January 15, 2025 • 43 mins
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alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_ (00:02):
Welcome to American POTUS.
I'm your host, Alan Lowe, and Ithank you so very much for
joining us for what promises tobe a wonderful conversation.
My guest today is Dr.
Richard Toye, a professor ofmodern history at the University
of Exeter in England and anaward winning author of books
like Churchill's Empire, TheWorld That Made Him and The
(00:22):
World He Made, WinstonChurchill, A Life in the News,
and An Age of Hope, Labor 1945,and the Birth of Modern Britain.
Richard's also the host of ToysTennessee, a terrific podcast I
encourage you to check out.
Now, I met Richard more than afew years ago, when he was part
of a program created on theAnglo American Alliance by the
(00:45):
Howard Baker Center, where I wasdirector, and the Churchill
Archive Center at Cambridge.
And then just a few months ago,we both were part of a
conference hosted by the EastTennessee History Center about
World War II.
And it was then that Richardasked if I'd ever heard of the
amazing interview conducted bythe famous journalist Edward R.
Murrow on his show, Small World,with former President Harry
(01:08):
Truman and former British PrimeMinister Clement Attlee.
I hadn't, and he told me inbrief outline what it contained,
and he recommended an AmericanPOTUS episode focusing on it.
I'm so glad he did.
This treasure that he found is aremarkable resource.
You can find the video onYouTube.
Thanks to the Trumanpresidential library museum.
(01:30):
And today we'll include somerelevant audio clips from that
video in the program.
So welcome Richard.
Thanks for joining me.
And for this wonderful idea.
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025 (01:39):
Well, it's a great pleasure to be here
and thank you for picking up onthe idea and running with it.
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_07 (01:44):
Well, I'm running, I'm running fast
with it, Richard, because it wasreally just amazing.
And as I researched Murrow'sSmall World just a bit, what an
amazing program that was.
Every week it gathered togetherseveral guests around the world,
speaking on topics, a wholerange of topics from atomic
energy, to education, to art, todiplomacy.
(02:05):
It aired from 1958 to 1960.
With guests like TennesseeWilliams, Edward Teller, Lauren
Bacall, prime minister, neighborof India.
This is a remarkable catalog ofguests and of episodes and chief
among them, I think, is this onewith Lord Attlee.
President Truman, so I reallyenjoyed it.
And just for a moment, Richardlet's look at Lord Atley.
(02:27):
Can you tell us a bit about hispolitical background prior to
World War ii?
And then perhaps how did he workwith Prime Minister Churchill
during the war
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025 (02:35):
Sure.
So he was somebody who came froma middle class family.
So maybe not somebody you wouldautomatically think of as a sort
of natural leader of labor, theworking class party.
But he was somebody who had beento a sort of elite private
school in the UK.
We kind of call those.
(02:56):
schools very, veryparadoxically.
Um, and so he was somebody whowas, maybe set for a fairly kind
of conventional, middle classtype career as a solicitor or
some other kind of professional.
But in the East end of London,he got involved with social work
and this really convinced him ofthe need to tackle the problem
(03:16):
of poverty that moved himtowards socialism.
He served in the First World Warwith distinction, including at
Gallipoli.
And he, um, you know, after thewar, rose through London Labour
politics to become an MP.
And when Labour formed its firstgovernment, first minority
(03:39):
government in 1924, became ajunior minister at the war
office.
So just thinking about histrajectory, by the time that he
became prime minister in 1945,he did have considerable
political experience.
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_0702 (03:56):
and during the war?
What was his role with Churchillduring the conflict?
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025 (04:01):
Well, probably the first thing to say
is that he got elected, uh,chosen as leader of the labor
party in 1935, uh, rather as akind of default.
Candidate if you like because in1931 labor was absolutely
smashed in a real landslidedefeat and he was one of the
(04:22):
kind of three former ministerswho actually kept their seats
with labor being reduced to onlyabout 50 seats in the house of
commons and that meant that hebecame deputy leader.
Um, you know, just on the sortof shortage of other people
available.
And in 1935, he actuallybecomes.
leader with a lot of experience,which he's developed because
(04:45):
with so few MPs in the House ofCommons, you need people to be
standing up and making speechesall the time.
He was one, you know, one of themore able, uh, relatively
younger MPs.
There are a lot of older LabourMPs.
And so by 1940, um, when he,He's not somebody who actually
(05:09):
really has a great nationalprofile in spite of being a
leader of the Labour Party.
He was still seen as a bit of astopgap leader.
And so, you know, nonethelesshas developed some important
political skills includingpolitical survival skills from
withstanding the efforts ofother people who might like to
(05:30):
have pushed him out and becomeleader, um, themselves.
So, he is a very, uh, I wouldsay from the beginning, he is an
effective member of Churchill'scoalition.
He does become.
minister in 1942 he holds arange of a significant although
(05:51):
perhaps not overwhelminglyimportant offices and I guess if
you're trying to think about hiskind of personal style, he was a
kind of unflashy personality.
He wasn't a.
you know, sort of big kind ofcharisma type person like
Churchill was, but he was verykeen on efficiency and on
(06:13):
getting things done and ontaking decisions.
And so of the other ministerssaid that, um, when Churchill
was leading cabinet, as ofcourse he usually did, Then you
had the, sense of having beenpresent on a great historical
occasion, but when Churchill wasout of the country and Attlee
(06:34):
took over running the cabinet,then you actually had a meeting
that got things done.
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_0702 (06:40):
So, so I think for us non Brits
outside of Britain, the factthat Churchill lost office in 45
right at the end of the conflictand Atlee became prime minister
was a bit of a surprise.
What led to him assuming office,Clement Atlee assuming office as
prime minister in 1945?
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025 (07:00):
Well, I think that, you know,
Churchill, of course, did have,A lot of support in the country
during the period in which hewas prime minister, because he
managed to present himself as sowarlike, if you like, because he
didn't take during the war agreat deal of interest in kind
(07:21):
of post war planning and tryingto prepare for the peace, that
it was quite easy for people to,uh, say that, you know, You
know, yeah, he's a great warleader, but he's not the leader
we need for the peace.
The Conservative Party itselfwas also discredited.
I mean, it's not a presidentialelection.
It's people voting for a party.
And as a consequence of theappeasement of the 1930s and
(07:45):
the, tough economic conditionsand mass unemployment in the
1930s, the Tory party definitelyhad an image problem.
So if you take those two thingstogether, plus the fact that
Labour had an appealing domesticpolicy and looked like they were
the people who actually had aplan for what was going to
happen next, then that kind ofsets the conditions for this
(08:09):
huge, uh, Labor victory.
And I suppose I would just sayin, in terms of what we're gonna
talk about in a moment in termsof, Atley being present at the
Potsdam Conference that you'vegotta remember that when the
election took place, victory inwar in Europe had been achieved.
But the victory over Japan hadnot yet been achieved.
(08:32):
And so Churchill's pitch in the1945 election was cool to a
considerable extent.
still a war going on.
I'm really good at running wars.
You should support me.
Uh, whereas from the point ofview of a lot of people, um, of
course, Not from the point ofview of the soldiers who were
actually still fighting in theFar East, but for a lot of
(08:53):
people at home in Britain, Ididn't really want to be
thinking about the war anylonger.
You know, the lights had gone onafter the end of the blackout.
People wanted to get back tonormal and.
Of course, that was what laborwas promising not only to get
back to normal, but to gotowards a brighter future.
And of course, it is so turnedout that after labor was elected
(09:17):
on 26th of July, in 1945, it'sreally only a matter of, uh,
three weeks until.
The atom bomb is dropped andthat the war actually comes to
an end.
So in a sense, a war whichpeople had expected to go on for
maybe another two years wasbrought to an end much more
rapidly than people expected.
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_0702 (09:40):
And as you know, Richard, I now
direct, uh, museums in Tennesseethat very much tell that story
about the Manhattan Project.
So let's wrap up his primeminister tenure.
How long did Attlee serve asprime minister?
And what would you say were someof the highs and lows of that
time as prime minister?
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025 (09:58):
Well, he served for a total of six
years,
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_07022 (10:00):
Mm hmm.
richard-toye_1_01-14-20 (10:01):
general election in 1950 where Labour
got a very small majority, andafter another 18 months in 1951,
he called another election,which Labour lost, I mean,
relatively narrowly, but thatbrought Churchill back into
office, and that was thebeginning of 13 years of
(10:22):
Conservative government.
In terms of the highlights,well, retrospectively, people
would always probably say thecreation of the National Health
Service, uh, free at point ofuse, health care would be the
major domestic highlight.
