April 18, 2025 • 34 mins
Text the ATB Team! We'd love to hear from you!
In this episode of At the Boundary, guest Nadwa Al-Dawsari, a Yemen expert of the Middle East Institute, joins GNSI’s own Dr. Armand Mahmoudian to unpack the rise of the Houthis and their growing impact on regional and global security.
The conversation explores the Houthis' ideological roots, inspired by the Iranian Revolution, and their strategic objectives—from dominating Yemen to targeting holy sites and calling for the destruction of Israel. With military backing and training from Iran, the Houthis have become a key player in Middle Eastern geopolitics.
The episode also delves into recent U.S. military strikes aimed at stopping Houthi attacks on global shipping, their ties with extremist groups like Al-Shabaab, and the involvement of major powers like Russia and China.
What’s next for Yemen—and what does it mean for the world? Tune in for expert insights and critical analysis of one of today’s most volatile security flashpoints.
At the Boundary from the Global and National Security Institute at the University of South Florida, features global and national security issues we’ve found to be insightful, intriguing, fascinating, maybe controversial, but overall just worth talking about.
A "boundary" is a place, either literal or figurative, where two forces exist in close proximity to each other. Sometimes that boundary is in a state of harmony. More often than not, that boundary has a bit of chaos baked in. The Global and National Security Institute will live on the boundary of security policy and technology and that's where this podcast will focus.
The mission of GNSI is to provide actionable solutions to 21st-century security challenges for decision-makers at the local, state, national and global levels. We hope you enjoy At the Boundary.
Look for our other publications and products on our website publications page.
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Jim Cardoso (00:12):
Jim, hello everyone. Welcome to a special
episode of at the boundary, thepodcast from the global and
national security Institute atthe University of South Florida.
I'm Jim Cardoso, Senior Directorfor GNSI, and your host for at
the boundary.
Today on the podcast, ourspecial guest will be nadwa al
(00:33):
daswari, an Associate Fellowfrom the Middle East Institute.
She's a leading expert on Yemenemerging as one of the most
volatile countries in thatregion. She's also a veteran
researcher, conflict analyst andpolicy advisor who spent over 12
years in the field, working onYemeni tribes. Today, she'll be
talking with GNSI ResearchFellow, Dr Armand mahmudian GNSI
(00:56):
resident fellow focusing on theMiddle East.
As you are no doubt aware, Yemenhas been front and center on the
world stage the past three weeksfollowing the successful conduct
of military strikes by US forcesagainst Houthi targets. While
these strikes were somewhatovershadowed by the news of
signal chat being used to passsensitive information, the long
(01:17):
term strategic significance ishuge. The Houthis have been
wreaking havoc on globalshipping in and around the Bab
al Mandeb and the Red Sea, andthis was the strongest response
yet by the United States. Let'sturn over now to Armen and his
conversation with nadwa aldaswari. You
Arman Mahmoudian (01:42):
thank you Jim.
Thank you for your kindintroduction, and once again,
thank you nadwa, I want to thankyou on behalf of our team at the
Global national securityInstitute to access for
accepting our invitation. It's agreat opportunity, and I
sincerely appreciate it. Butbefore going forward and talking
in depth about the Houthis,recent interaction with the
United States, theircommunication and connection
(02:04):
with the Iranian. I want to kindof start the conversation with a
historical background. You're aYemen expert. You have dedicated
most of your professional lifeto study Yemen. And I want to
take ask your take or insightthat will it all begin. What are
hooties. What's the historicalbackground behind them? What
constitutes their social base?
(02:26):
What is their ideologicalmanifesto? Basically, who are
these people? Thank you so muchfor having me. Armin, it's good
to be here. That's a bigquestion, but it's also the
answer is simple.
Nadwa Al-Dawsari (02:41):
Where it all began, in terms of the Houthis
rise, and now how they'veevolved into a regional actor
that attacks ship in the RedSea. Well, the Houthis are
zaidis, in particular. JarodiZaydi. Zaydis are known to be
relatively moderate, but Jarodyzaddies are not moderate.
(03:03):
Jehudi zaydis believe thatthe nation should be ruled by an
imam who is a descendant ofProphet Muhammad Yemen was ruled
by the Imamate, theocracy, untilthey were overthrown in 1962
so part of what what the Houthiswant to do is to is to reinstate
(03:25):
the Imamate. But that's the mostdomestically.
The Houthis are also inspired bythe Iranian Revolution, and
they've, over the past 30 years,they've established strong
relationship with Iran andthey've imported much of the
Iranian ideology and sort ofmechanisms into the country, and
(03:45):
that's where they became atransnational movement with
aspirations that are beyondYemen borders.
So what is the Houthis ideology?
So short term? What the Houthiswant to do? They want to control
Yemen. They want to expand intothe region.
(04:05):
Medium Term, they want to takethe holy sites in Mecca and
Medina. And in long term, theywant to destroy Israel. They
want to capture Jerusalem, wherethey want to establish an
Islamic govern, governance ofglobal nature,
and that is that ideology isrooted in Islamic
(04:26):
fundamentalism, both Shia andSunnah.
The only difference is that forShia, it's the 12 Imam who's who
went in hiding in the eighthcentury, at five year old, who
would emerge at the end of days,to march the armies towards
Jerusalem, but for zaydis, likethe Houthis, it would be born
(04:47):
out of Prophet Muhammad'sbloodline. And some of the
Houthi supporters and theideologues around Abd Al mak and
Houthi Some say that Abd Almakhuti himself, Abdul. Is the
leader of the movement. Believethat he is that figure the name
of so the figure is known inIslamic in Islam, the figures is
known as Al Mahdi. Is the isthis sort of Messianic savior
(05:15):
who will emerge in the end ofdays and restore justice into
the world. But it starts withtaking Jerusalem.
Arman Mahmoudian (05:29):
So it's kind of a messy Hall interview.
Correct you mentioned about theYemen being ruling by the Imam.
It's by then up until 1962 if Istand correct and correct me if
I'm wrong. So part of what theywant is actually restoring the
previous influence that thecommunity used to have, if I
(05:52):
can, if I'm getting it correct.
And it's kind of quitefascinating by concept, because
when it comes to thecommunities, the general
understanding is that it's aaffiliation of the Shi'ism
zaidis. But also there arearguments out there. And if I
have a feeling that you knowbetter, I'm sure you know
whether I want, like to takeyour take on it is that the
Houthis are, aside being a try aShi and an ideological
(06:16):
community, there are also tribalin structure. There are tribal
society. There is a great dealof bonds between different Zaydi
tribe, which Hutus comes from,of it, or they kind of get the
leg into the rise of the Houthismovement. I would like to know,
what is your insight on it? Isit tribal infrastructure? Is it
a tribal community, or it's asole ideological mind should be,
(06:39):
I said on the Z
Nadwa Al-Dawsari (06:43):
so the Houthis are not a tribe. The Houthis are
a clan. The Houthis are. Sayit's Hashemites, meaning they
are. They come at the top of thesocial strata as descendants of
the Prophet. That's where howthey identify themselves. So
they're not tribes. They areHashima saints, because that's
that's the class they belong to.
