The WSJ Got Quarterly Reporting Wrong

Michael Dell and his investors spent twenty-five billion dollars to buy back Dell Technologies. But they weren't really buying a company. They were buying freedom from quarterly earnings pressure.

I'm Phil McKinney, former CTO of Hewlett-Packard, and I witnessed how this pressure shaped decisions for years. Today, we are exploring why the WSJ's recent defense of quarterly reporting misses what actually happens inside corporate boardrooms.

The Reality of Quarterly Pressure

I want to show you what quarterly reporting actually looks like from the inside.

Let me paint you a picture. It's week seven of the quarter, and you're in a conference room with your executive team. On the screen are two critical numbers - your revenue projection and Wall Street's expectations. They don't align.

During my time as CTO at HP, I found myself in these situations repeatedly. R&D projects worth billions in the future would get paused. Innovation initiatives that could transform the company would get delayed.

Not because they lacked value. But because we had weeks to hit the quarterly numbers.

What struck me was how predictable this became. Quarter-end approaches? Cut the long-term stuff. Meet short-term targets. Rinse and repeat.

When your stock price swings ten percent over missing earnings by three cents per share, you optimize for quarterly performance, even when it destroys long-term competitiveness.

Now, this is where it gets interesting. One CEO escaped this system entirely.

The Dell Example: Twenty-Five Billion Dollar Proof

Here's the proof that this system is broken.

Michael Dell and Silver Lake paid $ 24.9 billion for one thing: freedom from quarterly earnings pressure, killing Dell's long-term potential.

Dell's explicit goal: "No more pulling R&D and growth investments to make in-quarter numbers."

What happened next was remarkable. R&D spending jumped from just over one billion to over four billion dollars. That's a 400 percent increase. Dell transformed from a declining PC manufacturer to an enterprise solutions leader.

The return on investment by 2023? Seventy billion dollars.

What Dell did wasn't just a corporate restructuring. It was a twenty-five billion dollar bet that quarterly reporting destroys long-term value. And they were proven spectacularly right.

If you've experienced similar pressure at your company, I'd love to hear about it in the comments.

Why the WSJ Analysis Falls Apart

So with examples like Dell showing the impact, why does the WSJ still support quarterly reporting?

The WSJ points to the UK's optional move from quarterly to semi-annual reporting and notes that companies didn't dramatically change behavior. Their conclusion: quarterly reporting isn't the real problem.

That reasoning ignores a fundamental truth. We've trained an entire generation to think in ninety-day cycles. Business schools teach earnings management. Compensation rewards quarterly performance. Analysts' careers depend on short-term predictions. Journalists need something to write about, like quarterly results. 

You don't undo decades of this quarterly mindset simply by making reporting optional. The UK comparison is meaningless without addressing the ecosystem that reinforces short-term thinking.

The Big Tech Illusion

The WSJ claims Big Tech's AI investments prove quarterly reporting doesn't hinder long-term thinking.

The argument misses the point completely. Google, Microsoft, and Meta can hide enormous R&D in their massive profit margins.

When you're generating margins of twenty to thirty percent on hundreds of billions in revenue? You can invest billions in moonshots while still