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April 21, 2025 47 mins

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What’s next in the Russia-Ukraine war, and how should the U.S. respond? In this episode of At the Boundary, we listen in on a critical conversation between Dr. Arman Mahmudian, GNSI Research Fellow, and David Kramer, Executive Director of the George W. Bush Institute.

Together, they examine the current state of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, explore the political landscape, and assess the potential for a ceasefire. Kramer outlines Russia’s continued aggression, the vital role of U.S. military and economic support, and the importance of long-term security guarantees for Ukraine.

The discussion also covers Ukraine’s battlefield innovations, the risks of premature negotiations, and strategic policy recommendations—including enhanced sanctions, seizing Russian assets, and maintaining pressure to deter future Russian actions.

🎧 Tune in for expert analysis on the war’s trajectory, U.S. foreign policy, and what’s at stake for global security.

At the Boundary from the Global and National Security Institute at the University of South Florida, features global and national security issues we’ve found to be insightful, intriguing, fascinating, maybe controversial, but overall just worth talking about.

A "boundary" is a place, either literal or figurative, where two forces exist in close proximity to each other. Sometimes that boundary is in a state of harmony. More often than not, that boundary has a bit of chaos baked in. The Global and National Security Institute will live on the boundary of security policy and technology and that's where this podcast will focus.

The mission of GNSI is to provide actionable solutions to 21st-century security challenges for decision-makers at the local, state, national and global levels. We hope you enjoy At the Boundary.

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Episode Transcript

Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Jim Cardoso (00:00):
Jim.

(00:12):
Hello everyone. Welcome to thisweek's episode of at the
boundary, the podcast from theglobal and national security
Institute at the University ofSouth Florida. I'm Jim Cardoso,
Senior Director for GNSI, andyour host for at the boundary.
Today on the podcast, we'regoing to listen in on a
conversation between GNSIResearch Fellow, Dr Arman

(00:35):
mahmudian and David Kramer. He'sthe Executive Director of the
George W Bush Institute, andthey're going to spend a little
time talking about the Russia,Ukraine war, or bring them into
the studio. However, want tomention a couple things. The
GNSI YouTube channel is theperfect place to see some of the
great analysis being produced byour team. Last week, we dropped

(00:56):
the latest episode of what'sreally happening with executive
director, retired Marine CorpsGeneral Frank McKenzie, that
video already has nearly 10,000views, as it generated a ton of
engagement, it provides a fourstar General's view on future
nuclear conflict. So you want tolisten in and be part of that.
Also in the next couple ofweeks, look for the videos from

(01:19):
last week's cyber frontierSummit. It was the first
conference hosted by our studentorganization, the future
strategist program. Easiestthing is just to subscribe to
our channel. Cost nothing, andyou'll be notified whenever new
content is added to the channel.
Speaking of great conferences,it's been a little over a month
since we hosted GNSI Tampasummit five focused on the

(01:39):
Russia, Ukraine, war lessons forfuture conflicts. One of our
featured speakers at theconference was David Kramer, who
heads up the George W BushInstitute. Prior to that, Kramer
spent time at the Green Schoolof International Public Affairs
at Florida InternationalUniversity. He also spent over
20 years in Washington, DC,taking leadership roles at the

(02:00):
McCain institute forinternational leadership, the
State Department during theGeorge W Bush administration,
and a host of other high profileroles, Kramer sat down recently
with our Dr Arman mahmudian.
Over to you,

Arman Mahmoudian (02:20):
Mr. Kramer, once again, thank you for being
here with us. I want to startwith the current atmosphere and
political climate in a globallyspeaking as you know, there is a
boat pressure on Ukraine toreach a cease fire or conclude
the war, and also there is arooting internationally speaking
for Ukraine to continue war, aslong as it comes to the terms

(02:43):
that can reach a deal or ceasefire favorable for itself. The
we have noticed. We havewitnessed the interaction
between President Zelensky andPresident Trump earlier on in
February and then the Riyadhmeeting. And also some polls
suggest that there are factionsof the Ukrainian city civilians
who are rooting for the peace orseize fall. But the polls also

(03:04):
don't suggest that there are,they are the majority of the
Ukrainian population. We alsohave seen different proposals
from the European partners,which is not quite necessarily
in the alignment with thecurrent administration of the
United States regarding the warin Ukraine. But the thing that I
want to ask you is that we want.
I want to start thisconversation with an assumption.
An assumption is that whichmight be a reality anytime soon,
that Ukraine accepts thepressure or the suggestion for

(03:27):
the peace deal and reach a dealwith the Russia, even based on
the current circumstances andthe status quo of the
battlefield and the ground,assuming that Russia would keep
the Crimean, other occupiedterritory in South and East so
the question is, what would bethe viable options for the

(03:48):
Ukrainian government? And let'ssay that the international
community, specifically speakingthe free world, the West,
primarily speaking UnitedStates, to guarantee the
security of the Ukraine itsterritorial integrity, the
remaining of this territorialintegrity and sovereignty in the
post cease fire or peace deal?

