August 4, 2025 • 45 mins
Text the ATB Team! We'd love to hear from you!
Joining us again is Charles Lister, a senior fellow and director of the Syria Initiative at the Middle East Institute (MEI), where his research focuses on Syria, terrorism, and insurgency across the Levant. In this episode of At the Boundary, Lister breaks down both the history and the sequence of events that reshaped Syria. He details Bashar al-Assad’s sudden flight to Russia to the rise of Syria’s new President Ahmed al-Sharaa, a figure who was once designated terrorist with a $10m bounty but is now engaging with diplomats from over 70 countries.
This discussion takes a look at the following:
· The “Rush to Damascus” and Assad’s unexpected downfall.
· Ahmed al-Sharaa’s foreign policy success and his mixed domestic policy performance.
· The effect of lifting sanctions and Syria’s economic recovery.
· Southern Syria’s clashes, the Druze, and Israel’s intervention.
· The future of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and U.S. counter-ISIS operations.
· The U.S. policy on Syria moving forward.
· How the region now views Syria as the key to unlocking a more stable and prosperous Middle East.
Charles Lister unpacks Syria’s past to help us understand its present and why there may finally be reason to hope for a better future.
Links from the Episode:
• "Building Trust in Digital Response: The Role of Chatbots in Cybercrime Prevention" Decision Brief
• "Our Knowledge of the Taliban as Guide for US Policy" JSS Article by Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum
• 2025 Notes from Cambridge Blog
At the Boundary from the Global and National Security Institute at the University of South Florida, features global and national security issues we’ve found to be insightful, intriguing, fascinating, maybe controversial, but overall just worth talking about.
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The mission of GNSI is to provide actionable solutions to 21st-century security challenges for decision-makers at the local, state, national and global levels. We hope you enjoy At the Boundary.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Jim Cardoso (00:00):
Jim, hello everyone. Welcome to this week's
(00:14):
episode of at the boundary, thepodcast from the global and
national security Institute atthe University of South Florida.
I'm Jim Cardoso, Senior Directorfor GNSI, and your host for at
the boundary. Today on the show,we're bringing back a guest we
previously interviewed almost ayear ago. Charles Lister is one
(00:35):
of the world's foremost expertson Syria. We said during our
last conversation we wanted tohave him back and with that
country again embroiled inconflict and turmoil, we thought
now would be a good time beforewe bring him in. However, we
wanted to remind you thatregistration is open for cyber
Bay 2025 some of the nation'sleading cybersecurity AI and
(00:57):
national security experts willbe gathering in downtown Tampa.
It's scheduled for October 13 tothe 15th, and it'll be a can't
miss event. Featured speakersinclude Jen easterly, the former
director of the cybersecurityand infrastructure security
agency, Arne Bellini, themanaging partner of Bellini
capital and the benefactor forthe newly created USF Bellini
(01:18):
College of AI cybersecurity andcomputing and our own executive
director, retired Marine CorpsGeneral, Frank McKenzie, we'll
drop a registration link in theshow notes. Keep an eye out as
well for the newest GNSIdecision brief titled building
trust in digital response, therole of chatbots in cyber crime
prevention. It comes out nextweek, along with the latest
(01:39):
issue of the GNSI newsletter. Ifyou haven't already, go to our
website and subscribe so youdon't miss future issues of our
monthly newsletter, or justclick the link in the show note.
All right, let's welcome ourspecial guest today. Joining us
today from the UK is CharlesLister, senior fellow at the
Middle East Institute, wherehe's also the director of their
(02:00):
counter terrorism and Syriaprograms, Charles, welcome back
to out the
Unknown (02:04):
boundary. Thanks so much for having me, Jim, it's
good to be back. So
Jim Cardoso (02:08):
let's dive into it.
Obviously, your area ofexpertise has been pretty active
recently, but going back alittle bit, Bashar Al Assad fled
from power in December 2024 atthe time, that was an incredibly
unexpected event, but I thinkthere were some expectations as
to what would happen goingforward. What's big and been the
biggest surprise for you?
Unknown (02:30):
Yeah, it's a good question. I mean, certainly a
lot has happened in Syria overthe last eight months or so. You
know, I think retrospectively,just a note, as someone who
lives and breathes Syria on analmost 24/7 basis. Certainly,
the speed of Assad's departureand downfall was unquestionably
unexpected. Definitely, no onesaw that coming in 10 days,
(02:53):
although I think alsoretrospectively, there were a
lot of clues that things werebeginning to unravel. And I
think, you know, one of thereally big lessons for me as
someone, as I say, who does payattention to this, you know,
every hour of the day is that,you know, paying real attention
to all the granular detailsreally does reveal some of those
(03:14):
really significant trends. Andthere were big warning signs in
the second half of last yearthat that something quite
significant was happening. Andso looking towards the future,
and what kind of surprises Ihad, and have had, I suppose,
over the last seven or eightmonths. I mean, the I'd probably
(03:35):
put them in in a sequence. Thefirst one was what I have called
the rush to Damascus. So it tooka matter of a handful of days
for Assad to flee on a privatejet to Russia and a leader of a
long time jihadist movement toassume the leadership and
(03:55):
Presidency of the country. Ittook a handful of days for that
to happen before countries wereflooding to Damascus, and over
the past seven months, at mycount, we've had over 70
governments around the worldcome to Damascus for official
engagements with thistransitional authority. And I
have not been able to find anycomparison, any comparison that
(04:19):
comes anywhere close in a postconflict environment where we
have seen so much of theinternational community flood to
a capital city and to engagewith it, with a transitional
government, and that's before wetake into consideration, you
know, who's at the top of thistransitional government, and
their kind of controversial, oras President Trump has called,
their strong histories. So therush to Damascus was the first
(04:42):
one. And of course, the US waswas part of that rush, as was
the Europeans and others. Thesecond one, as a sequence, is
the subsequent basically whatwhat would should be called the
normalization of Syria's newtransitional government in the
international community, and thespeed with which that's
happened. And. Um, you know,Syria is now right back in at
(05:03):
the highest levels of the UnitedNations. It's back in all of the
multinational bodies. It hasbeen basically fully
reintegrated into the world in away that we haven't seen in at
least 60 years. So for Syria,it's totally historic. But
again, I struggle to find acomparative case study where an
international pariah state ofthe level that Syria was has
(05:26):
basically been fullyreintegrated into the world in
the space of six months. So thespeed of that normalization was
was certainly a surprise, andcertainly something quite
significant. And then the third1/3, and last one is again in
sequence, President Trump'sdecision to dramatically pivot
away from, frankly speaking,everything that everyone he had
(05:48):
appointed into positions inforeign and national security
policy, and he did a complete180 degree against all of their
advice, and fully engaged andnormalized US relations with
this transitional government inSyria. So the first half of that
sort of third surprise wasTrump's pivot, and then the
second half of it is a reallesson for us, which is what I
(06:12):
have called Trump rules. Youknow, when President Trump
decides that something's goingto happen, it happens, and it
happens very fast. And so manyof my friends who work on
sanctions policy and, you know,sanctions analysis, they can't
come anywhere close to us to acase study where the America's
(06:33):
biggest and most complexsanctions regime against Syria
has basically almost entirelybeen removed in the space of
about three months. I mean,there's just literally no, no
comparison. So when PresidentTrump decides something is going
to happen, and in his words, hegives, He wants to give Syria a
chance to recover, and ofcourse, we can maybe come to
talk about why he wants to dothat, then it happens. And it
(06:56):
happens really fast. Andeveryone he'd appointed who was
deeply, deeply against thisbefore he met President Ahmad Al
Shara in Saudi Arabia, ralliedaround the flag, and are now,
you know, essentially, I guess,cautiously, cheerleading the
exact same policy of engagement.
So those would be my threesurprises. Well,
Jim Cardoso (07:15):
President Trump has proven he's sometimes willing to
go in his own separate way, andsometimes it works out well, and
sometimes it remains to be seen,but it is interesting. And I
think the speed, you all three,one thing they shared is the
speed at which things arehappening. And I think we're
gonna, we're gonna try to hit alittle bit about US policy and
your thoughts on that later on.
But first, at the beginning, youtalked about, you know, the new
(07:36):
leader there. You know, what isyour assessment of Amman al
showers leadership in Syria thusfar. I mean, this guy, he's gone
from a designated globalterrorist with 110 or was it a
$10 million bounty on his head,to meeting the world's diplomats
up to the, you know, up to thenumber of 70 countries. As you
said, What's your assessment ofthat album so far?
Unknown (07:59):
Well, I think his kind of scorecard is is split in in
in two parts. One is his kind offoreign policy, and one is his
domestic policy. And I think onforeign policy, he's barely put
a foot wrong. And again, thatthat helps to explain the speed
with which everything hashappened on day one, when he
(08:22):
walked into Damascus, given whohe was, he instantly was saying
the right things. He was talkingin the language of, you know,
traditional mainstream politicaltransitions. You know, I joked
very early on in the transitionin Syria that if someone had
written the dummy's guide to apolitical transition. He Ahmed
(08:42):
al Shara was literally tickingoff each box one by one. So he
said all of the right things. Hestructured the transition in
most of the right ways. And Ithink given a who he is, who was
around him when he walked intoDamascus, the movement that he
still led when he walked intoDamascus, the fact that we now
(09:03):
have we've gone from what wascalled a caretaker government,
which was entirely his men, towhat's now the transitional
government, where, for only fourout of 23 members of the
transitional government are Hispeople, and the rest of them are
genuine professionaltechnocrats. You know, I had a
(09:24):
meeting the other day with thegovernor of Syria's Central
Bank, who spent most of hiscareer working for Ernst and
Young all around the world andwith the New York Fed. You know,
the technocratic base of thetransitional government now is a
really encouraging sign, andthat has obviously given the
international community theconfidence to engage in the
rapid way that they have. And ofcourse, he's also had what He
(09:49):
has called a no problems policyin the region, and that's mostly
directed towards Israel, andthat's a whole nother sort of
topic of conversation we couldpotentially come to Israel has.
