August 18, 2025 • 48 mins
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In this episode of GNSI’s “At the Boundary” podcast, Arman Mahmoudian, PhD, interviews Marvin G. Weinbaum, PhD, who is senior fellow at the Middle East Institute and professor emeritus of political science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Drawing on his recent article, “Our Knowledge of the Taliban as Guide for US Policy” ( which was recently published in the Journal of Strategic Security), Dr. Weinbaum offers a detailed assessment of the collapse of the Afghan state and the return of the Taliban in 2021.
This episode discusses:
- Why the U.S. failed at state-building and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan
- The shift from counterterrorism to democratic nation-building
- Weinbaum’s analysis of Afghan leadership under Karzai and Ghani, and how their governance choices helped shape the state’s collapse
- Fragmentation within the Taliban leadership
- How the presence of ISIS-K pressures Taliban unity and policy
- The collapse of U.S. military support and Afghan troop morale
- Dangers of a failed Taliban state and the regional risk of civil war
- Weinbaum’s direct message to Afghans affected by the regime change
Throughout the interview, Weinbaum emphasizes that U.S. disengagement has reduced its leverage on critical issues like human rights, warning that effective diplomacy with the Taliban requires long-term engagement, not conditional demands. He also argues that continued absence risks ceding influence to regional powers already moving toward recognition.
Links from the episode:
• GNSI Tampa Summit 5 Report (March 2025) The Russia-Ukraine War: Lessons for Future Conflicts
• The Latest Journal of Strategic Security (JSS)
• GNSI’s Axis of Resistance Research Initiative Playlist
At the Boundary from the Global and National Security Institute at the University of South Florida, features global and national security issues we’ve found to be insightful, intriguing, fascinating, maybe controversial, but overall just worth talking about.
A "boundary" is a place, either literal or figurative, where two forces exist in close proximity to each other. Sometimes that boundary is in a state of harmony. More often than not, that boundary has a bit of chaos baked in. The Global and National Security Institute will live on the boundary of security policy and technology and that's where this podcast will focus.
The mission of GNSI is to provide actionable solutions to 21st-century security challenges for decision-makers at the local, state, national and global levels. We hope you enjoy At the Boundary.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Jim Cardoso (00:00):
Jim, hello everyone. Welcome to this week's
(00:14):
episode of at the boundary, apodcast from the global and
national security Institute atthe University of South Florida.
I'm Jim Cardoso, Senior DirectorGNSI and your host for at the
boundary. On today's episode,we're going to turn our
attention to Afghanistan whilethat country is not currently
(00:36):
grabbing headlines, Afghanistanremains vital to the United
States's relationships withinthe region. Our guest today will
be Dr Marvin Weinbaum, directorof the Afghanistan and Pakistan
studies programs at the MiddleEast Institute. Before we get to
that discussion, couple ofthings to tell you about. We're
excited to announce that we'llbe hosting one of the country's
(00:58):
most influential conferences onnational security and
cyberspace. Cyber beacon 2025the flagship annual event for
national defense University'sCollege of Information and
cyberspace, will be held on USFTampa campus on October 16. GNSI
is partnering with CIC to holdcyber beacon outside of
(01:18):
Washington, DC for the firsttime in the 12 year history of
the conference, we will conveneleading voices from the US,
military, Allied defenseinstitutions, government
agencies, academia and theprivate sector to explore
cutting edge developments incyber strategy, artificial
intelligence and autonomoussystems. The agenda is available
(01:40):
on our website, and look forofficial announcements on the
speaker lineup in the nearfuture. Registration will open
soon, so keep an eye out. Cyberbeacon will cap off a big week
in Tampa, following up on thecyber Bay event in downtown
Tampa. From October 13 throughthe 15th, registration is open
for this event, which willfeature GNSI Executive Director,
(02:02):
retired Marine Corps GeneralFrank McKenzie, as one of the
keynote speakers. GNSI will puton a national security focused
panel for the conference, andyou can find out
more@cyberbay.org on thepublications front, we recently
published the conference reportfor GNSI Tampa summit five.
Theme of the summit was theRussia, Ukraine war lessons for
(02:25):
future conflicts. You can findthe report on our website. We
also just published a specialprinted edition of our most
recent issue of the Journal ofstrategic security. This issue
focuses on Afghanistan andfeatures leading experts,
including Dr Weinbaum. It's thefirst printed issue in the 18
year history of the journal, andwe plan on transitioning to more
(02:48):
printed issues in the future.
The electronic version remainsavailable via our website. But
let's now turn to ourconversation with Dr Weinbaum.
He's professor emeritus at theUniversity of Illinois, a former
State Department official andcurrently serves as a director
of Afghanistan and Pakistanstudies programs at the Middle
East Institute. His article istitled, our knowledge of the
(03:10):
Taliban as guide for US policy,and argues for breaking new
ground in the tumultuous USFgnst and relationship and
shaking off establishedthinking. In engaging the
Taliban, we encourage you toread the article yourself, but
the author sat down with GNSIResearch Fellow, Dr Armon
mahmoudian, for an in depthdiscussion.
Arman Mahmoudian (03:36):
Well, Dr Weinbaum, once again, thank you
for joining us. It's a greatpleasure to be with you. My
pleasure at the GNSI, we had thean honor of the hosting you in
November of the 2024 which wehad a policy dialog event on
Afghanistan, and you spoke atour third panel. Later on, you
kindly also gave us the pleasureof, you know, publishing an
(03:56):
article in order in our journal,Journal of strategic security.
Your article was published underthe name of our knowledge of
Taliban as a guide for US policyin our article, one of the
things that you touch is thatwhat happened, why, after the
two decades of endeavor by ourUS and its allies, local and
international, Taliban,Afghanistan, fell into the hand
(04:17):
of Taliban in August of 2021 Iwant to start with this
question, which might be aspoiler. All out. I want to ask
you that, what could have unitedsaid done to prevent the fall of
Afghanistan, if you go back inthe time, what move would any
move would have changed? Well,look,
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum (04:38):
I think we really have to get the big
picture here, we have to askwhy. You know, what did we
attempt to do that we failed at?
Why did we try to do this? Afterall, United States had pretty
much killed. And up onAfghanistan in the 90s, except
(05:00):
for Bin Laden. We were concernedabout Bin Laden, but otherwise,
we really didn't care whetherthe Taliban regime survived or
not. We did not have regimechange as one of our objectives.
And I can say that because I wasin the State Department at the
(05:21):
time, and I know that for a factthat we did not want to get
involved. But what changed then?
Of course, it was 911 and andnow, in order to get rid of bin
Laden we had to get rid of theTaliban they had given, given
(05:46):
them an opportunity to turn themover, but they rejected. So
there we were. We foundourselves in Afghanistan, where
we hadn't expected to be,obviously, but with air power,
we were able to very quickly getthe upper hand. But we had the
(06:09):
now the responsibility of thiscountry. So it faced. We were
faced with two challenges,neither of which, again, we
wanted, but more and more wefound ourselves being drawn into
(06:30):
now. What were the challenges?
The first one was obviously thatwe were involved here in it had
to be state building, becausethere were no there were no
institutions left. So we had nochoice, but if we were going to
(06:52):
leave without having things goback to the way they were, we
had to leave with someinstitutions which would
stabilize the situation. Thesecond challenge was the
challenge of suppression of aninsurgency. And interestingly,
(07:13):
that challenge did not appearexcept Oh, by 2005 certainly by
2006 when it was realized thatthis was serious, this was a
serious challenge to the newAfghan state. Okay, so we, we.
