August 25, 2025 • 49 mins
Text the ATB Team! We'd love to hear from you!
In this episode of GNSI’s At the Boundarypodcast, Dr. Tad Schnaufer sits down with Dr. Namrata Goswami, professor of space security at Johns Hopkins University, to unpack one of the most ambitious U.S. defense projects in decades: the Golden Dome missile defense system.
Announced by the Trump administration in January 2025, the Golden Dome aims to protect the United States by intercepting missiles—including hypersonic threats—in both their boost and terminal phases. The system relies on a proliferated constellation of space-based sensors and interceptors, with the first demonstration expected by 2028.
The discussion explores the history of missile defense, the technological leaps that make Golden Dome possible, and the strategic implications for U.S. security, NATO allies, and global power competition. From the Cold War’s “Star Wars” program to today’s hypersonic challenge, this episode provides crucial insight into how space and missile defense are reshaping national and international security.
If you’re interested in U.S. defense strategy, missile defense, space security, or geopolitics, this is an episode you won’t want to miss.
Links from the episode:
At the Boundary from the Global and National Security Institute at the University of South Florida, features global and national security issues we’ve found to be insightful, intriguing, fascinating, maybe controversial, but overall just worth talking about.
A "boundary" is a place, either literal or figurative, where two forces exist in close proximity to each other. Sometimes that boundary is in a state of harmony. More often than not, that boundary has a bit of chaos baked in. The Global and National Security Institute will live on the boundary of security policy and technology and that's where this podcast will focus.
The mission of GNSI is to provide actionable solutions to 21st-century security challenges for decision-makers at the local, state, national and global levels. We hope you enjoy At the Boundary.
Look for our other publications and products on our website publications page.
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Jim Cardoso (00:00):
Jim, hello everyone. Welcome to this week's
(00:14):
episode of at the boundary, thepodcast from the global and
national security Institute atthe University of South Florida.
I'm Jim Cardoso, Senior Directorfor GNSI, and your host for at
the boundary. Today on thepodcast, we're going to talk to
Dr Namrata Goswami, Professor ofspace security at Johns Hopkins
(00:36):
University. Our interview todaywill focus on the Space Defense
Initiative announced by theWhite House earlier this year,
better known as the Golden Dome.
She spoke recently with her ownGNSI strategy and research
manager, Dr Tad schnaufer, aboutthe obvious advantages of the
Golden Dome and the just asobvious dangers and
disadvantages, including thesignificant cost before we get
(00:58):
to their discussion. However, acouple notes to tell you about
if you're listening to thisepisode, before October 16, 2025
mark that date on your calendaras GNSI will host cyber beacon
2025 here at USF. Cyber beaconis held annually by the College
of Information and cyberspace atthe National Defense University,
(01:19):
and it's one of the country'smost influential conferences on
national security with a focuson cybersecurity. This will be
the first time in its 12 yearhistory, cyber beacon will be
held outside the NDU campus inWashington DC. Registration will
open soon, so keep an eye onyour emails and our website for
updates in prep for thatconference, hop over to our
(01:44):
YouTube site to see ourinterview with retired Army
Colonel Nancy blacker. She's nowthe chair for the cyber strategy
department at NDU. She discussedcyber beacon and the work going
on at CIC in cybersecurity andAI towards the US national
defense strategy. Check out thevideo for a head start on the
conference themes, and be sureto register to hear from Nancy
(02:06):
and many other cybersecurityexperts and practitioners. On
October 16, staying with thecybersecurity theme, we want to
offer a big congratulations toUSF cyberherd team who took home
the first place trophy in thecapture the flag competition
recently at DEF CON 33 one ofthe world's largest and longest
(02:27):
running conferences for thehacker community, the cyber herd
team defeated 90 other teams,including three time defending
champion from Singapore's CyberSecurity Agency. We all conjure
images in our minds when we hearthe term hacker. But the truth
of the matter is, hackingexpertise is a vital component
to cybersecurity and nationalsecurity. This victory for cyber
(02:51):
herd is a prime example of theLegion of talent we have at USF
and the outstanding tech AIcybersecurity and national
security environment. Developinghere in Tampa Bay. All right,
let's move to our discussion, tothe Golden Dome missile defense
system. In January of this year,President Trump signed an
(03:13):
executive order directing the USarmed forces to construct a
missile defense system similarin nature to the Iron Dome that
defends Israel. Our guest todayon the podcast, Namrata gaswami
is a professor of space securityat Johns Hopkins University. She
spoke recently with her own Tadschnaufer about the golden dome.
Let's drop in for a listen.
(03:34):
Well,
Tad Schnaufer (03:39):
welcome to the podcast, thank you for having
me. Ted. Excellent. So todaywe're going to talk about the
golden dome, which was announcedby the Trump administration
earlier earlier this year, andjust try to get a little bit of
the base kind of facts or theassumptions that are around that
program. So if you don't mindjust starting us off, so what's
the golden dome and what's itsprimary purpose? Yes,
Dr Namrata Goswami (03:57):
absolutely.
So before I answer thatquestion, I do have to issue a
disclaimer. Everything I saytoday is my own perspective
based on my open source researchresearch, and does not represent
the perspective of the US, SpaceForce, the Air Force or the
Department of Defense. So now toanswer your question, what
exactly is the golden dome? Sofor your audience, the Golden
(04:19):
Dome was a memo, an executivememo, that President Trump put
out on January 27 2025 and theidea is that the United States
will build a missile defensesystem that is going to be able
to intercept incoming missiles,especially featuring boost phase
(04:41):
and terminal phase capabilities.
By boost phase, I meaninterceptor capability that can
actually counter a missile whenit's actually being launched. So
that's something very new thatthe golden dome memo is putting
out. And then. It also talksabout intercepting at the
(05:03):
terminal phase. So terminalphase is when the missile has
already been launched and it'sin space, so where it spends
about 20 minutes, it's a harderplace to intercept. But that's
part of the memo as well. Andthen the most important thing
about the memo is that it ishoping that it can intercept
hypersonic which is faster thanMac five, as well as ballistic
(05:25):
missile tracking sensor. Andthen finally, what the golden
dome memo actually clearlyarticulates is to build a
proliferated constellation ofspace based architecture that is
going to be able to offer youthe sensors and the ability to
detect something that is movingso fast. So ultimately, to make
(05:46):
it simple, what it actually doesis that it is trying and
attempting to build a defensebased architecture that secures
the US homeland, Hawaii as wellfrom any adversary missiles that
might be coming at it,especially from air. And so
that's what the golden domewants to do, and it wants to do
(06:08):
it for hypersonic missiles aswell.
Tad Schnaufer (06:11):
So people might imagine the golden domes like a
protective dome over the UnitedStates. But like you mentioned,
a lot of the strikes mighthappen in the boost phase. So is
it, does it have a global reach?
Is it anticipated have a globalreach being able to hit a
missile somewhere far awaybefore even gets close to the US
homeland?
Dr Namrata Goswami (06:28):
Yes, because one of the technologies that the
golden dome is encouraging theDepartment of Defense to do, and
the DOD has responded to that interms of what architecture they
are thinking so this particularcapability is being developed by
the DOD, in collaboration withsome of its own organizations,
(06:48):
like the Space DevelopmentAgency, the missile development
agency and the MDA, especiallyin collaboration with the Space
Development Agency, isdeveloping the hypersonic and
ballistic tracking sensor, HB,tss, which is basically a medium
filled of view. So what I meanby that, and I'll answer your
(07:08):
question about the reach of theGolden Dome. So what this does
is that it actually placessensors in space, which will
mean separate severalconstellation of satellites get
that can actually trackmissiles, especially at the
boost phase, because that'swhere it's a single target, and
you can actually know it's heatshield. So in that context,
(07:29):
while we argue or point out thatthis is only focused on
defending the US homeland, thereach is global, because it's
space based. So any allies,partner nations that say sign an
agreement with the UnitedStates, or whether us is treaty
bound to come to its defenselike Japan will benefit, because
the reach is global. It's notjust limited to the US homeland.
Tad Schnaufer (07:53):
That's really interesting. So is this
technology new, or is thisbuilding off of existing us
technologies, maybe Israelitechnologies from the Iron Dome,
which it's obviously comparedto, or even earlier us
development systems that didn'tnecessarily make it all the way,
like in the 1980s the StrategicDefense Initiative. So do we see
those technologies coming up toplay here?
Dr Namrata Goswami (08:15):
So great question to us, because the
golden dome is actually acontinuation of the kind of
conversations and very seriousdevelopment of theoretical
technologies during the 1980swith the Strategic Defense
Initiative. So these are not newconversations, as you pointed
out. So the conversation toprotect the US homeland in the
(08:38):
1980s from Soviet Union launchintercontinental ballistic
missile started with a verycritical figure named Daniel or
Graham. He was a army officer,and he was the main intellectual
guide behind building thisconcept of space based
interceptors. So in the 1980sand 1990s the conversation was
(09:05):
already put forward in astrategic sense, that we cannot
depend on a concept calledmutually assured destruction,
because that means that you'renot really deterring missiles
from getting into the UShomeland. So Graham with others,
pointed out that, well, what wereally need to think about is
space based interceptors thatcan actually identify missiles
(09:28):
coming at the US and defend anddeter against them. So
basically, in doctrinal terms,it means that you are moving
from deterrence by retaliationto deterrence by denial. So it's
a very critical phenomenon thathappened. What has changed with
the golden dome, and which isnew, is that unlike the 1980s
(09:53):
and the 1990s where adversarynations did not have hypersonic
missile capability, so. And sowhich means you're moving so
fast, you have to respond withintwo to three minutes, right?
That's something new. So thegolden dome has argued that it's
not just going to be a missileas we understand it, the
capability should be able totarget a missile moving that
(10:15):
fast, and that's why the boostphase targeting is so vital. And
so that's new. The second thingthat is new is that, unlike the
1980s and the 1990s we have muchhigher quality small satellite
constellations that can bebuilt, including cube sets.
Instead of having exquisite,really heavy, big satellites,
the smaller satellites arefaster. Computing is faster and
(10:39):
then and with this. The finalthing that the golden dome is
hoping to achieve is basicallyto be able to build an
architecture that is going tohelp identify real time
tracking. We don't have it yet.
