Why Incident Action Plans Matter

Send us a text

This episode is hosted by Josh Blum, Chris Stewart,  and John Vance.

We want your helmet (for the AVB CTC)! Check this out to find out more: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qg5_ZwoCZo0

Sign up for the B Shifter Buckslip, our free weekly newsletter here: https://lp.constantcontactpages.com/su/fmgs92N/Buckslip

Shop B Shifter here: https://bshifter.myshopify.com

All of our links here: https://linktr.ee/BShifter

Please subscribe and share. Thank you for listening!

This episode was recorded on August 15, 2025 in Orlando, Florida at Fire Rescue International.

The B-Shifters explore why incident action plans matter for fireground operations and firefighter safety, emphasizing the importance of a single, coordinated approach versus multiple disconnected plans.

• Incident action plans require proper size-up, evaluation of critical factors, risk management, and strategy selection before implementation
• "Size-up plus three" helps company officers think about what their company will do and what the next 2-3 companies should do
• IAPs must be continuously evaluated and revised based on changing conditions
• Command transfers require clear communication about the current plan and whether it should continue or change
• Effective IAPs must adapt to resource limitations, including staffing challenges
• Task, location, and objective assignments provide clear responsibilities for companies
• A poor plan directly impacts safety and effectiveness on the fireground

Join us for the 2025 Blue Card Hazard Zone Conference in Sharonville, Ohio, September 29 through October 3rd. Visit bshifter.com for information and registration. Workshops are filling up quickly!

Please subscribe to the B Shifter Podcast!

Episode Transcript

Speaker 2 (00:20):
Welcome to the V-Shifter podcast.
It's Josh Blum, chris Stewart,john Vance, and we are still at
FRI, although when you'relistening to this, fri is over.
We're gone from Orlando, butwe're here on the last day and
since we were together, wewanted to record another podcast
.
We're up early and talkingabout stuff, so we will be

(00:40):
talking today about incidentaction plans and really you know
why is that so important?
So we'll dig into that topic injust a little bit.
We still want to remind youabout the 2025 Blue Card Hazard
Zone Conference coming toSharonville, ohio, september
29th through October 3rd.
You can go to bshiftercom andfind all the information about

(01:02):
that.
You can meet the instructors,see the class descriptions.
The schedule of what's going onis on there right now.
As soon as you sign up, we'llsend you our app so you can
start planning out your visitand really looking at the
classes and giving you an agendafor the trip.
Do you have anything new on theconference?
We are full right now with thecertification lab, so that

(01:24):
pre-conference workshop is full.
How is the counts looking andwhat else do we have available
for folks?

Speaker 3 (01:31):
Yeah, so the I think there's maybe 10 seats left in
all the total and all theworkshops 10 or 12 seats in all
the workshops.
So if you're looking to jumpinto one of those, take
advantage of a full week oftraining, whether it's the.
There's only three seats in theMayday workshop, so that I'm
sure that that might be filledup by the time this airs.

(01:52):
But either way, yeah, theworkshops are filling up, so
that'll be good.
And then, yeah, our conferencenumbers still look good.
Looking forward to it.
People from I think we pickedup the furthest traveled
yesterday from right outside ofSeattle area coming to

(02:12):
Cincinnati, so that's almostlike going halfway around the
world, all the way across thecountry.

Speaker 2 (02:20):
We'll do that conference trick.
Who's the farthest away?
Show us your driver's licenseand give me a prize.

Speaker 3 (02:25):
We're looking forward to it.
Looking forward to catching upwith everybody, looking forward
to talking about where we'vebeen and where we're going and
what we have coming out new andthe general session stuff and
then the breakouts at theconference.
We've got some great sessionsgoing to take place there, so
get an update from Dan.
That's going to be nice.

(02:46):
Being here at FRI and hearing alittle bit of the buzz about
Narus and the rollout of thatcoming in January.
I mean, I guess it sounds likethey're going to flip the switch
and turn it all on in January,right, yeah?

Speaker 1 (03:00):
Well, they're going through waves right now of
logging people in and I thinkthey said yesterday they're in
the triple digits of places thatare already reporting into the
system.

Speaker 3 (03:10):
So it's going pretty quick, yeah.
So that's not Dan's big piece,but he's going to give us a
little update on what's going onwith that, where it's at, what
that rollout looks like.
So, yeah, a lot of takeawaysfrom the conference.
It's not the same old, same oldthing.
Like a lot of the places thatyou go, we try to put out new

(03:32):
what's the latest thing going onand try to give people tools to
take back to their organization.

Speaker 2 (03:38):
And there really isn't another conference for
incident commanders and fireservice leaders like this one.
This is really about the workwhere the rubber meets the road.
Great for anybody aspiring tobe an officer, chief officers,
folks who are leaders withintheir organization, both on the
scene and off.
So we have a lot of topics forthat.
The strategic decision-makingworkshop I think the material

(03:59):
that Chris and Eric put togetherfor that is really good.
What can we expect from thatworkshop, Chris, and tell us
about what those two days areall about?

Speaker 1 (04:12):
I think the simplest way to put it is we're going to
focus on not what to think, buthow to think and how to use the
strategic decision-makingprocess as your critical
thinking platform for the fireground.
And that critical thinkingshould be done by everybody on
the fire ground, from thefirefighters to the officers of

(04:36):
all levels.
Right, and when we're actuallyapproaching it from the same
perspective, utilizing the sameprocess, we tend to be way
better aligned and looking atthe actual things that we really
need to get done in the mostreasonable way, fastest, most
efficient, is typically thesafest right, and so when we
utilize and practice a systemand process regularly, it makes

(04:59):
us a lot better.
So really, what we're going todo is kind of define all that
talk about it and then giveexamples, and then we're going
to exercise it right, and it'svery simple low technology, as
Bruno would say, the lowfidelity exercise of utilizing
the system and practicing.
And it can be done individuallyat the company level, at the

(05:23):
battalion level, at thedepartment level, and it
requires literally absoluteminimal technology to do.
The technology required is whatevery fire department already
possesses, so it's not likewe've got anything crazy going
on here.
So it's, how are we going toexercise and use the system
better and more and moreefficiently to make better

(05:46):
decisions on the fire ground?