Tribes are different, and you'reright. I mean, Zaidi tribes in
(07:07):
the north, they identify asZaidi tribes, but it's not an
ideological identification.
Zaidi tribes, like tribes allover Yemen, are pretty
pragmatic, their anti ideology,but they identify as Zaydi
tribes. It's, it's more of ageographic identity, since they
(07:27):
belong to the north, where theZaydi Imamate ruled for hundreds
of years, and they becamezaidis. It became, they became
known as the Zaidi tribes, butit's not an ideological
identity. And so and then zaydisand for the most part, I mean,
(07:49):
throughout Yemen's history,zaydis and Shafi is shapiros Are
the moderate version of Sunni,zaidis are the moderate version
of Shia. Have coexisted inYemen. There's never been any
secretarian conflict of thatsort. Most of the conflicts are
rooted in grievances and sort ofpolitical differences and
competition over power andresources, rather than
(08:10):
secretarianism. So in terms ofthe Houthis relationship with
the tribes, the Houthis, so theHouthis have been trying to have
built an extremely repressivesystem, and part of that system
includes dismantling the tribalstructure, because the tribal
(08:33):
structure have always preventedthe central government or The
regimes from oppressing peopleand the tribes in Yemen are
armed. They're independent,they're strong, and so part of
why the Houthis want todismantle the tribal system, and
they've been trying to do thatfor the past 10 years through
(08:54):
different methods, and I cantalk about that, is to ensure
that the tribes are not a threatto them, while at the same time
exploiting the tribes for theirown purposes, for example, to
recruit fighters, toindoctrinate the anger
population in the tribes, and soon and so forth. But there is no
(09:15):
bond between the tribes and theHouthis right now. The
relationship is sometimestransactional. Sometimes it's,
you know, for the tribes, it'sthis, they don't have an option.
They cannot really go againstthe Houthis. But to a large
extent, the Houthis are deeply,deeply resented by the tribes
because of their repressivenature and because they have
(09:39):
really upset at the tribalstructure, but also they
violated a lot of the tribalcodes and values and ethics.
Wow.
Arman Mahmoudian (09:50):
Well, thank you. I want to make another
pivot back to your initialremarks you mentioned about what
is being influenced by theIslamic Republic of Iran, by the
revolution in 19. 29 whichIranian sources suggested. Right
after the revolution, a group ofdelegation of the Houthis went
to the Iran or the zaydis, andthey met with Ayatollah
Khomeini. After the Iranianrevolution, it seems that Iran
(10:15):
has been trying to assimilate orincorporate the zaydis version
of the Shi'ism, or the way thatthey practicing the Shia, or the
theology into the tulva or Ashiaor Tul Imam Shia, we kind of
witness a gradual difference,or, you know, in the way that
(10:39):
the Hutu is mourn for them,almost in or Muharram, we kind
of witnessed. It's kind ofevolving. It's not as dissimilar
quite as they used to do, orthat they don't go through the
measures or way of theperformance that they used to do
it 50 years ago. What they dotoday for the mourning of the
Muharram or some other alsoreligious traditions, is quite
(11:01):
similar to what the Iranians do,the 12 in Yemenis do. I would
like to ask you about the depthof the Iran's today, in
influence of Iran's today inYemen and over the Hutus, the
role that the Iranian played, ifthey played any, in Houthis
takeover in and then the rolethat Iranian played in
(11:22):
sponsoring and supporting the tosustain Houthis role in northern
Yemen.
Nadwa Al-Dawsari (11:30):
So in terms of ideology, the Houthis and Iran's
ideology align, but not 100% infact, traditional Shia scholars
in Iran considers 80s atheistsand the Houthis. They ridicule
the Shia sort of Twelver theory.
And I would say the relationshipis more ideological, ideological
(11:57):
slash. Pragmatic Iran,certainly, ASEM Soleimani saw an
opportunity in the Houthis toinfiltrate the Arabian Peninsula
and sort of threaten SaudiArabia, while at the same time,
you know, up in a gate to theRed Sea and the Horn of Africa.
(12:21):
The Houthis owe their rise tothe Iranians, to the to the to
the IRGC in particular. So Iranhas been investing in the
Houthis since the 1980s thefather of the Houthi movement,
leader and the founder, HusseinHouthi, both spent time in Qom
in Iran in the 80s. Abdul hotihimself also spent time in in
(12:47):
southern Lebanon with Hezbollah,and also in Iran in the 1990s
and and that relationship, theHezbollah commanders and IRGC
commanders have been present inYemen long before the war. So,
(13:09):
for example, a Bucha Larry, whowas sanctioned by the US in 2008
was in Yemen. Had been in Yemenbefore the Houthis took over the
capital. So Iran was involved inthe Houthis plot to expand
throughout Yemen, including totake the capital. I think when
people say Iran was upset thatthe Houthis took over Sana'a, I
(13:29):
think that's just, that's justIran feeding people, you know,
misinformation. I think Iranmight have been surprised that
Sana'a fell into the hands ofthe Houthis easily, but they
were not upset about it. Sosince 2014 Iran sent hundreds,
and that's this is Iranianofficials saying hundreds of
(13:50):
experts to Yemen to help theHouthis. Iran has helped the
Houthis expand militarilythroughout Yemen. So military
strategizing, militaryoperations, they've trained
them. It has helped the Houthisweapons, including ballistic
missiles, drones, but also hadthe Houthis develop weapon
manufacturing technology. Iranhas been involved in the Houthis
(14:14):
cross border attacks, and infact, Iran IRGC commanders on
the ground have are, havemanaged cross border attacks,
including attacks against SaudiArabia, but also Red Sea
attacks. So you know, theHouthis also run the country.
The Houthis have establishedthis highly repressive police,
(14:37):
police state that runs thecountry through a jihadist
council that is led by AbdulMelik al ho they was the leader
of the Houthi movement. Hisfirst aid is an IRGC commander,
and the deputy aide is aHezbollah commander. That's how
Iran is involved with theHouthis I will borrow so the.
Yeah, the Iran model is Iran ismanaging the Houthis, but Iran
(15:02):
does not micromanage theHouthis. They're not involved in
the routine, sort of day to day,sort of small activities. I
would borrow a term that afriend of mine said last week,
Iran's hands are not on thesteering wheel. Iran is the
steering wheel. It's, it's, it'snot accurate to say that the
(15:27):
Houthis are independent of Iran.
