March 17, 2025 • 48 mins
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Can the U.S. afford to shift its focus to China while Russia remains a threat?
Following the GNSI Summit on the Russian-Ukraine War, experts break down why abandoning Europe could be a serious mistake—and how Russian and Chinese aggression are more connected than you think. Maintaining a strong military presence in Europe isn’t just about defending allies—it’s about global stability.
The conversation explores why the U.S. must strike a balance between investing in legacy military systems and rapidly adopting new technologies like drones to stay ahead of emerging threats. The key to success? Proactive deterrence. Preventing conflicts before they start is more effective—and less costly—than responding after the damage is done.
Don’t miss this insightful deep dive into the future of U.S. defense strategy and why global power dynamics are more intertwined than ever. Subscribe to the “At the Boundary” Podcast to stay up to date on global policy!
Links From the Episode:
• FSP Cyber Frontier Summit on April 15th
• Critical Resources for National Security Decision Brief
At the Boundary from the Global and National Security Institute at the University of South Florida, features global and national security issues we’ve found to be insightful, intriguing, fascinating, maybe controversial, but overall just worth talking about.
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The mission of GNSI is to provide actionable solutions to 21st-century security challenges for decision-makers at the local, state, national and global levels. We hope you enjoy At the Boundary.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Glenn Beckmann (00:12):
Hi everybody.
Welcome to another episode of atthe boundary, the podcast from
the global and national securityInstitute at the University of
South Florida. I'm GlennBeckman, communications manager
at GNSI with you today. Four atthe boundary
on the pod. We're going to talka little bit about GNSI Tampa
(00:35):
Summit. Five, now that we've hada chance to catch our collective
breath and absorb everythingthat was presented at the
conference two weeks ago. Wewant to gather some folks
together and talk about what weall learned before we do that.
However, a couple of headlinesto pass along. If you remember,
last week, we made the bigannouncement of the first ever
conference produced and hostedby the GNSI future strategist
(00:57):
program, the studentorganization at USF dedicated to
students interested in a careerin national security. It's going
to be a great event focused oncyber security. Each of the five
sessions will have FSP studentsserving as moderators and
facilitators for guest speakersfrom the industry and from
academia, and they'll be divinginto pivotal cyber topics like
(01:20):
enhancing defense and navigatingemerging threats zero trust
architecture, protecting data ina post quantum world and
securing the digital economy. Wecan't wait to see what these
fantastic students have puttogether, and we urge you to
support them by attending theconference, which is scheduled
for April 15 in the Oval theaterat the Marshall Student Center
(01:41):
on the Tampa campus of USF,registration is now open. It's
an in person event. There's nocost to attend, but registration
is required. We'll drop a linkto register in the show notes.
And hey, we want to send out bigcongratulations this week to the
team at the College ofartificial intelligence,
cybersecurity and computing hereat USF, or should we more
(02:04):
accurately say the BelliniCollege of artificial
intelligence, cybersecurity andcomputing, making it the first
named college in the UnitedStates dedicated exclusively to
the convergence of cybersecurityand AI. USF announced last week
that Arnie and Lauren Bellinihave made a record setting, $40
(02:24):
million gift to the Universityestablishing the college, and
the Bellini support will go evenfurther. They've pledged $1 for
dollar matching program foradditional money raised for the
college. Now, if you remember,in last week's at the boundary,
we talked with Professor Johnlicatto of cake, and honestly,
we need to start calling itBellini cake, right?
(02:47):
Anyway, John hinted thatsomething big was coming, and
boy was he right.
Congratulations to everyoneinvolved. What a huge
announcement for USF and forcake. We also want to remind you
of the upcoming rethinkingAfghanistan part two conference
coming up on May 20. Theconference will be held in
Washington, DC. That's our firstout of town conference for our
(03:09):
team here at GNSI. Details arestill being worked out, so keep
an eye out on our website and toyour inboxes for more
information.
All right, it's time now for themost important segment of the
podcast. Today, we're gatheringa few people to talk about our
recently completed Tampa summitfive, the Russia, Ukraine war
(03:31):
lessons for future conflicts. Westarted this round table
discussion idea a post mortem,if you will, following our last
conference, and it was so wellreceived, we're going to do it
again. So we're bringing intothe studio Dr Tad schnaufer,
strategy and research manager atGNSI, Dr golf Alex the director
(03:51):
of the USF Institute forRussian, European and Eurasian
Studies, Sarah Brown, ResearchCoordinator at GNSI, and the
planner for TS five, along withJohan hermita, a USF student
who's a member of FSP, and healso got up on stage at the
conference to present hisresearch to the entire audience.
(04:12):
Tad, take it away. Well,
Tad Schnaufer (04:21):
thank you, Glenn, for that wonderful introduction.
So why don't we go ahead and getstarted with our elite group of
now podcasters here discussingthe recent global national
security Institute's Tampasummit number five, focused on
the Russian war in Ukraine. Sowhy don't we kick it over to
Sarah first. And overall, whatwas one of the most interesting
(04:41):
things, or the most interestingthing you took away from the
conference? Well, for me, one ofthe most interesting things from
the conference is, besides thephenomenal discussions that were
had by a variety of folks, isthat there really seemed to be a
sense that the United States isno longer going to be a security
guarantor for.
Sarah Brown (05:00):
Are at the global stage, and what that role is, I
think a lot of people are theunknown is scary, and how that
role become, transitioning awayfrom a security guarantor to
something else, whatever it maybe, is still undetermined, but
it's it's a little fearful forfolks right now, because it's
not what's been happening forthe past 70 years with the NATO
(05:22):
alliance, and there's just somuch uncertainty right now. So
that was one of the bigger keytakeaways that I took away from
the conference. Really a majortheme. Yeah, it's gonna be
playing. Yeah. It was especiallyinteresting the way the guests
from Europe, Mr. Norberg andgeneral rupees, what they said
(05:43):
about how Europeans are feelingin the wake of this new policy,
and it's not so new, actually,because a lot of people were
saying, Well, why? Why wasn'tEurope more prepared for the
second Trump administration?
Because, you know, we they, theyshould have anticipated this
move away from from globalengagement, but nonetheless, I
(06:04):
think it was very striking, andI received a lot of really
positive feedback from thatpanel. In particular, I think
Americans were really happy tohear a European perspective, and
also to hear their sense ofvulnerability and concern. You
know, what are the next stepsgoing to look
Yoan G. Hermida (06:26):
like? Yeah, I completely agree with the
previous two comments. Mybiggest takeaway was from Dr
Johan Norberg letter to Putinand the despair that I noticed
in his argument and absolutely,very striking the Europeans
even, even though they shouldhave been prepared for what may
(06:46):
have been coming with the Trumpadministration, I think it
completely caught them bysurprise. And you do detect that
level of high level ofuncertainty as to what the next
steps may be in their in theiractions, whether they'll be able
to regroup and, you know, get acohesive, coherent defense
(07:07):
policy together in the face ofwhat seems to be increasing
levels of doubt about theTransatlantic Alliance. I
thought it was very interestingto note with the Europeans that
their reaction has been, in asense, stronger to the Trump
administration, second Trumpadministration, than to the
actual invasion itself. So ifyou look at the $800 billion the
(07:28):
Europeans are looking to pulltogether for defense spending
that came not because ofRussia's invasion of Ukraine. It
came from the possibility, thisidea that the US could withdraw
security guarantees, or at leastnot be as 100% guarantee of a
protector of Europe. So that'swhat's actually driving them,
even as the threat of Russia asa conventional, large scale
(07:49):
military operations underway,that still was not enough,
right? I think that the Bidenadministration's commitment to
engagement and to our allies wasso unequivocal that they just
took it for granted. But I alsothink that they should have been
prepared, you know, because thefirst Trump administration
(08:10):
demonstrated these, thistendency to pull away from from
our role in the world,questioning NATO and so on. So,
yeah, absolutely. I think theythey were a little spoiled,
because Biden was so committedto the war and to our alliances
and to NATO but that. But theyshould have understood that in
(08:32):
American politics, you know, thependulum swings, and different
administrations come and go, andit's not anything for
presidential administrations tocall out allies for not spending
enough, and certainly from thefirst Trump administration and
from the invasion the a lot ofthe eastern flank, NATO Allies
particularly, have increasedtheir defense spending. I'm
noting Lithuania and Poland, forexample, which are spending a
(08:54):
lot, but the other alliescertainly are looking to pick up
more of the slack now thatthere's a possibility the US
starts withdrawing troops fromEurope and these other
possibilities, even as the warcontinues, I think one of the
speakers, I think it was one ofthe European speakers, mentioned
that
Sarah Brown (09:12):
the head of NATO is now saying that they have all
this money but no time to buildup the defense forces, whereas
before they had all the time totrain and prepare, but no money.
So it's interesting to see theinterplay of the EU and NATO
trying to step in that vacuumthat the US is leaving. Yeah.
Yoan G. Hermida (09:33):
And another thing that I would add about Dr
Norberg intervention is, assomeone who was born in an
authoritarian state, there was apoint in his intervention that
he said that he's lived 50 yearswithout having to fear for his
freedom. So, you know, theimplication is that now he does,
and the the existential threatfor the Scandinavian countries
(09:56):
and those on the the Europeanson the eastern flank that they
feel.
From Russia, compounded withwhat seems to be a certain level
of abandonment by the US ispalpable beyond the power
dynamics beyond, you know, thepercentage of GDP, it's it's a
real it'ssomething that strikes to the
core of your being and yourfreedom,
Golfo Alexopoulos (10:21):
all right, and I think it made a big
impression on the audience. If Ican shift to another
takeaway, one of the moststriking conversations, I
thought, first of all, therewere so many moments in the
conference that were reallystriking to me, but the the
opening panel on the second day,which was with Maria snegovaya
(10:46):
and Chris Marsh. ChristopherMarsh, so what was interesting
about their discussion, whichyou so so effectively moderated
had was that they expressed a adifference of opinion that is
just central in the field, andthat is, did the what did the
(11:09):
West have a major role to playin Putin's decision to invade
Ukraine? And Maria made a strongargument that the West tends to
exaggerate its influence onRussian politics, and that
really Putin sensed he wasalways going to move on Ukraine,
(11:32):
because he considers Ukrainewithin his sphere of influence.