(07:34):
This was our our goal. How werewe going to deal with this?
Well, we were going to leave itto the Afghans, pretty much, to
pick their own president,although we had a role in that
too, since they couldn't agreeon it, we we were going to have
(07:54):
them write their ownconstitution, fine and
meanwhile, we just couldn't walkaway while they were doing this,
and they would need a few yearsto settle in. And it didn't seem
to be any particular rush,especially by 2003 when we get
(08:16):
pulled off Afghanistan, almostcompletely because of Iraq, the
invasion of Iraq. So we havevery few people on the ground
there, and very littlecommitment, but we're there. We
we found that the wasn't aninsurgency, as I say, until four
(08:44):
or five, and by then, we had todeal with it, but once again,
now with all of our resources,pretty much in Iraq. Now I bring
this up because winning,building a state is a very
(09:08):
difficult job. It takes decades.
You have to build theinstitutions. You got to develop
the supporting norms to go withit. And we specified we didn't
want any state. Wanted ademocratic state correct, so it
(09:36):
had to meet that condition.
Arman Mahmoudian (09:39):
So basically, if I stand Correct, yeah, you're
saying that there was a changeof mission right after getting
into the Afghanistan, fromcountering al Qaeda to nation
state.
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum (09:50):
Well, we didn't, you know, we all the
only mission we had, really, wasto get rid of bin Laden, yes,
but once we got into it, youcouldn't. Get away without
facing the fact that you had toleave something in its place.
We're faced with the samesituation now in Gaza, yes, if
(10:11):
you can't simply win, you got toleave something in it to to to
assume authority. So here wewere taking on what is normally
a job which takes years to do.
That's true with the insurgencyas well, that when you're in an
(10:32):
asymmetrical kind of insurgencywhere all your opponent has to
do is to survive. You've got towin. All he has to do is to
survive. So why did we fail hereand on the state side? We
(10:56):
failed. Unfortunately, thepeople in positions of
leadership were not really well,let me put it this way. I think
that they were often wellmeaning, talking about mainly
Karzai and Ghani, in that theywanted the best for their
people. And yes, they wanted ademocratic system that they
(11:18):
could control, but in order tosucceed, they needed to have the
support of people, and for that,they needed their loyalty, and
their loyalty could not begained by saying, Well, we have
the legitimacy the way the kingcould before King says, Well,
(11:42):
I'm monarch, and I can do thiswith a democratic government.
The only way to succeed isultimately through the election
process that gives you thelegitimacy. And the first
election in 2004 went fairlywell, but as soon as Howard
(12:03):
Karzai got in there with atribal background, as soon as he
got in there, he realized thathe couldn't govern without the
personal loyalty. Came from atribal background, a personal
loyalty. And in order to getthis, he had to do things which
(12:26):
ultimately would undermine thestate. And this is, this is
basically what had happened. Sohe ends up in appointing people
to positions. And GNSI does thislater too, who are unqualified
but trustworthy. Trustworthy. Heends up appointing a little
(12:54):
later, generals and othermilitary people, not because
they were proven to havecompetence, but because they
could be trusted. And thisimmediately saddled the new
regime with a very difficultsituation, not made easier by
(13:19):
the fact that the US couldn't dowasn't going to do anything else
except pour money in forprograms, and then a little
later, for the military, andwhereas it was needed if they
(13:39):
were going to succeed and havesomething to show for what they
were doing. Even though it wasneeded, all it did was to feed
the corruption that wassustaining the regime. So what
we have to see is that the StateBuilding and insurgency
(14:04):
suppression are one the same.
One can't exist really, withoutone, you can't see succeed in
one without the other. Andthat's and that was what we
really ran into. I, I the stateran into particular problems by
(14:35):
2009 and then 14, because thosewere election years, and the it
was therefore going to be thejob of the of the people in
(14:57):
power if they wanted to stay inpower. And. Win that election,
whatever it took. So in theprocess those elections nine,
and I was one observer for thenine election, and then in the
and then in the 14 election,same clearly, those elections
(15:20):
were fraudulent. The processleading up to them was
fraudulent. All of this adds upto the fact that, meanwhile, the
public is becoming more and moredisillusioned the that the
government by its incompetence,by its corruption, by the way in
(15:46):
which it is sustained power isalienating the population.
They're alienating thepopulation now, it's not that
the people wanted the generalpublic wanted, for the most
part, the Taliban to return topower their their memory of the
(16:11):
first administer, the firstTaliban emirate was one they
they didn't want to Go back tothat, but they were on the
fence, and they run the on thefence. I should add to all of
this that on the military, theUS, okay, the US ultimately
(16:33):
becomes more heavily engaged.
Now, what does it do in 20091011, I 11, up to 14, where it
then reduces them, it pourstroops in, but its troops really
are trained to do, to engage inwarfare, other than what really
(16:58):
was required. This is aguerrilla war. Tanks aren't of
much value. Planes are. Tanksaren't of value. What is of
great value is that you've gotto establish relationships, and
that means you got to work inthe countryside. You got to
(17:23):
realize that the real, the realgovernance that goes on in the
country is really taking placelocally. You've got, it's in the
village councils. And we triedto address this, we tried the US
and our and our allies to toplace people into the local
(17:49):
areas, but for the most part,they they weren't trained for
this, and then they only stayedfor a year and then left. So
whatever, whatever kinds ofrelationships were established,
were then severed, because thepeople who were sent were
(18:13):
leaving.
Arman Mahmoudian (18:17):
I have a quick follow up questions. You know,
you mentioned that after 911your this, the United States
Government asked Talibans tohand out a lot and people around
him. Over a couple months ago,something went viral in the
social media some of the outletsthat the Taliban claims so some
(18:38):
of the Taliban leaders claimsthat United States gave them,
initially 48 hours of ultimatum.
But President Bush didn't waitout to 48 hours to be over, and
he made the decision to attackprior to the you know, to
reaching the deadline. Is thereany truth to it? Or Taliban is
just trying to just shift theblame for the war?
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum (19:01):
Not sure I'm following you, but are you
saying that a deal could havebeen arranged with the Taliban?
Arman Mahmoudian (19:09):
Yes. The reason that I'm saying is that
because of the some of thefigures close to Saul Taliban,
maker has made a claim thatUnited States didn't wait for
the ultimatum deadline to bereached, they make the decision
to attack Afghanistan prior tothe deadline.
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum (19:27):
Prior Yeah,
Unknown (19:29):
yes, no,
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum (19:31):
again, I was on the inside.