Speaker 3 (05:47):
So I think with the critical thing, classes, it's,
it's, it's exercising thebiggest and probably most
important tool we have andthat's our brain.
Right, that's the we have tothink, and I think, as Grant
Light says, you can't beat yourway through every problem, but
sometimes you can bully the fireinto submission.
But we call that accidentalsuccess, not really thinking

(06:11):
about it and doing things thesmartest way.
So I want to put out there thatevery workshop that we have at
the conference is also availableto be delivered on the road in
person at organizations or in aregion.
So we've got several May Dayworkshops coming up that are
full Washtenaw County, michigan,lenexa, kansas.

(06:31):
We're going to Kernersvilleright outside of Winston-Salem,
north Carolina.
Got a big box class, john, inyour area in Minnesota.
Still I think two or threesafety training trainers coming
up, los Alamos, right outside ofCharlotte, north Carolina.
So I just wanted to put thatout there, as all of our
workshops are available fordelivery regionally and it

(06:54):
doesn't have to be one firedepartment that fills them.
If you have people to fill partof the class, we organize and
help fill those with people fromall over your region.

Speaker 2 (07:04):
So if someone wants to host a workshop, say a big
box workshop, because I know wecan only do like five of those a
year based on Shane'savailability how do they do that
?
How do they go about trying toschedule a workshop for their
area?

Speaker 3 (07:16):
Yeah, if you're wanting to schedule something
for like maybe the fourthquarter of 2025, we have a
little bit of availability there.
But 2026, I actually just lookedthis morning we have like 17
workshops forecasted right nowfor 2026.
We don't have many datesassigned, but organizations that
have reached out saying youknow, we want the Mayday

(07:37):
workshop, we want the criticalthinking workshop, we want the
big box workshop.
So if you're wanting to dosomething with that, you can
reach out to me, my email,joshatbshiftercom.
As, as everybody that'sconnected to our system knows,
if you call me and I'm notsitting on a podcast, talking to
somebody else or sitting infront of a class, I'll answer,
I'll be on the phone with youand we'll we'll figure it out

(07:57):
and you know our mission withthat is to be able to deliver
deliver the message so that youcan do better and understand the
program better in your region.
Right, it's about that.
It's about what does it looklike in the end?
And, anyway, any way that wecan uh, help an organization or
a region to deliver the service,um, that's, that's what we're

(08:20):
about.

Speaker 2 (08:21):
So all right, joshabshiftercom, you can reach
out to us and get those bookedfor 2026 or the end of 2025.
So we've been on this series ofwhy it matters and you know we
talked about strategy a coupleweeks ago, we talked about risk
management and today we wantedto talk about incident action
planning.

(08:41):
And why does it matter,especially there being a single
incident action plan?
Because the fire service that Istarted in there were several
incident action plans becausepeople would just show up and do
whatever the captain told us todo and it really wasn't
coordinated by an ic.
A lot of times we had an icthere but the ic didn't really

(09:02):
coordinate that.
I've ridden along with othermetropolitan fire departments
where they operate that same way, where the company officers
have that under theirresponsibility for the incident
action plan, and when I see thathappen, I see a duplication of
effort a lot of times where twoor three companies are doing the

(09:23):
same thing, where thensomething else isn't getting
covered, you know, like either asearch or checking for
extension or whatever else.
So that's just my example of it.
But let's talk about theincident action plan and why it
matters today.

Speaker 3 (09:38):
So I think to start with the incident action plan,
you have to.
If you're listening to this, youshould go back and listen to
the other podcast that we'vedone the last two or three that
came out before this one to kindof get to this point though it
there'll be a lot of takeawayshere without.
It'll just help you connect thedots, I think, if you listen to
the other ones.
But you know, the incidentaction plan we I want to put out

(09:58):
there right in the beginning.
You know so many people arelike blue cards, a
communications program.
Well, we communicate theincident action plan over the
radio, but we can't get to theincident action plan unless
we've gone through the processand made decisions on the front
end of the incident, which isreally the Topics that we talked

(10:18):
about in the previous twopodcasts about.
You know size up, evaluation,critical fire, ground factors,
deployment how many people do Ireally have to go through and
fill out these roles Like what?
What can I do with what I have?
So in our focus with thatalways is, you know, fire
control and life safety.
You know that we want to fillthat out first and if we can't

(10:41):
do that then we shouldn't bedoing any other, uh, any other
support work.
The primary focus should be,you know, fire control and and
life safety.
Um, so, as we think aboutincident action plan, we want
everybody to be on the same pageand I I throw this out a lot
with the whole, you know, sportsthing If the, if the play is

(11:02):
called for, you know we're goingto on the football field and
we're gonna pass and the widereceiver and the quarterback are
not on the same page.
You know, we see it severaltimes a year and it's like that
wasn't an intentional throw,like we're not throwing it out
of bounds there, we're not.
We're not throwing it on thefield to somewhere where
somebody's not the quarterbackthought that's, they were on the

(11:23):
same page and that's where thewide receiver was going and
they're not.
So when we talk about that, thefire ground's the same thing.
Chris and I may think close tothe same, but when we pull up
and we have two different mindframes of what we're going to do
and I have my incident actionplan and he has his, and then
John, you get there and you'regoing to be the strategic guy.
See, have three different plans.

