November 17, 2025 • 35 mins
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In this episode of the At the Boundary podcast, Dr. Guido Rossi speaks with Dr. Peter Mansoor, a professor and the General Raymond E. Mason Jr. Chair in Military History at The Ohio State University. Their conversation delves into counterinsurgency warfare and preparing the American military for future threats.
Mansoor opens with the state of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, referencing Field Manual 23-4 and the foundations of counterinsurgency warfare, such as population persuasion. He notes that the wars between Ukraine and Russia and between Israel and Palestine do not qualify as counterinsurgencies and warns of the potential for larger scale hybrid conflicts in the United States’ future. He argues that the American military needs to stay educated and trained in counterinsurgency warfare, as well as continue to evolve its strategy to include drone warfare. In the future, NATO and Pacific allyship will be crucial for countering China and Russia should they decide to pursue a large-scale conflict against Taiwan or Europe, respectively.
At the Boundary from the Global and National Security Institute at the University of South Florida, features global and national security issues we’ve found to be insightful, intriguing, fascinating, maybe controversial, but overall just worth talking about.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Jim Cardoso (00:00):
Jim. Hello everyone. Welcome to this week's
(00:14):
episode of at the boundary, thepodcast from the global and
national security Institute atthe University of South Florida.
I'm Jim Cardoso, Senior Directorfor GNSI, and your host for at
the boundary. Today on thepodcast, we're going to talk
with Dr Peter Mansour, theGeneral Raymond e Mason, Jr,
(00:35):
Chair of military history atOhio State University. He's
retired US Army colonel andformer senior military fellow at
the Council of Foreign Relationsin New York, and he authored two
memoirs on his combat experiencein Iraq. He'll be talking today
with GNSI Research Fellow, DrGuido Rossi, who just happened
to be a protege of Dr Mansoorwhile earning his PhD at Ohio
(00:58):
State with the US strategicshift from counterinsurgency
back to Great Power competitionand large scale combat
operations, the two discusswhether the shift truly aligns
with future conflict, if thecounterinsurgency capabilities
should still be retained, andwhat lessons from the years of
Practicing counterinsurgency canbe applied to large scale combat
(01:21):
operations. While it's notexactly the same as the young
padawan confronting his formerJedi Master, it's still a great
opportunity to listen in as thestudent reunites with his
teacher,
Dr. Guido Rossi (01:37):
Dr Mansour, thank you so much for for
joining us and talking to ustoday.
Dr. Peter Mansoor (01:42):
Pleasure to be on. Thanks for the
invitation.
Dr. Guido Rossi (01:45):
It's it's always good to see you ever
since Ohio State University, youwere, you were my advisor then,
and the Ohio State University,you're right, you're right. But
the sort of today, today we'retalking about how the US
military is now shifting awayfrom counterinsurgency and
(02:07):
counterinsurgency doctrine, coindoctrine, and preparing in cell
itself instead for great powercompetition and large scale
comet operations, specificallyagainst China or Russia, or both
and But first, I'd like to beginby asking you, what is your
personal involvement with coindoctrine?
Dr. Peter Mansoor (02:31):
Yeah, so I was in the army for 26 years. I
was an armor officer. So thefirst part of my career, I was
deeply involved in winning theCold War, commanded a tank
company on the East West Germanborder. And then there was that
interim period after the ColdWar ended, where we're united
(02:52):
states army was trying to figureout what it was all about, and
peace keeping operations were inthere in the Bosnia conflict,
and eventually, after 911 thearmy had to shift focus to
counter insurgency warfare,particularly the wars in Iraq
(03:14):
and Afghanistan. I had two toursin Iraq. I was a brigade
commander in Baghdad, you know,304 and then, after a stint at
the Council on ForeignRelations, and then at Fort,
Leavenworth as as the head ofthe US Army Marine Corps counter
insurgency center, GeneralPetraeus selected me to be his
(03:37):
executive officer To go toBaghdad with him in 2007 2008
and help to execute the surge ofUS forces under a new counter
insurgency doctrine, FieldManual, 23 dash four, which
which I helped to edit a bitBefore heading over and
(03:58):
implementing its concepts incombat,
Dr. Guido Rossi (04:03):
any specific aspects of 23, four that you
supervise Exactly? Yeah.
Dr. Peter Mansoor (04:12):
So when the manual was nearly done, General
Petraeus sent me the digits, andhe said, make any changes that
you want, and I'll take a lookat them. And I was pretty
adamant that we should put somesort of measure of how many
troops were needed incounterinsurgency operations.
(04:36):
And so there's a part in therethat says successful
counterinsurgency operationsrequire somewhere between 20 and
50 counterinsurgents for every1000 people in the population.
And I did that mainly because Ididn't want political leaders in
(04:59):
the future. Are competing witheach other as to how few troops
they could send over to winthese types of conflicts,
because currency warfare is, istroop heavy. And I needed, I
wanted there to be a measure indoctrine where we could say to
political leaders, you know,you're saying that eight guys on
(05:22):
horseback can win the war. AndI'm telling you, doctrine says,
you know, you need 20 to 50 carinsurance for every 1000 people,
and eight guys on horsebackaren't going to cut it. So that
was the part of the manual thatI had the most impact on.
Dr. Guido Rossi (05:37):
Yeah, that's really interesting. Politicians
are usually very good at sellingwar, promising that he will take
just a few troops, just a fewmillions of dollars, not so much
fuel, but
Dr. Peter Mansoor (05:49):
in three months. Yeah,
Dr. Guido Rossi (05:52):
both Afghanistan and Iraq proved
proved otherwise. Do you? Do youfeel like the concepts that you
developed with General Petraeuswere then validated
Dr. Peter Mansoor (06:07):
for the kind of war we fought in Iraq. Yes,
so that's the conflict that wewere all thinking about when we
drafted 23, four in you know,the base of FM 23 dash four is
that the population is the key.