Unknown (19:33):
That's why I'm asking yes, yeah,
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum (19:37):
up until the 11th Hour, working through
general Mahmoud, who was thenthe liaison between Pakistan and
the Taliban leadership. Omar,particularly well. Omar, we held
(19:57):
out to them that. We're notgoing to attack, if you'll only
give us and run. That's all wethat's all we really want. This
may be apocryphal, butsupposedly the Mullah Omar said
(20:18):
to Mahmoud that I don't believethe Americans are going to
attack Wow. And if they do,we'll defeat them. And if we
don't defeat them now, we'lldefeat them later. Well, you
know, there's that. But Ithought you were also referring
(20:39):
to the fact that after the USattacked and the Taliban fled to
Pakistan, almost almost intact,it fled to Pakistan that the
Taliban then said, Okay, We'rewilling to enter into a deal, we
(21:01):
will now be willing to join withothers for an inclusive
government. Well, of course,that's what we have wanted them
to say in recent years, thatthey will, but the way it was
read at the time was sure nowthat they've been defeated and
(21:24):
they want to keep their hand inthe game that they'll say they
can do this now it overlooks thefact that At the bond
conference, it was exceedinglydifficult to reach any kind of
(21:45):
agreement. They They argued andthey argued. Ultimately, Karzai
was appointed, but only becauseof the Iranians and the
Russians. Well, put pressure onKarzai. Yeah, on the warlords,
if you will, put pressure onthem. So the idea that you could
(22:06):
have then injected the Talibaninto this new government, I
can't see possible. It wouldhave never reached an agreement
if the Taliban were sitting atthe table, it was nice to know
that that was a possibility. Asfar as you know, they were
(22:29):
willing to do it, but they weredoing for obvious reasons, and
now just to wind up on this, I Ithink that what really
undermined the US as much asanything was the fact that its
policy was never consistent. Itwas constantly being readjusted.
(22:55):
It, as I mentioned, the rotationpersonnel undercut it, but up
until a few months until the endof the regime of the Republic,
it would have still beenpossible for the Taliban regime
(23:17):
to hold on longer. It didn'thave to collapse
Unknown (23:22):
for the Afghanistan
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum (23:26):
regime, but once it became clear that
the US really was leaving, thenit was inevitable. And of
course, then it came apart veryquickly, particularly
inevitable, because the US wasnot going to leave behind any
(23:48):
forces, and particularly alsobecause what the Afghan Military
needed most of all was Americanair power, yes, and without the
air power, they could notsupport their troops on the
(24:10):
ground, and morale justcollapsed
Arman Mahmoudian (24:13):
for various variety of reason. And as you
said, the rule that Americansplayed, the rule that the very
foundation of that is the newstate of Afghanistan. At the
beginning, the regime fell, andnow we have Taliban too in
Afghanistan. And when it comesto the new Taliban, there is, as
you know, better than mostpeople, there is an argument out
(24:37):
there that this Taliban might bedifferent from previous and they
mostly point out to thedifferences between Kabul and
Kandahar. There is a speculationout there that Sarah Jean
Haqqani, the Ministry of theInterior, who is in Kabul
mostly, and hey batola hunzada.
Leader in the panda or theydon't get along. The rumors
(25:01):
suggest that the hack moneywants a better or more relations
with the rest of the world ispro isolation. I want to ask you
that to what extent you canverify, can you very will you
verify these rumors? Do youthink there is a division, and
if there is a division, whatthat say about the new
Afghanistan?
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum (25:23):
First of all, let's compare the emirate,
second emirate with the first.
Thank you. In some respects,they're very much alike on
particularly on social policyand on their political
repression, it would be hard todistinguish them In that regard,
(25:50):
the Emirate of the 90s wasreally a hermit state. It was
isolated from the world. Kabulwas a dead city. Everybody had
(26:12):
left. I know I was in Kabul afew months after the Taliban
took over and walked around, andit was so sad, because I had
lived in Kabul years earlier. Iknew what a fun city. It really
(26:33):
was, in some respects, certainlya very engaging place. I it was
just sad. I didn't, well, notthat that has changed, but I
didn't see a woman on on thestreet in all the time I was
(26:57):
there. Oh, except for some veryelderly women who were begging.
So the social policies,especially on the women and the
political repression, hasn'tchanged much but, but the second
emirate is different. It hasmany of the same people in the
(27:18):
leadership who were active inthe 90s, to be sure, but it also
has a younger generation whohave come through, and they're
at the second level, and they'remaking a difference, however,
gradually that will be but ingenerally, it's not a hermit
(27:41):
state. It's an the state is moreopen. It's more porous. It's
possible for many people to goand visit Kabul, to walk around
the city. The big change ofcourse, from a few years ago is
it's now safe to walk aroundany, pretty much anywhere in the
(28:02):
country. So yes, women are beingcriminally, I think, confined,
their ambitions crushed, and thepopulation feels the heavy
weight of the repression. Butthere are many people who are
(28:24):
returning, who the who it wasthought would be arrested
immediately. Some have but ingeneral, the Taliban has
welcomed back those people withtalents that they don't have.
It's a mixed picture. Yeah. Nowthat brings us to what you were
(28:47):
just saying, factionalism.
Having said all this, there aresome serious differences,
serious differences among theleadership, certainly on
strategy, but on principles,even the so called more
moderates and the hard linersdon't really different. Differ
(29:13):
that much, if at all. What theydiffer on are their strategies.
That is, if we're not going tohave women in education, are
there perhaps some other ways tokeep women separated without
(29:34):
completely ending education? Sothat you know there and there
are many other areas too, wherethe the more moderate Taliban
are open to dialog. They theywelcome dialog. Whereas the
Kandahar Shura, which is wherethe top leadership. And Zaida is
(30:03):
there. They don't meet withanyone. They're completely
insulated. But they are thepeople who ultimately are making
the decisions. Now there arestrong differences here. Their
ambitions are being thwarted.
People think that they should beleading, rather than our concern
(30:28):
have at all? Yes, ah, there arepeople who think so, but and we
hear from time to time thatthey're going to challenge, that
they're going to challenge.
Well, the truth is that wheneverthe rubber hits the road is they
(30:53):
back off, and the reason thatthey do that is the Taliban
leadership for all of itsdifferences, has come to the
conclusion that what's moreimportant than anything else is
that they hang together, that ifthey begin to divide, that the
(31:22):
whole movement is in jeopardy.
So take, for example, theHaqqanis are a major element of
the of the Taliban. They didn'tused to be. They used to be
separately. They're in analliance, but, but now the
(31:45):
Haqqani family, especially SirajUddin, the Haqqanis, are
powerful, and yet they have notreally thrown down the gauntlet,
as we say, he had them reallychallenged them because they
fear factionalism, disunity willlead to disintegration of the
(32:13):
movement. I suspect that we'regoing to see this remain pretty
much as it is, for at least thetime being.
Arman Mahmoudian (32:25):
I appreciate you confirming the you know, the
fragmentation which brings us tothe next stage and the last
stages about what the US policyshould be
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum (32:34):
before we do that, I want to mention
that the there is an elementhere. One of the things that
also keeps Taliban together is,is k is that is Islamic State?
(32:55):
Dash, yes, the fear that if theystart to divide, some of the
elements that lose out will joinISK, not Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is
pretty much out of the picturenow, wow. They have never really
been a major factor excepthelping with recruitment and
(33:20):
finances, and they may still bedoing that. They're really and
maybe, maybe they are plotting.
You don't need too many peopleto have a plot, but it really
is, is k, and at the moment,they're locked into a
competition is K says we are thetrue carriers of what the
(33:44):
Taliban beliefs are all about.
You're not living up to theideals of the movement we are.
And so there's constant pressureon them to maintain a if they if
(34:06):
they compromise on the women'sissue, they've got to be fearful
that the talent that is k dashwill capitalize on this, and
that this will strengthen theirmovement, because, again, they
(34:27):
want to replace the leadershipthat exists there. Now they
won't be able to do it in thenear run, in the near run, but
they're looking ahead, and theythink that they've got a chance
now, if they can just begin tosee some kind of disintegration
(34:53):
of the current leadership andthe leadership therefore
recognizing this has additional.
