August 11, 2025 • 48 mins
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In this episode of At the Boundary, Tad Schnaufer, PhD, speaks with John Pennell, PhD, a Senior Diplomacy Fellow with Narrative-Strategies, Senior Strategic Advisor with Pax Strategies LLC, Senior Practitioner with the Irregular Warfare Center, and author of Assessing Russia's Actions in Ukraine and Syria, 2014–2022: Implications for the Changing Character of War
Pennell breaks down Russia’s military and political strategies in two key theaters, Ukraine and Syria, and the implications for NATO, the United States, and global security.
Their discussion covers:
- Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics in Ukraine prior to the 2022 full-scale invasion, including “Little Green Men,” the Wagner Group, and local proxy forces
- How Russia’s disinformation campaigns, strategic plausible deniability, and cyber warfare shaped operations in Crimea and Donbas
- The 2015 Syrian intervention was a testing ground for drones, electronic warfare, and emerging military technology
- The debate over terminology used to describe the conflict: hybrid warfare vs. new generation warfare vs. full-spectrum conflict, and why these distinctions matter in military strategy and geopolitics
- Lessons for NATO, the U.S., and allies from Russian military operations between 2014–2022
- The Kremlin’s shift from destabilizing Ukraine to pursuing regime change, and the information warfare narratives used to justify it
- Implications for future conflicts and how the U.S. and partners can counter hybrid threats effectively
Links from the Episode:
• Read The Latest GNSI Newsletter
• 2025 Notes from Cambridge Blog
• Assessing Russia's Actions in Ukraine and Syria, 2014–2022: Implications for the Changing Character of War by Dr. John A. Pennell
At the Boundary from the Global and National Security Institute at the University of South Florida, features global and national security issues we’ve found to be insightful, intriguing, fascinating, maybe controversial, but overall just worth talking about.
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The mission of GNSI is to provide actionable solutions to 21st-century security challenges for decision-makers at the local, state, national and global levels. We hope you enjoy At the Boundary.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Tad Schnaufer (01:40):
Hey, John, well, welcome to the podcast.
Dr. John Pennell (02:00):
Thank you.
Thanks for having me excited tobe here. So today we're
Tad Schnaufer (02:03):
going to be discussing, you know, the
Russia's involvement in Ukraine,particularly before the full
Russia's involvement in Ukraine,particularly 2015 timeframe so
scale invasion, the tactics, themethods that they used in
they used in Ukraine war, around20. 2014 and 2022, as well as
Ukraine between
Dr. John Pennell (02:12):
2014 and 2022 as well as their involvement in
their involvement in Syria andparticularly the Syrian civil
Syria, and particularly theSyrian Civil War around 2015
war. Mention of military'sresponse in return. And so
timeframe. So why don't we startback chronologically with this
discussion, John, and talk aboutwhat was going on and what
interests you specifically withRussia's actions in Ukraine in
2014 and then moving into Syriain 2015 certainly. Well again,
(02:35):
thanks for having me. Big fan ofthe podcast and what GNSI is
doing in the irregular warfarespace, and also future war space
as well. And I think this willbe hopefully a useful
contribution. So I was actuallyserving for the US government in
Ukraine itself, from 2015 to2019 and was very interested in
all the discussions and debates,both in policy circles, but also
(02:58):
scholarly circles about hybridwarfare and kind of Russia's
actions in Ukraine, specificallywith the so called Little Green
Men, and, you know, forces inCrimea that were unmarked. And
you know what this all meant.
And there was a lot of back andforth and debate on whether
Russia was inventing or startstarting up a new form of
warfare, and if so, what it wasand what it looked like. And
(03:20):
then shortly thereafter, theystarted intervening in Syria,
which at that time, it was thefirst time that they'd really
projected power outside of theirtraditional sphere of influence
in Eurasia in quite some time.
And so I think there was a lotof concern, rightly so, as to
what was going on, what this allmeant. Obviously, the West, the
(03:41):
US NATO and others, our alliesand partners have a lot of
interest in the Mediterranean,let alone in Eastern Europe. And
so that's kind of really whatkicked it off for me. And I
decided to pursue a PhD in atKing's College London, and I was
focusing specifically onRussia's interventions in
Ukraine, and want to usesomething else, such as Syria as
(04:03):
a kind of a comparator. And sothat's kind of where Genesis,
really of this book for me,again, which is based on my PhD
thesis, kind of originatedExcellent So, and going back to
that timeframe, people might notremember the kind of complexity
of what was going on all theseactions below the threshold of
war that were taking place in2014 Russia annexed Crimea, as
(04:25):
you mentioned, the little greenmen. These are the soldiers that
didn't have patches on. Theyjust kind of show up. So what do
we call those tactics? And howdid those evolve over 2014 and
20 Ukraine? Sure. So I think atthat time, hybrid seemed to have
been the most common term,although you could argue that
irregular today, we use grayzone a lot more, but a range of
(04:46):
different activities, tools thatare essentially below the
threshold, as you described,because the sole purpose, really
of allowing for plausibledeniability and ideally not
certainly, I think that's kindof what took everyone by
(05:07):
surprise, in that sense, atleast those who maybe not
necessarily were that familiarwith Russian, even Soviet era
tactics, often referred to asactive measures, which, frankly,
there's been a lot ofconsistency in Russia's
approach, certainly prior toFebruary of 2022
Tad Schnaufer (05:24):
and that's interesting part is that the
even the concepts that werebeing used in 2014 were so
obscure that you really don'thave an acceptable definition of
what it was. So hybrid warfarehad a lot of scholarly baggage
with it, even before 2014because it was used with
terrorist organizations and nonstate actors. So how did you
(05:44):
conceptualize that in your bookand then also in your research?
Dr. John Pennell (05:48):
Certainly, so part of the book is really
focused on the array ofdifferent terms that are being
used. You know, hybrid orregular, gray zone, full
spectrum conflict, that newgeneration warfare, political
warfare, there's a fair amountof overlap among the different
terms. I think some of them moremore relevant for a particular
(06:09):
context, and not that we shouldnecessarily throw any one of
them away. And there arespecific definitions, for
example, that the Department ofDefense, us, Department of
Defense uses for some of theseterms. And so what I was trying
to get at with that was to tryto get a better sense of how
much of the focus on hybrid ishype versus like, is there a
(06:31):
there, there, so to speak. Andso I think it really was maybe
an overplayed term, not thatwhat Russia was doing was not
significant. It certainly was.
And I myself do use the termhybrid warfare, you know,
regularly, but my preference ofall the terms is probably more
full spectrum conflict, or newgeneration warfare, full
(06:52):
spectrum, because I think itbetter describes the array of
tools that that the Russianshave been using to this day, and
then also new generationwarfare, because that is a term
that the Russians themselveshave used to describe, along
with the hybrid warfare concept,what it perceives as the US or
the West doing against Russia,and historically doing against
(07:16):
Russia. And so I think those aremore probably relevant. But any
one of these terms could be useddepending on a particular
context. And so part of the bookdoes try to break down the where
there's overlap, where there'sdistinction, and kind of what is
made maybe more relevant thanothers, depending on the case,
right,
Tad Schnaufer (07:36):
because a lot of influential factors of both
sides the grass involveddoctrine, which was a part of an
article we published in 2013General grassimoff, the Russian
General, and then also the USdefinitions before the conflict
started, absolutely. So withthose you know, let's just take
the term out of it. Then in 2014Ukraine, what are the primary
characteristics of the conflict,which, you know, whatever you
(07:59):
call it. What were the Russiansactually doing that was
different. So certainly,
Dr. John Pennell (08:04):
again, kind of going back to then called fall
of 2013 that the Euromaidanprotests, where the then
president of Ukraine,Yanukovych, that kind of
backtracked on the population'sdesire to join the EU and
started to make some dealingswith Putin that led to a series
(08:26):
of protests, and unfortunately,leading to a lot of violence
against protesters, unarmedcivilians, etc, which then kind
of spurred worse protests, withwhich then eventually led to
Yanukovych fleeing to Russiahimself, along with a lot of
money and other things. Andafter that, somewhat in
(08:47):
response, of course, theRussians had already been
working in eastern Ukraine andDonbas with different proxy
forces, local militias, thosewho are like minded, so to
speak, leveraging culturalaffinity, religious affinity,
ethnicity, language, et cetera,those who identified as Russian
(09:08):
compatriots, for example, orwere supportive of Russia. And I
think one thing that's key toall of this is that, you know,
Ukraine and Russia border eachother, obviously, but they have
had a shared history in someways, for many, many years. And
one of the things that Russiatried to do, at least initially,
was to exploit where there wereopportunities to leverage the
(09:32):
affinity that some Ukrainianshad toward Russia, and not only
in the east, but also insouthern Ukraine as well. And
then, of course, in Crimea,where traditionally, the
population in Crimea hadidentified more as ethnic
Russian. And so I think becauseof those connections, it was a
little bit easier for Russia tointervene in some of those areas
(09:53):
and use proxy forces in easternand southern Ukraine, and then,
of course, going into Korea.
