Service agent was able to intervene. The
(01:40):
Secret Service needs to get out of a reactivemodel and into a readiness model set acting
director Ron Rowe in the aftermath. What doesthat mean? How about a common sense model? One
in which the Secret Service devotes the planningand the resources commensurate to the looming
threat. Both Roe and President Biden said one ofthe Secret Service, secret Services necessary
(02:01):
needs is more personnel. But I'd like to hearthe case for how many they say they need and
why, and how the additional personnel fit intothis paradigm Shift Rose suggested he is going
to initiate.
These are the same sorts of explanations wedemand of local police departments when they
make such asks Route touted Secret Services,recent successes, the RNC, the DNC, the debate,
(02:24):
the state's visit of Israel Prime Minister BibbNetanyahu. But the instances where the agency
has done a job cannot overcome inexplicablefailures like Butler that revealed apparent
culture problems within the agency, like anemphasis over the identity of agents rather than
their quality roge yet to speak to those issuesand was defensive when he was challenged on them
(02:47):
in a congressional hearing after the nearassassination of Trump in Butler, Pennsylvania.
So here we are again, try and get answers fromthe Secret Service and FBI while groping, for
some reason, to believe these federal lawenforcement agencies should enjoy the benefit of
the doubt as to both their competence andintegrity. To zero in on the important questions
to be answered about the attempt on the formerpresident at his golf course in West Palm. The
(03:11):
questions that remain about Butler and thecourse correction Secret Service should make.
We're pleased to be joined by Mike Olson, whoserved in the Secret Service for 22 years and
was also, was also in local law enforcement as apolice officer in St. Paul Minnesota. Mike Olson
is now in the private security business with afirm he co-founded called 360 Security Services,
(03:32):
which specializes in investigations,cybersecurity, and risk management. Mike,
welcome. Thank you for joining us. Appreciateit.
OLSON (03:40):
Glad to be here with you today, Dan.
PROFT (03:43):
So in that briefing that acting director,
Ron Roe gave, he, he, he basically said that
Secret Service is going to make a paradigm shiftfrom reactive to readiness, which will include
hard conversations about necessary needs thatwill allow the s QL service to be successful
every day. That sounds like sort of the wordsalad you expect from a, a candidate for
(04:08):
political office. I, I really, I have no ideawhat any of that actually means taken in
totality. So perhaps you could decipher a SecretService talk for us.
OLSON (04:17):
So apparently it's new language since I
left the agency, Dan. Okay. We, we, we, were not
an agency of reaction. We are a agency ofproactive risk assessment and protection, and
you can't provide protection when you're in areactive mode. Only that, that's then called
incident response, and it comes after bad thingshappen. So to be quite frank, I I've been
(04:42):
baffled by some of the things that have come outof the top echelon of the Secret Service over
the last several months, and I can't define thatfor you because it doesn't compute with my time
there at the Secret Service.
PROFT (04:54):
Something else Rose said. He basically
said we had a plan with respect to this off book
event, Trump playing golf at his golf course. Wehad a, we had a plan, and that plan succeeded.
It was almost like he was taking a victory lap.Is is that appropriate
OLSON (05:14):
In, in my humble opinion, no. And the
reason is, is one of the operative words that's
been left out of that statement ispredictability. President Trump ha has been,
we've, we've, he's been a protectee of theSecret Service since approximately 20 15, 20 16
when he declared his presidency for the firsttime. Ever since then, he has had a routine
(05:36):
behavior and predictability in the fact that helives between Mar-a-Lago in West Palm, Florida
and Bedminster New Jersey during other monthsand occasionally early on he was in in New York
as well. But when he comes to Mar-a-Lago, forexample, he plays golf regularly and it doesn't
take a, a, a, a brain surgeon to watch the newsto wa do very little work and determine that
(06:02):
he's regularly appearing at golf courses andgolfing when he is in Mar-a-Lago. So
predictability is the operative word that neededto be addressed here in regardless of whether
this was a quote unquote off the record or alast minute decision, a good risk and threat
assessment that should have been conducted,given everything that's happened up to this
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point, would dictate that people know where hegoes. And therefore, regardless of if it's last
minute, if someone who was gonna cause him harm,there's a good probability that they would lie
and wait in a place that they could get accessto 'em or easier access than say Mar-a-Lago
itself. And that would be a golf course.
PROFT (06:41):
Right. And so, so one of the things
that's been said is, well, he doesn't get the
same level of protection as the incumbent, as anincumbent president, but let's just say that's
okay. And I, I don't think it is, but we'll getto that. But let's just say for the sake of
argument that the level of protection he gets issufficient if the security planning is done
(07:02):
appropriately. So the level of protection hehas, would that necessarily include, you know,
sweeping the perimeter of the golf course beforehe's set to tee off so that, for example, if you
had a guy who was hiding in the bushes for some12 hours out off the fifth hole, you would see
that guy before Trump is on the course. I mean,you know, I understand you have percell
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limitations that are different for an incumbentfor a non-incumbent president versus incumbent
president. But still, just in terms of theprotocols that are adhered to, to make sure that
the particular footprint is safe and has beenscouted. Is that, is that fair? Should that have
been part of what Secret Service did?