You have to control or protectthe population in order to
(06:29):
basically make it impossible forthe insurgents to gain their
support, or course, theirsupport, and thereby win. But
that sort of assumes that thepopulation, you know, there's a
small percentage that are progovernment and a small
percentage that are proinsurgent, and that there's this
(06:50):
big gap in the middle where thepopulation can can be coerced or
protected and moved one way orthe other, either towards the
pro government side or towardsthe pro insurgent side, where
that sort of assumption is notoperative, then the precepts of
field manual 23 four won't work,but they did work in Iraq, and
(07:17):
That was the most importantconflict we had to fight in the
war on terror, and
Dr. Guido Rossi (07:28):
what, well, what do you think then? Now
about the from, from a point ofview then of conducting
counterinsurgency, about the,you know, Russian occupation of
of Ukraine, considering thatthere is insurgency occurring in
the areas in some of the areasthat Russia has occupied, or,
(07:51):
for instance, in the occupationof Gaza by The Israeli army, do
you think they are affectingeffectiveness? Counterinsurgency
doctrine. Or how do you how doyou evaluate their efforts?
Dr. Peter Mansoor (08:09):
Yeah, so I think this is a situation where
FM 23 dash four does not apply.
Neither of those situations,because the population can't be
swayed in Ukraine to be proRussia. They're just not.
They're going to be againstRussia. Even if Russia wins the
conflict, they're going to ruleover a sullen and combative
(08:30):
population, and there's likelyto be a guerrilla warfare,
guerrilla conflict that Russiacannot win. I don't think it can
win period, but they certainlycan't win it by trying to
convince the people to side withwhatever government they install
in Kiev. I just don't think it'sgoing to happen same way with
(08:53):
Israel and Gaza. They're nevergoing to convince the
Palestinian people to supportthem. Maybe they can find a
Palestinian government, perhapsthe Palestinian Authority that
would be more attractive forsupport, and maybe then they
(09:14):
could fashion their operationsin order to support that
government, and that might work,but if they were to go in and
occupy Gaza, they will be met byresistance, regardless of
whether it's Hamas or some otherform of Palestinian resistance.
Dr. Guido Rossi (09:36):
So basically, regardless of time commitment or
a troop commitment, correct?
Dr. Peter Mansoor (09:45):
You know what Israel has sort of devolved to
is a strategy of mowing thegrass. It doesn't want to occupy
Gaza, and so it will go inperiodically and conduct more.
Three operations to kill Hamasfighters and destroy their
(10:05):
weapons caches, and then they'llleave and they'll do it again
years or months later, and we'llsee what happens after this
conflict, because mowing thegrass worked until it didn't.
And on October 7, 2023 we foundout exactly how badly the
(10:27):
Israelis miscalculated thattheir strategy would tamp down
Hamas to an extent that wasacceptable to Israelis
Dr. Guido Rossi (10:38):
so but think again about the conflict in Gaza
and the conflict in Ukraine.
Presently, those are two typesof insurgencies, right? And at
the same time, though, the USmilitary has been saying at
least as far back as 2018 withthe national defense strategy
published then and then restatedagain in 2022 that insurgencies
(11:01):
is no more and that we bettershift off to preparing instead
for large scale commonoperations in the context of
grid power competition, or alsocalled peer to peer or near
peer, adversaries. So the firstquestion that I have, even
(11:21):
before asking you if it's if youthink this is a wise move, do
you think again, like the firsttime that they stated that this
was stated was in 2018 and itwasn't followed the time,
because the efforts against ISISwere renewed then, and we're in
2025 almost 2026, do you thinkit will start to be followed, or
(11:43):
it will just still be, you know,just wars on paper.
Dr. Peter Mansoor (11:51):
So first I have to take a small exception
to what you said about Ukrainebeing an insurgency. There is an
element of insurgency there, butit's a hybrid conflict, and
there is a large element oflarge scale combat operations
ongoing in that conflict. Gazais much more of an insurgency,
(12:13):
but even there, that's also ahybrid conflict, so we see a lot
of conventional operations thatthe US military can look at and
refashion their forces in orderto conduct in the future,
especially the integration ofdrones into combat forces, which
(12:39):
you can see in Ukraine in a big,big way that drones have have
refashioned the way forces canfight. I mean, basically you you
need to have air superiority toconduct maneuver warfare, and
neither side has it, neitherside is able to gain and
(13:03):
maintain air superiority inUkraine, and thus the front
lines are frozen solid. Butgoing back to whether the US
military should train for largescale combat operations today,
I'm reminded of people who askedmany while we were fighting in
Iraq, you know, what should theUS Army train for? And my
(13:29):
response was, you know, as longas we're fighting here in Iraq
and Afghanistan, we need totrain for counterinsurgency
warfare. But once those wars areover, I believe that the US Army
should once again train forlarge scale combat operations
and but educate broadly. If youeducate the leaders on a broad
(13:53):
range of military operations,including counter insurgency
warfare, the troops can beretrained relatively quickly if
you if you find yourself in asituation like Iraq or
Afghanistan, you know, it's onlygoing to take a matter of months
to retrain the troops, but ittakes years to, you know, re
(14:14):
wire someone's brain, and If theofficer corps is not educated in
counter insurgency operations,then they will simply revert to
doing what they know how to do,what to do, and that is kill
people and break things that didnot work in the first few years
of the war in Iraq. And thus wehad to redo the doctrine and
(14:39):
conduct the surge. We shouldnever be in that kind of
situation again, where we throwout the lessons learned from
Vietnam, because we'll neverfight that kind of war again.
You know, we we rejiggered theUS Army and the Air Force to
fight the. Red Army in Europeafter we came out of Vietnam,
(15:04):
and we did that verysuccessfully. Air land battle
was, you know, an excellentconcept, and worked really well
in the Gulf War, but it wasn't aconcept for fighting the kind of
war that we found ourselves inIraq or Afghanistan after the
initial large scale combatoperations were done, and we had
(15:25):
not trained or educated theofficer corps to understand
those kinds of counterinsurgencyconflicts, and so that it took a
while to to rewire their brains.
And, you know, and basicallyhave them understand that
killing a lot of the enemywasn't going to get the job
(15:49):
done, that you had to get theprotector control the people in
order to win this kind of war.
Dr. Guido Rossi (15:59):
So, so, so at the very least, you think that a
perhaps with an emphasis maybeon preparing for large scale and
combat operations, but thepossibility for training also
for counterinsurgency, at leastfrom the leadership education.