Plenty. Israel has plenty ofconcerns and has done plenty of
things, but Ahmed al Shara hasdone precisely nothing in
response. The biggest thing he'sdone to the Israelis in the last
(10:11):
seven months is file a complaintat the Security Council about
Israeli airstrikes. So again, interms of kind of a vote of
confidence to give the rest ofthe international community the
confidence to continue toengage. He's done those right
things on the foreign policylevel, on the domestic it's a
different picture. It's moregray than black and white. He
(10:33):
has had clear some successes.
The fact that he hasaccomplished, by and large, the
fully lifting of sanctions bythe international community
against Syria is and willcontinue to have a really
significant economic benefit tothe people who have, of course,
suffered immeasurably on ahumanitarian level for so long.
But we have had these bouts ofreally major conflict, internal
conflict, sectarian conflict,mass killings, and to an extent,
(10:57):
if I put on my very cold analysthat on, these things were
inevitable, and not becauseAhmed al Shara was the
transitional president, butbecause of how what Syria looks
like after 14 years of civilconflict and more than 50 Years
of minority dictatorship rule,which Basically weaponized
minority communities againstother minorities, minorities
(11:20):
against majorities. This, thisinstability that we're
continuing to see is, in a coldway, inevitable. His response to
it, though, has not been up toscratch. There needs to be a lot
more of a demonstration ofjustice and accountability for
for crimes, not just crimescommitted by the former regime,
but also by men under theMinistry of the new Ministry of
(11:44):
Defense and Ministry ofInterior. And although I think
we're starting to see some ofthis change, he and his
government also need to be muchmore flexible in the way that
they negotiate with some of,again, what I'm calling the kind
of unresolved territorial issuesin Syria that the Northeast sway
in the south areas that arebasically out of government
control. He's embraced a prettyzero sum posture in those
(12:07):
negotiations, and there needs tobe some flexibility, because if
they don't get resolved, we'regoing to continue to see these
major flare ups of violence. Soit's a mixed bag. On the
domestic level, I could give you20 other examples foreign policy
overwhelming success. Let's
Jim Cardoso (12:25):
and so let's Great answer. And thank you so much.
It's a great that's a greatinsight. Let's dive a little bit
more into the domestic side andbring it up to the to the
current as you said, in southernSyria and suede it's been the
site of deadly clashes,widespread reports of human
rights violations and abusesstarted with the pro government
forces and the Druze, and thenspread to the local Bedouin
(12:46):
tribes confronting the Jews aswell. What if you could maybe a
little primer on what drove theenmity between these factions?
And you may need to touch alittle bit on the Druze, because
I think a lot of peoplelistening may not be fully
familiar with who the Jews areand how they're comprised.
Unknown (13:02):
Yeah. So, as with everything on Syria, it's
complicated, so I'll try to,I'll try to make it as sort of
simple as,
Jim Cardoso (13:09):
that's why we have you on the show Charles, to make
the complicated easy tounderstand.
Unknown (13:14):
I'll try. I'll try, perhaps, to go through a little
bit of the chronology, but alsopick out some of the core kind
of drivers and things. I mean,first of all, the Druze are a
religious minority group withtheir with their roots within,
within the Islamic faith, buthave branched out a long, long,
long, long time ago into theirown sort of religious
(13:35):
foundations. They are spreadbetween parts of Syria parts of
Lebanon. They have a presence inIsrael too, which plays into why
Israel has embraced this kind ofdesire to protect the Druze,
mostly due to domestic Israeliconcerns, rather than
necessarily primarily theconcerns of Druze outside. But
(13:55):
so they're a minority group.
They're predominantly based inthis southern province or
governorate called sweder. Andin being the dominant community
there in this province, theDruze have historically, always,
over decades, embraced the ideathat they pursue a kind of an
extent of semi autonomy. Theyeven under the Assad's sweder
(14:19):
under Drew's leadership wasafforded a lot more sort of
Decentralized Governance. Theyhad a lot more control over
their local local governance.
And so under this transition,the Druze have expected those
same kind of rights or that thatsame kind of status. How did
(14:40):
things begin? So on the night ofJuly the 11th, a Druze man was
driving a pickup truck full ofvegetables from Damascus to
suede suede south of Damascus,about an hour's drive, and he
was stopped on the side of theroad by a handful of Ben. Gunmen
(15:01):
who you know, forced him out ofthe vehicle, beat him up and
stole his his truck andvegetables. So to start with a
relatively minor incident in thewhole scope of things. The
following morning, inretaliation for that Drew's
gunman kidnapped a bunch ofBedouin men, and hours later,
(15:22):
Bedouin gunmen kidnapped a bunchof Druze men, and we had 24
hours of tit for tat kidnappingsbetween Druze and Bedouin
communities, both of which arebased in sweder. So this was not
a kind of Syria conflict. Thiswas very hyper localized
tensions and hostilities betweenSwedish Bedouin community and
(15:43):
Sweden's Druze community go backdecades. So they have been at
loggerheads over land ownership,control of smuggling routes. It
should be said here that sweder,I mean, Syria as a country, has
been riven by smuggling for avery, very long time, very
powerful smuggling industry, andSweden was a really core
(16:04):
historical part of the smugglingtrade into Jordan through the
sweder desert. And so bothcomponents of the Bedouin
community and components of theDruze community have been
fighting over smuggling routes,smuggling access and land
ownership for a long time. Soreally, most of these tensions
emanate from that. It's gotnothing to do with religion.
(16:26):
It's everything to do with land,history and politics. Having
said that, when these tit fortat kidnappings began to
escalate into more directconflict, after about 36 hours,
we were in a place where, again,the transitional government in
Syria has zero presence insweder. They never went in after
Assad fell, they afforded swederThe same sort of status they had
(16:49):
before. They were attempting tonegotiate what they call kind of
integration agreement wherebysway unites into the rest of the
country and becomes part of thetransition. But they weren't
there yet. So all of this wasplaying out while the government
was on the outside. I think, inretrospect, the government was
clearly, I think, saw sis, to anextent, as an opportunity. In
(17:11):
other words, it allowed chaos tounfold between these two local
communities to press the ideathat if Syria is going to
stabilize, the government has aresponsibility to enforce law
and order, and the government isthe only actor who should have
the responsibility to enforcelaw and order. So again, not to
make it too complicated, butwhile that kidnapping was
(17:32):
happening on that day, July the12th, there was a meeting
between Syria and Israel inAzerbaijan, mediated by America
and Turkey, and in that meeting,I know for a fact a significant
portion of that meeting wasdedicated to a discussion around
what was called the sovereignrights of a transitional
government in Syria. And theSyrian delegation wanted to get
(17:56):
the Israelis to confirm that itwas the government's
responsibility to enforce lawand order when localized
conflict develops. And accordingto a third country observer who
was in the room, who I spoke to,the Israelis, did say, Yes, of
course, that's your right. Youknow, any government has the has
the responsibility and the rightto, you know, have a monopoly
(18:19):
over monopoly over the use offorce and to enforce law and
order. So 24 hours after thatmeeting, the government made a
decision that it was going to goin, and it was going to go into
swada and intervene before doingso, they consulted all
privately, of course, with allof the Druze leadership in
sweder. They consulted with thewith the United States. They
(18:41):
consulted with Jordan, and theysent a message through the US to
Israel to say, we intend tointervene in 12 hours. And then
they did so within 10 minutes ofgovernment forces going in on
July the 14th into Sweden,crossing the provincial line,
they were ambushed by Druzemilitiamen, 10 Syrian government
(19:02):
soldiers were rounded up on theside of the road and executed,
and then their dead bodies wereused for celebratory
photographs, which swiftly wentviral on social media. And then
eight other soldiers werestripped to their underwear,
marched to a nearby village,lined up alongside a wall and
shot that was that one incidentwas basically the kind of cases,
(19:24):
belly thing that turned thisinto a major conflict. The
government then saw that it, orperceived it, had been betrayed.
It had, you know, done all thoseconsultations. Nobody had said
no. And then instantly theywere, they were ambushed. And
this, this sort of small scalemassacre happened on the highway
as they went in. So thegovernment went all out. They
(19:46):
went, this is, you know, thishas to be dealt with. This is a
kind of coup against thegovernment. And that was when we
started to see some of thecrimes being committed. Then
Israel intervened in a. Way thatthey framed it as to protect the
Druze community. The Israeliintervention basically made this
entire conflict zero sum foreverybody. Though, the Druze saw
(20:09):
this as their one chance to drawa line in the sand and say, We
will forever be at least semiautonomous. We do not recognize
and we don't respect thetransitional government. The
government of Syria, saw this astheir only opportunity to draw a
line in the sand and say, No, weare the government and we have
the responsibility. And then theBedouin saw this as a kind of
(20:30):
fight for their existence. Allof that also fueled crimes and
atrocities on all sides. Andthere were crimes and atrocities
on all sides the governmentforces conducted extra judicial
executions, Drew's militiamen,beheaded dead bodies and posted
photographs up online. They alsohave been proven to have
(20:52):
executed a number of children,burnt Bedouin villages. It was
grim, really, really ugly, andcutting a long, long, long long
story short, because now we'reonly halfway through the
chronology, it's only been USled mediation that has also
involved the Saudis, theJordanians and the Turks that
have managed to get us to wherewe are now, which is a cease
(21:13):
fire. There's no solution here.
