Episode Transcript
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Glenn Beckmann (00:12):
Glenn, Hi
everybody. Welcome to another
episode of at the boundary, thepodcast from the global and
national security Institute atthe University of South Florida.
I'm Glenn Beckman,communications manager at GNSI,
and your host for today's at theboundary. This week on the
podcast, we have a very specialguest, Catherine Kozminski.
(00:35):
She's the Director of Studies atCNAs, the Center for New
American Security, where sheleads the Center's work on
national security human capital.
She'll be discussing the UnitedStates military's all volunteer
force and the challenges facingtheir recruiting efforts with
our own Dr Guido Rossi, whoseresearch frequently focuses on
military recruitment. The twowill also discuss whether or not
(00:58):
the US military draft is likelyto return. We'll listen in on
that interview in a moment.
First, big thanks to all ourspeakers from last week's Trans
Atlantic forum on cybersecurity.
We hope you had a chance to joinus for the live stream. If you
weren't able to jump on you canwatch the recorded video on our
YouTube channel. We'll drop alink in the show notes, and we
(01:20):
also want to say thanks one moretime to our collaborators on the
event, the University of Paris,Saclay, France's leading
cybersecurity institution, andone of the leading authorities
in all of Europe, cyber Florida,helping the state become a
national leader in cybersecurityeducation, academic and
practical research, as well asthe all new Bellini College of
(01:42):
AI cybersecurity and computing,the first named college in the
United States with a focus on AIand cybersecurity. This was a
lot of fun, and we're reallylooking forward to the next time
we can all work together again.
You know, last week, wepublished two new GNSI decision
briefs, one focused on thegolden dome, and the other a
(02:04):
current strategic assessment ofthe Russia Ukraine war. You can
find both on our websites. Youknow, GNSI decision briefs are
bite sized pieces of research,easy to read and designed to
help you quickly understand atopic. You should check them
out. By the way, GNSI ExecutiveDirector, retired Marine Corps
(02:25):
General Frank McKenzie,discusses both of those topics
on the latest episodes of hisvideo podcast. What's really
happening. You can find those onour YouTube channel as well.
Okay, it's time now for ourfeatured interview this week.
GNSI Research Fellow, Dr GuidoRossi, has been on the podcast
before discussing militaryrecruitment. He returns this
(02:47):
week for a conversation withKatherine Kozminski, the
Director of Studies at theCenter for New American
Security. Her work focuses onthe human capital side of
national security, and for ourpurposes today, zeros in on the
challenges facing our military'sall volunteer force, which has
been in place for over 50 years.
If you're old enough toremember, prior to 1973 the
(03:08):
United States had a draft, andthe two discuss whether or not
the US will need to reinstatethe draft today, as well as a
military historian, Dr Rossi'sresearch is a great background
for this conversation. Guido,take it away.
Dr. Guido Rossi (03:31):
Thank you so
much for the introduction and
thank you, Kate for being heretoday with us. Thanks for having
me so it's only been a couple ofyears that we have passed the 50
year anniversary of the allvolunteer force, which was
established in 1973 and today,50 years later, do you think
(03:55):
that that is still the bestchoice for the United States,
considering that many othernations, not only adversary
powers like China and Russia,but also some Allied powers like
South Korea or Sweden, theyinstead rely on conscription.
Unknown (04:10):
Yeah, so I think it's a
fair question, because we've
obviously, we've seen therecruiting challenges of the
past few years, and quitehonestly, that's something
that's been a challenge for thearmy on and off over the last 53
years, since we began the allvolunteer force. However, I
still think that the allvolunteer force provides the
(04:32):
professional force that theUnited States needs in order to
meet the emerging threatenvironment. At the same time,
it's worth noticing that the allvolunteer force was always
intended to be the backbone ofthe United States military, and
that there is a structure inplace to rapidly expand the
(04:55):
force that would require quite abit of political capital, but
we. Wherein the President andCongress could vote on
instituting a draft if we neededto rapidly expand the force that
we have, the all volunteer forcethat we have, and to take that
Professionalism and Leadershipthat we have in our officer
corps, in our non commissionedofficers, and then feed in a
(05:19):
larger force of conscriptsshould an existential threat
require it?
Dr. Guido Rossi (05:24):
So on this
point, you wrote a great article
in in July 2024 on the draftsand mobilization planning and
policy recommendations for thatso, so if the ADF or the old
volunteer force is still today,the best choice for the US. Why
(05:47):
has there been so much talkabout the need for a draft, or
maybe of reinstituting the draftrecently?