Dr. Peter Mansoor (16:17):
So after Vietnam, all the courses at the
Command and General StaffCollege in Fort Leavenworth on
counter insurgency werejettisoned over the course of
1970s they'd be they firststarted out as the majority of
courses, and then it was aminority. Then it was just one,
and then it was zero. And thenin the 1980s there was a group
(16:38):
of instructors who tried tocreate just an elective course
on counter insurgency warfare,and they went to the JFK School
of Special Warfare in Fort Braggto ask them for their files on
Vietnam, only to be told thatthey had been thrown away in the
1970s because the army staffsaid that we'll never fight that
(17:01):
kind of war again. We can't godown that road again. We need to
at least have a course in theCommand and General Staff
College, in the War College oncounterinsurgency warfare or
hybrid warfare, so that theofficer corps is not caught flat
footed again,
Dr. Guido Rossi (17:21):
a bit like, maybe, maybe I'm mistaken, a bit
like jungle warfare thatthroughout the late 90s and then
early 2000s was was alsoabandoned. And then while the
Marines, since they continuedtraining for it with a with, I
forget where the the junglewarfare school for them was, but
(17:43):
then the army, just a few yearsback, reopened the jungle
warfare training center inHawaii. So kind of a similar
concept, the idea of maintainingthe possibility that capability,
and then the possibility ofexpanding it, in case, then we
get involved in that type ofwarfare again,
Dr. Peter Mansoor (18:03):
yeah, similar, but different. Jungle
warfare is just a differentenvironment. You know, you can
fight a conventional war in thejungle. You can fight
counterinsurgency operations inthe jungle. The jungle is, is
the environment and not the typeof war. With counterinsurgency,
(18:24):
it's a type of war. So I thinkthe jungle warfare would require
a training center where counterinsurgency warfare doesn't
require a training center.
Requires courses.
Dr. Guido Rossi (18:38):
Okay, yes, makes good. And it sounds like a
very sensible recommendation tome in the in the larger scheme
of things. Do you? Do you thinkthat I always think about
predicting the future warfare asreading the tea leaves, right?
It's not an exact science. Doyou do you think that's where
(19:03):
the world and history is headedright now? Are we heading more
to again, large scale, commonoperations and the context of
great power competition, or, youknow, or what do you think will
be the role of insurgencies inthe near future.
Dr. Peter Mansoor (19:22):
So the US military has a pretty good track
record of getting the next warwrong. In the 1990s if someone
had said, you know, your nexttwo wars are going to be in Iraq
and Afghanistan, they would havebeen, you know, told to go to an
insane asylum. If in the 1980ssomeone would have said, your
next war is not going to be inEurope, it's going to be in
(19:43):
Europe. It's going to be inKuwait in Iraq. Again, they
would have been told they'renuts. We don't have a very good
track record of getting the nextwar right, and so the military
needs to train. Or a broad arrayof of conflicts focusing on
(20:04):
those that are are have the mostsignificant risk and outcomes to
the United States right now, Ithink most of the military would
agree that China should be apacing threat. The Trump
administration might not agreewith that. They seem to be
focused on the WesternHemisphere and right now
(20:26):
Venezuela. But I think if youlook at what's the most
dangerous conflict for theUnited States, it would be one
with China over Taiwan, or ifRussia decided to launch a
hybrid war of the Baltic states,for instance, and got NATO
involved. Those are the sorts ofconflicts I think that we need
(20:49):
to be training for.
Dr. Guido Rossi (20:51):
And in your opinion, is it much more China
than Russia, or much more Russiathan China? Which one is more
likely?
Dr. Peter Mansoor (21:00):
So it's both but we have the advantage in
Europe of having a lot of NATOallies that can that are ramping
up their defensive capabilitiesand their armed forces. So I
think that's a short termproblem. In the medium, longer
term, I think we're going to seeyour European allies
(21:21):
significantly augment theirmilitary capabilities, and that
would allow the United States tofocus more on on China, because
in Asia, there are no there isno power groups of power absent
the United States who can staveoff a Chinese attack on, say,
(21:41):
Taiwan, Japan can't do it alone.
Vietnam is too small. Australiais too far away and too small.
So it is the United Statesthat's the key player there, and
South Korea as well, yeah, SouthKorea as well. They are. They'll
be focused on defending justtheir own homeland, much less
defending Taiwan.
Dr. Guido Rossi (22:07):
So do you so well? So these brings to the
front of my mind the Europeanallies. Do you think the, do you
think the contribution of theNATO allies in Europe will be an
essential asset for preparingfor great power competition,
(22:29):
particularly if we're fightingwe will be facing not just one
of the two enemies, but both,
Dr. Peter Mansoor (22:36):
absolutely so during the Cold War, at least
from the mid 60s on, the UnitedStates could focus on Europe,
because China was notnecessarily an ally, but they
were. They were not going tonecessarily attack us interests
(23:00):
in Asia, they were focused ontheir northern border with the
Soviet Union, primarily and oninternal struggles, primarily
economic. So the United Statescould focus on Europe and
position several 100,000 troopsthere. It was not only the wolf
(23:26):
closest to the sled, but it wasthe most dangerous Wolf. Today.
We don't have that luxury. Wehave a de facto alliance between
China and Russia, and they'reboth, you know, they're both out
to combat the United States inwhatever, whatever way they can.
(23:50):
Right now, it's, it's in grayzone conflict. But if that turns
into a shooting war, then we'regoing to need our European
allies to stave off any sort ofRussian incursion in Europe,
while we focus on on China andAsia, because we can't, we don't
(24:12):
have the military forces to doboth right now,
Dr. Guido Rossi (24:17):
Some some analysts and commentators,
they're a bit pessimistic aboutthe Not, not only about the
ability, abilities of the forcesat hand that the United States
have right now for confrontingChina, or, well, China more than
Russia, but also about themobilization capabilities. How
(24:38):
do you how do you evaluatethose? Do you well? First of
all, do you think enough hasbeen is being done presently to
prepare for these fights? And doyou think that the United States
would be able, through a propermobilization, to prepare enough
forces and mobilize theindustry, enough. To fight such
(25:01):
wars.
Dr. Peter Mansoor (25:03):
I think right now, we would be hard pressed to
fight a World War in the 1920sand 1930s the United States put
a lot of effort into figuringout industrial mobilization and
troop mobilization. We had theluxury of time. In fact, we
(25:23):
started mobilizing after thefall of France, and weren't
involved in the shooting war for18 months, and that gave us a
head start. I'm not sure we'llget a head start the next time,
and I think it's going to takemuch longer to gin up our
capabilities. The SelectiveService system is moribund at
(25:48):
best. It'll take a while. I'mnot sure we have the number and
size of training bases that weneed. The industry is not in a
position to ramp up itscapabilities, and you know, it
(26:09):
could get there if you justthrew a lot of money at them.