It was also the case that Atleeand many others believed that,
(10:43):
Socialism wasn't just aboutsocial welfare.
It wasn't just about making surethat, you know, unemployed
people, had enough benefits tolive on or something like that.
They actually wanted to see achange in the nature of society.
And to that end, they saw thenationalization of industry, the
public ownership of things likecoal, steel, and so forth,
(11:04):
railways.
As being important to bring thatabout and indeed they pledged to
bring a large part of Britishindustry under public ownership
and did so that's generally notseen as one of the sort of the,
you know, the greatest successesof the government.
Although there were at least insome cases, logical reasons in
(11:25):
particular industries for doingit at the time.
so think that it.
has been tended to be moreremembered for the establishment
or the building up of or welfarestate.
There was already some socialwelfare provision in Britain
than it has been for itseconomic policies.
But it should be remembered thatin economic terms, the
(11:48):
government.
Did inherit an incrediblydifficult situation in part, I
mean, coming back to Trumanbecause of the suspension of
lend lease aid at that pointthat the war came to an end.
And really the far fromunproblematic, but broadly
successful economic managementwas very, important part of that
government's record, but also,of course, we've got to
(12:10):
remember, and we'll talk aboutthis later in depth, of course,
you know, the whole foreignpolicy and imperial scorecard
has to be considered as well.
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_070 (12:21):
Such an important time in world
history and certainly in historyof the United Kingdom.
I want to turn to this greatinterview now, this conversation
with Atlee, Truman and Morrow.
It certainly appears that Trumanand Atlee liked each other and I
wanted to play a snippet herefrom the very beginning with Ed
Morrow introducing a terrificexchange between the two men.
(12:44):
So here we go.
Good evening.
My job normally is to hold theclock and be a sort of
electronic gatekeeper and takecare of the introductions.
But tonight, those functions arenot necessary because both of
you gentlemen are old friends.
However, I cannot resist thetemptation of saying, President
Truman, I believe you know LordAttlee.
(13:06):
Very well, and I like him verymuch.
Lord Attlee is in London.
President Truman is in hisoffice in Independence,
Missouri.
You two gentlemen have beentalking and conversing since
Potsdam in 1945.
I've been wondering, do you evercall each other by your first
name?
We never have today, but Iwouldn't mind doing it.
Well, I always stick to you, youknow it.
(13:28):
Hey.
Well, I'll call you Clementthen.
That's right.
Clement, that's right.
Wonderful exchange.
I love that.
Uh, a perfect beginning for thatprogram, too.
And I do apologize to ourlisteners.
That static you hear is justkind of a remnant of the age of
that tape.
(13:48):
Uh, was that friendship areality?
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025_ (13:52):
Yes, I mean, I think, in fact, the
fact that they agreed to do thisprogram is a sign of the kind of
respect that they had for eachother.
So, obviously, the amount offaceTime they really had.
I mean, there were times like,the Potsdam conference when they
were in daily contact.
(14:13):
But obviously, you know, thereweren't times when, they were
sort of hanging out together forweeks at a time.
You couldn't instant messagepeople in the same way.
So I didn't really have anopportunity for that kind of
friendship.
But, I do think it's verysignificant that they would both
sign up to do this program.
And I think also, I just can'thelp reflecting on the
(14:35):
brilliance of the technology ofthe time, we think today we have
such brilliant technology, butit's even more brilliant where
we've less sophisticatedtechnology to manage a program,
is bringing together people fromdifferent sides of the Atlantic.
So, but I also think that, yes,friendship and respect real.
But what we heard in thatexchange there is the amazing
(14:58):
thing where Ed Murrow is saying.
Can I kind of make you talk toeach other with your first
names, you know, for the firsttime having, having known each
other for, a dozen years or so.
Um, and, and so that kind oflevel of formality was
certainly, much more normal forthe time.
(15:20):
And also, of course, Even morenormal in government circles,
uh, that that was a sort of, theetiquette or the, or the
conventions of the time that youwouldn't just automatically go
to first names.
I don't suppose is still somesituations in which you don't
automatically go to first names,but they are relatively few and
(15:43):
far between.
So time certainly have changed.
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_070228 (15:46):
I noticed, even though they have
that exchange at the verybeginning, they don't ever call
themselves by first names in therest of the interview.
So they say they're going to,but they do not do it.
Now, a couple of times wementioned the 1945 conference at
Potsdam.
Where they first met, um, whatdo you know about their work
together specifically at thatconference?
(16:07):
Did they see eye to eye?
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025_120 (16:09):
I think probably speaking like did
remember the conference in a wayfalls into two parts.
The first is before the generalelection and actually.
Uh, accompanies Churchill, whowas still prime minister
Churchill as a kind of courtesyuh, Atlee to go along as an
observer because, the election,the, the actual polling day had
(16:33):
taken place on the 5th of July,the results weren't to be known
until the 26th of July, becauseof the counting of, the service
boat.
And so there was this kind of,.
know, sort of shredding his catmoment where one party had won
the election but nobody knew whoit was.
So, Atlee was invited on thatbasis and he didn't really at
(16:55):
that stage make all that much ofan impression on anyone.
I don't think, um, but then, ofcourse, after he wins the
election, he comes back as primeminister and to the surprise of
both the.
Soviets and the Americans, uh,to maybe to a lesser extent,
it's really effectively the samedelegation that turns up the
(17:16):
less, uh, Churchill and his, uh,foreign minister anti Eden, so
even, uh, Churchill lends aptlyhis Man servant because he
didn't have one.
So the Soviets are terriblysurprised to begin with.
They're surprised simply thatlaborers won the election
because at least previously toldMolotov that the result is going
(17:40):
to be a close thing.
It's actually a landslide.
So when he comes back, says, butyou said it was going to be
close.
What's going on?
You know, like they just assumedthat there was going to be a
kind of rigged election of somekind.
And so the Soviets are actuallypretty suspicious, and not
especially friendly towardsAtlee and certainly no more
(18:01):
friendly towards him as a leftwing prime minister than they
were towards, Churchill as aconservative.
Truman doesn't really recordvery much in his memoirs about
what he thought of Attlee exceptto say that he felt that he had
a sort of sensible appreciationof, world affairs or something
(18:23):
like that.
So, it's not an instant love inbetween the two, but they had
been compared.
in the media it was partly a wayof making sense of what was
going on, you know, often forthe American public to say, Oh,
he's aptly the British Trumanagain, because, of course,
(18:43):
Truman had been, although, ofcourse, very long serving
senator, um, as it served asvice president.
President, only briefly beforebeing elevated to the presidency
on Roosevelt's death, uh, and socounted as a relatively unknown
figure.
Similarly, the case with, withAttlee, that he'd been active in
politics for a long time, butdidn't have this big national
(19:05):
profile.
And also, they both came from,uh, I mean, as I said you know,
Atlee's background, personalbackground wasn't that, modest,
but on the other hand, he wasn'tan aristocrat.
He, you know, he wasn't a bigname.
He wasn't somebody who was goingto go into politics by virtue of
(19:25):
family connection.
And of course, um, you know,Truman's, background was, was
again relatively, although notexcessively humble.
I might just sort of chuck in ananecdote here.
Which is that, um, you know,back in the week of 9 11, I was
at the Truman library when, kindof all hell broke loose, but I
was actually staying in a bedand breakfast, which was one of
(19:48):
Truman's Boyhood homes, um, and,um, yeah, very nice, pretty
substantial house, actually, sohe wasn't kind of living in a
shack, but of course, incomparison to, many other
politicians, certainly, youknow, sort of relatively humble
beginnings.
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_0702 (20:06):
And if our listeners haven't been to
the Truman Library Museum, go.
It's a great place.
And I didn't know there was abed and breakfast in one of his
former homes.
That's really cool.
Richard, I have to try that out.
So when looking at that post warworld of diplomacy, They both
very bluntly expressed theirfrustration with the Soviets in
this program.
(20:27):
And here I'm going to play acouple of segments.
This first one is Trumandiscussing Potsdam.
We had quite a time in Potsdam.
We were there.
We had a grand, uh, meeting overthere.
And we had cooperation on bothsides of the table.
And, I wouldn't say that on thethird side.
They forgot the agreement thatwe neglected.
I'm talking about the Russiansnow.
(20:47):
I don't know if you're aware.
Ah, yes.
Yep.
And now there's a bit more hereon the post Potsdam beginnings
of the Cold War.
I don't think we went wrong.
I think if the Russians had kepttheir agreements, the protocols
which Storodatle and myselfsigned at Potsdam, there would
(21:09):
never have been any trouble inthe world.
But they broke 32 of thoseagreements within a year after
they left that conference.