Tab. We don't have thecapability to do real time
tracking as yet. The hope isthat with ground based tracking
(11:00):
indicator, it's called MovingTarget indicator, ground
airspace that needs Absolutely,like no latency, like when
you're moving in a particularplace, I can tell you from 1000s
of miles away that this is thenow that you're moving so that
we can target you. That's whatthe golden dome is trying to
(11:21):
achieve, which is different sothat
Tad Schnaufer (11:26):
so the technology is advancing, like you
mentioned. But as we saw withthose past programs, with the
Strategic Defense Initiative,also known as Star Wars, in a
greater sense and pop culture,if you will, that program never
really came to complete fruitionas we understand it, because,
you know, funding, it took avery long time to develop the
technology, and then the SovietUnion obviously collapsed, so
the threat wasn't as muchpressing. So how long will it
(11:49):
take for the gold dome to becomeoperational? Do we see this in
the short term, to actuallyachieve a fully operational
concept?
Dr Namrata Goswami (11:57):
So first of all, just to answer your
question about the fact that thehistorical assessment of a space
based interceptor or missiledefense shield didn't work, not
because it was theoreticallypossible, but because there was
a lot of intellectualconversations that happened,
especially from the arms controlcommunity, that pointed out
(12:20):
that, well, if you're going tobuild a missile defense
deterrence by denial capacity,it could lead to escalatory
dynamics in space. So that's oneof the reason why the Strategic
Defense Initiative did not playout with change of
administrations from Reagan toGeorge Bush Senior. And then,
(12:42):
you know, Obama, George Bush,Jr, there was a lot of change.
Clinton, of course, limited theNational Missile Defense
capability right the groundbased interceptor. So there was
a lot of reason why the SDI didnot play out right. And so, to
answer your question, now thatwe have a golden dome executive
memo, January 2025 the timelinethat I have seen in open source
(13:06):
press conversations by PresidentTrump and others, including from
the United States Space ForceGeneral goodline, who is in
charge of it, we should Have thefirst level capacity
demonstration by 2028 so alreadythe contract has been given out
to build the tracking sensor tothe space development agency
(13:28):
with tranche two. Most importantis joint domain command and
control that is being developed,because that kind of capability
is vital for the golden domethat has already been now
contracted out, and so, yeah, by2028 we should be able to see a
demonstration of the first levelcapacity in this regard. Well,
Tad Schnaufer (13:51):
that's gonna be very interesting. Because, as
you said, you know, it gets intothis discussion of the
weaponization of space. So whatare the Russians doing in space,
the Chinese and obviously theUnited States? And in this case,
they're putting not necessarilyweapons. Necessarily weapons,
but interceptor missiles. So isthere, is there a fine line here
between the defensiveinterceptor missile going into
space compared to what maybe theRussians or the Chinese are
doing slash that conversationlike you mentioned, that was
(14:14):
taking place in the 80s and 90s,about if we weaponize base, it
actually will upset deterrence.
Dr Namrata Goswami (14:20):
So the context today. So one of the
question that I am dealing in myresearch is that, why golden
dome now? Right? So we have beentalking about missile defense
shield for a very long time.
Morally, the argument given bythe advocates is that you cannot
let American citizens die from amissile attack, or, you know, be
basing it on mutual assureddestruction. So I think what is
(14:43):
fascinating, actually, I reallylike your question, because in
the context of today, what I'mnoticing in the domain of space
is that to identify space as awar fighting domain is becoming
normal because of the fact. Atspace based assets, and I'll
talk about space basedinterceptors in a bit, which is
not there yet. We don't havespace based interceptors of the
(15:05):
kind we are talking with thegolden dome. We have anti
satellite weapon that is groundbased, that targets us asset in
space and destroys it, or wehave non kinetic capability like
laser or blinding, right? So,but what has changed is that,
because China was the firstcountry to establish a separate
space force in 2015 and thentalked about scaling up its
(15:27):
missile capability. For example,China tested the fractional
orbital bombardment system in2021 which is a nuclear based
capability that actually comesat you from the southern side,
which our radars are not lookingat, and it's hypersonic. It's a
hypersonic glide vehicle, andthe US at this moment do not
have the capability to interceptit, so that was a wake up call
(15:50):
in terms of deterring suchcapacity. So interestingly
today, because there is a globalutilization of space from a
military perspective, thehistorical conversations around
space being a sanctuary space isnot a war fighting domain, or
shouldn't be, is shifting. AndI'll end by saying that one of
(16:12):
the biggest evidence of this isnot just us or China, but Japan.
Japan has historically been verycareful of not using language
which is not peaceful. Just lastweek, Japan put out their space
domain defense policy in whichthey are identify the ability to
to highlight and predicthypersonic glide vehicle as
(16:36):
extremely vital. They're alsotalking about building intercept
capabilities. So in thatcontext, you can see that
partners and allies are alreadythere, right? So the what I'm
trying to say here is that thecontext has changed today
because of what has happened.
And so finally, to answer yourquestion about interceptors, so
(16:57):
in some sense, interceptors,especially in space, especially
space to Earth, interceptorsmight be seen as escalatory
because of the fact that you aregoing to be able to target a
missile launch at its boostphase. It is at the boost phase
where the missile is the mostvulnerable, and because it has
not deployed yet, it's theeasiest to target, and so you
(17:21):
are able to kill almost all themissiles at one go. You would
need ground based interceptorsfor this. You would need space
based sensors for this,including space based
interceptors. I would end bysaying that now that we have
this concept, I would be notsurprised if we have adversary
nations then thinking about howthey can use counter space
(17:42):
capabilities to target thosevery sensors and interceptors on
the ground, in terms ofdoctrinal thinking. So yeah,
that's
Tad Schnaufer (17:50):
very interesting, because we've seen in the last
couple of decades the additionof space and cyber to the
official domains of warfarewithin within many doctrine
assessments. So going to the,you know, deterrence piece, like
you mentioned, an interceptor,if we could dig down a little
bit deeper into that, so withthe perception that comes with
it. So it is this a bullethitting a bullet, if you will, a
(18:11):
missile coming from space tohit, a hypersonic missile launch
from Russia or China or whoevermay be launching it, or is it
some other type of interceptor.
Dr Namrata Goswami (18:21):
So it is a missile hitting a missile right.
So it's called the X atmosphericinterceptor vehicle. It has a
sensor then that tells you thatthe missile is coming. It's
launched. It could be spacebased, it could be air based, or
it could be earth based, right.
And then it intercepts themissile that is coming at you,
and so it is, if precise, and ifwe are able to achieve that
(18:46):
level of interception, it ishighly effective. We are not
there yet because of the factthat missiles move so fast. We
are talking about missiles thatmove so quickly between two to
five minutes, so a very limitedtime to do the interception
precisely. And when you'retalking about hypersonic, it's
moving very fast and so butexactly what you said, it's
(19:08):
basically targeting a missilewith another missile which is at
the interceptor, and basicallyusing computing, artificial
intelligence, automation, humanas well as very advanced
computing to achieve this. So weare, we have all the technology
today. The idea will now bevital to bring it all together
(19:29):
into an architecture,
Tad Schnaufer (19:33):
right? So then, in a sense, your defense or
deterrence capability is limitedby the number of interceptors
you have, assuming they'reeffective. So it would be, could
this possibly, again, upset thecurrent state of deterrence and
start an arms race, and if youcan just produce enough missiles
to out, in a sense, overwhelmthe interceptors? Is that? Is
that a possibility, or has thatbeen explored?
Dr Namrata Goswami (19:54):
So I will for that Tad, I will take you to
the Israeli arendum, right?
Because that's something. Thingthat we have as an example,
which is in real time. It hasbeen used. It has been
successful. So with the IronDome, first of all, I have to
tell your audience that theseare very expensive systems. They
cost billions of dollars. Sowhat in the Israeli case, the
(20:15):
Iron Dome was able to identifyHamas launch short range
missiles and deflect them,especially when they're going
towards populated areas. So, butit is also true that several
missiles were not deflected asbecause they aren't calculated
(20:35):
that these were not going topopulated areas, right? So one
way there is a great paper onthis by from West Point, where
the authors argue that whatHamas did, and they noticed
this, is that it produced somany missiles that the iron
Dome's capability to deteralmost all of them is
(20:56):
impossible. So there is that,right? As you mentioned, that
the adversary noticing the our,our, for example, deterrence by
denial strategy could build somany missiles, right? The other
thing which I didn't point outis that, why is boost face so
vital? Because when a missile,when, when you launch a missile,
and then the warheads arebasically released in space.
(21:20):
They also release decoys. And sowhen the sensor or the tracking
system in space is observing itin real time, sometimes it might
get confused with the decoys,right? And so those are the
limitations. So it is true thatone or two missiles might get
through, but the idea is thatthe missiles that are coming at
(21:40):
populated areas are going to bedeterred. So have you seen
Tad Schnaufer (21:47):
any other examples? Obviously, we had the
Iron Dome. But what about likeDavid sling and some of these
other anti missiles, or antiballistic missile defenses? Have
we seen those operational andeffective, and will that somehow
influence how the golden domeset up.
Dr Namrata Goswami (22:01):
So I mean, in some sense, besides that, the
US, if you think about thecurrent missile defense
realities, we already have thespace defense agencies tracking
layer. We have, which is calledtranche. We have the
proliferated war fightingarchitecture, so we have
capabilities that are able totrack and detect missiles coming
(22:25):
at us, right? So while we dohave capacity to, for example,
with the ages system, right orthe Patriot system, we saw
missiles being deterred, I thinkwhat we do not have today with
the golden dome, which is why itis so unique and different, is
that this is a system that isnot only going to deter attacks
(22:49):
by cruise missiles which do notget into space, but by those
which actually are of thevariety that China tested, which
is the fractional orbitalbombardment system, which is a
big threat to the US homeland,right? And so we are not there
yet, though. So we don't havethat capacity yet. And one of
(23:09):
the capacity that has to bedeveloped for that to happen is,
as I mentioned before, real timemoving target indicator, which
is like for your audience. IfI'm a car moving and you and
it's a car that has, forexample, explosives right for
you to target it, you needsatellite base, no latency data
(23:34):
that can then inform theinterceptor that this car is
dangerous. We need to get it outof the way. But don't forget, my
car is moving at Mac five andmore. It's very fast, so that's
the capability that we haven'ttested yet, and that's the hope
that we will have that by 2028
Tad Schnaufer (23:55):
and you know, obviously AI is a big topic. Is
AI playing with that ability toor playing a role in that
ability to identify threats,obviously, analyze risk, analyze
motion, that types of piece withthis technology?