He just waited for a time whenhe perceived the West to be at
its weakest, you know, after thefailed withdrawal from
Afghanistan and and the signsthat he was getting from two
American administrations aboutabout not engaging in foreign
(11:52):
conflicts. So I think that Mariawas making that argument about
continuity and about Putinreally being driven by his own
domestic concerns and his ownview of Russian sphere of
influence and its role in theworld. And then Chris was making
the argument that that the Westlost Russia, and that we in our
(12:15):
in not respecting Russia's as agreat power after the collapse
of the Soviet Union, in ourexpansion of NATO, we didn't pay
enough attention to Russia'ssecurity concerns and Russia's
(12:40):
Russia's desire to remainrelevant and remain and to be
seen as a great power. So Ithought that was really
interesting, because this debaterages in the field. You know,
there are those who think thatthe West is responsible. There
are those who believe that Putinwould have behaved regardless of
(13:03):
Western actions, and I thoughtthat was so nicely illustrated
in the conversation betweenChris and Maria
Yoan G. Hermida (13:12):
completely agree on that. Dr alexapolis, Dr
snegovaya, she mentioned howPutin's worldview was really
conditioned by growing up in theSoviet Union being, you know,
part of the KGB, as we all know.
And I think there's, there's alot to that, I think, in my, my
opinion, and I guess, what Imight take away from what Dr
snickel was saying was thatPutin knows very well that no
(13:35):
matter how far east NATOexpanded, it was never going to
invade Russia proper, right? Heknew that very well. So I think
those who are like you said,those are who are in the camp of
NATO expansion was what causedRussia to lash out fundamentally
misunderstand,or don't give a lot of credence
(13:55):
to sort of the constructivistargument of Putin's worldview
and how he grew up and hisideology, right? It's also, I
was also struck by what youmentioned about the 90s as a
pause in the Cold War. So weoften think of the Cold War as
having ended in 91 collapse ofSoviet Union, and then you had
(14:15):
the Unipolar Moment. Which ofthe US was
the primacy the hegemon. But inreality, the argument that it
was simply a pause as Russiarevamped its economic and
military capabilities tocontinue its actions during the
during the Cold War, or similarto the Cold War, really
(14:37):
resonated with me as well. Yeah,and Maria has actually written a
lot about this, about how theelites in Soviet society, the
nomenclatura under the Sovietregime, have basically
continued. You know, it's notlike we've had this incredible
change in personnel and worldviews. You know, there's been
this striking continuity. Andshe's demonstrated it in her
(14:59):
research.
Golfo Alexopoulos (15:00):
Surge. And for that reason, I actually am
more convinced by her argumenttoo.
Sarah Brown (15:06):
I think folks tend to forget that the Cold War and
the ending of the Cold War andthe elites that was only 3040,
years ago, those people arestill in power. They were able
to seamlessly transition fromthe old government to the new
government in each of itsiterations. So we tend to think,
oh, the Cold War was in thepast. It was, you know, close to
(15:28):
70 years ago when, really itended in 1989 that's very
recent. And I don't think weshould be surprised that there
is still an Imperial Russiandream being conducted by or
Carrie out by Putin. Well, what
Tad Schnaufer (15:46):
we can say is, if it is a continuation of the same
Cold War, then we won the firsthalf, and we're losing the
second half, because the firsthalf there was no major
conventional conflicts inEurope. Now again, you obviously
have Russian intervention inHungary in 56 in the Prague
Spring in 68 but no large scaleinvasions. So the second half,
something has changed. Eventhough Russia is, in a sense,
weaker, it's much smaller thanthe Soviet Union. 15 independent
(16:08):
republics or countries came outof the Soviet Union. It lost a
lot of population, territory,minerals, resources, yet a
smaller Russia, the inherentstate of the Soviet Union is
more aggressive. And I thinkwhat you can take away from our
panel, the number of otherpanels and discussions
throughout the entireconference, is that in the end,
Putin, as with mostauthoritarian leaders, respects
(16:30):
power, and that Putin acted notbecause, not necessarily because
of NATO expansion or not, notbecause Ukraine is part of
Russia, or not because Theopportunity was there, and there
was no set deterrence toactually deter him. We looking
through history, whenauthoritarian leaders want
something, they're going to takeit if they're not effectively
(16:51):
deterred through the fundamentalcurrency of international
relations, which is power. Andif I can pick up on this point
too Tad, because it's you'reabsolutely right, and it's
something that general McKinseymentioned in his remarks too,
when he said that the Bidenadministration was fighting this
war to withdraw, you know, notnot fighting to win, not
(17:14):
fighting to demonstrateoverwhelming force and power and
to really deter Russia, but justnot to escalate. You know, to
give just enough so that Ukrainecan kind of defend itself, but
not not lose, so that you sothat Ukraine couldn't lose. But
there wasn't really a strategyto ensure that Ukraine can win.
And I think that was a bigmistake, and it was something
(17:36):
that general McKenzie reallyunderscored in his remarks. I
think some someone mentionedthat the Biden administration
wanted to manage this conflictas if it was a business case to
keep it from escalating, likeyou mentioned, or from they
didn't really have what avictory meant. There was no
clear definition, at least fromthe US side, what a victory for
(18:00):
the US would be in the RussianUkraine conflict. And I think
it's interesting that you know,Russia invaded Georgia in 2008
if I'm remembering correctly,they did incursions in 2014
Sarah Brown (18:15):
there wasn't really an appetite then to interfere.
Yet, something was different in2022 when Russia did a full
scale invasion.
Yoan G. Hermida (18:26):
Yeah, also, there are those who argue, and I
think it sort of came out in thepanel, that what better way to
weaken Russia than tofight them by proxy, using the
Ukrainians number one and numbertwo, to not have a quick
victory, so that the Russianslose personnel, they lose
(18:47):
equipment. So that's the moresort of negative interpretation
of the whole thing, right? Whereit's the US was trying to weaken
Russia by not supplying Ukrainethe amount of military equipment
that it needed to fully defeatthem. So that, you know, the
conflict continued, and Russiawas weakened for years. Years.
(19:08):
The problem with that concept isit's it's a you're trying to
fight a war of attrition, butit's not a total war, neither.
Russia is not completelymobilized. And what it in many
ways, might have actuallystrengthened the Russians now,
not obviously the outcome thatthe US or its allies would want,
but a lot of people who leftRussia in the initial
mobilization were people whomight have actually resisted the
(19:28):
regime or voted differently, oractually might have supported
democracy, right? So this acouple, you know, roughly a
million Russians left in thebeginning of the war. Obviously,
they wanted to avoid a draft,those type of things, but those
people might have been the onesthat could have stood up to a
Putin regime. Perhaps, inaddition, Russia's economy just
simply worked around thesanctions. It was now closer to
China, and it might be a juniorpartner with China, but
(19:52):
nonetheless, now you have twomajor powers that are working
together because of likeinterests, and then really.
Tad Schnaufer (20:00):
Put the Russian economy on a war economy. So
although in the short term, theUkrainians are bleeding the
Russians, the Russians arebleeding the Ukrainians, but
their economy is going to bemore oriented to production of
drones, tanks, militaryequipment in the long term. So
the Russia's ability toreconstitute its military will
actually be better now, becausethey've been forced to reorient
(20:20):
their overall industry towardsthe military outcome. So if
you're looking to diminish theRussian military having a small,
relatively small operation, thisis not World War Two style
operation, they can actuallyreorient their economy, actually
be stronger in a few years thanweaker. The states can be more
consolidated that Putin did alot of work to consolidate his
power leading up to this war inthe 2024 elections. Later on. So
(20:45):
Putin, in many ways, might be ina more secure position. Yeah,
and I think that that is one ofthe reasons why he's not likely
to accept a negotiatedsettlement, because he has done
all this work to reorient hiseconomy to make sure that Russia
is on a wartime footing, andalso to consolidate his power.
(21:06):
You know that he's used this warto intensify his authoritarian
crackdown, and letting up on thewar and embracing a ceasefire
will then force him to pivot todomestic concerns, and he
doesn't want to do that, youknow, he he has noticed that
whenever he is aggressiveabroad, like when he annexed
(21:26):
Crimea, his approval rating goesthrough the roof. You know, not
that we should trust hisincredibly high approval
ratings, but these fluctuations,I think are,
Golfo Alexopoulos (21:41):
are really telling, and it's evident that
he knows that as long as hewages this big, you know, global
war against the West and andeverything that he does will
maintain domestic support. Ialso want to on the on this
subject of authoritarianism. Ialso want to point out that
(22:02):
Putin has been in power for 25years now, and he needs a war,
and he needs enemies, and heneeds this kind of
situation of heightened alert,this militarism, to stay in
power. So his economy isstruggling. The interest rates
are very high in Russia.
Inflation is high, and more andmore people are are struggling.
(22:27):
There is evidence that thatRussians are, you know, not
taking vacations, spending, youknow, going into more debt.
Russian households are soalthough Ukraine probably can't,
can't continue this war muchlonger. Russia can continue it a
(22:49):
little more than Ukraine, but itstill can't keep going on
forever, and yet, you and yet,Putin needs the war to maintain
his power. So we're, we're inthis really difficult situation
with Putin, I think on thequestion of the question about
the Russia China partnership isreally interesting, and I don't
(23:11):
know how much you want to getinto, you know, like current
events, but one of the thingsthat I find striking about the
Trump administration's policy isthat this 180 degree that is
being in many cases, led byMarco Rubio, who, up until a
couple of weeks ago, in essence,was one of the biggest
detractors of Russia and Chinaand the
Yoan G. Hermida (23:34):
Senate, to what extent are policymakers doing a
An analysis of if we pull Russiafrom China's camp five years
down the road, perhaps 10 yearsdown the road, it can help us in
the, you know, in Asia Pacificand the dynamic with the rising
China,
Golfo Alexopoulos (23:53):
right, right?