Everyone has just stoppedfighting. The lines have been
drawn. Sweden remains outside ofgovernment control. And whereas,
you know, three weeks ago, mostDruze leaders in sweder were
very open and supportive of theidea of making a compromise with
Damascus, most of them have nowcome out of this whole chapter,
(21:33):
you know, very, at least fornow, very against that idea. So
we've actually backtracked fromsome of the more soft,
constructive place we were a fewweeks ago. And meanwhile,
several 1000s and 1000s of theBedouin minority community in
Sweden have been evacuated,likely permanently, and for many
(21:54):
Syrians who have been displacedmultiple times throughout the
conflict, the imagery of beingforced onto busses and then
leaving to live somewhere elsehas a really, kind of dangerous,
evocative history. So I really,really worry here that if there
isn't more third party mediationto actually resolve this, not
just a cease fire, but actuallyresolve Swedish status in Syria,
(22:15):
that this is just a pause, andwe are going to see more ugly
bouts of fighting continue,particularly as this is the
Bedouin community. They havetribal links throughout the
country, and the tribes willalways mobilize to protect their
sort of tribal brethrenelsewhere in the country, which
is exactly what happened in thelast few days of this of this
(22:38):
conflict story. That was a lot,but hopefully it was simple to
simple to follow. It was
Jim Cardoso (22:45):
actually, and, you know, I mean, you can pull a lot
of things up online and readthrough them, but that was, I
mean, that was a fantastic, youknow, one shot overview of where
it's gone, kind of taken into,you know, an account the long
term, the long term animosity,and how it bubbled over, and how
sometimes just one seeminglyminor spark event turns into
something that almost that couldbecome overwhelming. And then
(23:06):
you enter the Israelis as well.
And let's talk about that alittle bit. So the Israelis
ended the conflict, and youknow, Prime Minister Netanyahu
described that to Israel'scommitment to prevent harm to
the Druze in Syria. But I think,I think you'd agree there's
indications that reasons forIsrael's actions are a little
more nuanced. Can you talk tothat?
Unknown (23:27):
Yeah, well, I mean, obviously it's a subject of
debate, but I mean, there is aDruze minority in Israel, which
is, which is a prettyinfluential minority. I mean,
they play, they haveconsistently dedicated
themselves, probably moreheavily than almost any
community in Israel to the IDFand and and regionally, when
Druze related issues have havedeveloped across the region, in
(23:50):
Syria and Lebanon elsewhere,they have been a very loud kind
of voice pressuring the Israeligovernment to do something about
it. And so my read, at least, isthat Israel's primary concern
here, particularly given thefact that it's still at war in
Gaza, is still conductingmilitary actions in Lebanon, and
it's still conducting militaryactions in Syria, the last thing
(24:11):
they need is a kind of internalrevolt within a significant
community that contributes soheavily towards the IDF. So I
think domestic politics played avery significant role here, the
added one of and you know, toput it very bluntly, is that the
current Israeli government, andit has said this, has zero trust
in Syria's transitionalauthority, you know, not despite
(24:34):
President Trump's embrace,despite, you know, everything
that we talked about in thefirst The first question around
those surprises and seriousintegration, Israel's posture is
it does not trust thisgovernment. And you know, as the
Israeli Foreign Minister justsaid, I think, yesterday or the
other day, he called it another,you know, jihadist government.
(24:57):
So, so there's no trust. Yeah.
And so even if there was ameeting in Azerbaijan, which
there was in which they wereboth on the same table, by the
way, they're going to meet againin a couple of days time. So
this is going to be like thefourth meeting they've had in a
week. So despite the fact thatthere is all of this dialog
going on, the public posture ishostile, and as a result of
that, Israel has demanded thatall of southern Syria be fully
(25:21):
demilitarized, which, you know,is never going to happen. No
government, even a weak,vulnerable transitional
government, is going to acceptthe idea that it has to allow
its entire southern, you know,corner, southern region of the
country, to basically belawless. It's never going to
happen. So we are in this kindof awkward balance whereby the
Syrian Government does havemilitary forces in the south and
(25:43):
they are combating Iranianproxies, and what have you,
which should be the ingredientsfor trust building, but the
Israeli posture is hostility.
And I think Israel saw this asan opportunity too to draw a
line against the government. AndI think if it's, if I want to
(26:05):
avoid sounding conspiratorialhere, I think they also saw this
as a trap for this transitionalgovernment, a trap into which,
you know, the Syrian authoritieswould step in. They would
intervene, Israel would thenintervene on the top and they
basically humiliate thetransitional government. Put it
in a very awkward position forSyrian government forces to
(26:27):
withdraw, which they now have.
And sort of, you know, placeDamascus in a much more tricky,
pressured spot than it wasbefore. And of course, they
continue to show that they couldconduct airstrikes with
impunity. I mean, they hit theMinistry of Defense on live TV,
which, incidentally, you know,it has to be said, Never
(26:48):
happened while the Assad regimewas killing hundreds of 1000s of
people in Syria. And so I think,yes, politics was playing more
of a role here than justprotecting civilian life in
Syria.
Jim Cardoso (27:01):
And you know, not to just add to the complexity,
but it is Syria, after all. Atthe same time this is going on
now, there's also discussionabout the Syrian Democratic
Forces getting them reintegratedin the Syrian army. And there's
us demands at the SDF theysurrender all their weapons and
withdraw from the key citieswhich SDS has rejected. I mean,
where do you see the SDF rolegoing in Syria. Yeah.
Unknown (27:23):
So, I mean, this is, again, I think I said this a
little earlier, these kind ofunresolved territorial issues.
There's really two. It's theNortheast controlled by the SDF,
and it's and it's the southerngovernor of Sweden. These issues
are existential for Syria'stransition. They have to be
resolved. You know, a Syriantransition cannot, in my view,
(27:46):
at least survive into the longterm when 30% of its territory
remains outside of its control.
You know, some significantperiod of time after after it
takes authority, and we're nownearly on month eight. So they
have to be resolved. We're alsoin a place where the United
States, the Trumpadministration, and all of
(28:06):
Europe and all of the MiddleEast, excepting Israel plus
China plus Russia plus basicallythe rest of the international
community, are full square aheadand behind the idea that Syria
must reunify, and that Damascusmust have a monopoly over the
use of force, and that all armedgroups of varying kinds in Syria
(28:28):
must integrate, must eitherdemobilize, or must integrate
into the ministry of defense.
And that picture says, tells youone thing, the SDF must dissolve
and must integrate into thestate. But of course, as you
know, you know, after nearly adecade of significant us support
and in which you know, the USgovernment and the US military
(28:52):
has has, you know, been by theSDF side every single day for
basically 10 years, the SDF isfinding it very, very difficult
that to accept the idea thatthey're going to have to, I
guess, let go of some of theirgains that they have made in
terms of status in order to makethat deal. And again, if I'm if
(29:12):
I put my cynical hat on, I thinkthey're playing a waiting game,
a kind of delaying game, in thehope that somehow this
transition in Syria falls apart,and then they still keep their
status in the Northeast. Butthey are under real pressure
from the US to make this deal,and including by their longtime
(29:32):
US military partners, who aretelling them, You got to make
this deal, and Ambassador ThomasBarak, President Trump's
appointee to be the point man onSyria has given them really
strict ultimatums where the lastone of which is by the end of
August, you guys have got tomake a deal. You will no longer
be able to count on our fullsupport and backing. And this
(29:53):
and the US position on that is,is for one very simple reason,
which is, if this deal doesn'tget done, Syria. Entire
transition may start to fallapart. And as far as you know,
President Trump's strategicvision for the region is
concerned, you know, moreintegration, more economic
interaction, of course, morepeace and stability. A
transition in Syria will likelydetermine whether or not the
(30:16):
Middle East looks like that ornot. What happens in Syria has
never stayed in Syria. Itsgeographic place in the heart of
the Middle East literallydefines whether or not the
economies of Jordan and sorry,Jordan and Iraq and Lebanon and
Turkey all get to benefit ornot. And they will define
(30:38):
whether or not the Middle Eastcan establish new
interconnectivity with the withEurope and through the
Mediterranean and all of this,it all depends on Syria, and so
that is why the SDF is under somuch pressure. But they're not
budging. To be frank about it,they really are not budging, at
least not yet. But do you
Jim Cardoso (30:55):
think that realistically, they can hold out
indefinitely? Is it just amatter of time or I mean, where
do you see this going in thenear future?
Unknown (31:04):
Well, I if calm heads prevail, the SDF will realize
that the clock is ticking here.
I mean, last week, US specialforces undertook their second
counter ISIS raid alongsideSyrian government troops. Now
they didn't make a lot of noiseabout it. The language in
CENTCOM statement was a littlevague, but they were
(31:24):
coordinating a joint operationagainst ISIS, and it was the
second one we've seen in severalweeks. And for the SDF, that's
like alarm bells ringing in boththeir ears that, you know, the
sort of the sands are startingto shift a little bit. There's
also the blunt reality that theSDF economy in the northeast of
Syria, they're basicallybankrupt. Their budget over the
(31:44):
last several years hasincreasingly been in a
significant deficit, and sofinancially, in terms of being
able to provide for the peopleof northeastern Syria, insisting
on remaining autonomous is justunsustainable. It is just not
going to work. And when Syriansin northeastern Syria are
looking at what's happening inDamascus, you know, there was a
(32:06):
delegation of more than 150 ofSaudi Arabia's most wealthy
people in Damascus a week ago,and they signed 47 contracts
worth more than six and a halfbillion dollars. And those are
contracts, not mo use thatmoney, that investment, that
development and reconstruction,is going to be happening in
territories controlled by thetransitional government, but
(32:29):
it's not going to be happeningin the north, in the SDF, held
northeast, or, for that matter,in sweder in the south, either
until all of Syria reunites. Andso despite the instability,
despite all of the challengesassociated with you know who
this transitional government is,is led by at the top, the
trajectory we're on here is,hopefully, if we're all
(32:53):
optimistic, a path for Syria'srecovery. And all Syrians should
benefit from that, but they can.