(11:43):
And you know when we have a,when we have a single objective
in mind.
Really, really, that ties twothings together.
Of you know, fire control andlife safety.
Everybody has to be on the samepage and we have to be working
towards that same end goal.
It can't be, it can't be therace.
You know, last week when we werein Orlando at the I-Chiefs

(12:05):
conference, we talked to severalpeople from several
organizations that currentlyhave that SOP-driven response
and you know they would say youknow, our second engine gets
there and pulls a backup line.
And he said the problem is isthe second engine is always
trying to beat the first engineand then the lines get wrapped
up and then we don't get wateron the fire.
And we don't have to look veryfar to find out that when we

(12:27):
don't get water on the fire,things are not getting better
and it's going to get worse, andwe shouldn't be surprised when
it gets worse.
So that's two clearly differentincident action plans.
And then the other part of thatis, if it's not communicated
and documented, I can't verifythat it's going to happen.
So I've seen this, you know,all across the country and I

(12:50):
talk to people every week aboutit.
Of you know, the first truck issupposed to get there and
they're supposed to do this, andwe found out that that's not
what they did, and and and.
Several cases it was like, uh,yeah, the first truck supposed
to go in and and search thefirst floor at a, at a two story
house.
You know, when they have somekind of SOP driven, you know

(13:12):
thing, and and and none of thatis communicated.
And it's like, well, they nevermade it to that point because
something they chose to dosomething else or there was
something better that theywanted to do, or whatever it is.
And when we're looking atsolving the problem and the end
goal, it's like, well, there's awhole piece missing there.
And then people act surprisedwhen they're like what do you

(13:35):
mean?
We didn't get an all-clear ofthe building.
I mean, we've heard a couple ofvery recent stories about the.
Well, we thought we had anall-clear of that, we thought we
thought that was searched, butnobody assigned it, nobody
verified it.
And then it comes back oh there, they found somebody in there,
you know, three days later, andit's like what?
Well, how did that happen?
Were they like totally buriedunder something?

(13:56):
Were they digging it out?
Or like what it's like?
Oh, no, they.
I guess nobody ever made itinto the area or whatever, and
it's like no, I guess nobodyever made it into the area or
whatever and it's like no.
That's why we have a system andthat's why it's so important
with the incident action plan,and I hit, you know, several
pieces of that.
But we'll break it.
We'll break kind of all of thatdown further now, I think yeah.

Speaker 1 (14:15):
So what work especially any work in public
safety or in dangerousenvironments or high risk or has
consequences?
Do consequences?
Does anyone approach the workwithout a plan?
Right, it'd be insane not to,or you would just learn to deal
with repeated failure, right?

(14:36):
So plan is in the word,incident action plan, and so we
have to know and understand howdo we develop that?
And then, what is theimportance and the value of
actually having one plan that ismanaged by whoever the incident
commander is, whether it's afast attacking mobile IC or a

(14:58):
stationary IC, number twostrategic level incident
commander?
There has to be a plan and thatplan, for us, has to have a
standard set of objectives that,when we show up on the fire
ground this is the work we arehere to complete Ours is the

(15:20):
tactical objectives fire controlor hazard mitigation.
Is the tactical objectives firecontrol or hazard mitigation,
life safety and getting it allclear and loss control and
property conservation, right?
So if we look at what is theacademic description or
definition of an incident actionplan, is what needs to occur on

(15:43):
the fire ground to achieve thetactical objectives?
Well, you have to be able toprocess and measure the problem
before you actually put a plantogether.
Any professional risk managerwould tell you the less
effective or the lack ofunderstanding of the problem is,

(16:05):
you have a high likelihood ofcoming up with a dumb solution
or a poor solution.
And so our incident action planis part of a process.
It's part of size up andevaluation for critical factors.
There's a risk management partthat it looks at and then the
strategy from what positionshould we be working?
All right, well, based on thosethree things, here is my plan.

(16:26):
Here's my plan to put the fireout, to get the searchable
places searched and to save thestuff or the things that we can.
And it gets confused a lot withassumed expectations.
Well, I had a plan, and soeverybody needs to kind of

(16:53):
assume what that plan is basedon their evaluation of the
conditions.
Well, that doesn't work.
That's SOP-driven stuff.
When an incident commander getsthere and shows up, develops
their plan and says, okay, basedon this plan, I'm on engine one
, I'm going to do this.
Engine two I need you to dothis.
Ladder one I need you to dothis.
Engine three I need you to dothis.

(17:14):
And then we're putting intoplace people in positions doing
the functions that need tohappen on the fire ground.
That now provides someaccountability for the work, and
I don't mean the accountabilityin the position and function
meaning of that.
I mean now I know where asearch is getting done, I know

(17:37):
where fire control is gettingdone, I know where it's not, I
know where I need to send othercompanies and I'm now ready to
receive some feedback about.
You know, are they able to dothe job or can't they?
Right?
We're going to do that in astandard communication process.
So there's a, there's a.
It is part of a bigger system.
To know and understand itactually is very simple once you
start learning andunderstanding it and the

(18:00):
confusion becomes with we startto use assumed expectations or
multiple perspectivessimultaneously and since human
beings are involved, they willnever ever come out perfectly
aligned.
So it's important to have it aspart of your process and know

(18:22):
and understand what it is andthat the IC, at any given point
of the incident, should be ableto communicate very simply to
anybody.
Well, here was our plan fromthe beginning.
Here's what we've accomplished,here's what we need to
accomplish.

Speaker 2 (18:35):
So IC number one gets there.
They look at the critical fireground factors.
They're going to size up thebuilding, they're going to
describe the problem and thenthey transmit it into an action
plan.
And when we talk about thinkingcompany officers, they're going
to key the mic and verbalizewhat needs to get done on the
scene from their perspective.

(18:55):
How often should that berevised then, during the course
of the time that they havecommand, before command is
transferred?

Speaker 3 (19:04):
during the course of the time that they have command
before command is transferred.
Yeah, so anytime that there's achange in the problem, a
perfect example is the companyofficer gets there, does the
size up plus three goes down.
What strategy they're going tobe in starts down the path of

(19:28):
we're stretching a line to thefront door, primary search fire
control.
They're doing a 360.
They get there and they're likewe got a victim hanging out the
window on the second floor.
Well, they're maybe still goingto do the same thing they were
doing, but that's going tochange the assignment.
But if they get to the Charlieside and we got a basement fire,
well, that's going to changethe action.
Right, no-transcript there.