But didn't. But I think Mariaalso mentioned a she laid out
this kind of scary scenario,that if we pivot entirely to
Asia, and let's say we have afrozen conflict in Ukraine, and
then we pivot to Asia and wefind ourselves in a conflict
with China over Taiwan, thenPutin will use that as an
(24:14):
opportunity to be aggressiveagain in Europe, Because he'll
know that the United States isnot doesn't have the capacity to
fight a two front war. I knowthat that many Russia analysts
really doubt the West's abilityto peel Russia away from China.
I know that there's been thisdiscussion about it, but I think
(24:38):
that the economies now are arepretty tight. I don't see Europe
reopening to to Russian naturalgas. I do think that that Putin
will be dependent on on Chinafor a long time. So I know
that's the hope among Americanpolicymakers. Is. But what I'm
(24:59):
hearing from Russia analysts isthat it's unlikely that we can
peel these two
Sarah Brown (25:08):
allies apart. Yes, David Kramer mentioned that
during his deep dive discussion,because it was brought up, it's
like, oh, is this 40 chesttrying to peel Russia away from
that Axis of Resistance? AndDavid Kramer was adamantly
saying no that they are they'rein it together because they have
a common, maybe not a commongoal, but a common enemy,
Tad Schnaufer (25:31):
right? We can't expect what happened with the
sino Russian break of the 1960swhere the two regimes were not
that economically inclined andthey had different ideologies.
In this case, you have twoauthoritarian states which are
tied together economically moreso now they've been driven
together, and it'll be harder topeel them apart. Not to mention
that the Russians particularlydo not let a hostile China to
their south, because the Chinesepopulation on the Chinese side
(25:52):
of the border is much higher.
The Russians would see that as amuch larger threat. They'd much
rather have a friendly, or atleast a partner, China at the
south and focus more on Europeangains. Well, for my assessment,
Sarah Brown (26:05):
what can I add one more conversation. The theme of
this conference was lessonslearned from the Russia Ukraine
conference. And I think when westarted planning this
conference, and we were gettingthe speakers to arrive and to
talk about their expertise. Ithink initially we're thinking
about, what are the lessons thatthe US, military industry is
(26:28):
learning from this and I thinkit was Maria who said, China's
watching China's also learninglessons from this conflict, and
it is going to apply thoselessons. They're going to apply
to Taiwan in the South ChinaSeas.
Yoan G. Hermida (26:42):
Yeah. And speaking of that, Dr Marsh, he
went out on a limb and said thatif the PRC ever invades Taiwan
through a fait accompli, hedoesn't. He does not see the US
responding to that, thatinvasion in any effective way,
which was another moment of theconference that really, you
know, struck me white. And wecould expect
Tad Schnaufer (27:02):
it the same in Ukraine. If the Russians would
have won in a week, that wouldthe Western response would have
been more sanctions, and thenPutin and the Russians would
have said, what do you do? Wegot Ukraine. Well,
Sarah Brown (27:11):
I think that was the expectation. The expectation
was that it was going to beessentially a blitzkrieg. It was
going to be a fast conflict, andit was going to be over in a
short time. And I think a lot offolks on the international stage
are surprised that it's stillgoing on. I mean, I know
ceasefires are ceasefirediscussion. Negotiations are in
discussion right now, but Ithink folks are surprised that
it's lasted three
Tad Schnaufer (27:32):
years, and when, during the report Golfo about
the peace, Putin is not likelyable to accept a ceasefire. I
think from what I've seen, wouldbe, certainly, as long as
there's Ukrainian troops onRussian soil, and he's going to
probably want the fourprovinces, which he's, you know,
formally, you know, annexed. Soprobably that's going to be
(27:52):
where the lines get frozen, anduntil, until he can achieve
that, he can't accept anythingless. Although the victory terms
that he set out aren't or wererelatively vague before, but it
seems like that's pretty muchwhere they're at.
Golfo Alexopoulos (28:05):
But they were pretty maximalist. You know his
he always wanted denazification, which basically
means regime change in Ukraine,demilitarization. I mean, now
you have a Ukraine that is hasdeveloped its own domestic
military domestic industry.
They're producing drones andthey're producing other military
(28:27):
equipment, so I don't seeUkraine becoming completely
demilitarized, and then, youknow, he wants neutrality after
being invaded a few times, andnot to mention, we're not even
discussing the cyber warfarethat he has waged on on Ukraine
well before that, well before2014 when they invaded. I just I
(28:50):
don't see how Ukrainians areneutral after this experience. I
think that they are firmly inthe western camp. Now, I think
it'll be very hard for them toforget what's happened. Putin
is, in my view, deluding himselfwhen he says, Well, you know,
(29:11):
we're going to iron out thesedifferences between our two
peoples, because we have a closehistory. Well, absolutely, they
do, but it will take generationsto heal this wound. So I do
think Ukraine is firmly in theEU camp. I think the EU will
will embrace Ukraine. NATO,that's a different question,
(29:32):
but, but we'll see. I do thinkthere are many countries in
Europe that are ready to defendUkraine.
Tad Schnaufer (29:43):
So with with this groundbreaking discussion we've
had here so far, let's turn tothe point of the lessons
learned. So we've kind of talkedabout some interesting points.
We've kind of set the stage ofwhat was discussed at the
conference in general. What arethe lessons that you're going to
take away from this conference,or that that you did take away
from the conference? Referenceand what would you recommend?
Let's say you did get thatchance to be at the National
(30:03):
Security Council meeting, andyou were going to make
recommendations to US orEuropean policy makers. What
from this conference, theinformation you learned, and
maybe some follow up news wouldyou recommend? What policies
would you recommend for the USgoing forward? One of
Yoan G. Hermida (30:18):
the things that very concrete things that I took
away from the conference isUkraine's drone production
capabilities and how frequentthey are able to update not just
the software and hardware of thedrones in response to new
jamming mechanisms from Russia.
So I think one of the previousGNSI conferences, there was a
panelist that spoke about thereplicator program that the DOD
(30:41):
has, and what I've read recentlyabout about that is that it
hasn't gone as it hasn'tprogressed as fast as it was
hoped. Even though the dronesare being produced, they are
quickly out of date. Once theythey make it off the production
line. So one of the things thatNATO can learn from from Ukraine
(31:05):
is how fast they're producingdrones, how to adapt the
software the drones to withbetter evasion capabilities. And
that's something that I thinkyou know, defense ministries in
all NATO countries and the DODcan definitely learn,
Golfo Alexopoulos (31:24):
I would just add to that, that Russia is a
hostile state, if we accept whatMaria said, that this is, this
is not a new Cold War. It's theCold War, and it just had a
brief period of a briefreprieve, and then it ramped up
again. I do think that Putinviews the West as an enemy. I
(31:47):
think that is I think that thosearound him feel the same way.
Many of his you know the topsecurity officials, maybe not
the broader elite, but certainlythe top security officials
around Putin do believe that.
And so I think that we shouldn'tfool ourselves into thinking
(32:08):
that we're that Putin is goingto become Boris Yeltsin. You
know, he's not. He is who He is.
That's, that's one takeaway.
Another is something that PeterPomerantsev noted in his
discussion about his book aboutgenocide and how we should be
thinking about genocide, I thinkthat this conflict enabled us to
(32:30):
record document and identifyacts of genocide and war crimes
on a scale that we just have notbeen able to in past conflicts.
And so I think that we willlearn from this. We will learn
(32:51):
how Russia wages war and thedegree to which it does not
adhere to the GenevaConventions, I think that that's
also a really big lesson. So Imean, we saw this in Syria.
We've seen Russian behavior inother conflicts, the way that
they deliberately targetcivilians and use terror as a
(33:13):
method of war. But I think thatthat's certainly a lesson that
we take away from from thisconflict,
Sarah Brown (33:24):
yeah, and just to for both of y'all points, it's
not only the democratization ofdrones, it's the democracy,
democratization of informationsystems. You know, when the
invasion of Crimea washappening, you could literally
watch it play out on telegram.
So the way that we are gettingthis information of the war is
(33:47):
completely different than Ithink, has happened in the past.
And what's really beeninteresting is, I think this was
also brought up during Peter'sconversation, was the Civic
information resistance, how it'sa very grassroots process
happening in Ukraine to combatRussian myths and
(34:07):
disinformation. But I thinkanother lesson that the US can
learn is that what we what theUS does on a global stage in
regards to national security andmilitary strategy has ripple
effects. Like I don't thinkanyone could have imagined that
if we pulled away from NATO,that NATO would have the
(34:28):
stronger response and buildtogether. So I think that
there's such a concentration onone event, one conflict at a
time, that there it's oftenignored how they're
interconnected together and howa decision's made from the
withdrawal from Afghanistanshows that Putin can invade
(34:50):
without consequence,
Golfo Alexopoulos (34:56):
right? I think that it's a very
understandable. A concern thatAmericans have about over
extension abroad. It's a totallylegitimate concern, I think that
we just have to also accept thatwhen we pull out, we create
vacuums for bad actors to stepin. And so there's a cost, and
(35:20):
it's, it's a debate that we needto continue to have, because we
want to be engaged, but we don'twant to be overextended, and we
also want to deter bad actors.
So it's, it's a tricky balance.
I
Tad Schnaufer (35:31):
think one of the lessons to take away, what I
would tell policy makers is,let's say we get a piece
tomorrow, there's a cease fire,and we create a DMZ, a
demilitarized zone or something,or we have a line of contact is
created going to golf. Oh, yourpoint is that this doesn't make
Russia a friend. Russia is stillan adversary. So you still have
a conflict, in a sense. It's notan open war, but you still have
a Cold War type scenario. Youhave an adversary who's right on
(35:53):
a border, who's military,aggressive and willing to use
force. So you're really not inthat much better of a situation.