Crimea with the so calledunmarked soldiers or little
green men, for the purpose,really, of plausible
deniability. And one of the mainthings related to that, of
course, is to make it seem likethis is homegrown. And also that
to the extent Russia needed tointervene, it was to protect
(10:17):
ethnic Russians from the socalled fascists in Kiev. And
that, you know, the newgovernment that was forming
under President Petro Poroshenkoat that time, the Kremlin
narrative was that not only washe fascist, but he hated
Russians and Russian language,etc, etc. And so, you know, that
stirred up a lot of fear. It'sobviously using a lot of
(10:37):
disinformation. But alsotechnologies. And that's
something I'm happy to talkabout in more depth, because
that's been one kind of keything over the evolution of, I
think, Russian warfare inUkraine and in Syria as well,
the role of new technologies,military technologies, but also
(10:59):
non military technologies, butthat can have strategic effects
or very broader strategicobjective impacts. And I think
that's also critical,
Tad Schnaufer (11:11):
sure, because we've seen Russian cyber
attacks, you've seenmisinformation campaigns. We've
seen them handing out passportsto people who want to be
Russian, so being able to craftthis deceptive narrative, and
again, using technology in manyways over the span of the time
we'll discuss here post 2014 sohow did that change after that
initial shock in early 2014
Dr. John Pennell (11:33):
certainly. So I think at that point, the West,
the US, NATO, allies andpartners, kind of, I think,
quickly caught on that Russiawas up to some pretty nefarious
activities, and obviouslyUkrainians did as well. I think
still, what was somewhatoffsetting, or maybe was the
challenge initially, is thateverything that Kremlin was
(11:54):
doing at that time was reallyjust below the threshold of a, I
think, wildly accepted conceptof what war is. And so I think
the question is, okay, how wouldthe US NATO allies and partners
respond to that, short of actualviolent conflict or
confrontation that was moreconventional? And so I think it
(12:19):
took some time to catch up,because Russia was doing quite a
lot of things, and not onlyusing proxies in terms of local
militias or the little green menor such, but also, again, the
compatriots, those who had someaffinity towards Russia for a
variety of reasons, could beethnic, could be religious, or
It could be language linguisticissues, but also those who were
(12:44):
either involved in the economy.
Donbas, historically, was a veryindustrial part of the country
of Ukraine, and you had a lot ofwhat had been previously called
oligarchs, I guess that term isstill used today. And I would
say the situation oligarchs inUkraine has been cleaned up
quite a bit over the years, overthe past several years in
(13:05):
particular. And so, you know,Zelensky, President of Ukraine,
deserves some credit for that.
But at that time, at least a lotof the oligarchs in Ukraine had
earned their money and incomefrom Moscow or connections to
Russia. And so I think Moscowwas also able to lever local
businesses in Ukraine and theirleadership in the so called
(13:27):
oligarchs to also produce someimpacts that would benefit them
as well, and particularlyengaging in the parliament in
Kiev. But then you also had anumber of so called Think
tankers, experts, mediapersonalities. Yet a lot of at
that time, again, it's beencleaned up quite a bit, but a
(13:47):
lot of media outlets that hadeither pro Russia backers,
financiers or folks are doingcommentary in the news. And so
there was just a lot of room andopportunity for Russia to sow
doubt amongst the Ukrainianpopulation, let alone the global
population, the world, if youwill, as to what was happening
in Ukraine. And so the Battle ofthe narrative really, really was
(14:11):
kind of starting and gettingstronger and stronger at that
point. And that's something thatyou know continues to this day.
Happy to talk more about that ina
Tad Schnaufer (14:19):
second, right?
Because that battle, thenarrative really spreads across
again, like we started theinternet, not only on the
ground, but also through medianetworks. These Russian troll
farms have constant comments onsocial media, so it's really
hard to get the real facts fromthe ground, because there's so
much deception going on outthere. And these actors, as you
mentioned, that are not actuallythe Russian government directly,
they're a proxy that being usedto the Russian government and
(14:43):
one of those other groups thatcame on to prominence Not long
into the Ukraine conflict, andlater, famously in Syria, than
the than the actual full scaleinvasion would be those military
contractors, private militarycontractors like Wagner group.
So how did those come about andbut. Dissipation campaign,
Dr. John Pennell (15:02):
certainly, yeah, so the private military
contractors, Wagner, I guess, isthe most notorious, but there
were several others. Certainly,it was another effort or way, or
tool, if you will, in terms ofplausible deniability. And what
was interesting as well is thata lot of these private military
contractors of PMCS actuallyflowed back and forth between
(15:24):
both the Syria area ofoperation, also Ukraine area of
operation, and so as part ofthat, also taking lessons
learned from one theater toanother and all to again, kind
of advance. You know Russia'snarrative that, well, we're
actually not there were actuallynot on the ground in Ukraine, at
least that this is allhomegrown. This is folks who are
(15:47):
dissatisfied with the newgovernment in Ukraine that is
taking the country away from itshistorical partner, Russia, if
you will. I think what's alsoimportant to note that the PMCs,
you know, in Syria inparticular, were used for a
variety of activities, and justto compare kind of the different
(16:08):
approaches, and then differentareas of focus and objectives
between the two theaters. Youknow, in Syria, it really was
about, you know, propping up theAssad regime, keeping him in
power, but under the we couldsay, maybe false pretense of
fighting ISIS, fightingterrorists, something that
(16:29):
obviously the US, the West, NATOand others, are also very
concerned about, and theinstability that not dealing
with that issue could bring tothe Middle East. And we've seen,
obviously, a lot of challengesin the Middle East over the
years with terrorism, from, youknow, whether it was Al Qaeda or
Daesh ISIS, et cetera. And sokind of using that as a
(16:51):
narrative as to why it wasintervening in Syria, but but
also to, you know, help keepAssad in power and then ensure
that it had access to its navaland air bases there as well. So
the PMCs, the Wagner and othergroups, particularly in Syria,
did an array of things,including like direct action,
(17:12):
going after so calledterrorists, helping and working
with Iranian backed militias,let alone Syrian regime
military, to also fight, youknow, so called terrorists, and
then also to secure differentenergy related installations,
and then which also led tobusiness opportunities, if you
(17:33):
will, among the differentprivate military contractor
firms. You know, later on, thatwas kind of one of the longer
term impacts there, and thensimilarly intervening as proxies
in Ukraine as well, alongsidelocal militias in Ukraine, and
(17:53):
then installing as well, proMoscow backed leadership in like
Donetsk and Luhansk, and thenother parts of eastern and
southern Ukraine as well. And sothose actors have played a very
significant role in both theareas of operation.
Tad Schnaufer (18:12):
Yeah. It reminds me at the time, you know, the
early time, 20 14/25, 2016 thatwhen Ukrainians caught actual
Russian soldiers in Ukraine inthe Donbas conflict, the
Russians would just say theywere on holiday or on leave, and
they chose to volunteer to gofight there. And again, all
about that deniability ofactually being on the ground,
right? So as we we look at thatdeniability campaign, that the
(18:35):
ability to conduct operationsbut not be held responsible for
the outcomes. How did thattranslate from Ukraine in 2014
and then when the Russians firstwill go into Syria actively?
Obviously, they had the basethere prior, but they actually
actively start conductingmilitary operations in 2015
Dr. John Pennell (18:52):
Yeah. So what was quite interesting, I think,
and want to talk about this alittle bit more in depth as
well, if you look back atRussian doctrine, the military
doctrine, but also its foreignpolicy concepts, its national
security strategies, itsinformation security strategies,
over the years, if not decades,there's been a consistent theme,
(19:12):
particularly since I'd say, thelate 90s, after the NATO
intervention in the Balkans andSerbia In particular, but then
also a little bit earlier, interms of the first Gulf War in
the early 90s, some themesaround that the West NATO, led
by the US, et cetera, is tryingto encircle Russia, and doing a
(19:34):
variety of activities thatcreate instability in Russia's
historic, if you will, sphere ofinfluence. And so that kind of
also goes back to Russia'sstrategic culture, historically,
this fear of being invaded, thisfear of just being insecure. And
there has been a history ofinvasion, of course, over the
years in Russia by a number ofdifferent actors from the west.