That will only happen if all ofthese sides come to the table
and all of them are willing tomake concessions and
compromises. And like I say,we're not there yet, but I think
(33:14):
increasingly it's going to dawnon the SDF that really they have
no choice. And the deal on thetable from Damascus is the last
thing I'll say a deal on thetable from Damascus isn't a
really bad one. You know, theBiden administration, before
Assad fell, was pushing the SDFto make a deal with Assad's
regime. The deal Assad had onthe table was way worse than
(33:34):
what's currently on the tablefrom this transitional
government in terms of rightsfor the Kurds, in terms of
Kurdish language rights,cultural rights, in terms of
seats within the governmentitself, influence within the
parliament, proportional,proportional disbursement of
revenues and everything else.
It's a much better deal on thetable. Now the problem is, of
(33:57):
course, is they don't trust thetransitional government, and
that's the that's the otherthing. So with us guarantees
that may be our way over thatwall,
Jim Cardoso (34:08):
and that's a great transition as we start to wind
down. The podcast been afascinating conversation. But
what do you see as the you knowtalk us through the US
positions, and you have beentalking about that through the
podcast, where do you see uspolicy going forward now?
Unknown (34:24):
Yeah, well, I think President Trump made a gamble on
this, and the gamble was toalign himself with the rest of
the region, and the rest of theregion sees Syria as the key to
unlocking a much moreprosperous, peaceful, integrated
(34:46):
region. And of course, thatquite aligns with the way that
President Trump wants to see theworld. He wants to see money
being and money and business andexchange being the path to to
stability and prosperity. And sohe. Has basically aligned
himself with the region, but itwas a gamble, because it's a
controversial transition, ortransitional government. It's
(35:08):
also, frankly speaking, it's atransition that is that faces
the most unbelievable structuralchallenges at a societal level,
an economic level, at aphysical, practical destruction
level. Everything else is almostan unprecedented transitional
challenge. But I think given thefact that he has so publicly
(35:30):
aligned himself with this, Istill struggle to see a path
where he changes his mind andbacktracks, in large part
because he would then lose therest of the region for good. And
again, sort of to broaden outthe conversation a little bit
here. You know, Trumpadministration still speaks
publicly about wanting tobroaden the Abraham Accords, for
(35:52):
example. Now, you know, theprospects of Syria going into
the Abraham accords is still wayaway. I think the best we can
hope for is kind of a deescalation or a security
agreement, but not impossible inthe long term. But I tell you,
what, if the US and Israel,because right now, Israel is the
spoiler in Syria as a country,but if the US and Israel become
(36:15):
a joint spoiler for Syria'stransition, then the idea that
anyone else in the region isgoing to join the Abraham
accords ever will basically beoff the table. The region sees
Syria as their biggest strategicopportunity in 50 years. So we
cannot sort of understate justhow much of a stake the region
has placed on this Syriantransition. And so for that
(36:37):
reason, too, I don't seePresident Trump, you know, doing
180 degree shift and turningagainst what's, you know, the
transition that's in place. Buttheir challenge now is more
complicated than it was a fewmonths ago. The decision a few
months ago was to engage, tomeet, to normalize, to lift
(36:58):
sanctions. And those things haveall happened now. The challenge
now is to lend us credibilitymediation to resolving some of
these really, really thornyterritorial and political issues
inside the country. And theFrank matter is the Saudis, the
Jordanians, the Turks, are alltrying mediation themselves. But
(37:19):
the real progress that we'veseen in terms of mediation and
negotiation in recent months hasonly ever been when the US has
been the front at the table. Andso, yeah, the challenge is
different. Now I think ThomasBarak has been amazingly dynamic
in his position. He isconstantly on the move. He's,
frankly speaking, looks likehe's doing way more in his role
(37:41):
as special envoy on Syria thanhe is as ambassador to Turkey.
Syria seems to be like a real,real passion for him, given the
opportunity. And I think that'sgood. We have to have an
empowered and dynamic frontperson, man or woman in this
role, and I think Tom Barak fitsthat very well, but it's going
to have to be sustained. Thiscan't just be a matter of
(38:02):
saying, right, we've normalizedand reintegrated them into the
world. Job done. Good luckSyria. Best of luck and hope
things work out. Then things arenot going to work out. The big
challenges lie ahead now interms of helping to reintegrate
the country itself,
Jim Cardoso (38:18):
you know, but what I hear as I listen to you, is
what I would call cautiousoptimism, that in a region that
really hasn't had much cause foroptimism for years, there may be
again that that light at the endof the tunnel that people talk
about, but that at least thereis a pathway to some level of
(38:40):
stability in a region that'sexperienced just nothing but
difficult times for years, underunder a despotic regime and with
a humanitarian crisis, which youtalked about last time you're on
the podcast. But you'd say theremay be, you know, some things
got to happen, no question aboutthat. But there is a positive
way ahead.
Unknown (39:00):
Yeah, yeah, there is, I mean, I mean, to make it sort of
personal, you know, I've spent14 years of my life being deeply
pessimistic and in a very darkplace about Syria and and, yes,
with Assad's removal and withinternational engagement, there
is finally a chance to becautiously optimistic. We have
to be optimistic, because Ithink the benefits of this all
(39:23):
working out will be genuinelyhistoric and transformative, not
just for Syria, but for the restof the region. And really,
really transformative. You know,there is a reason why, you know,
half of the Middle East that is,and has always been, for many,
many years, outright hostile topolitical Islam is now
(39:43):
championing, championing Ahmedal shara, the former leader of
al Qaeda affiliate in Syria. Imean, there's a reason for that.
You know, some of Ahmad Al Sharais biggest champions are the
leadership of the UAE, which,you know, if anyone who knows
anything about the Middle East,would have come as a huge
surprise. Yes, but there is areason for that one. Ahmed al
Shara is pretty pragmatic, andas very senior US Intel people
(40:07):
have told me, still seen as theonly person in Syria who could
potentially hold this alltogether, given all of the
challenges. But it's also givenit's also a result of this huge,
transformative opportunity thatthe Middle East has been
presented with, if Syria can bemade to work, if this transition
(40:28):
can succeed, can widen, canimprove itself over time, and
so, you know, again, I think,given all of the my attempt to
be optimistic here, you know, Ihave to always sort of remind
listeners that there's nopapering over the very many
troubling issues that are goingon inside Syria too. There's no
papering over the reality thatthere are, you know, weaker
(40:51):
foreign fighters from China whoare now part of the Ministry of
Defense, by the way, withAmerican permission. So also
weird, you know, blue sky placeto be. But you know, not
papering over any of theseenormous challenges and the
crimes that have been committedagainst civilians in the last
six or seven months. But assomeone who's worked on Syria
for so long, we are also in aplace where, in a very cold way,
(41:14):
all of this, all of those morenasty things, were always
inevitable. You know, we couldhave had Thomas Jefferson
running and running thepresidency in Damascus, we would
still have massacres,sectarianism and what have you
that that's going to be in Syriafor a long time to come. But the
key is, is that on a slow andlong trajectory, things get a
little bit better over time, andwe are in that place. Things
(41:37):
have got a little bit better.
You know, every single day forthe last seven and a half
months. And in politicaltransition terms, we're only
seven months in. That's reallyearly days, and the amount of
progress that they have made isstunning. But they do have very
real issues and challenges underthe surface. And I don't want to
sort of paper over any of that.
(41:59):
Those are all very, very real,and there are real issues there.
But yes, with an eye to thatstrategic vision, I have to be
still optimistic that we'restill pointing in the right
direction.
Jim Cardoso (42:11):
Well, I appreciate that while a lot of people are
trying to bring order to thechaos of Syria, you are able to
bring order to the chaos of whatwe know about Syria and how we
understand Syria, and I'm good.
I am hopeful that we haveanother opportunity to speak,
maybe a year from now, and maybethere is a reason for continued
optimism in that conversation wehave in the future. But for
(42:34):
today, looking to wrap up thepodcast. Any any final thoughts
as we as we go?
Unknown (42:41):
No, no, I don't think so. I think, I think it's just
yeah. It's this rare opportunityto try to be optimistic about
something in the future. Butit's also inevitably being the
Middle East. It's one of thosecases where nothing's black and
white. Nothing's perfect, forsure, nothing is perfect. But
you know, when I speak to somany people, you know, ordinary
(43:01):
people who don't work in ourworld. And I mentioned that I
work on the Middle East, theirinstant, you know, gut
responses, oh, God, you know.
Why do you do that? It's, it'schaos, it's conflict, it's, you
know, terrorism is whatever youknow. This is one of those real
chances where acknowledging allthe bad and all the challenges,
there is a chance to see abetter future. And it's not just
a better future for Syria, it'sa better future for the region.
(43:24):
And I think, you know, we've allgot to keep our eyes on that
long term horizon here, whilsteverything still looks chaotic
and messy and in some respectsquite bad, every now and then,
we've got to keep our eye onthat, on that long term vision,
because if we don't, then it'sall hopeless. And so that's
that's why I remain cautiouslyoptimistic.
Jim Cardoso (43:46):
Charles Lister, thank you so much for your time
today. Really appreciate it.