You still need a large militarycomplex, and you need to be able
to deter an attack if you wantto. And for a US policymaker, or
a Western policymaker, a NATOgeneral, whoever it may be, if
you do not want Russia to beaggressive, then you have to
deter that through force, whichwould mean 10s of 1000s of
(36:16):
troops on whatever front line isagreed for, for peace. And think
of it this way. Yes, Putin waswanted Ukraine back into
Russia's fold because ofcultural, historical means. Yes,
he likely wants to shore up hisdomestic support, but he would
not have invaded Ukraine ifthere was 1000s of US and allied
forces there, right? Because itwould have been effective
(36:38):
deterrence. We know this is truebecause even Soviet leaders
didn't invade Europe. When youhave hundreds of 1000s of allied
forces, the US perspective,Western perspective, is it worth
it? You have to make thatdecision. Is it worth it, or is
this just something we're goingto you know, have to sacrifice
because we're not willing tofight for this. And that goes to
how countries define theirinterest. Is this, as Ukraine, a
(36:59):
vital interest for the UnitedStates, meaning you're willing
to fight and possibly, you know,engage in a world war three type
scenario. If it's not, thengoing half measures actually
doesn't help the situation,really, either, which is slow,
incremental, supplying theforce. Yes, it makes the war
last longer, but you're not,you're not getting any political
objective achieved other than astalemate. So you have to, as a
(37:21):
policy maker, what I would tellthem is you have to decide what
you want, and then you're goingto have to make a hard decision,
because if you decide we don'twant Russia to invade anywhere
else in Europe, then you'regoing to need to put 10s of
1000s of troops on the border.
That's the only way that you'regoing to ensure that Russia does
not take aggressive physicalactions. You're still going to
have cyber issues. You're stillgoing to have hybrid threats,
but if you want to stop largescale conventional war, it means
(37:44):
you need to have the ability todeter it. So before we end up
with our last segment of thepodcast, why don't we discuss a
little bit about we had anexcellent panel of student
presenters discussing topicsrelated to the Russian war in
Ukraine. There's a lot oflessons. There a lot of
interesting points. What do youguys think about that panel?
Golfo Alexopoulos (38:04):
So I thought that the panel with the students
was excellent, and I thought inparticular, it was especially
interesting because it shedlight on the conversation that
we were having at the conferenceregarding Russia's war and the
lessons learned. I also thoughtthat there was significant
overall student engagement inthe panel and themes that were
(38:24):
relevant to students. Forexample, Admiral John Kirby
spoke extensively about his timein the White House as National
Security Council spokesperson,and how he got into the field.
What should students take awayfrom that? Quite a few of my
(38:45):
students told me that what, whatAdmiral Kirby said, really made
an impression on on them. So Ithought that that was a hugely
positive moment in theconference. Was when, when John
Kirby was speaking about his owncareer trajectory and what
(39:06):
advice he had for students,yeah,
Yoan G. Hermida (39:09):
on the student presentations as one of the
presenters, I must say that theTED Talk style format was very
engaging. It it was for me as apresenter, it facilitated the
points I needed to make acrossor wanted to make across, much
more than if it had been like,say, a panel discussion. So yes,
(39:32):
kudos to that format. I think itshould be replicated, not just
with students, but maybe infuture conferences with other
presenters. And some of thestudent presentations were very
technical. The gentleman talkingabout the drones, and the
various nomenclatures of thedrones, and how the Iranians
were producing these drones andshipping them to Ukraine, that
was fascinating. And it showedreally a level of expertise in
(39:56):
in his research that was verysurprising in a. Positive way.
Obviously,
Sarah Brown (40:01):
yes, and I'm going to approach the student TED
Talks and research presentationsfrom a different aspect. They
were all phenomenal, yoursincluded. But I think it shows
that GNSI, with the futurestrategist program, is providing
an avenue, or platform, I shouldsay, for students at the
(40:23):
graduate and undergraduate levelto present their research and
areas of interest. And that isso important, especially at a
university, we need to havethese type of opportunities for
our learners, because not onlyis it professional development,
but it also shows the audiencewhat the future policy makers
are thinking, where they'recoming from, what they're
(40:44):
interested in, what, not whattheir belief systems are, but
how are they're going toapproach problems in future
policy issues. So it is we aregoing to have these in future
conferences. The format maychange. It may be different. I
think we did posters one year.
But I think the audience, and Ithink the students really
enjoyed the TED Talkspresentation, and I look forward
(41:05):
to enabling that in the future
Tad Schnaufer (41:10):
well. And to wrap up with that, again, amazing
conference, a lot of greatspeakers, including some of our
students here at USF, to wrapup, if you were to bump into a
policymaker in the hallwaytomorrow that was not at our
conference. How would you whatwould you tell them from the
conference that you know youmiss this and you really need to
look into it, or you miss thislesson learned? And I just want
(41:33):
to highlight that for you. Sowhat do you think from the
conference you would tell apolicy maker if you bumped into
a bumped into them in anelevator or something of that
nature, and you had to give thema quick bite, size, digestible
policy recommendation from theconference to your point.
Yoan G. Hermida (41:47):
Had about the power dynamics in Europe. One of
the lessons that we need tolearn from from not just the
conference, but also theconflict, the ongoing conflict
in Ukraine, is that when the USabandons Europe, bad things
happen, right? We saw it duringthe isolationist period before
the First World War. We saw itin the 20s and 30s. And I don't
(42:10):
think the US should be in aposition or should withdraw the
number of forces that thepresent administration is
talking about. Nor do I thinkthat it sets a good precedent
for the liberal internationalorder, or whatever is left of
it, to cede territory, to Putinor to abandon, quote, unquote,
(42:37):
abandon European allies. I thinkit would be a mistake, and if I
ran into a policymaker, I wouldtell them to, and if they're
part of the administration, Iwould tell them to reverse,
reverse course as quickly asthey can.
Golfo Alexopoulos (42:49):
Yeah, I I think that picking up on that, I
would, I would say thatthat you can't focus on the
China threat without tacklingthe Russia threat as well, and
that those are connected,because these are authoritarian
regimes that have expansionistmotivations and ambitions. And I
(43:10):
think that what we do in Ukrainewill impact Chinese behavior.
China is watching, and if we letUkraine be absorbed by Russia,
well, China will interpret thatas a green light to absorb
Taiwan.
Sarah Brown (43:31):
So if I met a policy maker in the elevator,
what I would try to pitch isit's not it's not a sexy topic,
but it's logistics. It's supplychain and how I know there are
current programs in DOD that aretrying to keep up with the
innovation, especially withdrone technology and software
technology. Yet so much money isgoing into legacy systems, such
(43:53):
as aircraft carriers F 16, sothere needs to be a
hybridization of continuing tobuild up those legacy systems,
but also be innovative at arapid pace, where we can
implement these new technologiesand not lose our competitive
edge in a more kinetic setting.
Tad Schnaufer (44:16):
Excellent, excellent. The point I would
make is that all obviously,we're trying to solve these
tough situations, but the firstquestion we should ask is, how
do we don't how do we not end upin these type of situations? How
do we set the course so that weavoid catastrophes instead of
trying to fix them after they'vestarted? So again, going back to
either effective deterrence, forexample, in war, but also, just
(44:37):
like you would pre stageequipment. You know, we're here
in Florida, we pre stage getready for hurricanes. We're
ready for them when they happen.
We're not waiting for ahurricane to hit and then
figuring it out. Foreign policyneeds to be able to be ahead of
issues and start thinking likethat. But that means going back
to your point of, you know, nonsexy policy. That means having
true either, you know, if we'retrying to just hurt conflict,
having troops staged and. Uh,Korea, for example, for 70
(45:00):
years, and they're just there incase of war. I mean, that's not
adventurous. It's not, you know,you're spending a lot of money.
And the problem with deterrenceas a policy is that you can't
measure how successful it is,other than nothing happens, and
that's a hard policy to sell totaxpayers. Hey, nothing's
happening, so everything's good.
Well, the problem going toSarah's earlier point is it's
(45:23):
not happening in a vacuum. We'repaying for troops around the
world, but at home, our eggprices are going up. Different
things are going up. So it's notall stagnant. And another piece
is that going to golf with yourpoint about you know, they
always tell you, as a leader andleader training, that your
people who are working for youalways you look looking to you.
They're watching you. They'reseeing what you do. Or even you
hear this with parents, right?
You know, your kids are watchingwhat you do. They're taking that
(45:44):
example. But in theinternational stage, it's the
same thing. Signals are beingsent with every action, whether
if it's something you've done,and a country can do something
Latin America, but the worldsees it. It doesn't matter where
it's happening, and they'regoing to make inferences from
that based off of their currentpolicy advisors and their
current information, which will,by definition, be imperfect,
then they'll likely lead them tosub optimal policy. So being
(46:06):
conscious of that is another bigtakeaway I think the conference
taught us. So with all that, Iwant to thank you all so much
for your attendance today and atthe conference, as well as
thoughtful insights. And it wasan amazing conference. Thank you
so much for the support andplanning with it as well and
each of your individualcontributions.
Yoan G. Hermida (46:27):
Thank you.
Thank you. Thank you.
Glenn Beckmann (46:37):
What a great conversation today, as we look
back at Tampa summit five,digging into key observations
and takeaways on the Russia,Ukraine war, which continues to
make headlines as the twocountries, along with leaders
from the US and Europe, continueto work towards a resolution to
the largest land war in Europesince World War Two, a conflict
(46:59):
that has already claimed, bysome estimates, nearly 1 million
casualties in the three yearssince Russia invaded Ukraine,
thanks to our guests today, DrTad schnaufer and Sarah Brown
from GNSI, Dr golfel, AlexApollos from iris and Johan
hermita from the futurestrategist program. Next week on
at the boundary, we're going tokick off a discussion centered
(47:20):
on critical natural and nationalresources, we'll have a special
guest for the podcast as we talkabout increasing global
strategic competition for theseresources, and how countries are
competing and will compete forand secure these resources that
are so critical for thetechnology we all take for
granted in our everyday lives.