I quite agree with you.
So you place the blame entirelyon the Russians?
There are many questions aboutit.
They don't believe in keepingtheir engagements.
And it's too bad.
Because honor is the topmostthing in international
relations, and also in anypolitical relation.
They also have a missinginterest in disturbance.
(21:30):
They don't want a peacefulworld.
That's correct.
They want a world where they canpush their particular doctrines.
Yes, that's what they've done inthis last Nobel Prize award.
They've treated the man whoreceived it as if he were an
outside dog and didn't belong toRussia at all.
He was one of the great writersof the century.
(21:50):
That's really fascinating.
You can hear that frustration.
Dislike in Truman's voicetalking about the Soviets.
We know Truman was a cold warwarrior.
You look at the development ofthe H bomb Korea Marshall plan,
Berlin airlift.
Uh, would you classify Atleealso as a cold war warrior?
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025 (22:10):
Well, I, I mean, a way, yes, but I
suppose there's kind ofdifferent types of cold warrior,
I suppose.
I think that you've got to thinkabout the fact that.
From the beginning of his careeror from, you know, sort of from
the time of the RussianRevolution, wasn't somebody who
(22:34):
was instinctively hostile to theUSSR, where, in fact, he had
visited, and even in the late1930s, attended a Soviet show
trial from the, from thegallery, um, didn't really seem,
you know, think it necessary to,To comment, apparently, but at
the same time, that sort ofgeneral sympathy on the British
(22:58):
left for the Soviet Union didn'textend to the domestic
communists in Britain, theCommunist Party of Great
Britain, who, of course, wererivals of the Labour Party and
these two, you know, Labour andthe CPGB Hated and distrusted
each other with a vengeance andalso, I would say that Atlee was
(23:21):
probably relatively conventionalin international affairs.
That is to say, he was going tosort of stand up for British
interests as any previous primeminister would have done without
too many differences orvariations.
And that it wasn't.
(23:42):
I guess the would I say, got tothink about what kind of cold
warrior he was.
He wasn't necessarily saying weneed to back the iron curtain
and liberate all theseterritories.
It was more that he wanted to,you know.
Actually reach agreements withthe soviet union to have a kind
(24:04):
of reasonable division ofspheres of influence if you like
to make agreements that we'regoing to be stuck to and for
the.
Different sides to keep out ofeach other's hair.
And so it wasn't the mostaggressive form of promotion of
the Cold War.
He actually, his foreignsecretary, Ernest Bevin, was
(24:26):
probably verbally moreaggressive and at Potsdam, uh,
After the election victory,Attlee you know, tends to sit
back and sort of suck on hispipe, sort of nodding
approvingly as Bevin has a go atthe Soviets.
And so it's not this kind of useof ideological cold war, but it
(24:47):
is about is standing up forBritish interests and Anglo
American interests and, aboveall wanting to make agreements
that everybody is going to stickto and being very frustrated
when, this proves to beincredibly difficult, if not
impossible.
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_0702 (25:08):
And you see everything you just said
very well in the next couple ofclips I'm going to play.
And part of that is obviouslythough there was a close us UK
alliance, there weredifferences.
And one of those was over theissue of Taiwan and more
broadly, the correct approach tocommunist China.
So here are two clips on thosetopics.
After that, let's talk aboutthem.
(25:28):
I'm going to play them bothtogether here now.
Well, does it follow from that,that we should recognize Red
China rather than isolating thatcountry?
Well, Great Britain has alreadyrecognized Red China, but
they're in debt to us to such anextent, I don't know whether
we'll ever be able to recognizethem or not, with any
(25:50):
obligations to us.
Well, that's, of course, myview.
Well, I think you may drive theminto the arms of Russia and make
them into a solid block.
I think you've got to look at itfrom their point of view.
From their point of view,they've made a revolution that's
now being interfered with.
(26:10):
And that drives them on to seekhelp where they can.
And that drives them into thearms of Russia.
Now I think we've got to get asmuch contact as we can.
America's had very great contactin China in the past.
And I'm sure there will beplenty of goodwill still there
if we want to cultivate.
I think you're right, LordAttlee.
(26:32):
I think there are a large numberof people in China who are not
in complete agreement with thistotalitarian approach to free
thought and free action.
And sometime or other, they maybe on top in that case, then we
may get closer and closer to arecognition.
I think you're right about theputting all these totalitarians
(26:52):
together makes a very dangeroussituation as far as the free
world is concerned.
The more you hit a totalitariangovernment, the more you tend to
get the feeling of nationalismrunning around it.
That was so in the FrenchRevolution, it was the same in
the Russian Revolution.
If you hit it, you strengthenit, you're kind to it.
(27:15):
He weaken it.
I think that's right.
And eventually they, we've cometo the point where we can be
kind to'em, but we've been kindto'em in the past and they
didn't appreciate it.
And here's one more clip.
Well, I sometimes thinking ofhow we didn't quite get the
(27:35):
strategic position in the lightof the modern world, I think you
think too much importance of OSAas a place.
Just, I think our people thoughttoo much of Egypt and Cyprus as
a place when you get to thehydrogen bomb.
A lot of our old strategicnotions have got to go west.
I think you're correct on that,and I think you need to
(27:57):
resurvey, and I think, Presidentof the United States and the
rest of the free world ought tosit down and make a survey, so
we can keep the peace of theworld.
Such fascinating commentarythere, and, uh, You know, at
least saying you hit atotalitarian state, you make it
stronger, essentially, and thatthat idea of engagement and it's
(28:18):
interesting you hear that they,Seem to be agreeing, but they're
not in that you engage withcommunist China and Truman
saying, yeah, you engage withthose who don't accept the
totalitarian state.
So it was really interesting tosee how they finesse that to
appear to be agreeing.
So, um tell me, what do youthink about those clips?
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025 (28:37):
first of all, you're absolutely spot
on about this kind of finessingof, um, you know, uh, but I, I
also, one thing which I foundinteresting is that,
particularly in the first clip,Atlee seems quite loquacious.
I mean, certainly for him, Imean, remember he was somebody
who had this reputation of beingvery clipped and, uh, In
monosyllabic, and something haskind of pressed his buttons
(29:00):
there to actually make him, comeout and talk more.
And as you say, it actually kindof gets Truman into the position
where Truman appears to befollowing his lead and saying,
you know, I think you're rightbefore then saying something
which actually contradicts him.
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_0 (29:16):
Mm-hmm
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025_1 (29:16):
and it is fascinating to see that
dynamic which What I'm reallyhearing there is what it might
have been like to be in the roomin 1950, in particular, where
Atlee kind of makes this dash toWashington because In a press
(29:36):
conference, this appears beingat the time of the Korean War,
having gone on for severalmonths by that point, that
Truman had appeared to suggestthe United States might be
willing to use the atomic bomb.
Now, maybe he misspoke, he was,maybe he was just trying to say,
of course, we always have theatomic bomb as a reserve option.
(29:57):
But in the UK, this makespeople.
anxious, to go to the point ofthe extreme fear, really.
So, Atlee dashes off and triesto get a commitment from Truman
that the United States won't usethe atomic bomb unless the
British have agreed.
uh, He kind of thinks he sort ofgets Truman in a room by himself
(30:21):
and, you know, sort of thinksthat he's extracted this,
commitment, yet afterwards, theBritish can't get the Americans
to, you know, write anythinglike that down, and even if they
did write it down, what would itreally mean in the, you know, in
the final instance, um, so youcan almost hear it.
the exchange that we've justheard what it might have been
(30:43):
like when Atlee is sayingdefinitely need you to launch
the the bomb without us and thenyou know truman says I think
you're right directlyconfronting him and then kind of
you know comes in with animportant But,
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_070 (30:59):
But, right.
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025_1 (31:00):
be, you know, telling us something
about actually how they didn'tfully communicate effectively at
that moment, in spite of maybethinking that they were on the
same page.
Mm-hmm
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_0 (31:12):
Mm-hmm Oh, this is so fascinating.
I, again, I'm, I'm so glad thatMerle had these programs and
that you told me about them.
Just again, you're, you're takenback in time so here's the next
part.
They, they both argued forsomething called
internationalization of hotspotsin the world.
I thought that was a reallyinteresting part of their
conversation.
So let me play a quick clip onthat.
(31:38):
You know, I wanna see some ofthese soft spots.
Internationalized, I'm advocatefor.
An international police forcelocated in various premises, not
too big, but can intervene andstop whenever there's a bit of a
row of stopping.
You and I are in completeagreement on that.
(31:59):
I think the United Nations oughtto have the power to enforce its
decrees, and the majority ofthem agree.