But then looking at our nationaldebt, we're not in a position
necessarily financially, tofight a great power conflict,
especially if it's a world war.
So we've got a lot of work todo. I'm afraid that neither
party in Washington is is wellequipped to handle it, and
(26:33):
certainly they're not going towork together. So this is a real
issue. We could actually, Icould envision a world war in
which the United States loses,which is not a good prospect.
Dr. Guido Rossi (26:48):
I will just ask you. So if, if you were, if you
could establish some priorities,what do you think the way you
think the most glaring gaps orshortcomings that should be
addressed with priority rightnow. Which what will be the
(27:08):
priorities that you think thatshould be addressed right now to
prepare for these conflicts?
Dr. Peter Mansoor (27:15):
Yeah, I think at the moment, the military, all
the services, need to focus onunmanned systems and drone
warfare and figure out how tooperate in that kind of
environment and win in that kindof environment that includes the
use of AI to command droneswarms, the manufacturing
(27:41):
capability to create droneswarms in the hundreds of 1000s
and and to have the capabilityto replenish those drones when
they get destroyed, we need tofigure out drone to drone air
warfare so that we can gain andmaintain air superiority over
(28:07):
their future battlefields usingdrones. And this is going to
take a mindset shift among themilitary. We're very good at
creating very expensive, bespokesystems. You know the F 35
fighter, the the B 21 Raiderbomber, the you know the
(28:34):
predator and Global Hawk drones,for instance. But we're not very
good at what's happening inUkraine right now, which is
swarms of drones, some of themsmall, some of them large, all
of them lethal, that aredominating the aerospace and we
got to figure that out, and Ithink we can, but that's got to
(28:57):
be the Priority, at leasttactically and operational
strategically, it's a differentstory. We need to knit up our
alliances and focus on onintegrating alliance partners
into our operations, which Ihope we're doing. But
unfortunately, some of therhetoric coming out of the Trump
(29:19):
administration is less thanhelpful in that regard.
Dr. Guido Rossi (29:23):
The last question I will ask you is, what
doctrines, what lessons learned,specifically from from the
universe of counterinsurgencyand from counterinsurgency
doctrine could be applied alsoto large scale combat
operations?
Dr. Peter Mansoor (29:38):
Well, a lot of these wars that we can
envision are going to be hybridconflicts, where there's going
to be high end combat, for sure,but there's also going to be
asymmetric conflict. You seethat right now in Europe, where
Russia is launching drones intoWestern Europe and. And
(30:01):
inhibiting their their use oftheir own airspace, even for
peaceful purposes. We can seethat with their assassination
attempts and assassinations ofkey individuals, with their with
their interjection intoelections and their use of
social media so this sort theseare the same sorts of things
(30:24):
that happen in counterinsurgencywarfare, that you're in a fight
for the people, and that fightis in all realms, and not just
the military realm, and it's inthe intelligence realm. It's in
the information space. It's inthe diplomatic realm, and you
can take those lessons and applythem to the sorts of hybrid
(30:47):
conflicts that we are ongoingtoday, and not just in Europe,
but in Asia as well. And I thinkthose lessons will be quite
useful going forward.
Dr. Guido Rossi (31:00):
I can only thank you so much for for
talking to us today. And I'lljust say that I was in Boston
recently, and I saw on thebookshelf your latest book,
redemption MacArthur and thecampaign for the Philippines. So
I got a copy for myself, andit's, it's on the bookshelf, and
it'd be my next read. Awesome.
Dr. Peter Mansoor (31:19):
Well, thanks for thanks for the contribution.
I hope you enjoy the book. I asmuch as I did in writing it. It
was a labor of
Dr. Guido Rossi (31:27):
love. I remember that you were, you were
conducting research. I thinkwhen I, when I was still to
defend my own dissertation atOhio State, at The Ohio State.
So that's it, awesome. Thank youso much. Thanks, Guido.
Jim Cardoso (31:50):
Special thanks to Dr Peter Mansour, retired US
Army officer and the chair ofmilitary history at The Ohio
State University, as well as DrGuido Rossi GNSI Research
Fellow. It was a greatconversation, and we hope you
enjoyed it before we end thepodcast today, a couple things
to tell you aboutcongratulations to USF Associate
(32:10):
Professor and GNSI SeniorFaculty Fellow, Dr Steven Neely,
a previous at the boundary gueston the publication of his new
book The anxious state stresspolarization and elections in
America. Dr Neely explores thephysiological toll of exposure
to political conflict, the roleof the media and social media in
(32:31):
heightening anxiety and thestrain on personal relationships
caused by polarization at therisk of attempting sarcasm on an
audio only podcast that's not atall a timely and relevant topic,
right? His book is available forpre order, and we'll drop a link
in the show notes. We're alsolooking forward to the St
Petersburg conference on worldaffairs coming up in early 2026
(32:56):
GNSI will partner with the StPetersburg World Affairs Council
to convene outer spacecollaboration and competition on
February 11 at the USF St Petecampus. The conference will
highlight national securityissues in outer space, but also
touch on law, diplomacy, spaceresearch and the enormous
(33:17):
aerospace industry in Florida.
Astronaut Nicole Stott, a 27year NASA veteran who lives
right here in the Tampa Bayarea, will be our keynote
speaker. We'll have moreinformation in the weeks ahead
as we finalize the agenda. Ifyou're new to the podcast or to
genocide in general, I recommendyou explore our library of
genocide decision briefs as thename implies. They're short,
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such as drones, criticalminerals, Golden Dome, Israel
and Iran and Russia's invasionof Ukraine, we also cover under
explored but important topics,such as the US military
recruiting crisis, the use ofhunger as a weapon of war, and
(34:01):
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leaders. You can find all themon our website, just click
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today, next week on the podcast,we're going to discuss the
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featured an essentialexploration about the physical
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(35:12):
that's going to wrap up thisepisode of at the boundary. Each
new episode will feature globaland national security issues we
found to be insightful,intriguing, maybe controversial,
but overall, just worth talkingabout. I'm Jim Cardoso, and
we'll see you at the boundary.
You.
Jim. Hello everyone. Welcome to this week's
(00:14):
episode of at the boundary, thepodcast from the global and
national security Institute atthe University of South Florida.