David Kramer (04:07):
Well, first, it's great to be with you, and it was
also a great opportunity. Atleast. I participated remotely
in the conference at USF, and Iwas really pleased to be able to
do that. I'm sorry I wasn'tthere in person, but I would say
that this situation has becomemore complicated than it was,
and it was already rathercomplicated, and yet at the same

(04:29):
time, the war is rather simpleto understand. Let me start from
the premise that Russia is theguilty party here. There is no
question about it. There are fewconflicts. Is clear cut in my
mind is this one. Russialaunched a full scale invasion
of Ukraine in February of 2022but it also launched an initial
invasion of Ukraine in Februaryof 2014 this goes back now more

(04:52):
than a decade when after theEuromaidan.
One revolution, or Revolution ofDignity, as Ukrainians call it,
in 2013 2014led to the pro Russian Ukrainian
president fleeing power, ViktorYanukovych, and going to Russia.
And then Russia, of course,moved into Crimea, where it

(05:14):
already had some forces launchedan illegal referendum that
virtually no country recognized,and then moved into the Donbas
region of Ukraine. More than14,000 Ukrainians were killed
between that time in February2014 until February of 2022 and
that history, I think recenthistory, is very important to

(05:36):
understand what has beenhappening in the past three
years. Here now we are facing asituation where there is no
question that Ukraine has beenfacing pressure from the United
States, most recently, inparticular, to move ahead with a
cease fire arrangement. TheUkrainians have indicated they
are prepared and willing to doso. The problem is, and has been

(05:58):
Russia. It has been Putin whohas not shown a willingness to
engage in a 30 day Cease fire.
And so we also, I think, areseeing now an unfortunate
division between the UnitedStates and the rest of Europe,
where the French and British andGerman and other leaders in

(06:20):
Europe are demonstrating, atleast these days stronger
solidarity with Ukraine than theUnited States is right now. And
just recently, we have seen asigns that while Ukraine has
agreed to this 30 day ceasefire,Putin, won't he instead wants a
Black Sea moratorium so thatRussia's Navy can move without

(06:43):
fear of being hit by Ukrainianforces. And so Putin is now the
one clearly, who is the obstacleto any 30 day Cease fire. And as
Secretary Rubio said after themeetings a week or so ago in
Saudi Arabia with theUkrainians. The Ukrainians

(07:03):
agreed to the 30 day ceasefire.
The ball is in the Russianscourt, and the Russians now are
basically punting that ballaway.

Arman Mahmoudian (07:11):
You mentioned about that. The Russians are the
what the party that kind ofplay, the party that not play
along, and they are the cause ofpostponing the ceasefire. I want
to ask you a question beforegoing forward that let's say
that either Russia, or evenUkraine itself, despite the
international pressure,specifically speaking from the
United States, decides tocontinue the war. My question is

(07:35):
that, what are the odds, or whatare the chances of the Ukraine
in continuing the war withRussia, without the United
States support, or United Statessupport, as it used, the level
of support that United said theyused to project during the last
couple of years. Do you think ona battlefield, on the ground,
they do have a standard chance,or situation can go very severe

(07:56):
for them if they want tocontinue the war on their own?

David Kramer (07:59):
That would be incredibly unfortunate
development, if it unfolded us.
Support has been critical forUkraine's efforts to fend off
Russian invading forces. ForUkraine to be able to regain
control of most of itsterritory, there's now about 18%
of Ukrainian territory that iscurrently occupied by Russian
forces, it has been critical forUkraine's ability to launch

(08:22):
strikes deeper inside Russia,and that took a long time from
the previous US administrationto get agreement to allow the
Ukrainians to use longer rangemissile systems from the United
States to Hit Russian targets.
So us support is extremelyimportant. But should the United

(08:44):
States decide that it is nolonger going to support Ukraine
militarily? I think theUkrainians will continue to
fight, and I think it will applyadditional pressure on our
European allies to increasetheir support for Ukraine. Just
this week, we've seen meetingsbetween Zelensky and European
leaders in support of Ukraine,offers of reassurance force. It

(09:09):
obviously would be vastly betterif the United States were
involved, not necessarily havingour our troops on the ground,
but providing air cover,intelligence support and other
kinds of assistance to thatforce, so that it would be
formidable enough to deter anyfurther Russian aggression. The
Ukrainians are fighting fortheir land, for their freedom

(09:30):
and for their lives, and as longas the Russian forces are on
their territory, I think youwill see strong support among
the majority of Ukrainians tocontinue to defend their
territory and push back onRussian forces. Most surveys in
Ukraine have shown littlesupport for territorial
concessions and compromises.
They don't like the idea ofsigning agreements with the

(09:52):
Russians, as long as Russianforces remain on Ukrainian
territory, and I think PresidentZelensky has. And absolutely
right at pointing out to variousaudiences that any agreement
that Putin signs he doesn't liveup to there were agreements in
2014 and 2015 called the Minskaccords, that were supposed to
have led to ceasefires back whenRussia first invaded Ukraine.