We recently published a decisionbrief on this very topic. If
(47:44):
you're so inclined, go check itout on our website. It will make
a great jumping off point fornext week's podcast
that's going to wrap up thisepisode of at the boundary. Each
new episode will feature globaland national security issues we
(48:05):
found to be worthy of discussionand attention. I'm Glenn
Beckman, thanks for listeningtoday. We'll see you next week
at the boundary.
Hi everybody.
Welcome to another episode of atthe boundary, the podcast from
the global and national securityInstitute at the University of
South Florida. I'm GlennBeckman, communications manager
at GNSI with you today. Four atthe boundary
on the pod. We're going to talka little bit about GNSI Tampa
(00:35):
Summit. Five, now that we've hada chance to catch our collective
breath and absorb everythingthat was presented at the
conference two weeks ago. Wewant to gather some folks
together and talk about what weall learned before we do that.
However, a couple of headlinesto pass along. If you remember,
last week, we made the bigannouncement of the first ever
conference produced and hostedby the GNSI future strategist
(00:57):
program, the studentorganization at USF dedicated to
students interested in a careerin national security. It's going
to be a great event focused oncyber security. Each of the five
sessions will have FSP studentsserving as moderators and
facilitators for guest speakersfrom the industry and from
academia, and they'll be divinginto pivotal cyber topics like
(01:20):
enhancing defense and navigatingemerging threats zero trust
architecture, protecting data ina post quantum world and
securing the digital economy. Wecan't wait to see what these
fantastic students have puttogether, and we urge you to
support them by attending theconference, which is scheduled
for April 15 in the Oval theaterat the Marshall Student Center
(01:41):
on the Tampa campus of USF,registration is now open. It's
an in person event. There's nocost to attend, but registration
is required. We'll drop a linkto register in the show notes.
And hey, we want to send out bigcongratulations this week to the
team at the College ofartificial intelligence,
cybersecurity and computing hereat USF, or should we more
(02:04):
accurately say the BelliniCollege of artificial
intelligence, cybersecurity andcomputing, making it the first
named college in the UnitedStates dedicated exclusively to
the convergence of cybersecurityand AI. USF announced last week
that Arnie and Lauren Bellinihave made a record setting, $40
(02:24):
million gift to the Universityestablishing the college, and
the Bellini support will go evenfurther. They've pledged $1 for
dollar matching program foradditional money raised for the
college. Now, if you remember,in last week's at the boundary,
we talked with Professor Johnlicatto of cake, and honestly,
we need to start calling itBellini cake, right?
(02:47):
Anyway, John hinted thatsomething big was coming, and
boy was he right.
Congratulations to everyoneinvolved. What a huge
announcement for USF and forcake. We also want to remind you
of the upcoming rethinkingAfghanistan part two conference
coming up on May 20. Theconference will be held in
Washington, DC. That's our firstout of town conference for our
(03:09):
team here at GNSI. Details arestill being worked out, so keep
an eye out on our website and toyour inboxes for more
information.
All right, it's time now for themost important segment of the
podcast. Today, we're gatheringa few people to talk about our
recently completed Tampa summitfive, the Russia, Ukraine war
(03:31):
lessons for future conflicts. Westarted this round table
discussion idea a post mortem,if you will, following our last
conference, and it was so wellreceived, we're going to do it
again. So we're bringing intothe studio Dr Tad schnaufer,
strategy and research manager atGNSI, Dr golf Alex the director
(03:51):
of the USF Institute forRussian, European and Eurasian
Studies, Sarah Brown, ResearchCoordinator at GNSI, and the
planner for TS five, along withJohan hermita, a USF student
who's a member of FSP, and healso got up on stage at the
conference to present hisresearch to the entire audience.
(04:12):
Tad, take it away. Well,
Tad Schnaufer (04:21):
thank you, Glenn, for that wonderful introduction.
So why don't we go ahead and getstarted with our elite group of
now podcasters here discussingthe recent global national
security Institute's Tampasummit number five, focused on
the Russian war in Ukraine. Sowhy don't we kick it over to
Sarah first. And overall, whatwas one of the most interesting
(04:41):
things, or the most interestingthing you took away from the
conference? Well, for me, one ofthe most interesting things from
the conference is, besides thephenomenal discussions that were
had by a variety of folks, isthat there really seemed to be a
sense that the United States isno longer going to be a security
guarantor for.
Sarah Brown (05:00):
Are at the global stage, and what that role is, I
think a lot of people are theunknown is scary, and how that
role become, transitioning awayfrom a security guarantor to
something else, whatever it maybe, is still undetermined, but
it's it's a little fearful forfolks right now, because it's
not what's been happening forthe past 70 years with the NATO
(05:22):
alliance, and there's just somuch uncertainty right now. So
that was one of the bigger keytakeaways that I took away from
the conference. Really a majortheme. Yeah, it's gonna be
playing. Yeah. It was especiallyinteresting the way the guests
from Europe, Mr. Norberg andgeneral rupees, what they said
(05:43):
about how Europeans are feelingin the wake of this new policy,
and it's not so new, actually,because a lot of people were
saying, Well, why? Why wasn'tEurope more prepared for the
second Trump administration?
Because, you know, we they, theyshould have anticipated this
move away from from globalengagement, but nonetheless, I
(06:04):
think it was very striking, andI received a lot of really
positive feedback from thatpanel. In particular, I think
Americans were really happy tohear a European perspective, and
also to hear their sense ofvulnerability and concern. You
know, what are the next stepsgoing to look
Yoan G. Hermida (06:26):
like? Yeah, I completely agree with the
previous two comments. Mybiggest takeaway was from Dr
Johan Norberg letter to Putinand the despair that I noticed
in his argument and absolutely,very striking the Europeans
even, even though they shouldhave been prepared for what may
(06:46):
have been coming with the Trumpadministration, I think it
completely caught them bysurprise. And you do detect that
level of high level ofuncertainty as to what the next
steps may be in their in theiractions, whether they'll be able
to regroup and, you know, get acohesive, coherent defense
(07:07):
policy together in the face ofwhat seems to be increasing
levels of doubt about theTransatlantic Alliance. I
thought it was very interestingto note with the Europeans that
their reaction has been, in asense, stronger to the Trump
administration, second Trumpadministration, than to the
actual invasion itself. So ifyou look at the $800 billion the
(07:28):
Europeans are looking to pulltogether for defense spending
that came not because ofRussia's invasion of Ukraine. It
came from the possibility, thisidea that the US could withdraw
security guarantees, or at leastnot be as 100% guarantee of a
protector of Europe. So that'swhat's actually driving them,
even as the threat of Russia asa conventional, large scale
(07:49):
military operations underway,that still was not enough,
right? I think that the Bidenadministration's commitment to
engagement and to our allies wasso unequivocal that they just
took it for granted. But I alsothink that they should have been
prepared, you know, because thefirst Trump administration
(08:10):
demonstrated these, thistendency to pull away from from
our role in the world,questioning NATO and so on. So,
yeah, absolutely. I think theythey were a little spoiled,
because Biden was so committedto the war and to our alliances
and to NATO but that. But theyshould have understood that in
(08:32):
American politics, you know, thependulum swings, and different
administrations come and go, andit's not anything for
presidential administrations tocall out allies for not spending
enough, and certainly from thefirst Trump administration and
from the invasion the a lot ofthe eastern flank, NATO Allies
particularly, have increasedtheir defense spending. I'm
noting Lithuania and Poland, forexample, which are spending a
(08:54):
lot, but the other alliescertainly are looking to pick up
more of the slack now thatthere's a possibility the US
starts withdrawing troops fromEurope and these other
possibilities, even as the warcontinues, I think one of the
speakers, I think it was one ofthe European speakers, mentioned
that
Sarah Brown (09:12):
the head of NATO is now saying that they have all
this money but no time to buildup the defense forces, whereas
before they had all the time totrain and prepare, but no money.
So it's interesting to see theinterplay of the EU and NATO
trying to step in that vacuumthat the US is leaving. Yeah.
Yoan G. Hermida (09:33):
And another thing that I would add about Dr
Norberg intervention is, assomeone who was born in an
authoritarian state, there was apoint in his intervention that
he said that he's lived 50 yearswithout having to fear for his
freedom. So, you know, theimplication is that now he does,
and the the existential threatfor the Scandinavian countries
(09:56):
and those on the the Europeanson the eastern flank that they
feel.
From Russia, compounded withwhat seems to be a certain level
of abandonment by the US ispalpable beyond the power
dynamics beyond, you know, thepercentage of GDP, it's it's a
real it'ssomething that strikes to the
core of your being and yourfreedom,
Golfo Alexopoulos (10:21):
all right, and I think it made a big
impression on the audience. If Ican shift to another
takeaway, one of the moststriking conversations, I
thought, first of all, therewere so many moments in the
conference that were reallystriking to me, but the the
opening panel on the second day,which was with Maria snegovaya
(10:46):
and Chris Marsh. ChristopherMarsh, so what was interesting
about their discussion, whichyou so so effectively moderated
had was that they expressed a adifference of opinion that is
just central in the field, andthat is, did the what did the
(11:09):
West have a major role to playin Putin's decision to invade
Ukraine? And Maria made a strongargument that the West tends to
exaggerate its influence onRussian politics, and that
really Putin sensed he wasalways going to move on Ukraine,
(11:32):
because he considers Ukrainewithin his sphere of influence.