But I thought that all alongWell, Lord Atlee seems to
believe that some of thetroubled spots, including
Formosa, ought to beinternationalized.
How do you feel about that, Mr.
President?
I seem to remember that yousuggested as far back as 1945 at
Potsdam that certain areasshould be internationalized,
(32:22):
including, I believe, the SuezCanal.
Yes, I did.
And for the Ryan Daniels Canal,for the Keel Canal, for the
Panama Canal.
All those, uh, waterways and thebuses, too, ought to be, uh,
internationally controlled andthere wouldn't be any trouble at
all.
Yes, I remember very well yourputting that forward at Potsdam,
and I agree with you entirely.
He certainly did, and they triedto vet the internationals, and
(32:43):
the Russians wouldn't agree toit.
I think straight away, a goodstep would be to
internationalize the Antarctic.
And also the Arctic.
Yes, quite.
Another really interestingconversation there.
I was wondering as I listened tothat, how did that call for
internationalization of spots,like Suez and others, mesh with
the priorities of his party andthe voters in the United
(33:06):
Kingdom?
Uh
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025 (33:07):
Yeah, that's a really good question.
And I think that what theinterview brings out is that
these were ideas which had somekind of longstanding heritage
going back, you might say, tothe League Nations
administration of certainterritories in the interwar
years.
And, one thing to note, ofcourse, is that Atlee is out of
(33:29):
office, by this time uh, thathe's, you know, he ceased to be
continued, uh, after he, officeas Prime Minister for four years
as, uh, Leader of theopposition, but then stood down
in 1955.
and there's a certain degree towhich he then, maybe started to
articulate kind of bolder ideas.
(33:52):
He talked a lot about kind ofworld government during this
period, which wouldn'tnecessarily sound so practical
from the point of view of, um,know, sort of ordinary politics,
if you like.
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_070 (34:05):
huh.
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025_ (34:05):
But, with a couple of qualifications
there.
First, that he was definitely asincere, uh, Advocate of the
United Nations had been presentat the, you know, the San
Francisco founding conference in1945.
And I think there's always thatdilemma, for politicians who may
be quite sincere aboutinternationalization.
(34:27):
But then when Internationalizingthings runs up against the
interests of one's own country.
Well, here, who do you putfirst?
It would particularly make thepoint about what all the voters
think.
And so, he was, in some ways, afairly kind of reasonably
conventional Foreign policypolitician, but when they talk
(34:48):
about the United Nations there,of course, you've got to
remember that the Korean Warwas, in fact, a United Nations
operation, because the Sovietswere boycotting the Security
Council at that moment, whichsort of facilitated that.
So it wasn't a, wasn't sort of agenuinely global, um, um, You
know, operation, uh, but ofcourse it did have the
(35:10):
imprimatur of the UnitedNations.
So to a certain extent, Attleecould and Truman could claim to
have made UN a reality, um, uh,to some degree.
And also, although some of theseideas about internationalization
could sound a bit utopian, whenthey turned to talk about the
Arctic and the Antarctic, then,of course, there have been
(35:33):
agreements about that.
Uh, scientific cooperation andnot treating it like, uh, not
treating like any otherterritories.
I guess the side of the coin iswhen you're talking about the
Suez Canal, for example, and youtalk about internationalizing
it.
Well, that might sound.
very nice, but from the point ofview of the Egyptians, that
(35:56):
would actually sound like thatwas taking away their
sovereignty and their controlover it.
So, that these, theinternationalization is a term
which can sound and potentiallybe double edged.
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_0702 (36:09):
And I would note again for our
listeners, both of these leadersare out of office during this
interview.
So they are able to say thingsyou're right.
That, uh, or emphasize thingsthat perhaps were a bit more
difficult when they wereactually in office.
Um, we started the conversation,as you noted, when Churchill and
the conservative party werevoted out, it wasn't like a
presidential election.
(36:30):
It was the, the party was lostthe majority.
And, that difference between theBritish and the American systems
of government, actually Murrowstarts the interview with a
fascinating back and forth onthat between the two men.
So let me just play a little bitof that conversation.
(36:51):
Under the British system, if theexecutive loses support of
Parliament, then a new electionis held or a new executive head
is appointed.
What do you think of therelative merits of the two
systems?
They have a set of reservations.
I know people.
Keeps your party together, youknow.
That's true.
You have much better partydiscipline than we do.
(37:12):
I'm sure that's right.
Because we know we're all goingto lose the job if we don't
stand by the leader.
I think so.
I, uh, I hear frustration inTruman's voice there from not
being able to control the party.
Uh, I know Truman studiedgovernment, was a real student
of government.
Was the same true of Attlee?
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025_120 (37:32):
I mean, up to a point, so that in
1937, uh, Attlee publishes abook called The Labour Party in
Perspective, which has got somethoughts about, the machinery of
government, not from aparticularly kind of theoretical
perspective, more of a sort of apragmatic perspective, and also
he's certainly somebody who'sgiven a lot of thought about the
(37:55):
way in which you ought tocompose your cabinet and how,
uh, you ought to structure yourmeetings and so on in terms of
reform.
He was not a radical reformeroff.
The, the constitution, the laborgovernment of 1945 does make
some relatively, uh, marginalchanges so that up until that
(38:20):
point, university graduates had,um, got a second vote, for
example, and there wereuniversity constituencies, so,
you know, graduates ofuniversities would elect their
own MPs, that was abolished, uh,there was also, the, Reduction
of the delaying power of theHouse of Lords from two years to
(38:41):
one year.
Um, but this is relativelymarginal stuff and I think that
Attlee was generally speakingquite confident that you could
achieve a socialist program andremember he was a, you know,
convinced that.
If moderate socialist, hethought you could do that
through the existing machineryof government and through the
(39:03):
existing parliamentary system.
But I guess I would also addthat he appreciates some of the
difficulties that Truman facesmuch because.
He knows that when when dealingwith Truman that Truman can't
just do he happens to feel likeor whatever he is convinced is
best, he does have to deal withCongress.
(39:25):
That comes back to some of ourissues about, Formosa where, his
one of his books of memoirs,which is called A Prime Minister
Remembers, edited by his formerpress secretary, Francis
Williams, he says that he thinksthat the American failure to
recognize communist China and tohave such an obsession with,
(39:48):
with was and I quoteextraordinarily stupid he does
also make the acknowledgementthat truman had congress to deal
with and Didn't have an entirelyfree hand and and of course had
to deal with public opinion aswell
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_ (40:06):
Looking back at that, at the Truman
administration, Many episodescould contain this, but what he
did accomplish is truly amazingto see, uh, from the Marshall
plan on, um, Richard, I want tothank you so much for really
fascinating conversation and fortelling me about this program
(40:26):
and bring it to the table forAmerican POTUS.
Thank you so much.
Uh, before I let you go, can youtell us what are you working on
right now?
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025_ (40:34):
well a number of projects.
Um, but I guess one which mightbe of interest to your listeners
is about Uh, you know Peoplewriting letters to MPs over a
long period of time, throughoutthe 20th century and beyond, and
just a sort of anecdote, um,which links it back to Attlee.
(40:55):
Um, there was a, there was aschool girl who had a complaint
about, um, the way that theschool system was run, who wrote
to Attlee as Prime Minister, inthe early 1950s, and she writes
a complaint in the form of apoem.
remarkably enough, Atlee alsowrites his response in the form
(41:17):
of a poem.
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_070 (41:20):
That is, that is terrific.
You know, for many years Iworked as an archivist at
presidential libraries and someof my favorite things to view
were some of that, the publicmail coming into the presidents.
Remember when I first started atthe Reagan.
It was in the Reagan Projectbefore the library was even
constructed.
I ran out into the stacks andfound a letter my uncle Louis
Elbow had written to PresidentReagan in, in the collections.
(41:42):
But it really does give you agreat, um, understanding of what
issues were important to people.
Um, so I'm really look forwardto reading that Richard, as I
always do your works.
They're really terrific.
And thank, thanks again forjoining us on American POTUS.
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025 (41:55):
Thank you very much.
It's been a pleasure.
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_0702 (41:57):
And thanks to all of you for joining
us as well.
I so appreciate your support ofour efforts to provide a
nonpartisan.
Educational and I hope afascinating look at the
presidents and the presidency.
Also, please check out AmericanFLOTUS, a new podcast, all about
the first ladies formed inpartnership between American
POTUS and the first ladiesassociation for research and
(42:18):
education, or FLAIR.
You can find American FLOTUSepisodes at AmericanPOTUS.
org FLAIR net.
org or on your favorite podcastplatform.
Thanks very much.
And I'll see you next time onAmerican POTUS.