OLSON (07:45):
A a Absolutely. I think it should have
been e especially where we sit right now in EP
September of 2024, following the previousassassination attempt only two months ago. A
absolutely, he's a, he's the major partycandidate for president. And regardless of
whether he's commander in chief and doesn't comewith certain military assets that fall under the
presidential protective detail, the threat levelis high. I can see it from where I sit in the
(08:10):
private sector. And so, again, off the record ornot, he goes to these golf courses, he owns
them. So that pre advanced activity that shouldhave occurred, those sweeps that you, that you
mentioned absolutely should have occurred. Andafter those sweeps, they should have been posted
with either agents or police officers that thenheld a post. If, if Ryan Ruth was sitting there
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for 12 hours as, as has been reported in, in, inthe media, he would've been detected at that
time during those sweeps. And then, and thenthat perimeter would've been held further out to
keep anybody that maybe would try to come uplast minute to try to get into that shrubb in
those bushes to try to engage in the same typeof conduct that Ryan Ruth did.
PROFT (08:52):
Yeah, it's interesting because Florida
Governor Ron DeSantis said, you know, I played
that course with Trump before, and as soon as Iheard the story about some activity at the
course, I thought, well, that fifth and sixthgoal, I know that's a vulnerable area. I mean,
you know, obviously DeSantis is not an expertin, in, in, in, in security planning, but he's,
he's got a lot of experience having a securitydetail. And so he maybe, you know, he looks at
(09:17):
it a little bit, he says, you know, that's anarea that's definitely a vulnerability on the
course. And even a layman like DeSantis couldsuss that out. It's, it's sort of difficult to
understand why Secret Service didn't
OLSON (09:30):
Yeah, it, it's, it's because they haven't
assigned and looked at it with the correct
amount of resources that they need to, given thecurrent threat profile that exists against
former President Donald Trump in, in my opinionagain.
PROFT (09:46):
So, so how does that work? Because not
only do we have Butler two months ago, but we've
had a, you know, in the last six to 12 months,we've had a Chicago woman arrested making
threats against both Trump and Baron. We've hada Texas woman arrested traveling in the
direction of where she thought Trump would be inmaking threats. We've had a Pakistani, a
(10:08):
national arrested that was plotting generalpotential targets for assassination, including
Trump. Trump was specifically mentioned,although he didn't have a plan sketched out. We
understand. So, I mean, you know, that seems tome a lot of law enforcement interaction with
threats that are directed at President Trumpthat just, again, commonsensically you say,
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well, we're going to provide this guy, you know,basically the maximum protection that we can
because in this political environment and whatwe're seeing in terms of the real, the reality
on the ground, we, we have to do that to be, toair on the safe side.
OLSON (10:48):
Yeah, I I think part of the problem here
too, Dan, is the Secret Service has spent
decades. They do, overall, the protectionmethodology is great. The problem is though,
they've allowed themselves to fall into thesesilos of protective details. And what I mean by
that is you have the president's detail, youhave the vice president's detail, you have a
(11:09):
former president, whoever's detail and based andoverall based on that, they assign X amount of
resources and, and human, human resources aswell as technical resources to those details,
they have to break outside of that, that bubbleand that government bureaucracy funding model
that, well, the president's detail gets thismany dollars, the former president only gets
(11:34):
this many dollars. That, I think that's part ofwhat's lagging behind here. And, and to hear the
comments about this is a, we want to get out ofthe reactive model, that's kind of the mentality
then that it's broken and it needs to beproactive and you need to address threats,
period threats. When I was in the Secret Serviceshortly after nine 11, there was a, there was a
(11:57):
major threat against former President Carter.And, and given the, the, the attitude now, I
mean, if something even happened to formerPresident Carter at this juncture, it, it would
be catastrophic, especially with whatpsychological boost it gives our foreign enemies
across the globe just to see that they couldcome in here and, and, and take out, you know,
a, a protected person from the United StatesSecret Service or the United States government.
PROFT (12:20):
Yeah, right. I mean, it seems like,
right, there's not any discussion of this is an
agency that's gotta be nimble, that's gotta beresilient, that has to be proactive, as you say,
but also has to be flexible enough to adjustaccording to the reality on the ground what we
thought was a threat. But we have something thatwas unanticipated here. So we need to be nimble
(12:43):
and and react very quickly to that. It wouldseem,
OLSON (12:46):
Yeah, yeah, absolutely. And, and, and
part of it need, there needs to be some
additional forward thinking. I think under thecurrent threat environment is historically the
Secret Service obviously relies heavy onpartnerships with local and state and other
federal agencies. They do have a great workingrelationship. Part of the problem, though, is
there's not really a funding mechanism in placefor local and state agencies to support the
(13:11):
Secret Service. So in a typical non campaignyear, you have, you know, somebody comes in for
a visit, maybe it's a, it's a once a year visitthat the president comes in and the local
agencies can kind of weather that overtime coststhat they have to pay officers to come in and
things like that. But, but what we're talkingabout here right now is the Secret Service is
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short on what was referred to when I was thereas manpower, the human resource portion of this.