Unknown (05:54):
I think in part, it's
because we see an evolving
threat environment that looks alot more like pre World War Two
than it looks like the wars inIraq and Afghanistan. There were
some individuals calling forconsideration of a draft or
conscription during the wars inIraq and Afghanistan, just given
(06:16):
the pace of deployments thatwere being put on the all
volunteer force. And in someways, we used a different form
of compulsory service during thewars in Iraq and Afghanistan. So
we use stop loss, which is anindividual set to get out of the
military, and we tell them,actually you're not able to
(06:37):
leave. And there were extensionsof deployments. So for the army,
it went from 12 monthdeployments to 15 month
deployments. The Marine Corps,it went from six month
deployments to nine monthdeployments. So there was a bit
of a compulsory element that weused during the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. But those wars werenot at the scale that we
(07:00):
experienced in, say, World WarTwo, and when we look at a
potential conflict in the IndoPacific, we might expect to see
the need for rapid expansionthat will outstrip what the all
volunteer force can provide.
Another really sobering thoughtis the expected casualty rates
in a conflict in the IndoPacific theater that may outpace
(07:24):
the ability of the all volunteerforce to backfill and in fact,
that is part of the purpose ofconscription or a draft, would
be to provide and backfill thethose positions that are now
unfilled because of casualtyrates. But again, that's a
sobering topic that we don'ttend to want to think about a
(07:47):
lot. And I think everydayAmericans shouldn't have to walk
around thinking about that, butit is the job of policy planners
to be thinking about these lessthan favorable outcomes.
Dr. Guido Rossi (08:04):
So it's, it's
an extreme measure, essentially,
that we're, that you are arguingfor in the article with, so
with, with mobilization planningand draft planning, right? So
the article and correct me ifI'm wrong, it's not arguing for
the institution of a draft, butfor better, better plan for a
(08:27):
potential draft.
Unknown (08:28):
That's right. So we
would say that the the report
that we wrote and the subsequentop ed that we wrote based on it,
is not in any way advocating fora draft. We're saying that if a
draft were to be implemented, ithad better work, and especially
because the only reason that apresident and a Congress would
vote on a draft is because weare facing an existential
(08:52):
threat, because it is verycostly politically to vote yes
on a draft. We want to make surethat that tool would actually
function. The reality is that wehaven't fully tested what it
would take to call up a draftsince we transitioned on July 1
of 1973 to the all volunteerforce. There were some
(09:13):
mobilization exercises throughthe 70s and the 80s that gave us
some really useful findings. Sothe biggest of them was
Operation nifty nugget whichlooked which found that, you
know, we didn't really have thetransportation network that we
needed across the joint force.
So we saw the genesis oftranscom, the transportation
command. We the findings fromthat exercise also indicated
(09:38):
that we needed more HomelandDefense focus and resources at
state and local levels, andthat's how we got FEMA, the
Federal Emergency ManagementAgency has Yes, we think of them
as doing disaster relief andsupport, but there's also a
homeland defense aspect to FEMA.
(10:00):
And a coordination for amobilization effort. So So we've
had some useful exercises in thepast. There was a call in the in
the National DefenseAuthorization Act to begin
mobilization exercises, yetagain, to test where there might
be some gaps or seams in themobilization process that we'd
(10:21):
want to think through beforethere's a conflict, not to fear
monger, not to scare folks, butto figure out where there are
gaps in the capability and wherewe might want to shore up our
nation's response to a crediblethreat.
Dr. Guido Rossi (10:37):
And if article
correctly, that was in the
National Defense AuthorizationAct of 2022 Correct, right? So
what kind of gaps specificallywere identified?
Unknown (10:49):
So there are a couple.
One is that, as we were talkingabout the all volunteer force
and the professionalism of theall volunteer force, our
professionalized force is notnecessarily in a place to
receive draftees right from acultural perspective and from a
structural and processperspective. Another challenge
that we identified is there'sbeen a lot of coverage of the
(11:13):
the maps, processing timeline,so physical exams and clearing
folks for service, and that wasduring an era where we weren't
even able to meet our recruitingtargets. Now, what happens if we
have 100,000 individuals showingup at the front door of a map
(11:35):
station over the course of justa couple of months? How do we
build up the capacity toactually process those who are
being drafted? There are lessthere are things that we might
not even think about, right? Sodraft notifications are sent
through the mail, and Americansare much less apt to update
(11:57):
their address with at the postoffice in 2025 than they were in
1973 and so that may lead tosome delays or confusion. We
also gave a little bit ofthought to what happens. What's
the role of social media? On theone hand, you could have some
positive examples of, say, afamous football player being
(12:20):
drafted and then going to serve.