(19:57):
And so thinking about. Aboutthese actions by its obviously
adversaries and Russia'sperspective, whereas the US or
the West may think aboutintervening in Iraq in the early
90s to help Kuwait or helpKosovars in Serbia in the late
(20:19):
90s, Russia perceives this as,you know, going too far and kind
of intervening in its sphere ofinfluence. So that really,
really drives the Russianthinking, official thinking, and
it's certainly been writtenabout again, going back years,
if not decades. And so kind ofwhat this means in terms of
Syria and Ukraine, specifically,particularly during the 2014 to
(20:42):
22 timeframe, is looking at inthe Syria context, you know what
happened with the US ledinvasion of Iraq in 2003 and
Russia's perception, theinstability and chaos that that
kind of led to, and thisperception, I think arguably so,
there was A lot of instabilityand chaos in Iraq, let alone the
(21:03):
Middle East. After that, thatwhen it was intervening in
Syria, its long standing ally inSyria, it did not want the same
fate to happen to Assad as whathappened to Saddam Hussein, and
so that was one of his drivingfactors, you know, also the
concern about terrorism comingback home to Russia itself. And
(21:27):
so, you know, you could arguethere's legitimate concern on
Russia's part to have someintervention. And like I said,
USF is an ally. And then Russiahas also had air and naval bases
there too. So also interested inkind of, you know, protecting
those as well. So I think that'skind of the driver for the Syria
intervention, which was moreovert or conventional that we
saw in the initial stages, atleast, of the Russian invasion
(21:51):
of Ukraine, at least at theFebruary 2022, and having said
that, you know, Syria really wasalso used as kind of a live fire
testing ground for Russia, andit involves a lot of air power,
involved a lot of newtechnologies, you know, the
drones, et cetera, electronicwarfare, a whole lot of other
(22:12):
new military equipment testing,if you will, and then also
opportunities for its Militaryofficers to be trained again
like a live fire setting, and sousing that then as a basis to
adapt to what it was also doingin Ukraine. So taking possibly
(22:33):
arguably legitimate reasons tohelp us sit out in Syria, but
then taking that approach andadapting and learning in Ukraine
as well. So that, I think thatthat's important to note when
you think about the twocontexts, particularly at that
point in time. I think the otherreally important point about
Syria, after seeing how the USand the West got bogged down in
(22:57):
Iraq for so many years that ittried to avoid a similar
conclusion, if you will. And sowhat Gerasimov and others refer
to as the strategy of limitedmeans, or limited aims that
really just wanted to go in,rely on local forces, rely on
PMCs, Special Forces, as well asneeded air power, bombing
(23:20):
campaigns, etc, etc, to reallyget in and out. And so they more
or less wrapped up theiroperation with within like a
year or so timeframe. Obviously,they have continued involvement
with Syria. I think it stillremains to be seen with the new
leadership in Syria, kind ofwhat that means for the Russian
(23:42):
presence, regarding its navaland air bases. But I think
that's important to note. Andthen obviously in Ukraine,
there's still an ongoing warright now, and it's become more
and more conventional sinceFebruary 2022 situation,
Ukraine's kind of shifted,shifted a lot since that
Tad Schnaufer (24:02):
point, right?
And, you know, looking beforethat large scale invasion of
Ukraine in 22 how had Russianoperations, you know, as you
just mentioned, in Syria andUkraine, how did they evolve in
that timeframe from 2014 to 2022before everything kind of
changes the game with that largescale invasion,
Dr. John Pennell (24:20):
certainly.
Well, I think, you know, the oneconsistent thing that I've seen,
you know, when I was working inUkraine myself, let alone, you
know, the research that I wasable to conduct is taking
advantage of a couple ofdifferent things, one being the
geographic proximity, some ofthe connections to populations
in Eastern, southern Ukraine inparticular, although
(24:41):
inadvertently, I'm sure thiswasn't their intention. The idea
of being Ukraine, or a wholeUkraine, has certainly gotten
much stronger over the years,and certainly even the time
frame that I was there. Soinadvertently, I think, as those
who may have initially. Maybebelieve some of the
disinformation coming fromMoscow. I think a number have
(25:02):
changed the perspective over theyears. And then certainly, I
think since 2022 that Ukrainiansare generally much, much more
united than maybe they've everbeen. And so that's kind of one,
I think, outcome that Russia,certainly, I imagine, did not,
would not intend to have done.
But the other really importantpoint is technology, and
(25:26):
technology continues to developrapidly, continues to be used
for kinetic purposes, but alsonon kinetic purposes that can
still have strategic impacts.
And so the use of, you know, inmore and more AI in terms of
military technologies, you know,unmanned systems, drones,
electronic warfare, precisionguided munitions, all of these
(25:46):
types of things are other toolsthat not only enable greater
plausible deniability, although,again, since February 22 that
that's less relevant, but alsoenable actors including Russia,
but also Ukraine. BecauseUkraine's made a lot of advances
in technology. It's quiteinnovative as well, but it
(26:07):
allows the battlefield to happenin situations where even there
are, even though there are a lotof casualties, that it could
potentially reduce the numberof, you know, direct, kind of
conventional, you know, tank ontank, or soldier on soldier,
kind of on the on the ground, ifyou will, combat. Obviously,
(26:27):
that still does happen, but withall the emerging technology, I
think it's really important tonote that that's kind of been a
major shift over the years, andsomething that really I think
the US allies and partners needto continue to watch and try to
learn and adapt from but thenalso expect that our competitors
and adversaries are alsowatching what's happening as
(26:49):
well and also learning andadapting as well. And so I think
just going back to the initialquestion and discussion about
terminology, that's why I reallybelieve that, particularly with
the rise of these newtechnologies and how quickly
they are enabling things tohappen in real time and more and
(27:09):
more remotely, that it's reallygoing to have an impact on how
war is conducted going forward.
And so I just think we asAmericans need to be prepared to
understand that better and thinkabout it more and continue to
socialize with their ownpopulations as to what this
(27:29):
could look like cyber attacks,you know, and many other things
as well,
Tad Schnaufer (27:34):
right? Because, even though you know, as you
mentioned, you know, you get thelarge scale invasion of Russia,
or from Russia to Ukraine in2022 right? And that changes the
conflict of prime conflict toprimarily conventional, but you
still see those other hybridmethods, or whatever you'd like
to call them, happening duringthe conventional conflict. So is
that the change that we're we'reseeing that a conventional
conference going to have a lotmore of these, you know, cyber
(27:55):
attacks or informationcampaigns. Is that what we're
looking at?
Dr. John Pennell (27:59):
That's what I think, and that's certainly what
I've seen, you know, studying atleast Ukraine and Syria. But I
think you can argue elsewherefrom other actors and non state
actors as well, smartphones,that is obviously an easier way
to enable us to stay connectedand communicate with one
another, but it's also anothertool that can be used for malign
(28:21):
or nefarious purposes, hackinginto personnel files of US
government employees conductingcyber attacks against energy or
telecommunicationsinfrastructure, doing deep fakes
on different social media apps.
I mean, all of these things arenot only can be used for
criminal activities, but canalso be used for more strategic
(28:42):
activities as well. And so I dothink, and I do see that that's
likely that this technology, inan array of domains, if you
will, is likely to play an evenbigger role and future conflict.
And
Tad Schnaufer (29:00):
like you said, with, you know, drones, not just
air drones. Most people thinkdrones. You think a quad copter
or something like that. Maybe aPredator drone from the war, the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,but now you have land and sea
drones that are conducting a lotof operations. And even just
recently, a Russian unitsurrendered to a bunch of
rolling land drones has made thenews, you know, the first time
you've seen a render of thatsort. So is that also going to
(29:22):
continue? You think you continueto evolve the battlefield as we
look at possible futureconflicts, I
Dr. John Pennell (29:29):
do, and I think that's also very
concerning, because I thinkincreasingly non combatant local
populations are going to be moreand more participants in the
battlefield or in the battlespace, if you will, either
knowingly or unknowingly. Andsome have said that we're
(29:50):
already in a war by other means,and unfortunately, many don't
know about it. And so yes, I dosee that continuing. That does
not mean I think. Thatconventional forces or
conventional tactics would goaway, I just think that they
would be significantly augmentedby these new technologies on the
(30:11):
battlefield, and just the factthat, again, the world is so
globally interconnected that Ithink much easier to pursue a
state or non state actor topursue its objectives without
necessarily having to be infront of someone or nearby at
all. And so definitely, I think,things to be aware of and keep
(30:32):
thinking and focusing
Tad Schnaufer (30:34):
on, right. So what has the US, Western powers,
observers in general, learnedfrom Russia's operations in
Ukraine and Syria.
Dr. John Pennell (30:44):
So I think couple of different things. You
know, first, as I mentioned,going back to Russia's
intervention 2015, to 16 inSyria, that Russia was able to
project power outside itstraditional sphere of influence.
So indicating that it had thepotential to do that. I think
(31:04):
currently it's very muchoverstretched, I think obviously
in Ukraine, but it showed that,at least at that time, it
conduct operations in twodifferent theaters, because it
was also operating in Ukraine aswell. And so showing that
capability, I think it alsoshowed in Syria that was able to
operate with a diverse array offorces under kind of like an
(31:25):
integrated command structure aswell. It's something that
obviously the US and, you know,NATO and allies and partners, in
terms of the concept of jointoperations, if you will, has
done a lot of and continues todo I also think going back prior
to Syria and Ukraine in 2008 Ithink Russia also learned a lot
from its war in Georgia andrealized a lot of the failings
(31:48):
that it had. Obviously continuesto occupy 20% Georgian territory
to this day, but, you know, Ithink Russia certainly did not
perform as well in Georgia in2008 as it thought it would. And
I think learned a lot oflessons, and so underwent a lot
of military modernizationtransformation over the years,
which I think aided it in itsperformance in Syria and
(32:11):
certainly in initial parts ofUkraine as well. And then also
just looking more at theintegration of unmanned systems,
precision strike systems ofspecial forces on the ground. I
think that's also what's reallyimportant for its work in Syria.
And then, of course, electronicwarfare, and many other things
(32:34):
related to that in the cyberspace as well. But then also
back to the issue of likenarrative framing and kind of
information space and shapingpublic perceptions, you know,
arguing that, yes, Assad is ourlong standing ally and partner,
but there's also problems withinstability stemming from
(32:54):
terrorist threats in thecountry, in the region, and that
we need to support them, andthat actually fighting against
the terrorist benefits the USand its allies and partners as
well. And so I think, you know,there was some debate or
discussion about to the extentthat the Kremlin was being fully
honest, transparent about that.