(10:15):
Russia didn't live up to thoseagreements. It didn't live up to
the cease fire agreementpresident, then President
Sarkozy signed in 2008 afterRussia invaded Georgia, it
hasn't agreed to various otheragreements, including the
Budapest Memorandum of 1994where Russia was supposed to
respect Ukraine's sovereigntyand territorial integrity, the

(10:37):
1997 friendship. Agreement, Icould go on and on, Putin's
signature doesn't mean a damnthing. And so I think Zelensky
is right to seek securityguarantees so that Putin might
at least be deterred that way,even if he doesn't abide by
agreements he might sign. I

Arman Mahmoudian (10:57):
very much appreciate you of mentioning the
Russia's previous violation ofthe commitments to Ukrainian
territorial integrity. Andthat's why I want to kind of
make a pivot to our firstquestion again. So the matter of
the security guarantee, it seemsso far, and I would love to know
here your insight on it, theUnited States administration is

(11:17):
not interested in giving adeliberate and a clear cut
security guarantee at thislevel, at least Ukrainian. But
the question is that, should theUnited States decide to not make
such a commitment on a legalbasis? What would be the other
options in which United Statesand European partner can make or

(11:38):
imply somewhat of a securityguarantee for the Ukraine,
without offering Ukraine's NATOmembership or signing any accord
or treaty that offers a securityguarantee?

David Kramer (11:49):
Sure, let me, let me answer that, but let me just
add one other point to yourearlier question Iran, and that
is, it has been extraordinary tosee Ukraine's innovation and
development of its own militarycapabilities. Ukraine now is
largely self reliant ondevelopment of drone technology,

(12:09):
and it is, it is developeddrones that can reach far into
Russian territory, drones thatcarry significant weapon
capacity and payload. So alsohuge credit to the Ukrainians,
and they think that, based onthat, they might be able to
continue this, should us supportcome to an end on the question
of security guarantees. Look, Ithink it was a mistake for the

(12:33):
new US administration to ruleout NATO membership. It didn't
have to rule in NATO membership,if you will, but to rule it out,
was essentially making aconcession to the Russian side.
Before negotiations even began,we have seen interesting
comments from various leaders,including the prime minister of
Italy, of all people, who hastalked about some sort of

(12:56):
Article Five guarantee, even ifUkraine were not a member of
NATO, I think among Europeans,there is a recognition that
Ukraine needs some sort ofsecurity guarantee, whether it
is in the form of a deploymentof European troops to provide
some reassurance or deterrenceagainst Russian invasion or some

(13:18):
other way, the Ukrainians, Ithink not only need but deserve
that kind of support. The Bidenadministration was clear it was
not going to send us troops toengage in this fight. The Trump
administration has continuedthat approach in policy, but I
think we should be more open tothe idea of providing some sort

(13:41):
of security guarantees. I thinkit was a mistake to close the
door on NATO to Ukraine. Keepthat open is an issue to
discuss, because, frankly,otherwise, we are granting
Russia a de facto veto overUkraine's aspirations to join
NATO, and NATO has an open doorpolicy, and no outside country

(14:02):
should be able to reject thatcountry's interest in joining
the alliance. The Alliance isthe most successful military
defensive alliance in history.
Countries that border Russia,such as Estonia and Latvia,
Lithuania, now new entranceFinland, Norway, of course, has
a small border up in the northPoland does with Kaliningrad.

(14:22):
The reason those countries sleepbetter at night is because of
Article Five security guaranteesthat come with NATO membership.
And so I think it is importantto be innovative and coming up
with ideas that help providesome sense of security
guarantees for the Ukrainians sothat Putin doesn't do this
again. Look The only, the onlyway Putin backs off is if he

(14:44):
gets a punch in the nose, if hisforces suffer defeats, and
Russian forces have sufferedterribly as a result of Putin's
stupid decision to launch a fullscale invasion. The estimates
now are more than now. 900,000Russian troops have been killed
and wounded in this conflict.

(15:04):
You've had North Korea sendforces there. A lot of them have
been wiped out. And so withoutNorth Korean or Iranian or
Chinese support, I think Russiawould be in a much worse
position than it is right now.
Without European and Americansupport for Ukraine, Ukraine
would be in a worse position. Itseems to me, we have an
obligation to do what we can toput Ukraine in the strongest

(15:26):
position possible, whether towin this war, or to be in a
strong position from which tonegotiate.