Dr Namrata Goswami (24:07):
Yes. So if you look at the mapping that the
Iron Dome Israeli are in, domebasically worked on, artificial
intelligence has played a vitalrole. So because we have, for
example, let's take ahypothetical scenario to answer
your question, right? So welet's take say we are in 2028
and we have the golden domemissile defense architecture
(24:29):
being tested and showcased. Sowhich means we will have
hundreds of satelliteconstellations in low Earth
orbit that is going to tell us,through their sensor
capabilities, that there is amoving target coming at us.
Right? To do that, we will haveto have computing and AI
capability that can analyze datavery fast or in real time. So
(24:52):
that's why super intelligent AIthat is able to integrate such
data is going to play a vitalrole. For example. In the
Israeli case, with the IronDome, when not just for
detecting but also for, say,predicting that a particular
missile is coming at you,artificial intelligence has
played a role, and there are alot of great articles on that in
(25:16):
the Israeli press that tells youhow they do it.
Tad Schnaufer (25:18):
One of the other things that the golden dome has
been focused on, as well as theIron Dome in Israel is obviously
these larger either cruisemissiles or ballistic missiles,
or these larger employmentmechanisms. What about some of
the more autonomous drones, or alower level, lower flying
(25:38):
threats that might be coming in?
Is the golden dome almostlayered, or is it really just
focused on the big nuclearcapable missiles?
Dr Namrata Goswami (25:46):
No, actually, great question to ask,
right? So if you actually lookat the memo, the golden dome is
not just about, say, hypersonicmissiles or this ICBM like
intercontinental ballisticmissiles, right? Basically, they
want to target any advancedaerial threats, which includes
drones. So they want to buildmissile defense capability that
(26:11):
is layered. But also it's notjust focused on the high end
that we talked about so much,which is the unique thing about
the golden dome, but also thekind of things that has been
discussed historically in theUS, including lower level aerial
threats. For example, one of thebiggest aerial threats, as you
mentioned, are autonomousdrones, right? We have seen this
(26:32):
in the Middle East. We have seenthis in the Ukraine conflict. So
there is a lot of learning, andit includes that kind of aerial
threats as well. So any aerialthreat coming in the US is going
to be in that particulararchitecture of the golden dome
to be deterred. What's
Tad Schnaufer (26:49):
that going to look like? You know, we talked
about the missiles. Obviously, alot of that defense capability
is going to come from spacebased systems. But some of these
lower altitude threats, arethose going to be more land
based, or there's going to besea based. How is that golden
dome going to shape up?
Dr Namrata Goswami (27:05):
So the golden dome includes air, land,
space based interceptors, right?
And intelligence capabilities.
So it's not just space based.
You also have capability fromthe ground that can detect that.
So if you read the golden domearchitecture, it includes all
four levels. One is land, seabase, air base and space base.
(27:28):
So for example, if you havedrone capability that can be
detected from the ground and theinterceptors could also be from
the ground. The only uniquething that the golden dome does
is that it's talking about spacebased interceptors in today's
context. It is not new, as Imentioned to you before, but
then this particularconversation, strategically has
been reintroduced by the Trumpadministration with the golden
(27:51):
dome memo. So yeah, to answeryour question, it will be based
on different levels of layeredsensor capability as well as
interceptor capability, right?
So just to remind your audience,because I think sometimes when
we talk about the golden dome,some reports that actually
talked about it in detailhistorically can be forgotten,
(28:13):
right? So one is, of course, theUS Space Command, which was
established by the Reaganadministration. They came out
with a plan called long rangeplan in 1998 a vision for 2020
and that particular planactually has everything that we
are talking about, in terms ofthe golden dome, and it talks
(28:34):
about exactly what I said,different levels of
interception. But you know, Dad,what was so fascinating they
were thinking about space basedinterceptors then. And then, of
course, you have the long rangeplan that was also put out in
1998 so which is also by Spacecom. And then the and then the
Rumsfeld commission that alsotalked about this. So what the
(28:56):
golden dome is doing is that itis reiterating all those
technologies that theseparticular plants put out for
defending US homeland, and alsoreiterating the fact that we
need different levels ofintersection, ground, air, sea
and space.
Tad Schnaufer (29:17):
So like you said earlier, you mentioned the
question, why the golden domenow, and it sounds like the
technology is there, the threatlevel is there, and these things
are all motivating the Trumpadministration to really push
this thing forward.
Dr Namrata Goswami (29:30):
Yeah. And so besides the reports I mentioned,
right? So one thing that I wouldalso point out is that this is
the big question to us. Why arewe actually talking about the
golden dome now, and what haschanged in terms of technology,
right? So I would argue that inthe context of the conversation
we had earlier, which is thearms control architecture,
(29:51):
right? So with, for example,Russia was the one who suspended
the who was actually suspectedof violating the Inter.
Immediate range Nuclear ForcesTreaty, because it feel that
land based intermediate rangecruise missiles, and China was
never a party to it, right? Andso what we notice is that these
(30:12):
nations have actually developedcapacity that can reach the
United States in the last fewyears. And that's a big
realization the I think thesecond important thing is China
changed the game in terms of whya golden dome is necessary
because of the development ofits hypersonic light vehicles,
right? And then finally, as Imentioned before, there was
China's testing of thefractional orbital bombardment
(30:35):
system, right? And so that'ssomething that is is vital. Now,
in terms of technology, I'vementioned this again before, but
I mean, I would like toreiterate that, right? I think
the rise of small SATs and theCubeSat revolution has totally
changed how we manage thissystem, so they are no longer
dependent on single, costlysatellites. These are much
(30:57):
smaller satellites. They arecheaper, and they have been
developed by the SpaceDevelopment Agency, and then
also launch. The launch of thesesatellites have come down. So
during the Cold War, one launchcost you about $54,000 today,
launch cost you about $2,500 perkilogram. So that's one very
important reason. And thenfinally, as you mentioned,
(31:18):
artificial intelligence, thespeed of decision making, the
speed of data being analyzed. Soall that makes the golden dome
much more feasible in today'scontext. Sorry to give you a
long answer, but I thought it'sreally important to realize why
is the United States talkingabout the feasibility of a
golden dome architecture today?
Tad Schnaufer (31:41):
No, it makes perfect sense. And what it does
sound like is we, throughout ourwhole conversation here, is that
there's going to be a lot morecapabilities, satellites, these
different types of sensors, allgoing up in space. So how is
that space security aspect ofthis program, along with the
stuff that's already in spaceand the stuff that other
countries are putting up there,whether it's the Indians or the
(32:03):
Europeans or the Russians.
Dr Namrata Goswami (32:05):
So already, I mean, that's a great question
to think about from the moralperspective, right? What it
could do? So I can hypothesizeand say that, well, it could
result in some nations viewing agolden dome architecture as a
first strike capability. Sobecause of the fact that the US
can target another nation withno fear of being attacked,
(32:27):
right? So nations might see thatas escalatory, especially
nations like, say, China orRussia, that is possible. The
second thing in terms of spacesecurity is that now that's the
more hypothetically escalatoryside, right? But in some sense,
I think that when I'm listeningto conversations, say strategic
(32:47):
conversations in India, UnitedArab Emirates, Japan, as you
ask, the European Union orEuropean countries, what I'm
hearing is that because some ofthese nations face threats of
missile attack. They are seeingthe development of a missile
defense shield as actually quiteuseful, right? So most nations,
especially India, with becauseit faces border disputes with
(33:11):
China and Pakistan, and thenJapan, which has very much
suffered from missiles beinglaunched from North Korea that
falls into the Sea of Japan isactually quite interested in
participating in a missileshield that offers their
citizens some level ofreassurance, right? And so I see
that they are interested. AndI'll tell you, because I just
(33:33):
mentioned this in your podcast,the recent Japanese national
security strategy, the desire todevelop a ground moving target
indicator, especially in realtime that they announced that
they're going to build theirdesire to collaborate more with
the United States. Space Forceas well tells you that while it
(33:54):
has some escalatory dynamics inother ways, some nations are
also perceiving this asimproving their space security
assets, right? But I'll finallyend with the question that you
asked, which is vital in termsof, what does it do to low Earth
orbit, right? You have so manyconstellation structures now
with 1000s of satellites to belaunched to build the
architecture for the GoldenDome. I think one issue that
(34:18):
nations are really starting todiscuss is, for example, what
happens when these satellitesget defunct, right? So you
create debris, and do we haveplans to deorbit it already? The
US is making it mandatory forAmerican companies to deorbit
their satellites. But then youhave other nations. What happens
if other nations build thiscapacity? I don't think we have
(34:40):
reached a level of maturity interms of handling this many
satellites in low Earth orbityet. So the conversations have
started in regard to spacetraffic management, space
security stability, but I don'tthink we have reached a level of
maturity, especially given thiscurrent developments. Wow. So
Tad Schnaufer (34:59):
you're talking about. A new career field of
space traffic controllers.
Dr Namrata Goswami (35:04):
Oh, my Yes, I'm glad you brought that up
Ted, because air trafficcontrollers, right? I mean, the
very fact that I can take aplane from Montgomery, Alabama
and fly to New Delhi, India isbecause countries have agreed to
international air traffic rules,right? We don't have a similar
space traffic management as yet,right? But I argue in my
(35:26):
research, and this is takingaway from the Golden Dome
conversation, but the largerspace security conversation is
that once you have Americanprivate companies and other
private companies invested inspace one one space becomes
absolutely vital for ourcommunication, navigation,
shipping, movement of goods, wewill be incentivized to come to
(35:49):
some level of space trafficmanagement consensus as well,
very similar to how air domainplayed out.
Tad Schnaufer (35:56):
That makes sense as it can become more crowded in
space and one of the otherpieces of space. You know, you
mentioned a couple allies andpartners in the United States,
whether India, Japan, you know,we heard that maybe Canada might
be interested in participating.
What are we seeing across theworld otherwise, on
participation in this? Do theysee it as a partner effort, or
is this really just a US ledextension of extended
(36:19):
deterrence, pretty much agreater extension of its nuclear
deterrence, if you will.
Dr Namrata Goswami (36:25):
Yeah, yeah.
That's a great point to bring,actually, Ted, yeah. I mean, in
some sense it really matters onif you're a treaty ally or not,
right? So India is not a treatyally of the United States, so in
some sense partnership is a verydifferent level, right? So
extended deterrence will not bebe for India, but then for
treaty allies like Japan, or,for example, NATO partners,
(36:48):
because you have Article Five.