Thanks for having me, Jim. Thankyou. Thanks to Charles Lister, a
senior fellow at the Middle EastInstitute and director of their
counter terrorism and Syriaprograms. We couldn't ask for a
better person to help explainwhat's going on in Syria right
now and the regional and globalimplications. We always enjoy
having Charles on the podcast.
(44:09):
Next week on at the boundary,our guest will be Dr Marvin
Weinbaum, also a senior fellowat the Middle East Institute and
a leading scholar onAfghanistan. Dr Weinbaum wrote
an article for our most recentissue of the Journal of
strategic security, a specialissue focused exclusively on
Afghanistan. His articleexamines us dealings with the
Taliban and how we can chart apath to a successful national
(44:32):
policy in that nation. Thanksfor listening today. You like
the podcast, please subscribeand let your friends and
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we'd love to hear from you.
There's a link in the show notesto get in touch with us. You can
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(44:52):
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and national security issues wefound to be insightful,
(45:14):
fascinating, maybecontroversial, but overall, just
worth talking about, I'm JimCardoso, and we'll see you at
the boundary. You.
Jim, hello everyone. Welcome to this week's
(00:14):
episode of at the boundary, thepodcast from the global and
national security Institute atthe University of South Florida.
I'm Jim Cardoso, Senior Directorfor GNSI, and your host for at
the boundary. Today on the show,we're bringing back a guest we
previously interviewed almost ayear ago. Charles Lister is one
(00:35):
of the world's foremost expertson Syria. We said during our
last conversation we wanted tohave him back and with that
country again embroiled inconflict and turmoil, we thought
now would be a good time beforewe bring him in. However, we
wanted to remind you thatregistration is open for cyber
Bay 2025 some of the nation'sleading cybersecurity AI and
(00:57):
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It's scheduled for October 13 tothe 15th, and it'll be a can't
miss event. Featured speakersinclude Jen easterly, the former
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monthly newsletter, or justclick the link in the show note.
All right, let's welcome ourspecial guest today. Joining us
today from the UK is CharlesLister, senior fellow at the
Middle East Institute, wherehe's also the director of their
(02:00):
counter terrorism and Syriaprograms, Charles, welcome back
to out the
Unknown (02:04):
boundary. Thanks so much for having me, Jim, it's
good to be back. So
Jim Cardoso (02:08):
let's dive into it.
Obviously, your area ofexpertise has been pretty active
recently, but going back alittle bit, Bashar Al Assad fled
from power in December 2024 atthe time, that was an incredibly
unexpected event, but I thinkthere were some expectations as
to what would happen goingforward. What's big and been the
biggest surprise for you?
Unknown (02:30):
Yeah, it's a good question. I mean, certainly a
lot has happened in Syria overthe last eight months or so. You
know, I think retrospectively,just a note, as someone who
lives and breathes Syria on analmost 24/7 basis. Certainly,
the speed of Assad's departureand downfall was unquestionably
unexpected. Definitely, no onesaw that coming in 10 days,
(02:53):
although I think alsoretrospectively, there were a
lot of clues that things werebeginning to unravel. And I
think, you know, one of thereally big lessons for me as
someone, as I say, who does payattention to this, you know,
every hour of the day is that,you know, paying real attention
to all the granular detailsreally does reveal some of those
(03:14):
really significant trends. Andthere were big warning signs in
the second half of last yearthat that something quite
significant was happening. Andso looking towards the future,
and what kind of surprises Ihad, and have had, I suppose,
over the last seven or eightmonths. I mean, the I'd probably
(03:35):
put them in in a sequence. Thefirst one was what I have called
the rush to Damascus. So it tooka matter of a handful of days
for Assad to flee on a privatejet to Russia and a leader of a
long time jihadist movement toassume the leadership and
(03:55):
Presidency of the country. Ittook a handful of days for that
to happen before countries wereflooding to Damascus, and over
the past seven months, at mycount, we've had over 70
governments around the worldcome to Damascus for official
engagements with thistransitional authority. And I
have not been able to find anycomparison, any comparison that
(04:19):
comes anywhere close in a postconflict environment where we
have seen so much of theinternational community flood to
a capital city and to engagewith it, with a transitional
government, and that's before wetake into consideration, you
know, who's at the top of thistransitional government, and
their kind of controversial, oras President Trump has called,
their strong histories. So therush to Damascus was the first
(04:42):
one. And of course, the US waswas part of that rush, as was
the Europeans and others. Thesecond one, as a sequence, is
the subsequent basically whatwhat would should be called the
normalization of Syria's newtransitional government in the
international community, and thespeed with which that's
happened. And. Um, you know,Syria is now right back in at
(05:03):
the highest levels of the UnitedNations. It's back in all of the
multinational bodies. It hasbeen basically fully
reintegrated into the world in away that we haven't seen in at
least 60 years. So for Syria,it's totally historic. But
again, I struggle to find acomparative case study where an
international pariah state ofthe level that Syria was has
(05:26):
basically been fullyreintegrated into the world in
the space of six months. So thespeed of that normalization was
was certainly a surprise, andcertainly something quite
significant. And then the third1/3, and last one is again in
sequence, President Trump'sdecision to dramatically pivot
away from, frankly speaking,everything that everyone he had
(05:48):
appointed into positions inforeign and national security
policy, and he did a complete180 degree against all of their
advice, and fully engaged andnormalized US relations with
this transitional government inSyria. So the first half of that
sort of third surprise wasTrump's pivot, and then the
second half of it is a reallesson for us, which is what I
(06:12):
have called Trump rules. Youknow, when President Trump
decides that something's goingto happen, it happens, and it
happens very fast. And so manyof my friends who work on
sanctions policy and, you know,sanctions analysis, they can't
come anywhere close to us to acase study where the America's
(06:33):
biggest and most complexsanctions regime against Syria
has basically almost entirelybeen removed in the space of
about three months. I mean,there's just literally no, no
comparison. So when PresidentTrump decides something is going
to happen, and in his words, hegives, He wants to give Syria a
chance to recover, and ofcourse, we can maybe come to
talk about why he wants to dothat, then it happens. And it
(06:56):
happens really fast. Andeveryone he'd appointed who was
deeply, deeply against thisbefore he met President Ahmad Al
Shara in Saudi Arabia, ralliedaround the flag, and are now,
you know, essentially, I guess,cautiously, cheerleading the
exact same policy of engagement.
So those would be my threesurprises. Well,
Jim Cardoso (07:15):
President Trump has proven he's sometimes willing to
go in his own separate way, andsometimes it works out well, and
sometimes it remains to be seen,but it is interesting. And I
think the speed, you all three,one thing they shared is the
speed at which things arehappening. And I think we're
gonna, we're gonna try to hit alittle bit about US policy and
your thoughts on that later on.
But first, at the beginning, youtalked about, you know, the new
(07:36):
leader there. You know, what isyour assessment of Amman al
showers leadership in Syria thusfar. I mean, this guy, he's gone
from a designated globalterrorist with 110 or was it a
$10 million bounty on his head,to meeting the world's diplomats
up to the, you know, up to thenumber of 70 countries. As you
said, What's your assessment ofthat album so far?
Unknown (07:59):
Well, I think his kind of scorecard is is split in in
in two parts. One is his kind offoreign policy, and one is his
domestic policy. And I think onforeign policy, he's barely put
a foot wrong. And again, thatthat helps to explain the speed
with which everything hashappened on day one, when he
(08:22):
walked into Damascus, given whohe was, he instantly was saying
the right things. He was talkingin the language of, you know,
traditional mainstream politicaltransitions. You know, I joked
very early on in the transitionin Syria that if someone had
written the dummy's guide to apolitical transition. He Ahmed
(08:42):
al Shara was literally tickingoff each box one by one. So he
said all of the right things. Hestructured the transition in
most of the right ways. And Ithink given a who he is, who was
around him when he walked intoDamascus, the movement that he
still led when he walked intoDamascus, the fact that we now
(09:03):
have we've gone from what wascalled a caretaker government,
which was entirely his men, towhat's now the transitional
government, where, for only fourout of 23 members of the
transitional government are Hispeople, and the rest of them are
genuine professionaltechnocrats. You know, I had a
(09:24):
meeting the other day with thegovernor of Syria's Central
Bank, who spent most of hiscareer working for Ernst and
Young all around the world andwith the New York Fed. You know,
the technocratic base of thetransitional government now is a
really encouraging sign, andthat has obviously given the
international community theconfidence to engage in the
rapid way that they have. And ofcourse, he's also had what He
(09:49):
has called a no problems policyin the region, and that's mostly
directed towards Israel, andthat's a whole nother sort of
topic of conversation we couldpotentially come to Israel has.
Plenty. Israel has plenty ofconcerns and has done plenty of
things, but Ahmed al Shara hasdone precisely nothing in
response. The biggest thing he'sdone to the Israelis in the last
(10:11):
seven months is file a complaintat the Security Council about
Israeli airstrikes. So again, interms of kind of a vote of
confidence to give the rest ofthe international community the
confidence to continue toengage. He's done those right
things on the foreign policylevel, on the domestic it's a
different picture. It's moregray than black and white. He
(10:33):
has had clear some successes.
The fact that he hasaccomplished, by and large, the
fully lifting of sanctions bythe international community
against Syria is and willcontinue to have a really
significant economic benefit tothe people who have, of course,
suffered immeasurably on ahumanitarian level for so long.