Arman Mahmoudian (15:34):
Thank you. I must say, the argument you made
about the NATO open door policyis quite fascinating, because
the mostly focus that we do, weshouldn't offer Ukraine NATO
membership because of thesecurity concerns, and it's not
the investors fight. But Ibarely heard that. Somebody
makes an argument that if wedon't do so, we actually giving
Russia a veto right over thesovereignty of the NATO as an

(15:56):
organization, I appreciate that,and I want to a little bit go
back earlier to your you knowcomments about the Ukrainian
military defense capability. Wehave seen Ukrainians rapid
growth in production of drones,as you mentioned, also
production of military material,being at the shells and others.
And also covert operations.
Ukrainian have gained a great anotable level of food footprint,

(16:17):
COVID was in terms of sabotage,high value targeting in air
Russia, and it's quiteimpressive. Why we have these on
one hand, on the other hand isthe matter of the withdrawal of
the Ukrainian troops from theKursk, which it's left many
questions that why it happenedso quickly. I mean, they were

(16:41):
there for about a year. They hada good Advancement at the
beginning of the offense, orcounter offense, depends on the
point they had resistance.
Russians counter attacks quitewell for a good number of the
months and days. And then wehave a sudden withdraw. And
there is a debate out there,some making a suggestion that

(17:01):
the withdrawal or retreat happenas a part of a political deal,
preparing the stage for thetreaty or ceasefire. I don't
know about it. I personallydon't see it quite likely, some
pointing out that it was theoutcome of withdrawal of US
intelligence support,specifically speaking, sharing
the satellite images, which, itseems the United States also

(17:23):
pressed the European allies donot do so. As an expert, you're
so you're a sovietologist andexpert of Russia. I wonder, what
do you think was behind theKursk retreat so unexpectedly
and quickly?

David Kramer (17:38):
Yeah, well, first I it was a risky move on the
part of the Ukrainians that Ithink did pay off for several
months. It was a morale boostfor the Ukrainians at a time
when they needed that moraleboost. Remember, they were still
recovering from the delay inapproval of us funding and
support. There were about sixmonths or so between the time

(18:02):
and 2023 until April of 24 whenthe US Congress finally approved
the latest assistance package.
And morale among the Ukrainianshad been dropping, in part
because of that. It was a boldmove on the part of President
zelenskyy and his militaryleadership, and it was a move
that I think paid off. It was amorale boost. The main reason, I
would argue, Arman is, yes, thesuspension of military

(18:28):
assistance and intel sharingfrom the United States brief,
though it was, did have anegative impact on Ukraine's
abilities. But the maindifference, I would argue, is
President Zelensky is ademocratically elected leader of
Ukraine. He actually has to careabout what happens to his

(18:48):
troops. He does have to makedecisions if his troops are
surrounded and encircled by theenemy, to try to minimize as
much as possible the casualtiesthat his forces would suffer.
Contrast that with Putin, whodoesn't care what happens to his
his men that he sends into thisbattle or nor does North Korea's
leader camp when he sends hisforces to join Russia, they view

(19:12):
their soldiers as cannon fodder.
They view the North Koreans assimply, if you will, taking
bullets, so the Ukrainians useup their bullets on North
Koreans, and so that theRussians can then move in. And
so I think that actually is themain reason there was fear that

(19:33):
the Ukrainian forces in Kurskwere going to be badly defeated
and suffer huge casualties. AndPresident Zelensky is a
democratically elected leader ofUkraine. Had to take that into
account. Putin has, I don't knowif it's a luxury or just a total
lack of concern for what happensto his people. And this is the

(19:56):
difference between a brutalauthoritarian, if not. Even
fascist leader like Putin is anda democratically elected leader
like Zelensky, and it is richlyironic I think that Putin and
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrovand others are talking about
Ukraine's government beingillegitimate because it has over

(20:17):
stayed its term in office.
Elections should have takenplace last year for Ukraine, but
under Ukrainian law, electionscannot be held because of
martial law. Why was martial lawimposed in Ukraine? Because
Putin invaded Ukraine, and sofor a leader who decides
elections before they takeplace, who kills his opposition

(20:38):
or imprisons them. Putin is, ishas real chutzpah, in my view,
to be talking about theUkrainian leadership being
illegitimate. That, to me, isthe main reason for the
withdrawal, as it has happenedfrom course, Putin doesn't care
about his guys. Zelensky doesbefore

Arman Mahmoudian (21:01):
going forward.
Quick question, you mentioned apolitical consideration. But can
we say that the withdrawal fromthe Kors is somewhat an
equivalent of the allied forceswithdrawal from the Don cork in
earlier stage of The World WarTwo? Little

David Kramer (21:15):
bit. I mean, yes.
I mean the move into Kursk was,I think, to set up Ukraine to be
in a stronger position fornegotiations. We will withdraw
from Kursk if the Russian forceswould withdraw from from parts
of occupied Ukraine. So I thinkyou could make that comparison,
but I think it was for purposesof morale. It was for the

(21:39):
element of surprise. It was totry to draw Russian forces from
parts of occupied Ukraine to theKursk Region, but it also meant
that Zelensky and his militaryleadership were pulling out some
of its good forces from variousparts of the front lines. There
have been indications that theUkrainians have been launching

(21:59):
some incursions into theBelgorod region in Russia, and
so the Ukrainians keep look. Ithink one thing that there,
well, a couple things to drawour lessons from already, from
this, from this situation, isnever underestimate the
Ukrainians. The Ukrainians haveproven to be an incredibly

(22:20):
courageous, resilient people.
There were most predictions whenPutin was about to launch a full
scale invasion in 2022 were thatthis war would be over in days.
That was certainly the thinkingin the Kremlin, but it was even
the thinking in the USintelligence community and the
Ukrainians have proven that tobe terribly wrong. One other