They're not, but they can be intime.
Arman Mahmoudian (15:35):
So if I stand correct when you're saying this,
you're suggesting that why didthe relationship between Iran
and Hutus is not necessarily apatron client relationship, but
it's a somewhat of a partnershipwith a high degree of Reliance
from who is being the juniorpartner on the Iranian as the
(15:56):
main sponsor and the seniorpartner. That's, that's the way
that you're describing thedynamic, I think
Nadwa Al-Dawsari (16:01):
it's still a patron client, but it's it's
moving towards becoming, it'sbecoming a partnership, and I
think in time, it might becomefull partnership. But right now,
IRGC commanders are on theground supporting the Houthis in
every step, including theHouthis expansion into the Horn
(16:23):
of Africa.
Arman Mahmoudian (16:25):
And what are the factors that they are
forcing this involved evolutionfrom the patron client to the
partnership.
Nadwa Al-Dawsari (16:33):
I think Iran has been under tremendous
pressure, especially recently,since the Trump since President
Trump came to office, and Ithink for Iran, it would, it
would help them if theygradually sort of enabled the
Houthis to take charge, likeright now in the Horn of Africa,
(16:55):
Iran has helped the Houthisforge relationships with AQAP in
Yemen, with Somali al Qaeda andShabab in Somalia and ISIS in
Somalia, also Somali pirates.
But the Houthis informationindicate that the Houthis are
now sort of are in charge ofmanaging this relationship.
(17:16):
We're seeing an evolutiontowards sort of Iran, Iranians,
almost not quiet, but almostphasing out in the Houthis kind
of taking over that part of theoperation. But I think that's
just not completely allowing theHouthis to be in charge, but for
Iran to become or to have morelike plausible deniability,
Arman Mahmoudian (17:43):
and I'm very glad that you mentioned that
relationships that or connectionthat the Hutus are building with
the Somalian al Shabaab andother regional actors, because
that was actually one of thequestions that I wanted to ask
you. It's there have been manyreports about the relationship
between Houthis and Al Shabaab,and also the pirates and other
actors, even the Institute ofRusi has made, I believe, an
(18:08):
extensive and reliable study,not a paper talking about the
Houthis trying to build theirown network of access, of
resistance. I would like to askyou that what the dynamic or the
nature of the Houthis havespecifically speaking with
actors in Somalia, pirates andthe Al Shabaab, what's the
ultimate goal here from them?
What is driving and radicalSunni group and a radical Shia
(18:30):
group to cooperate? Is it purelybased on the mutual perception
that they have of the UnitedStates, or it's something bigger
here,
Nadwa Al-Dawsari (18:42):
that's part of it. I think radical Shia and
radical Sunni ideology alignwhen it comes to Israel, when it
comes to, you know, thismessianic vision, the
destruction of Israel, capturingJerusalem and establishing
global sort of Islamic State orIslamic government. But for now,
(19:04):
the goals are the same, which ispushing the US out of the
region, and also a lot of it hasto do with strengthening,
establishing and strengtheningsmuggling routes, illicit trade
money has a lot to do with it.
So revenue streams, for example,one of the benefits that the
(19:28):
Houthis are reaping in Somaliais access to mining and and the
Houthis have been training alShabaab in building
sophisticated weapons and bombs,the Houthis have provided al
Qaeda with drones that used toattack Yemeni government forces
(19:49):
in the south and hundreds of AlShabaab al Shabaab militants
have been sent, were sent toYemen to trip and were trained.
By the Houthis. Some of themwent back home, and some of them
were sent to Iran for additionaltraining. So yes, the Houthis
are forging their own Axis ofResistance across the Horn of
(20:13):
Africa, but Iran is part andparcel of that. I'm
Arman Mahmoudian (20:20):
very glad that you mentioned about what the
Houthis provide and what theirincentives are. The Israelis
think tanks. Last week, thinkwas Alma Think Tank published a
very, very interesting study,and very interesting, to some
extent, of a news arguing thatIranian are developing new
facilities in Sudan and tryingto basically establish a new
(20:44):
route to the Lebanon via the RedSea to arm and supplies the
hezbollahs. I wonder that if youthink, and I understand that's a
very hard question to ask, wedon't know yet, so grounds are
not solid on that front. But Iwonder that if you think the
Houthis would play any role indeveloping such an alternative
(21:08):
route to supply and armHezbollah,
Nadwa Al-Dawsari (21:12):
I think yes, so the Houthis are Iran's lost,
standing proxy, and there's theIraqi militias, but their
situation is a little different.
The Houthis have much moreaccess and much more potential.
And the Horn of Africa, and inAfrica in general, is a fertile
land for Iran to establishbases, to establish routes, to
(21:32):
establish the line, lines. Soand the Houthis have the hobbies
have been all over Africa. TheHouthis have been in Somalia,
Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan, somereports also that indicate that
they've been also in Libya. Andso I wouldn't be surprised if
these, if these reports areaccurate, in fact, they're most
(21:55):
likely accurate, as Iran istrying to compensate for the
massive loss it endured. Youknow, Hezbollah weakening, and
also the loss of the Assadregime. Well,
Arman Mahmoudian (22:12):
I think we discuss quite fairly, given to
our timings, about the regionalactors, relations with this,
Somalian pirates and Al Shabaaband Al hayde. But I think it
would be unfair if he didn't wedon't discuss the international
actors. A while ago, I believeit was in october 2024, Wallace
Street Journal made a report inwhich they made an argument that
(22:35):
Russia has been providing theHouthis with the targeting data,
the navigation, the route of theships, and prior to that, also
being various reports fromdifferent Institute, not only
one making a claim which seemsto be accurate, in my view,
correct me, you are the expertof the matter that the hoot is
(22:56):
also been Quite growinglyavoiding targeting the Chinese
or Chinese owned or ships, Iwould like to ask your first,
what do you think, or what doyou know of the Hooters
relationship with these twointernational actors that you
can share with us? And second,what are the motives that they
(23:17):
have to have a relationship withthe Houthis, if they have any
specifically regarding Russia,because for China, we can
understand it's a commercialestate trade is a primary issue
for them. So they want to have amaritime after resilience.