And by the way, which isfascinating, you ask this
question. So NATO, a few yearsago, stated that space is
operational domain. And ArticleFive can be invoked, as you
know, right, if space assets aretargeted. So what conversation
I'm hearing is that while thebuilding of the architecture,
(37:10):
the funding, which is about 25billion, the first level of
funding is, I think they agreedto 25,000,000,001 of my
colleagues, Sam Wilson, has donea great paper on this for the
Aerospace Corporation, where hetells us where exactly what is
going. I would urge youraudience, if they have time to
look at that paper, it's on thebudget and the Golden Dome. So I
(37:32):
think at this point of time,burden sharing, I'm not hearing
much right in terms of finances.
It's a US led effort, US fundedeffort. But once you have the
first level of demonstrationsuccessfully, I can imagine
Japan joining in. Japan'sbuilding that kind of capability
for deterrence purposes, right?
So very clearly they see this assomething I could see South
(37:55):
Korea being interested in. Icould see NATO member states
being interested in. So there'sa lot of potential here, as
Tad Schnaufer (38:02):
that program plays out. You know, there's
also some ability to actually,you know, knock satellites out
of orbit, or, you know, disruptthem. We've seen the Chinese
actually shoot down some oftheir own satellites over the
past couple decades, just toshow that they have the
capability. So is there thisthreat that the constellation
even wants up there, stillvulnerable to other types of
attack. Oh, absolutely,
Dr Namrata Goswami (38:24):
I know, I know this is tricky. So, yes,
so, because don't forget, right?
So we are talking about this intimes of conflict, not in times
of peace, right? So conflict,that's why I always tell my
students or my audience thatnations behave differently in
terms of conflict. So so onething and adversary will
obviously target is the missiledefense architecture that
(38:46):
another nation has that it mightsee to its disadvantage. So to
answer your question, yes, Chinahas anti satellite weapon
capability. So does Russia, andthis includes both kinetic and
non kinetic, like laser, theyhave core middle assets, they
have rendezvous and proximityoperation capability, right? So
almost all assets in space,including those to be utilized
(39:10):
for the Golden Dome, could bevulnerable to anti satellite
weapon attacks, jamming,spoofing. You know, interceptor
communications could beintercepted through cyber
attacks. So there's all thatthat is true of space assets
today. Could also be true for agolden dome architecture.
Tad Schnaufer (39:31):
It's really an integrated system. You have to
be able to have strongcybersecurity measures, space
security measures, and thenobviously all the other typical
military domains that wenormally operate in,
Dr Namrata Goswami (39:42):
yeah, and so and so. One thing that I'm
noticing in the conversation onChinese military doctrine is
that, and this was before thegolden dome memo was put out,
right? So when the US SpaceForce talked about the
proliferated architecture inspace with the lower. Orbit
constellation structure. So theargument was that, well, we can
(40:03):
actually counter the attack onsingle satellites by building so
many that it'll be hard, right?
So one anti satellite weaponattack is not going to deter the
whole system or make it, youknow, unusable. So
theoretically, the People'sLiberation Army, strategic
support force, which is ChinaSpace Force. Now the aerospace
force put out a theoreticalpaper saying that, Well, China
(40:24):
needs to think about systemslevel effects, which means that
it needs to build a counterspace capability that can target
several satellites at once.
Right? It's hard to do, butthat's the theoretical thinking,
and that happened in 2019 2019,20, 20. Right. So we have five
(40:44):
years from there. I don't haveopen source data to tell you
whether they have achieved somelevel of demonstration in that,
if in that, like in thatparticular capability, I do know
they have anti satellite weaponcapability and other from open
source data, but whether theycan do it in an integrated
manner, I don't know yet, butthat they will not try. I will
(41:05):
be surprised if Chinesestrategic thinkers do not think
that way.
Tad Schnaufer (41:10):
Well and with with that in mind, what would
you tell a US policy maker nowis the biggest priority going
forward with the golden dome andthese different threats, whether
it's missile or drone orautonomous systems. What's the
priority as they start puttingthis program in place? I
Dr Namrata Goswami (41:26):
think the biggest priority to make to
harden them right, to make themcapable of deterring such
attacks. Right? We can havetechnological development of
capability that can actuallynegate the attacks on, say,
satellite electronics, right? Wecan have, for example, if you
have a cyber attack, we shouldbe able to counter that. And so
(41:49):
that has been a conversation forlong. Can you maneuver? There
are article arguments made that,well, if there is a, say, a
kinetic attack and not a nonkinetic attack, we should be
able to maneuver a satellite.
China just demonstrated lastmonth the manure, the
maneuvering of their Sharon 25but can the can the US build
such capability? I think that'sa good thing, but I would if I
(42:13):
was to advise a policy makertoday, I would say, build
capacity that hardens yoursatellite against such attacks,
because you we do know whatthose attacks will look like.
It's not like we don't. We do.
We've simulated it. We know ittechnologically, what it is. So
it is absolutely possible, ifnot, deter everything, but to
(42:36):
deter the ones that we think arevital, for example, the golden
dome space architecture, right?
And then the second thing, Ithink a deterrence works, that
if you could deterrence bypunishment, right, not just
denial. So China depends onsatellites a lot today,
including for its economicdevelopment. So deterring could
happen if, if their satellitescan be, you know, targeted as
(43:00):
well. So that's another way thatyou can actually call their
satellites at risk. So as
Tad Schnaufer (43:07):
we look at technology, you know, we talked
about the expansive equipmentthese constellations going up in
space, are there any other areasin space that are going to be
home to some of thesetechnologies, even possibly the
moon?
Dr Namrata Goswami (43:22):
Oh, that's a great question to answer,
because so let me take you backto the year 1994 so one of the
mission that is globally veryfamous is the Clementine
Mission. So basically, theClementine Mission is known for
its contribution to lunarmapping and for discovering
water ice, which was laterconfirmed by the Indian
(43:44):
Chandrayaan one mission,especially in the polar region.
But I think most people don'trealize that this was this
mission, the Clementine Mission,was sponsored by the Department
of Defense, Strategic DefenseInitiative organization, which
was renamed the BallisticMissile Defense Organization in
1993 and so. And it was acollaboration between DOD and
(44:05):
NASA. So what the ClementineMission actually did was that it
carried a suite of lightweight,you know, miniaturized sensors,
including ultraviolet visiblecameras, Near Infrared Camera.
And so what it was doing wasthat it was actually testing
surveillance and trackingsystems, especially in a space
environment. And this is vitalfor SDI, because with that kind
(44:30):
of real time tracking, you canactually autonomously
discriminate between what is thetarget and what is not so.
Fascinatingly, Clementine,historically in the 1990s
demonstrated what we are talkingabout with the golden dome
today, which is that highperformance sensors could be
both lightweight, not too heavy,they could be power efficient,
(44:51):
and that they could work asconstellations for the kind of
sensor technologies we need tobe able to identify. Moving
Target so fascinating that wewere able to achieve that in the
1990s with a cost of merely $75million so it did both. It
confirmed the it discovered thewater molecules on the lunar
(45:14):
surface, but it also did amazingthings for Strategic Defense
Initiative.
Tad Schnaufer (45:21):
Wow. So we could actually expect, or not expect,
but at least it's in the realmof possibility that we'd have
Moon based sensors and possiblyother equipment for this gold
dome.
Dr Namrata Goswami (45:32):
Yeah, because in one of the papers
that I wrote for the AerospaceCorporation, where I talked
about the utility of cislunarspace, the space between the
Earth and the Moon for theUnited States, Space Force. I
point out that the moon is goingto play a very vital role,
especially because of the factthat the moon looks down. So
right now, most of our you knowtracking and sensor capabilities
(45:55):
are looking down on Earth, butnot from the moon for the US,
right? We're looking fromgeosynchronous orbit or low
Earth orbit. So what happens isthat the conversation, for
example, that we've been hearingglobally is that you can have
anti satellite attacks, forexample, right to any of those
architecture a moon basearchitecture system with sensors
(46:18):
and tracking systems canactually then determine if
something is coming at an asset,for example, a US, asset in
geosynchronous orbit. We don'thave that capability yet. The
only country, and this isconcerning to me, the only
country with a relaycommunications satellite and
lunar logistics capacity, isChina. China has a relay
(46:38):
satellite in LaGrange Earthmoon, Lagrange two that looks
down at the lunar surface. Andwhat China is arguing is that,
well, once we have a base on theMoon, by 2036 we will have
industrial logistics andcommunication infrastructure
that can then determine theentire lower orbit to cislunar
space. So I can see cislunarplay a space playing a role, not
(47:01):
today, but in the future,sometimes in terms of deterrence
as well,
Tad Schnaufer (47:07):
well. Thank you so much for this insightful
discussion today. Reallyappreciate having you on. Thank
Dr Namrata Goswami (47:12):
you Ted for having me.
Jim Cardoso (47:18):
Thanks to our special guest today, Namrata
Goswami, Professor of spacesecurity at Johns Hopkins
University. We hope you enjoyedour conversation about the
golden dome attached offer in2026 GNSI will be doing
conferences with both space andnuclear weapons themes. So you
may be hearing from Dr Goswamiagain in the future, next week
(47:39):
on at the boundary. Dr RobBurrell, senior research fellow
GNSI, will be kicking off hisresearch initiative, the future
of war. Rob is one of theworld's leading experts on
irregular warfare, resilienceand resistance. He's a fellow on
the irregular warfare initiativeat Arizona State University, and
recently published his latestbook on resilience and
(48:01):
resistance on the podcast nextweek, Rob will have a probing
conversation with retired USArmy Lieutenant General Charles
Cleveland and retired ArmyColonel Dave Maxwell. General
Cleveland is the formercommanding general of US Army
Special Operations Command,while Colonel Maxwell is a 30
year Army veteran who recentlyserved as an Associate Director
(48:22):
in the School of Foreign Serviceat Georgetown. You don't want to
miss that episode, or, frankly,any other episodes, so be sure
to hit that subscribe button.
Thanks for listening today. Ifyou like the podcast, please
subscribe and let your friendsand colleagues know. You can
follow GNSI on our LinkedIn andX accounts at USF, underscore
GNSI, and check out our websiteas well at usf.edu/gnsi, while
(48:44):
you're there, don't forget tosubscribe to our monthly
newsletterthat's going to wrap up this
episode of at the boundary. Eachnew episode will feature global
and national security issues wefound to be insightful,
(49:05):
fascinating, maybecontroversial, but overall, just
worth talking about. I'm JimCardoso, and we'll see you at
the boundary. You.