Welcome to American POTUS.
I'm your host, Alan Lowe, and Ithank you so very much for
joining us for what promises tobe a wonderful conversation.
My guest today is Dr.
Richard Toye, a professor ofmodern history at the University
of Exeter in England and anaward winning author of books
like Churchill's Empire, TheWorld That Made Him and The
(00:22):
World He Made, WinstonChurchill, A Life in the News,
and An Age of Hope, Labor 1945,and the Birth of Modern Britain.
Richard's also the host of ToysTennessee, a terrific podcast I
encourage you to check out.
Now, I met Richard more than afew years ago, when he was part
of a program created on theAnglo American Alliance by the
(00:45):
Howard Baker Center, where I wasdirector, and the Churchill
Archive Center at Cambridge.
And then just a few months ago,we both were part of a
conference hosted by the EastTennessee History Center about
World War II.
And it was then that Richardasked if I'd ever heard of the
amazing interview conducted bythe famous journalist Edward R.
Murrow on his show, Small World,with former President Harry
(01:08):
Truman and former British PrimeMinister Clement Attlee.
I hadn't, and he told me inbrief outline what it contained,
and he recommended an AmericanPOTUS episode focusing on it.
I'm so glad he did.
This treasure that he found is aremarkable resource.
You can find the video onYouTube.
Thanks to the Trumanpresidential library museum.
(01:30):
And today we'll include somerelevant audio clips from that
video in the program.
So welcome Richard.
Thanks for joining me.
And for this wonderful idea.
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025 (01:39):
Well, it's a great pleasure to be here
and thank you for picking up onthe idea and running with it.
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_07 (01:44):
Well, I'm running, I'm running fast
with it, Richard, because it wasreally just amazing.
And as I researched Murrow'sSmall World just a bit, what an
amazing program that was.
Every week it gathered togetherseveral guests around the world,
speaking on topics, a wholerange of topics from atomic
energy, to education, to art, todiplomacy.
(02:05):
It aired from 1958 to 1960.
With guests like TennesseeWilliams, Edward Teller, Lauren
Bacall, prime minister, neighborof India.
This is a remarkable catalog ofguests and of episodes and chief
among them, I think, is this onewith Lord Attlee.
President Truman, so I reallyenjoyed it.
And just for a moment, Richardlet's look at Lord Atley.
(02:27):
Can you tell us a bit about hispolitical background prior to
World War ii?
And then perhaps how did he workwith Prime Minister Churchill
during the war
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025 (02:35):
Sure.
So he was somebody who came froma middle class family.
So maybe not somebody you wouldautomatically think of as a sort
of natural leader of labor, theworking class party.
But he was somebody who had beento a sort of elite private
school in the UK.
We kind of call those.
(02:56):
schools very, veryparadoxically.
Um, and so he was somebody whowas, maybe set for a fairly kind
of conventional, middle classtype career as a solicitor or
some other kind of professional.
But in the East end of London,he got involved with social work
and this really convinced him ofthe need to tackle the problem
(03:16):
of poverty that moved himtowards socialism.
He served in the First World Warwith distinction, including at
Gallipoli.
And he, um, you know, after thewar, rose through London Labour
politics to become an MP.
And when Labour formed its firstgovernment, first minority
(03:39):
government in 1924, became ajunior minister at the war
office.
So just thinking about histrajectory, by the time that he
became prime minister in 1945,he did have considerable
political experience.
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_0702 (03:56):
and during the war?
What was his role with Churchillduring the conflict?
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025 (04:01):
Well, probably the first thing to say
is that he got elected, uh,chosen as leader of the labor
party in 1935, uh, rather as akind of default.
Candidate if you like because in1931 labor was absolutely
smashed in a real landslidedefeat and he was one of the
(04:22):
kind of three former ministerswho actually kept their seats
with labor being reduced to onlyabout 50 seats in the house of
commons and that meant that hebecame deputy leader.
Um, you know, just on the sortof shortage of other people
available.
And in 1935, he actuallybecomes.
leader with a lot of experience,which he's developed because
(04:45):
with so few MPs in the House ofCommons, you need people to be
standing up and making speechesall the time.
He was one, you know, one of themore able, uh, relatively
younger MPs.
There are a lot of older LabourMPs.
And so by 1940, um, when he,He's not somebody who actually
(05:09):
really has a great nationalprofile in spite of being a
leader of the Labour Party.
He was still seen as a bit of astopgap leader.
And so, you know, nonethelesshas developed some important
political skills includingpolitical survival skills from
withstanding the efforts ofother people who might like to
(05:30):
have pushed him out and becomeleader, um, themselves.
So, he is a very, uh, I wouldsay from the beginning, he is an
effective member of Churchill'scoalition.
He does become.
minister in 1942 he holds arange of a significant although
(05:51):
perhaps not overwhelminglyimportant offices and I guess if
you're trying to think about hiskind of personal style, he was a
kind of unflashy personality.
He wasn't a.
you know, sort of big kind ofcharisma type person like
Churchill was, but he was verykeen on efficiency and on
(06:13):
getting things done and ontaking decisions.
And so of the other ministerssaid that, um, when Churchill
was leading cabinet, as ofcourse he usually did, Then you
had the, sense of having beenpresent on a great historical
occasion, but when Churchill wasout of the country and Attlee
(06:34):
took over running the cabinet,then you actually had a meeting
that got things done.
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_0702 (06:40):
So, so I think for us non Brits
outside of Britain, the factthat Churchill lost office in 45
right at the end of the conflictand Atlee became prime minister
was a bit of a surprise.
What led to him assuming office,Clement Atlee assuming office as
prime minister in 1945?
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025 (07:00):
Well, I think that, you know,
Churchill, of course, did have,A lot of support in the country
during the period in which hewas prime minister, because he
managed to present himself as sowarlike, if you like, because he
didn't take during the war agreat deal of interest in kind
(07:21):
of post war planning and tryingto prepare for the peace, that
it was quite easy for people to,uh, say that, you know, You
know, yeah, he's a great warleader, but he's not the leader
we need for the peace.
The Conservative Party itselfwas also discredited.
I mean, it's not a presidentialelection.
It's people voting for a party.
And as a consequence of theappeasement of the 1930s and
(07:45):
the, tough economic conditionsand mass unemployment in the
1930s, the Tory party definitelyhad an image problem.
So if you take those two thingstogether, plus the fact that
Labour had an appealing domesticpolicy and looked like they were
the people who actually had aplan for what was going to
happen next, then that kind ofsets the conditions for this
(08:09):
huge, uh, Labor victory.
And I suppose I would just sayin, in terms of what we're gonna
talk about in a moment in termsof, Atley being present at the
Potsdam Conference that you'vegotta remember that when the
election took place, victory inwar in Europe had been achieved.
But the victory over Japan hadnot yet been achieved.
(08:32):
And so Churchill's pitch in the1945 election was cool to a
considerable extent.
still a war going on.
I'm really good at running wars.
You should support me.
Uh, whereas from the point ofview of a lot of people, um, of
course, Not from the point ofview of the soldiers who were
actually still fighting in theFar East, but for a lot of
(08:53):
people at home in Britain, Ididn't really want to be
thinking about the war anylonger.
You know, the lights had gone onafter the end of the blackout.
People wanted to get back tonormal and.
Of course, that was what laborwas promising not only to get
back to normal, but to gotowards a brighter future.
And of course, it is so turnedout that after labor was elected
(09:17):
on 26th of July, in 1945, it'sreally only a matter of, uh,
three weeks until.
The atom bomb is dropped andthat the war actually comes to
an end.
So in a sense, a war whichpeople had expected to go on for
maybe another two years wasbrought to an end much more
rapidly than people expected.
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_0702 (09:40):
And as you know, Richard, I now
direct, uh, museums in Tennesseethat very much tell that story
about the Manhattan Project.
So let's wrap up his primeminister tenure.
How long did Attlee serve asprime minister?
And what would you say were someof the highs and lows of that
time as prime minister?
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025 (09:58):
Well, he served for a total of six
years,
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_07022 (10:00):
Mm hmm.
richard-toye_1_01-14-20 (10:01):
general election in 1950 where Labour
got a very small majority, andafter another 18 months in 1951,
he called another election,which Labour lost, I mean,
relatively narrowly, but thatbrought Churchill back into
office, and that was thebeginning of 13 years of
(10:22):
Conservative government.
In terms of the highlights,well, retrospectively, people
would always probably say thecreation of the National Health
Service, uh, free at point ofuse, health care would be the
major domestic highlight.
It was also the case that Atleeand many others believed that,
(10:43):
Socialism wasn't just aboutsocial welfare.