Reason to hang together.
Arman Mahmoudian (35:02):
Now the question is, what should the
United States do in this middlefirst of all, should United
States try to meddle in theHaqqani Heba Tola conflict and
take a side? Should UnitedStates believe the Afghanistan
as it be? What do you suggest tothe current administration the
ones after to about theirAfghanistan policy should be an
(35:24):
Afghanistan policy together atall.
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum (35:26):
Well, look, no, the US should not try
to somehow divide the Taliban.
That will fail. Let me come backto that. I think if we're
looking now at the future, whichI think your question is getting
at the future of US policy, whatare our options, that if we're
(35:49):
looking at the future of theTaliban, that very likely, five
years from now, Afghanistan willlook pretty much the way it does
today. There's been very littlechange from 2021, when they took
over, to now. It's going on now.
Unknown (36:15):
Four years in August,
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum (36:18):
four years, we really haven't seen
that it has evolved very much.
Yes, in some ways, it's receded.
It's gotten more oppressive incertain respects. But generally
speaking, the Taliban have neverbeen willing to compromise.
(36:42):
They've been willing tonegotiate, but they've always
waited for their interlocutorsto make the concessions. This
has remained the same. They'vestacked they've been true to
their their major core or theircore principles. What is really
different now is, as I wassuggesting before, is that
(37:04):
there, there is this opennesshere to the outside world.
That's one issue on which thehard line is the moderates
disagree. The moderates havelost out on social policy. They
have succeeded in getting theregime to be open to the rest of
(37:27):
the world. One of the majorgoals, consistently since August
21 it's been to getinternational political
recognition, and whereas theyhave still not received it from
(37:48):
any country except mostrecently, Russia, there's no
doubt that within the next yearthere will be a large number of
countries that establishdiplomatic relations. So even in
this period of time before thecurrent there has been de facto
(38:12):
recognition, the reason beingthat there are countries,
particularly in the region, thathave reason to want to engage
with the Taliban. They havecommon interests. The neighbors
are very concerned abouteconomic integration. It's
(38:35):
impossible to have integrationin the region if you leave
Afghanistan out. It's right inthe middle. All the roads run
through Afghanistan, all thepipelines through Afghanistan.
So the Afghans, you know, havenot yielded on what the
international community wantedmost, and that's been that there
(38:58):
being more integrativeleadership. Because what they
wanted was to be able to putinto the leadership people who
were loyal to them, Pakistan,Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, but
the Taliban has been able towithstand any kind of pressure
(39:25):
to include new elements in theneighbors, I say, would most of
them, if they had their choice,would rather another regime than
the Taliban, but it's theTaliban regime that They've all
concluded is it's going to bearound for quite a while yet,
and we're going to have to livewith it, and we might as well
(39:50):
have faced that fact. Therefore,all of the calls here that they
should be supporting theopposition. Including the armed
resistance groups, the NationalResistance Front, for example,
they rejected. Everyone hasrejected this. Why? Because
(40:13):
they're fearful that howevermuch they would rather see a
regime other than the Taliban,which would be easier to get
along with if the Taliban failsNow, if that, if the Taliban
state fails, now there won't bea replacement state. There will
(40:35):
be anarchy, wow. There will befree for all, where Islamic
State and and all the variousfactions will be making claims,
including the neighbors. Theneighbors will get drawn in.
They'll have their proxies, sowe'll have a wild civil war.
(40:59):
That seems to be the what iskeeping the international
community from reallyundertaking any efforts which
would in any way undermine thisregime again, as much as they
want. Now, finally, I think,what about us, policy, the US
(41:21):
among all the nations, prettymuch has is least engaged with
Afghanistan. It does deal withAfghanistan on very narrow
grounds where it must absolutelysuch as getting people out of
the country. But the US doeshave interests there with
(41:42):
Taliban, that if weren'tengaged, it could develop,
particularly in the area ofcounter terrorism, because if Al
Qaeda Daesh is a threat, thenit's also a threat to the
Taliban. So they don't wantthey're not in favor of seeing
(42:04):
terrorist, terrorist groupscamping down as many are in the
country. And then there are alsothese insurgency groups that are
against the regimes inTajikistan and Uzbekistan and
Iran, so it would open up a canof worms. Really were there to
(42:30):
be instability in the countrynow, now the US is mainly kept
from making any changes in itspolicy because of the women's
issue, it is such a hot topic asit should be, for not just the
United States, but others thatone that is so offensive, it
(42:55):
would be difficult in the UnitedStates to get congressional
support, to get public supportfor policy which did not make
some progress on the women'sissue. What we know this is one
where the Taliban have reallydug in their heels. It's for
(43:18):
them a test of their faith. Doesthat mean that the US must
forever give up on the issue? Idon't think so. I think if the
United States were to look atthis in a fresh way, they could
come to the conclusion that wecan establish more engaged we
(43:44):
can create more engagement withthe Taliban than we have now.
Well, I'm for doing that inorder to do that, to help
cultivate that next generationof Taliban leaders who will be
much more inclined to take asofter line on the women's
(44:10):
issue, who have recognized, asthey do, among among the more
moderate types, that's the rightword, pragmatic types. They
recognize that they've paid itheavy, heavy price for their
stand on women's issues, it hasbeen the number one issue which
(44:31):
has made it difficult for themto get the acceptance that they
want. What I'm suggesting hereis that conditional diplomacy
will not work. The Taliban Don'tbargain. They're not
transactional. You have toconvince them, if you want to
make progress with them, thatwhat you're asking them to do is
(44:54):
in their interests as well asyours. And I think we can do
that. It's not something. We cando on, on the short term, in the
short term, and it certainlyisn't anything we can do by by
somehow staying out when all theother countries in the region
and in the world, pretty muchnow, are engaging the Taliban
(45:18):
for the US to be the greatholdout in saying on principle,
we can't do it. Their influenceis expanding. US influence is
receding. And so our ability topush that one issue of human
rights, which we care about morethan anybody else, also becomes
(45:43):
less potent, because we're notthere making the case at the
moment. Now there has, and therehas not been, since August of 21
an American diplomat on theground in all this time. That
makes no sense. Thank you,Marvin.
Arman Mahmoudian (46:01):
I want to you know, to and that take us to the
last question. If I want to askyou that, what would be your
message to our to those of ouraudience who are from
Afghanistan, what would you tellto them
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum (46:16):
that I feel for you, particularly those
who have lost everything, whohave left behind family, and
those who are protected now, andthe dreamers, I think that this
is is a blot on American foreignpolicy. This is something that
(46:39):
the US will be ashamed of goingforward, and I would tell them,
Don't be unrealistic about whatyou can accomplish, but don't
give up either.
Arman Mahmoudian (46:53):
Thank you. Dr Weinberg, well, once again, it
was a pleasure for us at theGNSI to host you. I'm very much
grateful for the opportunity.
Thank you for your insight.
Thank
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum (47:05):
you for the opportunity. Thank you.
Jim Cardoso (47:11):
A special thanks to Marvin Weinbaum and Armand
mahmoudian for theirconversation today. It's always
valuable to hear straight fromthe author and explore the
nuances of his written analysisof note. Armon is currently
leading a special researchproject for GNSI called the Axis
of Resistance. You can find thatproject on our YouTube channel.
