December 1, 2025 • 27 mins
Text the ATB Team! We'd love to hear from you!
In this episode of At the Boundary, retired four-star General Frank McKenzie joins USF’s Dr. Tad Schnaufer to break down one of the most pressing national security questions today: Can the United States build a true “Golden Dome” to defend the homeland from nuclear missile attack?
Together, they explore how America’s past missile defense systems—from Nike and Sentinel to THAAD—shaped today’s strategic landscape, and why emerging technologies may finally make boost-phase interception realistic. The conversation dives into the potential of space-based missile defense, the growing threat of hypersonic weapons, and what future U.S. policy and NATO cooperation would require keeping pace with rapidly advancing adversaries.
General McKenzie provides a candid assessment of the U.S.–China nuclear competition, the limits of current deterrence, and what it would take to shield the American homeland in a future strategic conflict.
A must-listen episode for anyone tracking U.S. defense strategy, missile defense innovation, and global security trends.
Links from the Episode:
• Pre Register for GNSI Tampa Summit 6
At the Boundary from the Global and National Security Institute at the University of South Florida, features global and national security issues we’ve found to be insightful, intriguing, fascinating, maybe controversial, but overall just worth talking about.
A "boundary" is a place, either literal or figurative, where two forces exist in close proximity to each other. Sometimes that boundary is in a state of harmony. More often than not, that boundary has a bit of chaos baked in. The Global and National Security Institute will live on the boundary of security policy and technology and that's where this podcast will focus.
The mission of GNSI is to provide actionable solutions to 21st-century security challenges for decision-makers at the local, state, national and global levels. We hope you enjoy At the Boundary.
Look for our other publications and products on our website publications page.
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Jim Cardoso (00:12):
Jim, hello everyone. Welcome to this week's
episode of at the boundary, thepodcast from the global and
national security Institute atthe University of South Florida.
I'm Jim Cardoso, Senior Directorfor GNSI, and your host for at
the boundary. Today on thepodcast, we're going to drop in
on a discussion between GNSIExecutive Director, retired
(00:35):
Marine Corps General, FrankMcKenzie, and GNSI strategy and
research manager Dr Tadschnaufer, earlier this year,
general McKenzie sat down withtad to discuss the concept of
golden dome as part of ourwhat's really happening video
series. Golden Dome remains afocus of the Trump
administration and will continueto feature prominently in
(00:57):
national security spending andstrategy. We felt it appropriate
to even more broadly publish thediscussion to ensure our at the
boundary audience and otherscould share in the tremendous
insight provided general.
McKenzie and Tad looked at thepromise and cost of a Golden
Dome system where an ICBM ismost vulnerable to an effective
(01:18):
defense. What NATO collaborationin that defense might look like,
and the future of US, China,nuclear competition. Suffice it
to say, the topic of golden domeremains as hot as ever. To that
end, GNSI is preparing for ourMarch 2026, Tampa summit on
nuclear warfare, nucleardefense, slash golden dome and
(01:40):
the use of nuclear energy fornational security purposes.
There is no better time torevisit a riveting discussion
with an eminently qualifiedexpert like our executive
director. So enjoy thisdiscussion on is golden dome The
Future of Us, nuclear missiledefense.
Gen. McKenzie (02:05):
Welcome back, general Ted, always good to be
with you.
Tad Schnaufer (02:08):
So what's really happening with this golden dome
concept? Well, Ted, I think
Gen. McKenzie (02:12):
golden dome is a is an idea worth exploring. I
think it's a good I think thePresident's own to something
here, I think certainlyprotecting the United States
against nuclear attack issomething we should all we
should all be interested and inseeing brought to fruition, it
will be an expensive project.
There's a lot of history here,and we can unpack a little bit
of that, if you'd like. But inmy bottom line is, I welcome it.
(02:34):
I think we should move forwardwith it.
Tad Schnaufer (02:38):
So let's first start with the history piece.
Obviously, during the Cold War,the threat of mutual
annihilation between US and theSoviets was a big deal. We
obviously had defense measuresin place, everything from the
missile defense alarm systemMidas, not the auto vehicle
people in the 1960s and then,you know, the Reagan
administration implemented whatis popularly known as Star Wars,
(02:59):
which got to a level ofcompletion. How does this
compare to those older, oldersystems? Sure.
Gen. McKenzie (03:04):
So, you know, going back into the 50s, 60s,
the United States experimentedwith with systems to shoot down
incoming ballistic missiles. Andin the 60s, the Nike system was
a very it was an Army system,not particularly effective,
designed to protect majorcities. Then, in the 70s, you
saw the Sentinel safeguardsystem, which was one we worked
(03:28):
in, sort of in negotiation with,with, with the Soviet Union,
designed to protect both missilefields and potentially major
urban areas. It used a couple ofdifferent types of missiles, a
short range missile and a longrange missile, and it never
really fully came online, but weexperimented with it in the 70s.
(03:48):
The radar from that system, theperimeter acquisition radar, is
still up in lovely concreteNorth Dakota, where it's in use
today, actually, to characterizeobjects in deep space. It's a
huge it's worth taking a look atthat actual par. You can see it
for miles, but it looks deepinto space. It's in concrete,
North Dakota. And actually, whenthe town of concrete ceased to
(04:09):
exist, as it did, it's nowcalled the Cavalier air era,
probably Space Force stationtoday, but at any rate, there's
still, there's a residue ofthat. Now, the Russians also
built a ballistic missiledefense system, and there still
exists, actually the galoshe isthe NATO code name for it, a
follow on to galoshe actually iscentered around Moscow and is
(04:30):
designed to prevent, protectMoscow from attack. I think we
would be able to overcome thatif we struck them, you know,
which would be a tragedy, but ifthat occurred, I think that that
system is probably overcomeable.
But nonetheless, it's an activeballistic miss. Active ballistic
missile defense system in placetoday. So of course, when
President Reagan came intooffice in the 80s, we talked
about Strategic DefenseInitiative. A lot of people
oppose that. A lot of scientistsopposed it on technical grounds,
(04:53):
and a lot of scientists opposeit on theological grounds, which
they clothe in technicalresistance. So I actually think
there was probably some there,there with that we never
followed up enough to find out.
You know, there's a theory of atheory says we, we pressured
Russia, or pressured the SovietUnion, by claiming that we were
(05:14):
going to invest in that, whichhelped push them to finance
ultimate insolvency, which ledto the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1990 1991 I thinkthere's that's a mixed, there's
mixed, mixed opinions on that.
The history is not real clear tome that that actually had a huge
hand in bringing the SovietUnion down. But the one thing
that that we looked at werespace based systems. And I'll
(05:34):
come back to space based systemshere in just, in just a few
minutes. But the fact of thefact of the matter is, if you're
going to talk about defendingagainst ballistic missiles, you
need to talk about puttingsystems into space. So today, as
you and I talk and Tad there,there are not a lot of ballistic
missile defense systems outthere. Our THAAD theater high
altitude air defense system cando EXO atmospheric intercepts
(05:55):
above the atmosphere, but itonly protects a very narrow
footprint. It's not an areadefense weapon in the size of
the footprints classified anddoesn't matter for our
discussion today. But you're notgoing to put one in an Omaha and
defend all of the middle theMidwest of the United States.