(20:13):
And they were called us forchest pains.
It's like getting called to astructure fire.
Well, you get called to astructure fire and people want
to take this.
We take the same action.
We do the same thing everysingle.
Well, we got hold to a fire.
This is what we do.
Well, when you get called tochest pains, you don't just do
what you do, right, you getthere and it's like, oh, you're
having chest pains and you know,goes through questions and

(20:36):
we're going to go through someother diagnostic things and
we're going to put them on amonitor and we're going to get
shocked today Like that's whatwe're going to do.
And it's like, well, if it saysthat's what we need to do,
based off of going through thatalgorithm and making decisions
because that's what we're doingon the MS run is making
decisions based off ofinformation that we're getting
from tools, diagnostic tools,what they're telling us, you
know whatever, then that's whatwe're going to do.

(20:58):
Well, on the fire ground, it'sthe same thing, right?
Like you got called to whateverand you sized it up from what I
could see at this point, andanytime that you see something
that changes the incident actionplan, we're going to
communicate that.
No different than you stretch aline.
You said I'm going to stretch aline to the front door.

(21:18):
I stretch a line through thefront door, and we've had plenty
of podcasts with this, three orfour, I think.
Now they stretch through thefront door, they see the seed of
the fire, but they also find avictim.
Well, they communicate that itchanges the incident action plan
, right?
I mean, maybe they're stillgoing to put water on the fire,
or maybe they say, hey, we putsome water on the fire, but
we're going to remove thisvictim.
We need another company toreplace us.

(21:39):
Or they already assigned thesecond company and they're going
to, because at that point thequestion was if IC1 still has it
, well, they're making all thedecisions.
So what do they need to do andwhat do they need other
companies to do to solve theproblem, to meet those
objectives, as Chris said?
So it's not a, it's not working,so let's do it harder, thing,

(22:02):
right?
I mean, and we have thistendency to do that right, it's
like we're not getting it.
Let's do it harder, thing,right?
I mean and and we're we, wehave this tendency to do that.
That right, it's like we're notgetting it, let's just push
harder.
And it's like, well, whatyou're doing isn't working, and
sometimes pushing harder, maybeit's like we're going to get a
second line here, but okay, I'mnot going to put a third line
there, potentially, because it'slike, no, you're just pushing
harder.
What you're doing is you're notgoing to win doing what you're

(22:24):
doing, right, it's not working.

Speaker 2 (22:27):
I want to back up to size up plus three, because with
Blue Card we talk aboutthinking company officers and I
don't know if I can stress thisenough Blue Card is not a script
.
You know, we hear that, weheard that at FRI in Orlando.
Oh, it's a script.
No, it's not a script.
It's a decision making processand really a format that is

(22:48):
standard, that allows people togo through the flow of
everything and disseminate thatinformation out to the folks
that are coming in.
So what is size up plus threeand why do we want the company
officers to practice thattactically as they're making
their initial incident actionplan?

Speaker 3 (23:07):
Yeah, so the size of plus three is.
You know they get there andit's the first part of the
strategic decision making model.
They evaluate the criticalfactors, what is the problem,
and they go through that process.
And if you want a fullbreakdown of that, you know we
have a podcast two back fromthis one, I think it is.
That is just that you know sizeup and size up plus threes

(23:27):
talked about in that.
But I evaluate what the problemis and then what am I going to
do and what am I going to dowith the next two or three
companies to support theincident action plan that I have
communicated to everybody,right?
So it's going through thatcompany officer's head of not
just what am I going to do, butwhat do I need everybody else to
do to solve the problem?

(23:48):
Cause they're they're in thebest position to make that
decision.
You know, when you're comingdown the street three blocks
away, uh, and you're thinkingthat, well, when I get there,
this is just what I do.
It's like you don't have, youdon't have all the information
and you you're not seeing what'sgoing on and the incident
action plan is forever changing,right?

(24:09):
Like you know, residentialbuilding fires in the line and
the next engine's two minutesbehind them and they got water
on the two rooms that areburning in this 2,000 square

(24:30):
foot house.
Well, your incident action planis changing right now.
Right, I got water there andthat's setting the stage.
And it would come out duringthe command transfer that, yeah,
we have the fire knocked downand you know, in our system,
like system, like what does thatmean?
Yeah, I haven't checked forextension yet, but that puts
that strategic, I see, in adifferent position too as far as
getting all clear, so I don'thave to focus as much on that.

(24:53):
Yeah, I don't have fire control, they haven't checked for
extension yet, but they got thefire knocked down.
So I feel a whole lot betterabout where we're going to work
and what we're going to do andwe're making it better for the
building, for the firemen, forany victims inside.
And my whole thought process ofI still got to work on fire
control is it gets lowered alittle bit, right, because this

(25:15):
company has water on the fireand they're starting to get that
.
And if they're not makingprogress, then in our system
that's where they're going touse the priority traffic piece
of.
You know we're not makingprogress.
And if the strategic IC is notthere and engine one, the
incident commander, at thatpoint needs other support, then
they're going to change theincident action plan by
communicating to one of thoseother companies what they need

(25:37):
in that position, right?
So when we're talking about allthis, it seems like in the
American Fire Service we get ourminds all wrapped around
residential building fires, andI mean single family residential
building fires.
Right, and that's why it's soimportant.
I think that the strategicdecision-making model and
creating think environment isimportant in the process,

(25:57):
because if you treat anapartment building like a house
fire, it's not going to workeither.
And if I treat a fullyprotected you know, fireproof
building like a house fire, it'snot going to work.
And if I treat Home Depot likea house fire, it's not going to
work.
And, as Chris Stewart, everyfire is different.
Right, I get there and it'sboarded up and there may be

(26:18):
somebody in there.
Yeah, we're still going tosearch and we're still going to
do all of that.
But if I get there and Ms Smithstands in the front yard and
says my kid's in that window,that changes it.
Right.
So we make decisions and deployto solve the problem, not just.
I don't want robots, I don'twant somebody just getting there
and just doing whatever,whatever some piece of paper

(26:39):
says, or maybe even worse,whatever they want to do, we
want to deploy to solve theproblem.