Maritime resiliency, let's seeRussia's motives. On the other
hand, is a bit vague, so you canexplain this for us, for our
(23:40):
audience, I would very muchappreciate
Nadwa Al-Dawsari (23:43):
it. Yeah, this relationship is beneficial for
both the Houthis and also Russiaand China. And the Houthis are
also sending fighters to Russiato fight in Ukraine. It makes
sense, because for the Houthis,they get the expertise, they
get, the weapons they get, thetechnology. For Russia,
(24:07):
expanding influence into Yemenis hugely beneficial, because it
means undermining us influencein the Red Sea and in the Middle
East. So that's what, and thatalso includes access to the Horn
of Africa and all the benefitsthat come with it. Again, the
(24:30):
holies are not just focused onYemen or Somalia. They are,
along with Iran. Iran is part ofthis too. They're they're all
focusing on expanding influenceinto Africa, into the Horn of
Africa. And Africa, we've seenIran increase influence in
countries like Burkina, Faso,Mali, Sudan and so Russia will
(24:52):
benefit from all all this, theaccess that comes with these
relationships, whether in termsof. Of you know, strengthening
economic ties, political ties,security, but also, more
importantly, you know, competingwith the US in that region as US
influence we've seen is fading.
And I mean in terms of China,what? China also buys 90% of
(25:18):
Iran's oil, and that goes, halfof that goes to the RGC, and
that funds their operations inYemen. So it's indirect funding
to the Houthis. But at the sametime, the the US has sanctioned,
recently, they've sanctionedseveral Houthi leaders and
(25:39):
Houthi affiliates for smugglingweapons from China into the
Houthis, and also smugglingweapons and military grade
materials to the Houthis fromfrom Russia. So I think it only
makes sense for these twointernational actors to build
alliance with the Houthis, tocompete with the US.
Arman Mahmoudian (26:01):
Yeah, that's that's very interesting,
specifically regarding Russians,because I think it's fair to say
that historically speaking,Russians were interested in that
region even during the SovietUnion. They made some on and off
attempts. But speaking of theinternational powers, you
brought United States, and itseems United States is in the
(26:23):
new period of time with theHutus, new generation of the
clash with the Hutus,specifically speaking, after the
October 7 that the Hutus, forsome reason, got involved, which
I want to first ask you aquestion about, why they got
involved. Why they decided tointerrupt? Was it the pressure
of the Iranian or an independentdecision. And second, how so far
(26:45):
United States handle the Houthisnaval rebels, or let's say that
disruptive actions in the RedSea, whether effective and
effective. Or how do youevaluate the US actions then
Nadwa Al-Dawsari (27:01):
the US is attacking Houthi targets because
the Houthis have been attackingships in the Red Sea. I think
the Trump administration hasmade that objective very clear.
They want to degrade the Houthiscapabilities in order to prevent
them from attacking ships. Partof that is an indirect message
(27:22):
to Iran, or a message to Iran,but, but it's, it is to prevent
the Houthis from attackingships. In itself, the attacks
have been, I was told, or I'mtold, have been very, very
precise. They have degraded someof the Houthis capabilities. We
(27:44):
don't know, it's too early toknow how much, but it also
disrupted the Houthiscommunication systems, because
it targeted communicationsystems, and it also killed many
of their leaders or commandersat the operational level,
especially those that aredealing with the drones and
missiles. So it did for thefirst time. I am hearing for the
(28:08):
first time, the Houthis believethat they find they they face
real war. Whatever happenedbefore, before the March, 15
attacks, was not really, did notreally put the Houthis under
pressure. Now they feel thatthey're under real military
pressure. Now, would that reallydestroy the Houthis ability to
attack ships in the future? Ithink air strikes by themselves
(28:32):
are not going to because of onereason, the Houthis have proven
before that they can withstandairstrikes. In fact, they've
they have suffered six years ofairstrikes by the Saudi led
coalition and emerged evenstronger. And the US cannot bomb
the Houthis forever. I mean,it's expensive. It's not
(28:54):
sustainable. What the Houthisare relying on is the passage of
time. They can wait, and then,when the US stops, they can
restock their weapons, theweapon storage through the
massive smuggling routes thatthey have established with the
help of Iran. I'm told that forevery ship that gets
(29:16):
interdicted, 100 ships pass.
Wow, yeah, I'm told byprofessionals in smuggling and
arms smuggling. I mean, I'veheard from them. So the Houthis
will restock and just wait, andthey will learn from this. They
will adapt, and they will comeback stronger. So the only way
(29:37):
to neutralize the Houthi threatonce and for all is to work with
the Yemeni Government, providethem with the necessary support
that they need to defeat theHouthis through ground
operation. And I'm notsuggesting that we, as the US
that we send boots on the groundyou. Yemenis don't need boots on
(29:59):
the ground. The Yemenigovernment needs support. We
have in Yemen there are thegovernment has about 200,000
fighters across the variousfront lines, and they're eager
to defeat the Houthis. They justhave never really got the
support they needed to do that.
(30:20):
So if the US administrationwants to and if the US
government wants to achieve itsobjective in dismantling the
Houthis capabilities to resumeattacks against ships in the
(30:40):
future. They need to team upwith the Yemeni government, and
they need to support Yemenigovernment forces to take the
Houthis down.
Arman Mahmoudian (30:48):
Thank you, nadwa. I'm very glad that you
brought future. We discussed thepast, the roads, the roots of
the Houthis. We discussedpresent. And now I want to
conclude this podcast with onefinal question, and ask about
the future. What future holdsfor Yemen and who it is if the
current status quo continues tobe sustained and survive, how do
(31:11):
you see the future of
Nadwa Al-Dawsari (31:13):
Yemen? Broadly speaking, I can think about two
scenarios. Scenario number one,the US and the Saudi led
coalition partner with the withthe Yemeni Government, support
the Yemeni government for theYemeni forces to defeat the
Houthis and then transition intopost war. It's not going to be a
(31:34):
walk in the park, but it willgive Yemen a chance at peace,
and, you know, to move forwardinto a brighter future. The
second scenario is the USrelying on airstrikes, and then,
you know, for a few months, andthen stops. And then for the
Houthis to wait for a year ortwo or three, and then come back
(31:55):
stronger, take over all Yemen,expand into the Horn of Africa
and Africa, and then present anightmare to the US and the West
and also regional allies.
Arman Mahmoudian (32:14):
Nadu, sorry once again. Thank you for your
insights. It's been a pleasureto have your unpacking podcast.
I want to thank you on behalf ofalso our team at the Global
national security Institute. Ittruly was a pleasure. Thank you.
Unknown (32:27):
Thank you for having me.
Jim Cardoso (32:36):
We hope you enjoyed this timely conversation about
Yemen, the attacks on Houthitargets and the global effects
of that chain of events. Ianticipate a lot more news to
come on that conflict, and nowyou've got a good baseline to
follow future events. Thanks toour special guest today, nadwa
aldaswari, an Associate Fellowwith the Middle East Institute.