But we have had these bouts ofreally major conflict, internal
conflict, sectarian conflict,mass killings, and to an extent,
(10:57):
if I put on my very cold analysthat on, these things were
inevitable, and not becauseAhmed al Shara was the
transitional president, butbecause of how what Syria looks
like after 14 years of civilconflict and more than 50 Years
of minority dictatorship rule,which Basically weaponized
minority communities againstother minorities, minorities
(11:20):
against majorities. This, thisinstability that we're
continuing to see is, in a coldway, inevitable. His response to
it, though, has not been up toscratch. There needs to be a lot
more of a demonstration ofjustice and accountability for
for crimes, not just crimescommitted by the former regime,
but also by men under theMinistry of the new Ministry of
(11:44):
Defense and Ministry ofInterior. And although I think
we're starting to see some ofthis change, he and his
government also need to be muchmore flexible in the way that
they negotiate with some of,again, what I'm calling the kind
of unresolved territorial issuesin Syria that the Northeast sway
in the south areas that arebasically out of government
control. He's embraced a prettyzero sum posture in those
(12:07):
negotiations, and there needs tobe some flexibility, because if
they don't get resolved, we'regoing to continue to see these
major flare ups of violence. Soit's a mixed bag. On the
domestic level, I could give you20 other examples foreign policy
overwhelming success. Let's
Jim Cardoso (12:25):
and so let's Great answer. And thank you so much.
It's a great that's a greatinsight. Let's dive a little bit
more into the domestic side andbring it up to the to the
current as you said, in southernSyria and suede it's been the
site of deadly clashes,widespread reports of human
rights violations and abusesstarted with the pro government
forces and the Druze, and thenspread to the local Bedouin
(12:46):
tribes confronting the Jews aswell. What if you could maybe a
little primer on what drove theenmity between these factions?
And you may need to touch alittle bit on the Druze, because
I think a lot of peoplelistening may not be fully
familiar with who the Jews areand how they're comprised.
Unknown (13:02):
Yeah. So, as with everything on Syria, it's
complicated, so I'll try to,I'll try to make it as sort of
simple as,
Jim Cardoso (13:09):
that's why we have you on the show Charles, to make
the complicated easy tounderstand.
Unknown (13:14):
I'll try. I'll try, perhaps, to go through a little
bit of the chronology, but alsopick out some of the core kind
of drivers and things. I mean,first of all, the Druze are a
religious minority group withtheir with their roots within,
within the Islamic faith, buthave branched out a long, long,
long, long time ago into theirown sort of religious
(13:35):
foundations. They are spreadbetween parts of Syria parts of
Lebanon. They have a presence inIsrael too, which plays into why
Israel has embraced this kind ofdesire to protect the Druze,
mostly due to domestic Israeliconcerns, rather than
necessarily primarily theconcerns of Druze outside. But
(13:55):
so they're a minority group.
They're predominantly based inthis southern province or
governorate called sweder. Andin being the dominant community
there in this province, theDruze have historically, always,
over decades, embraced the ideathat they pursue a kind of an
extent of semi autonomy. Theyeven under the Assad's sweder
(14:19):
under Drew's leadership wasafforded a lot more sort of
Decentralized Governance. Theyhad a lot more control over
their local local governance.
And so under this transition,the Druze have expected those
same kind of rights or that thatsame kind of status. How did
(14:40):
things begin? So on the night ofJuly the 11th, a Druze man was
driving a pickup truck full ofvegetables from Damascus to
suede suede south of Damascus,about an hour's drive, and he
was stopped on the side of theroad by a handful of Ben. Gunmen
(15:01):
who you know, forced him out ofthe vehicle, beat him up and
stole his his truck andvegetables. So to start with a
relatively minor incident in thewhole scope of things. The
following morning, inretaliation for that Drew's
gunman kidnapped a bunch ofBedouin men, and hours later,
(15:22):
Bedouin gunmen kidnapped a bunchof Druze men, and we had 24
hours of tit for tat kidnappingsbetween Druze and Bedouin
communities, both of which arebased in sweder. So this was not
a kind of Syria conflict. Thiswas very hyper localized
tensions and hostilities betweenSwedish Bedouin community and
(15:43):
Sweden's Druze community go backdecades. So they have been at
loggerheads over land ownership,control of smuggling routes. It
should be said here that sweder,I mean, Syria as a country, has
been riven by smuggling for avery, very long time, very
powerful smuggling industry, andSweden was a really core
(16:04):
historical part of the smugglingtrade into Jordan through the
sweder desert. And so bothcomponents of the Bedouin
community and components of theDruze community have been
fighting over smuggling routes,smuggling access and land
ownership for a long time. Soreally, most of these tensions
emanate from that. It's gotnothing to do with religion.
(16:26):
It's everything to do with land,history and politics. Having
said that, when these tit fortat kidnappings began to
escalate into more directconflict, after about 36 hours,
we were in a place where, again,the transitional government in
Syria has zero presence insweder. They never went in after
Assad fell, they afforded swederThe same sort of status they had
(16:49):
before. They were attempting tonegotiate what they call kind of
integration agreement wherebysway unites into the rest of the
country and becomes part of thetransition. But they weren't
there yet. So all of this wasplaying out while the government
was on the outside. I think, inretrospect, the government was
clearly, I think, saw sis, to anextent, as an opportunity. In
(17:11):
other words, it allowed chaos tounfold between these two local
communities to press the ideathat if Syria is going to
stabilize, the government has aresponsibility to enforce law
and order, and the government isthe only actor who should have
the responsibility to enforcelaw and order. So again, not to
make it too complicated, butwhile that kidnapping was
(17:32):
happening on that day, July the12th, there was a meeting
between Syria and Israel inAzerbaijan, mediated by America
and Turkey, and in that meeting,I know for a fact a significant
portion of that meeting wasdedicated to a discussion around
what was called the sovereignrights of a transitional
government in Syria. And theSyrian delegation wanted to get
(17:56):
the Israelis to confirm that itwas the government's
responsibility to enforce lawand order when localized
conflict develops. And accordingto a third country observer who
was in the room, who I spoke to,the Israelis, did say, Yes, of
course, that's your right. Youknow, any government has the has
the responsibility and the rightto, you know, have a monopoly
(18:19):
over monopoly over the use offorce and to enforce law and
order. So 24 hours after thatmeeting, the government made a
decision that it was going to goin, and it was going to go into
swada and intervene before doingso, they consulted all
privately, of course, with allof the Druze leadership in
sweder. They consulted with thewith the United States. They
(18:41):
consulted with Jordan, and theysent a message through the US to
Israel to say, we intend tointervene in 12 hours. And then
they did so within 10 minutes ofgovernment forces going in on
July the 14th into Sweden,crossing the provincial line,
they were ambushed by Druzemilitiamen, 10 Syrian government
(19:02):
soldiers were rounded up on theside of the road and executed,
and then their dead bodies wereused for celebratory
photographs, which swiftly wentviral on social media. And then
eight other soldiers werestripped to their underwear,
marched to a nearby village,lined up alongside a wall and
shot that was that one incidentwas basically the kind of cases,
(19:24):
belly thing that turned thisinto a major conflict. The
government then saw that it, orperceived it, had been betrayed.
It had, you know, done all thoseconsultations. Nobody had said
no. And then instantly theywere, they were ambushed. And
this, this sort of small scalemassacre happened on the highway
as they went in. So thegovernment went all out. They
(19:46):
went, this is, you know, thishas to be dealt with. This is a
kind of coup against thegovernment. And that was when we
started to see some of thecrimes being committed. Then
Israel intervened in a. Way thatthey framed it as to protect the
Druze community. The Israeliintervention basically made this
entire conflict zero sum foreverybody. Though, the Druze saw
(20:09):
this as their one chance to drawa line in the sand and say, We
will forever be at least semiautonomous. We do not recognize
and we don't respect thetransitional government. The
government of Syria, saw this astheir only opportunity to draw a
line in the sand and say, No, weare the government and we have
the responsibility. And then theBedouin saw this as a kind of
(20:30):
fight for their existence. Allof that also fueled crimes and
atrocities on all sides. Andthere were crimes and atrocities
on all sides the governmentforces conducted extra judicial
executions, Drew's militiamen,beheaded dead bodies and posted
photographs up online. They alsohave been proven to have
(20:52):
executed a number of children,burnt Bedouin villages. It was
grim, really, really ugly, andcutting a long, long, long long
story short, because now we'reonly halfway through the
chronology, it's only been USled mediation that has also
involved the Saudis, theJordanians and the Turks that
have managed to get us to wherewe are now, which is a cease
(21:13):
fire. There's no solution here.
Everyone has just stoppedfighting. The lines have been
drawn. Sweden remains outside ofgovernment control. And whereas,
you know, three weeks ago, mostDruze leaders in sweder were
very open and supportive of theidea of making a compromise with
Damascus, most of them have nowcome out of this whole chapter,
(21:33):
you know, very, at least fornow, very against that idea. So
we've actually backtracked fromsome of the more soft,
constructive place we were a fewweeks ago. And meanwhile,
several 1000s and 1000s of theBedouin minority community in
Sweden have been evacuated,likely permanently, and for many
(21:54):
Syrians who have been displacedmultiple times throughout the
conflict, the imagery of beingforced onto busses and then
leaving to live somewhere elsehas a really, kind of dangerous,
evocative history. So I really,really worry here that if there
isn't more third party mediationto actually resolve this, not
just a cease fire, but actuallyresolve Swedish status in Syria,
(22:15):
that this is just a pause, andwe are going to see more ugly
bouts of fighting continue,particularly as this is the
Bedouin community. They havetribal links throughout the
country, and the tribes willalways mobilize to protect their
sort of tribal brethrenelsewhere in the country, which
is exactly what happened in thelast few days of this of this
(22:38):
conflict story. That was a lot,but hopefully it was simple to
simple to follow. It was
Jim Cardoso (22:45):
actually, and, you know, I mean, you can pull a lot
of things up online and readthrough them, but that was, I
mean, that was a fantastic, youknow, one shot overview of where
it's gone, kind of taken into,you know, an account the long
term, the long term animosity,and how it bubbled over, and how
sometimes just one seeminglyminor spark event turns into
something that almost that couldbecome overwhelming. And then
(23:06):
you enter the Israelis as well.