I'm Jim Cardoso, Senior Directorfor GNSI, and your host for at
the boundary. Today on thepodcast, we're going to talk
with Dr Peter Mansour, theGeneral Raymond e Mason, Jr,
(00:35):
Chair of military history atOhio State University. He's
retired US Army colonel andformer senior military fellow at
the Council of Foreign Relationsin New York, and he authored two
memoirs on his combat experiencein Iraq. He'll be talking today
with GNSI Research Fellow, DrGuido Rossi, who just happened
to be a protege of Dr Mansoorwhile earning his PhD at Ohio
(00:58):
State with the US strategicshift from counterinsurgency
back to Great Power competitionand large scale combat
operations, the two discusswhether the shift truly aligns
with future conflict, if thecounterinsurgency capabilities
should still be retained, andwhat lessons from the years of
Practicing counterinsurgency canbe applied to large scale combat
(01:21):
operations. While it's notexactly the same as the young
padawan confronting his formerJedi Master, it's still a great
opportunity to listen in as thestudent reunites with his
teacher,
Dr. Guido Rossi (01:37):
Dr Mansour, thank you so much for for
joining us and talking to ustoday.
Dr. Peter Mansoor (01:42):
Pleasure to be on. Thanks for the
invitation.
Dr. Guido Rossi (01:45):
It's it's always good to see you ever
since Ohio State University, youwere, you were my advisor then,
and the Ohio State University,you're right, you're right. But
the sort of today, today we'retalking about how the US
military is now shifting awayfrom counterinsurgency and
(02:07):
counterinsurgency doctrine, coindoctrine, and preparing in cell
itself instead for great powercompetition and large scale
comet operations, specificallyagainst China or Russia, or both
and But first, I'd like to beginby asking you, what is your
personal involvement with coindoctrine?
Dr. Peter Mansoor (02:31):
Yeah, so I was in the army for 26 years. I
was an armor officer. So thefirst part of my career, I was
deeply involved in winning theCold War, commanded a tank
company on the East West Germanborder. And then there was that
interim period after the ColdWar ended, where we're united
(02:52):
states army was trying to figureout what it was all about, and
peace keeping operations were inthere in the Bosnia conflict,
and eventually, after 911 thearmy had to shift focus to
counter insurgency warfare,particularly the wars in Iraq
(03:14):
and Afghanistan. I had two toursin Iraq. I was a brigade
commander in Baghdad, you know,304 and then, after a stint at
the Council on ForeignRelations, and then at Fort,
Leavenworth as as the head ofthe US Army Marine Corps counter
insurgency center, GeneralPetraeus selected me to be his
(03:37):
executive officer To go toBaghdad with him in 2007 2008
and help to execute the surge ofUS forces under a new counter
insurgency doctrine, FieldManual, 23 dash four, which
which I helped to edit a bitBefore heading over and
(03:58):
implementing its concepts incombat,
Dr. Guido Rossi (04:03):
any specific aspects of 23, four that you
supervise Exactly? Yeah.
Dr. Peter Mansoor (04:12):
So when the manual was nearly done, General
Petraeus sent me the digits, andhe said, make any changes that
you want, and I'll take a lookat them. And I was pretty
adamant that we should put somesort of measure of how many
troops were needed incounterinsurgency operations.
(04:36):
And so there's a part in therethat says successful
counterinsurgency operationsrequire somewhere between 20 and
50 counterinsurgents for every1000 people in the population.
And I did that mainly because Ididn't want political leaders in
(04:59):
the future. Are competing witheach other as to how few troops
they could send over to winthese types of conflicts,
because currency warfare is, istroop heavy. And I needed, I
wanted there to be a measure indoctrine where we could say to
political leaders, you know,you're saying that eight guys on
(05:22):
horseback can win the war. AndI'm telling you, doctrine says,
you know, you need 20 to 50 carinsurance for every 1000 people,
and eight guys on horsebackaren't going to cut it. So that
was the part of the manual thatI had the most impact on.
Dr. Guido Rossi (05:37):
Yeah, that's really interesting. Politicians
are usually very good at sellingwar, promising that he will take
just a few troops, just a fewmillions of dollars, not so much
fuel, but
Dr. Peter Mansoor (05:49):
in three months. Yeah,
Dr. Guido Rossi (05:52):
both Afghanistan and Iraq proved
proved otherwise. Do you? Do youfeel like the concepts that you
developed with General Petraeuswere then validated
Dr. Peter Mansoor (06:07):
for the kind of war we fought in Iraq. Yes,
so that's the conflict that wewere all thinking about when we
drafted 23, four in you know,the base of FM 23 dash four is
that the population is the key.
You have to control or protectthe population in order to
(06:29):
basically make it impossible forthe insurgents to gain their
support, or course, theirsupport, and thereby win. But
that sort of assumes that thepopulation, you know, there's a
small percentage that are progovernment and a small
percentage that are proinsurgent, and that there's this
(06:50):
big gap in the middle where thepopulation can can be coerced or
protected and moved one way orthe other, either towards the
pro government side or towardsthe pro insurgent side, where
that sort of assumption is notoperative, then the precepts of
field manual 23 four won't work,but they did work in Iraq, and
(07:17):
That was the most importantconflict we had to fight in the
war on terror, and
Dr. Guido Rossi (07:28):
what, well, what do you think then? Now
about the from, from a point ofview then of conducting
counterinsurgency, about the,you know, Russian occupation of
of Ukraine, considering thatthere is insurgency occurring in
the areas in some of the areasthat Russia has occupied, or,
(07:51):
for instance, in the occupationof Gaza by The Israeli army, do
you think they are affectingeffectiveness? Counterinsurgency
doctrine. Or how do you how doyou evaluate their efforts?
Dr. Peter Mansoor (08:09):
Yeah, so I think this is a situation where
FM 23 dash four does not apply.
Neither of those situations,because the population can't be
swayed in Ukraine to be proRussia. They're just not.
They're going to be againstRussia. Even if Russia wins the
conflict, they're going to ruleover a sullen and combative
(08:30):
population, and there's likelyto be a guerrilla warfare,
guerrilla conflict that Russiacannot win. I don't think it can
win period, but they certainlycan't win it by trying to
convince the people to side withwhatever government they install
in Kiev. I just don't think it'sgoing to happen same way with
(08:53):
Israel and Gaza. They're nevergoing to convince the
Palestinian people to supportthem. Maybe they can find a
Palestinian government, perhapsthe Palestinian Authority that
would be more attractive forsupport, and maybe then they
(09:14):
could fashion their operationsin order to support that
government, and that might work,but if they were to go in and
occupy Gaza, they will be met byresistance, regardless of
whether it's Hamas or some otherform of Palestinian resistance.