But then also, you know, theconcept in Ukraine initiative at
(33:17):
least, about protecting ethnicRussians and kind of Russian
culture and heritage from whatit was describing to its
population and Ukraine andothers as a very anti Russia
Russian government in the time,at that time in Ukraine, but
then beyond that, particularlyin Ukraine, I think just the
fact that Russia hadlongstanding economic and other
(33:41):
connections to business people,the so called oligarchs, to
media outlets, to politicalparties and politicians, etc,
etc, that it was much easier topursue its objectives without
necessarily relying onconventional forces or even
proxy forces. It obviously diduse those forces as well, but
(34:03):
some of that, I don't think,could be replicated in other
theaters as easily as it couldin Ukraine, just given all the
avenues for Russian influence inUkraine at that time, obviously,
that's changed a lot and evolvedover the years. Certainly I
don't think that's the casesince 2022 but thinking more,
taking a couple more steps back,thinking more in the more
(34:29):
professional military education,strategic thinking, strategic
thought perspective, I think atleast in Department of Defense,
heavy, intelligence communitycircles and others as well
thinking about the blending ofthe lines, or crossing of lines
between war and peace, and kindof that area that sometimes is
(34:52):
referred to as gray, and what itmeans in terms of the tools that
we have available to us toreach. Bond and without
eliciting eliciting aconventional military response
and breaking out into like fullscale overt war, these issues
are still being discussed today,quite a lot among you know,
these types of circles andacademics as well, and I don't
(35:15):
think that's going to go awayagain, fueled at least by not
only what we're seeing byRussia, but also the PRC in the
Indo Pacific as well, and Iranwith all of its proxies, and
also the fact that Iran has usedsome irregular hybrid tools as
well, and then a number of nonstate actors doing the same
thing. I don't think thesetactics or the tools are going
(35:38):
to go away. If anything, they'llbe even more enhanced by the
emergence of these newtechnologies and the continued
evolution of existingtechnologies as
Tad Schnaufer (35:49):
well, right?
Because it's interesting that ifthese tactics, the in and of
themselves, were successful, whywould Russia need to actually
invade in 2022 so you had sowhat pushed him over the edge?
From your perspective,
Dr. John Pennell (36:03):
sure, it's a great question, I guess the
million dollar question from myperspective, I think initially,
I think even to this day, Ithink obviously Moscow is has
over played its hand andoverstretched itself. Obviously,
was overly confident going intoUkraine in 2014 to begin with.
(36:24):
And obviously that's not workedout whatsoever. I think it
misunderstood Ukrainianresilience, and I think
Ukrainian innovation,particularly on the battlefield.
To this day, I'm still in closecontact with number of
Ukrainians, including themilitary and just the amount of
innovation going on, because,you know, their their nationhood
(36:47):
is at stake, and they're reallyfighting for their lives. And I
think, you know, deserve somesome credit to think, on their
part, for thinking through waysto counter these different
threats, but in terms of thequestion about maybe what
changed in Russia's perspective,I think initially, at least, I
think the Kremlin was satisfiedwith as long as it had a
(37:08):
foothold either in Crimea orEastern or southern Ukraine. But
that, in and of itself, wouldmitigate anytime soon, at least
in their perspective, Ukraine'sability to enter the European
Union as a member or as a memberof NATO. And so I think at least
at that time, I think theKremlin was satisfied with that.
And I think also was using thatinterim period before 2022 to
(37:32):
continue to undermine the thenPoroshenko government, and then
afterwards, the Zelenskygovernment, all the reforms that
Ukraine had to undertake relatedto corruption, transparency in a
number of the areas as well. Andso I think that the Kremlin
thought that it would be able toeventually kind of oust
(37:55):
Zelensky, if not Poroshenkobefore him, and put in a more
pliable regime, but I think overthe years, I think the Kremlin
also thought that the NATO andkind of Western alliance on
Ukraine would fracture. Andwhile there had been some
challenges at different periodsof time over the last, let's
say, 10 or so years, it's mostlyheld together. And so I think
(38:17):
maybe he underestimated thatPutin himself. And so I think,
seeing as how Ukraine wasproceeding quite rapidly on its
internal reforms, in my view, Ithink the Kremlin and Putin
himself just said it's notenough that we have a foothold
in Ukraine. Let's promote ourown version of Ukrainian history
(38:40):
and install our own kind ofpuppet, if you will. And so I
think the focus then became fromone transition from
destabilization of Ukraine tojust regime change. But again, I
know also many in the Westthought that it would be
relatively short battle inFebruary 2022, and here we are
(39:01):
three plus years later, andthat's not at all the case. So I
just think Russia made a lot ofstrategic mistakes and
miscalculations, let aloneoperational tactical as well.
But I really think just theiroverall objective shifted from
destabilization to regimechange, and I think that's what
(39:22):
I would argue, is the mainreason for the change in
February 2022
Tad Schnaufer (39:25):
right? So the gray zone activities, gray zone
operations, can only yield somuch change, and in the end,
they pretty much, you had to goall the way conventional to make
to reach a new goal, if youwill. Is it right? Because,
right? Because if we look at thenarrative right before the
invasion in 22 you know, Putinwrote his famous article in July
of 2021 calling, you know,Ukrainian French brothers. And
(39:47):
then he used in his speechduring the night of the invasion
about the de nazification anddemilitarization of Ukraine,
same like you mentioned in 2014same things, trying to fight
this fascist government. So themessaging is almost the same.
It's just the new goal. Goals.
Is what you're seeing is reallythat flip switch?
Dr. John Pennell (40:03):
Yeah, definitely. And again, I think
obviously us, you know, Westernsupport has been extremely
important to Ukraine, and youknow, it's good that it's
continued. And you know, I knowthat we also have some
challenges with whether onbudget, budget situation the
United States, but I know thatUkraine really needs us and
(40:27):
Western support. But I think isagain, also showed a lot of
resilience and innovation interms of its ability to maneuver
on the battleground, bothphysically, but also in the
cyber and information realms aswell,
Tad Schnaufer (40:42):
right? And so based on your analysis, where
does Russia sit today, with itsobviously the current war in
Ukraine, and also it's stillhanging on to some bases in
Syria. So what's the currentassessment? From your
perspective?
Dr. John Pennell (40:52):
I definitely think that, again, Russia's
overplayed its hands,unfortunately, many times, and
is overstretched. I thinkthere's only enough people who
are going to continue to kind ofgo through the meat grinder, at
least voluntarily in Ukraine.
Obviously, a lot of it isinvoluntary. I am hoping that,
(41:13):
and I know there's been a lot oftalk about some some peace
negotiations that, you know, wedo get to that point, because
obviously a lot of people aresuffering, and, you know, both
Ukrainians and Russians, butsomething that is fair to
(41:33):
Ukraine. I don't think thatRussia, or Putin himself is
interested in any deal thatdoesn't benefit Russia only. So
that's somewhat where I'mconcerned about how this would
continue or not continue goingforward. But I don't think it's
necessarily sustainable forRussia to continue at this pace.
(41:55):
On the other hand, I'm not sureit's sustainable for Ukraine to
do so without continuous supportfrom the US and its allies and
partners and so, you know, hencethe need, I think, to find a way
to bring the parties togetherand come up with a negotiated
settlement that's fair. I thinkwe just, we just have to see, I
(42:17):
think it's going to be tough, atough slog, kind of going
forward.
Tad Schnaufer (42:24):
And what about in Syria?
Dr. John Pennell (42:27):
So in Syria, I I'm glad that we are taking a
new approach in terms of, youknow, outreach. I know there,
there are a lot of validconcerns about the leadership in
Syria, you know, based onhistorical experience with this
individual and some of theorganizations he's associated
with, but, you know, the flipside of it, I think it does
(42:48):
warrant a new approach, in thesense that some of the things
that we've done in the MiddleEast haven't necessarily worked
out well. I think there's stillsome hope in certain cases, such
as in Iraq, despite all thechallenges over the years, that
there may be some, some promise,some hope coming forward that,
you know, maybe this is, youknow, our renewed outreach and
(43:08):
approach to Syria could be anopportunity to kind of shape at
least Syria and their thinking,about Russia, about Iran, about
non state actors. So I think wehave to try, and I think it is
worth trying. Russia, obviously,to get in the way, has had a
(43:29):
long standing involvement inSyria, I think, to the extent
that maybe the US or ourpartners and allies could
influence leadership's thinkingregarding to Russia and its
access to naval and air bases, Ithink would be to our benefit.
It may also kind of, like youwith Ukraine, require some kind
of negotiated deal, if you will,as to what is in the US and
(43:55):
Europe centers, let alone whatRussia wants out of it. I think
we also kind of have to wait andsee, but I do think it's good
that we've conducted someproactive outreach in trying to
figure out what we can do withSyria going forward, just given
how how much suffering there'sbeen in Syria as well
domestically, pride USF falling,but then also resulting,
(44:18):
unfortunately, fromindiscriminate Russian bombing
campaigns, particularly during2015, and 16, a lot of civilians
were killed as well. I think wehave to see right?