(22:41):
conclusion is, don'toverestimate the Russians
military capabilities, becausethe Russians have proven to be a
pretty weak military. TheUkrainians have inflicted
tremendous damage on the Russianmilitary, taken out 1000s of
tanks and various militaryvehicles and weapons systems, to
say nothing of the 900,000 or socasualties on the Russian side,

(23:04):
and we have provided less than3% of our Pentagon budget in
support of Ukraine. That seemsto me to be one hell of a return
on investment, the assistance wehave provided Ukraine with the
damage it has inflicted onRussian forces. And by the way,
for us audiences, most of themoney that we have provided

(23:27):
stays in the United States. Itgoes to American workers and
manufacturers of new weaponsystems as we send older systems
to the Ukrainians. And so thishas been, I think, a very
important investment, not onlyin Ukraine and the assistance it
needs, but in the opportunity toupdate and develop our weapons

(23:50):
and make sure we have enough,whether it's for helping Ukraine
or any other contingencies.
Thank

Arman Mahmoudian (23:56):
you. I very much appreciate that actually,
all of your comment, what aboutwhat you said, that the money I
spend is actually internally,remains internal in United
States, I believe SenatorLindsey Graham also kind of
delivered the speech on that.
They made it very clean andplain and a very direct point I
want to move forward with underthe assumption that there will
be a ceasefire and war is aboutreaching its conclusion, and I

(24:19):
want to kind of divide it inthree, stage one stages about
Russia, what what future holdsfor Russia? What future holds
for Ukraine and NATO. And Iwould like to start with the
NATO, what would you see thestate and circumstances,
security wise for the NATO in apost ceasefire era, because the

(24:42):
Ukraine development, the Ukrainewar, from a pragmatic point of
view, had benefits for NATO.
NATO has been enlarged. Swedenand Finland are the part. We
have seen a kind of revival ofvoice of collaboration in NATO,
which. After the war on terrorhas kind of been on decline. I
mean, in a very passive manner,the cooperation with tied it

(25:05):
kind of awakened European desireto have a self sufficient and
resilient military capability.
Germany just passed the law lastweek. What would you think? What
would the future for the NATO ina post Russo Ukrainian war, at
least this stage of the world asecond right?

David Kramer (25:23):
I agree that I think NATO has found its
purpose. After floundering alittle bit and after the
collapse of the Soviet Union,the end of the Warsaw Pact,
there certainly was a purpose inbringing in new members, and and
one point I think worth makingis that was driven by countries

(25:46):
that were outside of NATO whohad an incredibly strong desire
and interest in joining NATO. Itwas not the case where the
United States and other NATOAllies were trying to drag
countries that didn't want tojoin the Alliance into the
Alliance. This was in responseinitially to Poland, the Czech
Republic and Hungary, who wantedto join the Alliance. And then

(26:10):
it moved into the three BalticStates and other countries as
well. And so the alliance hascertainly increased
significantly, largely because alot of those countries have had
experience with either Sovietaggression or Russian
aggression, and wantedprotection from them. But also
joining NATO was a sense ofreturning a belonging to Europe.

(26:33):
And I think that identity,together with the European
Union, was very important tomany countries. I think since
2022 we have seen NATO reallymove in a positive direction.
We've seen a number of countriesincrease their defense spending,
as they had promised they woulddo, and some of that is due to

(26:54):
the pressure from PresidentTrump during his first
administration. And I think wesee NATO in a stronger position
today than we did before. But,and this is the important
caveat, it will depend on theUnited States remaining a
reliable member of the allianceright now. As you know, there is
controversy with a fellow NATOmember, Denmark, over the

(27:17):
territory of Greenland. Thereare questions about whether the
United States would respond ifthere were an attack on a
country that doesn't spend morethan 2% of its GDP on defense.
There are questions aboutwhether the United States would
respond to a country that doesspend more than 2% but is small
and along Russia's borders, forexample, one of the Baltic

(27:39):
states. So I think the future ofNATO is now going to depend on
these questions that surroundthe United States as much as
anything. But I do think thatNATO has found its purpose in
supporting Ukraine. And as yourightly point out, since the
full scale invasion in 2022 thealliance has expanded. Finland

(28:01):
and Sweden decided that Russianinvasion of Ukraine was the
tipping point for two countriesthat had stayed out of the
Alliance for decades, and now wehave 32 members, and now about
24 if not 25 of those countriesdo spend more than 22% of their
GDP on defense, and thecountries that don't need to

(28:22):
pick up because the Unitedbecause of the questions about
the United States and theuncertainty about how reliable
the US will be.

Arman Mahmoudian (28:31):
Q, I want to sum up it wouldn't be Russia's
opposition to NATO thatdetermines the future of NATO.
It would be the American factor,and where does the United States
stands?