Dr. Guido Rossi (09:36):
So basically, regardless of time commitment or
a troop commitment, correct?
Dr. Peter Mansoor (09:45):
You know what Israel has sort of devolved to
is a strategy of mowing thegrass. It doesn't want to occupy
Gaza, and so it will go inperiodically and conduct more.
Three operations to kill Hamasfighters and destroy their
(10:05):
weapons caches, and then they'llleave and they'll do it again
years or months later, and we'llsee what happens after this
conflict, because mowing thegrass worked until it didn't.
And on October 7, 2023 we foundout exactly how badly the
(10:27):
Israelis miscalculated thattheir strategy would tamp down
Hamas to an extent that wasacceptable to Israelis
Dr. Guido Rossi (10:38):
so but think again about the conflict in Gaza
and the conflict in Ukraine.
Presently, those are two typesof insurgencies, right? And at
the same time, though, the USmilitary has been saying at
least as far back as 2018 withthe national defense strategy
published then and then restatedagain in 2022 that insurgencies
(11:01):
is no more and that we bettershift off to preparing instead
for large scale commonoperations in the context of
grid power competition, or alsocalled peer to peer or near
peer, adversaries. So the firstquestion that I have, even
(11:21):
before asking you if it's if youthink this is a wise move, do
you think again, like the firsttime that they stated that this
was stated was in 2018 and itwasn't followed the time,
because the efforts against ISISwere renewed then, and we're in
2025 almost 2026, do you thinkit will start to be followed, or
(11:43):
it will just still be, you know,just wars on paper.
Dr. Peter Mansoor (11:51):
So first I have to take a small exception
to what you said about Ukrainebeing an insurgency. There is an
element of insurgency there, butit's a hybrid conflict, and
there is a large element oflarge scale combat operations
ongoing in that conflict. Gazais much more of an insurgency,
(12:13):
but even there, that's also ahybrid conflict, so we see a lot
of conventional operations thatthe US military can look at and
refashion their forces in orderto conduct in the future,
especially the integration ofdrones into combat forces, which
(12:39):
you can see in Ukraine in a big,big way that drones have have
refashioned the way forces canfight. I mean, basically you you
need to have air superiority toconduct maneuver warfare, and
neither side has it, neitherside is able to gain and
(13:03):
maintain air superiority inUkraine, and thus the front
lines are frozen solid. Butgoing back to whether the US
military should train for largescale combat operations today,
I'm reminded of people who askedmany while we were fighting in
Iraq, you know, what should theUS Army train for? And my
(13:29):
response was, you know, as longas we're fighting here in Iraq
and Afghanistan, we need totrain for counterinsurgency
warfare. But once those wars areover, I believe that the US Army
should once again train forlarge scale combat operations
and but educate broadly. If youeducate the leaders on a broad
(13:53):
range of military operations,including counter insurgency
warfare, the troops can beretrained relatively quickly if
you if you find yourself in asituation like Iraq or
Afghanistan, you know, it's onlygoing to take a matter of months
to retrain the troops, but ittakes years to, you know, re
(14:14):
wire someone's brain, and If theofficer corps is not educated in
counter insurgency operations,then they will simply revert to
doing what they know how to do,what to do, and that is kill
people and break things that didnot work in the first few years
of the war in Iraq. And thus wehad to redo the doctrine and
(14:39):
conduct the surge. We shouldnever be in that kind of
situation again, where we throwout the lessons learned from
Vietnam, because we'll neverfight that kind of war again.
You know, we we rejiggered theUS Army and the Air Force to
fight the. Red Army in Europeafter we came out of Vietnam,
(15:04):
and we did that verysuccessfully. Air land battle
was, you know, an excellentconcept, and worked really well
in the Gulf War, but it wasn't aconcept for fighting the kind of
war that we found ourselves inIraq or Afghanistan after the
initial large scale combatoperations were done, and we had
(15:25):
not trained or educated theofficer corps to understand
those kinds of counterinsurgencyconflicts, and so that it took a
while to to rewire their brains.
And, you know, and basicallyhave them understand that
killing a lot of the enemywasn't going to get the job
(15:49):
done, that you had to get theprotector control the people in
order to win this kind of war.
Dr. Guido Rossi (15:59):
So, so, so at the very least, you think that a
perhaps with an emphasis maybeon preparing for large scale and
combat operations, but thepossibility for training also
for counterinsurgency, at leastfrom the leadership education.
Dr. Peter Mansoor (16:17):
So after Vietnam, all the courses at the
Command and General StaffCollege in Fort Leavenworth on
counter insurgency werejettisoned over the course of
1970s they'd be they firststarted out as the majority of
courses, and then it was aminority. Then it was just one,
and then it was zero. And thenin the 1980s there was a group
(16:38):
of instructors who tried tocreate just an elective course
on counter insurgency warfare,and they went to the JFK School
of Special Warfare in Fort Braggto ask them for their files on
Vietnam, only to be told thatthey had been thrown away in the
1970s because the army staffsaid that we'll never fight that
(17:01):
kind of war again. We can't godown that road again. We need to
at least have a course in theCommand and General Staff
College, in the War College oncounterinsurgency warfare or
hybrid warfare, so that theofficer corps is not caught flat
footed again,
Dr. Guido Rossi (17:21):
a bit like, maybe, maybe I'm mistaken, a bit
like jungle warfare thatthroughout the late 90s and then
early 2000s was was alsoabandoned. And then while the
Marines, since they continuedtraining for it with a with, I
forget where the the junglewarfare school for them was, but
(17:43):
then the army, just a few yearsback, reopened the jungle
warfare training center inHawaii. So kind of a similar
concept, the idea of maintainingthe possibility that capability,
and then the possibility ofexpanding it, in case, then we
get involved in that type ofwarfare again,
Dr. Peter Mansoor (18:03):
yeah, similar, but different. Jungle
warfare is just a differentenvironment. You know, you can
fight a conventional war in thejungle. You can fight
counterinsurgency operations inthe jungle. The jungle is, is
the environment and not the typeof war. With counterinsurgency,
(18:24):
it's a type of war. So I thinkthe jungle warfare would require
a training center where counterinsurgency warfare doesn't
require a training center.