Speaker 1 (26:45):
So I think a couple of things to support what Josh
is saying is IAP plus three isnot the same everywhere, right?
What are the variables in that?
The variables are the criticalfactors, the incident conditions
and what's critical going onright there in that moment on
the fire ground.
The other parts of it is whatare your resources?

(27:08):
Right?
So you may be getting threeengines and a ladder company,
say for your initial response,right?
How are they staffed, how arethey equipped, how are they
trained and at what time arethey going to arrive?
All of those things play intoyour plan.
I can have very clear objectives.
I need to get fire control andI really want to get an all

(27:31):
clear here and so.
But I have to build my planaround the resources that I have
coming and their abilities andcapacities to actually do that
work.
And a lot of that is dependenton how many folks are going to
show up on those rigs.
So if I'm in an agency that issuburban or rural and maybe I

(27:53):
have two, maybe I have threecoming on those rigs, then my
plan I have the same objectives,but my plan of how I'm going to
go about it's going to be alittle bit different than if I'm
showing it up in a metro firedepartment and the first three
engines are showing up with fivepeople, right, that's a very
different capacity to actuallydo the work.
So that has to be figured outinside your organization to be

(28:16):
able to know and understand whatIEP plus three is.
So it's yeah, we can have thesame objective, but there are
things and variables that gointo that that may change and or
drive our plan.
The other thing is the incidentplan, action plan is never
stagnant.
It is constantly andpersistently should be revised.

(28:37):
At the very least it'sevaluated, and that is through
size up, that's throughre-evaluation of action, that's
through meeting objectives onthe fire ground.
Those things cause the fireground to evolve.
Very few fire grounds stay thesame.
They're either getting better orthey're getting worse, right,
and so that re-evaluationprocess helps me decide.

(29:01):
Does the plan need to changebased on those conditions or
based on some other variable, ordoes the plan stay the same?
No, we're in the right place,we're doing the right things,
things are getting better, weare going to continue to march,
push on with this plan, and soit is the idea to say that we
show up and this is the plan inthe beginning, and this is what

(29:22):
we're going to do, no matterwhat that's not, you build an
increased potential for failureif that's the way we do it.
So the system then allows forthat re-evaluation part of it in
adjusting and changing the planbased on the conditions, risk

(29:45):
management and strategy choices.

Speaker 3 (29:47):
Chris, as you described and we talk about this
all over the place what's yourreal resource capability?
What's on the apparatus?
What is the apparatuscapability?
Is it a tower, a ladder, anengine?
What's its water capacity?
Foam, you know any and all ofthat, but even in a single

(30:09):
organization that looksdifferent.
I mean, john, at Clay, right?
I mean, if you're, there wasareas where probably four or
five companies and you know fiveminutes, and there's areas
where it's like no engine, 23 orwhoever whatever.
That is that outlying area.
They're going to be bythemselves for a minute, right?
We just got some audio from avery large county fire

(30:32):
department right here in Floridathat I think they cover 600
square miles and the firstengine gets there and they did a
nice job, pulled off a rescue,put the fire out First company
officer was tasked but had asystem and was trained on the
system and that deployment modellooked quite different than if

(30:54):
they were in.
You know more of their metroarea, right, this fire happened
in.
You know, maybe a little bitmore of a I don't want to say
rule, but an area where it'sbeing developed right.
And the staffing was justdifferent.
And I'll take that a stepfurther.
The incident action plan has tochange.
When your fire department isthe first emergency first-type

(31:16):
organization which is all overthe country, right, everybody
isn't riding five or four, it'slooking more like two or three.
I mean last week at theconference we heard a whole lot
of that.
Right, you know everybody isn'triding five or four, it's
looking more like two or three.
I mean, last week at theconference we heard a whole lot
of that, right, another verylarge Georgia metro county fire
department.
It blew me away when the guytold me, yeah, we ride three.
And he said, typically we endup having to put two engines

(31:40):
together to make one attack team, to make a stretch.
And it was like, wow, you'relike that's Atlanta Metro, very
highly populated area.
And he was like, no, that'sjust what we have, right.
So with that said, withincident action planning and
that deployment piece, you takeone engine out.
That changes your incidentaction plan.
Who's normally second isn'tsecond, it's two, they're two
minutes.
The next engine now is twominutes delayed.

(32:02):
So what does that look like?
And then all everywhere thatthat is doing that first
emergency first.
Or I got five people in thestation, but two of them are on
the medic unit.
Where I have four people on thestation, two of them are in the
medic unit, and if all four ofthem are there, they all get on
the fire truck.
But, uh, all, all four or fiveof your stations are staffed

(32:23):
like that, but all four or fiveof your stations are staffed
like that and you have fourambulances on the road, which
that happens all the time.
You can't talk about yourstaffing being 16, and you're
going to pull up in sevenminutes with 16 people.
You need to talk about yourstaffing being seven.
And what does that look like?
And now I'm going to have topair up companies to create a
whole company, right, and we,you know, we know that's it's

(32:45):
not ideal, that's not what anyof us want.
We all want fully staff.
We know that capability isbigger, but that that I think
that number is 90 plus percent,I would say 95% or more of the
American fire service has lessthan four people, and three is a

(33:05):
pretty close, I think, number.
And we see it more and more andmore that there's two, and it's
like even metro cities, right,that they don't advertise that
they have two people on it.
But I think a fire department,just in the top 10 largest fire
departments in the country, hassome areas that are in some
rural areas that have an enginein there that have two people
there, right, and it's likeseveral engines that have two

(33:27):
people on it and they, that firedepartment has well over a
thousand people on their firedepartment and it's like, well,
they do that because not as muchhappens out there or whatever.
But that thought, that thoughtprocess, is a little broke.
But the company officer at thatstation has to think totally
different than the person who'sdowntown and is like, uh, engine
one, two, three and ladderseven are going to pull up at

(33:48):
the same time and battalionone's pulling up, well, at the
same time if everybody's inquarters, right, but one run
changes that.
And that's why it's soimportant to go back to the, to
the process and the, thethinking thing, and why we uh,
why we size up the factors andthen base our deployment based

(34:09):
off of what resources do wereally have to solve the problem
?
There's very seldom, is it lookexactly the same.
I mean, it seems like ourservice is getting busier and
busier with incidents because wekeep on taking on more, so the
availability of apparatus isless and less.