Thanks as well to Dr Ammanmahmudian GNSI, Research Fellow
(33:00):
and resident expert on theMiddle East, a regular episode
about the boundary drops onMonday, and we look forward to
welcoming David Kramer, theexecutive director of the George
W Bush Institute. But for today,thanks for listening. If you
liked the podcast, please sharewith your colleagues and network
you can follow genus sign orLinkedIn and X accounts at USF,
(33:21):
underscore GNSI, and check outour website as well, at
usf.edu/gnsi, where you can alsosubscribe to our monthly
newsletterthat's going to wrap up this
special Episode of at theboundary, whether a regular
weekly or breaking special,every episode will feature
(33:44):
global and national securityissues we found to be
insightful, intriguing,fascinating, maybe
controversial, but overall, justworth talking about. I'm Jim
Cardoso, and we'll see you atthe boundary.
Jim, hello everyone. Welcome to a special
episode of at the boundary, thepodcast from the global and
national security Institute atthe University of South Florida.
I'm Jim Cardoso, Senior Directorfor GNSI, and your host for at
the boundary.
Today on the podcast, ourspecial guest will be nadwa al
(00:33):
daswari, an Associate Fellowfrom the Middle East Institute.
She's a leading expert on Yemenemerging as one of the most
volatile countries in thatregion. She's also a veteran
researcher, conflict analyst andpolicy advisor who spent over 12
years in the field, working onYemeni tribes. Today, she'll be
talking with GNSI ResearchFellow, Dr Armand mahmudian GNSI
(00:56):
resident fellow focusing on theMiddle East.
As you are no doubt aware, Yemenhas been front and center on the
world stage the past three weeksfollowing the successful conduct
of military strikes by US forcesagainst Houthi targets. While
these strikes were somewhatovershadowed by the news of
signal chat being used to passsensitive information, the long
(01:17):
term strategic significance ishuge. The Houthis have been
wreaking havoc on globalshipping in and around the Bab
al Mandeb and the Red Sea, andthis was the strongest response
yet by the United States. Let'sturn over now to Armen and his
conversation with nadwa aldaswari. You
Arman Mahmoudian (01:42):
thank you Jim.
Thank you for your kindintroduction, and once again,
thank you nadwa, I want to thankyou on behalf of our team at the
Global national securityInstitute to access for
accepting our invitation. It's agreat opportunity, and I
sincerely appreciate it. Butbefore going forward and talking
in depth about the Houthis,recent interaction with the
United States, theircommunication and connection
(02:04):
with the Iranian. I want to kindof start the conversation with a
historical background. You're aYemen expert. You have dedicated
most of your professional lifeto study Yemen. And I want to
take ask your take or insightthat will it all begin. What are
hooties. What's the historicalbackground behind them? What
constitutes their social base?
(02:26):
What is their ideologicalmanifesto? Basically, who are
these people? Thank you so muchfor having me. Armin, it's good
to be here. That's a bigquestion, but it's also the
answer is simple.
Nadwa Al-Dawsari (02:41):
Where it all began, in terms of the Houthis
rise, and now how they'veevolved into a regional actor
that attacks ship in the RedSea. Well, the Houthis are
zaidis, in particular. JarodiZaydi. Zaydis are known to be
relatively moderate, but Jarodyzaddies are not moderate.
(03:03):
Jehudi zaydis believe thatthe nation should be ruled by an
imam who is a descendant ofProphet Muhammad Yemen was ruled
by the Imamate, theocracy, untilthey were overthrown in 1962
so part of what what the Houthiswant to do is to is to reinstate
(03:25):
the Imamate. But that's the mostdomestically.
The Houthis are also inspired bythe Iranian Revolution, and
they've, over the past 30 years,they've established strong
relationship with Iran andthey've imported much of the
Iranian ideology and sort ofmechanisms into the country, and
(03:45):
that's where they became atransnational movement with
aspirations that are beyondYemen borders.
So what is the Houthis ideology?
So short term? What the Houthiswant to do? They want to control
Yemen. They want to expand intothe region.
(04:05):
Medium Term, they want to takethe holy sites in Mecca and
Medina. And in long term, theywant to destroy Israel. They
want to capture Jerusalem, wherethey want to establish an
Islamic govern, governance ofglobal nature,
and that is that ideology isrooted in Islamic
(04:26):
fundamentalism, both Shia andSunnah.
The only difference is that forShia, it's the 12 Imam who's who
went in hiding in the eighthcentury, at five year old, who
would emerge at the end of days,to march the armies towards
Jerusalem, but for zaydis, likethe Houthis, it would be born
(04:47):
out of Prophet Muhammad'sbloodline. And some of the
Houthi supporters and theideologues around Abd Al mak and
Houthi Some say that Abd Almakhuti himself, Abdul. Is the
leader of the movement. Believethat he is that figure the name
of so the figure is known inIslamic in Islam, the figures is
known as Al Mahdi. Is the isthis sort of Messianic savior
(05:15):
who will emerge in the end ofdays and restore justice into
the world. But it starts withtaking Jerusalem.
Arman Mahmoudian (05:29):
So it's kind of a messy Hall interview.
Correct you mentioned about theYemen being ruling by the Imam.
It's by then up until 1962 if Istand correct and correct me if
I'm wrong. So part of what theywant is actually restoring the
previous influence that thecommunity used to have, if I
(05:52):
can, if I'm getting it correct.
And it's kind of quitefascinating by concept, because
when it comes to thecommunities, the general
understanding is that it's aaffiliation of the Shi'ism
zaidis. But also there arearguments out there. And if I
have a feeling that you knowbetter, I'm sure you know
whether I want, like to takeyour take on it is that the
Houthis are, aside being a try aShi and an ideological
(06:16):
community, there are also tribalin structure. There are tribal
society. There is a great dealof bonds between different Zaydi
tribe, which Hutus comes from,of it, or they kind of get the
leg into the rise of the Houthismovement. I would like to know,
what is your insight on it? Isit tribal infrastructure? Is it
a tribal community, or it's asole ideological mind should be,
(06:39):
I said on the Z
Nadwa Al-Dawsari (06:43):
so the Houthis are not a tribe. The Houthis are
a clan. The Houthis are. Sayit's Hashemites, meaning they
are. They come at the top of thesocial strata as descendants of
the Prophet. That's where howthey identify themselves. So
they're not tribes. They areHashima saints, because that's
that's the class they belong to.
Tribes are different, and you'reright. I mean, Zaidi tribes in
(07:07):
the north, they identify asZaidi tribes, but it's not an
ideological identification.