He just waited for a time whenhe perceived the West to be at
its weakest, you know, after thefailed withdrawal from
Afghanistan and and the signsthat he was getting from two
American administrations aboutabout not engaging in foreign
(11:52):
conflicts. So I think that Mariawas making that argument about
continuity and about Putinreally being driven by his own
domestic concerns and his ownview of Russian sphere of
influence and its role in theworld. And then Chris was making
the argument that that the Westlost Russia, and that we in our
(12:15):
in not respecting Russia's as agreat power after the collapse
of the Soviet Union, in ourexpansion of NATO, we didn't pay
enough attention to Russia'ssecurity concerns and Russia's
(12:40):
Russia's desire to remainrelevant and remain and to be
seen as a great power. So Ithought that was really
interesting, because this debaterages in the field. You know,
there are those who think thatthe West is responsible. There
are those who believe that Putinwould have behaved regardless of
(13:03):
Western actions, and I thoughtthat was so nicely illustrated
in the conversation betweenChris and Maria
Yoan G. Hermida (13:12):
completely agree on that. Dr alexapolis, Dr
snegovaya, she mentioned howPutin's worldview was really
conditioned by growing up in theSoviet Union being, you know,
part of the KGB, as we all know.
And I think there's, there's alot to that, I think, in my, my
opinion, and I guess, what Imight take away from what Dr
snickel was saying was thatPutin knows very well that no
(13:35):
matter how far east NATOexpanded, it was never going to
invade Russia proper, right? Heknew that very well. So I think
those who are like you said,those are who are in the camp of
NATO expansion was what causedRussia to lash out fundamentally
misunderstand,or don't give a lot of credence
(13:55):
to sort of the constructivistargument of Putin's worldview
and how he grew up and hisideology, right? It's also, I
was also struck by what youmentioned about the 90s as a
pause in the Cold War. So weoften think of the Cold War as
having ended in 91 collapse ofSoviet Union, and then you had
(14:15):
the Unipolar Moment. Which ofthe US was
the primacy the hegemon. But inreality, the argument that it
was simply a pause as Russiarevamped its economic and
military capabilities tocontinue its actions during the
during the Cold War, or similarto the Cold War, really
(14:37):
resonated with me as well. Yeah,and Maria has actually written a
lot about this, about how theelites in Soviet society, the
nomenclatura under the Sovietregime, have basically
continued. You know, it's notlike we've had this incredible
change in personnel and worldviews. You know, there's been
this striking continuity. Andshe's demonstrated it in her
(14:59):
research.
Golfo Alexopoulos (15:00):
Surge. And for that reason, I actually am
more convinced by her argumenttoo.
Sarah Brown (15:06):
I think folks tend to forget that the Cold War and
the ending of the Cold War andthe elites that was only 3040,
years ago, those people arestill in power. They were able
to seamlessly transition fromthe old government to the new
government in each of itsiterations. So we tend to think,
oh, the Cold War was in thepast. It was, you know, close to
(15:28):
70 years ago when, really itended in 1989 that's very
recent. And I don't think weshould be surprised that there
is still an Imperial Russiandream being conducted by or
Carrie out by Putin. Well, what
Tad Schnaufer (15:46):
we can say is, if it is a continuation of the same
Cold War, then we won the firsthalf, and we're losing the
second half, because the firsthalf there was no major
conventional conflicts inEurope. Now again, you obviously
have Russian intervention inHungary in 56 in the Prague
Spring in 68 but no large scaleinvasions. So the second half,
something has changed. Eventhough Russia is, in a sense,
weaker, it's much smaller thanthe Soviet Union. 15 independent
(16:08):
republics or countries came outof the Soviet Union. It lost a
lot of population, territory,minerals, resources, yet a
smaller Russia, the inherentstate of the Soviet Union is
more aggressive. And I thinkwhat you can take away from our
panel, the number of otherpanels and discussions
throughout the entireconference, is that in the end,
Putin, as with mostauthoritarian leaders, respects
(16:30):
power, and that Putin acted notbecause, not necessarily because
of NATO expansion or not, notbecause Ukraine is part of
Russia, or not because Theopportunity was there, and there
was no set deterrence toactually deter him. We looking
through history, whenauthoritarian leaders want
something, they're going to takeit if they're not effectively
(16:51):
deterred through the fundamentalcurrency of international
relations, which is power. Andif I can pick up on this point
too Tad, because it's you'reabsolutely right, and it's
something that general McKinseymentioned in his remarks too,
when he said that the Bidenadministration was fighting this
war to withdraw, you know, notnot fighting to win, not
(17:14):
fighting to demonstrateoverwhelming force and power and
to really deter Russia, but justnot to escalate. You know, to
give just enough so that Ukrainecan kind of defend itself, but
not not lose, so that you sothat Ukraine couldn't lose. But
there wasn't really a strategyto ensure that Ukraine can win.
And I think that was a bigmistake, and it was something
(17:36):
that general McKenzie reallyunderscored in his remarks. I
think some someone mentionedthat the Biden administration
wanted to manage this conflictas if it was a business case to
keep it from escalating, likeyou mentioned, or from they
didn't really have what avictory meant. There was no
clear definition, at least fromthe US side, what a victory for
(18:00):
the US would be in the RussianUkraine conflict. And I think
it's interesting that you know,Russia invaded Georgia in 2008
if I'm remembering correctly,they did incursions in 2014
Sarah Brown (18:15):
there wasn't really an appetite then to interfere.
Yet, something was different in2022 when Russia did a full
scale invasion.
Yoan G. Hermida (18:26):
Yeah, also, there are those who argue, and I
think it sort of came out in thepanel, that what better way to
weaken Russia than tofight them by proxy, using the
Ukrainians number one and numbertwo, to not have a quick
victory, so that the Russianslose personnel, they lose
(18:47):
equipment. So that's the moresort of negative interpretation
of the whole thing, right? Whereit's the US was trying to weaken
Russia by not supplying Ukrainethe amount of military equipment
that it needed to fully defeatthem. So that, you know, the
conflict continued, and Russiawas weakened for years. Years.
(19:08):
The problem with that concept isit's it's a you're trying to
fight a war of attrition, butit's not a total war, neither.
Russia is not completelymobilized. And what it in many
ways, might have actuallystrengthened the Russians now,
not obviously the outcome thatthe US or its allies would want,
but a lot of people who leftRussia in the initial
mobilization were people whomight have actually resisted the
(19:28):
regime or voted differently, oractually might have supported
democracy, right? So this acouple, you know, roughly a
million Russians left in thebeginning of the war. Obviously,
they wanted to avoid a draft,those type of things, but those
people might have been the onesthat could have stood up to a
Putin regime. Perhaps, inaddition, Russia's economy just
simply worked around thesanctions. It was now closer to
China, and it might be a juniorpartner with China, but
(19:52):
nonetheless, now you have twomajor powers that are working
together because of likeinterests, and then really.
Tad Schnaufer (20:00):
Put the Russian economy on a war economy. So
although in the short term, theUkrainians are bleeding the
Russians, the Russians arebleeding the Ukrainians, but
their economy is going to bemore oriented to production of
drones, tanks, militaryequipment in the long term. So
the Russia's ability toreconstitute its military will
actually be better now, becausethey've been forced to reorient
(20:20):
their overall industry towardsthe military outcome. So if
you're looking to diminish theRussian military having a small,
relatively small operation, thisis not World War Two style
operation, they can actuallyreorient their economy, actually
be stronger in a few years thanweaker. The states can be more
consolidated that Putin did alot of work to consolidate his
power leading up to this war inthe 2024 elections. Later on. So
(20:45):
Putin, in many ways, might be ina more secure position. Yeah,
and I think that that is one ofthe reasons why he's not likely
to accept a negotiatedsettlement, because he has done
all this work to reorient hiseconomy to make sure that Russia
is on a wartime footing, andalso to consolidate his power.
(21:06):
You know that he's used this warto intensify his authoritarian
crackdown, and letting up on thewar and embracing a ceasefire
will then force him to pivot todomestic concerns, and he
doesn't want to do that, youknow, he he has noticed that
whenever he is aggressiveabroad, like when he annexed
(21:26):
Crimea, his approval rating goesthrough the roof. You know, not
that we should trust hisincredibly high approval
ratings, but these fluctuations,I think are,
Golfo Alexopoulos (21:41):
are really telling, and it's evident that
he knows that as long as hewages this big, you know, global
war against the West and andeverything that he does will
maintain domestic support. Ialso want to on the on this
subject of authoritarianism. Ialso want to point out that
(22:02):
Putin has been in power for 25years now, and he needs a war,
and he needs enemies, and heneeds this kind of
situation of heightened alert,this militarism, to stay in
power. So his economy isstruggling. The interest rates
are very high in Russia.
Inflation is high, and more andmore people are are struggling.
(22:27):
There is evidence that thatRussians are, you know, not
taking vacations, spending, youknow, going into more debt.
Russian households are soalthough Ukraine probably can't,
can't continue this war muchlonger. Russia can continue it a
(22:49):
little more than Ukraine, but itstill can't keep going on
forever, and yet, you and yet,Putin needs the war to maintain
his power. So we're, we're inthis really difficult situation
with Putin, I think on thequestion of the question about
the Russia China partnership isreally interesting, and I don't
(23:11):
know how much you want to getinto, you know, like current
events, but one of the thingsthat I find striking about the
Trump administration's policy isthat this 180 degree that is
being in many cases, led byMarco Rubio, who, up until a
couple of weeks ago, in essence,was one of the biggest
detractors of Russia and Chinaand the
Yoan G. Hermida (23:34):
Senate, to what extent are policymakers doing a
An analysis of if we pull Russiafrom China's camp five years
down the road, perhaps 10 yearsdown the road, it can help us in
the, you know, in Asia Pacificand the dynamic with the rising
China,
Golfo Alexopoulos (23:53):
right, right?
But didn't. But I think Mariaalso mentioned a she laid out
this kind of scary scenario,that if we pivot entirely to
Asia, and let's say we have afrozen conflict in Ukraine, and
then we pivot to Asia and wefind ourselves in a conflict
with China over Taiwan, thenPutin will use that as an
(24:14):
opportunity to be aggressiveagain in Europe, Because he'll
know that the United States isnot doesn't have the capacity to
fight a two front war. I knowthat that many Russia analysts
really doubt the West's abilityto peel Russia away from China.