Speaker 1 (34:28):
So one thing that I think is important for ICs, at
whatever level, is to recognizethat having a knowing and
understanding your incidentaction plan is one thing.
Deploying companies is atotally separate thing.
That's a deployment plan.
That's taking the plan, and youhave to have a plan in order to
effectively deploy yourcompanies.

(34:50):
If you don't have a decent planof how you're going to achieve
all clear fire control and stop,then you have a high likelihood
of your deployment not beingeffective.
You have a high likelihood ofyour deployment not being
effective.
So, although you know we don'tpause and narrate our incident

(35:12):
action plan on the radio, right,that incident commander needs
to have a very clear picture ofwhat that is.
And they, as they start toassign companies through task,
location and objective, they'renow communicating those pieces
of hey, here's where I want youto go, here's what I want you to
do, and these are theobjectives I'm looking for you
from that assignment.
And that's the cue of, that'sthe information you're going to
have to feed back to me when youfinish it, or you can't finish

(35:35):
it or you need help, right, andso the plan is integral to that.
So many places just assume well,our incident action plan is our
deployment and that'sineffective.
But they believe that that'sokay because of accidental

(35:56):
success.
Well, we've done it before andit didn't prove to be a problem.
So I want to make sure that weclearly delineate that fact.
That was actually a big dealthat I learned, you know,
growing up in the system withBruno and the shift commanders
that we had is no, no, you needto know and understand the
differentiation of those twoincident action plan and the

(36:25):
offensive strategy.
And what are the standardelements of an incident action
plan and the defensive strategy,right.
So I'm going to do this stuffup on the front end of sizing up
and figuring out my criticalfactors, determining where am I
at my risk, and those things aregoing to define all right,
should we be in the hazard zoneor should we be working from
outside the hazard zone?
That's strategy, right.
And then so, if we're workingin the hazard zone, these are
the typical standard criticalelements of a plan to execute in

(36:49):
the offensive strategy roominside the hazard zone.
And then, conversely, whenthose things line up and say, no
, I need to be defensive here,well, here are the standard
elements of the defensiveincident action plan and they
are not the same as an offensiveincident action plan, and
that's where we get into thisidea of crews working in

(37:10):
offensive positions duringdefensive fire conditions.
The IC didn't clearly recognizethe critical factors and select
their strategy effectively maybe, or they did, but the action
and the incident action planaren't aligning with that
strategy and that's creating bigproblems for us.
We had a battalion chief from alarger county fire department

(37:33):
describing to us a strategiclevel mayday of no, we declared
this fire defensive, but theywere working up next to the
building and the building fellon them and they spent six or
eight minutes digging them out.
That's a problem.
That was a strategic levelmayday because the plan didn't
match the conditions andstrategy right.
So again, this is all system inprocess, and incident action

(37:58):
plan by itself is not nearly aseffective unless you describe
how you come up with that planand then how you reevaluate and
either change or support thatplan moving forward.
So it's a critical element thatwe can't dilute.

(38:19):
We need to know and understandwhat it is and then how we
actually use it.

Speaker 2 (38:24):
When it comes to that task, location and objective,
one of the things people justmiss a lot is the objective.

Speaker 3 (38:45):
Why is it so important for us to verbalize
and put it out there what theobjective of that task and the
location is as we're assigningit or just stating it on an
initial radio report that that'swhat we're going to do.
So who won it?
You know it tells everybodyelse where everybody's working
right.
And then if I'm going to givesomebody an assignment, I want
them to go to a specific placeand do a specific thing.
Then I want them to acknowledgethat and that's why we use the
order model.
Right, and you know the ordermodel helps with that because
they verify that they understandthat assignment.

(39:07):
And then as long as I give theassignment, I feel much better
as an incident commander knowingthat, okay, they're going to
the second floor for primarysearch and fire control and then
if they confirm that theyunderstand that, then that's
what they're going to do.
You know no different thanengine seven.
I want you to lay a watersupply to tower seven and if
you're okay with the we got itDon't be surprised when tower

(39:30):
seven is like we're stillwaiting on water.
Command engine seven Are yougetting?
Uh, yeah, we got a water supplyto ourself, or you know
whatever.
It is Right and they missed theassignment.
And then the objective piece.
It is Right and they missed theassignment and then the
objective piece.
You know, part of the objectivepiece is the reminder to the
company of this is what I wantyou to do.
And then, when you've completedthat, I need to know that, like

(39:52):
it's typically something that Iwant to know.
So, you know, in our systemthat would come out as like
status change, right, like ifthey're getting fire, if they're
getting fire control, or theygot water on the fire or they
got an all clear of an area,because I'm tracking that,
because that's going to impactmy incident action plan, right.
Like all of the parts andpieces tie together and one is
connected to the other and one,any one piece by itself probably

(40:16):
has some value, but you can'tput all the puzzle together when
you're missing one piece, andthat's that's the beauty of
having a system that everybody'susing and is on the same page
with.

Speaker 1 (40:27):
Yeah, the objective part is the simplest way we have
to pointing out to thosecompanies.
This is what you're responsiblefor, and it's simple.
There's only three things, allclear, under control, lost stock
.
And it's simple.
There's only three things, allclear, under control, lost stop.
Sometimes under control, loststop or, excuse me, under
control.
And all clear are coupledtogether hey, go to this place,

(40:50):
get me an all clear check forextension, all right.
Well, the officer needs to thenfigure out OK, what's the most
effective way to actually dothat and what tools do I need to
actually accomplish that?
So it's giving them that lastpiece of hey, this is what
you're responsible for,simplifying it.
And then I want that back andit's going to come back as a

(41:10):
status change if they'vecompleted it, or priority
traffic right Exactly.
And if they can't, or they findsomething they didn't expect or
something that could drive achange, or they need assistance,
then priority trafficAbsolutely, so that objective
becomes a critical piece ofinformation for them.