And you can't bring enough human resources in atthis juncture to get through backgrounds to be
trained to then understand the job, to, youknow, to understand the playbook to get in
there. So you have to then start to rely onthose additional resources. And I think some of
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that funding mechanism that they need toidentify needs to go then to pay somebody state
and local law enforcements to supplement themand, and more rigorously train with them.
Because there's very competent policedepartments out there, and if they spend the
time training with them, they can work to try tomitigate some of this and, and extend those
perimeters of security that need to exist. Imean, this, this, this event the other day in,
(14:17):
in Palm West Palm was unacceptable in terms ofthe proximity that we allowed this potential
threat to get to. There needed to be additionalperimeters of security off the record or not. It
di it didn't matter. The threat profile againstDonald Trump is too high. I mean, again, I don't
have access to all that anymore. I can see itfrom where I sit these days. So it, it, it, I
(14:40):
just don't understand it.
PROFT (14:42):
Right. So, so Ro talking about personnel
and he also mentioned, you know, we, we, he, he
mentioned training essentially too. 'cause hewas saying, we want the, the, the most highly
trained counter snipers. We want them to be sortof, you know, military grade, you know, Chris,
Kyle type sharpshooters. And, but so as he'ssaying that, I'm saying, well, so what's
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happened? How, if the Secret Service has indeedatrophied both in terms of headcount as well as
expertise, then, then how, how exactly has thathappened? Why, why are we talking about the need
for these additional agents, the need foradditional training for counters, snipers at
this juncture?
OLSON (15:25):
It, it, it, the problem is, you know,
part of the problem here too is it's a law
enforcement agency. It, it's not a business, nota corporation that's run by somebody with, with
true business acumen. And, and understanding,being able to look at a long-term strategic plan
and understand where competition for jobs isgoing, where, you know, who are we gonna be able
(15:47):
to retain? Are we gonna be able to pay themenough? Are they gonna be able to, you know, go,
go through this training physically? Can wespend enough money on training to make sure
training is in fact required and not justsomething we put in our policy manuals that we
should receive training X amount of months peryear, but then we don't really do it because
(16:08):
we're shorthanded. So the atrophy's a good word.And, and, and it, and it's unacceptable. But
these are things that have been problems fordecades and, and, and it, and so there was the
ability to foresee these things. A as time wenton and, and especially when, when Donald Trump
took office the first time, we can see some ofthe reaction and the vitriol that exists out
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there in the public. And so the tea leavesneeded to be read as to what the future may hold
and, and the, and the type of resources thatneeded to be put in place before we have
incidents happen. And we're in this reactivemodel.
PROFT (16:45):
How, how much has the politicization of
hiring impacted secret service? I mean, even if
you, just from the outside and maybe obviouslyformer colleagues you work with your, your
perspective on it because, you know, we saw theincidents at at Butler and, you know, some of
those, and this was now admittedly, I I think alot of this was Department of Homeland Security
(17:09):
officers and not technically secret service. SoI, I wanna distinguish, but I mean, it speaks to
the larger problem of hiring based on we need tohave x number of women and x number of people of
this group and that group rather than we need tohave the, you know, the most capable agents
possible. You, you, you just, you just wonder ifthe, the personnel is not of the quality it
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could be because you're factoring in things thathave very little to do with aptitude and, and
professionalism.
OLSON (17:41):
A absolutely. This, this is not a career,
you know, nor is the military, nor are some of
the other federal agencies, even state and locallaw enforcement agencies where we should have
anything less than a, a meritocracy based, youknow, program of recruitment and training and,
and meeting those standards. You know, I was aphysical, doesn't look like it anymore. I've
(18:02):
been out of it for a long time. But, but I wasa, one of the PT coordinators for the agency
when I was there, and they're supposed to betraining or, or testing new recruits as they
come in and then maintaining that program. Andit, it, it, it's a roller coaster ride always.
You get into certain times where, hey, we don't,we don't have the time to do it, so we don't do
that. Well complete, that's, that leads us onthat path to complacency and problems. And, and
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then eventually other things become moreimportant because of political influence or
whatever it is. These, these, these, what welook like and, and you know, what we ascribe to
and things like that. It's very dangerous.Extremely dangerous.
PROFT (18:38):
So how, you know, one of the questions
about what happened at Trump International Golf
course there, that attempt is, you know, howdoes this guy know that Trump is going to be
there particularly be, I mean, whether it was onhis public schedule, whether it was on his
schedule and that this was, you know, knowableor not, but particularly because it wasn't, and,
(19:02):
and the excuse is given, you know, we had to doa, a sort of a reaction because he decided to
play golf and this was seemingly like a lastminute thing. So he even calls Warren to
question the idea of, okay, well, from, is, isthere, is there a leak in secret service? Is
there a leak in the Trump campaign? You know,what was the circle of people who knew he was
going to be on the course at that particulartime, particularly to give, that would be
(19:26):
assassin as much time as he had to lie and wait.And so, you know, what is your confidence level
now it's bringing this other agency called theFBI, what is your confidence level that the FBI
is gonna get to the bottom of that and providewhatever they do find to the public at large?