And let's talk about that alittle bit. So the Israelis
ended the conflict, and youknow, Prime Minister Netanyahu
described that to Israel'scommitment to prevent harm to
the Druze in Syria. But I think,I think you'd agree there's
indications that reasons forIsrael's actions are a little
more nuanced. Can you talk tothat?
Unknown (23:27):
Yeah, well, I mean, obviously it's a subject of
debate, but I mean, there is aDruze minority in Israel, which
is, which is a prettyinfluential minority. I mean,
they play, they haveconsistently dedicated
themselves, probably moreheavily than almost any
community in Israel to the IDFand and and regionally, when
Druze related issues have havedeveloped across the region, in
(23:50):
Syria and Lebanon elsewhere,they have been a very loud kind
of voice pressuring the Israeligovernment to do something about
it. And so my read, at least, isthat Israel's primary concern
here, particularly given thefact that it's still at war in
Gaza, is still conductingmilitary actions in Lebanon, and
it's still conducting militaryactions in Syria, the last thing
(24:11):
they need is a kind of internalrevolt within a significant
community that contributes soheavily towards the IDF. So I
think domestic politics played avery significant role here, the
added one of and you know, toput it very bluntly, is that the
current Israeli government, andit has said this, has zero trust
in Syria's transitionalauthority, you know, not despite
(24:34):
President Trump's embrace,despite, you know, everything
that we talked about in thefirst The first question around
those surprises and seriousintegration, Israel's posture is
it does not trust thisgovernment. And you know, as the
Israeli Foreign Minister justsaid, I think, yesterday or the
other day, he called it another,you know, jihadist government.
(24:57):
So, so there's no trust. Yeah.
And so even if there was ameeting in Azerbaijan, which
there was in which they wereboth on the same table, by the
way, they're going to meet againin a couple of days time. So
this is going to be like thefourth meeting they've had in a
week. So despite the fact thatthere is all of this dialog
going on, the public posture ishostile, and as a result of
that, Israel has demanded thatall of southern Syria be fully
(25:21):
demilitarized, which, you know,is never going to happen. No
government, even a weak,vulnerable transitional
government, is going to acceptthe idea that it has to allow
its entire southern, you know,corner, southern region of the
country, to basically belawless. It's never going to
happen. So we are in this kindof awkward balance whereby the
Syrian Government does havemilitary forces in the south and
(25:43):
they are combating Iranianproxies, and what have you,
which should be the ingredientsfor trust building, but the
Israeli posture is hostility.
And I think Israel saw this asan opportunity too to draw a
line against the government. AndI think if it's, if I want to
(26:05):
avoid sounding conspiratorialhere, I think they also saw this
as a trap for this transitionalgovernment, a trap into which,
you know, the Syrian authoritieswould step in. They would
intervene, Israel would thenintervene on the top and they
basically humiliate thetransitional government. Put it
in a very awkward position forSyrian government forces to
(26:27):
withdraw, which they now have.
And sort of, you know, placeDamascus in a much more tricky,
pressured spot than it wasbefore. And of course, they
continue to show that they couldconduct airstrikes with
impunity. I mean, they hit theMinistry of Defense on live TV,
which, incidentally, you know,it has to be said, Never
(26:48):
happened while the Assad regimewas killing hundreds of 1000s of
people in Syria. And so I think,yes, politics was playing more
of a role here than justprotecting civilian life in
Syria.
Jim Cardoso (27:01):
And you know, not to just add to the complexity,
but it is Syria, after all. Atthe same time this is going on
now, there's also discussionabout the Syrian Democratic
Forces getting them reintegratedin the Syrian army. And there's
us demands at the SDF theysurrender all their weapons and
withdraw from the key citieswhich SDS has rejected. I mean,
where do you see the SDF rolegoing in Syria. Yeah.
Unknown (27:23):
So, I mean, this is, again, I think I said this a
little earlier, these kind ofunresolved territorial issues.
There's really two. It's theNortheast controlled by the SDF,
and it's and it's the southerngovernor of Sweden. These issues
are existential for Syria'stransition. They have to be
resolved. You know, a Syriantransition cannot, in my view,
(27:46):
at least survive into the longterm when 30% of its territory
remains outside of its control.
You know, some significantperiod of time after after it
takes authority, and we're nownearly on month eight. So they
have to be resolved. We're alsoin a place where the United
States, the Trumpadministration, and all of
(28:06):
Europe and all of the MiddleEast, excepting Israel plus
China plus Russia plus basicallythe rest of the international
community, are full square aheadand behind the idea that Syria
must reunify, and that Damascusmust have a monopoly over the
use of force, and that all armedgroups of varying kinds in Syria
(28:28):
must integrate, must eitherdemobilize, or must integrate
into the ministry of defense.
And that picture says, tells youone thing, the SDF must dissolve
and must integrate into thestate. But of course, as you
know, you know, after nearly adecade of significant us support
and in which you know, the USgovernment and the US military
(28:52):
has has, you know, been by theSDF side every single day for
basically 10 years, the SDF isfinding it very, very difficult
that to accept the idea thatthey're going to have to, I
guess, let go of some of theirgains that they have made in
terms of status in order to makethat deal. And again, if I'm if
(29:12):
I put my cynical hat on, I thinkthey're playing a waiting game,
a kind of delaying game, in thehope that somehow this
transition in Syria falls apart,and then they still keep their
status in the Northeast. Butthey are under real pressure
from the US to make this deal,and including by their longtime
(29:32):
US military partners, who aretelling them, You got to make
this deal, and Ambassador ThomasBarak, President Trump's
appointee to be the point man onSyria has given them really
strict ultimatums where the lastone of which is by the end of
August, you guys have got tomake a deal. You will no longer
be able to count on our fullsupport and backing. And this
(29:53):
and the US position on that is,is for one very simple reason,
which is, if this deal doesn'tget done, Syria. Entire
transition may start to fallapart. And as far as you know,
President Trump's strategicvision for the region is
concerned, you know, moreintegration, more economic
interaction, of course, morepeace and stability. A
transition in Syria will likelydetermine whether or not the
(30:16):
Middle East looks like that ornot. What happens in Syria has
never stayed in Syria. Itsgeographic place in the heart of
the Middle East literallydefines whether or not the
economies of Jordan and sorry,Jordan and Iraq and Lebanon and
Turkey all get to benefit ornot. And they will define
(30:38):
whether or not the Middle Eastcan establish new
interconnectivity with the withEurope and through the
Mediterranean and all of this,it all depends on Syria, and so
that is why the SDF is under somuch pressure. But they're not
budging. To be frank about it,they really are not budging, at
least not yet. But do you
Jim Cardoso (30:55):
think that realistically, they can hold out
indefinitely? Is it just amatter of time or I mean, where
do you see this going in thenear future?
Unknown (31:04):
Well, I if calm heads prevail, the SDF will realize
that the clock is ticking here.
I mean, last week, US specialforces undertook their second
counter ISIS raid alongsideSyrian government troops. Now
they didn't make a lot of noiseabout it. The language in
CENTCOM statement was a littlevague, but they were
(31:24):
coordinating a joint operationagainst ISIS, and it was the
second one we've seen in severalweeks. And for the SDF, that's
like alarm bells ringing in boththeir ears that, you know, the
sort of the sands are startingto shift a little bit. There's
also the blunt reality that theSDF economy in the northeast of
Syria, they're basicallybankrupt. Their budget over the
(31:44):
last several years hasincreasingly been in a
significant deficit, and sofinancially, in terms of being
able to provide for the peopleof northeastern Syria, insisting
on remaining autonomous is justunsustainable. It is just not
going to work. And when Syriansin northeastern Syria are
looking at what's happening inDamascus, you know, there was a
(32:06):
delegation of more than 150 ofSaudi Arabia's most wealthy
people in Damascus a week ago,and they signed 47 contracts
worth more than six and a halfbillion dollars. And those are
contracts, not mo use thatmoney, that investment, that
development and reconstruction,is going to be happening in
territories controlled by thetransitional government, but
(32:29):
it's not going to be happeningin the north, in the SDF, held
northeast, or, for that matter,in sweder in the south, either
until all of Syria reunites. Andso despite the instability,
despite all of the challengesassociated with you know who
this transitional government is,is led by at the top, the
trajectory we're on here is,hopefully, if we're all
(32:53):
optimistic, a path for Syria'srecovery. And all Syrians should
benefit from that, but they can.
That will only happen if all ofthese sides come to the table
and all of them are willing tomake concessions and
compromises. And like I say,we're not there yet, but I think
(33:14):
increasingly it's going to dawnon the SDF that really they have
no choice. And the deal on thetable from Damascus is the last
thing I'll say a deal on thetable from Damascus isn't a
really bad one. You know, theBiden administration, before
Assad fell, was pushing the SDFto make a deal with Assad's
regime. The deal Assad had onthe table was way worse than
(33:34):
what's currently on the tablefrom this transitional
government in terms of rightsfor the Kurds, in terms of
Kurdish language rights,cultural rights, in terms of
seats within the governmentitself, influence within the
parliament, proportional,proportional disbursement of
revenues and everything else.
