September 5, 2025 • 39 mins
Best of B Shifter: The Initial Radio Report
This fan-favorite episode—one of the most downloaded in B Shifter history—dives into what Chief Alan Brunacini called “probably one of the most important communications we transmit throughout an entire incident”: the Initial Radio Report (IRR).
Nick Brunacini and Josh Blum break down why the IRR sets the tone for safety, coordination, and success on the fireground. Using real-world audio, they explore excellent examples from Colerain Township, Ohio, including strong dispatcher interaction, as well as a full IRR, follow-up, and command transfer from the Las Vegas Fire Department.
The episode wraps up with a timeless lesson, as the crew pulls a card from Bruno’s Timeless Tactical Truths deck and unpacks how it applies to today’s incident commanders.
If you want to sharpen your command skills with practical takeaways from the street, this “Best of B Shifter” episode delivers.
Originally aired: October 19, 2021
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:06):
Hello and welcome B-Shifters John Vance here, glad
to have you along.
Today.
We're joined by Nick Brunicini,Josh Bloom and we are talking
about initial radio reports,setting up the incident for
success, painting the picture,giving a good incident action
plan, and we'll even have somereal-life examples today Some
(00:29):
departments out there using BlueCard and using it very
effectively.
Thanks for joining us on thisepisode of B-Shifter.
All right, we're with Nick andJosh and today we are going to
talk about initial radio reportsand the anatomy of a great
initial radio report.
And so often, you know, we'vetalked about when things go
(00:51):
wrong.
Today we're going to talk aboutthings going right and really
setting up an incident forsuccess.
So, josh, where are welistening to this radio report
from?
And give us a little backgroundbefore we actually roll it.
Speaker 3 (01:05):
So the radio report's from Coleraine Township Fire
Department in Ohio and HamiltonCounty medium-sized fire
department.
They've been really engaged indoing blue card for coming up on
a year so they're kind of newinto it but they're fully
engaged, adopted it and trainedeverybody on the basis of what
(01:25):
the program is really built on.
And then they're doing reallygood reviewing, you know,
incidents, not in a punitive waybut just reminding people let's
do better.
Speaker 1 (01:36):
So which is really a part of the continuous
improvement model.
If you want to continuallyimprove.
You've got a good SOG.
You train on it, you apply it,you make those adjustments
through your after actionreviews and then go back to it.
Speaker 3 (01:48):
right, it's a command function really.
I mean we use the commandfunction on the fire ground to
continually review and evaluatewhat's going on and revise our
action.
And then afterwards they'redoing, you know, post incident
reviews and then they talk tothe people and make sure that
they continue to refine it tomake it what they want it to be.
(02:08):
Corwin Township Fire Department.
We all know that theyexperienced a double line of
duty death Brockstrom and Shirafell into the basement.
So they're moving forward nowand doing a lot of things
different and this initial radioreport that we're going to
listen to is just a piece of oneof the things that they're
doing.
I think Chief Pernasini said ita long time ago that the
(02:31):
initial radio report might bethe most important communication
that happens on the fire ground.
So just sets the stage for theincident.
And when we really understandwhat the initial radio report
means and we train everybody onit, it sets the stage for the
entire event.
Speaker 1 (02:45):
All right, so let's go ahead and roll this audio
from Colerain Township, ohio ontheir initial radio report Area
26,.
Speaker 5 (02:54):
District 25,.
Engine 109,.
Engine 25,.
Engine 26,.
Engine 55.
Engine 74.
Medic 26.
Medic 55.
Quint 75.
Quint 78.
Rescue 26.
On Fireground 5.
(03:17):
83-43, jackie's Drive Structure, fire Cross of Linus Drive and
Barthas Place.
8343, jackie's Drive, onFireground 5.
Speaker 6 (03:33):
It's your Corning Township News responding.
On Jackie's Drive.
The additional informationadvises heavy black smoke from
the windows.
They have a black truck parkedin the driveway.
Unknown if there are anyoccupants.
Reference 8343, Jackie's Drive.
Speaker 4 (03:51):
Passerby reporting heavy black smoke from the
windows Engine 26.
We're on scene.
We've got a small two-storyresidential.
Got a working fire Smokeshowing from the second floor,
alpha side, Engine 26, AtlantaSupply Line stretching a hand
line for fire control, searchand rescue.
Speaker 6 (04:11):
We'll have Jackie's command, you're clear on 25.
You're on the scene of a smalltwo-story residential structure
with an obvious working fire,showing the fire on the side, a
Alpha stretching a hand line forinitial fire attack, offering
an offensive strategy, switchingto fire ground 5, 2035.
Speaker 1 (04:31):
All right, that was a great report that we heard from
that arriving company officerand also a great dispatcher on
there too.
That dispatcher picked up thestrategy of what was being
declared, even though thecompany officer didn't come out
and say it was going to beoffensive.
The dispatcher said it andcertainly after the initial
(04:52):
radio report company officercould have come back and
corrected if they were going tobe defensive.
So let's talk a little bitabout this.
You know this radio report, howit's a great example of what
Blue Card is and how it reallysets up the incident for success
.
Speaker 3 (05:09):
I guess I want to just hit on.
That dispatcher was Andy Knapp,who was a dispatch chief in the
county for a long time.
Now he's the director of thewhole dispatch center in the
whole county, dispatchinganybody and everybody who works
in Hamilton County Ohio.
So he's been connected to BlueCard in some form or fashion for
like probably 10 years and it'sinteresting that he was on the
(05:31):
desk that night, you know,filling in and just seeing what
was going on with the dispatchcenter.
And that's what we hear backfrom somebody who's a fully
engaged train dispatcher thatthey repeated it all back and
gave you the sounds like you'regoing to be offensive.
So he said that and then, likeyou said, you know the the
company also had an opportunityto come back and say no, we're,
(05:53):
we're not, but, um, it was agreat initial radio report when
we have an initial radio reportlike that, and I think it's
really good that we point outpositive examples, because so
often we talk about what goeswrong.
Speaker 1 (06:06):
This is definitely an incident where things went
right.
How important is it that westart off the incident like this
?
What we just heard fromColerain.
Speaker 2 (06:16):
It's very important.
Speaker 1 (06:18):
Thank you.
Speaker 2 (06:19):
The initial radio report is your incident action
plan for the incident.
So that's the way we startedoff and that first in arriver
becomes the IC.
They do their size up, justlike happened here, and then
(06:41):
they share that with the rest ofthe response in the form of
initial radio report thatdescribes the current critical
factors and then the actionsthey're taking within the
strategy that they're going tobe utilizing to complete the
tactical priorities, and thenthey take command.
So it sets the stage foreverything that happens after.
So everybody responding in isfully aware of the like
(07:05):
situation status and then what'sgoing on with those first-in
companies.
So that becomes a big deal.
Is a I was a response to for Idon't know, 12, 13, 14 years,
something like that.
When you saw the products ofcombustion on the horizon and
that first unit keyed gettingready to give their initial
radio report, we would shut offall the noisemakers on our rig
(07:29):
so we could hear that.
Because you would know, okay,this is what we got.
And as a BC half the time Iknew, okay, I'm probably not
going to take command when I getthere.
It's based on what they said inthis report.
It's not going to be burningwhen I show up to the scene, or
it's okay, I got to get there asquick as I can, because this is
, I need to take it sooner thanlater, because this thing's
(07:50):
going a different direction.
Just based on the conditionsthey inherited when they got
there.
That becomes a huge deal,especially for you guys, as
you're sitting there, like inyour offices, as senior
executive level people in theorganization.
That's how you figure out oh, Igot to go to this or not.
So it really informs anyonelistening to the radio what the
(08:11):
hell's taking place at theincident scene In real time in
terms we can all understand anddigest, makes sense of very
rapidly.
Speaker 1 (08:20):
Back when our initial radio report was Engine 1's on
the scene, we've got a fire andthen that would be the last
thing you hear from Engine 1.
Nine times out of ten, as aresponse chief, I had to go and
untangle some mess that hadhappened because people were
arriving in freelancing orcritical factors weren't
accounted for or tasks weren'tgetting done like water supply
(08:44):
etc.
So that radio report we justheard let us know exactly what
was going on.
And another critical factor isthe size of the building.
Right when we start looking atresidentials they said it was a
small building.
So what kind of square feet arewe looking at for a small?
Speaker 3 (09:01):
yeah so.
So organizations get to decidereally for themselves what they
call small, medium, large ormega home.