And on the other hand, you couldsow a lot of confusion or or
public dissent on social mediathat may dissuade folks from
from answering the call for fora draft notification. And then
(12:42):
the last is probably the mostcontroversial, but thinking
about no we currently, the lawis that we have all male
Selective Service registration,and that has been upheld by
successive Supreme Court casesover time that found that
because only men could serve incombat positions, all male
(13:06):
Selective Service registrationwas constitutional when we saw
the introduction of women in thecombat arms in 2015 the
underpinning of the SupremeCourt cases no longer stands,
and we haven't had the SupremeCourt or Congress really answer
(13:27):
the question of, is itconstitutional to have an all
male draft, or all maleSelective Service registration
and then subsequently an allmale draft, if that were passed,
Is that constitutional? Becausewe will likely see a situation
where, if a draft isimplemented, their men will have
standing to file a court casesaying it's not fair. Either
(13:52):
it's all Americans of thequalified age or it's no
Americans of qualified age, andthat, in and of itself, will
raise questions about thevalidity of the draft while that
gets worked out in the courts ata time when we'll have needed to
mobilize individuals. So it'snot about advocating for whether
(14:14):
or not women should be includedin selective service
registration, but rather justflagging that there will be
delays in court cases if we doget to this case,
Dr. Guido Rossi (14:25):
that would be
the worst possible. That's
right,
Unknown (14:28):
exactly. So perhaps
it's worth Congress actually
making a decision one way oranother and putting it in law.
So those two options would bethat we either get rid of
selective service registration,which has complications, because
then what happens if we actuallydo need to mobilize, or we go
(14:49):
the other direction, and we sayall American youth between the
ages of 18 and 26 which is thecurrent age eligibility, must
register with selective service.
And then we can figure out thedetails on the back end of what
positions and roles individualsare put in.
Dr. Guido Rossi (15:07):
That raises
several questions in my mind.
First of all, do you envision anopposition from from the female
section of the population to thepotential of a draft and maybe a
resistance to that,
Unknown (15:21):
yeah, so it's
complicated on both ends. So on
the one hand, there are thosewho believe that only men should
be serving in the military, andso they would push back to the
inclusion of women from theperspective that they don't
think that women should becompelled to serve in the
military. And then on the otherside, there is a concern of, I
(15:43):
don't want to be drafted, whichis something that we also see
across the male populationright. There are certainly folks
in every conflict who havedodged the draft. Didn't believe
in the underlying principles ofthe conflict they were being
called into, or didn't feelcompelled into service. Now,
there are ways to go intoalternative service, but that
(16:04):
requires quite a bit of aprocess at the local level to
determine who must serve and whomust not serve. So yeah, it is
very complicated and thornyissue.
Dr. Guido Rossi (16:17):
Do you think
simplifying avenues and the
process for individuals to servein alternative capacities or
alternative national servicewould help not only facilitating
the draft process if it were tohappen, but also the passing of
new legislations to do somedraft pre draft planning,
Unknown (16:42):
yeah, and, you know, we
certainly see that there are
needs across the broadermobilization enterprise that
aren't just military service,right? So traditionally, what
alternative service looked likewas medical care, was the forces
needed to rapidly build basinghere in the United States for
(17:03):
training, right? So thinkingabout using mobilizing national
service as a way, as on theconstruction project side of
things. And then certainly, wehave a lot of challenges right
now in our defense industrialbase, workforce, in our maritime
industrial base. And so therecould also be ways to compel
(17:23):
international service for thosefunctions, more akin to what we
saw in the World War Two era,and the use of women who were
back on the home front while menwere drafted
Dr. Guido Rossi (17:37):
overseas. So in
a way, is to catch two birds
with one stone, right? Is thathow you say it, and not only
facilitate the draft, but alsorevitalize ship building, which
is another very importantproblem that this administration
has pledged to to solve, andand, like I was saying, it's,
it's a little bit of a Achillesheel in our industry, in our
(18:00):
ability for industrialmobilization, right?