(47:32):
Next week, on at the boundary,we'll talk to author, professor
and academic entrepreneurNamrata Goswami. She's a
professor of space security atJohns Hopkins University, and an
instructor of emergingtechnologies and unconventional
warfare at the Joint SpecialOperations University. We'll be
talking to her about spacedefense and, of course, the
(47:52):
golden dome concept. Make sureyou don't miss it or any other
episodes of at the boundary byhitting that subscribe button.
Thanks for listening today. Ifyou like the podcast, please
subscribe and let your friendsand colleagues know. You can
also follow GNSI and ourLinkedIn and X accounts at USF,
underscore GNSI And check outour website as well at
(48:14):
usf.edu/gnsi, when you're there,don't forget to subscribe to our
monthly newsletterthat's going to wrap up this
episode of at the boundary. Eachnew episode will feature global
and national security issues wefound to be insightful,
(48:34):
fascinating, maybecontroversial, but overall, just
worth talking about, I'm JimCardoso, and we'll see you at
the boundary. You.
Jim, hello everyone. Welcome to this week's
(00:14):
episode of at the boundary, apodcast from the global and
national security Institute atthe University of South Florida.
I'm Jim Cardoso, Senior DirectorGNSI and your host for at the
boundary. On today's episode,we're going to turn our
attention to Afghanistan whilethat country is not currently
(00:36):
grabbing headlines, Afghanistanremains vital to the United
States's relationships withinthe region. Our guest today will
be Dr Marvin Weinbaum, directorof the Afghanistan and Pakistan
studies programs at the MiddleEast Institute. Before we get to
that discussion, couple ofthings to tell you about. We're
excited to announce that we'llbe hosting one of the country's
(00:58):
most influential conferences onnational security and
cyberspace. Cyber beacon 2025the flagship annual event for
national defense University'sCollege of Information and
cyberspace, will be held on USFTampa campus on October 16. GNSI
is partnering with CIC to holdcyber beacon outside of
(01:18):
Washington, DC for the firsttime in the 12 year history of
the conference, we will conveneleading voices from the US,
military, Allied defenseinstitutions, government
agencies, academia and theprivate sector to explore
cutting edge developments incyber strategy, artificial
intelligence and autonomoussystems. The agenda is available
(01:40):
on our website, and look forofficial announcements on the
speaker lineup in the nearfuture. Registration will open
soon, so keep an eye out. Cyberbeacon will cap off a big week
in Tampa, following up on thecyber Bay event in downtown
Tampa. From October 13 throughthe 15th, registration is open
for this event, which willfeature GNSI Executive Director,
(02:02):
retired Marine Corps GeneralFrank McKenzie, as one of the
keynote speakers. GNSI will puton a national security focused
panel for the conference, andyou can find out
more@cyberbay.org on thepublications front, we recently
published the conference reportfor GNSI Tampa summit five.
Theme of the summit was theRussia, Ukraine war lessons for
(02:25):
future conflicts. You can findthe report on our website. We
also just published a specialprinted edition of our most
recent issue of the Journal ofstrategic security. This issue
focuses on Afghanistan andfeatures leading experts,
including Dr Weinbaum. It's thefirst printed issue in the 18
year history of the journal, andwe plan on transitioning to more
(02:48):
printed issues in the future.
The electronic version remainsavailable via our website. But
let's now turn to ourconversation with Dr Weinbaum.
He's professor emeritus at theUniversity of Illinois, a former
State Department official andcurrently serves as a director
of Afghanistan and Pakistanstudies programs at the Middle
East Institute. His article istitled, our knowledge of the
(03:10):
Taliban as guide for US policy,and argues for breaking new
ground in the tumultuous USFgnst and relationship and
shaking off establishedthinking. In engaging the
Taliban, we encourage you toread the article yourself, but
the author sat down with GNSIResearch Fellow, Dr Armon
mahmoudian, for an in depthdiscussion.
Arman Mahmoudian (03:36):
Well, Dr Weinbaum, once again, thank you
for joining us. It's a greatpleasure to be with you. My
pleasure at the GNSI, we had thean honor of the hosting you in
November of the 2024 which wehad a policy dialog event on
Afghanistan, and you spoke atour third panel. Later on, you
kindly also gave us the pleasureof, you know, publishing an
(03:56):
article in order in our journal,Journal of strategic security.
Your article was published underthe name of our knowledge of
Taliban as a guide for US policyin our article, one of the
things that you touch is thatwhat happened, why, after the
two decades of endeavor by ourUS and its allies, local and
international, Taliban,Afghanistan, fell into the hand
(04:17):
of Taliban in August of 2021 Iwant to start with this
question, which might be aspoiler. All out. I want to ask
you that, what could have unitedsaid done to prevent the fall of
Afghanistan, if you go back inthe time, what move would any
move would have changed? Well,look,
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum (04:38):
I think we really have to get the big
picture here, we have to askwhy. You know, what did we
attempt to do that we failed at?
Why did we try to do this? Afterall, United States had pretty
much killed. And up onAfghanistan in the 90s, except
(05:00):
for Bin Laden. We were concernedabout Bin Laden, but otherwise,
we really didn't care whetherthe Taliban regime survived or
not. We did not have regimechange as one of our objectives.
And I can say that because I wasin the State Department at the
(05:21):
time, and I know that for a factthat we did not want to get
involved. But what changed then?
Of course, it was 911 and andnow, in order to get rid of bin
Laden we had to get rid of theTaliban they had given, given
(05:46):
them an opportunity to turn themover, but they rejected. So
there we were. We foundourselves in Afghanistan, where
we hadn't expected to be,obviously, but with air power,
we were able to very quickly getthe upper hand. But we had the
(06:09):
now the responsibility of thiscountry. So it faced. We were
faced with two challenges,neither of which, again, we
wanted, but more and more wefound ourselves being drawn into
(06:30):
now. What were the challenges?
The first one was obviously thatwe were involved here in it had
to be state building, becausethere were no there were no
institutions left. So we had nochoice, but if we were going to
(06:52):
leave without having things goback to the way they were, we
had to leave with someinstitutions which would
stabilize the situation. Thesecond challenge was the
challenge of suppression of aninsurgency. And interestingly,
(07:13):
that challenge did not appearexcept Oh, by 2005 certainly by
2006 when it was realized thatthis was serious, this was a
serious challenge to the newAfghan state. Okay, so we, we.
(07:34):
This was our our goal. How werewe going to deal with this?
Well, we were going to leave itto the Afghans, pretty much, to
pick their own president,although we had a role in that
too, since they couldn't agreeon it, we we were going to have
(07:54):
them write their ownconstitution, fine and
meanwhile, we just couldn't walkaway while they were doing this,
and they would need a few yearsto settle in. And it didn't seem
to be any particular rush,especially by 2003 when we get
(08:16):
pulled off Afghanistan, almostcompletely because of Iraq, the
invasion of Iraq. So we havevery few people on the ground
there, and very littlecommitment, but we're there. We
we found that the wasn't aninsurgency, as I say, until four
(08:44):
or five, and by then, we had todeal with it, but once again,
now with all of our resources,pretty much in Iraq. Now I bring
this up because winning,building a state is a very
(09:08):
difficult job. It takes decades.