But within the blue card systemwe kind of we kind of give them
a template to say, you know, upto 1500 square feet maybe you
would call that small and thenwe really define and can talk
further about well, what doesthat really mean?
How big are rooms?
(09:23):
Are they divided up?
So it starts to paint a bit ofa picture, especially in your
own response area, like how bigis this place?
And then if we get the mediumand we just say 2,500 square
feet, it paints a little bit ofa different picture, starting to
talk about maybe a little bitmore open air spaces, starting
to talk about vaulted ceilings,maybe attached garages, and then
(09:47):
above that, when we get tolarge, you know maybe 3,500
square feet, up to I don't know4,500 square feet we'll just say
, you know, it's something else,we're starting to maybe get
some, you know, theaters andbasements and multiple void
spaces and attic spaces andmaybe a couple of master suite
bedrooms.
(10:08):
And then above that, you knowwe're talking about the
McMansion things that in my timeI made multiple fires where we
didn't realize that a house hadan indoor swimming pool and it's
like once we realized that wecommunicate, that everybody but
the size of the building startsto tell you some other things
that may be going on there andit just starts to paint that
(10:30):
picture for everybody elsethat's responding in 1500 square
foot house on fire with, withthat radio report that they gave
the first few companiesresponding and can start to put
into their mind what that firstengine may need to support their
operation.
Speaker 2 (10:44):
When we would do classes, when we first started
all this, you would get to thepoint where the first in company
would give an initial radioreport.
And let's say you're doing likea sets and wraps or something
where you got a smaller group,you could stop it and say, okay,
where's the next assignmentgoing to come?
And the group could say this iswhere they're going to send the
(11:07):
second engine.
They're going to do this withthe ladder and like 90% of the
time that's what happened andwithout a preload, they just
said this is the next logicalplace to take it.
So, by virtue of giving aconcise initial radio report,
what it did for me during mycareer, especially when I worked
on a company, is if I was likethird or fourth due and I heard
(11:27):
the radio report you just played, it was like no, I don't want
any part of this.
They're going to put the fireout and I don't want to salvage
these guys fire.
So I'm going to sit on thistruck and behave.
I'm going to stage one time andhopefully they'll finish their
business and then we can go backand wait for the next one.
Now if you're a response chief,it's a different deal.
(11:48):
It's like OK, I think they canhandle this with the line.
So you know, I'm happy.
The second engine is staging,because there's nothing to
freelance into.
So when I get there we'llfigure out what's going on with
who we got staged and if we needthem or what's going to happen
next, out what's going on withwho we got staged and if we need
them or what's going to happennext.
So it really starts to kind ofset the next order of what
(12:12):
you're going to be doing, whichis what a good IAP does, is it
says, okay, this is what we got,this is what I've done so far,
this is the work that needs tobe completed and this is how
that's going to look.
And the more you train togetherand kind of come to agreement
with all that, then you get thewhat just happened here in
Coleraine, where it's like, ohokay, buildings on fire, and we
all can kind of figure outwhat's going to happen next.
Speaker 3 (12:34):
Yeah.
So we we talk about it a lotthat I don't know.
90% of the fires we go to goout with one well-placed hand
line, so in this case the laterarriving companies or the
response chief pulling up.
If they're two or three minutesbehind that first due engine
and it still looks like theinitial radio report, then
something's not working.
So that's one view that wouldrequire one incident action plan
(12:58):
.
But if they pull up and it'sall converted and everything's
looking good, then it's atotally different incident
action plan.
And everything's looking good,then it's a totally different
incident action plan.
So that initial report just setsthe stage for the entire event
and gives us that initialpicture to work from.
From that point forward it'salways either going to get
better or worse.
It's not going to stay the samefor the most part.
(13:19):
So that's that whole piece ofwhy the initial radio report is
so important, why we say what wesay, why we say working fire.
And the guy was very specificon smoke from the second floor.
Well, I mean, just in my mindI'm at a 1,500-square-foot house
smoke from the second floor, a1,500-square-foot house, two
(13:39):
stories, in that part of thecountry.
The bedroom's on the secondfloor, so it's probably in a
bedroom that's 12 by 12 or 12 by14, or a bathroom, or that's
the only living space likely onthe second floor of that home.
Speaker 2 (13:53):
So it just starts to paint a bunch of other pictures
when you mentioned earlier, josh, is you have your first two
area, so you know what buildingsare in it.
So, based on the address thatyou're being dispatched to and
then the report you're getting,you think, okay, this is what
this house looks like when youtalk about vaults or flat
(14:15):
ceilings or basements or the erawhere they were built.
So you guys may mention thecritical factors.
It's all based on the criticalfactors.
Well, those are always changing.
Yeah, I mean, you start in acity and they start with full
dimensional lumber and this isthe way these look when we built
them originally in the 1800s.
(14:35):
And now we're here and it looksdifferent.
So, as those critical factorschange, is you have to change
your fire department, becausethat's what we respond to the
scene to deal with.
So, if we go from old growthlumber to glue and no nails,
that's going to changefirefighting, even the new
(14:56):
science, with how we do searchand rescue in these buildings
where we used to just go in andwe would search the thing as
quickly as we can.
Well, now we've learned that,no, you leave these doors closed
and we're not going to get anyof the can.
Well, now we've learned that,no, you leave these doors closed
and we're not going to get anyof the nasty stuff on anybody on
the other side of them.
So it sets the stage.
The critical factors becomewhat the training director
(15:18):
should be focused on.
This is changing.
We need to incorporate thisbecause our old actions don't
match the new set of conditionsthis because our old actions
don't match the new set ofconditions.
Speaker 1 (15:30):
One of the things that the Coleraine Township SOP
outlines and it's a blue cardSOP pretty much for their
command SOP but they acknowledgein the SOP the difference
between new construction andlegacy construction and they
spell out for their people.
If it's new construction andit's unabated for five minutes
after you get there, you have tothink about your strategy
versus, I believe they say, 20minutes for legacy construction.
(15:52):
So in a lot of our communitiesI've got it all and I'm sure
everybody else has it all.
So it's really interesting tocall that out.
And it's not aone-size-fits-all.
I came into a fire service thatwas one-size-fits-all.
We operated the same on everyfire because we were afforded
that opportunity, not onlybecause of the construction but
the contents within.
But now we don't have thatopportunity, especially with the
(16:14):
newer contents and newerconstruction, and I think they
call it out beautifully andacknowledge that at that
department.
Speaker 7 (16:21):
Fire dispatch engine four, engine four.
Engine four is on scene of asmall one-story house.
We have a working fire.
We're in the alleyway between8th and 7th street.
We're going to be stretchinglines for an offensive uh that
to the charlie side for firecontrol primary.
(16:44):
This will be an offensive fire,all units, level one.
This will be 8th.
Speaker 1 (16:48):
Street Command.
So that's Las Vegas.
Speaker 3 (16:52):
Nevada yeah, so, the city of Las Vegas, nevada Fire
Department.
So they've been really usingthe 2nd Edition of Fire Command
for a long time and it's intheir SOPs and the 8 Functions
of Command and critical factors,that whole region kind of I
don't know 2010, 11, 12, youknow jumped on board and then it
kind of went away and now it'sback.
(17:13):
So they've been fully engagedwith it again for like a year
and they're just working ongetting everybody trained.
Everybody's not even trained atthe fire department, but
they've been sharing some oftheir successes and they're
doing the same thing as Colerain.
They're reviewing their audioand then they just remind people
hey, you didn't say this, wecan do better, and it's.
It's interesting A bunch ofthese places that contact me
(17:34):
with with radio traffic or sharetraffic or share their
experience.
It only takes one or two firesof them having a conversation
with somebody about hey, uh, youdidn't say strategy, just
remember to say that.
Is there anything else you gotto say about it?
They talk about it like one ortwo times and then that company
officer, if they miss something,they're calling their battalion
(17:54):
chief and want to talk about itimmediately.
Oh yeah, I screwed that up.
I didn't, I didn't say this, orI should have said that, or it
would have maybe been better ifI described something more
specifically.
So, again, that's that.
That's that let's revive, let'slet's continue to evaluate and
revise what we're doing and tryto do better and have continuous
(18:17):
improvement.
And you know, these are twoorganizations that are clearly
working on and doing that, youknow, moving forward.
Speaker 1 (18:23):
One of the things that on the initial size up he
also reminded everyone to levelone stage, which we're doing
that a lot in my system onlybecause I have some mutual aid
companies that will not levelone stage.
So we just want to remind themof that.