You might be able to defend asection of Omaha, but just a
(06:16):
very small footprint. The UnitedStates Navy has ships Ballistic
Missile Defense shooters, whichare Aegis platform ships,
typically your Arleigh Burke,late model destroyers and some
residual cruiser ships thatactually have the capability to
do this as well. Again, thoughthey're very narrow, they're not
an Area Defense system, so canprotect you, but not broad areas
(06:38):
of protection. The Israelis havesome systems that we've
cooperated with them on, notIron Dome. Iron Dome is a much
lower altitude system. It's noteffective against ballistic
missiles. It's effective againstdrones. It's effective against
short range systems, but wouldnot be effective against an
ICBM. What is effective againstan ICBM would be David sling, an
(06:59):
arrow, or systems that Israeluses to shoot again EXO
atmospherically, you're lookingat systems outside the
atmosphere as they descend inthe post boost phase of their
flight. So that's what Israelhas used in defending itself
against the short rangeballistic missiles that Iran
fired against them in the twoattacks that have been made, and
(07:20):
generally, those intercepts havebeen successful, although they
have not achieved 100% results,sure. But finally, one other
system that's in place now is wehave ground based interceptors
up in Fort Greeley, Alaska thatare designed really oriented
against the launch of NorthKorean weapons against the
United States, and they wouldintercept in the post again, in
(07:42):
the post boost phase, after themissile has finished its power
flight, it was beginning itsdescent to the United States. I
think there are 44 ground basedinterceptors up there, and the
results have been mixed. Dependson your point of view. Some
people would say not likely tobe successful in an intercept.
Others have been more positiveabout that. The problem with
(08:05):
these types of systems are it'shard to know unless you test it.
You got to test it, and it'shard to do those tests.
Tad Schnaufer (08:11):
So what we're looking at with this golden dome
missile defense concept thatPresident Trump announced
recently is it's more about theintercontinental ballistic
missiles. It's more the bigmissiles, the nuclear attic or
something of that nature. We'renot talking about smaller drones
or anything like that, like yousaid, with the Iron Dome. So
with that in mind, what doesthat actually look like? How
(08:31):
would you intercept a missilebeing launched on North Korea or
Russia or China or somethinglike that?
Gen. McKenzie (08:36):
So Tad, I think what we're going to see in the
next few months is we're goingto do an intensive study of
this, and we're not going toneed to uncover new material. We
already know the answer to it.
Here's the fact of the matter,if you want to shoot at a
ballistic missile and interceptit, the time to shoot it is
during its powered boost phase.
It launches from, say, NorthKorea. It's going to be in
powered boost flight for twominutes, maybe three minutes,
(08:59):
depending during that period offlight, that missile is non
maneuverable. It's on a veryfixed trajectory. It has an
extremely bright thermal trail.
It's easy to see, verypredictable. That's the time to
shoot it down if you want to doit. That's when you want to do
that. So now you're not going tobe able to do that from Fort
Greeley, Alaska. You're notgoing to be able to be able to
(09:20):
do that from the United States.
In order to do that, you reallyhave to do it from space, which
means you have to have systemsin space that will observe the
launch. And those systems exist.
Now we don't need to inventthose, but you need something up
there that will then engage thatmissile as it gains speed and
begins to exit the atmosphere.
The other advantage when youshoot at it, then the missile
(09:41):
can't deploy what we callpenetration aids, systems that
can be deployed as it enters itspost boost phase, that cloud
your radar as you look at it,that make it hard to acquire the
main target of the warheaditself. Additionally, in
descent, a missile may maneuver.
It may. Deploy multiplewarheads, it may do a variety of
things that make defense muchmore difficult. None of those
(10:04):
things apply in boost andparticularly that also begins
now we begin to look athypersonic missiles who now are
going to be able to maneuverpretty radically in their late
phases. So you want to get tothem again early in flight,
while they're still gaining thespeed necessary that will allow
them to do those successivemaneuvers. So what I come back
to Ted really, is if we're goingto look at this seriously, we
(10:26):
need to look at space basedsystems. I don't know that
there's any other way to do itthat offers the promise of
technical feasibility.
Tad Schnaufer (10:36):
So with the, you know, the idea that people might
get in their mind of the GoldenDome is like over the United
States is dome of protection.
But what would you recommend isthat you really have to kind of
get out there and touch wherethe missile takes off or
relatively rapidly afterwards.
You can't wait for it to come. Ithink
Gen. McKenzie (10:49):
the evidence is compelling. If you want to gain
high, what we call PKprobability kill, you got to get
it early in flight. And sotherefore, you know the and then
you've got to make decisions on,you know, how many are you going
to deploy, and that'll be basedon the nature of the threat. I
mean, defending against a NorthKorean threat is much simpler
than defending against a Russianthreat. Defending against a
(11:09):
Chinese threat today is muchsimpler than defending against a
Russian threat, although theChinese threat is certainly
growing, and we need to be awareof that. And of course, the
problem is even more complicatedthan that. For example,
ballistic missile submarines canlaunch, you've now got to be
able to take that into account.
So if you're looking at NorthKorea land based sites, they're
fixed. We know pretty much wherethey will be, and we know the
(11:30):
same thing for much of Russiaand China as well. But if you're
going to defend now againstballistic missiles, you've got
to have a little moreflexibility in how you position,
how you look, at how youposition your satellites. All
those things again, are withinthe realm of technical
attainment. It will not beinexpensive to do that. But I
would argue Ted, look, what'sthe other side of the coin?
(11:52):
People argue that what thedoctrine of Mutual Assured
Destruction has kept us safe formany decades. That's a thin
tissue, and I would much ratherprefer to have the ability to
defend the United States againsta nuclear attack, rather than
depend on the opinions of anational leader in another
country who may or may notultimately prove to be rational.
Tad Schnaufer (12:15):
So what does the threat look like from, let's
say, the Russians or theChinese? Is it primarily going
to be these intercontinentalmissiles that we're trying to
defend, or how do we get afterthat issue today?
Gen. McKenzie (12:25):
Tad, the most significant capability that
exists against us is, of course,the Russian threat. They can
fire many hundreds of ballisticmissiles, intercontinental
ballistic missiles against theUnited States. At the same time,
they can launch submarinelaunched ballistic missiles
against the United States. Theypose the most significant
existential threat in thenuclear domain that we face
today. Additionally, some oftheir submarines might be able
(12:47):
to fire cruise missiles againstthe United States from much
shorter ranges. So it really isa complex threat that we face
now. It may be, it may prove toodifficult to be able to defend
against that total threat. AndI'm not sure that we would need
to do that. I think you want tobe able to protect against a
smaller threat, handfuls ofmissiles, dozens of missiles,
(13:10):
not hundreds of missiles. Andthat then that threat would
actually be able to accommodatea North Korean threat, an
Iranian threat, potentially aPakistani threat at some point
in the future, and you'reprobably against China for now,
maybe not in the future againstChina. And would have to, you
know, you want to eventuallyscope and scare your defense to
the capabilities of yourpotential adversaries. So we
(13:31):
need to take a look at that. Butall those things, I think, are
certainly, are certainly,certainly possible things that
we would need to be able todefend against, right? Because
you hear
Tad Schnaufer (13:39):
people discussing these systems as kind of a
bullet hitting a bullet, hittinga bullet, if you will, a missile
hitting a missile. And so theyhave to be very precise. They
have to be locked in. Thetechnology
Gen. McKenzie (13:47):
has to be there absolutely and so much easier to
do that in the boost phase,
Tad Schnaufer (13:50):
right? So do it early. And additional
consideration is you have tohave enough of these intercept
missiles.