Unknown (18:03):
That's right. And so
Shipbuilding is a big piece of
it, but also the munitionsbuilding is another area where
the war in between the Russiaand Ukraine has exposed the
industrial capacity of the USand my colleagues here at CNS,
Becca, Wasser and Phil shearshave spent a lot of time
(18:25):
thinking about the defenseindustrial base as part of
mobilization.
Dr. Guido Rossi (18:31):
Are there any
other recommendations
specifically that stand, standout in the in the article, or in
your mind right now? And thearticle came out last summer,
right? And so the question is,what's been the progress on
those recommendations?
Unknown (18:49):
Yeah, so I do know that
the services and DOD as a whole
have followed through on some ofthe recommendations from the
2022 NDAA to stand up workinggroups thinking through these
issues, the issue ofmobilization in a for a future
conflict. I think there's alsoopenness on the part of
(19:13):
selective service. Now howselective service operates is
fully inscribed in the law, andso it does actually require
Congress to provide moreauthority there, but there has
been some interest in, you know,one of the things we identified
is that the Selective Servicecollects five pieces of
(19:34):
information about individuals,three of which they already
know. So it's your name, yourdate of birth, your social
security number, your mailingaddress, and, more recently, the
addition of your email address.
That's all the information thatthey have. Wouldn't it be great
for them to be able to build abigger database of you know,
what are the critical skills,experiences, education that
(19:56):
individuals might have? Yeah,and you could incentivize the
sharing of that information, if,say, by sharing this
information, you're able toindicate your preference of
which service you were called upinto, whether that was the Army
and the Marine Corps, the AirForce, the Navy. So I think
there's openness to that.
(20:19):
There's also hesitation, and Ican easily see how, you know, it
could be received by theAmerican public as a escalation,
or moving in the direction ofhaving a draft if they if
individuals were asked to sharethis information. So it is a
very delicate balance to figureout which information to share
(20:42):
and collect.
Dr. Guido Rossi (20:44):
And then I
remember reading in your article
that you were also calling for amore centralized authority or
director for a potential draft.
Is
Unknown (20:55):
that, yeah, and so when
we think about the draft, we
tend to think only about theDepartment of Defense and the
military services, and certainlythey're the ones who are most
affected by the outcome andefficiency of a draft. But the
reality is, when we mobilize thenation at this kind of scale, we
(21:16):
have to consider the role of theDepartment of Labor. What are
some of the critical skills thatwe need to make sure remain in
the United States that aren'tdeployed overseas. We need to
think about the role of theDepartment of Education. We need
to think about homeland securityand law enforcement. And so it
does require more of a whole ofgovernment approach. And so one
(21:39):
of the things that I wouldadvocate for is a person on the
National Security Council who'sresponsible for thinking across
the whole of government and thewhole of society, such that if
we did have to mobilize rightaway, you are able to draw
across the span of control ofall of these departments and
agencies, whereas Right now,they each kind of operate
independently.
Dr. Guido Rossi (22:01):
So these, these
sound like very logical and
very, very good recommendationsin my mind. So what is a hold
up?
Unknown (22:12):
Yeah, it's a really
uncomfortable talk topic to talk
about and to think about, right?
You have to think about theworst case scenario and then
make a plan that requiressomething of, if not all of
American society, much ofAmerican society, and so there
have to be sensitivities in howit's talked about and planned
for that doesn't lead to, youknow, some sort of mass
(22:37):
hysteria, or This, this beliefin this inevitability of a
conflict with the PRCspecifically, right? We don't
want to talk in terms of theabout that being inevitable. And
in fact, we want to make sure,on the flip side, that we're
building out our deterrentcapability such that that never
happens. And at the same time,there needs to be a way to
(22:58):
navigate this conversation. Sowhen we look at some of the
debate, the debates in Congress,specific to the issue of women
and the draft, but I think it'smuch broader, it points to a
much broader issue, which isthis is a really uncomfortable
topic to talk about, and itshould be uncomfortable to talk
(23:19):
about it. There is aresponsibility and a duty to
care that the President has,that Congress has Secretary of
Defense, and the service leadshave in executing this wisely
and and effectively. And sothere's some trade offs that are
made on the well, do we want totalk about this or not, but we
(23:42):
should have a plan that issitting on the shelf. Should we
need it?