Let's talk about staging for aminute and the importance
especially after I see numberone gives that IAP what they're
(18:45):
going to do, but they're stillwaiting for a follow-up report
and what those next units aregoing to do in our size up plus
three.
Speaker 3 (18:53):
So on this one, that captain that was riding on that
engine company gave that initialradio report.
You know it was a good frontend, painted a really good
picture, said exactly where theywere because it sounded like
they were, you know between astreet and an alley, and it's
like exactly where they were,because it sounded like they
were, you know between a streetand an alley and it's like
exactly where is this?
Uh, what did really good as faras, like, the offensive
strategy.
And then he said level one, anda piece of that is because
(19:18):
they're working in a responsesystem with multiple agencies
also and it's new, like justreminding everybody, hey, level
one and this was, it was a smallhouse, so just give the
incident commander a minute, andit's not even a minute, but
just give them a minute tofigure out exactly what's going
on so that we have the best planto solve the problem as quickly
(19:38):
as possible.
So on this one, if we play thefollow-up report, we'll hear
some really good informationcome out of it.
Speaker 7 (19:46):
Fire dispatch from command H3.
Command go ahead 360, complete.
This occupancy does have acrawl space.
We're going to be doing atransitional attack on the
Charlie side of the structurewhich is in the alleyway.
We'll remain in the offensivestrategy.
All units continue to level one.
Speaker 1 (20:05):
So with that great follow-up report, um, they talk
about making a transitionalattack, or what we'd call a
quick hit typically, but theyhave transitional in their sops.
I believe they talk about that.
Um, the other thing that hecalls out is the crawl space, um
, so that we know there's ahazard underneath too.
We talk about basements a lot,but crawl spaces also pose a
(20:29):
hazard, so it's good that hecalled that out yeah, I mean
then he goes further to describethe charlie side of the
building.
Speaker 3 (20:36):
Is the alley he's operating on the charlie side?
So I mean he paints a veryclear picture of what's going on
with that.
Um.
So I think everybody everybodyresponding in, you know, knows
what's going on and can reallystart to think about where's
this building sitting, what isthe best way to come into it.
(20:57):
It comes back to our level one,staging procedures, like don't
go past the last street, lasthydrant, the best way to get
into this thing, because it'ssounds like it's sitting not in
a block but in in between acouple of a street, in an alley
or whatever it is, and I'm notfamiliar with exactly where that
is, but without even knowingit's not just sitting on the
(21:19):
street when we hear systems thatand we get new blue card users
where their system reallyself-deploys, auto-deploys,
sop-deploys, however you call it.
Speaker 1 (21:31):
What is the difference between that and what
we're hearing now in Las Vegas,where we level one stage and
wait for our orders based on thecritical fire ground factors
from IC?
Speaker 3 (21:40):
number one, the person that has the most
information at the incident,make decisions to have incoming
resources, help that company tosolve the problem as quickly as
possible because they have themost information, and then they
assign companies to support themto solve and meet all of our
(22:00):
objectives.
So in this case he wasgathering some information, said
he's making a transitionalattack, he's on the Charlie side
, and then there's more audio togo with this that this fire
actually started on the outsideof the battalion and the can
report that, hey, we need to getcompanies in through the alpha
(22:28):
side because it's gone insidethe building from the outside
let's go to that commandtransfer command.
Speaker 8 (22:36):
One command bye.
I've copied.
You completed the 360.
You're an offensive strategyand you're going to be making
entry from the Charlie side.
Eight will be the Alpha side.
If that's correct, I'll goahead and assume command.
Speaker 7 (22:52):
That's correct, Chief .
We have water on the fire.
It appears that this fire didextend into the house.
We're going to need anothercrew to open up on the Alpha
side to help us make entry fromthat point.
There are a few doors on thisCharlie side that we're going to
make access through.
Speaker 8 (23:11):
Hi, copy, just confirming that you're making
access from the Charlie side andyou want another crew on the
alpha side to make entry.
I just don't want opposingattack points.
Speaker 7 (23:22):
Yes, that's correct, Chief.
It looks like this might be aseparate structure that has
extended into the main portionof the house.
Speaker 8 (23:30):
I copy Fire dispatch Retire 1 has assumed command.
It's going to continue with anoffensive strategy.
Speaker 1 (23:38):
All right, let's talk about that command transfer,
because that was very smooth,very blue card and it also
proves that the order modelworks, because there was a
little confusion on command'spart on what actually needs to
happen.
So he did some greatclarification there.
Speaker 2 (23:53):
As IC number two Well , and it sounds like there's OK.
The fire started outside.
It extended in through the backof the building.
We're knocking down the fire onthe outside, we're getting into
the thing.
We need somebody to come infrom the front of this to make
sure it's not burning above orbelow us.
So all of that is in the.
That's his incident action planand so he hands that off to
(24:17):
that BC when they get there.
So now they can manage thisthing from a strategic position
and he's making sense of whatthey're doing in the front and
the back.
During my career level onestaging, I used that more often,
or I didn't use it, it's justthe fire department had that
when I was hired.
So in 1980, level one stage wethought it was normal.
(24:40):
We didn't know any better.
When I promoted up to the chiefranks, you would start to
manage incidents.
To the chief ranks is you wouldstart to manage incidents.
I use level one staging more tokeep the first, the initial
companies there clean so theycould finish what they started
without these other companiesdumping on top of them.
Well, here's an example whereit's like, okay, we've got the
(25:02):
back of it, but we need somebodycoming in the other side to
make sure that we get the fireknocked down above and below.
So there's, in the old daysthey would have just gone
straight to Charlie to try tosteal a line from the first in
engine back there.
Now they have to stage so ICnumber two can say no, no, no,
no, you go to the front and whatwe're going to do is we're
(25:23):
going to complete this incidentoperation, to complete the
tactical priorities and not ourown wish list of the activities
that we want to engage in.
I mean good, bad or otherwise,but yeah, so that's, that's the.
That's the beauty of thecommand transfer is, and as you
(25:45):
sit there and listen to it, youcan tell what the hell is going
on.
And what's going to happen nextIs it's just, it kind of tells
the story of okay, this is wherewe've been and this is where
we're heading.
Speaker 3 (25:55):
That command transfer piece, you know, set the stage
also with, with the can reportthat engine four gave to the
battalion, to all those othercompanies that responding on
that of, hey, this fire isknocked down, we really just
need to get somebody in throughthe alpha side to verify that it
either is or is not inside.
(26:17):
And we're not deploying eight ornine how many ever companies
were dispatched onto thatincident?
At the same time, we're usingour resources to the best of our
ability to solve the problem,based off the critical fire
ground factors and everybodyworking in within a single plan.
That started with that firstnew company officer setting the
stage, with an initial radioreport and the battalion pulling
(26:39):
up and clearly hearing what wasgoing on, cleaning a few pieces
up with what exactly is goingon, what side is what?
Making sure that they weren'tgoing to have opposing hose
lines and running a cleanincident, instead of everybody
just getting there and doingwhatever they want to do.
That that is fun for the day.
And then we use 30 people on anincident that we solved with 10
(27:06):
yeah, I mean that's.
Speaker 2 (27:08):
That's what it gets you is.
I see number two takes over.
There'll be three companies maybe assigned to this incident,
based on what we've listened to,and you've got four that are
going to stage that don't get totake their pike poles in and
spear things with them thatdon't need to be speared.
Speaker 1 (27:28):
One of the critical things on that command transfer
that I think happens and youtalk to guys from Miami or Las
Vegas or a lot of other rapidlygrowing Sunbelt areas is single
family homes that are divided upwith either mother-in-law
apartments or a renter'sapartment.
I know they have that problemin Miami big time and this was
(27:49):
great.
Speaker 3 (27:49):
On the Charlie side, Engine four calls it out and
says this might be two differentoccupancies, which lets
everybody else know if you makeentry from the alpha side you
may not get to the back of thehouse, which is why we do 360,
so we get a 360 degree view ofexactly what's going on, so we
can solve the problem to thebest of our ability with the
(28:10):
most information, instead ofexactly what you said, which the
standard approach of we lay aline, we go through the front
door and then it's like, well,it's not here and uh, I think it
was Homewood, illinois, it wastwo separate occupancy spaces
and it was that fire resulted ina line of duty death or maybe a
double on duty death.
(28:30):
I think that that went inthrough the alpha side and the
victim was on the Charlie side,in a separate occupancy space,
and things just didn't go welland they just didn't see the
whole big picture of exactlywhat was going on.
Because it's what we hear a lot, it's just what we do.
We really get paid to makedecisions and be thinking
(28:55):
firefighters, company officers,chiefs and be professional.