(41:31):
The other thing is, once I givethem that task, location
objective, me as an IC I've gotto be disciplined enough to shut
up unless I really have somelegitimate, serious concern
about what they're doing.
And I don't want to hear fromthem until they've completed or
they can't complete it.
And I am not going to bug themand badger them and have them

(41:53):
narrate to me what they'reactually doing.
Because you can micromanagethat at very small fires and be
successful and feel like you'reyou know you're a really good
incident commander doing that.
But once you get half a dozen oreight or 10 companies doing the
same thing right, you can'tmicromanage all those.
So and but you'll try andyou'll be, you're horribly

(42:14):
ineffective at it, so you don'tdo it to begin with.
Give them that clear objective,let them do the work, let them
come back to you, and that'swhen it calms the radio traffic
down.
So a clear plan andwell-communicated plan actually
has a direct connection toimproving, decreasing and
maximizing communication on thefire ground.

(42:35):
And the question earlier is whydo we use radio communication
to do all this?
Is because we haven't masteredmind control yet and we can't
telepathically let the IC know.
So it has to be done over theradio.
But it's got to be way moredisciplined.

Speaker 2 (42:51):
So we do a command transfer.
We've covered IC1, size up plusthree.
We could talk about that allday, but before we wrap up we
need to talk about the commandtransfer and then how.
That incident commander and youexplained this with a group
recently and I heard you say it,so hopefully we can.
You could say it the way yousaid it because it just made so
much sense to me.

(43:11):
But you're either going to takethe incident action plan that
IC1 set up and say, yep, that'swhat we're going to continue, or
IC2 changes course.
So they have to be a part ofthat because now they're
coordinating what they see fromthe exterior with the CAN report
from the inside.
So let's address the transferof command and the acceptance or

(43:36):
change of that incident actionplan.

Speaker 1 (43:39):
Yeah.
So to review, you know, ourstandard process of the transfer
of command is commandcommunicating to IC1, making
sure, yeah, ic1 making surethey're ready for the command
transfer.
The first thing I will gothrough is a unit rundown.
I want to verify that I havethe positional function
everybody on the fire ground.
Quickly, very briefly, very,very efficiently, very briefly,

(44:09):
very, very efficiently.
Once IC1 validates it orchanges it or, you know,
corrects me, then I'm going tosay, okay, give me a CAN report
and then that's the opportunityI have position and function
down, accountability done.
Now it's the opportunity forIC1 to give me an update on the
conditions and I guess the mostimportant thing I want out of
that is the needs part of it.
I want the conditions andactions, clearly, but then I
need needs.
All right, that's the forwardlooking part is what are we

(44:31):
going to do?
And then the then IC number twotakes command and they they
finish that off by verifyingstrategy and resource
determination.
So at that moment the IC has achoice.
The IC there are really onlytwo selections here is based on
the conditions, the information,the accountability or lack of.

(44:54):
Am I going to continue with thisincident action plan that I see
number one set up or, throughmy evaluation, have the critical
factors changed and or gottenworse, where we have to make a
change in the incident actionplan.
That change can be very subtle.
It can be, oh okay, I need toreinforce some positions or I
need to assign a couple morecompanies to key tactical

(45:16):
positions.
Or it can be, oh no, no, ifthis thing's gotten way worse,
we're making a wholesale changeand doing a 180, and we're going
to go from the offensive todefensive strategy.
Those are kind of the two endsof the spectrum in the changes.
But if things are going alongsmoothly, we're headed in the
right direction.
Companies are where they needto be, we're seeing progress,

(45:36):
we're getting good reports.
I'm going to support that plan,that initial plan.
I'm going to build on top of itand then to a successful
completion of the tacticalobjectives.
And if not, then I'm going tomake some adjustment.
And I have this big, I have abunch of leeway here in what I
can do in these adjustments, andso that is utilizing the system

(45:59):
, clearly understanding, maybe,the initial plan and what the
plan should be now, because it'schanged from whenever the
initial plan.
The conditions have changedfrom whenever the initial plan
was implemented, so I need toadjust it.
I'm going to be fluid and I'mgoing to measure these variables
and figure out is it right oris it isn't.

Speaker 3 (46:19):
And if it isn't, I'm going to be fluid and I'm going
to measure these variables andfigure out is it right or is it
isn't, and if it isn't, I'mgoing to fix it.
Yeah, so the very first thing Iguess when that strategic guy
sees pulling up is and it's anobvious thing in our system, but
I just want to mention it is ifthey're in the wrong strategy
when you're pulling up, then youneed to change that, like right
now, Number one job.
That's a strategy, has, you know, the biggest impact.

(46:39):
So, and it's possible, you knowyou're pulling up seven minutes
later what it looks like now,what they described when they
pulled up, and they are in thereworking for seven minutes and
it don't look like they've madeprogress.
We're going to change, like wewould change Right, and then
that's not very often at all,but we would do that Right,
we're not we, we, we wouldn'teven go through any other
process, probably it would justbe no, this is not looking good.

(47:01):
We're going to changestrategies.
And then the beauty of thesystem and we have tons of
examples of this during thecommand transfer, where that IC1
is giving IC2 the can reportthe needs part, very specific on
yeah, my next assignment is Iwas going to have truck seven
who may be on deck already, orlevel one, they were going to do
this, and it's like, oh, that,just that is.