It wasn't just about making surethat, you know, unemployed
people, had enough benefits tolive on or something like that.
They actually wanted to see achange in the nature of society.
And to that end, they saw thenationalization of industry, the
public ownership of things likecoal, steel, and so forth,
(11:04):
railways.
As being important to bring thatabout and indeed they pledged to
bring a large part of Britishindustry under public ownership
and did so that's generally notseen as one of the sort of the,
you know, the greatest successesof the government.
Although there were at least insome cases, logical reasons in
(11:25):
particular industries for doingit at the time.
so think that it.
has been tended to be moreremembered for the establishment
or the building up of or welfarestate.
There was already some socialwelfare provision in Britain
than it has been for itseconomic policies.
But it should be remembered thatin economic terms, the
(11:48):
government.
Did inherit an incrediblydifficult situation in part, I
mean, coming back to Trumanbecause of the suspension of
lend lease aid at that pointthat the war came to an end.
And really the far fromunproblematic, but broadly
successful economic managementwas very, important part of that
government's record, but also,of course, we've got to
(12:10):
remember, and we'll talk aboutthis later in depth, of course,
you know, the whole foreignpolicy and imperial scorecard
has to be considered as well.
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_070 (12:21):
Such an important time in world
history and certainly in historyof the United Kingdom.
I want to turn to this greatinterview now, this conversation
with Atlee, Truman and Morrow.
It certainly appears that Trumanand Atlee liked each other and I
wanted to play a snippet herefrom the very beginning with Ed
Morrow introducing a terrificexchange between the two men.
(12:44):
So here we go.
Good evening.
My job normally is to hold theclock and be a sort of
electronic gatekeeper and takecare of the introductions.
But tonight, those functions arenot necessary because both of
you gentlemen are old friends.
However, I cannot resist thetemptation of saying, President
Truman, I believe you know LordAttlee.
(13:06):
Very well, and I like him verymuch.
Lord Attlee is in London.
President Truman is in hisoffice in Independence,
Missouri.
You two gentlemen have beentalking and conversing since
Potsdam in 1945.
I've been wondering, do you evercall each other by your first
name?
We never have today, but Iwouldn't mind doing it.
Well, I always stick to you, youknow it.
(13:28):
Hey.
Well, I'll call you Clementthen.
That's right.
Clement, that's right.
Wonderful exchange.
I love that.
Uh, a perfect beginning for thatprogram, too.
And I do apologize to ourlisteners.
That static you hear is justkind of a remnant of the age of
that tape.
(13:48):
Uh, was that friendship areality?
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025_ (13:52):
Yes, I mean, I think, in fact, the
fact that they agreed to do thisprogram is a sign of the kind of
respect that they had for eachother.
So, obviously, the amount offaceTime they really had.
I mean, there were times like,the Potsdam conference when they
were in daily contact.
(14:13):
But obviously, you know, thereweren't times when, they were
sort of hanging out together forweeks at a time.
You couldn't instant messagepeople in the same way.
So I didn't really have anopportunity for that kind of
friendship.
But, I do think it's verysignificant that they would both
sign up to do this program.
And I think also, I just can'thelp reflecting on the
(14:35):
brilliance of the technology ofthe time, we think today we have
such brilliant technology, butit's even more brilliant where
we've less sophisticatedtechnology to manage a program,
is bringing together people fromdifferent sides of the Atlantic.
So, but I also think that, yes,friendship and respect real.
But what we heard in thatexchange there is the amazing
(14:58):
thing where Ed Murrow is saying.
Can I kind of make you talk toeach other with your first
names, you know, for the firsttime having, having known each
other for, a dozen years or so.
Um, and, and so that kind oflevel of formality was
certainly, much more normal forthe time.
(15:20):
And also, of course, Even morenormal in government circles,
uh, that that was a sort of, theetiquette or the, or the
conventions of the time that youwouldn't just automatically go
to first names.
I don't suppose is still somesituations in which you don't
automatically go to first names,but they are relatively few and
(15:43):
far between.
So time certainly have changed.
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_070228 (15:46):
I noticed, even though they have
that exchange at the verybeginning, they don't ever call
themselves by first names in therest of the interview.
So they say they're going to,but they do not do it.
Now, a couple of times wementioned the 1945 conference at
Potsdam.
Where they first met, um, whatdo you know about their work
together specifically at thatconference?
(16:07):
Did they see eye to eye?
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025_120 (16:09):
I think probably speaking like did
remember the conference in a wayfalls into two parts.
The first is before the generalelection and actually.
Uh, accompanies Churchill, whowas still prime minister
Churchill as a kind of courtesyuh, Atlee to go along as an
observer because, the election,the, the actual polling day had
(16:33):
taken place on the 5th of July,the results weren't to be known
until the 26th of July, becauseof the counting of, the service
boat.
And so there was this kind of,.
know, sort of shredding his catmoment where one party had won
the election but nobody knew whoit was.
So, Atlee was invited on thatbasis and he didn't really at
(16:55):
that stage make all that much ofan impression on anyone.
I don't think, um, but then, ofcourse, after he wins the
election, he comes back as primeminister and to the surprise of
both the.
Soviets and the Americans, uh,to maybe to a lesser extent,
it's really effectively the samedelegation that turns up the
(17:16):
less, uh, Churchill and his, uh,foreign minister anti Eden, so
even, uh, Churchill lends aptlyhis Man servant because he
didn't have one.
So the Soviets are terriblysurprised to begin with.
They're surprised simply thatlaborers won the election
because at least previously toldMolotov that the result is going
(17:40):
to be a close thing.
It's actually a landslide.
So when he comes back, says, butyou said it was going to be
close.
What's going on?
You know, like they just assumedthat there was going to be a
kind of rigged election of somekind.
And so the Soviets are actuallypretty suspicious, and not
especially friendly towardsAtlee and certainly no more
(18:01):
friendly towards him as a leftwing prime minister than they
were towards, Churchill as aconservative.
Truman doesn't really recordvery much in his memoirs about
what he thought of Attlee exceptto say that he felt that he had
a sort of sensible appreciationof, world affairs or something
(18:23):
like that.
So, it's not an instant love inbetween the two, but they had
been compared.
in the media it was partly a wayof making sense of what was
going on, you know, often forthe American public to say, Oh,
he's aptly the British Trumanagain, because, of course,
(18:43):
Truman had been, although, ofcourse, very long serving
senator, um, as it served asvice president.
President, only briefly beforebeing elevated to the presidency
on Roosevelt's death, uh, and socounted as a relatively unknown
figure.
Similarly, the case with, withAttlee, that he'd been active in
politics for a long time, butdidn't have this big national
(19:05):
profile.
And also, they both came from,uh, I mean, as I said you know,
Atlee's background, personalbackground wasn't that, modest,
but on the other hand, he wasn'tan aristocrat.
He, you know, he wasn't a bigname.
He wasn't somebody who was goingto go into politics by virtue of
(19:25):
family connection.
And of course, um, you know,Truman's, background was, was
again relatively, although notexcessively humble.
I might just sort of chuck in ananecdote here.
Which is that, um, you know,back in the week of 9 11, I was
at the Truman library when, kindof all hell broke loose, but I
was actually staying in a bedand breakfast, which was one of
(19:48):
Truman's Boyhood homes, um, and,um, yeah, very nice, pretty
substantial house, actually, sohe wasn't kind of living in a
shack, but of course, incomparison to, many other
politicians, certainly, youknow, sort of relatively humble
beginnings.
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_0702 (20:06):
And if our listeners haven't been to
the Truman Library Museum, go.
It's a great place.
And I didn't know there was abed and breakfast in one of his
former homes.
That's really cool.
Richard, I have to try that out.
So when looking at that post warworld of diplomacy, They both
very bluntly expressed theirfrustration with the Soviets in
this program.
(20:27):
And here I'm going to play acouple of segments.
This first one is Trumandiscussing Potsdam.
We had quite a time in Potsdam.
We were there.
We had a grand, uh, meeting overthere.
And we had cooperation on bothsides of the table.
And, I wouldn't say that on thethird side.
They forgot the agreement thatwe neglected.
I'm talking about the Russiansnow.
(20:47):
I don't know if you're aware.
Ah, yes.
Yep.
And now there's a bit more hereon the post Potsdam beginnings
of the Cold War.
I don't think we went wrong.
I think if the Russians had kepttheir agreements, the protocols
which Storodatle and myselfsigned at Potsdam, there would
(21:09):
never have been any trouble inthe world.
But they broke 32 of thoseagreements within a year after
they left that conference.
I quite agree with you.
So you place the blame entirelyon the Russians?