Gen. McKenzie (13:55):
You do have to have enough of these intercept
missiles. So now you're talkingabout putting them on orbit. You
got to maintain them in space.
There's been resistance tomilitarizing space. I would
argue, China is already there.
The Russians are already there.
We need to recognize reality andbe able to protect ourselves in
the space domain, as others aredoing now.
Tad Schnaufer (14:14):
So we'll go to space with that. With that in
mind, what about the Chinese andthe Russians? In a sense,
particularly the Chinese pushingback on this is, you know,
escalating the overall tensionbetween the nations now that we
can better defend ourselves,they now have to, you know,
Gen. McKenzie (14:30):
laughable Tad, actually, because the Chinese
have heavily militarized spacealready, and they're busily
building a nuclear capability tobe at least equivalent to ours
by the mid 2030s so this istypical Chinese propaganda,
typical Chinese disinformation,misinformation designed to
designed to occlude theargument, if you
Tad Schnaufer (14:50):
will. So either way, the United States should
prepare for defensive actions,even if the you know the
Chinese,
Gen. McKenzie (14:56):
I would argue the President's emphasis is exactly
correct, right? It will beexpensive. We need to thoroughly
look at the technologies, but Iwould argue the technologies are
there to defend against this. Wewill look we're probably not
going to be able to defendagainst what we used to call a
no notice over the pole, massiveRussian attack, but Mutual
Assured Destruction is your isyour defense against that? But a
(15:19):
smaller attack, and even amidsize attack you want to be
able to defend against, becausethen what you know, if a nuclear
weapon goes off on United Statessoil, then that begins to narrow
the range of a president'sresponses. If you can prevent
that from happening, actually,it opens the door for de
escalation, right? So to saythat ballistic missile defense
(15:39):
is inherently escalatory, Ithink, misses the problem
completely. That's
Tad Schnaufer (15:43):
an excellent point, that it gives that buffer
for negotiation, because once itgoes off,
Gen. McKenzie (15:47):
once a city is destroyed in the United States,
any president is going to have avery narrow range of options to
choose from. In his response, ifyou can prevent that from
happening, you give thePresident of the United States
more options about how to managethe crisis.
Tad Schnaufer (16:02):
So what role with that in mind, managing the
crisis the US, it typicallyworks with allies. What role
does allies play? We heardCanada would like to be involved
with such a, you know, GoldenDome concept. What about other
allies, the Canadians? I think
Gen. McKenzie (16:15):
this is something that we should in the long run,
we should work with all ourallies to give them the
capability to do this, you know,and that's a way forward. I
think it's good for the US. It'sgood for them. It would perhaps
revitalize some of the alliancestructure out there. But I would
think, and I don't know this,but I would think that we would
certainly work to offer it toour NATO allies as we go
(16:35):
forward.
Tad Schnaufer (16:36):
You believe that they bring something to the
table as well, obviously, thegeography they bring. But do
they have other technologiesthat can
Gen. McKenzie (16:43):
assist I think, yes, I'm sure they do. I think
most of these technologies aregoing to come from the United
States and perhaps some fromIsrael. But I think we should
open it up to as broad a broad atent as possible as we look at
it.
Tad Schnaufer (16:57):
And with that in mind, as this program expands
this concept, it's obviously notsomething that's going to happen
in the happened in the next yearor so. It takes time to really
play this out. So what's theoperational timeline for
something like this? I mean,very grand program. Well, I
Gen. McKenzie (17:09):
think you need to move I think a lot of these
technologies exist today. Ithink we need to move quickly on
it. But you're right. It's not ayear away, it's much it's much
more, much longer than that. Butwe need to commit to it. We need
to lay the scientific research.
And that's, yeah, well, mine thescientific research that's
already out there in order tomove forward with it. This is
not something that's 20 yearsdown the road. I think it's much
(17:29):
closer than
Tad Schnaufer (17:32):
that. And you mentioned cost a few times. So
as the DoD cuts costs in someother areas, is this, is this
another program that it shouldinvest in and moving forward.
Gen. McKenzie (17:42):
And again, what's, what's wrong about
defending the United Statesagainst nuclear attack? Sure, I
don't, I don't see any issues. Idon't see any issues with it
either. And I think it's worth,I think it's worth the
expenditure of money that itwould require to do that.
Tad Schnaufer (17:53):
And then what looking to our potential
adversaries in this type ofscenario? What are the defense
capabilities of the say, theRussians or the Chinese. They
have similar you mentionedbriefly, with the Russians, but
the Chinese also have defense.
The
Gen. McKenzie (18:07):
Chinese have no ballistic missile defense
capabilities that I'm aware of.
They may have something on orbitthat we don't know about. That's
always possible with theChinese. The Russians have the
Kalash system that we talkedabout, which is really designed
to protect Moscow, not much elsebeyond that. So you know, they
will be very they will be keenlyinterested in these systems. As
you may recall, President Reaganactually talked about sharing
(18:27):
the technology with the Russiansso they would be able to protect
themselves too. I don't knowthat that's the way we want to
go with this, but it certainlyshows flexibility of thought as
you approach it.
Tad Schnaufer (18:39):
And then, as we noted, the golden dome concept
really focuses on the nuclearmissile defense. What about
smaller craft? You know, we havedrones. We've seen with Israel,
the different types of, youknow, missiles that could come
in. Should the us also look tomaybe have another level, level
of the stone below the
Gen. McKenzie (18:57):
TED? I think you're exactly right. I think
you need to be prepared tooperate against long range
cruise missiles. The Russians,we know, are experimenting with
those with global range. Youwant to be able to work against
drones, not drones so much, butcruise missiles launched from
submarines that are off yourshores. That requires really air
defense capabilities. It doesn'trequire new technology so much
(19:19):
as additive capabilities thatalready exist. You're not gonna
have to invent new things todefend against these
capabilities. You are going tohave to buy new equipment, buy
new radars, buy new missilesystems. In order to do it, and
you're gonna have to make somebasic philosophical decisions.