Tad Schnaufer (44:30):
So to wrap up, if you could tell a senior US
policy maker in one sentence,what they need to do with
Russia. Now I'm just reallyconcise, one sentence. Blip. You
caught him on an elevator. Whatwould you tell what would you
tell
Dr. John Pennell (44:42):
them? Yeah, this is great question. And of
course, I have a lot to say. Tryto keep it. Keep it concise. I
think it's extremely importantto think about the threats and
challenges that are bothcompetitors but also adversaries
present to us. Withoutnecessarily having to rely on or
use traditional kinetic ormilitary tools, and that a lot
(45:08):
of warfare going forward is, canit see more and more of what
we've seen like in Ukraine, atleast prior to February 2022,
but still to this day that theuse of these advanced, emerging,
evolving technologies to achievestrategic objectives, and I
think we need to inoculate ourcountry and our allies and
(45:28):
partners to that from cyber toAI enabled DIS and
misinformation to be morecareful on our smartphones and
use social media apps beingmindful of, you know,
disinformation seeping into ourown political ecosystems, and,
you know, causing instability,etc, and decreasing social
(45:52):
cohesion our own countries. Ithink these things are going to
be out there. And if not get getmore difficult. And then,
relatedly, terms the whole ofthe society approach, getting
the private sector, becausethese types of activities
ultimately will affect theirbottom line, non governmental
organizations, academic thinktanks, etc, etc, along with the
(46:12):
whole of government approach tokind of dealing with these
challenges, I think, will becritical.
Tad Schnaufer (46:18):
Well, thank you so much for your insight. Thank
you. Applause.
Hey, John, well, welcome to the podcast.
Dr. John Pennell (02:00):
Thank you.
Thanks for having me excited tobe here. So today we're
Tad Schnaufer (02:03):
going to be discussing, you know, the
Russia's involvement in Ukraine,particularly before the full
Russia's involvement in Ukraine,particularly 2015 timeframe so
scale invasion, the tactics, themethods that they used in
they used in Ukraine war, around20. 2014 and 2022, as well as
Ukraine between
Dr. John Pennell (02:12):
2014 and 2022 as well as their involvement in
their involvement in Syria andparticularly the Syrian civil
Syria, and particularly theSyrian Civil War around 2015
war. Mention of military'sresponse in return. And so
timeframe. So why don't we startback chronologically with this
discussion, John, and talk aboutwhat was going on and what
interests you specifically withRussia's actions in Ukraine in
2014 and then moving into Syriain 2015 certainly. Well again,
(02:35):
thanks for having me. Big fan ofthe podcast and what GNSI is
doing in the irregular warfarespace, and also future war space
as well. And I think this willbe hopefully a useful
contribution. So I was actuallyserving for the US government in
Ukraine itself, from 2015 to2019 and was very interested in
all the discussions and debates,both in policy circles, but also
(02:58):
scholarly circles about hybridwarfare and kind of Russia's
actions in Ukraine, specificallywith the so called Little Green
Men, and, you know, forces inCrimea that were unmarked. And
you know what this all meant.
And there was a lot of back andforth and debate on whether
Russia was inventing or startstarting up a new form of
warfare, and if so, what it wasand what it looked like. And
(03:20):
then shortly thereafter, theystarted intervening in Syria,
which at that time, it was thefirst time that they'd really
projected power outside of theirtraditional sphere of influence
in Eurasia in quite some time.
And so I think there was a lotof concern, rightly so, as to
what was going on, what this allmeant. Obviously, the West, the
(03:41):
US NATO and others, our alliesand partners have a lot of
interest in the Mediterranean,let alone in Eastern Europe. And
so that's kind of really whatkicked it off for me. And I
decided to pursue a PhD in atKing's College London, and I was
focusing specifically onRussia's interventions in
Ukraine, and want to usesomething else, such as Syria as
(04:03):
a kind of a comparator. And sothat's kind of where Genesis,
really of this book for me,again, which is based on my PhD
thesis, kind of originatedExcellent So, and going back to
that timeframe, people might notremember the kind of complexity
of what was going on all theseactions below the threshold of
war that were taking place in2014 Russia annexed Crimea, as
(04:25):
you mentioned, the little greenmen. These are the soldiers that
didn't have patches on. Theyjust kind of show up. So what do
we call those tactics? And howdid those evolve over 2014 and
20 Ukraine? Sure. So I think atthat time, hybrid seemed to have
been the most common term,although you could argue that
irregular today, we use grayzone a lot more, but a range of
(04:46):
different activities, tools thatare essentially below the
threshold, as you described,because the sole purpose, really
of allowing for plausibledeniability and ideally not
certainly, I think that's kindof what took everyone by
(05:07):
surprise, in that sense, atleast those who maybe not
necessarily were that familiarwith Russian, even Soviet era
tactics, often referred to asactive measures, which, frankly,
there's been a lot ofconsistency in Russia's
approach, certainly prior toFebruary of 2022
Tad Schnaufer (05:24):
and that's interesting part is that the
even the concepts that werebeing used in 2014 were so
obscure that you really don'thave an acceptable definition of
what it was. So hybrid warfarehad a lot of scholarly baggage
with it, even before 2014because it was used with
terrorist organizations and nonstate actors. So how did you
(05:44):
conceptualize that in your bookand then also in your research?
Dr. John Pennell (05:48):
Certainly, so part of the book is really
focused on the array ofdifferent terms that are being
used. You know, hybrid orregular, gray zone, full
spectrum conflict, that newgeneration warfare, political
warfare, there's a fair amountof overlap among the different
terms. I think some of them moremore relevant for a particular
(06:09):
context, and not that we shouldnecessarily throw any one of
them away. And there arespecific definitions, for
example, that the Department ofDefense, us, Department of
Defense uses for some of theseterms. And so what I was trying
to get at with that was to tryto get a better sense of how
much of the focus on hybrid ishype versus like, is there a
(06:31):
there, there, so to speak. Andso I think it really was maybe
an overplayed term, not thatwhat Russia was doing was not
significant. It certainly was.
And I myself do use the termhybrid warfare, you know,
regularly, but my preference ofall the terms is probably more
full spectrum conflict, or newgeneration warfare, full
(06:52):
spectrum, because I think itbetter describes the array of
tools that that the Russianshave been using to this day, and
then also new generationwarfare, because that is a term
that the Russians themselveshave used to describe, along
with the hybrid warfare concept,what it perceives as the US or
the West doing against Russia,and historically doing against
(07:16):
Russia. And so I think those aremore probably relevant. But any
one of these terms could be useddepending on a particular
context. And so part of the bookdoes try to break down the where
there's overlap, where there'sdistinction, and kind of what is
made maybe more relevant thanothers, depending on the case,
right,
Tad Schnaufer (07:36):
because a lot of influential factors of both
sides the grass involveddoctrine, which was a part of an
article we published in 2013General grassimoff, the Russian
General, and then also the USdefinitions before the conflict
started, absolutely. So withthose you know, let's just take
the term out of it. Then in 2014Ukraine, what are the primary
characteristics of the conflict,which, you know, whatever you
(07:59):
call it. What were the Russiansactually doing that was
different. So certainly,
Dr. John Pennell (08:04):
again, kind of going back to then called fall
of 2013 that the Euromaidanprotests, where the then
president of Ukraine,Yanukovych, that kind of
backtracked on the population'sdesire to join the EU and
started to make some dealingswith Putin that led to a series
(08:26):
of protests, and unfortunately,leading to a lot of violence
against protesters, unarmedcivilians, etc, which then kind
of spurred worse protests, withwhich then eventually led to
Yanukovych fleeing to Russiahimself, along with a lot of
money and other things. Andafter that, somewhat in
(08:47):
response, of course, theRussians had already been
working in eastern Ukraine andDonbas with different proxy
forces, local militias, thosewho are like minded, so to
speak, leveraging culturalaffinity, religious affinity,
ethnicity, language, et cetera,those who identified as Russian
(09:08):
compatriots, for example, orwere supportive of Russia. And I
think one thing that's key toall of this is that, you know,
Ukraine and Russia border eachother, obviously, but they have
had a shared history in someways, for many, many years. And
one of the things that Russiatried to do, at least initially,
was to exploit where there wereopportunities to leverage the
(09:32):
affinity that some Ukrainianshad toward Russia, and not only
in the east, but also insouthern Ukraine as well. And
then, of course, in Crimea,where traditionally, the
population in Crimea hadidentified more as ethnic
Russian. And so I think becauseof those connections, it was a
little bit easier for Russia tointervene in some of those areas
(09:53):
and use proxy forces in easternand southern Ukraine, and then,
of course, going into Korea.
Crimea with the so calledunmarked soldiers or little
green men, for the purpose,really, of plausible
deniability. And one of the mainthings related to that, of
course, is to make it seem likethis is homegrown. And also that
to the extent Russia needed tointervene, it was to protect
(10:17):
ethnic Russians from the socalled fascists in Kiev. And
that, you know, the newgovernment that was forming
under President Petro Poroshenkoat that time, the Kremlin
narrative was that not only washe fascist, but he hated
Russians and Russian language,etc, etc. And so, you know, that
stirred up a lot of fear. It'sobviously using a lot of
(10:37):
disinformation. But alsotechnologies. And that's
something I'm happy to talkabout in more depth, because
that's been one kind of keything over the evolution of, I
think, Russian warfare inUkraine and in Syria as well,
the role of new technologies,military technologies, but also
(10:59):
non military technologies, butthat can have strategic effects
or very broader strategicobjective impacts. And I think
that's also critical,
Tad Schnaufer (11:11):
sure, because we've seen Russian cyber
attacks, you've seenmisinformation campaigns. We've
seen them handing out passportsto people who want to be
Russian, so being able to craftthis deceptive narrative, and
again, using technology in manyways over the span of the time
we'll discuss here post 2014 sohow did that change after that
initial shock in early 2014
Dr. John Pennell (11:33):
certainly. So I think at that point, the West,
the US, NATO, allies andpartners, kind of, I think,
quickly caught on that Russiawas up to some pretty nefarious
activities, and obviouslyUkrainians did as well. I think
still, what was somewhatoffsetting, or maybe was the
challenge initially, is thateverything that Kremlin was
(11:54):
doing at that time was reallyjust below the threshold of a, I
think, wildly accepted conceptof what war is. And so I think
the question is, okay, how wouldthe US NATO allies and partners
respond to that, short of actualviolent conflict or
confrontation that was moreconventional? And so I think it
(12:19):
took some time to catch up,because Russia was doing quite a
lot of things, and not onlyusing proxies in terms of local
militias or the little green menor such, but also, again, the
compatriots, those who had someaffinity towards Russia for a
variety of reasons, could beethnic, could be religious, or
It could be language linguisticissues, but also those who were
(12:44):
either involved in the economy.