You have to build theinstitutions. You got to develop
the supporting norms to go withit. And we specified we didn't
want any state. Wanted ademocratic state correct, so it
(09:36):
had to meet that condition.
Arman Mahmoudian (09:39):
So basically, if I stand Correct, yeah, you're
saying that there was a changeof mission right after getting
into the Afghanistan, fromcountering al Qaeda to nation
state.
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum (09:50):
Well, we didn't, you know, we all the
only mission we had, really, wasto get rid of bin Laden, yes,
but once we got into it, youcouldn't. Get away without
facing the fact that you had toleave something in its place.
We're faced with the samesituation now in Gaza, yes, if
(10:11):
you can't simply win, you got toleave something in it to to to
assume authority. So here wewere taking on what is normally
a job which takes years to do.
That's true with the insurgencyas well, that when you're in an
(10:32):
asymmetrical kind of insurgencywhere all your opponent has to
do is to survive. You've got towin. All he has to do is to
survive. So why did we fail hereand on the state side? We
(10:56):
failed. Unfortunately, thepeople in positions of
leadership were not really well,let me put it this way. I think
that they were often wellmeaning, talking about mainly
Karzai and Ghani, in that theywanted the best for their
people. And yes, they wanted ademocratic system that they
(11:18):
could control, but in order tosucceed, they needed to have the
support of people, and for that,they needed their loyalty, and
their loyalty could not begained by saying, Well, we have
the legitimacy the way the kingcould before King says, Well,
(11:42):
I'm monarch, and I can do thiswith a democratic government.
The only way to succeed isultimately through the election
process that gives you thelegitimacy. And the first
election in 2004 went fairlywell, but as soon as Howard
(12:03):
Karzai got in there with atribal background, as soon as he
got in there, he realized thathe couldn't govern without the
personal loyalty. Came from atribal background, a personal
loyalty. And in order to getthis, he had to do things which
(12:26):
ultimately would undermine thestate. And this is, this is
basically what had happened. Sohe ends up in appointing people
to positions. And GNSI does thislater too, who are unqualified
but trustworthy. Trustworthy. Heends up appointing a little
(12:54):
later, generals and othermilitary people, not because
they were proven to havecompetence, but because they
could be trusted. And thisimmediately saddled the new
regime with a very difficultsituation, not made easier by
(13:19):
the fact that the US couldn't dowasn't going to do anything else
except pour money in forprograms, and then a little
later, for the military, andwhereas it was needed if they
(13:39):
were going to succeed and havesomething to show for what they
were doing. Even though it wasneeded, all it did was to feed
the corruption that wassustaining the regime. So what
we have to see is that the StateBuilding and insurgency
(14:04):
suppression are one the same.
One can't exist really, withoutone, you can't see succeed in
one without the other. Andthat's and that was what we
really ran into. I, I the stateran into particular problems by
(14:35):
2009 and then 14, because thosewere election years, and the it
was therefore going to be thejob of the of the people in
(14:57):
power if they wanted to stay inpower. And. Win that election,
whatever it took. So in theprocess those elections nine,
and I was one observer for thenine election, and then in the
and then in the 14 election,same clearly, those elections
(15:20):
were fraudulent. The processleading up to them was
fraudulent. All of this adds upto the fact that, meanwhile, the
public is becoming more and moredisillusioned the that the
government by its incompetence,by its corruption, by the way in
(15:46):
which it is sustained power isalienating the population.
They're alienating thepopulation now, it's not that
the people wanted the generalpublic wanted, for the most
part, the Taliban to return topower their their memory of the
(16:11):
first administer, the firstTaliban emirate was one they
they didn't want to Go back tothat, but they were on the
fence, and they run the on thefence. I should add to all of
this that on the military, theUS, okay, the US ultimately
(16:33):
becomes more heavily engaged.
Now, what does it do in 20091011, I 11, up to 14, where it
then reduces them, it pourstroops in, but its troops really
are trained to do, to engage inwarfare, other than what really
(16:58):
was required. This is aguerrilla war. Tanks aren't of
much value. Planes are. Tanksaren't of value. What is of
great value is that you've gotto establish relationships, and
that means you got to work inthe countryside. You got to
(17:23):
realize that the real, the realgovernance that goes on in the
country is really taking placelocally. You've got, it's in the
village councils. And we triedto address this, we tried the US
and our and our allies to toplace people into the local
(17:49):
areas, but for the most part,they they weren't trained for
this, and then they only stayedfor a year and then left. So
whatever, whatever kinds ofrelationships were established,
were then severed, because thepeople who were sent were
(18:13):
leaving.
Arman Mahmoudian (18:17):
I have a quick follow up questions. You know,
you mentioned that after 911your this, the United States
Government asked Talibans tohand out a lot and people around
him. Over a couple months ago,something went viral in the
social media some of the outletsthat the Taliban claims so some
(18:38):
of the Taliban leaders claimsthat United States gave them,
initially 48 hours of ultimatum.
But President Bush didn't waitout to 48 hours to be over, and
he made the decision to attackprior to the you know, to
reaching the deadline. Is thereany truth to it? Or Taliban is
just trying to just shift theblame for the war?
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum (19:01):
Not sure I'm following you, but are you
saying that a deal could havebeen arranged with the Taliban?
Arman Mahmoudian (19:09):
Yes. The reason that I'm saying is that
because of the some of thefigures close to Saul Taliban,
maker has made a claim thatUnited States didn't wait for
the ultimatum deadline to bereached, they make the decision
to attack Afghanistan prior tothe deadline.
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum (19:27):
Prior Yeah,
Unknown (19:29):
yes, no,
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum (19:31):
again, I was on the inside.
Unknown (19:33):
That's why I'm asking yes, yeah,
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum (19:37):
up until the 11th Hour, working through
general Mahmoud, who was thenthe liaison between Pakistan and
the Taliban leadership. Omar,particularly well. Omar, we held
(19:57):
out to them that. We're notgoing to attack, if you'll only
give us and run. That's all wethat's all we really want. This
may be apocryphal, butsupposedly the Mullah Omar said
(20:18):
to Mahmoud that I don't believethe Americans are going to
attack Wow. And if they do,we'll defeat them. And if we
don't defeat them now, we'lldefeat them later. Well, you
know, there's that. But Ithought you were also referring
(20:39):
to the fact that after the USattacked and the Taliban fled to
Pakistan, almost almost intact,it fled to Pakistan that the
Taliban then said, Okay, We'rewilling to enter into a deal, we
(21:01):
will now be willing to join withothers for an inclusive
government. Well, of course,that's what we have wanted them
to say in recent years, thatthey will, but the way it was
read at the time was sure nowthat they've been defeated and
(21:24):
they want to keep their hand inthe game that they'll say they
can do this now it overlooks thefact that At the bond
conference, it was exceedinglydifficult to reach any kind of
(21:45):
agreement. They They argued andthey argued. Ultimately, Karzai
was appointed, but only becauseof the Iranians and the
Russians. Well, put pressure onKarzai. Yeah, on the warlords,
if you will, put pressure onthem. So the idea that you could
(22:06):
have then injected the Talibaninto this new government, I
can't see possible. It wouldhave never reached an agreement
if the Taliban were sitting atthe table, it was nice to know
that that was a possibility. Asfar as you know, they were
(22:29):
willing to do it, but they weredoing for obvious reasons, and
now just to wind up on this, I Ithink that what really
undermined the US as much asanything was the fact that its
policy was never consistent. Itwas constantly being readjusted.