What are you going to defend? Doyou want to defend your major
urban areas? Certainly, you alsowant to be able to defend
(19:40):
against your submarine bases,the parts of our nuclear
capability that would benecessary to fight if we had to
fight, and then our missilefields. So some things, and this
has all been thoroughly analyzedand discussed for many decades,
going back to the 70s, when wefirst began to look at this,
what is it that you want todefend that will lead you to how
much. You need, and how muchyou're going to be willing to
(20:02):
spend. And look, the last thingI would simply say on this, on
this particular subject, ishypersonics complicate the
problem. They're very difficultto strike once they gain speed,
once they gain the ability tomaneuver. So that, again, I go
back to the point you want to beable to get them when they
launch, not once they're inflight and have had the
opportunity to begin theirmaneuvers.
Tad Schnaufer (20:21):
So we noted exactly getting them early. So
we noted that you'd have topretty much have something in
space to be able to
Gen. McKenzie (20:26):
really, practically. There's no other
way to do it.
Tad Schnaufer (20:30):
What else would be? What other components of
this golden dome would also needto be in place? Obviously, you
need radars.
Gen. McKenzie (20:37):
Or what else we actually have in space? The best
early warning missile system inthe world. It's actually in a
geosynchronous orbit, about25,000 miles altitude, that
looks down that gives usinfrared notification if someone
launches a missile. We know thatvery quickly we have other
radars that then give us what wecall dual phenomenology, which,
in this business, is what youwant in order to predict a
(20:58):
missile you want to get, youwant to get two separate sources
of its existence and path ofmovement, so you can then begin
to determine where it's going tohit. We can do this in a matter
of seconds. It's very quick.
I've been part of this processbefore, so you can do that now
for talking about taking weaponsin space. Now you're probably
going to need to put even betterradars on low Earth orbit. So
(21:19):
once you get the initialindication of a launch, you can
lock in on it. Then you're goingto have a missile platform, a
bus, if you will, with multiplewarheads, probably that would
then release those and be guidedto the target. Look, there are a
lot of ways to do this that areabove our technical level of
discussion here, active, semiactive, passive, all kinds of
ways you can apply guidance to akill vehicle. The key thing,
(21:43):
though, is you want to do itwhen the missile itself cannot
maneuver and is on a very, verypredictable ballistic path.
Tad Schnaufer (21:53):
And we should note that the these kill
missiles are interceptors.
They're not nuclear, they'rejust meant to
Gen. McKenzie (21:57):
destroy. They're not nuclear. They can be high
explosive. They can be purelykinetic, where they got to
actually hit the vehicle. We gotpeople that will work that out,
Tad Schnaufer (22:06):
right but, but in the end, it is a defensive
system. It
Gen. McKenzie (22:12):
is inherently defensive, and I would argue
that it actually bringsstability. I reject the
assertion that ABM systems aredestabilizing and that's that
argument's been made by a lot ofsmart people. I just don't agree
with it. I think anything thatadds to your defensive
capabilities provides furtherstability, right?
Tad Schnaufer (22:31):
And with that stability, as the nuclear
problem becomes what's somethingcalled a three body problem, as
the Chinese are rapidlyexpanding their nuclear program,
is this part of a response tothat? Is this?
Gen. McKenzie (22:42):
I think it could be tad is where, because look,
as the Chinese nuclear arsenalexpands, we're either going to
have to expand our own nucleararsenal as we confront two
potential adversaries, or you'regoing to have to come up with a
way to protect our owncapability. Well, nobody wants
to build more nuclear weapons.
So here's a path where you don'thave to build more, a lot more
nuclear weapons.
Tad Schnaufer (23:01):
And then lastly, to finish up with, the overall
threats, a number of us treatieswith the Russians on nuclear
weapons actually will be ending.
They're coming to term here inthe next few years, and it
doesn't look like those will bereinitiated, particularly as the
war in Ukraine continues. Isthat another area of cause of
concern? Or is it something
Gen. McKenzie (23:18):
I tell you? What causes concern is the way the
Chinese are building nuclearcapability and to negotiate with
a single partner in a threebody. Problem is strategic
myopia that we can't afford. SoI think I'm not particularly
concerned at the idea that thesetreaties are going
Tad Schnaufer (23:35):
to lapse right particularly if you have the
defenses in place,
Gen. McKenzie (23:39):
particularly if you recognize you're now dealing
with two different entities, theChinese and the Russians, and
you believe you have thecapability to at least partially
defend yourself against a smallto moderate strike.
Tad Schnaufer (23:50):
So with all that in mind, what can we expect of
this golden dome project in nextcouple of years here, as we look
forward,
Gen. McKenzie (23:57):
you know, I think, I think we're going to
see the pass forward. They'regoing to look at all these
possibilities. We're going toselect which ways we're actually
going to deploy I think that'llcome fairly quickly, because,
again, there's a lot oftechnology that already exists.
We're not going to have toinvent a whole bunch of stuff to
do this. So I think that'll movefairly quickly. It won't be six
months, it won't be a year, butit won't be 20 years either,
(24:19):
right?
Tad Schnaufer (24:20):
Yeah, it probably won't stall. Stall out as some
of those later Cold War programsthat ended up not
Gen. McKenzie (24:25):
technology is better. And again, if you shift
to the ascent phase vice thedescent phase, you remarkably
simplify your problem. Well,thank you very much, sir. My
pleasure. Ted, as always.
Jim Cardoso (24:42):
Thank you again to GNSI Executive Director, retired
general, Frank McKenzie, andGNSI strategy and research
manager Dr Tad schnaufer for anexcellent discussion on Golden
Dome. This timely, CriticalConversation is a great lead in
for our next GNSI Tampa summitat. Which will be held March 24
to the 25th 2026 at the USFTampa campus. We'll spend two
(25:07):
days diving into the REemergence of nuclear weapons in
Modern Warfare, nuclear defense,slash golden dome and the use of
small nuclear reactors fornational security purposes. The
summit will feature keynotes andpanels from experts across
government, academia andindustry, and provide smaller
Working Group opportunities forparticipants to really
(25:29):
contribute to the dialog. GNSI smission is to inform policy
makers to enable actionable,well informed decisions, and you
can be part of that input. Go toour website for more information
and to pre register to receivefurther updates on the summit.
Thanks for spending some timewith us today, next week on the
podcast, we'll turn ourattention back to critical
(25:52):
minerals. Recall that six monthsago, the Trump administration
released an executive order onunleashing America's offshore
critical minerals and resources.
Since then, there's been noshortage of developments
associated with China's nearmonopoly of the global supply
chain for critical minerals inboth mining and even more
importantly, in processing.
(26:14):
We'll sit down with GNSIresident fellow, Dr Linda known
who is finalizing a decisionbrief on critical minerals, with
focus on cobalt, which iscrucial for smartphones, jet
engines and other nationalsecurity applications, that's
next week on at the boundary. Ifyou don't want to miss that
episode or any other Be sure torate, subscribe and let your
(26:36):
friends and colleagues know ifyou're watching on YouTube, hit
that like button, subscribe andturn on alerts. Follow along the
GNSI on our LinkedIn and Xaccounts at USF, underscore GNSI
And check out our website aswell at usf.edu/gnsi,
(26:59):
that's going to wrap up thisepisode of at the boundary. Each
new episode will feature globaland national security issues we
found to be insightful,intriguing, maybe controversial,
but overall, just worth talkingabout. I'm Jim Cardoso, and
we'll see you at the boundary.