Zaidi tribes, like tribes allover Yemen, are pretty
pragmatic, their anti ideology,but they identify as Zaydi
tribes. It's, it's more of ageographic identity, since they
(07:27):
belong to the north, where theZaydi Imamate ruled for hundreds
of years, and they becamezaidis. It became, they became
known as the Zaidi tribes, butit's not an ideological
identity. And so and then zaydisand for the most part, I mean,
(07:49):
throughout Yemen's history,zaydis and Shafi is shapiros Are
the moderate version of Sunni,zaidis are the moderate version
of Shia. Have coexisted inYemen. There's never been any
secretarian conflict of thatsort. Most of the conflicts are
rooted in grievances and sort ofpolitical differences and
competition over power andresources, rather than
(08:10):
secretarianism. So in terms ofthe Houthis relationship with
the tribes, the Houthis, so theHouthis have been trying to have
built an extremely repressivesystem, and part of that system
includes dismantling the tribalstructure, because the tribal
(08:33):
structure have always preventedthe central government or The
regimes from oppressing peopleand the tribes in Yemen are
armed. They're independent,they're strong, and so part of
why the Houthis want todismantle the tribal system, and
they've been trying to do thatfor the past 10 years through
(08:54):
different methods, and I cantalk about that, is to ensure
that the tribes are not a threatto them, while at the same time
exploiting the tribes for theirown purposes, for example, to
recruit fighters, toindoctrinate the anger
population in the tribes, and soon and so forth. But there is no
(09:15):
bond between the tribes and theHouthis right now. The
relationship is sometimestransactional. Sometimes it's,
you know, for the tribes, it'sthis, they don't have an option.
They cannot really go againstthe Houthis. But to a large
extent, the Houthis are deeply,deeply resented by the tribes
because of their repressivenature and because they have
(09:39):
really upset at the tribalstructure, but also they
violated a lot of the tribalcodes and values and ethics.
Wow.
Arman Mahmoudian (09:50):
Well, thank you. I want to make another
pivot back to your initialremarks you mentioned about what
is being influenced by theIslamic Republic of Iran, by the
revolution in 19. 29 whichIranian sources suggested. Right
after the revolution, a group ofdelegation of the Houthis went
to the Iran or the zaydis, andthey met with Ayatollah
Khomeini. After the Iranianrevolution, it seems that Iran
(10:15):
has been trying to assimilate orincorporate the zaydis version
of the Shi'ism, or the way thatthey practicing the Shia, or the
theology into the tulva or Ashiaor Tul Imam Shia, we kind of
witness a gradual difference,or, you know, in the way that
(10:39):
the Hutu is mourn for them,almost in or Muharram, we kind
of witnessed. It's kind ofevolving. It's not as dissimilar
quite as they used to do, orthat they don't go through the
measures or way of theperformance that they used to do
it 50 years ago. What they dotoday for the mourning of the
Muharram or some other alsoreligious traditions, is quite
(11:01):
similar to what the Iranians do,the 12 in Yemenis do. I would
like to ask you about the depthof the Iran's today, in
influence of Iran's today inYemen and over the Hutus, the
role that the Iranian played, ifthey played any, in Houthis
takeover in and then the rolethat Iranian played in
(11:22):
sponsoring and supporting the tosustain Houthis role in northern
Yemen.
Nadwa Al-Dawsari (11:30):
So in terms of ideology, the Houthis and Iran's
ideology align, but not 100% infact, traditional Shia scholars
in Iran considers 80s atheistsand the Houthis. They ridicule
the Shia sort of Twelver theory.
And I would say the relationshipis more ideological, ideological
(11:57):
slash. Pragmatic Iran,certainly, ASEM Soleimani saw an
opportunity in the Houthis toinfiltrate the Arabian Peninsula
and sort of threaten SaudiArabia, while at the same time,
you know, up in a gate to theRed Sea and the Horn of Africa.
(12:21):
The Houthis owe their rise tothe Iranians, to the to the to
the IRGC in particular. So Iranhas been investing in the
Houthis since the 1980s thefather of the Houthi movement,
leader and the founder, HusseinHouthi, both spent time in Qom
in Iran in the 80s. Abdul hotihimself also spent time in in
(12:47):
southern Lebanon with Hezbollah,and also in Iran in the 1990s
and and that relationship, theHezbollah commanders and IRGC
commanders have been present inYemen long before the war. So,
(13:09):
for example, a Bucha Larry, whowas sanctioned by the US in 2008
was in Yemen. Had been in Yemenbefore the Houthis took over the
capital. So Iran was involved inthe Houthis plot to expand
throughout Yemen, including totake the capital. I think when
people say Iran was upset thatthe Houthis took over Sana'a, I
(13:29):
think that's just, that's justIran feeding people, you know,
misinformation. I think Iranmight have been surprised that
Sana'a fell into the hands ofthe Houthis easily, but they
were not upset about it. Sosince 2014 Iran sent hundreds,
and that's this is Iranianofficials saying hundreds of
(13:50):
experts to Yemen to help theHouthis. Iran has helped the
Houthis expand militarilythroughout Yemen. So military
strategizing, militaryoperations, they've trained
them. It has helped the Houthisweapons, including ballistic
missiles, drones, but also hadthe Houthis develop weapon
manufacturing technology. Iranhas been involved in the Houthis
(14:14):
cross border attacks, and infact, Iran IRGC commanders on
the ground have are, havemanaged cross border attacks,
including attacks against SaudiArabia, but also Red Sea
attacks. So you know, theHouthis also run the country.
The Houthis have establishedthis highly repressive police,
(14:37):
police state that runs thecountry through a jihadist
council that is led by AbdulMelik al ho they was the leader
of the Houthi movement. Hisfirst aid is an IRGC commander,
and the deputy aide is aHezbollah commander. That's how
Iran is involved with theHouthis I will borrow so the.
Yeah, the Iran model is Iran ismanaging the Houthis, but Iran
(15:02):
does not micromanage theHouthis. They're not involved in
the routine, sort of day to day,sort of small activities. I
would borrow a term that afriend of mine said last week,
Iran's hands are not on thesteering wheel. Iran is the
steering wheel. It's, it's, it'snot accurate to say that the
(15:27):
Houthis are independent of Iran.
They're not, but they can be intime.
Arman Mahmoudian (15:35):
So if I stand correct when you're saying this,
you're suggesting that why didthe relationship between Iran
and Hutus is not necessarily apatron client relationship, but
it's a somewhat of a partnershipwith a high degree of Reliance
from who is being the juniorpartner on the Iranian as the
(15:56):
main sponsor and the seniorpartner. That's, that's the way
that you're describing thedynamic, I think
Nadwa Al-Dawsari (16:01):
it's still a patron client, but it's it's
moving towards becoming, it'sbecoming a partnership, and I
think in time, it might becomefull partnership. But right now,
IRGC commanders are on theground supporting the Houthis in
every step, including theHouthis expansion into the Horn
(16:23):
of Africa.
Arman Mahmoudian (16:25):
And what are the factors that they are
forcing this involved evolutionfrom the patron client to the
partnership.