(22:55):
It, as I mentioned, the rotationpersonnel undercut it, but up
until a few months until the endof the regime of the Republic,
it would have still beenpossible for the Taliban regime
(23:17):
to hold on longer. It didn'thave to collapse
Unknown (23:22):
for the Afghanistan
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum (23:26):
regime, but once it became clear that
the US really was leaving, thenit was inevitable. And of
course, then it came apart veryquickly, particularly
inevitable, because the US wasnot going to leave behind any
(23:48):
forces, and particularly alsobecause what the Afghan Military
needed most of all was Americanair power, yes, and without the
air power, they could notsupport their troops on the
(24:10):
ground, and morale justcollapsed
Arman Mahmoudian (24:13):
for various variety of reason. And as you
said, the rule that Americansplayed, the rule that the very
foundation of that is the newstate of Afghanistan. At the
beginning, the regime fell, andnow we have Taliban too in
Afghanistan. And when it comesto the new Taliban, there is, as
you know, better than mostpeople, there is an argument out
(24:37):
there that this Taliban might bedifferent from previous and they
mostly point out to thedifferences between Kabul and
Kandahar. There is a speculationout there that Sarah Jean
Haqqani, the Ministry of theInterior, who is in Kabul
mostly, and hey batola hunzada.
Leader in the panda or theydon't get along. The rumors
(25:01):
suggest that the hack moneywants a better or more relations
with the rest of the world ispro isolation. I want to ask you
that to what extent you canverify, can you very will you
verify these rumors? Do youthink there is a division, and
if there is a division, whatthat say about the new
Afghanistan?
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum (25:23):
First of all, let's compare the emirate,
second emirate with the first.
Thank you. In some respects,they're very much alike on
particularly on social policyand on their political
repression, it would be hard todistinguish them In that regard,
(25:50):
the Emirate of the 90s wasreally a hermit state. It was
isolated from the world. Kabulwas a dead city. Everybody had
(26:12):
left. I know I was in Kabul afew months after the Taliban
took over and walked around, andit was so sad, because I had
lived in Kabul years earlier. Iknew what a fun city. It really
(26:33):
was, in some respects, certainlya very engaging place. I it was
just sad. I didn't, well, notthat that has changed, but I
didn't see a woman on on thestreet in all the time I was
(26:57):
there. Oh, except for some veryelderly women who were begging.
So the social policies,especially on the women and the
political repression, hasn'tchanged much but, but the second
emirate is different. It hasmany of the same people in the
(27:18):
leadership who were active inthe 90s, to be sure, but it also
has a younger generation whohave come through, and they're
at the second level, and they'remaking a difference, however,
gradually that will be but ingenerally, it's not a hermit
(27:41):
state. It's an the state is moreopen. It's more porous. It's
possible for many people to goand visit Kabul, to walk around
the city. The big change ofcourse, from a few years ago is
it's now safe to walk aroundany, pretty much anywhere in the
(28:02):
country. So yes, women are beingcriminally, I think, confined,
their ambitions crushed, and thepopulation feels the heavy
weight of the repression. Butthere are many people who are
(28:24):
returning, who the who it wasthought would be arrested
immediately. Some have but ingeneral, the Taliban has
welcomed back those people withtalents that they don't have.
It's a mixed picture. Yeah. Nowthat brings us to what you were
(28:47):
just saying, factionalism.
Having said all this, there aresome serious differences,
serious differences among theleadership, certainly on
strategy, but on principles,even the so called more
moderates and the hard linersdon't really different. Differ
(29:13):
that much, if at all. What theydiffer on are their strategies.
That is, if we're not going tohave women in education, are
there perhaps some other ways tokeep women separated without
(29:34):
completely ending education? Sothat you know there and there
are many other areas too, wherethe the more moderate Taliban
are open to dialog. They theywelcome dialog. Whereas the
Kandahar Shura, which is wherethe top leadership. And Zaida is
(30:03):
there. They don't meet withanyone. They're completely
insulated. But they are thepeople who ultimately are making
the decisions. Now there arestrong differences here. Their
ambitions are being thwarted.
People think that they should beleading, rather than our concern
(30:28):
have at all? Yes, ah, there arepeople who think so, but and we
hear from time to time thatthey're going to challenge, that
they're going to challenge.
Well, the truth is that wheneverthe rubber hits the road is they
(30:53):
back off, and the reason thatthey do that is the Taliban
leadership for all of itsdifferences, has come to the
conclusion that what's moreimportant than anything else is
that they hang together, that ifthey begin to divide, that the
(31:22):
whole movement is in jeopardy.
So take, for example, theHaqqanis are a major element of
the of the Taliban. They didn'tused to be. They used to be
separately. They're in analliance, but, but now the
(31:45):
Haqqani family, especially SirajUddin, the Haqqanis, are
powerful, and yet they have notreally thrown down the gauntlet,
as we say, he had them reallychallenged them because they
fear factionalism, disunity willlead to disintegration of the
(32:13):
movement. I suspect that we'regoing to see this remain pretty
much as it is, for at least thetime being.
Arman Mahmoudian (32:25):
I appreciate you confirming the you know, the
fragmentation which brings us tothe next stage and the last
stages about what the US policyshould be
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum (32:34):
before we do that, I want to mention
that the there is an elementhere. One of the things that
also keeps Taliban together is,is k is that is Islamic State?
(32:55):
Dash, yes, the fear that if theystart to divide, some of the
elements that lose out will joinISK, not Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is
pretty much out of the picturenow, wow. They have never really
been a major factor excepthelping with recruitment and
(33:20):
finances, and they may still bedoing that. They're really and
maybe, maybe they are plotting.
You don't need too many peopleto have a plot, but it really
is, is k, and at the moment,they're locked into a
competition is K says we are thetrue carriers of what the
(33:44):
Taliban beliefs are all about.
You're not living up to theideals of the movement we are.
And so there's constant pressureon them to maintain a if they if
(34:06):
they compromise on the women'sissue, they've got to be fearful
that the talent that is k dashwill capitalize on this, and
that this will strengthen theirmovement, because, again, they
(34:27):
want to replace the leadershipthat exists there. Now they
won't be able to do it in thenear run, in the near run, but
they're looking ahead, and theythink that they've got a chance
now, if they can just begin tosee some kind of disintegration
(34:53):
of the current leadership andthe leadership therefore
recognizing this has additional.
Reason to hang together.
Arman Mahmoudian (35:02):
Now the question is, what should the
United States do in this middlefirst of all, should United
States try to meddle in theHaqqani Heba Tola conflict and
take a side? Should UnitedStates believe the Afghanistan
as it be? What do you suggest tothe current administration the
ones after to about theirAfghanistan policy should be an
(35:24):
Afghanistan policy together atall.
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum (35:26):
Well, look, no, the US should not try
to somehow divide the Taliban.
That will fail. Let me come backto that. I think if we're
looking now at the future, whichI think your question is getting
at the future of US policy, whatare our options, that if we're
(35:49):
looking at the future of theTaliban, that very likely, five
years from now, Afghanistan willlook pretty much the way it does
today. There's been very littlechange from 2021, when they took
over, to now. It's going on now.
Unknown (36:15):
Four years in August,
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum (36:18):
four years, we really haven't seen
that it has evolved very much.