Requires courses.
Dr. Guido Rossi (18:38):
Okay, yes, makes good. And it sounds like a
very sensible recommendation tome in the in the larger scheme
of things. Do you? Do you thinkthat I always think about
predicting the future warfare asreading the tea leaves, right?
It's not an exact science. Doyou do you think that's where
(19:03):
the world and history is headedright now? Are we heading more
to again, large scale, commonoperations and the context of
great power competition, or, youknow, or what do you think will
be the role of insurgencies inthe near future.
Dr. Peter Mansoor (19:22):
So the US military has a pretty good track
record of getting the next warwrong. In the 1990s if someone
had said, you know, your nexttwo wars are going to be in Iraq
and Afghanistan, they would havebeen, you know, told to go to an
insane asylum. If in the 1980ssomeone would have said, your
next war is not going to be inEurope, it's going to be in
(19:43):
Europe. It's going to be inKuwait in Iraq. Again, they
would have been told they'renuts. We don't have a very good
track record of getting the nextwar right, and so the military
needs to train. Or a broad arrayof of conflicts focusing on
(20:04):
those that are are have the mostsignificant risk and outcomes to
the United States right now, Ithink most of the military would
agree that China should be apacing threat. The Trump
administration might not agreewith that. They seem to be
focused on the WesternHemisphere and right now
(20:26):
Venezuela. But I think if youlook at what's the most
dangerous conflict for theUnited States, it would be one
with China over Taiwan, or ifRussia decided to launch a
hybrid war of the Baltic states,for instance, and got NATO
involved. Those are the sorts ofconflicts I think that we need
(20:49):
to be training for.
Dr. Guido Rossi (20:51):
And in your opinion, is it much more China
than Russia, or much more Russiathan China? Which one is more
likely?
Dr. Peter Mansoor (21:00):
So it's both but we have the advantage in
Europe of having a lot of NATOallies that can that are ramping
up their defensive capabilitiesand their armed forces. So I
think that's a short termproblem. In the medium, longer
term, I think we're going to seeyour European allies
(21:21):
significantly augment theirmilitary capabilities, and that
would allow the United States tofocus more on on China, because
in Asia, there are no there isno power groups of power absent
the United States who can staveoff a Chinese attack on, say,
(21:41):
Taiwan, Japan can't do it alone.
Vietnam is too small. Australiais too far away and too small.
So it is the United Statesthat's the key player there, and
South Korea as well, yeah, SouthKorea as well. They are. They'll
be focused on defending justtheir own homeland, much less
defending Taiwan.
Dr. Guido Rossi (22:07):
So do you so well? So these brings to the
front of my mind the Europeanallies. Do you think the, do you
think the contribution of theNATO allies in Europe will be an
essential asset for preparingfor great power competition,
(22:29):
particularly if we're fightingwe will be facing not just one
of the two enemies, but both,
Dr. Peter Mansoor (22:36):
absolutely so during the Cold War, at least
from the mid 60s on, the UnitedStates could focus on Europe,
because China was notnecessarily an ally, but they
were. They were not going tonecessarily attack us interests
(23:00):
in Asia, they were focused ontheir northern border with the
Soviet Union, primarily and oninternal struggles, primarily
economic. So the United Statescould focus on Europe and
position several 100,000 troopsthere. It was not only the wolf
(23:26):
closest to the sled, but it wasthe most dangerous Wolf. Today.
We don't have that luxury. Wehave a de facto alliance between
China and Russia, and they'reboth, you know, they're both out
to combat the United States inwhatever, whatever way they can.
(23:50):
Right now, it's, it's in grayzone conflict. But if that turns
into a shooting war, then we'regoing to need our European
allies to stave off any sort ofRussian incursion in Europe,
while we focus on on China andAsia, because we can't, we don't
(24:12):
have the military forces to doboth right now,
Dr. Guido Rossi (24:17):
Some some analysts and commentators,
they're a bit pessimistic aboutthe Not, not only about the
ability, abilities of the forcesat hand that the United States
have right now for confrontingChina, or, well, China more than
Russia, but also about themobilization capabilities. How
(24:38):
do you how do you evaluatethose? Do you well? First of
all, do you think enough hasbeen is being done presently to
prepare for these fights? And doyou think that the United States
would be able, through a propermobilization, to prepare enough
forces and mobilize theindustry, enough. To fight such
(25:01):
wars.
Dr. Peter Mansoor (25:03):
I think right now, we would be hard pressed to
fight a World War in the 1920sand 1930s the United States put
a lot of effort into figuringout industrial mobilization and
troop mobilization. We had theluxury of time. In fact, we
(25:23):
started mobilizing after thefall of France, and weren't
involved in the shooting war for18 months, and that gave us a
head start. I'm not sure we'llget a head start the next time,
and I think it's going to takemuch longer to gin up our
capabilities. The SelectiveService system is moribund at
(25:48):
best. It'll take a while. I'mnot sure we have the number and
size of training bases that weneed. The industry is not in a
position to ramp up itscapabilities, and you know, it
(26:09):
could get there if you justthrew a lot of money at them.
But then looking at our nationaldebt, we're not in a position
necessarily financially, tofight a great power conflict,
especially if it's a world war.
So we've got a lot of work todo. I'm afraid that neither
party in Washington is is wellequipped to handle it, and
(26:33):
certainly they're not going towork together. So this is a real
issue. We could actually, Icould envision a world war in
which the United States loses,which is not a good prospect.
Dr. Guido Rossi (26:48):
I will just ask you. So if, if you were, if you
could establish some priorities,what do you think the way you
think the most glaring gaps orshortcomings that should be
addressed with priority rightnow. Which what will be the
(27:08):
priorities that you think thatshould be addressed right now to
prepare for these conflicts?