Speaker 1 (28:59):
And also to add on to the occupancy being split up.
That's not just for olderoccupancies, because we see
those modified all the time.
The trend right now in newhousing is multi-generational
housing, so you will get adifferent unit that might be an
in-law apartment that was builtthat way by the builder and they
may or may not have a separateentrance.
(29:19):
A lot of times the entrance isoff of a garage, a third garage
stall.
So we are looking at housesright now that are
non-traditional houses and arenon-traditional time that we're
in.
So you've got to be aware ofall of that and that's why the
360 is so important.
Speaker 2 (29:34):
Well, the other part of that is your critical factors
.
You really learn them for fireson EMS calls.
So you go into these structuresand occupancies all day long on
calls and it's mostly EMS innature.
We're not dragging attack lines, but that's where you figure
out, oh, where this is how thisis set up.
(29:55):
So that's the other part of thesystem.
As you're going to.
Uh, what you do is going to bebased on the critical factors in
your community.
So in this one it's like, okay,there may be like an occupancy
front and back.
You go to a place like woosterand like, no, we don't have them
like that, we have thesedeckers.
(30:15):
And so every part of thecountry has a little something
different based on what theystarted with.
But it seems like the trend isgoing to.
New constructions all start tolook more like, no matter where
you go.
I mean, you can be in LosAngeles or you could be in
Kansas City, or you could be inthe East Coast and if it's a
(30:36):
city block apartment with retailon the bottom, they're all 99%
the same thing.
We got to make sense of that.
When we get to the scene ofwhatever's on fire, is this an
old small thing, an old bigthing, a brand new thing.
So it's just being familiarwith where you work, I guess, is
the simplest way about it.
Speaker 3 (30:59):
That initial radio report.
You know it's one of our slidesthat we use that when we pull
up we have standard conditions,which the standard conditions
are simply the critical fireground factor.
So that small two-story houseis much different than the what
Nick said, the five-story woodframe on top of a concrete
platform commercial area.
We're going to deploy different.
(31:20):
We're going to do somethingdifferent.
I mean, we're even going to dosomething different when the
standard conditions are.
We gave a size up smoke's comingfrom the second floor window.
We're doing a 360, and I get tothe Charlie side and there's a
victim hanging out the windowwith their kid.
It changes it up a little bit.
What are we going to do?
Well, we're going to do what wehave to do to solve the problem
(31:41):
.
So our incident action plan isgoing to be a little bit
different then than if thevictim wasn't hanging out the
window.
So when we have those standardconditions, we take some sort of
a standard action to solve thatproblem.
So we have that standardoutcome.
So I mean, we talk about that alot and we get to that.
We get to there by using thestrategic decision-making model.
It really walks us down thatpath of how do we get some
(32:05):
standard outcomes and it helpsus develop the incident action
plan.
What is our strategy so that wesolve the problem as quickly as
possible, without keeping,without getting ourselves into
into trouble?
Speaker 1 (32:20):
All right.
Well, kudos to the Las Vegasfire department and Coleraine
township fire department.
I mean they both have greatinitial radio reports that we
can all learn a little something.
And if you're interested insharing our contact information
in the show notes and we'd loveto have your initial radio
report on here too.
And before we wrap up thisepisode, let's check in with a
(32:44):
timeless tactical truth.
Of course we have these uh niceplaying cards available from b
shifter at some point and, uh,they're all of bruno's timeless
tactical.
So we're going to shuffle thedeck and we're going to randomly
pull out a card after shufflingthe deck and Nick and Josh are
going to check in on this one.
Okay, this one, the five ofhearts and it says responding
(33:09):
ranking officers or supervisorsnot on the scene should stay off
the radio unless they havecritical supporting information
that could help the current IC.
Let's talk about that one alittle bit, because we hear
oftentimes people getting on theradio and starting to either
give orders or make decisions,and they're not even on the
(33:31):
scene.
Speaker 2 (33:31):
It's not effective.
Speaker 1 (33:33):
No.
Speaker 2 (33:34):
At all.
Speaker 3 (33:35):
So the person with the most information is the
person that's there on the scene.
It's not effective, no at all.
So the person with the mostinformation is the person that's
there on the scene.
So all you're really doing isdisrupting the incident
commanders incident action planby trying to throw in your two
cents about whatever it is, andthere may be a time and a place
for it.
If you heard something thatmaybe somebody else didn't hear,
but other other than that,there's no reason for somebody
(33:57):
who's responding, not on thescene, to get on the radio and
interact with the incidentcommander of where you would get
on the radio ahead of beingthere is when the responding
(34:17):
chief let's say IC number onegets there, they give an initial
radio report.
Speaker 2 (34:28):
They describe an incident that's going to require
more resources, let's say, andthen just the conditions that
you're seeing as you'reresponding would validate that.
Sometimes they will clear alarmand request the next assignment
without being the IC.
Now we did some podcasts theother day and the dispatch
(34:49):
center came back and did thatwhere it was like you have just
described something where you'renot going to be able to do that
with the five units you have onthis dispatch.
So do you want some more?
And usually they'll say yes.
But I think the way you youeliminate that is through
training and saying this is what.
This is how you match the levelof resource you need, what
(35:11):
you're looking at when you getthere.
Speaker 1 (35:19):
I know I've been inbound before to a call and
you're getting a bad feelingabout what's going on.
But I've always resisted thetemptation to get on the radio
and start taking command whileyou're still rolling in.
And I've heard that done beforeand all that does is it seems
to mess up the scene even morebecause that IC number two,
who's not even there, doesn'thave the critical fire ground
factors.
They haven't done a standardcommand transfer.
They've got no can reports fromanybody.
(35:40):
They're just doing that solelyon the fact that it sounds like
the situation's out of control.
But they don't really know.
But it's that temptation thatchief officers have to.
I've got to get on, I've got totake care of this, but it never
really seems to help.
Speaker 2 (35:57):
You know, because it disrupts, it turns everything on
its head.
So in those cases, let's sayyou're two minutes away from the
scene why would you even dothat at that point?
Because I'm going to get thereand if you take command before
you get there, it's going totake you 10 minutes to figure
out what's going on the next 10minutes.
If you wait two minutes, it'sgoing to take you about four
minutes to figure out what'sgoing on the next 10 minutes.
If you wait two minutes, it'sgoing to take you about four
(36:18):
minutes to figure out what'sgoing on.
Because you're going to do acommand transfer with the ic
number one and they're going toat least inform you of what's
going on in their world, whichwill at least ic number two has
some information to base thetransfer on you had an incident
that you talked about before.
Speaker 1 (36:35):
Where you arrived, the, you had interior companies
but you waited until you gotthere on the scene.
But you immediately pulled theplug on offensive operations.
It was like in a strip mallwith a liquor store type of
thing, and shortly after youpulled everybody out there was a
collapse.
But you were on the scene whenyou did that.
You weren't inbound, but you'reprobably getting some
(36:55):
information.
Speaker 2 (36:56):
Well, and that was while you were en route.
Well, you're listening to theradio and what's going on, and
then you're looking at theconditions and then, when you
get there and you see, oh my god, well, there's, it's easy.
At that point it's hey,battalion three's on the scene
give me emergency traffic, andthen you just take it over from
there.
It's a, I'm changing thestrategy, we're going defensive,
(37:17):
everybody out, I'm command.
So see, but that system wasdesigned around having a BC to
the scene within the first fiveminutes of that incident taking
place.
Speaker 1 (37:31):
And if you're in a system where you can't provide a
BC in the first five minutes,you have to make those
adjustments.
Yeah, so if you're in a systemwhere you can't provide a BC in
the first five minutes, you haveto make those adjustments.
Speaker 3 (37:37):
Yeah, so if you're in a system where you're not
getting that BC that's outsidesitting in a car in the first
five, six, seven minutes,somebody has to be in that
position.
So whether well you just thatinitial arriving IC just has to
step outside the building, whichthat's really hard to do
(37:57):
because we lose total track oftime when we cross that
threshold and go into the IDLHenvironment.
Speaker 1 (38:04):
And having IC number ones trained to the appropriate
level really helps eliminate anyof the need to do that anyway.
Speaker 2 (38:11):
Really, my experience through my career is IC number
one solved the problem over halfthe time.
In fact I got to the point as aresponse chief I'm going to be
the first one to the scene.
Are we going to be the IC inthis one or not?
And you know, you'd kind offigure that out when you got
there and think no, ic numberone took care of everything.
There's nothing for me to doexcept support the current IC.