Dr. Guido Rossi (23:48):
And so it's
also so politicians, essentially
also would like to be reelected, and so that, okay,
yeah. And also another questionis, some would see any
mobilization pre planning as asan escalatory move, right? But
(24:13):
what can also be seen as a aspart of deterrence,
Unknown (24:17):
yes, so that's
something that we gave a lot of
thought to and a piece of it isfrom the open source reporting,
we can see that the PRC onlywants to engage in a conflict if
it's going to be short anddecisive, and they're going to
be able to come to the fightwith overwhelming power, such
(24:38):
that it won't be a protractedconflict when we game out in in
unclassified war games, when wegame that out, we find over and
over again. And so ourcolleagues at CSIS have done
some unclassified war games.
We've done unclassified wargames here at CNS, we find that
any such conflict with. The PRCwill be a protracted conflict.
(25:00):
And so our ability to signalthat we have the capability to
sustain a protracted conflict,which is the thing that the PRC
does not want, can serve as adeterrent to them starting the
fight in the first place. Nowthey have to believe that we'd
be willing to use it right? Andso there are questions as to
(25:23):
whether, you know, I think if,if the conflict were the result
of some sort of attack on the UShomeland that looks very
different than public perceptionof what the United States could
and should do. Say in a PRCinvasion of Taiwan.
Dr. Guido Rossi (25:44):
So, so what do
you see as the biggest
challenges for the United Statesand its allies in in case of
embolization against China orRussia in the next few years?
Unknown (25:59):
Yeah, I think we see
that playing out right now
across NATO, not necessarily inthe United States, but across
several of our allies,particularly those who are right
at Russia's front door or whoare close into the fight. And so
we see hard conversationshappening, for example, in
(26:19):
Germany about whether or notthey should bring back a draft
or compulsory service. As ofright now, they have brought
back their equivalent ofregistration for eligible men,
and we see that there's anevolution, both in Russia and
Ukraine, about expanding whoshould serve and who should be
(26:43):
compelled to serve. Now, theirmodels are a little bit
different than ours, in that wetend to our draft would apply to
18 to 26 year olds. And inRussia and in Ukraine, we see a
much older conscript force. Andso what we've seen over time,
particularly in Ukraine, is thecontinued lowering of the age of
(27:08):
those who are eligible forconscription. In Russia, they've
been able to politically it'snot in Putin's interest to have
to continue to conscript. Sowhat we've seen is an escalation
of the incentives that areoffered for recruitment in
(27:31):
Russia, but they may run backinto a case where they do need
to conscript again. So in thefirst in the beginning of the
war, they were relying onconscripts, and they moved away
from that, because, again, adraft of any type in any country
is not necessarily a politicallyviable or welcomed approach to
(27:56):
war fighting,
Dr. Guido Rossi (27:57):
Yeah, so you
sort of hinted at it. But in
neither in Ukraine, nor inRussia, they actually launched
total mobilization. They werealways kind of half hearted and
partial mobilizations. Arethose? Are those good models for
the US to to look at and takeinspiration from, in case of of
(28:22):
the need for immobilization?
Unknown (28:23):
Yeah, I think we see
two separate models that speak
to the power of being theindividual who's protecting your
homeland, versus being in amilitary that is deploying to
another country. And so inUkraine, the appetite,
(28:44):
especially the beginning of thewar, to serve, was very high,
because the stakes were veryhigh. And for Russians there,
it's a different a differentperspective, in that it didn't
feel as existential, though forsome it certainly may have for
the United States, I think it isinstructive to look at the
(29:05):
Ukraine model in particular,because this is what is required
of a society when it is facing atruly existential threat. Is
different than perhaps whatwe're used to, or what we would
want in steady state every dayengagement, and so that's why it
has been so difficult to planfor. Well, what would it look
(29:27):
like if we truly were under anexistential threat?
Dr. Guido Rossi (29:31):
And for for
Russia, especially, we've seen
their reliance also onalternative sources of manpower,
prisoners and and PMCs, which isthe modern name for essentially
mercenaries, right? Do you thinkmaybe also looking at the past
(29:55):
American military experiencesduring the war, the war on
terror? When there was a quiteheavy reliance on PMCs, private
military companies. Do you seethese alternative sources of
manpower as potentially playinga role? How and how have they
helped or made mobilizations forRussia and Ukraine
Unknown (30:19):
possible? Yeah, so it
certainly is one way to augment
manpower, I think, in the UnitedStates. And even looking at the
models that were used in thewars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
there are challenges to that.