Nadwa Al-Dawsari (16:33):
I think Iran has been under tremendous
pressure, especially recently,since the Trump since President
Trump came to office, and Ithink for Iran, it would, it
would help them if theygradually sort of enabled the
Houthis to take charge, likeright now in the Horn of Africa,
(16:55):
Iran has helped the Houthisforge relationships with AQAP in
Yemen, with Somali al Qaeda andShabab in Somalia and ISIS in
Somalia, also Somali pirates.
But the Houthis informationindicate that the Houthis are
now sort of are in charge ofmanaging this relationship.
(17:16):
We're seeing an evolutiontowards sort of Iran, Iranians,
almost not quiet, but almostphasing out in the Houthis kind
of taking over that part of theoperation. But I think that's
just not completely allowing theHouthis to be in charge, but for
Iran to become or to have morelike plausible deniability,
Arman Mahmoudian (17:43):
and I'm very glad that you mentioned that
relationships that or connectionthat the Hutus are building with
the Somalian al Shabaab andother regional actors, because
that was actually one of thequestions that I wanted to ask
you. It's there have been manyreports about the relationship
between Houthis and Al Shabaab,and also the pirates and other
actors, even the Institute ofRusi has made, I believe, an
(18:08):
extensive and reliable study,not a paper talking about the
Houthis trying to build theirown network of access, of
resistance. I would like to askyou that what the dynamic or the
nature of the Houthis havespecifically speaking with
actors in Somalia, pirates andthe Al Shabaab, what's the
ultimate goal here from them?
What is driving and radicalSunni group and a radical Shia
(18:30):
group to cooperate? Is it purelybased on the mutual perception
that they have of the UnitedStates, or it's something bigger
here,
Nadwa Al-Dawsari (18:42):
that's part of it. I think radical Shia and
radical Sunni ideology alignwhen it comes to Israel, when it
comes to, you know, thismessianic vision, the
destruction of Israel, capturingJerusalem and establishing
global sort of Islamic State orIslamic government. But for now,
(19:04):
the goals are the same, which ispushing the US out of the
region, and also a lot of it hasto do with strengthening,
establishing and strengtheningsmuggling routes, illicit trade
money has a lot to do with it.
So revenue streams, for example,one of the benefits that the
(19:28):
Houthis are reaping in Somaliais access to mining and and the
Houthis have been training alShabaab in building
sophisticated weapons and bombs,the Houthis have provided al
Qaeda with drones that used toattack Yemeni government forces
(19:49):
in the south and hundreds of AlShabaab al Shabaab militants
have been sent, were sent toYemen to trip and were trained.
By the Houthis. Some of themwent back home, and some of them
were sent to Iran for additionaltraining. So yes, the Houthis
are forging their own Axis ofResistance across the Horn of
(20:13):
Africa, but Iran is part andparcel of that. I'm
Arman Mahmoudian (20:20):
very glad that you mentioned about what the
Houthis provide and what theirincentives are. The Israelis
think tanks. Last week, thinkwas Alma Think Tank published a
very, very interesting study,and very interesting, to some
extent, of a news arguing thatIranian are developing new
facilities in Sudan and tryingto basically establish a new
(20:44):
route to the Lebanon via the RedSea to arm and supplies the
hezbollahs. I wonder that if youthink, and I understand that's a
very hard question to ask, wedon't know yet, so grounds are
not solid on that front. But Iwonder that if you think the
Houthis would play any role indeveloping such an alternative
(21:08):
route to supply and armHezbollah,
Nadwa Al-Dawsari (21:12):
I think yes, so the Houthis are Iran's lost,
standing proxy, and there's theIraqi militias, but their
situation is a little different.
The Houthis have much moreaccess and much more potential.
And the Horn of Africa, and inAfrica in general, is a fertile
land for Iran to establishbases, to establish routes, to
(21:32):
establish the line, lines. Soand the Houthis have the hobbies
have been all over Africa. TheHouthis have been in Somalia,
Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan, somereports also that indicate that
they've been also in Libya. Andso I wouldn't be surprised if
these, if these reports areaccurate, in fact, they're most
(21:55):
likely accurate, as Iran istrying to compensate for the
massive loss it endured. Youknow, Hezbollah weakening, and
also the loss of the Assadregime. Well,
Arman Mahmoudian (22:12):
I think we discuss quite fairly, given to
our timings, about the regionalactors, relations with this,
Somalian pirates and Al Shabaaband Al hayde. But I think it
would be unfair if he didn't wedon't discuss the international
actors. A while ago, I believeit was in october 2024, Wallace
Street Journal made a report inwhich they made an argument that
(22:35):
Russia has been providing theHouthis with the targeting data,
the navigation, the route of theships, and prior to that, also
being various reports fromdifferent Institute, not only
one making a claim which seemsto be accurate, in my view,
correct me, you are the expertof the matter that the hoot is
(22:56):
also been Quite growinglyavoiding targeting the Chinese
or Chinese owned or ships, Iwould like to ask your first,
what do you think, or what doyou know of the Hooters
relationship with these twointernational actors that you
can share with us? And second,what are the motives that they
(23:17):
have to have a relationship withthe Houthis, if they have any
specifically regarding Russia,because for China, we can
understand it's a commercialestate trade is a primary issue
for them. So they want to have amaritime after resilience.
Maritime resiliency, let's seeRussia's motives. On the other
hand, is a bit vague, so you canexplain this for us, for our
(23:40):
audience, I would very muchappreciate
Nadwa Al-Dawsari (23:43):
it. Yeah, this relationship is beneficial for
both the Houthis and also Russiaand China. And the Houthis are
also sending fighters to Russiato fight in Ukraine. It makes
sense, because for the Houthis,they get the expertise, they
get, the weapons they get, thetechnology. For Russia,
(24:07):
expanding influence into Yemenis hugely beneficial, because it
means undermining us influencein the Red Sea and in the Middle
East. So that's what, and thatalso includes access to the Horn
of Africa and all the benefitsthat come with it. Again, the
(24:30):
holies are not just focused onYemen or Somalia. They are,
along with Iran. Iran is part ofthis too. They're they're all
focusing on expanding influenceinto Africa, into the Horn of
Africa. And Africa, we've seenIran increase influence in
countries like Burkina, Faso,Mali, Sudan and so Russia will
(24:52):
benefit from all all this, theaccess that comes with these
relationships, whether in termsof. Of you know, strengthening
economic ties, political ties,security, but also, more
importantly, you know, competingwith the US in that region as US
influence we've seen is fading.
And I mean in terms of China,what? China also buys 90% of
(25:18):
Iran's oil, and that goes, halfof that goes to the RGC, and
that funds their operations inYemen. So it's indirect funding
to the Houthis. But at the sametime, the the US has sanctioned,
recently, they've sanctionedseveral Houthi leaders and
(25:39):
Houthi affiliates for smugglingweapons from China into the
Houthis, and also smugglingweapons and military grade
materials to the Houthis fromfrom Russia. So I think it only
makes sense for these twointernational actors to build
alliance with the Houthis, tocompete with the US.