Jim, hello everyone. Welcome to this week's
(00:14):
episode of at the boundary, thepodcast from the global and
national security Institute atthe University of South Florida.
I'm Jim Cardoso, Senior Directorfor GNSI, and your host for at
the boundary. Today on thepodcast, we're going to talk to
Dr Namrata Goswami, Professor ofspace security at Johns Hopkins
(00:36):
University. Our interview todaywill focus on the Space Defense
Initiative announced by theWhite House earlier this year,
better known as the Golden Dome.
She spoke recently with her ownGNSI strategy and research
manager, Dr Tad schnaufer, aboutthe obvious advantages of the
Golden Dome and the just asobvious dangers and
disadvantages, including thesignificant cost before we get
(00:58):
to their discussion. However, acouple notes to tell you about
if you're listening to thisepisode, before October 16, 2025
mark that date on your calendaras GNSI will host cyber beacon
2025 here at USF. Cyber beaconis held annually by the College
of Information and cyberspace atthe National Defense University,
(01:19):
and it's one of the country'smost influential conferences on
national security with a focuson cybersecurity. This will be
the first time in its 12 yearhistory, cyber beacon will be
held outside the NDU campus inWashington DC. Registration will
open soon, so keep an eye onyour emails and our website for
updates in prep for thatconference, hop over to our
(01:44):
YouTube site to see ourinterview with retired Army
Colonel Nancy blacker. She's nowthe chair for the cyber strategy
department at NDU. She discussedcyber beacon and the work going
on at CIC in cybersecurity andAI towards the US national
defense strategy. Check out thevideo for a head start on the
conference themes, and be sureto register to hear from Nancy
(02:06):
and many other cybersecurityexperts and practitioners. On
October 16, staying with thecybersecurity theme, we want to
offer a big congratulations toUSF cyberherd team who took home
the first place trophy in thecapture the flag competition
recently at DEF CON 33 one ofthe world's largest and longest
(02:27):
running conferences for thehacker community, the cyber herd
team defeated 90 other teams,including three time defending
champion from Singapore's CyberSecurity Agency. We all conjure
images in our minds when we hearthe term hacker. But the truth
of the matter is, hackingexpertise is a vital component
to cybersecurity and nationalsecurity. This victory for cyber
(02:51):
herd is a prime example of theLegion of talent we have at USF
and the outstanding tech AIcybersecurity and national
security environment. Developinghere in Tampa Bay. All right,
let's move to our discussion, tothe Golden Dome missile defense
system. In January of this year,President Trump signed an
(03:13):
executive order directing the USarmed forces to construct a
missile defense system similarin nature to the Iron Dome that
defends Israel. Our guest todayon the podcast, Namrata gaswami
is a professor of space securityat Johns Hopkins University. She
spoke recently with her own Tadschnaufer about the golden dome.
Let's drop in for a listen.
(03:34):
Well,
Tad Schnaufer (03:39):
welcome to the podcast, thank you for having
me. Ted. Excellent. So todaywe're going to talk about the
golden dome, which was announcedby the Trump administration
earlier earlier this year, andjust try to get a little bit of
the base kind of facts or theassumptions that are around that
program. So if you don't mindjust starting us off, so what's
the golden dome and what's itsprimary purpose? Yes,
Dr Namrata Goswami (03:57):
absolutely.
So before I answer thatquestion, I do have to issue a
disclaimer. Everything I saytoday is my own perspective
based on my open source researchresearch, and does not represent
the perspective of the US, SpaceForce, the Air Force or the
Department of Defense. So now toanswer your question, what
exactly is the golden dome? Sofor your audience, the Golden
(04:19):
Dome was a memo, an executivememo, that President Trump put
out on January 27 2025 and theidea is that the United States
will build a missile defensesystem that is going to be able
to intercept incoming missiles,especially featuring boost phase
(04:41):
and terminal phase capabilities.
By boost phase, I meaninterceptor capability that can
actually counter a missile whenit's actually being launched. So
that's something very new thatthe golden dome memo is putting
out. And then. It also talksabout intercepting at the
(05:03):
terminal phase. So terminalphase is when the missile has
already been launched and it'sin space, so where it spends
about 20 minutes, it's a harderplace to intercept. But that's
part of the memo as well. Andthen the most important thing
about the memo is that it ishoping that it can intercept
hypersonic which is faster thanMac five, as well as ballistic
(05:25):
missile tracking sensor. Andthen finally, what the golden
dome memo actually clearlyarticulates is to build a
proliferated constellation ofspace based architecture that is
going to be able to offer youthe sensors and the ability to
detect something that is movingso fast. So ultimately, to make
(05:46):
it simple, what it actually doesis that it is trying and
attempting to build a defensebased architecture that secures
the US homeland, Hawaii as wellfrom any adversary missiles that
might be coming at it,especially from air. And so
that's what the golden domewants to do, and it wants to do
(06:08):
it for hypersonic missiles aswell.
Tad Schnaufer (06:11):
So people might imagine the golden domes like a
protective dome over the UnitedStates. But like you mentioned,
a lot of the strikes mighthappen in the boost phase. So is
it, does it have a global reach?
Is it anticipated have a globalreach being able to hit a
missile somewhere far awaybefore even gets close to the US
homeland?
Dr Namrata Goswami (06:28):
Yes, because one of the technologies that the
golden dome is encouraging theDepartment of Defense to do, and
the DOD has responded to that interms of what architecture they
are thinking so this particularcapability is being developed by
the DOD, in collaboration withsome of its own organizations,
(06:48):
like the Space DevelopmentAgency, the missile development
agency and the MDA, especiallyin collaboration with the Space
Development Agency, isdeveloping the hypersonic and
ballistic tracking sensor, HB,tss, which is basically a medium
filled of view. So what I meanby that, and I'll answer your
(07:08):
question about the reach of theGolden Dome. So what this does
is that it actually placessensors in space, which will
mean separate severalconstellation of satellites get
that can actually trackmissiles, especially at the
boost phase, because that'swhere it's a single target, and
you can actually know it's heatshield. So in that context,
(07:29):
while we argue or point out thatthis is only focused on
defending the US homeland, thereach is global, because it's
space based. So any allies,partner nations that say sign an
agreement with the UnitedStates, or whether us is treaty
bound to come to its defenselike Japan will benefit, because
the reach is global. It's notjust limited to the US homeland.
Tad Schnaufer (07:53):
That's really interesting. So is this
technology new, or is thisbuilding off of existing us
technologies, maybe Israelitechnologies from the Iron Dome,
which it's obviously comparedto, or even earlier us
development systems that didn'tnecessarily make it all the way,
like in the 1980s the StrategicDefense Initiative. So do we see
those technologies coming up toplay here?
Dr Namrata Goswami (08:15):
So great question to us, because the
golden dome is actually acontinuation of the kind of
conversations and very seriousdevelopment of theoretical
technologies during the 1980swith the Strategic Defense
Initiative. So these are not newconversations, as you pointed
out. So the conversation toprotect the US homeland in the
(08:38):
1980s from Soviet Union launchintercontinental ballistic
missile started with a verycritical figure named Daniel or
Graham. He was a army officer,and he was the main intellectual
guide behind building thisconcept of space based
interceptors. So in the 1980sand 1990s the conversation was
(09:05):
already put forward in astrategic sense, that we cannot
depend on a concept calledmutually assured destruction,
because that means that you'renot really deterring missiles
from getting into the UShomeland. So Graham with others,
pointed out that, well, what wereally need to think about is
space based interceptors thatcan actually identify missiles
(09:28):
coming at the US and defend anddeter against them. So
basically, in doctrinal terms,it means that you are moving
from deterrence by retaliationto deterrence by denial. So it's
a very critical phenomenon thathappened. What has changed with
the golden dome, and which isnew, is that unlike the 1980s
(09:53):
and the 1990s where adversarynations did not have hypersonic
missile capability, so. And sowhich means you're moving so
fast, you have to respond withintwo to three minutes, right?
That's something new. So thegolden dome has argued that it's
not just going to be a missileas we understand it, the
capability should be able totarget a missile moving that
(10:15):
fast, and that's why the boostphase targeting is so vital. And
so that's new. The second thingthat is new is that, unlike the
1980s and the 1990s we have muchhigher quality small satellite
constellations that can bebuilt, including cube sets.
Instead of having exquisite,really heavy, big satellites,
the smaller satellites arefaster. Computing is faster and
(10:39):
then and with this. The finalthing that the golden dome is
hoping to achieve is basicallyto be able to build an
architecture that is going tohelp identify real time
tracking. We don't have it yet.
Tab. We don't have thecapability to do real time
tracking as yet. The hope isthat with ground based tracking
(11:00):
indicator, it's called MovingTarget indicator, ground
airspace that needs Absolutely,like no latency, like when
you're moving in a particularplace, I can tell you from 1000s
of miles away that this is thenow that you're moving so that
we can target you. That's whatthe golden dome is trying to
(11:21):
achieve, which is different sothat
Tad Schnaufer (11:26):
so the technology is advancing, like you
mentioned. But as we saw withthose past programs, with the
Strategic Defense Initiative,also known as Star Wars, in a
greater sense and pop culture,if you will, that program never
really came to complete fruitionas we understand it, because,
you know, funding, it took avery long time to develop the
technology, and then the SovietUnion obviously collapsed, so
the threat wasn't as muchpressing. So how long will it
(11:49):
take for the gold dome to becomeoperational? Do we see this in
the short term, to actuallyachieve a fully operational
concept?
Dr Namrata Goswami (11:57):
So first of all, just to answer your
question about the fact that thehistorical assessment of a space
based interceptor or missiledefense shield didn't work, not
because it was theoreticallypossible, but because there was
a lot of intellectualconversations that happened,
especially from the arms controlcommunity, that pointed out
(12:20):
that, well, if you're going tobuild a missile defense
deterrence by denial capacity,it could lead to escalatory
dynamics in space. So that's oneof the reason why the Strategic
Defense Initiative did not playout with change of
administrations from Reagan toGeorge Bush Senior. And then,
(12:42):
you know, Obama, George Bush,Jr, there was a lot of change.