David Kramer (28:42):
I think that's right. Yes. I mean, unless we
give Russia a de facto veto overother countries aspirations to
join. But I think right now, oneof the biggest questions facing
the alliance is what the UnitedStates will do. President Trump
has been rather critical of NATOallies for various reasons, we

(29:03):
have seen some disparagement ofEuropean leaders talking about
sending a force to Ukraine tohelp provide assistance there
and security for Ukraine. As Isaid earlier, NATO is the most
successful military alliance inhistory, and the United States
has been central to it. It isone of the founding members of

(29:25):
NATO going back to 1949 and so Idon't think NATO's job is
finished. I think the job ofNATO remains important. And what
we also need to recognize iscountries that are in the gray
zone, which is to say countriesthat are no longer part of the
Warsaw Pact or part of theSoviet Union, but are also no
longer, or not no longer, butare also not members of NATO. We

(29:49):
need to help address that issueabout the gray zone, because
countries in the gray zone arethe ones most vulnerable to
Russian aggression, and it's nocoin. Incidents that it's
Georgia that has been invaded byRussia. Ukraine has been invaded
by Russia. Moldova that has anoccupying force in the
Transnistrian region of Russiantroops. Those three countries

(30:12):
are not members of NATO, butRussia has not attacked a NATO
member state, at least in a fullkinetic way. There was a cyber
attack against Estonia in 2007and so it is. It is, I think, is
dependent on what the UnitedStates does is as it is on
Russia. What we let Russia do,

Arman Mahmoudian (30:32):
perfect. Thank you. Speaking of Russia now
again, so I want to ask aboutthe Russia's imposed War era we
have seen, and it's been statedby you. It's been stated by
other former officials andexperts, including our Executive
Director General Matt can seethat one of the things that we
realized about the Ukraine fromthe Ukraine war is that we had,

(30:53):
we didn't have the accurateassessment of the Russians
military capability. However,during the time of the war.
While the Russians had setbacks,we have witnessed also a growth
in a specific sectors of theRussia's military. It seems
they're jamming, and theirelectronic warfare has kind of
catching out. It seems that theyare in it. They are developing.

(31:16):
It seems that they are revivingtheir military cooperations with
the outsiders, which was kind ofit was on and off prior so that
with the Iranians, with theNorth Koreans, some SIP reports,
also soldiers from the Chinese,but it seems they are less bold
than Iranian Koreans, NorthKoreans. So one question would

(31:36):
be, what would be the Russia'sprojection of power look like in
the post war era and what wouldbe the direction of Russia's
foreign policy? Because there,there is a growing concern, not
only in West, actuallyneighboring countries. Of
Russia's reports, comes a goodchunk of the good number of
people in Belarus and Gaza. Someboth have neighboring and also

(31:56):
substantial Russians minorities,or Belarus is Slavic country,
are concerned about their futureas a sovereign state. How would
Russia look like a day a yearafter the peace fire with
Ukraine?

David Kramer (32:15):
You know what they say about predictions? They're
awfully hard to make about thefuture. I think it depends on
how the war that Russia startedagainst Ukraine ends. If it ends
in a fragile ceasefire, then Idon't think Russia will have
learned its lesson. If it endsin a way that Ukraine is seen as

(32:38):
as rather victorious in thesense of regaining control over
its territory over time, whethermilitarily or diplomatically,
that I think, will have animpact on the future of Russia.
You're right to bring up Belarusin a way Russia has occupied.
Belarus Lukashenko is so thelong time leader of Belarus has

(33:03):
been in power since 1994 isincredibly dependent on Putin
and Russia for staying in power.
He stole the election in hiscountry in August of 2020.
Launched a brutal crackdownweaponized immigrants and
refugees along the borders withLithuania and Poland, and then
then basically hijacked aRyanair flight that was going

(33:26):
from Greece to Lithuania. LukeSheng remains a threat, and we
shouldn't fall for his effortsto try to play Russian in the
West off of each other. I citethat because it is another
example of how Russia uses otherauthoritarian leaders to advance
its cause, and Lukashenko iscomplicit in the Russian full

(33:50):
scale invasion of Ukraine inFebruary of 2022 because he
allowed the territory of Belarusto be used as a launching pad
For part of that invasion,particularly heading to a Kyiv,
the capital, I think Moldovaremains fragile, given the
occupying force in theTransnistrian part of that

(34:11):
country and Russia is doingeverything it can to try to pull
Moldova back into Its sphere.
Georgia is a very unfortunatesituation where you have
essentially a pro Russian party,Georgian dream that is doing
Russia's dirty work for it, andan oligarch bin Zina Ibn

(34:33):
ashvili, who runs the countryessentially, who made his
fortune in Russia, that looks atRussia is George's partner, not
the West in the United States.
But then you also see Armenia,where the Armenians feel
betrayed by the Russians, thatRussia didn't come to Armenia's
aid in its time of need whenAzerbaijan moved into Nagorno

(34:56):
Karabakh. Azerbaijan has alwayshad a complicated relationship
with with Russia, so thedynamics there, I think, are not
favorable to Russia's expandinginfluence, but Russia has never
done it in a soft way. It doesit through hybrid tactics. It
does it through brute use offorce, and so it's really