One is that using PMCS is ratherexpensive for a country, and the
other is just the ethical boundsand the legal bounds that the
(30:41):
United States is comfortablewith look quite a bit different
from what Russia is comfortablewith. So certainly, you know, we
did see a number of groups thatwere on the ground. They tended
to provide more force protectionor to kind of set up the
Installation Management in aconflict zone in a way that's
(31:06):
very different from how theRussians are actually using them
as a paramilitary organization.
And I think it runs counter tous principles, both, you know,
the legal and ethicalcomplications, but also just
culturally, it goes back to ourbelief in having a
professionalized all volunteerforce. It's a little bit counter
(31:29):
to that, even though you'reright, we did have private
military companies that wereaugmenting some of the resources
in the wars in Iraq andAfghanistan
Dr. Guido Rossi (31:40):
and so, and
also so, you mentioned how the
appetite for war in Ukraine wasquite high early on, because
they really felt like theyneeded to defend their homeland.
How have? How has the course ofthe war for not just Ukraine,
but also Russia, changed theirapproach to mobilization and
(32:02):
what they needed to do to getthe needed personnel,
Unknown (32:06):
yeah. So there's
certainly fatigue on both sides
and understandably, right andand when we talk about the
casualty rates, it's not justabout who was killed, but also
those who were injured, who youknow were years on into this
conflict, and so there's a highlevel of fatigue. I think in
part, that's why you're alsoseeing more and more adaptation
(32:28):
of technology on the battlefieldright. And certainly the use of
drones on the battlefield hasgotten a lot of attention. How
do we replace human capital withtechnological advances, while at
the same time recognizing thatwar is fundamentally a human
endeavor, and we're never goingto have a situation where it's
purely technology on technology.
Dr. Guido Rossi (32:50):
Excellent. And
so do you think, do you think
that you know exactly looking athow Ukraine, and Russia, Ukraine
especially, has struggled sortof, to keep the momentum going
as the war transitioned from,you know, a Patriotic War of
(33:13):
defense to one of attrition.
Should that? Should that? Shouldthat consideration help inform
pre pre mobilization, pre draftplanning for the
Unknown (33:25):
US. Yeah, yeah. So I
think it's certainly a
cautionary tale in the need forthe MO, the overwhelming force
at the beginning of the fight,such that it doesn't protract to
the point that we're now seeingin Russia and Ukraine, for
either side, and again, this isthe precise thing that open
(33:46):
source reporting would indicatethat the PRC is also terrified
of. So I think it points back tothe need to strengthen the
deterrent value of US strategicassets in which I include the
human capital element, such thatwe don't get to that point. But
that should we get to that pointwe are prepared to go in with
(34:07):
that overwhelming force andshorten the length of such a
conflict.
Dr. Guido Rossi (34:12):
Another thing
that has been seen in the case
of Russian mobilization was itsincreased reliance, especially
like in more recent, more recentmonths, on also North Korean
troops as an alternative sourceof so manpower coming from
(34:34):
allies. And you know, as of, asof now, the United States are
still very close to the rest ofits NATO Alliance and its NATO
allies. How would, however, aneventual, maybe not total, pull
out from NATO, but a distancingof the United States from from
(34:54):
that from the Alliance? Howwould that impact a potential.
Potential mobilization. Or, youknow, how does the presence of
the United States within theNATO alliance, you know,
facilitate a potentialmobilization?
Unknown (35:13):
Yeah, so it is
certainly a challenge that NATO
faces. And I spoke at the NATOschool back here in March about
this precise topic with a numberof allies, thinking about if the
United States is is dedicatingfewer forces to NATO and to the
(35:33):
European continent. One of thechallenges is that NATO itself
doesn't govern how individualstates derive and contribute
their forces to the NATO force.
They set the NATO requirement,but they don't. NATO itself
doesn't dictate that. You know,Great Britain must provide X
(35:54):
number of troops while, whileSweden must provide their own,
and instead, it's a kind oftotal force structure, which is
how you see very differentrecruitment and conscription
models across each of the NATOstates. Right? So they can run
that independently, and theyshould be able to run that
(36:15):
independently, and they justneed to contribute, what the
what the top line number is toNATO itself. If the United
States were to withdraw that youknow, the second largest
contributor to the NATO allianceof manpower is from Turkey. It's
not actually even from thecontinent. And so thinking
through, okay, what would thegap be, or what requirements
(36:37):
would be there for NATO, andthat's whether the United States
pulls out, in a political move,which has been indicated by some
of the comments, certainly byVice President's comments at the
Munich Security Conference. Andthen alternatively, what happens
if the United States has towithdraw troops from the NATO?