Clinton, of course, limited theNational Missile Defense
capability right the groundbased interceptor. So there was
a lot of reason why the SDI didnot play out right. And so, to
answer your question, now thatwe have a golden dome executive
memo, January 2025 the timelinethat I have seen in open source
(13:06):
press conversations by PresidentTrump and others, including from
the United States Space ForceGeneral goodline, who is in
charge of it, we should Have thefirst level capacity
demonstration by 2028 so alreadythe contract has been given out
to build the tracking sensor tothe space development agency
(13:28):
with tranche two. Most importantis joint domain command and
control that is being developed,because that kind of capability
is vital for the golden domethat has already been now
contracted out, and so, yeah, by2028 we should be able to see a
demonstration of the first levelcapacity in this regard. Well,
Tad Schnaufer (13:51):
that's gonna be very interesting. Because, as
you said, you know, it gets intothis discussion of the
weaponization of space. So whatare the Russians doing in space,
the Chinese and obviously theUnited States? And in this case,
they're putting not necessarilyweapons. Necessarily weapons,
but interceptor missiles. So isthere, is there a fine line here
between the defensiveinterceptor missile going into
space compared to what maybe theRussians or the Chinese are
doing slash that conversationlike you mentioned, that was
(14:14):
taking place in the 80s and 90s,about if we weaponize base, it
actually will upset deterrence.
Dr Namrata Goswami (14:20):
So the context today. So one of the
question that I am dealing in myresearch is that, why golden
dome now? Right? So we have beentalking about missile defense
shield for a very long time.
Morally, the argument given bythe advocates is that you cannot
let American citizens die from amissile attack, or, you know, be
basing it on mutual assureddestruction. So I think what is
(14:43):
fascinating, actually, I reallylike your question, because in
the context of today, what I'mnoticing in the domain of space
is that to identify space as awar fighting domain is becoming
normal because of the fact. Atspace based assets, and I'll
talk about space basedinterceptors in a bit, which is
not there yet. We don't havespace based interceptors of the
(15:05):
kind we are talking with thegolden dome. We have anti
satellite weapon that is groundbased, that targets us asset in
space and destroys it, or wehave non kinetic capability like
laser or blinding, right? So,but what has changed is that,
because China was the firstcountry to establish a separate
space force in 2015 and thentalked about scaling up its
(15:27):
missile capability. For example,China tested the fractional
orbital bombardment system in2021 which is a nuclear based
capability that actually comesat you from the southern side,
which our radars are not lookingat, and it's hypersonic. It's a
hypersonic glide vehicle, andthe US at this moment do not
have the capability to interceptit, so that was a wake up call
(15:50):
in terms of deterring suchcapacity. So interestingly
today, because there is a globalutilization of space from a
military perspective, thehistorical conversations around
space being a sanctuary space isnot a war fighting domain, or
shouldn't be, is shifting. AndI'll end by saying that one of
(16:12):
the biggest evidence of this isnot just us or China, but Japan.
Japan has historically been verycareful of not using language
which is not peaceful. Just lastweek, Japan put out their space
domain defense policy in whichthey are identify the ability to
to highlight and predicthypersonic glide vehicle as
(16:36):
extremely vital. They're alsotalking about building intercept
capabilities. So in thatcontext, you can see that
partners and allies are alreadythere, right? So the what I'm
trying to say here is that thecontext has changed today
because of what has happened.
And so finally, to answer yourquestion about interceptors, so
(16:57):
in some sense, interceptors,especially in space, especially
space to Earth, interceptorsmight be seen as escalatory
because of the fact that you aregoing to be able to target a
missile launch at its boostphase. It is at the boost phase
where the missile is the mostvulnerable, and because it has
not deployed yet, it's theeasiest to target, and so you
(17:21):
are able to kill almost all themissiles at one go. You would
need ground based interceptorsfor this. You would need space
based sensors for this,including space based
interceptors. I would end bysaying that now that we have
this concept, I would be notsurprised if we have adversary
nations then thinking about howthey can use counter space
(17:42):
capabilities to target thosevery sensors and interceptors on
the ground, in terms ofdoctrinal thinking. So yeah,
that's
Tad Schnaufer (17:50):
very interesting, because we've seen in the last
couple of decades the additionof space and cyber to the
official domains of warfarewithin within many doctrine
assessments. So going to the,you know, deterrence piece, like
you mentioned, an interceptor,if we could dig down a little
bit deeper into that, so withthe perception that comes with
it. So it is this a bullethitting a bullet, if you will, a
(18:11):
missile coming from space tohit, a hypersonic missile launch
from Russia or China or whoevermay be launching it, or is it
some other type of interceptor.
Dr Namrata Goswami (18:21):
So it is a missile hitting a missile right.
So it's called the X atmosphericinterceptor vehicle. It has a
sensor then that tells you thatthe missile is coming. It's
launched. It could be spacebased, it could be air based, or
it could be earth based, right.
And then it intercepts themissile that is coming at you,
and so it is, if precise, and ifwe are able to achieve that
(18:46):
level of interception, it ishighly effective. We are not
there yet because of the factthat missiles move so fast. We
are talking about missiles thatmove so quickly between two to
five minutes, so a very limitedtime to do the interception
precisely. And when you'retalking about hypersonic, it's
moving very fast and so butexactly what you said, it's
(19:08):
basically targeting a missilewith another missile which is at
the interceptor, and basicallyusing computing, artificial
intelligence, automation, humanas well as very advanced
computing to achieve this. So weare, we have all the technology
today. The idea will now bevital to bring it all together
(19:29):
into an architecture,
Tad Schnaufer (19:33):
right? So then, in a sense, your defense or
deterrence capability is limitedby the number of interceptors
you have, assuming they'reeffective. So it would be, could
this possibly, again, upset thecurrent state of deterrence and
start an arms race, and if youcan just produce enough missiles
to out, in a sense, overwhelmthe interceptors? Is that? Is
that a possibility, or has thatbeen explored?
Dr Namrata Goswami (19:54):
So I will for that Tad, I will take you to
the Israeli arendum, right?
Because that's something. Thingthat we have as an example,
which is in real time. It hasbeen used. It has been
successful. So with the IronDome, first of all, I have to
tell your audience that theseare very expensive systems. They
cost billions of dollars. Sowhat in the Israeli case, the
(20:15):
Iron Dome was able to identifyHamas launch short range
missiles and deflect them,especially when they're going
towards populated areas. So, butit is also true that several
missiles were not deflected asbecause they aren't calculated
(20:35):
that these were not going topopulated areas, right? So one
way there is a great paper onthis by from West Point, where
the authors argue that whatHamas did, and they noticed
this, is that it produced somany missiles that the iron
Dome's capability to deteralmost all of them is
(20:56):
impossible. So there is that,right? As you mentioned, that
the adversary noticing the our,our, for example, deterrence by
denial strategy could build somany missiles, right? The other
thing which I didn't point outis that, why is boost face so
vital? Because when a missile,when, when you launch a missile,
and then the warheads arebasically released in space.
(21:20):
They also release decoys. And sowhen the sensor or the tracking
system in space is observing itin real time, sometimes it might
get confused with the decoys,right? And so those are the
limitations. So it is true thatone or two missiles might get
through, but the idea is thatthe missiles that are coming at
(21:40):
populated areas are going to bedeterred. So have you seen
Tad Schnaufer (21:47):
any other examples? Obviously, we had the
Iron Dome. But what about likeDavid sling and some of these
other anti missiles, or antiballistic missile defenses? Have
we seen those operational andeffective, and will that somehow
influence how the golden domeset up.
Dr Namrata Goswami (22:01):
So I mean, in some sense, besides that, the
US, if you think about thecurrent missile defense
realities, we already have thespace defense agencies tracking
layer. We have, which is calledtranche. We have the
proliferated war fightingarchitecture, so we have
capabilities that are able totrack and detect missiles coming
(22:25):
at us, right? So while we dohave capacity to, for example,
with the ages system, right orthe Patriot system, we saw
missiles being deterred, I thinkwhat we do not have today with
the golden dome, which is why itis so unique and different, is
that this is a system that isnot only going to deter attacks
(22:49):
by cruise missiles which do notget into space, but by those
which actually are of thevariety that China tested, which
is the fractional orbitalbombardment system, which is a
big threat to the US homeland,right? And so we are not there
yet, though. So we don't havethat capacity yet. And one of
(23:09):
the capacity that has to bedeveloped for that to happen is,
as I mentioned before, real timemoving target indicator, which
is like for your audience. IfI'm a car moving and you and
it's a car that has, forexample, explosives right for
you to target it, you needsatellite base, no latency data
(23:34):
that can then inform theinterceptor that this car is
dangerous. We need to get it outof the way. But don't forget, my
car is moving at Mac five andmore. It's very fast, so that's
the capability that we haven'ttested yet, and that's the hope
that we will have that by 2028
Tad Schnaufer (23:55):
and you know, obviously AI is a big topic. Is
AI playing with that ability toor playing a role in that
ability to identify threats,obviously, analyze risk, analyze
motion, that types of piece withthis technology?
Dr Namrata Goswami (24:07):
Yes. So if you look at the mapping that the
Iron Dome Israeli are in, domebasically worked on, artificial
intelligence has played a vitalrole. So because we have, for
example, let's take ahypothetical scenario to answer
your question, right? So welet's take say we are in 2028
and we have the golden domemissile defense architecture
(24:29):
being tested and showcased. Sowhich means we will have
hundreds of satelliteconstellations in low Earth
orbit that is going to tell us,through their sensor
capabilities, that there is amoving target coming at us.
Right? To do that, we will haveto have computing and AI
capability that can analyze datavery fast or in real time. So
(24:52):
that's why super intelligent AIthat is able to integrate such
data is going to play a vitalrole. For example. In the
Israeli case, with the IronDome, when not just for
detecting but also for, say,predicting that a particular
missile is coming at you,artificial intelligence has
played a role, and there are alot of great articles on that in
(25:16):
the Israeli press that tells youhow they do it.
Tad Schnaufer (25:18):
One of the other things that the golden dome has
been focused on, as well as theIron Dome in Israel is obviously
these larger either cruisemissiles or ballistic missiles,
or these larger employmentmechanisms. What about some of
the more autonomous drones, or alower level, lower flying
(25:38):
threats that might be coming in?
Is the golden dome almostlayered, or is it really just
focused on the big nuclearcapable missiles?