OLSON (19:44):
Well, you, you know, I'll start with the,
with the last question. I and many others of my
vintage that have retired from the federalgovernment, and not just secret service, I have
former FBI colleagues, D-E-A-H-S, you, you nameit. There is an uncomfortable fear factor in, in
(20:06):
all of us as, as to what's kind of become ofsome of these agencies. And, and I don't think
any of us, as we've sat around and had coffeeand discussed what happened, this wasn't the way
it was when I was there, kind of comments. Sothe con the confidence does wane. I, I'll, I'll
be honest with you, I, I, i, it concerns me,especially when you take in the totality of some
(20:29):
of the things we've observed over the last manyyears and, and the, the, you know, the, the, the
cases that have been made, the, the efforts thatare, that are going a going after, you know,
Donald Trump in certain ways, there's a littlebit of a conflict of interest there as well.
When you've got an agency that's part of, youknow, trying to make some of these cases then
(20:49):
investigating these threats. I mean, that's,that's just an objective comment from somebody
who's done both investigations and protection mywhole life. That there needs to be
accountability and transparency. And I'm notsure under the circumstances in the last few
years that that's achievable in a, in a, in atransparent way, I guess. So, so that is a
(21:13):
concern, you know, and I, and I think bottomline, I think historically a lot of that needs
to be reevaluated in terms of accountability. Imean, we, we stick in those silos. Again, FBI
has the memorandum of understanding toinvestigate these. It's understandable. And
there's good, you know, again, in every agencyand there remains there, there remains committed
(21:33):
patriots and people that are, are dedicated towhat they do. They believe in the constitution,
they believe in the, the oath they actuallytook. But it can, it's very dangerous as to when
that power gets corrupted at the higher levelsand how that influence can, can grab a
stranglehold on whether agencies are doing theright thing or not at the, at the lower levels.
PROFT (21:52):
Well, right, and I would think that law
enforcement would be particularly sensitive to
this because if there is not a public accountingfor what went down, and this was actually a
point that Thomas Baker made when I interviewedhim, who was the F first FBI agent on scene and,
and the point man for the investigation into thefailed assassination attempt by Hinkley on
(22:13):
Reagan. And he said, you know, we gather theevidence, we put together our understanding of
the case. Tim McCarthy says the same thing,former Secret Service took a bullet for Reagan.
And, and then we, once, we thought we had anunderstanding of what happened and why it
happened best as we could, we started to makethe case to the public. And so you can ask us
questions, you can disagree with ourconclusions, you can say we missed something
(22:35):
this, but at least we're saying we've gatheredall the evidence. We think we have this
understanding of, of what transpired and why itdid and how it went about and what we learned
from it. And it's there for public consumptiondiscussion and debate. That seems to be not
something we're getting anymore. And it breedsconspiracy theories. And conspiracy theories
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don't make the job of law enforcement anyeasier.
OLSON (23:02):
No. That no, you're, you're absolutely
correct. And, and these, these devices don't
help either. I mean, they're working against thespeed of light at messages that are out there
and people start communicating all this stuff.What was very apparent and should have, have
been apparent to everybody was look at thedifference between a couple of days ago after
the incident in Florida and, and the ButlerPennsylvania incident where we heard nothing.
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We, we received no press briefings, no criticalincident updates. All of a sudden, this one, it
wasn't quite immediate. We got it a little bitfrom the local sheriff's, which was great,
right? And then, but then we did get it from thefeds, and that that is, that's kind of security
incident planning 10 0 1. It was shocking that,that that wasn't something that was on the
radar, radar after Butler. And so that time lagdoes then, especially when we have people out
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there that can talk about all these otherthings, it does start to breed that conspiracy
aspect of it.
You know, I, I think overall, you know, in thiscase, and I was glad to see, and I'm not saying
that the FB i's not gonna do its job or anythinglike that, but I'm glad to see that the local
sheriffs and maybe even the governor of Floridais stepping in to try to be a part of that. And
(24:13):
I, and I think they should be allowed into that,to, to, to gain that confidence of that
transparency and accountability that hey, it'snot, the feds aren't, you know, closing, you
know, it's kind of like elections when we sealup windows and don't let certain people see
what's going on inside. Yeah. We end up withconspiracy theories or, or, you know, or there's
a reason for it. And, and Right. You know,rightfully assumed. So I think it's important
(24:36):
right now, given everything that's going on,that there's an overt effort made to bring in
other people to kind of audit or ensure thegovernance and the transparency of some of these
processes.