(35:22):
important, I think, for theUnited States and our European
allies to stand with thosecountries, to press for
democratic progress in thesecountries, but also to make sure
that their independence,sovereignty and territorial
integrity are respected. I thinkthe future of Russia will be up

(35:44):
to the Russian people. Sospeaking domestically now about
Russia, I think there is toomuch concern in Washington and
in other places about who mightcome next after Putin. We're not
going to have a say in that.
That's going to be up to theRussian people in one form or
another. And so I think weshould not tie our hands behind

(36:10):
our backs and not help Ukraineout of some fear that what might
come after Putin might be worse.
Looking at what Putin has beendoing, it's pretty bad. Invaded
Georgia, invaded Ukraine twice.
The pressure, the basic takeoverof Belarus, the pressure on
Moldova, the hybrid activity inEurope and even in the United

(36:30):
States. The Putin regime is adanger, not only to its own
people, but to its neighbors andto the United States. And I
think full recognition of thatis critically important when we
hear some US officials say Putinis not a bad guy, well, look at
his record. If he's not a badguy, I'm not quite sure what a

(36:50):
bad guy would look like and soand we shouldn't fall for his
traps and trying to play gamesand and win us over with some
silly measures. Putin means usharm. He doesn't. He also means
harm to his neighbors. He wantsto make sure that Ukraine is not

(37:13):
a successful democratic countrymoving closer to the west,
because he worries that couldpose a threatening alternative
to the authoritarian grip he hasin his own country and India, he
doesn't recognize Ukraine as anindependent state. He said that
to President Bush as far back as2008 and he has repeated that
line many, many times. So weneed to recognize that Russia

(37:35):
under Putin remains a threat.
Russia after Putin may remain athreat. There's no guarantee
that Russia will be better, butwe shouldn't. We shouldn't tie
our hands behind our back out offear that Russia after Putin may
be worse. It may be better, Idon't know, but it also isn't
going to be determined byWashington, Brussels, or anybody
else who will be determined bythe people of Russia. Thank you,

(37:57):
and

Arman Mahmoudian (38:01):
we go through the last stage of this question,
and the question before theconcluding question, I want to
ask you about the future ofUkraine, and I need to kind of
give a foreign fair warning toyou and the audience that I'm
guilty of obsession with theHistory and when I look at the

(38:21):
conflict between Russia andUkraine since 2014 and 2022 what
comes to my mind is the way thatthe Nazi Germany went after the
Czechoslovakia, a salamislicing, piece by piece, which
evidently led to the destructionof the Czechoslovakia, of you
know, sort of A sovereign state,as they've been occupied by
Germany? What future would holdfor Ukraine in the post the day

(38:48):
after, or years after the ceasewar with Russia? How can they
can they survive, protect theirsurvival and territorial
integrity and sovereign statewithout being a member of the
NATO? Look,

David Kramer (39:01):
I think you're right to bring up history. And I
think the comparison to 1938with Czechoslovakia is an apt
one. If you think back to 2014the first Minsk agreement that
was signed in September of 2014so March of 2014 is when Russia
illegally annexed Crimea.
September 2014 was the firstMinsk agreement, and then early

(39:24):
in 2015 was the second. NeitherMinsk agreement mentioned
Crimea, and so those efforts tobring about a ceasefire didn't
deal with one of the key partsof the conflict back then, which
was Russian occupation of Crimeaand the use of Crimea as a
launching pad for attacksagainst other parts of Ukraine.
As long as Russian forces are onUkrainian territory, whether

(39:48):
it's done yet, Zaporizhzhia, herson, you name it, or Crimea,
Russia will remain a threat toUkraine. And so I think it is
crucial. Critically importantthat we never recognize the
illegal annexation of Crimea.
Former Secretary of State MikePompeo essentially issued a

(40:08):
declaration on this in the firstTrump administration. And we
shouldn't think that there werelegitimate referenda in these
other four regions whereUkrainians living in those
occupied territories wanted tojoin Russia. It's utter
nonsense. The referenda, as theywere called, were conducted

(40:30):
under gunpoint. I think thereare very few Ukrainians who have
given a choice would want tojoin Russia, given the way
Russia has treated thepopulations in these regions
that it has occupied, it's beenbrutal, and if you look at what
they've done in other parts ofUkraine, Bucha and Mariupol and
other places, the Russiansdeliberately try to inflict fear

(40:56):
and tremendous destruction onUkraine. Why? Because Putin
doesn't recognize Ukraine as anindependent state, and as long
as that is the case, he willpose a threat to Ukraine. And so
that's why I think it isimportant, whether again,
militarily or diplomatically,that we support efforts to
restore Ukraine's fullsovereignty and territorial

(41:17):
integrity, and that includesCrimea. Crimea is a part of
Ukraine that Russia recognizedin the Bela vija agreements in
1991 through various treatiesand agreements with Ukraine, the
Budapest Memorandum of 94 thefriendship treaty between Russia
and Ukraine and 97 again, on andon. There are many times where

(41:37):
Russia has recognized Ukrainethat includes Crimea, and so I
do think that we set ourselvesup for the potential of renewal
of aggression from Russia if wedon't support restoration of the
full sovereignty and territorialintegrity of Ukraine, and those
salami tactics that you referredto would Be very much on the

(42:00):
Russian menu for Ukraine.