Dr Namrata Goswami (25:46):
No, actually, great question to ask,
right? So if you actually lookat the memo, the golden dome is
not just about, say, hypersonicmissiles or this ICBM like
intercontinental ballisticmissiles, right? Basically, they
want to target any advancedaerial threats, which includes
drones. So they want to buildmissile defense capability that
(26:11):
is layered. But also it's notjust focused on the high end
that we talked about so much,which is the unique thing about
the golden dome, but also thekind of things that has been
discussed historically in theUS, including lower level aerial
threats. For example, one of thebiggest aerial threats, as you
mentioned, are autonomousdrones, right? We have seen this
(26:32):
in the Middle East. We have seenthis in the Ukraine conflict. So
there is a lot of learning, andit includes that kind of aerial
threats as well. So any aerialthreat coming in the US is going
to be in that particulararchitecture of the golden dome
to be deterred. What's
Tad Schnaufer (26:49):
that going to look like? You know, we talked
about the missiles. Obviously, alot of that defense capability
is going to come from spacebased systems. But some of these
lower altitude threats, arethose going to be more land
based, or there's going to besea based. How is that golden
dome going to shape up?
Dr Namrata Goswami (27:05):
So the golden dome includes air, land,
space based interceptors, right?
And intelligence capabilities.
So it's not just space based.
You also have capability fromthe ground that can detect that.
So if you read the golden domearchitecture, it includes all
four levels. One is land, seabase, air base and space base.
(27:28):
So for example, if you havedrone capability that can be
detected from the ground and theinterceptors could also be from
the ground. The only uniquething that the golden dome does
is that it's talking about spacebased interceptors in today's
context. It is not new, as Imentioned to you before, but
then this particularconversation, strategically has
been reintroduced by the Trumpadministration with the golden
(27:51):
dome memo. So yeah, to answeryour question, it will be based
on different levels of layeredsensor capability as well as
interceptor capability, right?
So just to remind your audience,because I think sometimes when
we talk about the golden dome,some reports that actually
talked about it in detailhistorically can be forgotten,
(28:13):
right? So one is, of course, theUS Space Command, which was
established by the Reaganadministration. They came out
with a plan called long rangeplan in 1998 a vision for 2020
and that particular planactually has everything that we
are talking about, in terms ofthe golden dome, and it talks
(28:34):
about exactly what I said,different levels of
interception. But you know, Dad,what was so fascinating they
were thinking about space basedinterceptors then. And then, of
course, you have the long rangeplan that was also put out in
1998 so which is also by Spacecom. And then the and then the
Rumsfeld commission that alsotalked about this. So what the
(28:56):
golden dome is doing is that itis reiterating all those
technologies that theseparticular plants put out for
defending US homeland, and alsoreiterating the fact that we
need different levels ofintersection, ground, air, sea
and space.
Tad Schnaufer (29:17):
So like you said earlier, you mentioned the
question, why the golden domenow, and it sounds like the
technology is there, the threatlevel is there, and these things
are all motivating the Trumpadministration to really push
this thing forward.
Dr Namrata Goswami (29:30):
Yeah. And so besides the reports I mentioned,
right? So one thing that I wouldalso point out is that this is
the big question to us. Why arewe actually talking about the
golden dome now, and what haschanged in terms of technology,
right? So I would argue that inthe context of the conversation
we had earlier, which is thearms control architecture,
(29:51):
right? So with, for example,Russia was the one who suspended
the who was actually suspectedof violating the Inter.
Immediate range Nuclear ForcesTreaty, because it feel that
land based intermediate rangecruise missiles, and China was
never a party to it, right? Andso what we notice is that these
(30:12):
nations have actually developedcapacity that can reach the
United States in the last fewyears. And that's a big
realization the I think thesecond important thing is China
changed the game in terms of whya golden dome is necessary
because of the development ofits hypersonic light vehicles,
right? And then finally, as Imentioned before, there was
China's testing of thefractional orbital bombardment
(30:35):
system, right? And so that'ssomething that is is vital. Now,
in terms of technology, I'vementioned this again before, but
I mean, I would like toreiterate that, right? I think
the rise of small SATs and theCubeSat revolution has totally
changed how we manage thissystem, so they are no longer
dependent on single, costlysatellites. These are much
(30:57):
smaller satellites. They arecheaper, and they have been
developed by the SpaceDevelopment Agency, and then
also launch. The launch of thesesatellites have come down. So
during the Cold War, one launchcost you about $54,000 today,
launch cost you about $2,500 perkilogram. So that's one very
important reason. And thenfinally, as you mentioned,
(31:18):
artificial intelligence, thespeed of decision making, the
speed of data being analyzed. Soall that makes the golden dome
much more feasible in today'scontext. Sorry to give you a
long answer, but I thought it'sreally important to realize why
is the United States talkingabout the feasibility of a
golden dome architecture today?
Tad Schnaufer (31:41):
No, it makes perfect sense. And what it does
sound like is we, throughout ourwhole conversation here, is that
there's going to be a lot morecapabilities, satellites, these
different types of sensors, allgoing up in space. So how is
that space security aspect ofthis program, along with the
stuff that's already in spaceand the stuff that other
countries are putting up there,whether it's the Indians or the
(32:03):
Europeans or the Russians.
Dr Namrata Goswami (32:05):
So already, I mean, that's a great question
to think about from the moralperspective, right? What it
could do? So I can hypothesizeand say that, well, it could
result in some nations viewing agolden dome architecture as a
first strike capability. Sobecause of the fact that the US
can target another nation withno fear of being attacked,
(32:27):
right? So nations might see thatas escalatory, especially
nations like, say, China orRussia, that is possible. The
second thing in terms of spacesecurity is that now that's the
more hypothetically escalatoryside, right? But in some sense,
I think that when I'm listeningto conversations, say strategic
(32:47):
conversations in India, UnitedArab Emirates, Japan, as you
ask, the European Union orEuropean countries, what I'm
hearing is that because some ofthese nations face threats of
missile attack. They are seeingthe development of a missile
defense shield as actually quiteuseful, right? So most nations,
especially India, with becauseit faces border disputes with
(33:11):
China and Pakistan, and thenJapan, which has very much
suffered from missiles beinglaunched from North Korea that
falls into the Sea of Japan isactually quite interested in
participating in a missileshield that offers their
citizens some level ofreassurance, right? And so I see
that they are interested. AndI'll tell you, because I just
(33:33):
mentioned this in your podcast,the recent Japanese national
security strategy, the desire todevelop a ground moving target
indicator, especially in realtime that they announced that
they're going to build theirdesire to collaborate more with
the United States. Space Forceas well tells you that while it
(33:54):
has some escalatory dynamics inother ways, some nations are
also perceiving this asimproving their space security
assets, right? But I'll finallyend with the question that you
asked, which is vital in termsof, what does it do to low Earth
orbit, right? You have so manyconstellation structures now
with 1000s of satellites to belaunched to build the
architecture for the GoldenDome. I think one issue that
(34:18):
nations are really starting todiscuss is, for example, what
happens when these satellitesget defunct, right? So you
create debris, and do we haveplans to deorbit it already? The
US is making it mandatory forAmerican companies to deorbit
their satellites. But then youhave other nations. What happens
if other nations build thiscapacity? I don't think we have
(34:40):
reached a level of maturity interms of handling this many
satellites in low Earth orbityet. So the conversations have
started in regard to spacetraffic management, space
security stability, but I don'tthink we have reached a level of
maturity, especially given thiscurrent developments. Wow. So
Tad Schnaufer (34:59):
you're talking about. A new career field of
space traffic controllers.
Dr Namrata Goswami (35:04):
Oh, my Yes, I'm glad you brought that up
Ted, because air trafficcontrollers, right? I mean, the
very fact that I can take aplane from Montgomery, Alabama
and fly to New Delhi, India isbecause countries have agreed to
international air traffic rules,right? We don't have a similar
space traffic management as yet,right? But I argue in my
(35:26):
research, and this is takingaway from the Golden Dome
conversation, but the largerspace security conversation is
that once you have Americanprivate companies and other
private companies invested inspace one one space becomes
absolutely vital for ourcommunication, navigation,
shipping, movement of goods, wewill be incentivized to come to
(35:49):
some level of space trafficmanagement consensus as well,
very similar to how air domainplayed out.
Tad Schnaufer (35:56):
That makes sense as it can become more crowded in
space and one of the otherpieces of space. You know, you
mentioned a couple allies andpartners in the United States,
whether India, Japan, you know,we heard that maybe Canada might
be interested in participating.
What are we seeing across theworld otherwise, on
participation in this? Do theysee it as a partner effort, or
is this really just a US ledextension of extended
(36:19):
deterrence, pretty much agreater extension of its nuclear
deterrence, if you will.
Dr Namrata Goswami (36:25):
Yeah, yeah.
That's a great point to bring,actually, Ted, yeah. I mean, in
some sense it really matters onif you're a treaty ally or not,
right? So India is not a treatyally of the United States, so in
some sense partnership is a verydifferent level, right? So
extended deterrence will not bebe for India, but then for
treaty allies like Japan, or,for example, NATO partners,
(36:48):
because you have Article Five.
And by the way, which isfascinating, you ask this
question. So NATO, a few yearsago, stated that space is
operational domain. And ArticleFive can be invoked, as you
know, right, if space assets aretargeted. So what conversation
I'm hearing is that while thebuilding of the architecture,
(37:10):
the funding, which is about 25billion, the first level of
funding is, I think they agreedto 25,000,000,001 of my
colleagues, Sam Wilson, has donea great paper on this for the
Aerospace Corporation, where hetells us where exactly what is
going. I would urge youraudience, if they have time to
look at that paper, it's on thebudget and the Golden Dome. So I
(37:32):
think at this point of time,burden sharing, I'm not hearing
much right in terms of finances.
It's a US led effort, US fundedeffort. But once you have the
first level of demonstrationsuccessfully, I can imagine
Japan joining in. Japan'sbuilding that kind of capability
for deterrence purposes, right?
So very clearly they see this assomething I could see South
(37:55):
Korea being interested in. Icould see NATO member states
being interested in. So there'sa lot of potential here, as
Tad Schnaufer (38:02):
that program plays out. You know, there's
also some ability to actually,you know, knock satellites out
of orbit, or, you know, disruptthem. We've seen the Chinese
actually shoot down some oftheir own satellites over the
past couple decades, just toshow that they have the
capability. So is there thisthreat that the constellation
even wants up there, stillvulnerable to other types of
attack. Oh, absolutely,
Dr Namrata Goswami (38:24):
I know, I know this is tricky. So, yes,
so, because don't forget, right?