PROFT (24:48):
Yeah, I think that's the, the DeSantis
saying like, we're gonna do our own state level
investigation because there are state laws thatwere violated too. And so he can bring, or, you
know, prosecutors can bring their own lawenforcement action against this would be
assassin. And, but you know how government istoo. I'm very interested to see how that plays
out because people, you know, get veryterritorial. They like to protect their fiefdoms
(25:10):
and, you know, and it's, despite the fact thatone of the lessons we were supposed to have
learned after nine 11 was that federal, state,local government, particularly in law
enforcement, need to be able to communicate withone another. And here we are just marking the
23rd anniversary of nine 11, and we still havethis problem. And we saw this problem at Butler
too, where, you know, the, the, the, the guy incharge of making sure the radios between Secret
(25:36):
Service and local, our, you know, our work, ourin inter interoperable, well, they, they
weren't, I mean, we, you know, how do we havethese pro you know, people look at this and say
all this, you know, high minded rhetoric abouthere's what we're gonna do and we learned these
lessons, and then decades later you haveincidents where it's the same problem that rears
(25:57):
its head.
OLSON (25:58):
Yeah, a hundred percent. And, and, you
know, and that when we, that gets back a little
bit into the whole resource allocation thing,you know, where some of the things you'll hear
from the Secret Service about whether theyshould be in treasury, whether they should be in
DHS there, I mean, there's literally, it, it, itnever really improved. Did it get a little be
better? Maybe the Secret Service definitely hasgood relationships with local and state overall
(26:23):
good with other federal agencies, but thefederal agencies compete like, like it's a
competition for those dollars out there from,from Congress. And, you know, somebody, and I'm
not, I'm not casting Stones, but the FBI is amuch larger agency has the ability to put a lot
of agents literally on Capitol Hill as, asliterally lobbyists to assist on certain things.
(26:45):
Whereas the Secret Service doesn't have that,that bandwidth to be able to do something like
that. So when you need people out there reallyselling why we need more budget and things like
that, you don't have that. And, andunfortunately we end up having to try to react
to it when, when bad things happen, which, whichshouldn't be the case, that the this should be
proactive and, and preventative not, notreactive. So I'll let you comment if you mean
PROFT (27:09):
That. Yeah, well, I mean, I mean, so I,
so just thinking about all this too, now, as you
say that distinguishing between the publicresponse and the, the speed of it after what
happened this past Sunday versus what happenedon July 13th in Butler, Pennsylvania. Yeah,
that's good. But, but then I, i, it gets methinking about Butler, Pennsylvania and two
(27:32):
months later, how little handle we really haveabout what went down, who made the decisions or
failed to make the decisions, who, whoseresponsibilities were not fulfilled. We don't
really have that. But we have, what we have isin advance of this report that's supposed to be
forthcoming shortly, senior level Secret Servicepeople are gonna be retiring. And we have, you
(27:55):
know, sort of ge general accountability thatwill be accepted so that no individual
accountability needs to be ascribed. So nobodyindividually needs to be held accountable except
for these guys that'll, you know, get brushed tobrushed over to, to retire or a year or two
early. I mean, that's not, we, we, we don't knowthat much about the shooter. We don't know
(28:18):
exactly why they prevented his body from beingautopsied. I mean, all these questions that
surround what the events of July 13th and theFBI has provided very little public commentary
about that two months, two months later.
OLSON (28:34):
Yeah. It, it again be because information
unlike, you know, 30, 40, 50, 60 years ago when
something like this happened, information again,moves at that speed of light. And law
enforcement has to realize you have to get outin front of this. And, and they do have to
change their processes. And, and, and there's noreason under the, given the circumstances of a
(28:58):
potential as or not potential two assassinationattempts, that there shouldn't be a process in
place to investigate these immediately. I mean,we, you can throw enough resources at that to
get 90% of your case done. The que the nextquestion is are, are we actually making the case
to have successful prosecution? Because that'spart of, we have to preserve evidence, we have
(29:20):
to make sure we don't t you know, taint theevidence or the chain of custody. And there's
things like that. But we can comment to some ofthis because the public interest is at play here
too.
And, and not only that, more importantly, Iwould argue right now, public safety, going back
to maybe the importance of having the state,like, like the state of Florida, or in this case
or, or the Sheriff's office involved at thetable for this investigation, is the general
(29:45):
public is potentially being put at greater riskwhen, when these protectees are, are coming into
the area that, that they're at, you know, ununfortunately the sad, you know, death of Cory
Cooper in Pennsylvania, you know, so a sheriffor a state official does have some obligation to
uphold their own public safety if, if somebodyis coming in that's, you know, to some degree
(30:10):
brings the potential for risk at a heightenedlevel to them. And, and so they can't be closed
outta that process. And I think, you know,bridging that those relationships a little bit
more would be helpful, you know, especially inlight of potential, you know, conspiracy
theories and, you know, and things like that toget multiple agencies at the table, you know,
(30:30):
contrary to what, what, like what you said, whatwe expected after nine 11.
PROFT (30:33):
Well, and, and because in Butler, in the
wake of the failed attempt in Butler, you had
finger pointing going on. You had the secretservice director at the time, more or less
insinuating that it was the Butler police thatfell down on the job. And then Butler police are
saying, the hell we did. And you have body camvideo of a Butler police officer, you know, days
(30:56):
after the, after the, the near miss, I mean thehit. But the, you know, the, the near miss in
terms of taking the precedent out is saying, Itold these guys, I told these guys. And, and
when you have that sort of excited extortion inthe moment that captured on a body cam video,
(31:17):
you know, Butler police chief combined withSecret Service leadership needs to, seems to me
come forward and, and offer an explanation forwhat happened and, and on who's watch it
happened, and here's what we're gonna do aboutit, and here's what we learned from it. I mean,
you know, it's like the whole thing, theAmerican people are forgiving, but not if you're
(31:38):
going to, you know, lie and obfuscate at everyturn. And that's, that's really what it feels
like is going on here.