You you.
Jim, hello everyone. Welcome to this week's
episode of at the boundary, thepodcast from the global and
national security Institute atthe University of South Florida.
I'm Jim Cardoso, Senior Directorfor GNSI, and your host for at
the boundary. Today on thepodcast, we're going to drop in
on a discussion between GNSIExecutive Director, retired
(00:35):
Marine Corps General, FrankMcKenzie, and GNSI strategy and
research manager Dr Tadschnaufer, earlier this year,
general McKenzie sat down withtad to discuss the concept of
golden dome as part of ourwhat's really happening video
series. Golden Dome remains afocus of the Trump
administration and will continueto feature prominently in
(00:57):
national security spending andstrategy. We felt it appropriate
to even more broadly publish thediscussion to ensure our at the
boundary audience and otherscould share in the tremendous
insight provided general.
McKenzie and Tad looked at thepromise and cost of a Golden
Dome system where an ICBM ismost vulnerable to an effective
(01:18):
defense. What NATO collaborationin that defense might look like,
and the future of US, China,nuclear competition. Suffice it
to say, the topic of golden domeremains as hot as ever. To that
end, GNSI is preparing for ourMarch 2026, Tampa summit on
nuclear warfare, nucleardefense, slash golden dome and
(01:40):
the use of nuclear energy fornational security purposes.
There is no better time torevisit a riveting discussion
with an eminently qualifiedexpert like our executive
director. So enjoy thisdiscussion on is golden dome The
Future of Us, nuclear missiledefense.
Gen. McKenzie (02:05):
Welcome back, general Ted, always good to be
with you.
Tad Schnaufer (02:08):
So what's really happening with this golden dome
concept? Well, Ted, I think
Gen. McKenzie (02:12):
golden dome is a is an idea worth exploring. I
think it's a good I think thePresident's own to something
here, I think certainlyprotecting the United States
against nuclear attack issomething we should all we
should all be interested and inseeing brought to fruition, it
will be an expensive project.
There's a lot of history here,and we can unpack a little bit
of that, if you'd like. But inmy bottom line is, I welcome it.
(02:34):
I think we should move forwardwith it.
Tad Schnaufer (02:38):
So let's first start with the history piece.
Obviously, during the Cold War,the threat of mutual
annihilation between US and theSoviets was a big deal. We
obviously had defense measuresin place, everything from the
missile defense alarm systemMidas, not the auto vehicle
people in the 1960s and then,you know, the Reagan
administration implemented whatis popularly known as Star Wars,
(02:59):
which got to a level ofcompletion. How does this
compare to those older, oldersystems? Sure.
Gen. McKenzie (03:04):
So, you know, going back into the 50s, 60s,
the United States experimentedwith with systems to shoot down
incoming ballistic missiles. Andin the 60s, the Nike system was
a very it was an Army system,not particularly effective,
designed to protect majorcities. Then, in the 70s, you
saw the Sentinel safeguardsystem, which was one we worked
(03:28):
in, sort of in negotiation with,with, with the Soviet Union,
designed to protect both missilefields and potentially major
urban areas. It used a couple ofdifferent types of missiles, a
short range missile and a longrange missile, and it never
really fully came online, but weexperimented with it in the 70s.
(03:48):
The radar from that system, theperimeter acquisition radar, is
still up in lovely concreteNorth Dakota, where it's in use
today, actually, to characterizeobjects in deep space. It's a
huge it's worth taking a look atthat actual par. You can see it
for miles, but it looks deepinto space. It's in concrete,
North Dakota. And actually, whenthe town of concrete ceased to
(04:09):
exist, as it did, it's nowcalled the Cavalier air era,
probably Space Force stationtoday, but at any rate, there's
still, there's a residue ofthat. Now, the Russians also
built a ballistic missiledefense system, and there still
exists, actually the galoshe isthe NATO code name for it, a
follow on to galoshe actually iscentered around Moscow and is
(04:30):
designed to prevent, protectMoscow from attack. I think we
would be able to overcome thatif we struck them, you know,
which would be a tragedy, but ifthat occurred, I think that that
system is probably overcomeable.
But nonetheless, it's an activeballistic miss. Active ballistic
missile defense system in placetoday. So of course, when
President Reagan came intooffice in the 80s, we talked
about Strategic DefenseInitiative. A lot of people
oppose that. A lot of scientistsopposed it on technical grounds,
(04:53):
and a lot of scientists opposeit on theological grounds, which
they clothe in technicalresistance. So I actually think
there was probably some there,there with that we never
followed up enough to find out.
You know, there's a theory of atheory says we, we pressured
Russia, or pressured the SovietUnion, by claiming that we were
(05:14):
going to invest in that, whichhelped push them to finance
ultimate insolvency, which ledto the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1990 1991 I thinkthere's that's a mixed, there's
mixed, mixed opinions on that.
The history is not real clear tome that that actually had a huge
hand in bringing the SovietUnion down. But the one thing
that that we looked at werespace based systems. And I'll
(05:34):
come back to space based systemshere in just, in just a few
minutes. But the fact of thefact of the matter is, if you're
going to talk about defendingagainst ballistic missiles, you
need to talk about puttingsystems into space. So today, as
you and I talk and Tad there,there are not a lot of ballistic
missile defense systems outthere. Our THAAD theater high
altitude air defense system cando EXO atmospheric intercepts
(05:55):
above the atmosphere, but itonly protects a very narrow
footprint. It's not an areadefense weapon in the size of
the footprints classified anddoesn't matter for our
discussion today. But you're notgoing to put one in an Omaha and
defend all of the middle theMidwest of the United States.
You might be able to defend asection of Omaha, but just a
(06:16):
very small footprint. The UnitedStates Navy has ships Ballistic
Missile Defense shooters, whichare Aegis platform ships,
typically your Arleigh Burke,late model destroyers and some
residual cruiser ships thatactually have the capability to
do this as well. Again, thoughthey're very narrow, they're not
an Area Defense system, so canprotect you, but not broad areas
(06:38):
of protection. The Israelis havesome systems that we've
cooperated with them on, notIron Dome. Iron Dome is a much
lower altitude system. It's noteffective against ballistic
missiles. It's effective againstdrones. It's effective against
short range systems, but wouldnot be effective against an
ICBM. What is effective againstan ICBM would be David sling, an
(06:59):
arrow, or systems that Israeluses to shoot again EXO
atmospherically, you're lookingat systems outside the
atmosphere as they descend inthe post boost phase of their
flight. So that's what Israelhas used in defending itself
against the short rangeballistic missiles that Iran
fired against them in the twoattacks that have been made, and
(07:20):
generally, those intercepts havebeen successful, although they
have not achieved 100% results,sure. But finally, one other
system that's in place now is wehave ground based interceptors
up in Fort Greeley, Alaska thatare designed really oriented
against the launch of NorthKorean weapons against the
United States, and they wouldintercept in the post again, in
(07:42):
the post boost phase, after themissile has finished its power
flight, it was beginning itsdescent to the United States. I
think there are 44 ground basedinterceptors up there, and the
results have been mixed. Dependson your point of view. Some
people would say not likely tobe successful in an intercept.