There are many questions aboutit.
They don't believe in keepingtheir engagements.
And it's too bad.
Because honor is the topmostthing in international
relations, and also in anypolitical relation.
They also have a missinginterest in disturbance.
(21:30):
They don't want a peacefulworld.
That's correct.
They want a world where they canpush their particular doctrines.
Yes, that's what they've done inthis last Nobel Prize award.
They've treated the man whoreceived it as if he were an
outside dog and didn't belong toRussia at all.
He was one of the great writersof the century.
(21:50):
That's really fascinating.
You can hear that frustration.
Dislike in Truman's voicetalking about the Soviets.
We know Truman was a cold warwarrior.
You look at the development ofthe H bomb Korea Marshall plan,
Berlin airlift.
Uh, would you classify Atleealso as a cold war warrior?
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025 (22:10):
Well, I, I mean, a way, yes, but I
suppose there's kind ofdifferent types of cold warrior,
I suppose.
I think that you've got to thinkabout the fact that.
From the beginning of his careeror from, you know, sort of from
the time of the RussianRevolution, wasn't somebody who
(22:34):
was instinctively hostile to theUSSR, where, in fact, he had
visited, and even in the late1930s, attended a Soviet show
trial from the, from thegallery, um, didn't really seem,
you know, think it necessary to,To comment, apparently, but at
the same time, that sort ofgeneral sympathy on the British
(22:58):
left for the Soviet Union didn'textend to the domestic
communists in Britain, theCommunist Party of Great
Britain, who, of course, wererivals of the Labour Party and
these two, you know, Labour andthe CPGB Hated and distrusted
each other with a vengeance andalso, I would say that Atlee was
(23:21):
probably relatively conventionalin international affairs.
That is to say, he was going tosort of stand up for British
interests as any previous primeminister would have done without
too many differences orvariations.
And that it wasn't.
(23:42):
I guess the would I say, got tothink about what kind of cold
warrior he was.
He wasn't necessarily saying weneed to back the iron curtain
and liberate all theseterritories.
It was more that he wanted to,you know.
Actually reach agreements withthe soviet union to have a kind
(24:04):
of reasonable division ofspheres of influence if you like
to make agreements that we'regoing to be stuck to and for
the.
Different sides to keep out ofeach other's hair.
And so it wasn't the mostaggressive form of promotion of
the Cold War.
He actually, his foreignsecretary, Ernest Bevin, was
(24:26):
probably verbally moreaggressive and at Potsdam, uh,
After the election victory,Attlee you know, tends to sit
back and sort of suck on hispipe, sort of nodding
approvingly as Bevin has a go atthe Soviets.
And so it's not this kind of useof ideological cold war, but it
(24:47):
is about is standing up forBritish interests and Anglo
American interests and, aboveall wanting to make agreements
that everybody is going to stickto and being very frustrated
when, this proves to beincredibly difficult, if not
impossible.
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_0702 (25:08):
And you see everything you just said
very well in the next couple ofclips I'm going to play.
And part of that is obviouslythough there was a close us UK
alliance, there weredifferences.
And one of those was over theissue of Taiwan and more
broadly, the correct approach tocommunist China.
So here are two clips on thosetopics.
After that, let's talk aboutthem.
(25:28):
I'm going to play them bothtogether here now.
Well, does it follow from that,that we should recognize Red
China rather than isolating thatcountry?
Well, Great Britain has alreadyrecognized Red China, but
they're in debt to us to such anextent, I don't know whether
we'll ever be able to recognizethem or not, with any
(25:50):
obligations to us.
Well, that's, of course, myview.
Well, I think you may drive theminto the arms of Russia and make
them into a solid block.
I think you've got to look at itfrom their point of view.
From their point of view,they've made a revolution that's
now being interfered with.
(26:10):
And that drives them on to seekhelp where they can.
And that drives them into thearms of Russia.
Now I think we've got to get asmuch contact as we can.
America's had very great contactin China in the past.
And I'm sure there will beplenty of goodwill still there
if we want to cultivate.
I think you're right, LordAttlee.
(26:32):
I think there are a large numberof people in China who are not
in complete agreement with thistotalitarian approach to free
thought and free action.
And sometime or other, they maybe on top in that case, then we
may get closer and closer to arecognition.
I think you're right about theputting all these totalitarians
(26:52):
together makes a very dangeroussituation as far as the free
world is concerned.
The more you hit a totalitariangovernment, the more you tend to
get the feeling of nationalismrunning around it.
That was so in the FrenchRevolution, it was the same in
the Russian Revolution.
If you hit it, you strengthenit, you're kind to it.
(27:15):
He weaken it.
I think that's right.
And eventually they, we've cometo the point where we can be
kind to'em, but we've been kindto'em in the past and they
didn't appreciate it.
And here's one more clip.
Well, I sometimes thinking ofhow we didn't quite get the
(27:35):
strategic position in the lightof the modern world, I think you
think too much importance of OSAas a place.
Just, I think our people thoughttoo much of Egypt and Cyprus as
a place when you get to thehydrogen bomb.
A lot of our old strategicnotions have got to go west.
I think you're correct on that,and I think you need to
(27:57):
resurvey, and I think, Presidentof the United States and the
rest of the free world ought tosit down and make a survey, so
we can keep the peace of theworld.
Such fascinating commentarythere, and, uh, You know, at
least saying you hit atotalitarian state, you make it
stronger, essentially, and thatthat idea of engagement and it's
(28:18):
interesting you hear that they,Seem to be agreeing, but they're
not in that you engage withcommunist China and Truman
saying, yeah, you engage withthose who don't accept the
totalitarian state.
So it was really interesting tosee how they finesse that to
appear to be agreeing.
So, um tell me, what do youthink about those clips?
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025 (28:37):
first of all, you're absolutely spot
on about this kind of finessingof, um, you know, uh, but I, I
also, one thing which I foundinteresting is that,
particularly in the first clip,Atlee seems quite loquacious.
I mean, certainly for him, Imean, remember he was somebody
who had this reputation of beingvery clipped and, uh, In
monosyllabic, and something haskind of pressed his buttons
(29:00):
there to actually make him, comeout and talk more.
And as you say, it actually kindof gets Truman into the position
where Truman appears to befollowing his lead and saying,
you know, I think you're rightbefore then saying something
which actually contradicts him.
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_0 (29:16):
Mm-hmm
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025_1 (29:16):
and it is fascinating to see that
dynamic which What I'm reallyhearing there is what it might
have been like to be in the roomin 1950, in particular, where
Atlee kind of makes this dash toWashington because In a press
(29:36):
conference, this appears beingat the time of the Korean War,
having gone on for severalmonths by that point, that
Truman had appeared to suggestthe United States might be
willing to use the atomic bomb.
Now, maybe he misspoke, he was,maybe he was just trying to say,
of course, we always have theatomic bomb as a reserve option.
(29:57):
But in the UK, this makespeople.
anxious, to go to the point ofthe extreme fear, really.
So, Atlee dashes off and triesto get a commitment from Truman
that the United States won't usethe atomic bomb unless the
British have agreed.
uh, He kind of thinks he sort ofgets Truman in a room by himself
(30:21):
and, you know, sort of thinksthat he's extracted this,
commitment, yet afterwards, theBritish can't get the Americans
to, you know, write anythinglike that down, and even if they
did write it down, what would itreally mean in the, you know, in
the final instance, um, so youcan almost hear it.
the exchange that we've justheard what it might have been
(30:43):
like when Atlee is sayingdefinitely need you to launch
the the bomb without us and thenyou know truman says I think
you're right directlyconfronting him and then kind of
you know comes in with animportant But,
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_070 (30:59):
But, right.
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025_1 (31:00):
be, you know, telling us something
about actually how they didn'tfully communicate effectively at
that moment, in spite of maybethinking that they were on the
same page.
Mm-hmm
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_0 (31:12):
Mm-hmm Oh, this is so fascinating.
I, again, I'm, I'm so glad thatMerle had these programs and
that you told me about them.
Just again, you're, you're takenback in time so here's the next
part.
They, they both argued forsomething called
internationalization of hotspotsin the world.
I thought that was a reallyinteresting part of their
conversation.
So let me play a quick clip onthat.
(31:38):
You know, I wanna see some ofthese soft spots.
Internationalized, I'm advocatefor.
An international police forcelocated in various premises, not
too big, but can intervene andstop whenever there's a bit of a
row of stopping.
You and I are in completeagreement on that.
(31:59):
I think the United Nations oughtto have the power to enforce its
decrees, and the majority ofthem agree.
But I thought that all alongWell, Lord Atlee seems to
believe that some of thetroubled spots, including
Formosa, ought to beinternationalized.