OLSON (31:45):
I, I agree with you, Dan. And there,
there is, there is an unfortunate drive by
certain people yes. To, to, to want to not justown mistakes. Humans make mistakes. They do.
There's no, there is no perfect security planout there. There's no perfect cybersecurity
(32:05):
plan, don't fit. So it, it is troubling thatthey can't come forward and learn from that. I,
I will say I was a little disappointed back whenI was on the job. I was actually there the day
former Vice president Dick Cheney shot thegentleman down in Texas, and that was an unusual
event. We didn't train Yeah. For a situationwhere you're protectee shoot somebody. So, but
(32:27):
there was a, there was literally a lot to belearned after that incident that those of us
that were there could have been tapped into moreto help train or provide better post incident or
after action briefings to train the nextgeneration of agents or law enforcement for,
geez, we, we didn't think of this one, but here,here's what happened, here's what went good,
(32:50):
here's what didn't go good, you know, and learnfrom that. There, there wasn't enough of that.
And it, it's, it needs to happen.
PROFT (32:56):
One of the, one of the lessons lessons,
one of the lessons is don't go bird hunting with
Dick Cheney. That was one of the after actionlessons, right? Yeah. But no, but it is
interesting because I, you know, one of thethings too is, is, you know, outside of maybe
Clint Eastwood in, in the line of fire, youknow, you don't really have an idea of what
Secret Service does on a daily basis. I mean,you know, generally people know, generally they,
(33:19):
they, they investigate forgeries and the cybercrime and obviously the protectees and this, but
I mean, you don't really have a sense of whatthey do in the same way, maybe just through the,
the popularization through through TV and moviesthat FBI or military do. And, and I, I wonder,
you know, maybe you could describe it beingthere two decades, you know, I mean, what, what
(33:42):
is the job of the Secret Service on a dailybasis, and what, what are those interactions
like with state and local, with the protecteethemselves? We've heard about relationships
between, you know, different people anddifferent details with different presidents or
other protectees, but I just like the, you know,an insight into the culture at Secret Service,
(34:02):
the job of Secret Service, you know, all ofthat. It's, it's, it's definitely more murky
than some of the other law enforcement agencies.
OLSON (34:10):
Sure. One, one of the things I usually
say, and I noticed you didn't mention it, Dan,
was you mentioned in the line of fire, but youdidn't mention guarding te with Nicholas Cage.
Oh, yeah. Right. Yeah. I, I, I saw, I often jokewith, I often joke with people that want to go
on the job is the protection environment,contrary to what we've seen this year is a
little bit more like the movie guarding test.It's standing around, it's complete boredom, you
(34:33):
know, things like that. But honestly, the, thejob is actually very rewarding. It's very
difficult. The, one of the big things I thinkthat needs to be changed is this emphasis on
moving people around the country on a regularbasis to, to promote or to get into another
office or to go to this. I think, I think thatneeds, I think that's part of what's been a
problem for many decades.
(34:55):
But aside from that, the opportunity to havethat dual mission, and, and there's people out
there that say it, they should completely doaway with investigations, and they, it should be
protection only. That's great. But you talk to alot of people, and I have, and I continue to,
even newer agents that are on the job right now,that it's because of the protection portion of
it, that they wanna leave the job because it'stoo demanding. It's too, they stand around other
(35:20):
than what we've seen this year, the majority ofthe time, you're spending an eight hour shift
standing in front of a, a door, doing nothing,trying to stay awake, trying to, you know, keep
your mind sharp. You might be on a midnightshift trying to stay awake as you're trying to
do that and remain vigilant. Every once in awhile you get to go out and be a part of an
advanced team.
And that's fun because you get to do theplanning you're responsible for that it, the
(35:44):
Secret Service, because of these relationships,both in its investigative and its protective
mission. That was one of the greatest thingsabout the job, is the ability to go and meet
people from all walks of life, be it militarybusiness, you know, any city, any part of the
world, and work with them usually when it meantprotection in a very short order to, to put
(36:04):
together a security plan, achieve the mission,you know, and, and hopefully walk away with no
incidents. That's a big part of it. So you needpeople that can communicate and interact at that
full enterprise level concept, so to speak. Ifthis was a, if this was a company we were
talking about, you need individuals that can goand interact with that C-suite level, because a
(36:25):
lot of these protectees, the, you know, thepresidents and the former presidents, they're
going to these places that they visit.