Others have been more positiveabout that. The problem with
(08:05):
these types of systems are it'shard to know unless you test it.
You got to test it, and it'shard to do those tests.
Tad Schnaufer (08:11):
So what we're looking at with this golden dome
missile defense concept thatPresident Trump announced
recently is it's more about theintercontinental ballistic
missiles. It's more the bigmissiles, the nuclear attic or
something of that nature. We'renot talking about smaller drones
or anything like that, like yousaid, with the Iron Dome. So
with that in mind, what doesthat actually look like? How
(08:31):
would you intercept a missilebeing launched on North Korea or
Russia or China or somethinglike that?
Gen. McKenzie (08:36):
So Tad, I think what we're going to see in the
next few months is we're goingto do an intensive study of
this, and we're not going toneed to uncover new material. We
already know the answer to it.
Here's the fact of the matter,if you want to shoot at a
ballistic missile and interceptit, the time to shoot it is
during its powered boost phase.
It launches from, say, NorthKorea. It's going to be in
powered boost flight for twominutes, maybe three minutes,
(08:59):
depending during that period offlight, that missile is non
maneuverable. It's on a veryfixed trajectory. It has an
extremely bright thermal trail.
It's easy to see, verypredictable. That's the time to
shoot it down if you want to doit. That's when you want to do
that. So now you're not going tobe able to do that from Fort
Greeley, Alaska. You're notgoing to be able to be able to
(09:20):
do that from the United States.
In order to do that, you reallyhave to do it from space, which
means you have to have systemsin space that will observe the
launch. And those systems exist.
Now we don't need to inventthose, but you need something up
there that will then engage thatmissile as it gains speed and
begins to exit the atmosphere.
The other advantage when youshoot at it, then the missile
(09:41):
can't deploy what we callpenetration aids, systems that
can be deployed as it enters itspost boost phase, that cloud
your radar as you look at it,that make it hard to acquire the
main target of the warheaditself. Additionally, in
descent, a missile may maneuver.
It may. Deploy multiplewarheads, it may do a variety of
things that make defense muchmore difficult. None of those
(10:04):
things apply in boost andparticularly that also begins
now we begin to look athypersonic missiles who now are
going to be able to maneuverpretty radically in their late
phases. So you want to get tothem again early in flight,
while they're still gaining thespeed necessary that will allow
them to do those successivemaneuvers. So what I come back
to Ted really, is if we're goingto look at this seriously, we
(10:26):
need to look at space basedsystems. I don't know that
there's any other way to do itthat offers the promise of
technical feasibility.
Tad Schnaufer (10:36):
So with the, you know, the idea that people might
get in their mind of the GoldenDome is like over the United
States is dome of protection.
But what would you recommend isthat you really have to kind of
get out there and touch wherethe missile takes off or
relatively rapidly afterwards.
You can't wait for it to come. Ithink
Gen. McKenzie (10:49):
the evidence is compelling. If you want to gain
high, what we call PKprobability kill, you got to get
it early in flight. And sotherefore, you know the and then
you've got to make decisions on,you know, how many are you going
to deploy, and that'll be basedon the nature of the threat. I
mean, defending against a NorthKorean threat is much simpler
than defending against a Russianthreat. Defending against a
(11:09):
Chinese threat today is muchsimpler than defending against a
Russian threat, although theChinese threat is certainly
growing, and we need to be awareof that. And of course, the
problem is even more complicatedthan that. For example,
ballistic missile submarines canlaunch, you've now got to be
able to take that into account.
So if you're looking at NorthKorea land based sites, they're
fixed. We know pretty much wherethey will be, and we know the
(11:30):
same thing for much of Russiaand China as well. But if you're
going to defend now againstballistic missiles, you've got
to have a little moreflexibility in how you position,
how you look, at how youposition your satellites. All
those things again, are withinthe realm of technical
attainment. It will not beinexpensive to do that. But I
would argue Ted, look, what'sthe other side of the coin?
(11:52):
People argue that what thedoctrine of Mutual Assured
Destruction has kept us safe formany decades. That's a thin
tissue, and I would much ratherprefer to have the ability to
defend the United States againsta nuclear attack, rather than
depend on the opinions of anational leader in another
country who may or may notultimately prove to be rational.
Tad Schnaufer (12:15):
So what does the threat look like from, let's
say, the Russians or theChinese? Is it primarily going
to be these intercontinentalmissiles that we're trying to
defend, or how do we get afterthat issue today?
Gen. McKenzie (12:25):
Tad, the most significant capability that
exists against us is, of course,the Russian threat. They can
fire many hundreds of ballisticmissiles, intercontinental
ballistic missiles against theUnited States. At the same time,
they can launch submarinelaunched ballistic missiles
against the United States. Theypose the most significant
existential threat in thenuclear domain that we face
today. Additionally, some oftheir submarines might be able
(12:47):
to fire cruise missiles againstthe United States from much
shorter ranges. So it really isa complex threat that we face
now. It may be, it may prove toodifficult to be able to defend
against that total threat. AndI'm not sure that we would need
to do that. I think you want tobe able to protect against a
smaller threat, handfuls ofmissiles, dozens of missiles,
(13:10):
not hundreds of missiles. Andthat then that threat would
actually be able to accommodatea North Korean threat, an
Iranian threat, potentially aPakistani threat at some point
in the future, and you'reprobably against China for now,
maybe not in the future againstChina. And would have to, you
know, you want to eventuallyscope and scare your defense to
the capabilities of yourpotential adversaries. So we
(13:31):
need to take a look at that. Butall those things, I think, are
certainly, are certainly,certainly possible things that
we would need to be able todefend against, right? Because
you hear
Tad Schnaufer (13:39):
people discussing these systems as kind of a
bullet hitting a bullet, hittinga bullet, if you will, a missile
hitting a missile. And so theyhave to be very precise. They
have to be locked in. Thetechnology
Gen. McKenzie (13:47):
has to be there absolutely and so much easier to
do that in the boost phase,
Tad Schnaufer (13:50):
right? So do it early. And additional
consideration is you have tohave enough of these intercept
missiles.
Gen. McKenzie (13:55):
You do have to have enough of these intercept
missiles. So now you're talkingabout putting them on orbit. You
got to maintain them in space.
There's been resistance tomilitarizing space. I would
argue, China is already there.
The Russians are already there.
We need to recognize reality andbe able to protect ourselves in
the space domain, as others aredoing now.