Donbas, historically, was a veryindustrial part of the country
of Ukraine, and you had a lot ofwhat had been previously called
oligarchs, I guess that term isstill used today. And I would
say the situation oligarchs inUkraine has been cleaned up
quite a bit over the years, overthe past several years in
(13:05):
particular. And so, you know,Zelensky, President of Ukraine,
deserves some credit for that.
But at that time, at least a lotof the oligarchs in Ukraine had
earned their money and incomefrom Moscow or connections to
Russia. And so I think Moscowwas also able to lever local
businesses in Ukraine and theirleadership in the so called
(13:27):
oligarchs to also produce someimpacts that would benefit them
as well, and particularlyengaging in the parliament in
Kiev. But then you also had anumber of so called Think
tankers, experts, mediapersonalities. Yet a lot of at
that time, again, it's beencleaned up quite a bit, but a
(13:47):
lot of media outlets that hadeither pro Russia backers,
financiers or folks are doingcommentary in the news. And so
there was just a lot of room andopportunity for Russia to sow
doubt amongst the Ukrainianpopulation, let alone the global
population, the world, if youwill, as to what was happening
in Ukraine. And so the Battle ofthe narrative really, really was
(14:11):
kind of starting and gettingstronger and stronger at that
point. And that's something thatyou know continues to this day.
Happy to talk more about that ina
Tad Schnaufer (14:19):
second, right?
Because that battle, thenarrative really spreads across
again, like we started theinternet, not only on the
ground, but also through medianetworks. These Russian troll
farms have constant comments onsocial media, so it's really
hard to get the real facts fromthe ground, because there's so
much deception going on outthere. And these actors, as you
mentioned, that are not actuallythe Russian government directly,
they're a proxy that being usedto the Russian government and
(14:43):
one of those other groups thatcame on to prominence Not long
into the Ukraine conflict, andlater, famously in Syria, than
the than the actual full scaleinvasion would be those military
contractors, private militarycontractors like Wagner group.
So how did those come about andbut. Dissipation campaign,
Dr. John Pennell (15:02):
certainly, yeah, so the private military
contractors, Wagner, I guess, isthe most notorious, but there
were several others. Certainly,it was another effort or way, or
tool, if you will, in terms ofplausible deniability. And what
was interesting as well is thata lot of these private military
contractors of PMCS actuallyflowed back and forth between
(15:24):
both the Syria area ofoperation, also Ukraine area of
operation, and so as part ofthat, also taking lessons
learned from one theater toanother and all to again, kind
of advance. You know Russia'snarrative that, well, we're
actually not there were actuallynot on the ground in Ukraine, at
least that this is allhomegrown. This is folks who are
(15:47):
dissatisfied with the newgovernment in Ukraine that is
taking the country away from itshistorical partner, Russia, if
you will. I think what's alsoimportant to note that the PMCs,
you know, in Syria inparticular, were used for a
variety of activities, and justto compare kind of the different
(16:08):
approaches, and then differentareas of focus and objectives
between the two theaters. Youknow, in Syria, it really was
about, you know, propping up theAssad regime, keeping him in
power, but under the we couldsay, maybe false pretense of
fighting ISIS, fightingterrorists, something that
(16:29):
obviously the US, the West, NATOand others, are also very
concerned about, and theinstability that not dealing
with that issue could bring tothe Middle East. And we've seen,
obviously, a lot of challengesin the Middle East over the
years with terrorism, from, youknow, whether it was Al Qaeda or
Daesh ISIS, et cetera. And sokind of using that as a
(16:51):
narrative as to why it wasintervening in Syria, but but
also to, you know, help keepAssad in power and then ensure
that it had access to its navaland air bases there as well. So
the PMCs, the Wagner and othergroups, particularly in Syria,
did an array of things,including like direct action,
(17:12):
going after so calledterrorists, helping and working
with Iranian backed militias,let alone Syrian regime
military, to also fight, youknow, so called terrorists, and
then also to secure differentenergy related installations,
and then which also led tobusiness opportunities, if you
(17:33):
will, among the differentprivate military contractor
firms. You know, later on, thatwas kind of one of the longer
term impacts there, and thensimilarly intervening as proxies
in Ukraine as well, alongsidelocal militias in Ukraine, and
(17:53):
then installing as well, proMoscow backed leadership in like
Donetsk and Luhansk, and thenother parts of eastern and
southern Ukraine as well. And sothose actors have played a very
significant role in both theareas of operation.
Tad Schnaufer (18:12):
Yeah. It reminds me at the time, you know, the
early time, 20 14/25, 2016 thatwhen Ukrainians caught actual
Russian soldiers in Ukraine inthe Donbas conflict, the
Russians would just say theywere on holiday or on leave, and
they chose to volunteer to gofight there. And again, all
about that deniability ofactually being on the ground,
right? So as we we look at thatdeniability campaign, that the
(18:35):
ability to conduct operationsbut not be held responsible for
the outcomes. How did thattranslate from Ukraine in 2014
and then when the Russians firstwill go into Syria actively?
Obviously, they had the basethere prior, but they actually
actively start conductingmilitary operations in 2015
Dr. John Pennell (18:52):
Yeah. So what was quite interesting, I think,
and want to talk about this alittle bit more in depth as
well, if you look back atRussian doctrine, the military
doctrine, but also its foreignpolicy concepts, its national
security strategies, itsinformation security strategies,
over the years, if not decades,there's been a consistent theme,
(19:12):
particularly since I'd say, thelate 90s, after the NATO
intervention in the Balkans andSerbia In particular, but then
also a little bit earlier, interms of the first Gulf War in
the early 90s, some themesaround that the West NATO, led
by the US, et cetera, is tryingto encircle Russia, and doing a
(19:34):
variety of activities thatcreate instability in Russia's
historic, if you will, sphere ofinfluence. And so that kind of
also goes back to Russia'sstrategic culture, historically,
this fear of being invaded, thisfear of just being insecure. And
there has been a history ofinvasion, of course, over the
years in Russia by a number ofdifferent actors from the west.
(19:57):
And so thinking about. Aboutthese actions by its obviously
adversaries and Russia'sperspective, whereas the US or
the West may think aboutintervening in Iraq in the early
90s to help Kuwait or helpKosovars in Serbia in the late
(20:19):
90s, Russia perceives this as,you know, going too far and kind
of intervening in its sphere ofinfluence. So that really,
really drives the Russianthinking, official thinking, and
it's certainly been writtenabout again, going back years,
if not decades. And so kind ofwhat this means in terms of
Syria and Ukraine, specifically,particularly during the 2014 to
(20:42):
22 timeframe, is looking at inthe Syria context, you know what
happened with the US ledinvasion of Iraq in 2003 and
Russia's perception, theinstability and chaos that that
kind of led to, and thisperception, I think arguably so,
there was A lot of instabilityand chaos in Iraq, let alone the
(21:03):
Middle East. After that, thatwhen it was intervening in
Syria, its long standing ally inSyria, it did not want the same
fate to happen to Assad as whathappened to Saddam Hussein, and
so that was one of his drivingfactors, you know, also the
concern about terrorism comingback home to Russia itself. And
(21:27):
so, you know, you could arguethere's legitimate concern on
Russia's part to have someintervention. And like I said,
USF is an ally. And then Russiahas also had air and naval bases
there too. So also interested inkind of, you know, protecting
those as well. So I think that'skind of the driver for the Syria
intervention, which was moreovert or conventional that we
saw in the initial stages, atleast, of the Russian invasion
(21:51):
of Ukraine, at least at theFebruary 2022, and having said
that, you know, Syria really wasalso used as kind of a live fire
testing ground for Russia, andit involves a lot of air power,
involved a lot of newtechnologies, you know, the
drones, et cetera, electronicwarfare, a whole lot of other
(22:12):
new military equipment testing,if you will, and then also
opportunities for its Militaryofficers to be trained again
like a live fire setting, and sousing that then as a basis to
adapt to what it was also doingin Ukraine. So taking possibly
(22:33):
arguably legitimate reasons tohelp us sit out in Syria, but
then taking that approach andadapting and learning in Ukraine
as well. So that, I think thatthat's important to note when
you think about the twocontexts, particularly at that
point in time. I think the otherreally important point about
Syria, after seeing how the USand the West got bogged down in
(22:57):
Iraq for so many years that ittried to avoid a similar
conclusion, if you will. And sowhat Gerasimov and others refer
to as the strategy of limitedmeans, or limited aims that
really just wanted to go in,rely on local forces, rely on
PMCs, Special Forces, as well asneeded air power, bombing
(23:20):
campaigns, etc, etc, to reallyget in and out. And so they more
or less wrapped up theiroperation with within like a
year or so timeframe. Obviously,they have continued involvement
with Syria. I think it stillremains to be seen with the new
leadership in Syria, kind ofwhat that means for the Russian
(23:42):
presence, regarding its navaland air bases. But I think
that's important to note. Andthen obviously in Ukraine,
there's still an ongoing warright now, and it's become more
and more conventional sinceFebruary 2022 situation,
Ukraine's kind of shifted,shifted a lot since that
Tad Schnaufer (24:02):
point, right?