Arman Mahmoudian (42:03):
Thank you. I appreciate it. You've been very
kind and generous with giving usvery insightful answers, and I'm
going to take advantage of yourkindness with the one last
question,

David Kramer (42:12):
one that's your listeners might think my answers
have been too long, that's why.
Not so long, but I appreciateit.

Arman Mahmoudian (42:20):
No, I'm quite confident they would enjoy, Mr.
Kramer, you're a veteran, ascholar, and also a civil
servant of the foreign policyyou've been the State Department
for a while, for a couple ofyears. If the US administration
asks you right now, what shouldbe the immediate action they are
going to take regarding the warin Ukraine and the restoration

(42:40):
of the order. That is the firstthing that needs to be done
right now

David Kramer (42:47):
to increase military assistance and
intelligence sharing forUkraine. Ukraine needs our
support. We talked earlier.
Ukraine will keep fighting, evenif we end that support, but
making sure we continue that, Ithink is the first thing that we
need to do. But then, if you'llallow me, I'll add a couple
other things, tighten thesanctions on Russia. Don't talk

(43:09):
about lifting the sanctions.
Don't allow Russia back into theSwift banking system. As long as
Russia continues to occupyUkrainian territory and carry
out aggression against Ukraine,let's remember that Putin has
been indicted by theInternational Criminal Court for
the abduction of Ukrainianchildren into Russia, and So

(43:31):
Russia has been accused of warcrimes and crimes against
humanity and genocide againstthe Ukrainian people for that
kind of regime. We should not betalking about easing of
sanctions right now, I wouldhave recommended, but I think
this one may be a pipe dream ofkeeping the door open to NATO.

(43:51):
That doesn't seem very likely, Irecognize in the current
circumstances, but there's oneother I'll just mention, and
that is, there is an opportunityto make Russia pay for what it
has done, and that is to movefrom not just freezing but
seizing the $300 billion thatPutin and Russian officials

(44:12):
stupidly left in westernfinancial institutions at the
start of the full scale invasionof February 2022 that Money, in
my view, should never bereturned to Russia after the
terrible destruction of damageit has caused in Ukraine. The
Russians, more than anyone,should be forced to pay for what
they have done before assistancefor reparations and and

(44:35):
rebuilding company United Statesor from Europe. The Russians
should be the first ones inline, and that $300 billion has
been sitting in our banks foryears. We're using the interest
to securitize loans for Ukrainefrom that that's not enough, and
to me, it would beunconscionable to allow that
money to go back to Ukraine.
That's a way to pay make Russiapay for the damage it has done.

(44:58):
So. So military assistance andintelligence sharing for
Ukraine, tightening sanctions,seizing those funds that Russia
left, and ideally not totallyclosing the door on NATO for
Ukraine down the road. Thank

Arman Mahmoudian (45:15):
you. I'm sure those of our audience who are in
the decision making processwould enjoy our users enjoy that
this evening. But thank you.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Kramerfrom the Bush Institute, it was
very kind of you to be in ourprogram. We appreciate it
opportunity, and thanks for allof your insight. Thank you.
Thanks so

David Kramer (45:32):
much for having me. I really appreciate great
questions. Thank you. You

Jim Cardoso (45:44):
We hope you enjoyed a great conversation about the
Russian invasion of Ukraine, thelargest land war in Europe since
World War Two, and which hasimpacted millions of lives in
the region, even as thatconflict is now in its third
year, still lots of threads topull on and better understand.
Thanks today to David Cramer,head of the George W Bush

(46:04):
Institute, next week on at theboundary, we're going to talk
with Dr Armand mahmudian, aresearch fellow here at GNSI. He
recently conducted an interviewon the Yemeni Houthis on this
podcast, but we'll put him onthe other end of the mic to talk
about the upcoming researchseries he's putting together on
the Axis of Resistance. Thisseries will feature in depth

(46:24):
examinations in the Middle East,focusing on Iran, as well as the
roles of Russia and North Koreaas those countries continue to
expand their influence in theregion. The series will be
months in the making and willfeature significant research and
new discussion and analysis.
We're looking forward to apreview with Arman next week.
Don't miss it. Thanks forlistening today. If you like the

(46:45):
podcast, please share with yourcolleagues and network. You can
follow GNSI on our LinkedIn andX accounts at USF, underscore
GNSI, and check out our websiteas well at usf.edu/gnsi where
you can also subscribe to ourmonthly newsletter

(47:09):
that's going to wrap up thisepisode about the boundary. Each
new episode will feature globaland national security issues
we've found to be insightful,intriguing, fascinating, maybe
controversial, but overall, justworth talking about. I'm Jim
Cardoso, and we'll see you atthe boundary.
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