Tad Schnaufer (14:14):
So we'll go to space with that. With that in
mind, what about the Chinese andthe Russians? In a sense,
particularly the Chinese pushingback on this is, you know,
escalating the overall tensionbetween the nations now that we
can better defend ourselves,they now have to, you know,
Gen. McKenzie (14:30):
laughable Tad, actually, because the Chinese
have heavily militarized spacealready, and they're busily
building a nuclear capability tobe at least equivalent to ours
by the mid 2030s so this istypical Chinese propaganda,
typical Chinese disinformation,misinformation designed to
designed to occlude theargument, if you
Tad Schnaufer (14:50):
will. So either way, the United States should
prepare for defensive actions,even if the you know the
Chinese,
Gen. McKenzie (14:56):
I would argue the President's emphasis is exactly
correct, right? It will beexpensive. We need to thoroughly
look at the technologies, but Iwould argue the technologies are
there to defend against this. Wewill look we're probably not
going to be able to defendagainst what we used to call a
no notice over the pole, massiveRussian attack, but Mutual
Assured Destruction is your isyour defense against that? But a
(15:19):
smaller attack, and even amidsize attack you want to be
able to defend against, becausethen what you know, if a nuclear
weapon goes off on United Statessoil, then that begins to narrow
the range of a president'sresponses. If you can prevent
that from happening, actually,it opens the door for de
escalation, right? So to saythat ballistic missile defense
(15:39):
is inherently escalatory, Ithink, misses the problem
completely. That's
Tad Schnaufer (15:43):
an excellent point, that it gives that buffer
for negotiation, because once itgoes off,
Gen. McKenzie (15:47):
once a city is destroyed in the United States,
any president is going to have avery narrow range of options to
choose from. In his response, ifyou can prevent that from
happening, you give thePresident of the United States
more options about how to managethe crisis.
Tad Schnaufer (16:02):
So what role with that in mind, managing the
crisis the US, it typicallyworks with allies. What role
does allies play? We heardCanada would like to be involved
with such a, you know, GoldenDome concept. What about other
allies, the Canadians? I think
Gen. McKenzie (16:15):
this is something that we should in the long run,
we should work with all ourallies to give them the
capability to do this, you know,and that's a way forward. I
think it's good for the US. It'sgood for them. It would perhaps
revitalize some of the alliancestructure out there. But I would
think, and I don't know this,but I would think that we would
certainly work to offer it toour NATO allies as we go
(16:35):
forward.
Tad Schnaufer (16:36):
You believe that they bring something to the
table as well, obviously, thegeography they bring. But do
they have other technologiesthat can
Gen. McKenzie (16:43):
assist I think, yes, I'm sure they do. I think
most of these technologies aregoing to come from the United
States and perhaps some fromIsrael. But I think we should
open it up to as broad a broad atent as possible as we look at
it.
Tad Schnaufer (16:57):
And with that in mind, as this program expands
this concept, it's obviously notsomething that's going to happen
in the happened in the next yearor so. It takes time to really
play this out. So what's theoperational timeline for
something like this? I mean,very grand program. Well, I
Gen. McKenzie (17:09):
think you need to move I think a lot of these
technologies exist today. Ithink we need to move quickly on
it. But you're right. It's not ayear away, it's much it's much
more, much longer than that. Butwe need to commit to it. We need
to lay the scientific research.
And that's, yeah, well, mine thescientific research that's
already out there in order tomove forward with it. This is
not something that's 20 yearsdown the road. I think it's much
(17:29):
closer than
Tad Schnaufer (17:32):
that. And you mentioned cost a few times. So
as the DoD cuts costs in someother areas, is this, is this
another program that it shouldinvest in and moving forward.
Gen. McKenzie (17:42):
And again, what's, what's wrong about
defending the United Statesagainst nuclear attack? Sure, I
don't, I don't see any issues. Idon't see any issues with it
either. And I think it's worth,I think it's worth the
expenditure of money that itwould require to do that.
Tad Schnaufer (17:53):
And then what looking to our potential
adversaries in this type ofscenario? What are the defense
capabilities of the say, theRussians or the Chinese. They
have similar you mentionedbriefly, with the Russians, but
the Chinese also have defense.
The
Gen. McKenzie (18:07):
Chinese have no ballistic missile defense
capabilities that I'm aware of.
They may have something on orbitthat we don't know about. That's
always possible with theChinese. The Russians have the
Kalash system that we talkedabout, which is really designed
to protect Moscow, not much elsebeyond that. So you know, they
will be very they will be keenlyinterested in these systems. As
you may recall, President Reaganactually talked about sharing
(18:27):
the technology with the Russiansso they would be able to protect
themselves too. I don't knowthat that's the way we want to
go with this, but it certainlyshows flexibility of thought as
you approach it.
Tad Schnaufer (18:39):
And then, as we noted, the golden dome concept
really focuses on the nuclearmissile defense. What about
smaller craft? You know, we havedrones. We've seen with Israel,
the different types of, youknow, missiles that could come
in. Should the us also look tomaybe have another level, level
of the stone below the
Gen. McKenzie (18:57):
TED? I think you're exactly right. I think
you need to be prepared tooperate against long range
cruise missiles. The Russians,we know, are experimenting with
those with global range. Youwant to be able to work against
drones, not drones so much, butcruise missiles launched from
submarines that are off yourshores. That requires really air
defense capabilities. It doesn'trequire new technology so much
(19:19):
as additive capabilities thatalready exist. You're not gonna
have to invent new things todefend against these
capabilities. You are going tohave to buy new equipment, buy
new radars, buy new missilesystems. In order to do it, and
you're gonna have to make somebasic philosophical decisions.
What are you going to defend? Doyou want to defend your major
urban areas? Certainly, you alsowant to be able to defend
(19:40):
against your submarine bases,the parts of our nuclear
capability that would benecessary to fight if we had to
fight, and then our missilefields. So some things, and this
has all been thoroughly analyzedand discussed for many decades,
going back to the 70s, when wefirst began to look at this,
what is it that you want todefend that will lead you to how
much. You need, and how muchyou're going to be willing to
(20:02):
spend. And look, the last thingI would simply say on this, on
this particular subject, ishypersonics complicate the
problem. They're very difficultto strike once they gain speed,
once they gain the ability tomaneuver. So that, again, I go
back to the point you want to beable to get them when they
launch, not once they're inflight and have had the
opportunity to begin theirmaneuvers.
Tad Schnaufer (20:21):
So we noted exactly getting them early. So
we noted that you'd have topretty much have something in
space to be able to
Gen. McKenzie (20:26):
really, practically. There's no other
way to do it.
Tad Schnaufer (20:30):
What else would be? What other components of
this golden dome would also needto be in place? Obviously, you
need radars.
Gen. McKenzie (20:37):
Or what else we actually have in space? The best
early warning missile system inthe world. It's actually in a
geosynchronous orbit, about25,000 miles altitude, that
looks down that gives usinfrared notification if someone
launches a missile. We know thatvery quickly we have other
radars that then give us what wecall dual phenomenology, which,
in this business, is what youwant in order to predict a
(20:58):
missile you want to get, youwant to get two separate sources
of its existence and path ofmovement, so you can then begin
to determine where it's going tohit. We can do this in a matter
of seconds. It's very quick.