Dr. Peter Mansoor (27:15):
Yeah, I think at the moment, the military, all
the services, need to focus onunmanned systems and drone
warfare and figure out how tooperate in that kind of
environment and win in that kindof environment that includes the
use of AI to command droneswarms, the manufacturing
(27:41):
capability to create droneswarms in the hundreds of 1000s
and and to have the capabilityto replenish those drones when
they get destroyed, we need tofigure out drone to drone air
warfare so that we can gain andmaintain air superiority over
(28:07):
their future battlefields usingdrones. And this is going to
take a mindset shift among themilitary. We're very good at
creating very expensive, bespokesystems. You know the F 35
fighter, the the B 21 Raiderbomber, the you know the
(28:34):
predator and Global Hawk drones,for instance. But we're not very
good at what's happening inUkraine right now, which is
swarms of drones, some of themsmall, some of them large, all
of them lethal, that aredominating the aerospace and we
got to figure that out, and Ithink we can, but that's got to
(28:57):
be the Priority, at leasttactically and operational
strategically, it's a differentstory. We need to knit up our
alliances and focus on onintegrating alliance partners
into our operations, which Ihope we're doing. But
unfortunately, some of therhetoric coming out of the Trump
(29:19):
administration is less thanhelpful in that regard.
Dr. Guido Rossi (29:23):
The last question I will ask you is, what
doctrines, what lessons learned,specifically from from the
universe of counterinsurgencyand from counterinsurgency
doctrine could be applied alsoto large scale combat
operations?
Dr. Peter Mansoor (29:38):
Well, a lot of these wars that we can
envision are going to be hybridconflicts, where there's going
to be high end combat, for sure,but there's also going to be
asymmetric conflict. You seethat right now in Europe, where
Russia is launching drones intoWestern Europe and. And
(30:01):
inhibiting their their use oftheir own airspace, even for
peaceful purposes. We can seethat with their assassination
attempts and assassinations ofkey individuals, with their with
their interjection intoelections and their use of
social media so this sort theseare the same sorts of things
(30:24):
that happen in counterinsurgencywarfare, that you're in a fight
for the people, and that fightis in all realms, and not just
the military realm, and it's inthe intelligence realm. It's in
the information space. It's inthe diplomatic realm, and you
can take those lessons and applythem to the sorts of hybrid
(30:47):
conflicts that we are ongoingtoday, and not just in Europe,
but in Asia as well. And I thinkthose lessons will be quite
useful going forward.
Dr. Guido Rossi (31:00):
I can only thank you so much for for
talking to us today. And I'lljust say that I was in Boston
recently, and I saw on thebookshelf your latest book,
redemption MacArthur and thecampaign for the Philippines. So
I got a copy for myself, andit's, it's on the bookshelf, and
it'd be my next read. Awesome.
Dr. Peter Mansoor (31:19):
Well, thanks for thanks for the contribution.
I hope you enjoy the book. I asmuch as I did in writing it. It
was a labor of
Dr. Guido Rossi (31:27):
love. I remember that you were, you were
conducting research. I thinkwhen I, when I was still to
defend my own dissertation atOhio State, at The Ohio State.
So that's it, awesome. Thank youso much. Thanks, Guido.
Jim Cardoso (31:50):
Special thanks to Dr Peter Mansour, retired US
Army officer and the chair ofmilitary history at The Ohio
State University, as well as DrGuido Rossi GNSI Research
Fellow. It was a greatconversation, and we hope you
enjoyed it before we end thepodcast today, a couple things
to tell you aboutcongratulations to USF Associate
(32:10):
Professor and GNSI SeniorFaculty Fellow, Dr Steven Neely,
a previous at the boundary gueston the publication of his new
book The anxious state stresspolarization and elections in
America. Dr Neely explores thephysiological toll of exposure
to political conflict, the roleof the media and social media in
(32:31):
heightening anxiety and thestrain on personal relationships
caused by polarization at therisk of attempting sarcasm on an
audio only podcast that's not atall a timely and relevant topic,
right? His book is available forpre order, and we'll drop a link
in the show notes. We're alsolooking forward to the St
Petersburg conference on worldaffairs coming up in early 2026
(32:56):
GNSI will partner with the StPetersburg World Affairs Council
to convene outer spacecollaboration and competition on
February 11 at the USF St Petecampus. The conference will
highlight national securityissues in outer space, but also
touch on law, diplomacy, spaceresearch and the enormous
(33:17):
aerospace industry in Florida.
Astronaut Nicole Stott, a 27year NASA veteran who lives
right here in the Tampa Bayarea, will be our keynote
speaker. We'll have moreinformation in the weeks ahead
as we finalize the agenda. Ifyou're new to the podcast or to
genocide in general, I recommendyou explore our library of
genocide decision briefs as thename implies. They're short,
(33:41):
easy to read. Explanations ontoday's national security issues
such as drones, criticalminerals, Golden Dome, Israel
and Iran and Russia's invasionof Ukraine, we also cover under
explored but important topics,such as the US military
recruiting crisis, the use ofhunger as a weapon of war, and
(34:01):
how to best educate and preparefuture national security
leaders. You can find all themon our website, just click
publications. Thanks forspending some time with us
today, next week on the podcast,we're going to discuss the
recently completed first everFlorida security forum. It
featured an essentialexploration about the physical
(34:22):
and cyber security of Florida'sports and the national security
implications even while we'reworking on the post conference
deliverables, it's never tooearly to explore important
takeaways. We'll bring togetherkey members of the conference
team for a mini roundtable nextweek on at the boundary. You
don't want to miss that episodeor any other Be sure to rate,
(34:45):
subscribe and let your friendsand colleagues know. If you're
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LinkedIn and X accounts at USF,underscore. GNSI. GNSI, and
check out our website as well,at usf.edu/gnsi,
(35:12):
that's going to wrap up thisepisode of at the boundary. Each
new episode will feature globaland national security issues we
found to be insightful,intriguing, maybe controversial,
but overall, just worth talkingabout. I'm Jim Cardoso, and
we'll see you at the boundary.
You.
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Crime Junkie
Does hearing about a true crime case always leave you scouring the internet for the truth behind the story? Dive into your next mystery with Crime Junkie. Every Monday, join your host Ashley Flowers as she unravels all the details of infamous and underreported true crime cases with her best friend Brit Prawat. From cold cases to missing persons and heroes in our community who seek justice, Crime Junkie is your destination for theories and stories you won’t hear anywhere else. Whether you're a seasoned true crime enthusiast or new to the genre, you'll find yourself on the edge of your seat awaiting a new episode every Monday. If you can never get enough true crime... Congratulations, you’ve found your people. Follow to join a community of Crime Junkies! Crime Junkie is presented by audiochuck Media Company.