It's a much better deal on thetable. Now the problem is, of
(33:57):
course, is they don't trust thetransitional government, and
that's the that's the otherthing. So with us guarantees
that may be our way over thatwall,
Jim Cardoso (34:08):
and that's a great transition as we start to wind
down. The podcast been afascinating conversation. But
what do you see as the you knowtalk us through the US
positions, and you have beentalking about that through the
podcast, where do you see uspolicy going forward now?
Unknown (34:24):
Yeah, well, I think President Trump made a gamble on
this, and the gamble was toalign himself with the rest of
the region, and the rest of theregion sees Syria as the key to
unlocking a much moreprosperous, peaceful, integrated
(34:46):
region. And of course, thatquite aligns with the way that
President Trump wants to see theworld. He wants to see money
being and money and business andexchange being the path to to
stability and prosperity. And sohe. Has basically aligned
himself with the region, but itwas a gamble, because it's a
controversial transition, ortransitional government. It's
(35:08):
also, frankly speaking, it's atransition that is that faces
the most unbelievable structuralchallenges at a societal level,
an economic level, at aphysical, practical destruction
level. Everything else is almostan unprecedented transitional
challenge. But I think given thefact that he has so publicly
(35:30):
aligned himself with this, Istill struggle to see a path
where he changes his mind andbacktracks, in large part
because he would then lose therest of the region for good. And
again, sort of to broaden outthe conversation a little bit
here. You know, Trumpadministration still speaks
publicly about wanting tobroaden the Abraham Accords, for
(35:52):
example. Now, you know, theprospects of Syria going into
the Abraham accords is still wayaway. I think the best we can
hope for is kind of a deescalation or a security
agreement, but not impossible inthe long term. But I tell you,
what, if the US and Israel,because right now, Israel is the
spoiler in Syria as a country,but if the US and Israel become
(36:15):
a joint spoiler for Syria'stransition, then the idea that
anyone else in the region isgoing to join the Abraham
accords ever will basically beoff the table. The region sees
Syria as their biggest strategicopportunity in 50 years. So we
cannot sort of understate justhow much of a stake the region
has placed on this Syriantransition. And so for that
(36:37):
reason, too, I don't seePresident Trump, you know, doing
180 degree shift and turningagainst what's, you know, the
transition that's in place. Buttheir challenge now is more
complicated than it was a fewmonths ago. The decision a few
months ago was to engage, tomeet, to normalize, to lift
(36:58):
sanctions. And those things haveall happened now. The challenge
now is to lend us credibilitymediation to resolving some of
these really, really thornyterritorial and political issues
inside the country. And theFrank matter is the Saudis, the
Jordanians, the Turks, are alltrying mediation themselves. But
(37:19):
the real progress that we'veseen in terms of mediation and
negotiation in recent months hasonly ever been when the US has
been the front at the table. Andso, yeah, the challenge is
different. Now I think ThomasBarak has been amazingly dynamic
in his position. He isconstantly on the move. He's,
frankly speaking, looks likehe's doing way more in his role
(37:41):
as special envoy on Syria thanhe is as ambassador to Turkey.
Syria seems to be like a real,real passion for him, given the
opportunity. And I think that'sgood. We have to have an
empowered and dynamic frontperson, man or woman in this
role, and I think Tom Barak fitsthat very well, but it's going
to have to be sustained. Thiscan't just be a matter of
(38:02):
saying, right, we've normalizedand reintegrated them into the
world. Job done. Good luckSyria. Best of luck and hope
things work out. Then things arenot going to work out. The big
challenges lie ahead now interms of helping to reintegrate
the country itself,
Jim Cardoso (38:18):
you know, but what I hear as I listen to you, is
what I would call cautiousoptimism, that in a region that
really hasn't had much cause foroptimism for years, there may be
again that that light at the endof the tunnel that people talk
about, but that at least thereis a pathway to some level of
(38:40):
stability in a region that'sexperienced just nothing but
difficult times for years, underunder a despotic regime and with
a humanitarian crisis, which youtalked about last time you're on
the podcast. But you'd say theremay be, you know, some things
got to happen, no question aboutthat. But there is a positive
way ahead.
Unknown (39:00):
Yeah, yeah, there is, I mean, I mean, to make it sort of
personal, you know, I've spent14 years of my life being deeply
pessimistic and in a very darkplace about Syria and and, yes,
with Assad's removal and withinternational engagement, there
is finally a chance to becautiously optimistic. We have
to be optimistic, because Ithink the benefits of this all
(39:23):
working out will be genuinelyhistoric and transformative, not
just for Syria, but for the restof the region. And really,
really transformative. You know,there is a reason why, you know,
half of the Middle East that is,and has always been, for many,
many years, outright hostile topolitical Islam is now
(39:43):
championing, championing Ahmedal shara, the former leader of
al Qaeda affiliate in Syria. Imean, there's a reason for that.
You know, some of Ahmad Al Sharais biggest champions are the
leadership of the UAE, which,you know, if anyone who knows
anything about the Middle East,would have come as a huge
surprise. Yes, but there is areason for that one. Ahmed al
Shara is pretty pragmatic, andas very senior US Intel people
(40:07):
have told me, still seen as theonly person in Syria who could
potentially hold this alltogether, given all of the
challenges. But it's also givenit's also a result of this huge,
transformative opportunity thatthe Middle East has been
presented with, if Syria can bemade to work, if this transition
(40:28):
can succeed, can widen, canimprove itself over time, and
so, you know, again, I think,given all of the my attempt to
be optimistic here, you know, Ihave to always sort of remind
listeners that there's nopapering over the very many
troubling issues that are goingon inside Syria too. There's no
papering over the reality thatthere are, you know, weaker
(40:51):
foreign fighters from China whoare now part of the Ministry of
Defense, by the way, withAmerican permission. So also
weird, you know, blue sky placeto be. But you know, not
papering over any of theseenormous challenges and the
crimes that have been committedagainst civilians in the last
six or seven months. But assomeone who's worked on Syria
for so long, we are also in aplace where, in a very cold way,
(41:14):
all of this, all of those morenasty things, were always
inevitable. You know, we couldhave had Thomas Jefferson
running and running thepresidency in Damascus, we would
still have massacres,sectarianism and what have you
that that's going to be in Syriafor a long time to come. But the
key is, is that on a slow andlong trajectory, things get a
little bit better over time, andwe are in that place. Things
(41:37):
have got a little bit better.
You know, every single day forthe last seven and a half
months. And in politicaltransition terms, we're only
seven months in. That's reallyearly days, and the amount of
progress that they have made isstunning. But they do have very
real issues and challenges underthe surface. And I don't want to
sort of paper over any of that.
(41:59):
Those are all very, very real,and there are real issues there.
But yes, with an eye to thatstrategic vision, I have to be
still optimistic that we'restill pointing in the right
direction.
Jim Cardoso (42:11):
Well, I appreciate that while a lot of people are
trying to bring order to thechaos of Syria, you are able to
bring order to the chaos of whatwe know about Syria and how we
understand Syria, and I'm good.
I am hopeful that we haveanother opportunity to speak,
maybe a year from now, and maybethere is a reason for continued
optimism in that conversation wehave in the future. But for
(42:34):
today, looking to wrap up thepodcast. Any any final thoughts
as we as we go?
Unknown (42:41):
No, no, I don't think so. I think, I think it's just
yeah. It's this rare opportunityto try to be optimistic about
something in the future. Butit's also inevitably being the
Middle East. It's one of thosecases where nothing's black and
white. Nothing's perfect, forsure, nothing is perfect. But
you know, when I speak to somany people, you know, ordinary
(43:01):
people who don't work in ourworld. And I mentioned that I
work on the Middle East, theirinstant, you know, gut
responses, oh, God, you know.
Why do you do that? It's, it'schaos, it's conflict, it's, you
know, terrorism is whatever youknow. This is one of those real
chances where acknowledging allthe bad and all the challenges,
there is a chance to see abetter future. And it's not just
a better future for Syria, it'sa better future for the region.
(43:24):
And I think, you know, we've allgot to keep our eyes on that
long term horizon here, whilsteverything still looks chaotic
and messy and in some respectsquite bad, every now and then,
we've got to keep our eye onthat, on that long term vision,
because if we don't, then it'sall hopeless. And so that's
that's why I remain cautiouslyoptimistic.
Jim Cardoso (43:46):
Charles Lister, thank you so much for your time
today. Really appreciate it.
Thanks for having me, Jim. Thankyou. Thanks to Charles Lister, a
senior fellow at the Middle EastInstitute and director of their
counter terrorism and Syriaprograms. We couldn't ask for a
better person to help explainwhat's going on in Syria right
now and the regional and globalimplications. We always enjoy
having Charles on the podcast.
(44:09):
Next week on at the boundary,our guest will be Dr Marvin
Weinbaum, also a senior fellowat the Middle East Institute and
a leading scholar onAfghanistan. Dr Weinbaum wrote
an article for our most recentissue of the Journal of
strategic security, a specialissue focused exclusively on
Afghanistan. His articleexamines us dealings with the
Taliban and how we can chart apath to a successful national
(44:32):
policy in that nation. Thanksfor listening today. You like
the podcast, please subscribeand let your friends and
colleagues know, and if you havean idea for a future podcast,
we'd love to hear from you.
There's a link in the show notesto get in touch with us. You can
follow genocide or LinkedIn andX accounts at USF, underscore
GNSI, and check out our websiteas well at usf.edu/gnsi, as I
(44:52):
mentioned before, when you'rethere, don't forget to subscribe
to our. Monthly newsletterthat's going to wrap up this
episode of at the boundary. Eachnew episode will feature global
and national security issues wefound to be insightful,
(45:14):
fascinating, maybecontroversial, but overall, just
worth talking about, I'm JimCardoso, and we'll see you at
the boundary. You.
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