(36:58):
From forward presence withinNATO, because they need them in
the Indo Pacific. And so that'sanother scenario that NATO has
to plan for, and that theEuropean allies have to plan
for. What What are we going todo to fill that gap? Should the
United States be elsewhere.
Dr. Guido Rossi (37:23):
So, okay, so in
the eventuality that we were
involved in a in a war with amajor adversary power, how do
you assess American capabilitiesfor mobilization? How do you
assess the needs and itscapabilities to fulfill these
(37:44):
needs. One of
Unknown (37:45):
the things that brought
me a little bit of hope over the
course of our study was we ran amobilization exercise with a
number of individuals whocurrently serve in the military,
who are or from academia or fromthe policy space. And one piece
of feedback that we receivedwas, you know, the United States
(38:08):
didn't have a clearinfrastructure for mobilization
prior to World War One, and wefigured it out really quickly,
and then we learned and weperfected it a bit before going
into World War Two, but thepoint that he was trying to make
was it might take an existentialthreat to actually drive the
(38:29):
system forward, and sopracticing it isn't going to get
us necessarily to where we wouldbe in a conflict, but we have a
track record of being able Tomobilize and get up to speed.
Now, I'm a little morepessimistic than that, but I do
think that there is some valueto the perspective that it takes
actually having the threat toforce all of the functions to
(38:52):
work together,
Dr. Guido Rossi (38:54):
thinking back
to again, other examples of
American military past andhistory thinking about
specifically War Two, where over16 million individuals were
mobilized within the armedforces, and many, many more
millions were mobilizedinternally as civilians in the
workforce and other roles. Doyou think the US would be able
(39:21):
to pull a similar effort. Or,even better, do you think a
similar effort would ever beneeded in case of a major
conflict with a matter of peer?
Unknown (39:33):
Yeah, so I think that
the threat of that requirement
does exist now where it fits onthe spectrum of how likely or
unlikely that is will bedetermined. But I do think that
there are scenarios in which wewould need to mobilize the whole
of society. And I do think that,you know, if we look back just
(39:56):
culturally, we are different nowthan. We were in in the early
1940s at the same time. It'sworth highlighting. You know, we
tend to look at World War Twothrough these rose colored
glasses that all of Americansociety came together. We had
deserters for the draft in WorldWar Two as well. We're looking
(40:17):
at it. You know, hindsight is2020 we're looking at it from
the perspective of how it ended.
But the reality is, there was alot more debate internally then
too, and so that can also giveus a little bit of optimism, or
at least realistic visions ofyou know, it does require a lot
and it doesn't. It might notnecessarily require all
Dr. Guido Rossi (40:43):
well, I can
only thank you so much for your
insightful comments on the topicof mobilization and draft. Thank
you so much for having me hereat CNS and to speaking for
genocide today.
Unknown (40:58):
Yeah, it's been great.
You.
Glenn Beckmann (41:03):
A special thanks
today to Dr Guido Rossi GNSI,
Research Fellow and militaryhistorian, for his interview
today with Katherine Kozminski,the Director of Studies at the
Center for New AmericanSecurity, interesting
perspectives on the recruitingchallenges facing the US
military, and whether or notthose challenges will mean the
(41:24):
return of the draft next week,on at the boundary, we'll
welcome GNSI, Senior ResearchFellow, Dr Jeff rogg, whose
recently published book hasgarnered a lot of attention
around the country. We'll betalking with him about the spy
in the state the history ofAmerican intelligence, and in
the book, he proposes thatintelligence, also known as
(41:47):
spying in some circles, isdecidedly un American. We'll ask
him about that and a lot more.
That's next week. Thanks forlistening today. If you like the
podcast, please subscribe andlet your friends and colleagues
know about us. We're on Applepodcasts, Spotify, overcast, all
the major platforms. We're alsoavailable on our YouTube
channel. If you like yourpodcasts that way, we'd
(42:08):
appreciate a like, follow orsubscribe wherever you find us.
That's going to wrap up thisepisode of at the boundary. Each
new episode will feature globaland national security issues
we've found to be worthy ofattention and discussion. I'm
(42:30):
Glenn Beckman, thanks forlistening today. We'll see you
next week at the boundary. You