And, you know, looking beforethat large scale invasion of
Ukraine in 22 how had Russianoperations, you know, as you
just mentioned, in Syria andUkraine, how did they evolve in
that timeframe from 2014 to 2022before everything kind of
changes the game with that largescale invasion,
Dr. John Pennell (24:20):
certainly.
Well, I think, you know, the oneconsistent thing that I've seen,
you know, when I was working inUkraine myself, let alone, you
know, the research that I wasable to conduct is taking
advantage of a couple ofdifferent things, one being the
geographic proximity, some ofthe connections to populations
in Eastern, southern Ukraine inparticular, although
(24:41):
inadvertently, I'm sure thiswasn't their intention. The idea
of being Ukraine, or a wholeUkraine, has certainly gotten
much stronger over the years,and certainly even the time
frame that I was there. Soinadvertently, I think, as those
who may have initially. Maybebelieve some of the
disinformation coming fromMoscow. I think a number have
(25:02):
changed the perspective over theyears. And then certainly, I
think since 2022 that Ukrainiansare generally much, much more
united than maybe they've everbeen. And so that's kind of one,
I think, outcome that Russia,certainly, I imagine, did not,
would not intend to have done.
But the other really importantpoint is technology, and
(25:26):
technology continues to developrapidly, continues to be used
for kinetic purposes, but alsonon kinetic purposes that can
still have strategic impacts.
And so the use of, you know, inmore and more AI in terms of
military technologies, you know,unmanned systems, drones,
electronic warfare, precisionguided munitions, all of these
(25:46):
types of things are other toolsthat not only enable greater
plausible deniability, although,again, since February 22 that
that's less relevant, but alsoenable actors including Russia,
but also Ukraine. BecauseUkraine's made a lot of advances
in technology. It's quiteinnovative as well, but it
(26:07):
allows the battlefield to happenin situations where even there
are, even though there are a lotof casualties, that it could
potentially reduce the numberof, you know, direct, kind of
conventional, you know, tank ontank, or soldier on soldier,
kind of on the on the ground, ifyou will, combat. Obviously,
(26:27):
that still does happen, but withall the emerging technology, I
think it's really important tonote that that's kind of been a
major shift over the years, andsomething that really I think
the US allies and partners needto continue to watch and try to
learn and adapt from but thenalso expect that our competitors
and adversaries are alsowatching what's happening as
(26:49):
well and also learning andadapting as well. And so I think
just going back to the initialquestion and discussion about
terminology, that's why I reallybelieve that, particularly with
the rise of these newtechnologies and how quickly
they are enabling things tohappen in real time and more and
(27:09):
more remotely, that it's reallygoing to have an impact on how
war is conducted going forward.
And so I just think we asAmericans need to be prepared to
understand that better and thinkabout it more and continue to
socialize with their ownpopulations as to what this
(27:29):
could look like cyber attacks,you know, and many other things
as well,
Tad Schnaufer (27:34):
right? Because, even though you know, as you
mentioned, you know, you get thelarge scale invasion of Russia,
or from Russia to Ukraine in2022 right? And that changes the
conflict of prime conflict toprimarily conventional, but you
still see those other hybridmethods, or whatever you'd like
to call them, happening duringthe conventional conflict. So is
that the change that we're we'reseeing that a conventional
conference going to have a lotmore of these, you know, cyber
(27:55):
attacks or informationcampaigns. Is that what we're
looking at?
Dr. John Pennell (27:59):
That's what I think, and that's certainly what
I've seen, you know, studying atleast Ukraine and Syria. But I
think you can argue elsewherefrom other actors and non state
actors as well, smartphones,that is obviously an easier way
to enable us to stay connectedand communicate with one
another, but it's also anothertool that can be used for malign
(28:21):
or nefarious purposes, hackinginto personnel files of US
government employees conductingcyber attacks against energy or
telecommunicationsinfrastructure, doing deep fakes
on different social media apps.
I mean, all of these things arenot only can be used for
criminal activities, but canalso be used for more strategic
(28:42):
activities as well. And so I dothink, and I do see that that's
likely that this technology, inan array of domains, if you
will, is likely to play an evenbigger role and future conflict.
And
Tad Schnaufer (29:00):
like you said, with, you know, drones, not just
air drones. Most people thinkdrones. You think a quad copter
or something like that. Maybe aPredator drone from the war, the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,but now you have land and sea
drones that are conducting a lotof operations. And even just
recently, a Russian unitsurrendered to a bunch of
rolling land drones has made thenews, you know, the first time
you've seen a render of thatsort. So is that also going to
(29:22):
continue? You think you continueto evolve the battlefield as we
look at possible futureconflicts, I
Dr. John Pennell (29:29):
do, and I think that's also very
concerning, because I thinkincreasingly non combatant local
populations are going to be moreand more participants in the
battlefield or in the battlespace, if you will, either
knowingly or unknowingly. Andsome have said that we're
(29:50):
already in a war by other means,and unfortunately, many don't
know about it. And so yes, I dosee that continuing. That does
not mean I think. Thatconventional forces or
conventional tactics would goaway, I just think that they
would be significantly augmentedby these new technologies on the
(30:11):
battlefield, and just the factthat, again, the world is so
globally interconnected that Ithink much easier to pursue a
state or non state actor topursue its objectives without
necessarily having to be infront of someone or nearby at
all. And so definitely, I think,things to be aware of and keep
(30:32):
thinking and focusing
Tad Schnaufer (30:34):
on, right. So what has the US, Western powers,
observers in general, learnedfrom Russia's operations in
Ukraine and Syria.
Dr. John Pennell (30:44):
So I think couple of different things. You
know, first, as I mentioned,going back to Russia's
intervention 2015, to 16 inSyria, that Russia was able to
project power outside itstraditional sphere of influence.
So indicating that it had thepotential to do that. I think
(31:04):
currently it's very muchoverstretched, I think obviously
in Ukraine, but it showed that,at least at that time, it
conduct operations in twodifferent theaters, because it
was also operating in Ukraine aswell. And so showing that
capability, I think it alsoshowed in Syria that was able to
operate with a diverse array offorces under kind of like an
(31:25):
integrated command structure aswell. It's something that
obviously the US and, you know,NATO and allies and partners, in
terms of the concept of jointoperations, if you will, has
done a lot of and continues todo I also think going back prior
to Syria and Ukraine in 2008 Ithink Russia also learned a lot
from its war in Georgia andrealized a lot of the failings
(31:48):
that it had. Obviously continuesto occupy 20% Georgian territory
to this day, but, you know, Ithink Russia certainly did not
perform as well in Georgia in2008 as it thought it would. And
I think learned a lot oflessons, and so underwent a lot
of military modernizationtransformation over the years,
which I think aided it in itsperformance in Syria and
(32:11):
certainly in initial parts ofUkraine as well. And then also
just looking more at theintegration of unmanned systems,
precision strike systems ofspecial forces on the ground. I
think that's also what's reallyimportant for its work in Syria.
And then, of course, electronicwarfare, and many other things
(32:34):
related to that in the cyberspace as well. But then also
back to the issue of likenarrative framing and kind of
information space and shapingpublic perceptions, you know,
arguing that, yes, Assad is ourlong standing ally and partner,
but there's also problems withinstability stemming from
(32:54):
terrorist threats in thecountry, in the region, and that
we need to support them, andthat actually fighting against
the terrorist benefits the USand its allies and partners as
well. And so I think, you know,there was some debate or
discussion about to the extentthat the Kremlin was being fully
honest, transparent about that.
But then also, you know, theconcept in Ukraine initiative at
(33:17):
least, about protecting ethnicRussians and kind of Russian
culture and heritage from whatit was describing to its
population and Ukraine andothers as a very anti Russia
Russian government in the time,at that time in Ukraine, but
then beyond that, particularlyin Ukraine, I think just the
fact that Russia hadlongstanding economic and other
(33:41):
connections to business people,the so called oligarchs, to
media outlets, to politicalparties and politicians, etc,
etc, that it was much easier topursue its objectives without
necessarily relying onconventional forces or even
proxy forces. It obviously diduse those forces as well, but
(34:03):
some of that, I don't think,could be replicated in other
theaters as easily as it couldin Ukraine, just given all the
avenues for Russian influence inUkraine at that time, obviously,
that's changed a lot and evolvedover the years. Certainly I
don't think that's the casesince 2022 but thinking more,
taking a couple more steps back,thinking more in the more
(34:29):
professional military education,strategic thinking, strategic
thought perspective, I think atleast in Department of Defense,
heavy, intelligence communitycircles and others as well
thinking about the blending ofthe lines, or crossing of lines
between war and peace, and kindof that area that sometimes is
(34:52):
referred to as gray, and what itmeans in terms of the tools that
we have available to us toreach. Bond and without
eliciting eliciting aconventional military response
and breaking out into like fullscale overt war, these issues
are still being discussed today,quite a lot among you know,
these types of circles andacademics as well, and I don't
(35:15):
think that's going to go awayagain, fueled at least by not
only what we're seeing byRussia, but also the PRC in the
Indo Pacific as well, and Iranwith all of its proxies, and
also the fact that Iran has usedsome irregular hybrid tools as
well, and then a number of nonstate actors doing the same
thing. I don't think thesetactics or the tools are going
(35:38):
to go away. If anything, they'llbe even more enhanced by the
emergence of these newtechnologies and the continued
evolution of existingtechnologies as
Tad Schnaufer (35:49):
well, right?