Yes, in some ways, it's receded.
It's gotten more oppressive incertain respects. But generally
speaking, the Taliban have neverbeen willing to compromise.
(36:42):
They've been willing tonegotiate, but they've always
waited for their interlocutorsto make the concessions. This
has remained the same. They'vestacked they've been true to
their their major core or theircore principles. What is really
different now is, as I wassuggesting before, is that
(37:04):
there, there is this opennesshere to the outside world.
That's one issue on which thehard line is the moderates
disagree. The moderates havelost out on social policy. They
have succeeded in getting theregime to be open to the rest of
(37:27):
the world. One of the majorgoals, consistently since August
21 it's been to getinternational political
recognition, and whereas theyhave still not received it from
(37:48):
any country except mostrecently, Russia, there's no
doubt that within the next yearthere will be a large number of
countries that establishdiplomatic relations. So even in
this period of time before thecurrent there has been de facto
(38:12):
recognition, the reason beingthat there are countries,
particularly in the region, thathave reason to want to engage
with the Taliban. They havecommon interests. The neighbors
are very concerned abouteconomic integration. It's
(38:35):
impossible to have integrationin the region if you leave
Afghanistan out. It's right inthe middle. All the roads run
through Afghanistan, all thepipelines through Afghanistan.
So the Afghans, you know, havenot yielded on what the
international community wantedmost, and that's been that there
(38:58):
being more integrativeleadership. Because what they
wanted was to be able to putinto the leadership people who
were loyal to them, Pakistan,Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, but
the Taliban has been able towithstand any kind of pressure
(39:25):
to include new elements in theneighbors, I say, would most of
them, if they had their choice,would rather another regime than
the Taliban, but it's theTaliban regime that They've all
concluded is it's going to bearound for quite a while yet,
and we're going to have to livewith it, and we might as well
(39:50):
have faced that fact. Therefore,all of the calls here that they
should be supporting theopposition. Including the armed
resistance groups, the NationalResistance Front, for example,
they rejected. Everyone hasrejected this. Why? Because
(40:13):
they're fearful that howevermuch they would rather see a
regime other than the Taliban,which would be easier to get
along with if the Taliban failsNow, if that, if the Taliban
state fails, now there won't bea replacement state. There will
(40:35):
be anarchy, wow. There will befree for all, where Islamic
State and and all the variousfactions will be making claims,
including the neighbors. Theneighbors will get drawn in.
They'll have their proxies, sowe'll have a wild civil war.
(40:59):
That seems to be the what iskeeping the international
community from reallyundertaking any efforts which
would in any way undermine thisregime again, as much as they
want. Now, finally, I think,what about us, policy, the US
(41:21):
among all the nations, prettymuch has is least engaged with
Afghanistan. It does deal withAfghanistan on very narrow
grounds where it must absolutelysuch as getting people out of
the country. But the US doeshave interests there with
(41:42):
Taliban, that if weren'tengaged, it could develop,
particularly in the area ofcounter terrorism, because if Al
Qaeda Daesh is a threat, thenit's also a threat to the
Taliban. So they don't wantthey're not in favor of seeing
(42:04):
terrorist, terrorist groupscamping down as many are in the
country. And then there are alsothese insurgency groups that are
against the regimes inTajikistan and Uzbekistan and
Iran, so it would open up a canof worms. Really were there to
(42:30):
be instability in the countrynow, now the US is mainly kept
from making any changes in itspolicy because of the women's
issue, it is such a hot topic asit should be, for not just the
United States, but others thatone that is so offensive, it
(42:55):
would be difficult in the UnitedStates to get congressional
support, to get public supportfor policy which did not make
some progress on the women'sissue. What we know this is one
where the Taliban have reallydug in their heels. It's for
(43:18):
them a test of their faith. Doesthat mean that the US must
forever give up on the issue? Idon't think so. I think if the
United States were to look atthis in a fresh way, they could
come to the conclusion that wecan establish more engaged we
(43:44):
can create more engagement withthe Taliban than we have now.
Well, I'm for doing that inorder to do that, to help
cultivate that next generationof Taliban leaders who will be
much more inclined to take asofter line on the women's
(44:10):
issue, who have recognized, asthey do, among among the more
moderate types, that's the rightword, pragmatic types. They
recognize that they've paid itheavy, heavy price for their
stand on women's issues, it hasbeen the number one issue which
(44:31):
has made it difficult for themto get the acceptance that they
want. What I'm suggesting hereis that conditional diplomacy
will not work. The Taliban Don'tbargain. They're not
transactional. You have toconvince them, if you want to
make progress with them, thatwhat you're asking them to do is
(44:54):
in their interests as well asyours. And I think we can do
that. It's not something. We cando on, on the short term, in the
short term, and it certainlyisn't anything we can do by by
somehow staying out when all theother countries in the region
and in the world, pretty muchnow, are engaging the Taliban
(45:18):
for the US to be the greatholdout in saying on principle,
we can't do it. Their influenceis expanding. US influence is
receding. And so our ability topush that one issue of human
rights, which we care about morethan anybody else, also becomes
(45:43):
less potent, because we're notthere making the case at the
moment. Now there has, and therehas not been, since August of 21
an American diplomat on theground in all this time. That
makes no sense. Thank you,Marvin.
Arman Mahmoudian (46:01):
I want to you know, to and that take us to the
last question. If I want to askyou that, what would be your
message to our to those of ouraudience who are from
Afghanistan, what would you tellto them
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum (46:16):
that I feel for you, particularly those
who have lost everything, whohave left behind family, and
those who are protected now, andthe dreamers, I think that this
is is a blot on American foreignpolicy. This is something that
(46:39):
the US will be ashamed of goingforward, and I would tell them,
Don't be unrealistic about whatyou can accomplish, but don't
give up either.
Arman Mahmoudian (46:53):
Thank you. Dr Weinberg, well, once again, it
was a pleasure for us at theGNSI to host you. I'm very much
grateful for the opportunity.
Thank you for your insight.
Thank
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum (47:05):
you for the opportunity. Thank you.
Jim Cardoso (47:11):
A special thanks to Marvin Weinbaum and Armand
mahmoudian for theirconversation today. It's always
valuable to hear straight fromthe author and explore the
nuances of his written analysisof note. Armon is currently
leading a special researchproject for GNSI called the Axis
of Resistance. You can find thatproject on our YouTube channel.
(47:32):
Next week, on at the boundary,we'll talk to author, professor
and academic entrepreneurNamrata Goswami. She's a
professor of space security atJohns Hopkins University, and an
instructor of emergingtechnologies and unconventional
warfare at the Joint SpecialOperations University. We'll be
talking to her about spacedefense and, of course, the
(47:52):
golden dome concept. Make sureyou don't miss it or any other
episodes of at the boundary byhitting that subscribe button.
Thanks for listening today. Ifyou like the podcast, please
subscribe and let your friendsand colleagues know. You can
also follow GNSI and ourLinkedIn and X accounts at USF,
underscore GNSI And check outour website as well at
(48:14):
usf.edu/gnsi, when you're there,don't forget to subscribe to our
monthly newsletterthat's going to wrap up this
episode of at the boundary. Eachnew episode will feature global
and national security issues wefound to be insightful,
(48:34):
fascinating, maybecontroversial, but overall, just
worth talking about, I'm JimCardoso, and we'll see you at
the boundary. You.
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