So you need people that can, that can talk,talk, you know, with them and, and, and carry on
that professionalism. The investigations itselfwere, were, were great and, and because of the
reliance on those relationships with say, stateand locals, so for example, I, I ran our, our,
(36:48):
what's called now what the Secret Service iscalled now, it's called the Cyber Fraud Task
Force. When I was there, it was the ElectronicFinancial and Electronic Crimes Task force. So I
ran that for the state of Minnesota on behalf ofthe office of Minneapolis. So I worked greatly
with all kinds of different agencies. That wasimportant because it was those same agencies
where we're working a lot of these criminalcases that then become our partners when a
(37:11):
protective visit comes in. And so you have thoseinstant contacts to, and relationships to be
able to call up and say, Hey, president'scoming, can you, can we, you know, do X, Y, or
Z?
Or you've built relationships with the policeofficers so you know, there's a trust there. You
can, you, you know, you can trust becausethat's, that's always a fear that the Secret
Service doesn't want to admit to. And that'spart of the reason they put people through
extensive backgrounds is we gotta make sure thatthere's not somebody that, you know, has an
(37:36):
issue with this protectee and is gonna dosomething. You know, that, that's always on the
back of your mind. But so, so that whole, thatwhole relationship thing is really at the core
of everything. They do both investigations andprotection and one feeds into the other. The,
the part of my view on the problem of doingprotection only is it's literally a roller
(37:58):
coaster campaign. Years are out of control.They're massive. You're, you're gonna spend a
majority of your time as a secret service personon the road traveling deal going from campaign
site to campaign site.
But then in those off years, there's not as muchtravel. So if you have all these agents on the
job, and that's part of what the Secret Servicehas struggled with over the years, well, I think
with not staffing up appropriately is it's thoseoff years then, well, now what do we do with
(38:22):
people? We've got all these human resources, wedon't have enough protection going on. Well,
that's when they should be training, that's whenthey should be training with locals and state
and, and have those, you know, goodopportunities and, and all these other things
that need to take place on a more, more regularbasis or working these investigations that then
continue to build those partnerships. Secretservices always expected investigations to be
(38:43):
dropped and put aside when a protection has hasin theory always come first. I'll pause for a
minute in case you have any, you know, comments,Dan,
PROFT (38:51):
Just on the relationship with FBI, you
know, I mean, one of the big questions,
recurring questions in this era of unprecedentedlawfare is who investigates the investigators,
who prosecutes the prosecutors? You know, whereare the accountability mechanisms for these
federal agencies that have so much lawenforcement police power effectively? And so the
(39:15):
relationship between FBI and Secret Servicesince FBI is investigating Butler now they'll be
investigating West Palm and those assassinationattempts. You know, is this, is this a
relationship that is competitive? Is itantagonistic? Is it closer to you? Get you cover
(39:36):
my back and I'll cover your back. You know, howmuch confidence should the American people have
in what the FBI determines did and did nothappen with respect to these assassination
attempts.
OLSON (39:51):
So the, the relationship actually is
really honestly dependent on the individuals and
the individual district state, the relationshipsthat, say in this recent example, that Miami
agent in charge of the FBI and the Miami agentin charge of the Secret Service, if they've got
a good relationship, you know, there, there's,there's gonna be some good trust there. I don't
think it's, I've never really seen it. Likewe're, we're, we're all locked arm in arm.
(40:15):
There's definitely, you know, some level of, youknow, there always has been, and I say it more
in a friendly competition for budgets, forresources, for jurisdiction, investigative
jurisdiction. I, I mean, I saw it. I was, I waspart of it and, but I, I don't know how to
(40:36):
honestly answer your question about should wetrust what's going on now, because I've seen the
same things a lot of the American people areseeing it that are, you know, using discernment
and, and studying what's going on. And, and notonly me, but agents that have worked in those
agencies have seen it, and we've talked aboutthat when I, like I mentioned to you earlier,
(40:56):
there is concern and it, and it, and it, butwe're not sure what we're concerned about
because it, it just doesn't look the same. And
PROFT (41:05):
Well, that's, that's, that's sort of,
that's sort of the point is like, is, you know,
the, the, the, to simplify the question is, youknow, are are we gonna get something that's on
the level, or is getting something on the level,is that just not gonna happen anymore? Un until,
and unless there's this paradigm shift orleadership change that Ron Roe was talking
about,
OLSON (41:24):
I i, I, the good news is, and this is one
of the things that was done right many, many,
many years ago after the Kennedy assassination,was the Secret Service did establish this
memorandum of understanding with the FBI, thatSecret Service can't investigate itself when it
comes to an assassination attempt or anassassination. It, it could have been an inside
job. So for that reason, you do need that, thatob objectivity and that outside avenue. I think
(41:48):
given a lot of what's gone on, and I follow alot of different things on social media and
understand what some of the concerns are outthere in, in all both sides of the spectrum, is
the importance of some additional accountabilityand transparency that needs to happen right now
with these federal agencies. I think with eitheran additional government agency at the federal
level or potentially the state, state partners,and they need to be brought in, I think that's
(42:14):
would help and go a long ways with putting somepeople's minds at ease.