(38:34):
So I supported by leaving themin command and finishing the
operation off.
Speaker 1 (38:39):
And that wraps up this episode of B Shifter.
Thanks so much for joining ustoday.
If you have any comments foreither Nick, josh or myself, you
can check out the show notes.
That's where you will find ourcontact information and, if you
like this, please rate theepisode highly.
Share it with a friend.
Help us get the word out Untilnext time.
(39:01):
Thanks so much for listeningand being with us and please be
safe.
Hello and welcome B-Shifters John Vance here, glad
to have you along.
Today.
We're joined by Nick Brunicini,Josh Bloom and we are talking
about initial radio reports,setting up the incident for
success, painting the picture,giving a good incident action
plan, and we'll even have somereal-life examples today Some
(00:29):
departments out there using BlueCard and using it very
effectively.
Thanks for joining us on thisepisode of B-Shifter.
All right, we're with Nick andJosh and today we are going to
talk about initial radio reportsand the anatomy of a great
initial radio report.
And so often, you know, we'vetalked about when things go
(00:51):
wrong.
Today we're going to talk aboutthings going right and really
setting up an incident forsuccess.
So, josh, where are welistening to this radio report
from?
And give us a little backgroundbefore we actually roll it.
Speaker 3 (01:05):
So the radio report's from Coleraine Township Fire
Department in Ohio and HamiltonCounty medium-sized fire
department.
They've been really engaged indoing blue card for coming up on
a year so they're kind of newinto it but they're fully
engaged, adopted it and trainedeverybody on the basis of what
(01:25):
the program is really built on.
And then they're doing reallygood reviewing, you know,
incidents, not in a punitive waybut just reminding people let's
do better.
Speaker 1 (01:36):
So which is really a part of the continuous
improvement model.
If you want to continuallyimprove.
You've got a good SOG.
You train on it, you apply it,you make those adjustments
through your after actionreviews and then go back to it.
Speaker 3 (01:48):
right, it's a command function really.
I mean we use the commandfunction on the fire ground to
continually review and evaluatewhat's going on and revise our
action.
And then afterwards they'redoing, you know, post incident
reviews and then they talk tothe people and make sure that
they continue to refine it tomake it what they want it to be.
(02:08):
Corwin Township Fire Department.
We all know that theyexperienced a double line of
duty death Brockstrom and Shirafell into the basement.
So they're moving forward nowand doing a lot of things
different and this initial radioreport that we're going to
listen to is just a piece of oneof the things that they're
doing.
I think Chief Pernasini said ita long time ago that the
(02:31):
initial radio report might bethe most important communication
that happens on the fire ground.
So just sets the stage for theincident.
And when we really understandwhat the initial radio report
means and we train everybody onit, it sets the stage for the
entire event.
Speaker 1 (02:45):
All right, so let's go ahead and roll this audio
from Colerain Township, ohio ontheir initial radio report Area
26,.
Speaker 5 (02:54):
District 25,.
Engine 109,.
Engine 25,.
Engine 26,.
Engine 55.
Engine 74.
Medic 26.
Medic 55.
Quint 75.
Quint 78.
Rescue 26.
On Fireground 5.
(03:17):
83-43, jackie's Drive Structure, fire Cross of Linus Drive and
Barthas Place.
8343, jackie's Drive, onFireground 5.
Speaker 6 (03:33):
It's your Corning Township News responding.
On Jackie's Drive.
The additional informationadvises heavy black smoke from
the windows.
They have a black truck parkedin the driveway.
Unknown if there are anyoccupants.
Reference 8343, Jackie's Drive.
Speaker 4 (03:51):
Passerby reporting heavy black smoke from the
windows Engine 26.
We're on scene.
We've got a small two-storyresidential.
Got a working fire Smokeshowing from the second floor,
alpha side, Engine 26, AtlantaSupply Line stretching a hand
line for fire control, searchand rescue.
Speaker 6 (04:11):
We'll have Jackie's command, you're clear on 25.
You're on the scene of a smalltwo-story residential structure
with an obvious working fire,showing the fire on the side, a
Alpha stretching a hand line forinitial fire attack, offering
an offensive strategy, switchingto fire ground 5, 2035.
Speaker 1 (04:31):
All right, that was a great report that we heard from
that arriving company officerand also a great dispatcher on
there too.
That dispatcher picked up thestrategy of what was being
declared, even though thecompany officer didn't come out
and say it was going to beoffensive.
The dispatcher said it andcertainly after the initial
(04:52):
radio report company officercould have come back and
corrected if they were going tobe defensive.
So let's talk a little bitabout this.
You know this radio report, howit's a great example of what
Blue Card is and how it reallysets up the incident for success
.
Speaker 3 (05:09):
I guess I want to just hit on.
That dispatcher was Andy Knapp,who was a dispatch chief in the
county for a long time.
Now he's the director of thewhole dispatch center in the
whole county, dispatchinganybody and everybody who works
in Hamilton County Ohio.
So he's been connected to BlueCard in some form or fashion for
like probably 10 years and it'sinteresting that he was on the
(05:31):
desk that night, you know,filling in and just seeing what
was going on with the dispatchcenter.
And that's what we hear backfrom somebody who's a fully
engaged train dispatcher thatthey repeated it all back and
gave you the sounds like you'regoing to be offensive.
So he said that and then, likeyou said, you know the the
company also had an opportunityto come back and say no, we're,
(05:53):
we're not, but, um, it was agreat initial radio report when
we have an initial radio reportlike that, and I think it's
really good that we point outpositive examples, because so
often we talk about what goeswrong.
Speaker 1 (06:06):
This is definitely an incident where things went
right.
How important is it that westart off the incident like this
?
What we just heard fromColerain.
Speaker 2 (06:16):
It's very important.
Speaker 1 (06:18):
Thank you.
Speaker 2 (06:19):
The initial radio report is your incident action
plan for the incident.
So that's the way we startedoff and that first in arriver
becomes the IC.
They do their size up, justlike happened here, and then
(06:41):
they share that with the rest ofthe response in the form of
initial radio report thatdescribes the current critical
factors and then the actionsthey're taking within the
strategy that they're going tobe utilizing to complete the
tactical priorities, and thenthey take command.
So it sets the stage foreverything that happens after.
So everybody responding in isfully aware of the like
(07:05):
situation status and then what'sgoing on with those first-in
companies.
So that becomes a big deal.
Is a I was a response to for Idon't know, 12, 13, 14 years,
something like that.
When you saw the products ofcombustion on the horizon and
that first unit keyed gettingready to give their initial
radio report, we would shut offall the noisemakers on our rig
(07:29):
so we could hear that.
Because you would know, okay,this is what we got.
And as a BC half the time Iknew, okay, I'm probably not
going to take command when I getthere.
It's based on what they said inthis report.
It's not going to be burningwhen I show up to the scene, or
it's okay, I got to get there asquick as I can, because this is
, I need to take it sooner thanlater, because this thing's
(07:50):
going a different direction.
Just based on the conditionsthey inherited when they got
there.
That becomes a huge deal,especially for you guys, as
you're sitting there, like inyour offices, as senior
executive level people in theorganization.
That's how you figure out oh, Igot to go to this or not.
So it really informs anyonelistening to the radio what the
(08:11):
hell's taking place at theincident scene In real time in
terms we can all understand anddigest, makes sense of very
rapidly.
Speaker 1 (08:20):
Back when our initial radio report was Engine 1's on
the scene, we've got a fire andthen that would be the last
thing you hear from Engine 1.
Nine times out of ten, as aresponse chief, I had to go and
untangle some mess that hadhappened because people were
arriving in freelancing orcritical factors weren't
accounted for or tasks weren'tgetting done like water supply
(08:44):
etc.
So that radio report we justheard let us know exactly what
was going on.
And another critical factor isthe size of the building.
Right when we start looking atresidentials they said it was a
small building.
So what kind of square feet arewe looking at for a small?
Speaker 3 (09:01):
yeah so.
So organizations get to decidereally for themselves what they
call small, medium, large ormega home.
But within the blue card systemwe kind of we kind of give them
a template to say, you know, upto 1500 square feet maybe you
would call that small and thenwe really define and can talk
further about well, what doesthat really mean?
How big are rooms?
(09:23):
Are they divided up?
So it starts to paint a bit ofa picture, especially in your
own response area, like how bigis this place?