I know that there's been thisdiscussion about it, but I think
(24:38):
that the economies now are arepretty tight. I don't see Europe
reopening to to Russian naturalgas. I do think that that Putin
will be dependent on on Chinafor a long time. So I know
that's the hope among Americanpolicymakers. Is. But what I'm
(24:59):
hearing from Russia analysts isthat it's unlikely that we can
peel these two
Sarah Brown (25:08):
allies apart. Yes, David Kramer mentioned that
during his deep dive discussion,because it was brought up, it's
like, oh, is this 40 chesttrying to peel Russia away from
that Axis of Resistance? AndDavid Kramer was adamantly
saying no that they are they'rein it together because they have
a common, maybe not a commongoal, but a common enemy,
Tad Schnaufer (25:31):
right? We can't expect what happened with the
sino Russian break of the 1960swhere the two regimes were not
that economically inclined andthey had different ideologies.
In this case, you have twoauthoritarian states which are
tied together economically moreso now they've been driven
together, and it'll be harder topeel them apart. Not to mention
that the Russians particularlydo not let a hostile China to
their south, because the Chinesepopulation on the Chinese side
(25:52):
of the border is much higher.
The Russians would see that as amuch larger threat. They'd much
rather have a friendly, or atleast a partner, China at the
south and focus more on Europeangains. Well, for my assessment,
Sarah Brown (26:05):
what can I add one more conversation. The theme of
this conference was lessonslearned from the Russia Ukraine
conference. And I think when westarted planning this
conference, and we were gettingthe speakers to arrive and to
talk about their expertise. Ithink initially we're thinking
about, what are the lessons thatthe US, military industry is
(26:28):
learning from this and I thinkit was Maria who said, China's
watching China's also learninglessons from this conflict, and
it is going to apply thoselessons. They're going to apply
to Taiwan in the South ChinaSeas.
Yoan G. Hermida (26:42):
Yeah. And speaking of that, Dr Marsh, he
went out on a limb and said thatif the PRC ever invades Taiwan
through a fait accompli, hedoesn't. He does not see the US
responding to that, thatinvasion in any effective way,
which was another moment of theconference that really, you
know, struck me white. And wecould expect
Tad Schnaufer (27:02):
it the same in Ukraine. If the Russians would
have won in a week, that wouldthe Western response would have
been more sanctions, and thenPutin and the Russians would
have said, what do you do? Wegot Ukraine. Well,
Sarah Brown (27:11):
I think that was the expectation. The expectation
was that it was going to beessentially a blitzkrieg. It was
going to be a fast conflict, andit was going to be over in a
short time. And I think a lot offolks on the international stage
are surprised that it's stillgoing on. I mean, I know
ceasefires are ceasefirediscussion. Negotiations are in
discussion right now, but Ithink folks are surprised that
it's lasted three
Tad Schnaufer (27:32):
years, and when, during the report Golfo about
the peace, Putin is not likelyable to accept a ceasefire. I
think from what I've seen, wouldbe, certainly, as long as
there's Ukrainian troops onRussian soil, and he's going to
probably want the fourprovinces, which he's, you know,
formally, you know, annexed. Soprobably that's going to be
(27:52):
where the lines get frozen, anduntil, until he can achieve
that, he can't accept anythingless. Although the victory terms
that he set out aren't or wererelatively vague before, but it
seems like that's pretty muchwhere they're at.
Golfo Alexopoulos (28:05):
But they were pretty maximalist. You know his
he always wanted denazification, which basically
means regime change in Ukraine,demilitarization. I mean, now
you have a Ukraine that is hasdeveloped its own domestic
military domestic industry.
They're producing drones andthey're producing other military
(28:27):
equipment, so I don't seeUkraine becoming completely
demilitarized, and then, youknow, he wants neutrality after
being invaded a few times, andnot to mention, we're not even
discussing the cyber warfarethat he has waged on on Ukraine
well before that, well before2014 when they invaded. I just I
(28:50):
don't see how Ukrainians areneutral after this experience. I
think that they are firmly inthe western camp. Now, I think
it'll be very hard for them toforget what's happened. Putin
is, in my view, deluding himselfwhen he says, Well, you know,
(29:11):
we're going to iron out thesedifferences between our two
peoples, because we have a closehistory. Well, absolutely, they
do, but it will take generationsto heal this wound. So I do
think Ukraine is firmly in theEU camp. I think the EU will
will embrace Ukraine. NATO,that's a different question,
(29:32):
but, but we'll see. I do thinkthere are many countries in
Europe that are ready to defendUkraine.
Tad Schnaufer (29:43):
So with with this groundbreaking discussion we've
had here so far, let's turn tothe point of the lessons
learned. So we've kind of talkedabout some interesting points.
We've kind of set the stage ofwhat was discussed at the
conference in general. What arethe lessons that you're going to
take away from this conference,or that that you did take away
from the conference? Referenceand what would you recommend?
Let's say you did get thatchance to be at the National
(30:03):
Security Council meeting, andyou were going to make
recommendations to US orEuropean policy makers. What
from this conference, theinformation you learned, and
maybe some follow up news wouldyou recommend? What policies
would you recommend for the USgoing forward? One of
Yoan G. Hermida (30:18):
the things that very concrete things that I took
away from the conference isUkraine's drone production
capabilities and how frequentthey are able to update not just
the software and hardware of thedrones in response to new
jamming mechanisms from Russia.
So I think one of the previousGNSI conferences, there was a
panelist that spoke about thereplicator program that the DOD
(30:41):
has, and what I've read recentlyabout about that is that it
hasn't gone as it hasn'tprogressed as fast as it was
hoped. Even though the dronesare being produced, they are
quickly out of date. Once theythey make it off the production
line. So one of the things thatNATO can learn from from Ukraine
(31:05):
is how fast they're producingdrones, how to adapt the
software the drones to withbetter evasion capabilities. And
that's something that I thinkyou know, defense ministries in
all NATO countries and the DODcan definitely learn,
Golfo Alexopoulos (31:24):
I would just add to that, that Russia is a
hostile state, if we accept whatMaria said, that this is, this
is not a new Cold War. It's theCold War, and it just had a
brief period of a briefreprieve, and then it ramped up
again. I do think that Putinviews the West as an enemy. I
(31:47):
think that is I think that thosearound him feel the same way.
Many of his you know the topsecurity officials, maybe not
the broader elite, but certainlythe top security officials
around Putin do believe that.
And so I think that we shouldn'tfool ourselves into thinking
(32:08):
that we're that Putin is goingto become Boris Yeltsin. You
know, he's not. He is who He is.
That's, that's one takeaway.
Another is something that PeterPomerantsev noted in his
discussion about his book aboutgenocide and how we should be
thinking about genocide, I thinkthat this conflict enabled us to
(32:30):
record document and identifyacts of genocide and war crimes
on a scale that we just have notbeen able to in past conflicts.
And so I think that we willlearn from this. We will learn
(32:51):
how Russia wages war and thedegree to which it does not
adhere to the GenevaConventions, I think that that's
also a really big lesson. So Imean, we saw this in Syria.
We've seen Russian behavior inother conflicts, the way that
they deliberately targetcivilians and use terror as a
(33:13):
method of war. But I think thatthat's certainly a lesson that
we take away from from thisconflict,
Sarah Brown (33:24):
yeah, and just to for both of y'all points, it's
not only the democratization ofdrones, it's the democracy,
democratization of informationsystems. You know, when the
invasion of Crimea washappening, you could literally
watch it play out on telegram.
So the way that we are gettingthis information of the war is
(33:47):
completely different than Ithink, has happened in the past.
And what's really beeninteresting is, I think this was
also brought up during Peter'sconversation, was the Civic
information resistance, how it'sa very grassroots process
happening in Ukraine to combatRussian myths and
(34:07):
disinformation. But I thinkanother lesson that the US can
learn is that what we what theUS does on a global stage in
regards to national security andmilitary strategy has ripple
effects. Like I don't thinkanyone could have imagined that
if we pulled away from NATO,that NATO would have the
(34:28):
stronger response and buildtogether. So I think that
there's such a concentration onone event, one conflict at a
time, that there it's oftenignored how they're
interconnected together and howa decision's made from the
withdrawal from Afghanistanshows that Putin can invade
(34:50):
without consequence,
Golfo Alexopoulos (34:56):
right? I think that it's a very
understandable. A concern thatAmericans have about over
extension abroad. It's a totallylegitimate concern, I think that
we just have to also accept thatwhen we pull out, we create
vacuums for bad actors to stepin. And so there's a cost, and
(35:20):
it's, it's a debate that we needto continue to have, because we
want to be engaged, but we don'twant to be overextended, and we
also want to deter bad actors.
So it's, it's a tricky balance.
I
Tad Schnaufer (35:31):
think one of the lessons to take away, what I
would tell policy makers is,let's say we get a piece
tomorrow, there's a cease fire,and we create a DMZ, a
demilitarized zone or something,or we have a line of contact is
created going to golf. Oh, yourpoint is that this doesn't make
Russia a friend. Russia is stillan adversary. So you still have
a conflict, in a sense. It's notan open war, but you still have
a Cold War type scenario. Youhave an adversary who's right on
(35:53):
a border, who's military,aggressive and willing to use
force. So you're really not inthat much better of a situation.