That, that, that this is a, you know, a fairthing personally, I think what we've witnessed
between Butler, Pennsylvania and the other dayin, in West Palm Beach, Florida, I I, is a
combination of growing incompetence, lack ofresources, and, and we've always done it this
(42:39):
way. You know, why, why, you know, why did weneed to change? And there's never been, there
hasn't been an attempt in forever. It didn'thappen during my watch. I mean, it didn't happen
while I was on the job. You know, we, we cameclose to the opposite of protect. He almost shot
an in, you know, an innocent person, but therewas no assassination. There are a lot of
incidents that happen on a daily basis thatpeople are never aware of where we get close,
(42:59):
but they're mitigated and deterred. So, but I, Ithink, I think given everything that's going on
there, there needs to be a, a heightened levelof, of accountability under the current
conditions for us all to feel good.
PROFT (43:12):
I just, before I let you go, just to go
back to West Palm Beach, the, one of the other
questions I I failed to ask earlier, what weknow about that alleged would be Assassin, who's
now in custody and been arraigned, should hehave been on Secret Services Radar with
everything that we know about him, publiclyprofiles in the New York Times, a self-published
(43:34):
book on Amazon that talks about assassinatingPresident Trump, you know, talks favorably about
it. The, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, theinterviews that he gave associated with going
over and, and trying to be essentially some sortof, you know, white Knight for the Ukrainians
(43:55):
and, and, and going to the, the, the front,although I don't think he ever did based on what
we know, his criminal gr his criminal record,he's a convicted felon. A machine gun was one of
the felonies, theft in his background, so on andso forth.
You know, all of that does that, I mean, I, youknow, I think people, again, are reasonable in
the sense like, you, you must get likeinformation and tips about a thousand cooks,
(44:21):
cooks an hour around the country, you know,targeting one person or another or saying
disparaging things about one person or anotherthat you have to sift through. So I'm not saying
this is not a leading question. I'm not sayinghe should have been, I'm asking the question.
It's like, try when does the manifest weight ofthe evidence clear the threshold to say we
gotta, we gotta like keep an eye on this guy.
OLSON (44:41):
So it's a great question and it's
extremely important under the circumstances.
'cause we don't know yet if he was the only oneinvolved. I have those questions given his
background that you just cited. And, and if, ifwe're not looking at who did he make contact
with while overseas, is anybody behind gettinghim back here to carry out his little mission he
was on on Sunday? That's an important piece ofthis. Should he have been on the Secret Services
(45:05):
radar? Absolutely. If, if he has ever named anyprotectees in, in, in any violent way. And if
you look at conducting a true behavioral orthreat assessment on somebody like him, you just
rattled off a lot of the major red flags. Dan,this guy has shown propensity for violence. He's
gotten into standoffs with law enforcement.There's probably a degree of mental health
(45:28):
issues. I, I myself was able to see, assuming itwas, you know, not some sort of artificially and
produced LinkedIn profile of a rambling message,which is usually indicative of mental health
issues.
He's traveled overseas, he's, he's been withweapons. All of these things are massive red
flags that usually raises somebody that's madethreats to Secret Service protectee to, to our
(45:50):
highest level within our protective intelligencemethodology where, where we're, where we're
looking to monitor those kinds of things. Whatconcerns me even more on this is, was he on
somebody else's radar? Was he, was he on theradar of the FBI? Were they looking at it from
a, from a global perspective that he had beenover there in Ukraine trying to recruit people
(46:11):
over there. He is not a member of the military.And did they know he came back here? He, he had
to hit travel list when he, when he flew backinto the country from, from over there. So was
he under any type of observation orsurveillance? And if so, when he show, if he
was, when he showed up in Florida, were peoplenotified of this?
You know, because that goes to forget the offthe record movement. If, if another agency is
(46:34):
tracking somebody that's a potential threat andnow they're here in Florida, and I'm speaking
obviously hypothetically, I don't wanna suggestthat that, that that happened here. And if it
didn't, it's actually kinda a sad case that it,that it didn't. But that would change the, the,
the approach, whether you're going out on an offthe record, move to a golf course or not. If, if
somebody, you know, especially if they don'tknow exactly where they're at, but they might be
(46:57):
in the city, so you, it, it, somebody like RyanRuth should be on the radar. It's very difficult
though. A lot of people think, you know, and weget into the whole surveillance issues and
fourth amendment rights, constitutional rightsof individuals that, you know, if there's not an
ongoing continuing need that can be articulatedand demonstrated, or an open investigation on an
(47:21):
individual because they do pose a potentialongoing threat, then it's difficult for law
enforcement to, you know, continue to track anddo things and not be in violation of our
constitution.
PROFT (47:32):
No, absolutely. And, and this is exactly
why, like all these questions need substantive
answers because whatever the answer is and thenthe explanation, then we can have a discussion
about it and it, and it, and it could be like alearning moment for a lot of the American
public, which wouldn't be a bad thing either.So, no, I, I'm well, we'll see. Looking forward
to more questions being asked and hopefully somebeing answered in the coming days. Mike Olson,
(47:56):
veteran secret service agent, now retired andoperating a security firm, he co-founded called
360 Security Services. Mike, thanks so much foryour time. Really appreciate it. We appreciate
your insights.
OLSON (48:09):
You're welcome, Dan. Anytime. Appreciate
you having me.
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