And then if we get the mediumand we just say 2,500 square
feet, it paints a little bit ofa different picture, starting to
talk about maybe a little bitmore open air spaces, starting
to talk about vaulted ceilings,maybe attached garages, and then
(09:47):
above that, when we get tolarge, you know maybe 3,500
square feet, up to I don't know4,500 square feet we'll just say
, you know, it's something else,we're starting to maybe get
some, you know, theaters andbasements and multiple void
spaces and attic spaces andmaybe a couple of master suite
bedrooms.
(10:08):
And then above that, you knowwe're talking about the
McMansion things that in my timeI made multiple fires where we
didn't realize that a house hadan indoor swimming pool and it's
like once we realized that wecommunicate, that everybody but
the size of the building startsto tell you some other things
that may be going on there andit just starts to paint that
(10:30):
picture for everybody elsethat's responding in 1500 square
foot house on fire with, withthat radio report that they gave
the first few companiesresponding and can start to put
into their mind what that firstengine may need to support their
operation.
Speaker 2 (10:44):
When we would do classes, when we first started
all this, you would get to thepoint where the first in company
would give an initial radioreport.
And let's say you're doing likea sets and wraps or something
where you got a smaller group,you could stop it and say, okay,
where's the next assignmentgoing to come?
And the group could say this iswhere they're going to send the
(11:07):
second engine.
They're going to do this withthe ladder and like 90% of the
time that's what happened andwithout a preload, they just
said this is the next logicalplace to take it.
So, by virtue of giving aconcise initial radio report,
what it did for me during mycareer, especially when I worked
on a company, is if I was likethird or fourth due and I heard
(11:27):
the radio report you just played, it was like no, I don't want
any part of this.
They're going to put the fireout and I don't want to salvage
these guys fire.
So I'm going to sit on thistruck and behave.
I'm going to stage one time andhopefully they'll finish their
business and then we can go backand wait for the next one.
Now if you're a response chief,it's a different deal.
(11:48):
It's like OK, I think they canhandle this with the line.
So you know, I'm happy.
The second engine is staging,because there's nothing to
freelance into.
So when I get there we'llfigure out what's going on with
who we got staged and if we needthem or what's going to happen
next, out what's going on withwho we got staged and if we need
them or what's going to happennext.
So it really starts to kind ofset the next order of what
(12:12):
you're going to be doing, whichis what a good IAP does, is it
says, okay, this is what we got,this is what I've done so far,
this is the work that needs tobe completed and this is how
that's going to look.
And the more you train togetherand kind of come to agreement
with all that, then you get thewhat just happened here in
Coleraine, where it's like, ohokay, buildings on fire, and we
all can kind of figure outwhat's going to happen next.
Speaker 3 (12:34):
Yeah.
So we we talk about it a lotthat I don't know.
90% of the fires we go to goout with one well-placed hand
line, so in this case the laterarriving companies or the
response chief pulling up.
If they're two or three minutesbehind that first due engine
and it still looks like theinitial radio report, then
something's not working.
So that's one view that wouldrequire one incident action plan
(12:58):
.
But if they pull up and it'sall converted and everything's
looking good, then it's atotally different incident
action plan.
And everything's looking good,then it's a totally different
incident action plan.
So that initial report just setsthe stage for the entire event
and gives us that initialpicture to work from.
From that point forward it'salways either going to get
better or worse.
It's not going to stay the samefor the most part.
(13:19):
So that's that whole piece ofwhy the initial radio report is
so important, why we say what wesay, why we say working fire.
And the guy was very specificon smoke from the second floor.
Well, I mean, just in my mindI'm at a 1,500-square-foot house
smoke from the second floor, a1,500-square-foot house, two
(13:39):
stories, in that part of thecountry.
The bedroom's on the secondfloor, so it's probably in a
bedroom that's 12 by 12 or 12 by14, or a bathroom, or that's
the only living space likely onthe second floor of that home.
Speaker 2 (13:53):
So it just starts to paint a bunch of other pictures
when you mentioned earlier, josh, is you have your first two
area, so you know what buildingsare in it.
So, based on the address thatyou're being dispatched to and
then the report you're getting,you think, okay, this is what
this house looks like when youtalk about vaults or flat
(14:15):
ceilings or basements or the erawhere they were built.
So you guys may mention thecritical factors.
It's all based on the criticalfactors.
Well, those are always changing.
Yeah, I mean, you start in acity and they start with full
dimensional lumber and this isthe way these look when we built
them originally in the 1800s.
(14:35):
And now we're here and it looksdifferent.
So, as those critical factorschange, is you have to change
your fire department, becausethat's what we respond to the
scene to deal with.
So, if we go from old growthlumber to glue and no nails,
that's going to changefirefighting, even the new
(14:56):
science, with how we do searchand rescue in these buildings
where we used to just go in andwe would search the thing as
quickly as we can.
Well, now we've learned that,no, you leave these doors closed
and we're not going to get anyof the can.
Well, now we've learned that,no, you leave these doors closed
and we're not going to get anyof the nasty stuff on anybody on
the other side of them.
So it sets the stage.
The critical factors becomewhat the training director
(15:18):
should be focused on.
This is changing.
We need to incorporate thisbecause our old actions don't
match the new set of conditionsthis because our old actions
don't match the new set ofconditions.
Speaker 1 (15:30):
One of the things that the Coleraine Township SOP
outlines and it's a blue cardSOP pretty much for their
command SOP but they acknowledgein the SOP the difference
between new construction andlegacy construction and they
spell out for their people.
If it's new construction andit's unabated for five minutes
after you get there, you have tothink about your strategy
versus, I believe they say, 20minutes for legacy construction.
(15:52):
So in a lot of our communitiesI've got it all and I'm sure
everybody else has it all.
So it's really interesting tocall that out.
And it's not aone-size-fits-all.
I came into a fire service thatwas one-size-fits-all.
We operated the same on everyfire because we were afforded
that opportunity, not onlybecause of the construction but
the contents within.
But now we don't have thatopportunity, especially with the
(16:14):
newer contents and newerconstruction, and I think they
call it out beautifully andacknowledge that at that
department.
Speaker 7 (16:21):
Fire dispatch engine four, engine four.
Engine four is on scene of asmall one-story house.
We have a working fire.
We're in the alleyway between8th and 7th street.
We're going to be stretchinglines for an offensive uh that
to the charlie side for firecontrol primary.
(16:44):
This will be an offensive fire,all units, level one.
This will be 8th.
Speaker 1 (16:48):
Street Command.
So that's Las Vegas.
Speaker 3 (16:52):
Nevada yeah, so, the city of Las Vegas, nevada Fire
Department.
So they've been really usingthe 2nd Edition of Fire Command
for a long time and it's intheir SOPs and the 8 Functions
of Command and critical factors,that whole region kind of I
don't know 2010, 11, 12, youknow jumped on board and then it
kind of went away and now it'sback.
(17:13):
So they've been fully engagedwith it again for like a year
and they're just working ongetting everybody trained.
Everybody's not even trained atthe fire department, but
they've been sharing some oftheir successes and they're
doing the same thing as Colerain.
They're reviewing their audioand then they just remind people
hey, you didn't say this, wecan do better, and it's.
It's interesting A bunch ofthese places that contact me
(17:34):
with with radio traffic or sharetraffic or share their
experience.
It only takes one or two firesof them having a conversation
with somebody about hey, uh, youdidn't say strategy, just
remember to say that.
Is there anything else you gotto say about it?
They talk about it like one ortwo times and then that company
officer, if they miss something,they're calling their battalion
(17:54):
chief and want to talk about itimmediately.
Oh yeah, I screwed that up.
I didn't, I didn't say this, orI should have said that, or it
would have maybe been better ifI described something more
specifically.
So, again, that's that.
That's that let's revive, let'slet's continue to evaluate and
revise what we're doing and tryto do better and have continuous
(18:17):
improvement.
And you know, these are twoorganizations that are clearly
working on and doing that, youknow, moving forward.
Speaker 1 (18:23):
One of the things that on the initial size up he
also reminded everyone to levelone stage, which we're doing
that a lot in my system onlybecause I have some mutual aid
companies that will not levelone stage.
So we just want to remind themof that.
Let's talk about staging for aminute and the importance
especially after I see numberone gives that IAP what they're
(18:45):
going to do, but they're stillwaiting for a follow-up report
and what those next units aregoing to do in our size up plus
three.
Speaker 3 (18:53):
So on this one, that captain that was riding on that
engine company gave that initialradio report.
You know it was a good frontend, painted a really good
picture, said exactly where theywere because it sounded like
they were, you know between astreet and an alley, and it's
like exactly where they were,because it sounded like they
were, you know between a streetand an alley and it's like
exactly where is this?