You still need a large militarycomplex, and you need to be able
to deter an attack if you wantto. And for a US policymaker, or
a Western policymaker, a NATOgeneral, whoever it may be, if
you do not want Russia to beaggressive, then you have to
deter that through force, whichwould mean 10s of 1000s of
(36:16):
troops on whatever front line isagreed for, for peace. And think
of it this way. Yes, Putin waswanted Ukraine back into
Russia's fold because ofcultural, historical means. Yes,
he likely wants to shore up hisdomestic support, but he would
not have invaded Ukraine ifthere was 1000s of US and allied
forces there, right? Because itwould have been effective
(36:38):
deterrence. We know this is truebecause even Soviet leaders
didn't invade Europe. When youhave hundreds of 1000s of allied
forces, the US perspective,Western perspective, is it worth
it? You have to make thatdecision. Is it worth it, or is
this just something we're goingto you know, have to sacrifice
because we're not willing tofight for this. And that goes to
how countries define theirinterest. Is this, as Ukraine, a
(36:59):
vital interest for the UnitedStates, meaning you're willing
to fight and possibly, you know,engage in a world war three type
scenario. If it's not, thengoing half measures actually
doesn't help the situation,really, either, which is slow,
incremental, supplying theforce. Yes, it makes the war
last longer, but you're not,you're not getting any political
objective achieved other than astalemate. So you have to, as a
(37:21):
policy maker, what I would tellthem is you have to decide what
you want, and then you're goingto have to make a hard decision,
because if you decide we don'twant Russia to invade anywhere
else in Europe, then you'regoing to need to put 10s of
1000s of troops on the border.
That's the only way that you'regoing to ensure that Russia does
not take aggressive physicalactions. You're still going to
have cyber issues. You're stillgoing to have hybrid threats,
but if you want to stop largescale conventional war, it means
(37:44):
you need to have the ability todeter it. So before we end up
with our last segment of thepodcast, why don't we discuss a
little bit about we had anexcellent panel of student
presenters discussing topicsrelated to the Russian war in
Ukraine. There's a lot oflessons. There a lot of
interesting points. What do youguys think about that panel?
Golfo Alexopoulos (38:04):
So I thought that the panel with the students
was excellent, and I thought inparticular, it was especially
interesting because it shedlight on the conversation that
we were having at the conferenceregarding Russia's war and the
lessons learned. I also thoughtthat there was significant
overall student engagement inthe panel and themes that were
(38:24):
relevant to students. Forexample, Admiral John Kirby
spoke extensively about his timein the White House as National
Security Council spokesperson,and how he got into the field.
What should students take awayfrom that? Quite a few of my
(38:45):
students told me that what, whatAdmiral Kirby said, really made
an impression on on them. So Ithought that that was a hugely
positive moment in theconference. Was when, when John
Kirby was speaking about his owncareer trajectory and what
(39:06):
advice he had for students,yeah,
Yoan G. Hermida (39:09):
on the student presentations as one of the
presenters, I must say that theTED Talk style format was very
engaging. It it was for me as apresenter, it facilitated the
points I needed to make acrossor wanted to make across, much
more than if it had been like,say, a panel discussion. So yes,
(39:32):
kudos to that format. I think itshould be replicated, not just
with students, but maybe infuture conferences with other
presenters. And some of thestudent presentations were very
technical. The gentleman talkingabout the drones, and the
various nomenclatures of thedrones, and how the Iranians
were producing these drones andshipping them to Ukraine, that
was fascinating. And it showedreally a level of expertise in
(39:56):
in his research that was verysurprising in a. Positive way.
Obviously,
Sarah Brown (40:01):
yes, and I'm going to approach the student TED
Talks and research presentationsfrom a different aspect. They
were all phenomenal, yoursincluded. But I think it shows
that GNSI, with the futurestrategist program, is providing
an avenue, or platform, I shouldsay, for students at the
(40:23):
graduate and undergraduate levelto present their research and
areas of interest. And that isso important, especially at a
university, we need to havethese type of opportunities for
our learners, because not onlyis it professional development,
but it also shows the audiencewhat the future policy makers
are thinking, where they'recoming from, what they're
(40:44):
interested in, what, not whattheir belief systems are, but
how are they're going toapproach problems in future
policy issues. So it is we aregoing to have these in future
conferences. The format maychange. It may be different. I
think we did posters one year.
But I think the audience, and Ithink the students really
enjoyed the TED Talkspresentation, and I look forward
(41:05):
to enabling that in the future
Tad Schnaufer (41:10):
well. And to wrap up with that, again, amazing
conference, a lot of greatspeakers, including some of our
students here at USF, to wrapup, if you were to bump into a
policymaker in the hallwaytomorrow that was not at our
conference. How would you whatwould you tell them from the
conference that you know youmiss this and you really need to
look into it, or you miss thislesson learned? And I just want
(41:33):
to highlight that for you. Sowhat do you think from the
conference you would tell apolicy maker if you bumped into
a bumped into them in anelevator or something of that
nature, and you had to give thema quick bite, size, digestible
policy recommendation from theconference to your point.
Yoan G. Hermida (41:47):
Had about the power dynamics in Europe. One of
the lessons that we need tolearn from from not just the
conference, but also theconflict, the ongoing conflict
in Ukraine, is that when the USabandons Europe, bad things
happen, right? We saw it duringthe isolationist period before
the First World War. We saw itin the 20s and 30s. And I don't
(42:10):
think the US should be in aposition or should withdraw the
number of forces that thepresent administration is
talking about. Nor do I thinkthat it sets a good precedent
for the liberal internationalorder, or whatever is left of
it, to cede territory, to Putinor to abandon, quote, unquote,
(42:37):
abandon European allies. I thinkit would be a mistake, and if I
ran into a policymaker, I wouldtell them to, and if they're
part of the administration, Iwould tell them to reverse,
reverse course as quickly asthey can.
Golfo Alexopoulos (42:49):
Yeah, I I think that picking up on that, I
would, I would say thatthat you can't focus on the
China threat without tacklingthe Russia threat as well, and
that those are connected,because these are authoritarian
regimes that have expansionistmotivations and ambitions. And I
(43:10):
think that what we do in Ukrainewill impact Chinese behavior.
China is watching, and if we letUkraine be absorbed by Russia,
well, China will interpret thatas a green light to absorb
Taiwan.
Sarah Brown (43:31):
So if I met a policy maker in the elevator,
what I would try to pitch isit's not it's not a sexy topic,
but it's logistics. It's supplychain and how I know there are
current programs in DOD that aretrying to keep up with the
innovation, especially withdrone technology and software
technology. Yet so much money isgoing into legacy systems, such
(43:53):
as aircraft carriers F 16, sothere needs to be a
hybridization of continuing tobuild up those legacy systems,
but also be innovative at arapid pace, where we can
implement these new technologiesand not lose our competitive
edge in a more kinetic setting.
Tad Schnaufer (44:16):
Excellent, excellent. The point I would
make is that all obviously,we're trying to solve these
tough situations, but the firstquestion we should ask is, how
do we don't how do we not end upin these type of situations? How
do we set the course so that weavoid catastrophes instead of
trying to fix them after they'vestarted? So again, going back to
either effective deterrence, forexample, in war, but also, just
(44:37):
like you would pre stageequipment. You know, we're here
in Florida, we pre stage getready for hurricanes. We're
ready for them when they happen.
We're not waiting for ahurricane to hit and then
figuring it out. Foreign policyneeds to be able to be ahead of
issues and start thinking likethat. But that means going back
to your point of, you know, nonsexy policy. That means having
true either, you know, if we'retrying to just hurt conflict,
having troops staged and. Uh,Korea, for example, for 70
(45:00):
years, and they're just there incase of war. I mean, that's not
adventurous. It's not, you know,you're spending a lot of money.
And the problem with deterrenceas a policy is that you can't
measure how successful it is,other than nothing happens, and
that's a hard policy to sell totaxpayers. Hey, nothing's
happening, so everything's good.
Well, the problem going toSarah's earlier point is it's
(45:23):
not happening in a vacuum. We'repaying for troops around the
world, but at home, our eggprices are going up. Different
things are going up. So it's notall stagnant. And another piece
is that going to golf with yourpoint about you know, they
always tell you, as a leader andleader training, that your
people who are working for youalways you look looking to you.
They're watching you. They'reseeing what you do. Or even you
hear this with parents, right?
You know, your kids are watchingwhat you do. They're taking that
(45:44):
example. But in theinternational stage, it's the
same thing. Signals are beingsent with every action, whether
if it's something you've done,and a country can do something
Latin America, but the worldsees it. It doesn't matter where
it's happening, and they'regoing to make inferences from
that based off of their currentpolicy advisors and their
current information, which will,by definition, be imperfect,
then they'll likely lead them tosub optimal policy. So being
(46:06):
conscious of that is another bigtakeaway I think the conference
taught us. So with all that, Iwant to thank you all so much
for your attendance today and atthe conference, as well as
thoughtful insights. And it wasan amazing conference. Thank you
so much for the support andplanning with it as well and
each of your individualcontributions.
Yoan G. Hermida (46:27):
Thank you.
Thank you. Thank you.
Glenn Beckmann (46:37):
What a great conversation today, as we look
back at Tampa summit five,digging into key observations
and takeaways on the Russia,Ukraine war, which continues to
make headlines as the twocountries, along with leaders
from the US and Europe, continueto work towards a resolution to
the largest land war in Europesince World War Two, a conflict
(46:59):
that has already claimed, bysome estimates, nearly 1 million
casualties in the three yearssince Russia invaded Ukraine,
thanks to our guests today, DrTad schnaufer and Sarah Brown
from GNSI, Dr golfel, AlexApollos from iris and Johan
hermita from the futurestrategist program. Next week on
at the boundary, we're going tokick off a discussion centered
(47:20):
on critical natural and nationalresources, we'll have a special
guest for the podcast as we talkabout increasing global
strategic competition for theseresources, and how countries are
competing and will compete forand secure these resources that
are so critical for thetechnology we all take for
granted in our everyday lives.
We recently published a decisionbrief on this very topic. If
(47:44):
you're so inclined, go check itout on our website. It will make
a great jumping off point fornext week's podcast
that's going to wrap up thisepisode of at the boundary. Each
new episode will feature globaland national security issues we
(48:05):
found to be worthy of discussionand attention. I'm Glenn
Beckman, thanks for listeningtoday. We'll see you next week
at the boundary.
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