So we are talking about this intimes of conflict, not in times
of peace, right? So conflict,that's why I always tell my
students or my audience thatnations behave differently in
terms of conflict. So so onething and adversary will
obviously target is the missiledefense architecture that
(38:46):
another nation has that it mightsee to its disadvantage. So to
answer your question, yes, Chinahas anti satellite weapon
capability. So does Russia, andthis includes both kinetic and
non kinetic, like laser, theyhave core middle assets, they
have rendezvous and proximityoperation capability, right? So
almost all assets in space,including those to be utilized
(39:10):
for the Golden Dome, could bevulnerable to anti satellite
weapon attacks, jamming,spoofing. You know, interceptor
communications could beintercepted through cyber
attacks. So there's all thatthat is true of space assets
today. Could also be true for agolden dome architecture.
Tad Schnaufer (39:31):
It's really an integrated system. You have to
be able to have strongcybersecurity measures, space
security measures, and thenobviously all the other typical
military domains that wenormally operate in,
Dr Namrata Goswami (39:42):
yeah, and so and so. One thing that I'm
noticing in the conversation onChinese military doctrine is
that, and this was before thegolden dome memo was put out,
right? So when the US SpaceForce talked about the
proliferated architecture inspace with the lower. Orbit
constellation structure. So theargument was that, well, we can
(40:03):
actually counter the attack onsingle satellites by building so
many that it'll be hard, right?
So one anti satellite weaponattack is not going to deter the
whole system or make it, youknow, unusable. So
theoretically, the People'sLiberation Army, strategic
support force, which is ChinaSpace Force. Now the aerospace
force put out a theoreticalpaper saying that, Well, China
(40:24):
needs to think about systemslevel effects, which means that
it needs to build a counterspace capability that can target
several satellites at once.
Right? It's hard to do, butthat's the theoretical thinking,
and that happened in 2019 2019,20, 20. Right. So we have five
(40:44):
years from there. I don't haveopen source data to tell you
whether they have achieved somelevel of demonstration in that,
if in that, like in thatparticular capability, I do know
they have anti satellite weaponcapability and other from open
source data, but whether theycan do it in an integrated
manner, I don't know yet, butthat they will not try. I will
(41:05):
be surprised if Chinesestrategic thinkers do not think
that way.
Tad Schnaufer (41:10):
Well and with with that in mind, what would
you tell a US policy maker nowis the biggest priority going
forward with the golden dome andthese different threats, whether
it's missile or drone orautonomous systems. What's the
priority as they start puttingthis program in place? I
Dr Namrata Goswami (41:26):
think the biggest priority to make to
harden them right, to make themcapable of deterring such
attacks. Right? We can havetechnological development of
capability that can actuallynegate the attacks on, say,
satellite electronics, right? Wecan have, for example, if you
have a cyber attack, we shouldbe able to counter that. And so
(41:49):
that has been a conversation forlong. Can you maneuver? There
are article arguments made that,well, if there is a, say, a
kinetic attack and not a nonkinetic attack, we should be
able to maneuver a satellite.
China just demonstrated lastmonth the manure, the
maneuvering of their Sharon 25but can the can the US build
such capability? I think that'sa good thing, but I would if I
(42:13):
was to advise a policy makertoday, I would say, build
capacity that hardens yoursatellite against such attacks,
because you we do know whatthose attacks will look like.
It's not like we don't. We do.
We've simulated it. We know ittechnologically, what it is. So
it is absolutely possible, ifnot, deter everything, but to
(42:36):
deter the ones that we think arevital, for example, the golden
dome space architecture, right?
And then the second thing, Ithink a deterrence works, that
if you could deterrence bypunishment, right, not just
denial. So China depends onsatellites a lot today,
including for its economicdevelopment. So deterring could
happen if, if their satellitescan be, you know, targeted as
(43:00):
well. So that's another way thatyou can actually call their
satellites at risk. So as
Tad Schnaufer (43:07):
we look at technology, you know, we talked
about the expansive equipmentthese constellations going up in
space, are there any other areasin space that are going to be
home to some of thesetechnologies, even possibly the
moon?
Dr Namrata Goswami (43:22):
Oh, that's a great question to answer,
because so let me take you backto the year 1994 so one of the
mission that is globally veryfamous is the Clementine
Mission. So basically, theClementine Mission is known for
its contribution to lunarmapping and for discovering
water ice, which was laterconfirmed by the Indian
(43:44):
Chandrayaan one mission,especially in the polar region.
But I think most people don'trealize that this was this
mission, the Clementine Mission,was sponsored by the Department
of Defense, Strategic DefenseInitiative organization, which
was renamed the BallisticMissile Defense Organization in
1993 and so. And it was acollaboration between DOD and
(44:05):
NASA. So what the ClementineMission actually did was that it
carried a suite of lightweight,you know, miniaturized sensors,
including ultraviolet visiblecameras, Near Infrared Camera.
And so what it was doing wasthat it was actually testing
surveillance and trackingsystems, especially in a space
environment. And this is vitalfor SDI, because with that kind
(44:30):
of real time tracking, you canactually autonomously
discriminate between what is thetarget and what is not so.
Fascinatingly, Clementine,historically in the 1990s
demonstrated what we are talkingabout with the golden dome
today, which is that highperformance sensors could be
both lightweight, not too heavy,they could be power efficient,
(44:51):
and that they could work asconstellations for the kind of
sensor technologies we need tobe able to identify. Moving
Target so fascinating that wewere able to achieve that in the
1990s with a cost of merely $75million so it did both. It
confirmed the it discovered thewater molecules on the lunar
(45:14):
surface, but it also did amazingthings for Strategic Defense
Initiative.
Tad Schnaufer (45:21):
Wow. So we could actually expect, or not expect,
but at least it's in the realmof possibility that we'd have
Moon based sensors and possiblyother equipment for this gold
dome.
Dr Namrata Goswami (45:32):
Yeah, because in one of the papers
that I wrote for the AerospaceCorporation, where I talked
about the utility of cislunarspace, the space between the
Earth and the Moon for theUnited States, Space Force. I
point out that the moon is goingto play a very vital role,
especially because of the factthat the moon looks down. So
right now, most of our you knowtracking and sensor capabilities
(45:55):
are looking down on Earth, butnot from the moon for the US,
right? We're looking fromgeosynchronous orbit or low
Earth orbit. So what happens isthat the conversation, for
example, that we've been hearingglobally is that you can have
anti satellite attacks, forexample, right to any of those
architecture a moon basearchitecture system with sensors
(46:18):
and tracking systems canactually then determine if
something is coming at an asset,for example, a US, asset in
geosynchronous orbit. We don'thave that capability yet. The
only country, and this isconcerning to me, the only
country with a relaycommunications satellite and
lunar logistics capacity, isChina. China has a relay
(46:38):
satellite in LaGrange Earthmoon, Lagrange two that looks
down at the lunar surface. Andwhat China is arguing is that,
well, once we have a base on theMoon, by 2036 we will have
industrial logistics andcommunication infrastructure
that can then determine theentire lower orbit to cislunar
space. So I can see cislunarplay a space playing a role, not
(47:01):
today, but in the future,sometimes in terms of deterrence
as well,
Tad Schnaufer (47:07):
well. Thank you so much for this insightful
discussion today. Reallyappreciate having you on. Thank
Dr Namrata Goswami (47:12):
you Ted for having me.
Jim Cardoso (47:18):
Thanks to our special guest today, Namrata
Goswami, Professor of spacesecurity at Johns Hopkins
University. We hope you enjoyedour conversation about the
golden dome attached offer in2026 GNSI will be doing
conferences with both space andnuclear weapons themes. So you
may be hearing from Dr Goswamiagain in the future, next week
(47:39):
on at the boundary. Dr RobBurrell, senior research fellow
GNSI, will be kicking off hisresearch initiative, the future
of war. Rob is one of theworld's leading experts on
irregular warfare, resilienceand resistance. He's a fellow on
the irregular warfare initiativeat Arizona State University, and
recently published his latestbook on resilience and
(48:01):
resistance on the podcast nextweek, Rob will have a probing
conversation with retired USArmy Lieutenant General Charles
Cleveland and retired ArmyColonel Dave Maxwell. General
Cleveland is the formercommanding general of US Army
Special Operations Command,while Colonel Maxwell is a 30
year Army veteran who recentlyserved as an Associate Director
(48:22):
in the School of Foreign Serviceat Georgetown. You don't want to
miss that episode, or, frankly,any other episodes, so be sure
to hit that subscribe button.
Thanks for listening today. Ifyou like the podcast, please
subscribe and let your friendsand colleagues know. You can
follow GNSI on our LinkedIn andX accounts at USF, underscore
GNSI, and check out our websiteas well at usf.edu/gnsi, while
(48:44):
you're there, don't forget tosubscribe to our monthly
newsletterthat's going to wrap up this
episode of at the boundary. Eachnew episode will feature global
and national security issues wefound to be insightful,
(49:05):
fascinating, maybecontroversial, but overall, just
worth talking about. I'm JimCardoso, and we'll see you at
the boundary. You.
Popular Podcasts
Dateline NBC
Current and classic episodes, featuring compelling true-crime mysteries, powerful documentaries and in-depth investigations. Follow now to get the latest episodes of Dateline NBC completely free, or subscribe to Dateline Premium for ad-free listening and exclusive bonus content: DatelinePremium.com
Stuff You Should Know
If you've ever wanted to know about champagne, satanism, the Stonewall Uprising, chaos theory, LSD, El Nino, true crime and Rosa Parks, then look no further. Josh and Chuck have you covered.
My Favorite Murder with Karen Kilgariff and Georgia Hardstark
My Favorite Murder is a true crime comedy podcast hosted by Karen Kilgariff and Georgia Hardstark. Each week, Karen and Georgia share compelling true crimes and hometown stories from friends and listeners. Since MFM launched in January of 2016, Karen and Georgia have shared their lifelong interest in true crime and have covered stories of infamous serial killers like the Night Stalker, mysterious cold cases, captivating cults, incredible survivor stories and important events from history like the Tulsa race massacre of 1921. My Favorite Murder is part of the Exactly Right podcast network that provides a platform for bold, creative voices to bring to life provocative, entertaining and relatable stories for audiences everywhere. The Exactly Right roster of podcasts covers a variety of topics including historic true crime, comedic interviews and news, science, pop culture and more. Podcasts on the network include Buried Bones with Kate Winkler Dawson and Paul Holes, That's Messed Up: An SVU Podcast, This Podcast Will Kill You, Bananas and more.