Uh, what did really good as faras, like, the offensive
strategy.
And then he said level one, anda piece of that is because
(19:18):
they're working in a responsesystem with multiple agencies
also and it's new, like justreminding everybody, hey, level
one and this was, it was a smallhouse, so just give the
incident commander a minute, andit's not even a minute, but
just give them a minute tofigure out exactly what's going
on so that we have the best planto solve the problem as quickly
(19:38):
as possible.
So on this one, if we play thefollow-up report, we'll hear
some really good informationcome out of it.
Speaker 7 (19:46):
Fire dispatch from command H3.
Command go ahead 360, complete.
This occupancy does have acrawl space.
We're going to be doing atransitional attack on the
Charlie side of the structurewhich is in the alleyway.
We'll remain in the offensivestrategy.
All units continue to level one.
Speaker 1 (20:05):
So with that great follow-up report, um, they talk
about making a transitionalattack, or what we'd call a
quick hit typically, but theyhave transitional in their sops.
I believe they talk about that.
Um, the other thing that hecalls out is the crawl space, um
, so that we know there's ahazard underneath too.
We talk about basements a lot,but crawl spaces also pose a
(20:29):
hazard, so it's good that hecalled that out yeah, I mean
then he goes further to describethe charlie side of the
building.
Speaker 3 (20:36):
Is the alley he's operating on the charlie side?
So I mean he paints a veryclear picture of what's going on
with that.
Um.
So I think everybody everybodyresponding in, you know, knows
what's going on and can reallystart to think about where's
this building sitting, what isthe best way to come into it.
(20:57):
It comes back to our level one,staging procedures, like don't
go past the last street, lasthydrant, the best way to get
into this thing, because it'ssounds like it's sitting not in
a block but in in between acouple of a street, in an alley
or whatever it is, and I'm notfamiliar with exactly where that
is, but without even knowingit's not just sitting on the
(21:19):
street when we hear systems thatand we get new blue card users
where their system reallyself-deploys, auto-deploys,
sop-deploys, however you call it.
Speaker 1 (21:31):
What is the difference between that and what
we're hearing now in Las Vegas,where we level one stage and
wait for our orders based on thecritical fire ground factors
from IC?
Speaker 3 (21:40):
number one, the person that has the most
information at the incident,make decisions to have incoming
resources, help that company tosolve the problem as quickly as
possible because they have themost information, and then they
assign companies to support themto solve and meet all of our
(22:00):
objectives.
So in this case he wasgathering some information, said
he's making a transitionalattack, he's on the Charlie side
, and then there's more audio togo with this that this fire
actually started on the outsideof the battalion and the can
report that, hey, we need to getcompanies in through the alpha
(22:28):
side because it's gone insidethe building from the outside
let's go to that commandtransfer command.
Speaker 8 (22:36):
One command bye.
I've copied.
You completed the 360.
You're an offensive strategyand you're going to be making
entry from the Charlie side.
Eight will be the Alpha side.
If that's correct, I'll goahead and assume command.
Speaker 7 (22:52):
That's correct, Chief .
We have water on the fire.
It appears that this fire didextend into the house.
We're going to need anothercrew to open up on the Alpha
side to help us make entry fromthat point.
There are a few doors on thisCharlie side that we're going to
make access through.
Speaker 8 (23:11):
Hi, copy, just confirming that you're making
access from the Charlie side andyou want another crew on the
alpha side to make entry.
I just don't want opposingattack points.
Speaker 7 (23:22):
Yes, that's correct, Chief.
It looks like this might be aseparate structure that has
extended into the main portionof the house.
Speaker 8 (23:30):
I copy Fire dispatch Retire 1 has assumed command.
It's going to continue with anoffensive strategy.
Speaker 1 (23:38):
All right, let's talk about that command transfer,
because that was very smooth,very blue card and it also
proves that the order modelworks, because there was a
little confusion on command'spart on what actually needs to
happen.
So he did some greatclarification there.
Speaker 2 (23:53):
As IC number two Well , and it sounds like there's OK.
The fire started outside.
It extended in through the backof the building.
We're knocking down the fire onthe outside, we're getting into
the thing.
We need somebody to come infrom the front of this to make
sure it's not burning above orbelow us.
So all of that is in the.
That's his incident action planand so he hands that off to
(24:17):
that BC when they get there.
So now they can manage thisthing from a strategic position
and he's making sense of whatthey're doing in the front and
the back.
During my career level onestaging, I used that more often,
or I didn't use it, it's justthe fire department had that
when I was hired.
So in 1980, level one stage wethought it was normal.
(24:40):
We didn't know any better.
When I promoted up to the chiefranks, you would start to
manage incidents.
To the chief ranks is you wouldstart to manage incidents.
I use level one staging more tokeep the first, the initial
companies there clean so theycould finish what they started
without these other companiesdumping on top of them.
Well, here's an example whereit's like, okay, we've got the
(25:02):
back of it, but we need somebodycoming in the other side to
make sure that we get the fireknocked down above and below.
So there's, in the old daysthey would have just gone
straight to Charlie to try tosteal a line from the first in
engine back there.
Now they have to stage so ICnumber two can say no, no, no,
no, you go to the front and whatwe're going to do is we're
(25:23):
going to complete this incidentoperation, to complete the
tactical priorities and not ourown wish list of the activities
that we want to engage in.
I mean good, bad or otherwise,but yeah, so that's, that's the.
That's the beauty of thecommand transfer is, and as you
(25:45):
sit there and listen to it, youcan tell what the hell is going
on.
And what's going to happen nextIs it's just, it kind of tells
the story of okay, this is wherewe've been and this is where
we're heading.
Speaker 3 (25:55):
That command transfer piece, you know, set the stage
also with, with the can reportthat engine four gave to the
battalion, to all those othercompanies that responding on
that of, hey, this fire isknocked down, we really just
need to get somebody in throughthe alpha side to verify that it
either is or is not inside.
(26:17):
And we're not deploying eight ornine how many ever companies
were dispatched onto thatincident?
At the same time, we're usingour resources to the best of our
ability to solve the problem,based off the critical fire
ground factors and everybodyworking in within a single plan.
That started with that firstnew company officer setting the
stage, with an initial radioreport and the battalion pulling
(26:39):
up and clearly hearing what wasgoing on, cleaning a few pieces
up with what exactly is goingon, what side is what?
Making sure that they weren'tgoing to have opposing hose
lines and running a cleanincident, instead of everybody
just getting there and doingwhatever they want to do.
That that is fun for the day.
And then we use 30 people on anincident that we solved with 10
(27:06):
yeah, I mean that's.
Speaker 2 (27:08):
That's what it gets you is.
I see number two takes over.
There'll be three companies maybe assigned to this incident,
based on what we've listened to,and you've got four that are
going to stage that don't get totake their pike poles in and
spear things with them thatdon't need to be speared.
Speaker 1 (27:28):
One of the critical things on that command transfer
that I think happens and youtalk to guys from Miami or Las
Vegas or a lot of other rapidlygrowing Sunbelt areas is single
family homes that are divided upwith either mother-in-law
apartments or a renter'sapartment.
I know they have that problemin Miami big time and this was
(27:49):
great.
Speaker 3 (27:49):
On the Charlie side, Engine four calls it out and
says this might be two differentoccupancies, which lets
everybody else know if you makeentry from the alpha side you
may not get to the back of thehouse, which is why we do 360,
so we get a 360 degree view ofexactly what's going on, so we
can solve the problem to thebest of our ability with the
(28:10):
most information, instead ofexactly what you said, which the
standard approach of we lay aline, we go through the front
door and then it's like, well,it's not here and uh, I think it
was Homewood, illinois, it wastwo separate occupancy spaces
and it was that fire resulted ina line of duty death or maybe a
double on duty death.
(28:30):
I think that that went inthrough the alpha side and the
victim was on the Charlie side,in a separate occupancy space,
and things just didn't go welland they just didn't see the
whole big picture of exactlywhat was going on.
Because it's what we hear a lot, it's just what we do.
We really get paid to makedecisions and be thinking
(28:55):
firefighters, company officers,chiefs and be professional.
Speaker 1 (28:59):
And also to add on to the occupancy being split up.
That's not just for olderoccupancies, because we see
those modified all the time.
The trend right now in newhousing is multi-generational
housing, so you will get adifferent unit that might be an
in-law apartment that was builtthat way by the builder and they
may or may not have a separateentrance.
(29:19):
A lot of times the entrance isoff of a garage, a third garage
stall.