I've been part of this processbefore, so you can do that now
for talking about taking weaponsin space. Now you're probably
going to need to put even betterradars on low Earth orbit. So
(21:19):
once you get the initialindication of a launch, you can
lock in on it. Then you're goingto have a missile platform, a
bus, if you will, with multiplewarheads, probably that would
then release those and be guidedto the target. Look, there are a
lot of ways to do this that areabove our technical level of
discussion here, active, semiactive, passive, all kinds of
ways you can apply guidance to akill vehicle. The key thing,
(21:43):
though, is you want to do itwhen the missile itself cannot
maneuver and is on a very, verypredictable ballistic path.
Tad Schnaufer (21:53):
And we should note that the these kill
missiles are interceptors.
They're not nuclear, they'rejust meant to
Gen. McKenzie (21:57):
destroy. They're not nuclear. They can be high
explosive. They can be purelykinetic, where they got to
actually hit the vehicle. We gotpeople that will work that out,
Tad Schnaufer (22:06):
right but, but in the end, it is a defensive
system. It
Gen. McKenzie (22:12):
is inherently defensive, and I would argue
that it actually bringsstability. I reject the
assertion that ABM systems aredestabilizing and that's that
argument's been made by a lot ofsmart people. I just don't agree
with it. I think anything thatadds to your defensive
capabilities provides furtherstability, right?
Tad Schnaufer (22:31):
And with that stability, as the nuclear
problem becomes what's somethingcalled a three body problem, as
the Chinese are rapidlyexpanding their nuclear program,
is this part of a response tothat? Is this?
Gen. McKenzie (22:42):
I think it could be tad is where, because look,
as the Chinese nuclear arsenalexpands, we're either going to
have to expand our own nucleararsenal as we confront two
potential adversaries, or you'regoing to have to come up with a
way to protect our owncapability. Well, nobody wants
to build more nuclear weapons.
So here's a path where you don'thave to build more, a lot more
nuclear weapons.
Tad Schnaufer (23:01):
And then lastly, to finish up with, the overall
threats, a number of us treatieswith the Russians on nuclear
weapons actually will be ending.
They're coming to term here inthe next few years, and it
doesn't look like those will bereinitiated, particularly as the
war in Ukraine continues. Isthat another area of cause of
concern? Or is it something
Gen. McKenzie (23:18):
I tell you? What causes concern is the way the
Chinese are building nuclearcapability and to negotiate with
a single partner in a threebody. Problem is strategic
myopia that we can't afford. SoI think I'm not particularly
concerned at the idea that thesetreaties are going
Tad Schnaufer (23:35):
to lapse right particularly if you have the
defenses in place,
Gen. McKenzie (23:39):
particularly if you recognize you're now dealing
with two different entities, theChinese and the Russians, and
you believe you have thecapability to at least partially
defend yourself against a smallto moderate strike.
Tad Schnaufer (23:50):
So with all that in mind, what can we expect of
this golden dome project in nextcouple of years here, as we look
forward,
Gen. McKenzie (23:57):
you know, I think, I think we're going to
see the pass forward. They'regoing to look at all these
possibilities. We're going toselect which ways we're actually
going to deploy I think that'llcome fairly quickly, because,
again, there's a lot oftechnology that already exists.
We're not going to have toinvent a whole bunch of stuff to
do this. So I think that'll movefairly quickly. It won't be six
months, it won't be a year, butit won't be 20 years either,
(24:19):
right?
Tad Schnaufer (24:20):
Yeah, it probably won't stall. Stall out as some
of those later Cold War programsthat ended up not
Gen. McKenzie (24:25):
technology is better. And again, if you shift
to the ascent phase vice thedescent phase, you remarkably
simplify your problem. Well,thank you very much, sir. My
pleasure. Ted, as always.
Jim Cardoso (24:42):
Thank you again to GNSI Executive Director, retired
general, Frank McKenzie, andGNSI strategy and research
manager Dr Tad schnaufer for anexcellent discussion on Golden
Dome. This timely, CriticalConversation is a great lead in
for our next GNSI Tampa summitat. Which will be held March 24
to the 25th 2026 at the USFTampa campus. We'll spend two
(25:07):
days diving into the REemergence of nuclear weapons in
Modern Warfare, nuclear defense,slash golden dome and the use of
small nuclear reactors fornational security purposes. The
summit will feature keynotes andpanels from experts across
government, academia andindustry, and provide smaller
Working Group opportunities forparticipants to really
(25:29):
contribute to the dialog. GNSI smission is to inform policy
makers to enable actionable,well informed decisions, and you
can be part of that input. Go toour website for more information
and to pre register to receivefurther updates on the summit.
Thanks for spending some timewith us today, next week on the
podcast, we'll turn ourattention back to critical
(25:52):
minerals. Recall that six monthsago, the Trump administration
released an executive order onunleashing America's offshore
critical minerals and resources.
Since then, there's been noshortage of developments
associated with China's nearmonopoly of the global supply
chain for critical minerals inboth mining and even more
importantly, in processing.
(26:14):
We'll sit down with GNSIresident fellow, Dr Linda known
who is finalizing a decisionbrief on critical minerals, with
focus on cobalt, which iscrucial for smartphones, jet
engines and other nationalsecurity applications, that's
next week on at the boundary. Ifyou don't want to miss that
episode or any other Be sure torate, subscribe and let your
(26:36):
friends and colleagues know ifyou're watching on YouTube, hit
that like button, subscribe andturn on alerts. Follow along the
GNSI on our LinkedIn and Xaccounts at USF, underscore GNSI
And check out our website aswell at usf.edu/gnsi,
(26:59):
that's going to wrap up thisepisode of at the boundary. Each
new episode will feature globaland national security issues we
found to be insightful,intriguing, maybe controversial,
but overall, just worth talkingabout. I'm Jim Cardoso, and
we'll see you at the boundary.
You you.
Popular Podcasts
On Purpose with Jay Shetty
I’m Jay Shetty host of On Purpose the worlds #1 Mental Health podcast and I’m so grateful you found us. I started this podcast 5 years ago to invite you into conversations and workshops that are designed to help make you happier, healthier and more healed. I believe that when you (yes you) feel seen, heard and understood you’re able to deal with relationship struggles, work challenges and life’s ups and downs with more ease and grace. I interview experts, celebrities, thought leaders and athletes so that we can grow our mindset, build better habits and uncover a side of them we’ve never seen before. New episodes every Monday and Friday. Your support means the world to me and I don’t take it for granted — click the follow button and leave a review to help us spread the love with On Purpose. I can’t wait for you to listen to your first or 500th episode!
Dateline NBC
Current and classic episodes, featuring compelling true-crime mysteries, powerful documentaries and in-depth investigations. Follow now to get the latest episodes of Dateline NBC completely free, or subscribe to Dateline Premium for ad-free listening and exclusive bonus content: DatelinePremium.com
Stuff You Should Know
If you've ever wanted to know about champagne, satanism, the Stonewall Uprising, chaos theory, LSD, El Nino, true crime and Rosa Parks, then look no further. Josh and Chuck have you covered.