Arman Mahmoudian (26:01):
Yeah, that's that's very interesting,
specifically regarding Russians,because I think it's fair to say
that historically speaking,Russians were interested in that
region even during the SovietUnion. They made some on and off
attempts. But speaking of theinternational powers, you
brought United States, and itseems United States is in the
(26:23):
new period of time with theHutus, new generation of the
clash with the Hutus,specifically speaking, after the
October 7 that the Hutus, forsome reason, got involved, which
I want to first ask you aquestion about, why they got
involved. Why they decided tointerrupt? Was it the pressure
of the Iranian or an independentdecision. And second, how so far
(26:45):
United States handle the Houthisnaval rebels, or let's say that
disruptive actions in the RedSea, whether effective and
effective. Or how do youevaluate the US actions then
Nadwa Al-Dawsari (27:01):
the US is attacking Houthi targets because
the Houthis have been attackingships in the Red Sea. I think
the Trump administration hasmade that objective very clear.
They want to degrade the Houthiscapabilities in order to prevent
them from attacking ships. Partof that is an indirect message
(27:22):
to Iran, or a message to Iran,but, but it's, it is to prevent
the Houthis from attackingships. In itself, the attacks
have been, I was told, or I'mtold, have been very, very
precise. They have degraded someof the Houthis capabilities. We
(27:44):
don't know, it's too early toknow how much, but it also
disrupted the Houthiscommunication systems, because
it targeted communicationsystems, and it also killed many
of their leaders or commandersat the operational level,
especially those that aredealing with the drones and
missiles. So it did for thefirst time. I am hearing for the
(28:08):
first time, the Houthis believethat they find they they face
real war. Whatever happenedbefore, before the March, 15
attacks, was not really, did notreally put the Houthis under
pressure. Now they feel thatthey're under real military
pressure. Now, would that reallydestroy the Houthis ability to
attack ships in the future? Ithink air strikes by themselves
(28:32):
are not going to because of onereason, the Houthis have proven
before that they can withstandairstrikes. In fact, they've
they have suffered six years ofairstrikes by the Saudi led
coalition and emerged evenstronger. And the US cannot bomb
the Houthis forever. I mean,it's expensive. It's not
(28:54):
sustainable. What the Houthisare relying on is the passage of
time. They can wait, and then,when the US stops, they can
restock their weapons, theweapon storage through the
massive smuggling routes thatthey have established with the
help of Iran. I'm told that forevery ship that gets
(29:16):
interdicted, 100 ships pass.
Wow, yeah, I'm told byprofessionals in smuggling and
arms smuggling. I mean, I'veheard from them. So the Houthis
will restock and just wait, andthey will learn from this. They
will adapt, and they will comeback stronger. So the only way
(29:37):
to neutralize the Houthi threatonce and for all is to work with
the Yemeni Government, providethem with the necessary support
that they need to defeat theHouthis through ground
operation. And I'm notsuggesting that we, as the US
that we send boots on the groundyou. Yemenis don't need boots on
(29:59):
the ground. The Yemenigovernment needs support. We
have in Yemen there are thegovernment has about 200,000
fighters across the variousfront lines, and they're eager
to defeat the Houthis. They justhave never really got the
support they needed to do that.
(30:20):
So if the US administrationwants to and if the US
government wants to achieve itsobjective in dismantling the
Houthis capabilities to resumeattacks against ships in the
(30:40):
future. They need to team upwith the Yemeni government, and
they need to support Yemenigovernment forces to take the
Houthis down.
Arman Mahmoudian (30:48):
Thank you, nadwa. I'm very glad that you
brought future. We discussed thepast, the roads, the roots of
the Houthis. We discussedpresent. And now I want to
conclude this podcast with onefinal question, and ask about
the future. What future holdsfor Yemen and who it is if the
current status quo continues tobe sustained and survive, how do
(31:11):
you see the future of
Nadwa Al-Dawsari (31:13):
Yemen? Broadly speaking, I can think about two
scenarios. Scenario number one,the US and the Saudi led
coalition partner with the withthe Yemeni Government, support
the Yemeni government for theYemeni forces to defeat the
Houthis and then transition intopost war. It's not going to be a
(31:34):
walk in the park, but it willgive Yemen a chance at peace,
and, you know, to move forwardinto a brighter future. The
second scenario is the USrelying on airstrikes, and then,
you know, for a few months, andthen stops. And then for the
Houthis to wait for a year ortwo or three, and then come back
(31:55):
stronger, take over all Yemen,expand into the Horn of Africa
and Africa, and then present anightmare to the US and the West
and also regional allies.
Arman Mahmoudian (32:14):
Nadu, sorry once again. Thank you for your
insights. It's been a pleasureto have your unpacking podcast.
I want to thank you on behalf ofalso our team at the Global
national security Institute. Ittruly was a pleasure. Thank you.
Unknown (32:27):
Thank you for having me.
Jim Cardoso (32:36):
We hope you enjoyed this timely conversation about
Yemen, the attacks on Houthitargets and the global effects
of that chain of events. Ianticipate a lot more news to
come on that conflict, and nowyou've got a good baseline to
follow future events. Thanks toour special guest today, nadwa
aldaswari, an Associate Fellowwith the Middle East Institute.
Thanks as well to Dr Ammanmahmudian GNSI, Research Fellow
(33:00):
and resident expert on theMiddle East, a regular episode
about the boundary drops onMonday, and we look forward to
welcoming David Kramer, theexecutive director of the George
W Bush Institute. But for today,thanks for listening. If you
liked the podcast, please sharewith your colleagues and network
you can follow genus sign orLinkedIn and X accounts at USF,
(33:21):
underscore GNSI, and check outour website as well, at
usf.edu/gnsi, where you can alsosubscribe to our monthly
newsletterthat's going to wrap up this
special Episode of at theboundary, whether a regular
weekly or breaking special,every episode will feature
(33:44):
global and national securityissues we found to be
insightful, intriguing,fascinating, maybe
controversial, but overall, justworth talking about. I'm Jim
Cardoso, and we'll see you atthe boundary.
Popular Podcasts
Stuff You Should Know
If you've ever wanted to know about champagne, satanism, the Stonewall Uprising, chaos theory, LSD, El Nino, true crime and Rosa Parks, then look no further. Josh and Chuck have you covered.
Dateline NBC
Current and classic episodes, featuring compelling true-crime mysteries, powerful documentaries and in-depth investigations. Follow now to get the latest episodes of Dateline NBC completely free, or subscribe to Dateline Premium for ad-free listening and exclusive bonus content: DatelinePremium.com
24/7 News: The Latest
The latest news in 4 minutes updated every hour, every day.