So we are looking at housesright now that are
non-traditional houses and arenon-traditional time that we're
in.
So you've got to be aware ofall of that and that's why the
360 is so important.
Speaker 2 (29:34):
Well, the other part of that is your critical factors
.
You really learn them for fireson EMS calls.
So you go into these structuresand occupancies all day long on
calls and it's mostly EMS innature.
We're not dragging attack lines, but that's where you figure
out, oh, where this is how thisis set up.
(29:55):
So that's the other part of thesystem.
As you're going to.
Uh, what you do is going to bebased on the critical factors in
your community.
So in this one it's like, okay,there may be like an occupancy
front and back.
You go to a place like woosterand like, no, we don't have them
like that, we have thesedeckers.
(30:15):
And so every part of thecountry has a little something
different based on what theystarted with.
But it seems like the trend isgoing to.
New constructions all start tolook more like, no matter where
you go.
I mean, you can be in LosAngeles or you could be in
Kansas City, or you could be inthe East Coast and if it's a
(30:36):
city block apartment with retailon the bottom, they're all 99%
the same thing.
We got to make sense of that.
When we get to the scene ofwhatever's on fire, is this an
old small thing, an old bigthing, a brand new thing.
So it's just being familiarwith where you work, I guess, is
the simplest way about it.
Speaker 3 (30:59):
That initial radio report.
You know it's one of our slidesthat we use that when we pull
up we have standard conditions,which the standard conditions
are simply the critical fireground factor.
So that small two-story houseis much different than the what
Nick said, the five-story woodframe on top of a concrete
platform commercial area.
We're going to deploy different.
(31:20):
We're going to do somethingdifferent.
I mean, we're even going to dosomething different when the
standard conditions are.
We gave a size up smoke's comingfrom the second floor window.
We're doing a 360, and I get tothe Charlie side and there's a
victim hanging out the windowwith their kid.
It changes it up a little bit.
What are we going to do?
Well, we're going to do what wehave to do to solve the problem
(31:41):
.
So our incident action plan isgoing to be a little bit
different then than if thevictim wasn't hanging out the
window.
So when we have those standardconditions, we take some sort of
a standard action to solve thatproblem.
So we have that standardoutcome.
So I mean, we talk about that alot and we get to that.
We get to there by using thestrategic decision-making model.
It really walks us down thatpath of how do we get some
(32:05):
standard outcomes and it helpsus develop the incident action
plan.
What is our strategy so that wesolve the problem as quickly as
possible, without keeping,without getting ourselves into
into trouble?
Speaker 1 (32:20):
All right.
Well, kudos to the Las Vegasfire department and Coleraine
township fire department.
I mean they both have greatinitial radio reports that we
can all learn a little something.
And if you're interested insharing our contact information
in the show notes and we'd loveto have your initial radio
report on here too.
And before we wrap up thisepisode, let's check in with a
(32:44):
timeless tactical truth.
Of course we have these uh niceplaying cards available from b
shifter at some point and, uh,they're all of bruno's timeless
tactical.
So we're going to shuffle thedeck and we're going to randomly
pull out a card after shufflingthe deck and Nick and Josh are
going to check in on this one.
Okay, this one, the five ofhearts and it says responding
(33:09):
ranking officers or supervisorsnot on the scene should stay off
the radio unless they havecritical supporting information
that could help the current IC.
Let's talk about that one alittle bit, because we hear
oftentimes people getting on theradio and starting to either
give orders or make decisions,and they're not even on the
(33:31):
scene.
Speaker 2 (33:31):
It's not effective.
Speaker 1 (33:33):
No.
Speaker 2 (33:34):
At all.
Speaker 3 (33:35):
So the person with the most information is the
person that's there on the scene.
It's not effective, no at all.
So the person with the mostinformation is the person that's
there on the scene.
So all you're really doing isdisrupting the incident
commanders incident action planby trying to throw in your two
cents about whatever it is, andthere may be a time and a place
for it.
If you heard something thatmaybe somebody else didn't hear,
but other other than that,there's no reason for somebody
(33:57):
who's responding, not on thescene, to get on the radio and
interact with the incidentcommander of where you would get
on the radio ahead of beingthere is when the responding
(34:17):
chief let's say IC number onegets there, they give an initial
radio report.
Speaker 2 (34:28):
They describe an incident that's going to require
more resources, let's say, andthen just the conditions that
you're seeing as you'reresponding would validate that.
Sometimes they will clear alarmand request the next assignment
without being the IC.
Now we did some podcasts theother day and the dispatch
(34:49):
center came back and did thatwhere it was like you have just
described something where you'renot going to be able to do that
with the five units you have onthis dispatch.
So do you want some more?
And usually they'll say yes.
But I think the way you youeliminate that is through
training and saying this is what.
This is how you match the levelof resource you need, what
(35:11):
you're looking at when you getthere.
Speaker 1 (35:19):
I know I've been inbound before to a call and
you're getting a bad feelingabout what's going on.
But I've always resisted thetemptation to get on the radio
and start taking command whileyou're still rolling in.
And I've heard that done beforeand all that does is it seems
to mess up the scene even morebecause that IC number two,
who's not even there, doesn'thave the critical fire ground
factors.
They haven't done a standardcommand transfer.
They've got no can reports fromanybody.
(35:40):
They're just doing that solelyon the fact that it sounds like
the situation's out of control.
But they don't really know.
But it's that temptation thatchief officers have to.
I've got to get on, I've got totake care of this, but it never
really seems to help.
Speaker 2 (35:57):
You know, because it disrupts, it turns everything on
its head.
So in those cases, let's sayyou're two minutes away from the
scene why would you even dothat at that point?
Because I'm going to get thereand if you take command before
you get there, it's going totake you 10 minutes to figure
out what's going on the next 10minutes.
If you wait two minutes, it'sgoing to take you about four
minutes to figure out what'sgoing on the next 10 minutes.
If you wait two minutes, it'sgoing to take you about four
(36:18):
minutes to figure out what'sgoing on.
Because you're going to do acommand transfer with the ic
number one and they're going toat least inform you of what's
going on in their world, whichwill at least ic number two has
some information to base thetransfer on you had an incident
that you talked about before.
Speaker 1 (36:35):
Where you arrived, the, you had interior companies
but you waited until you gotthere on the scene.
But you immediately pulled theplug on offensive operations.
It was like in a strip mallwith a liquor store type of
thing, and shortly after youpulled everybody out there was a
collapse.
But you were on the scene whenyou did that.
You weren't inbound, but you'reprobably getting some
(36:55):
information.
Speaker 2 (36:56):
Well, and that was while you were en route.
Well, you're listening to theradio and what's going on, and
then you're looking at theconditions and then, when you
get there and you see, oh my god, well, there's, it's easy.
At that point it's hey,battalion three's on the scene
give me emergency traffic, andthen you just take it over from
there.
It's a, I'm changing thestrategy, we're going defensive,
(37:17):
everybody out, I'm command.
So see, but that system wasdesigned around having a BC to
the scene within the first fiveminutes of that incident taking
place.
Speaker 1 (37:31):
And if you're in a system where you can't provide a
BC in the first five minutes,you have to make those
adjustments.
Yeah, so if you're in a systemwhere you can't provide a BC in
the first five minutes, you haveto make those adjustments.
Speaker 3 (37:37):
Yeah, so if you're in a system where you're not
getting that BC that's outsidesitting in a car in the first
five, six, seven minutes,somebody has to be in that
position.
So whether well you just thatinitial arriving IC just has to
step outside the building, whichthat's really hard to do
(37:57):
because we lose total track oftime when we cross that
threshold and go into the IDLHenvironment.
Speaker 1 (38:04):
And having IC number ones trained to the appropriate
level really helps eliminate anyof the need to do that anyway.
Speaker 2 (38:11):
Really, my experience through my career is IC number
one solved the problem over halfthe time.
In fact I got to the point as aresponse chief I'm going to be
the first one to the scene.
Are we going to be the IC inthis one or not?
And you know, you'd kind offigure that out when you got
there and think no, ic numberone took care of everything.
There's nothing for me to doexcept support the current IC.
(38:34):
So I supported by leaving themin command and finishing the
operation off.
Speaker 1 (38:39):
And that wraps up this episode of B Shifter.
Thanks so much for joining ustoday.
If you have any comments foreither Nick, josh or myself, you
can check out the show notes.
That's where you will find ourcontact information and, if you
like this, please rate theepisode highly.
Share it with a friend.
Help us get the word out Untilnext time.
(39:01):
Thanks so much for listeningand being with us and please be
safe.
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