How do you feel about that, Mr.
President?
I seem to remember that yousuggested as far back as 1945 at
Potsdam that certain areasshould be internationalized,
(32:22):
including, I believe, the SuezCanal.
Yes, I did.
And for the Ryan Daniels Canal,for the Keel Canal, for the
Panama Canal.
All those, uh, waterways and thebuses, too, ought to be, uh,
internationally controlled andthere wouldn't be any trouble at
all.
Yes, I remember very well yourputting that forward at Potsdam,
and I agree with you entirely.
He certainly did, and they triedto vet the internationals, and
(32:43):
the Russians wouldn't agree toit.
I think straight away, a goodstep would be to
internationalize the Antarctic.
And also the Arctic.
Yes, quite.
Another really interestingconversation there.
I was wondering as I listened tothat, how did that call for
internationalization of spots,like Suez and others, mesh with
the priorities of his party andthe voters in the United
(33:06):
Kingdom?
Uh
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025 (33:07):
Yeah, that's a really good question.
And I think that what theinterview brings out is that
these were ideas which had somekind of longstanding heritage
going back, you might say, tothe League Nations
administration of certainterritories in the interwar
years.
And, one thing to note, ofcourse, is that Atlee is out of
(33:29):
office, by this time uh, thathe's, you know, he ceased to be
continued, uh, after he, officeas Prime Minister for four years
as, uh, Leader of theopposition, but then stood down
in 1955.
and there's a certain degree towhich he then, maybe started to
articulate kind of bolder ideas.
(33:52):
He talked a lot about kind ofworld government during this
period, which wouldn'tnecessarily sound so practical
from the point of view of, um,know, sort of ordinary politics,
if you like.
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_070 (34:05):
huh.
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025_ (34:05):
But, with a couple of qualifications
there.
First, that he was definitely asincere, uh, Advocate of the
United Nations had been presentat the, you know, the San
Francisco founding conference in1945.
And I think there's always thatdilemma, for politicians who may
be quite sincere aboutinternationalization.
(34:27):
But then when Internationalizingthings runs up against the
interests of one's own country.
Well, here, who do you putfirst?
It would particularly make thepoint about what all the voters
think.
And so, he was, in some ways, afairly kind of reasonably
conventional Foreign policypolitician, but when they talk
(34:48):
about the United Nations there,of course, you've got to
remember that the Korean Warwas, in fact, a United Nations
operation, because the Sovietswere boycotting the Security
Council at that moment, whichsort of facilitated that.
So it wasn't a, wasn't sort of agenuinely global, um, um, You
know, operation, uh, but ofcourse it did have the
(35:10):
imprimatur of the UnitedNations.
So to a certain extent, Attleecould and Truman could claim to
have made UN a reality, um, uh,to some degree.
And also, although some of theseideas about internationalization
could sound a bit utopian, whenthey turned to talk about the
Arctic and the Antarctic, then,of course, there have been
(35:33):
agreements about that.
Uh, scientific cooperation andnot treating it like, uh, not
treating like any otherterritories.
I guess the side of the coin iswhen you're talking about the
Suez Canal, for example, and youtalk about internationalizing
it.
Well, that might sound.
very nice, but from the point ofview of the Egyptians, that
(35:56):
would actually sound like thatwas taking away their
sovereignty and their controlover it.
So, that these, theinternationalization is a term
which can sound and potentiallybe double edged.
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_0702 (36:09):
And I would note again for our
listeners, both of these leadersare out of office during this
interview.
So they are able to say thingsyou're right.
That, uh, or emphasize thingsthat perhaps were a bit more
difficult when they wereactually in office.
Um, we started the conversation,as you noted, when Churchill and
the conservative party werevoted out, it wasn't like a
presidential election.
(36:30):
It was the, the party was lostthe majority.
And, that difference between theBritish and the American systems
of government, actually Murrowstarts the interview with a
fascinating back and forth onthat between the two men.
So let me just play a little bitof that conversation.
(36:51):
Under the British system, if theexecutive loses support of
Parliament, then a new electionis held or a new executive head
is appointed.
What do you think of therelative merits of the two
systems?
They have a set of reservations.
I know people.
Keeps your party together, youknow.
That's true.
You have much better partydiscipline than we do.
(37:12):
I'm sure that's right.
Because we know we're all goingto lose the job if we don't
stand by the leader.
I think so.
I, uh, I hear frustration inTruman's voice there from not
being able to control the party.
Uh, I know Truman studiedgovernment, was a real student
of government.
Was the same true of Attlee?
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025_120 (37:32):
I mean, up to a point, so that in
1937, uh, Attlee publishes abook called The Labour Party in
Perspective, which has got somethoughts about, the machinery of
government, not from aparticularly kind of theoretical
perspective, more of a sort of apragmatic perspective, and also
he's certainly somebody who'sgiven a lot of thought about the
(37:55):
way in which you ought tocompose your cabinet and how,
uh, you ought to structure yourmeetings and so on in terms of
reform.
He was not a radical reformeroff.
The, the constitution, the laborgovernment of 1945 does make
some relatively, uh, marginalchanges so that up until that
(38:20):
point, university graduates had,um, got a second vote, for
example, and there wereuniversity constituencies, so,
you know, graduates ofuniversities would elect their
own MPs, that was abolished, uh,there was also, the, Reduction
of the delaying power of theHouse of Lords from two years to
(38:41):
one year.
Um, but this is relativelymarginal stuff and I think that
Attlee was generally speakingquite confident that you could
achieve a socialist program andremember he was a, you know,
convinced that.
If moderate socialist, hethought you could do that
through the existing machineryof government and through the
(39:03):
existing parliamentary system.
But I guess I would also addthat he appreciates some of the
difficulties that Truman facesmuch because.
He knows that when when dealingwith Truman that Truman can't
just do he happens to feel likeor whatever he is convinced is
best, he does have to deal withCongress.
(39:25):
That comes back to some of ourissues about, Formosa where, his
one of his books of memoirs,which is called A Prime Minister
Remembers, edited by his formerpress secretary, Francis
Williams, he says that he thinksthat the American failure to
recognize communist China and tohave such an obsession with,
(39:48):
with was and I quoteextraordinarily stupid he does
also make the acknowledgementthat truman had congress to deal
with and Didn't have an entirelyfree hand and and of course had
to deal with public opinion aswell
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_ (40:06):
Looking back at that, at the Truman
administration, Many episodescould contain this, but what he
did accomplish is truly amazingto see, uh, from the Marshall
plan on, um, Richard, I want tothank you so much for really
fascinating conversation and fortelling me about this program
(40:26):
and bring it to the table forAmerican POTUS.
Thank you so much.
Uh, before I let you go, can youtell us what are you working on
right now?
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025_ (40:34):
well a number of projects.
Um, but I guess one which mightbe of interest to your listeners
is about Uh, you know Peoplewriting letters to MPs over a
long period of time, throughoutthe 20th century and beyond, and
just a sort of anecdote, um,which links it back to Attlee.
(40:55):
Um, there was a, there was aschool girl who had a complaint
about, um, the way that theschool system was run, who wrote
to Attlee as Prime Minister, inthe early 1950s, and she writes
a complaint in the form of apoem.
remarkably enough, Atlee alsowrites his response in the form
(41:17):
of a poem.
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_070 (41:20):
That is, that is terrific.
You know, for many years Iworked as an archivist at
presidential libraries and someof my favorite things to view
were some of that, the publicmail coming into the presidents.
Remember when I first started atthe Reagan.
It was in the Reagan Projectbefore the library was even
constructed.
I ran out into the stacks andfound a letter my uncle Louis
Elbow had written to PresidentReagan in, in the collections.
(41:42):
But it really does give you agreat, um, understanding of what
issues were important to people.
Um, so I'm really look forwardto reading that Richard, as I
always do your works.
They're really terrific.
And thank, thanks again forjoining us on American POTUS.
richard-toye_1_01-14-2025 (41:55):
Thank you very much.
It's been a pleasure.
alan-lowe_1_01-14-2025_0702 (41:57):
And thanks to all of you for joining
us as well.
I so appreciate your support ofour efforts to provide a
nonpartisan.
Educational and I hope afascinating look at the
presidents and the presidency.
Also, please check out AmericanFLOTUS, a new podcast, all about
the first ladies formed inpartnership between American
POTUS and the first ladiesassociation for research and
(42:18):
education, or FLAIR.
You can find American FLOTUSepisodes at AmericanPOTUS.
org FLAIR net.
org or on your favorite podcastplatform.
Thanks very much.
And I'll see you next time onAmerican POTUS.
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