Because it's interesting that ifthese tactics, the in and of
themselves, were successful, whywould Russia need to actually
invade in 2022 so you had sowhat pushed him over the edge?
From your perspective,
Dr. John Pennell (36:03):
sure, it's a great question, I guess the
million dollar question from myperspective, I think initially,
I think even to this day, Ithink obviously Moscow is has
over played its hand andoverstretched itself. Obviously,
was overly confident going intoUkraine in 2014 to begin with.
(36:24):
And obviously that's not workedout whatsoever. I think it
misunderstood Ukrainianresilience, and I think
Ukrainian innovation,particularly on the battlefield.
To this day, I'm still in closecontact with number of
Ukrainians, including themilitary and just the amount of
innovation going on, because,you know, their their nationhood
(36:47):
is at stake, and they're reallyfighting for their lives. And I
think, you know, deserve somesome credit to think, on their
part, for thinking through waysto counter these different
threats, but in terms of thequestion about maybe what
changed in Russia's perspective,I think initially, at least, I
think the Kremlin was satisfiedwith as long as it had a
(37:08):
foothold either in Crimea orEastern or southern Ukraine. But
that, in and of itself, wouldmitigate anytime soon, at least
in their perspective, Ukraine'sability to enter the European
Union as a member or as a memberof NATO. And so I think at least
at that time, I think theKremlin was satisfied with that.
And I think also was using thatinterim period before 2022 to
(37:32):
continue to undermine the thenPoroshenko government, and then
afterwards, the Zelenskygovernment, all the reforms that
Ukraine had to undertake relatedto corruption, transparency in a
number of the areas as well. Andso I think that the Kremlin
thought that it would be able toeventually kind of oust
(37:55):
Zelensky, if not Poroshenkobefore him, and put in a more
pliable regime, but I think overthe years, I think the Kremlin
also thought that the NATO andkind of Western alliance on
Ukraine would fracture. Andwhile there had been some
challenges at different periodsof time over the last, let's
say, 10 or so years, it's mostlyheld together. And so I think
(38:17):
maybe he underestimated thatPutin himself. And so I think,
seeing as how Ukraine wasproceeding quite rapidly on its
internal reforms, in my view, Ithink the Kremlin and Putin
himself just said it's notenough that we have a foothold
in Ukraine. Let's promote ourown version of Ukrainian history
(38:40):
and install our own kind ofpuppet, if you will. And so I
think the focus then became fromone transition from
destabilization of Ukraine tojust regime change. But again, I
know also many in the Westthought that it would be
relatively short battle inFebruary 2022, and here we are
(39:01):
three plus years later, andthat's not at all the case. So I
just think Russia made a lot ofstrategic mistakes and
miscalculations, let aloneoperational tactical as well.
But I really think just theiroverall objective shifted from
destabilization to regimechange, and I think that's what
(39:22):
I would argue, is the mainreason for the change in
February 2022
Tad Schnaufer (39:25):
right? So the gray zone activities, gray zone
operations, can only yield somuch change, and in the end,
they pretty much, you had to goall the way conventional to make
to reach a new goal, if youwill. Is it right? Because,
right? Because if we look at thenarrative right before the
invasion in 22 you know, Putinwrote his famous article in July
of 2021 calling, you know,Ukrainian French brothers. And
(39:47):
then he used in his speechduring the night of the invasion
about the de nazification anddemilitarization of Ukraine,
same like you mentioned in 2014same things, trying to fight
this fascist government. So themessaging is almost the same.
It's just the new goal. Goals.
Is what you're seeing is reallythat flip switch?
Dr. John Pennell (40:03):
Yeah, definitely. And again, I think
obviously us, you know, Westernsupport has been extremely
important to Ukraine, and youknow, it's good that it's
continued. And you know, I knowthat we also have some
challenges with whether onbudget, budget situation the
United States, but I know thatUkraine really needs us and
(40:27):
Western support. But I think isagain, also showed a lot of
resilience and innovation interms of its ability to maneuver
on the battleground, bothphysically, but also in the
cyber and information realms aswell,
Tad Schnaufer (40:42):
right? And so based on your analysis, where
does Russia sit today, with itsobviously the current war in
Ukraine, and also it's stillhanging on to some bases in
Syria. So what's the currentassessment? From your
perspective?
Dr. John Pennell (40:52):
I definitely think that, again, Russia's
overplayed its hands,unfortunately, many times, and
is overstretched. I thinkthere's only enough people who
are going to continue to kind ofgo through the meat grinder, at
least voluntarily in Ukraine.
Obviously, a lot of it isinvoluntary. I am hoping that,
(41:13):
and I know there's been a lot oftalk about some some peace
negotiations that, you know, wedo get to that point, because
obviously a lot of people aresuffering, and, you know, both
Ukrainians and Russians, butsomething that is fair to
(41:33):
Ukraine. I don't think thatRussia, or Putin himself is
interested in any deal thatdoesn't benefit Russia only. So
that's somewhat where I'mconcerned about how this would
continue or not continue goingforward. But I don't think it's
necessarily sustainable forRussia to continue at this pace.
(41:55):
On the other hand, I'm not sureit's sustainable for Ukraine to
do so without continuous supportfrom the US and its allies and
partners and so, you know, hencethe need, I think, to find a way
to bring the parties togetherand come up with a negotiated
settlement that's fair. I thinkwe just, we just have to see, I
(42:17):
think it's going to be tough, atough slog, kind of going
forward.
Tad Schnaufer (42:24):
And what about in Syria?
Dr. John Pennell (42:27):
So in Syria, I I'm glad that we are taking a
new approach in terms of, youknow, outreach. I know there,
there are a lot of validconcerns about the leadership in
Syria, you know, based onhistorical experience with this
individual and some of theorganizations he's associated
with, but, you know, the flipside of it, I think it does
(42:48):
warrant a new approach, in thesense that some of the things
that we've done in the MiddleEast haven't necessarily worked
out well. I think there's stillsome hope in certain cases, such
as in Iraq, despite all thechallenges over the years, that
there may be some, some promise,some hope coming forward that,
you know, maybe this is, youknow, our renewed outreach and
(43:08):
approach to Syria could be anopportunity to kind of shape at
least Syria and their thinking,about Russia, about Iran, about
non state actors. So I think wehave to try, and I think it is
worth trying. Russia, obviously,to get in the way, has had a
(43:29):
long standing involvement inSyria, I think, to the extent
that maybe the US or ourpartners and allies could
influence leadership's thinkingregarding to Russia and its
access to naval and air bases, Ithink would be to our benefit.
It may also kind of, like youwith Ukraine, require some kind
of negotiated deal, if you will,as to what is in the US and
(43:55):
Europe centers, let alone whatRussia wants out of it. I think
we also kind of have to wait andsee, but I do think it's good
that we've conducted someproactive outreach in trying to
figure out what we can do withSyria going forward, just given
how how much suffering there'sbeen in Syria as well
domestically, pride USF falling,but then also resulting,
(44:18):
unfortunately, fromindiscriminate Russian bombing
campaigns, particularly during2015, and 16, a lot of civilians
were killed as well. I think wehave to see right?
Tad Schnaufer (44:30):
So to wrap up, if you could tell a senior US
policy maker in one sentence,what they need to do with
Russia. Now I'm just reallyconcise, one sentence. Blip. You
caught him on an elevator. Whatwould you tell what would you
tell
Dr. John Pennell (44:42):
them? Yeah, this is great question. And of
course, I have a lot to say. Tryto keep it. Keep it concise. I
think it's extremely importantto think about the threats and
challenges that are bothcompetitors but also adversaries
present to us. Withoutnecessarily having to rely on or
use traditional kinetic ormilitary tools, and that a lot
(45:08):
of warfare going forward is, canit see more and more of what
we've seen like in Ukraine, atleast prior to February 2022,
but still to this day that theuse of these advanced, emerging,
evolving technologies to achievestrategic objectives, and I
think we need to inoculate ourcountry and our allies and
(45:28):
partners to that from cyber toAI enabled DIS and
misinformation to be morecareful on our smartphones and
use social media apps beingmindful of, you know,
disinformation seeping into ourown political ecosystems, and,
you know, causing instability,etc, and decreasing social
(45:52):
cohesion our own countries. Ithink these things are going to
be out there. And if not get getmore difficult. And then,
relatedly, terms the whole ofthe society approach, getting
the private sector, becausethese types of activities
ultimately will affect theirbottom line, non governmental
organizations, academic thinktanks, etc, etc, along with the
(46:12):
whole of government approach tokind of dealing with these
challenges, I think, will becritical.
Tad Schnaufer (46:18):
Well, thank you so much for your insight. Thank
you. Applause.
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