(47:24):
That's like the hug and thekiss of the system, right there,
right, it's just like OK, it'sdialed in, like everybody's on
the same page.
The incident commander is likeoh, I like it.
Yeah, we're, we're going.
That's when you're going downthat same path, right.
Yeah, we're going.
That's when you're going downthat same path.
Right, ic1 had this.
They know what needed to bedone, they know who's there,
what's the next assignment, whatneeds to happen.
We kind of had that in a waywith a recent audio thing from

(47:48):
Cobb County where you know whatwas Truck 17's assignment.
I was going to have them dosearch or I hadn't assigned them
, but I was going to have themdo search and the next
assignment is, you know, truck17.
I want you to make sure you'regetting all clear of that.
First, you know whatever, sothat's everybody being on the
same page, right, and thenyou're verifying position and
function and all of that.
And to circle back to, if youwant to hear what some of this

(48:10):
sounds like, listen to some ofthese, listen to all of these
live audio things that we putout from these working incidents
.
Uh, you want to know why wegive, um, we, why we put an
incident action plan out and whywe communicate the way we do.
Well, uh, the cop, the CobbCounty audio from you know, late

(48:30):
July, early August, um, acompany keys up, you know we, we
can get an all clear of thisarea and other companies like
engine 17.
We already got, we can get anall clear of this area.
And another company's likeengine 17,.
We already got, we already gotan all clear of that, it's all
clear.
Or truck 17, or whoever it was,it don't matter who.
The company was Right, it's likeno, everybody's on the same
page, and that that's what kindof goes back to that duplication

(48:51):
of effort thing.
Right, well, I want to go dothis, that's what I do.
Well, it's already been done.
So why do you really want to dothat anyway?
But they probably didn't knowthat it had been done.
But in the system that companyhad, it was important that they
say that.
Because, like, why are we goingto put them in there?
Because everybody on thatincident knew they were going
down the path that we'rechanging strategies here.
We already got significant fireand we got a collapse.

(49:12):
We're just waiting to get anall clear of these other spaces
and we're going.
This thing's transitioning todefensive and again going back
to it.
That's the beauty of the systemand everybody being on the same
page and while we communicatethe incident action plan so that
everybody on the fire ground ison the same page, there's no
secrets.

Speaker 2 (49:32):
Well, before we wrap up this part of the conversation
and get to the timelesstactical truths, if you're
watching us on video, you knowthat the buzz is pretty exciting
here.

Speaker 1 (49:41):
Is that what I just felt?

Speaker 2 (49:42):
Yeah, that was the buzz.
Okay, they're getting ready toopen the doors here pretty soon,
so we're going to get to atimeless tactical truth.
But do you have any lastthoughts on incident action plan
?
I know this is just a surfaceview, but we wanted to talk
about why it is so important.

Speaker 1 (49:57):
As your plan goes, so goes your safety and
effectiveness on the fire ground.
If you suck at coming up withplans because you don't take the
time to actually size up andyou have no ability to measure
risk and you have no ability todefine strategy, you have a
chance that your plan will suck.
And if that plan sucks badenough, you will end up with bad

(50:18):
things happening to yourcommunity or your firefighters
on the fire ground and we'llchalk that up to a predictable
surprise Right.
Anybody looking from theoutside who knows and
understands the process will gooh no, I know I can tell you
exactly what occurred there andwhy that was, why that was
problematic.

Speaker 2 (50:48):
And we can.
Everybody else can act like, oh, we had no idea that could have
possibly happened.
No, you actually can't pick itout.
This is another volume twoWe've been hitting this lately.
We're going to go back tovolume one next week because
that is now available at the BShifter store for 10 bucks.
I believe it has been out ofprint for such a long time.
But now you can get the book atB Shifter dot com.

(51:10):
I know we saw some of them oneBay going for big dollars.
I've seen guys photocopying itand sharing it, so now you can
actually get it for yourself.
So last one from volume two fora period of time.
This one says from AVB certainstreet knowledge does not begin
with information.
It begins with experience andperception.

(51:31):
But there is a dark and twistyroad from experience and
perception to correct action.
And when we talk about thecompany officer, the chief,
coming in and developing thisIAP blue card training is one of

(51:53):
the very important elements ofthat, but there are some other
important elements in being agood officer.

Speaker 1 (52:04):
good officer, yeah Well, when I hear that JV, I
think of folks who takeparticular experience and action
and they try to apply thateverywhere right Now.
It becomes universal truth foreverything in their own mind.
And it's no, it's not the onlything that's universal is the
process.
Your evaluation of the processor your utilization of the
process really becomes yoursuccess.

(52:25):
So that deep and dark place Ithink he's talking about becomes
using that experience whetherit's accidental success or
legitimate success and applyingit everywhere.
And that doesn't work.
You have to actually connectthat too.
And so to your point isutilizing the system, practicing

(52:47):
the system as a part of your.
The way you train keeps you outof that right, because then you
start actually approachingevery incident very
independently.
And I'm focused on the process,not experience or what I want
to do here.

Speaker 3 (53:03):
we're going to do actually what we need to do here
yeah, I think it's a a matterof fact thing is you, you can
get away with what you get awaywith until you don't get away
with it, and that's thataccidental success thing, right?
So, uh, for 30 years, this iswhat I did and it worked and I
never got caught Right.
And, um, that doesn't mean thatit was right and I'll make it

(53:27):
the simplest thing possible of Inever wear my seatbelt.
Well, you never wore yourseatbelt until that day and you
didn't have it on and you gotcaught right and whatever
happened to you happened to you.
Well, that's kind of that.
Like your, your experiencematters.
But, uh, when you look at it,big picture, if you're just, if

(53:50):
you're getting away with whatyou're doing because of that
experience, that doesn't make itright.
So it kind of comes back to aline of you better be doing
everything right when somethinggoes wrong and you know what,
know what does that look like?
And I think in the system, um,that means you're, you're,
you're using the system andyou're actually, you know,
diagnosing the problem andyou're taking action based off

(54:12):
of what, what you have and whatyou can do, what you have the
capability of doing.
Um, and we hear, and we hear itall the time when you're a
fireman we were just talkingabout this recently and I think
Nick and Terry and Pat were justtalking about it as well when
you're a fireman, you have atotally different perspective
than when I'm a lieutenant, andwhen I'm a lieutenant I have a

(54:34):
different perspective than thecaptain and the battalion chief
and the operations chief and thefire chief, right.
So I have the opportunity andI'm thankful for it to talk to
so many people all across thecountry on a very regular basis
that are making transitions toour system or trying to figure
our system out.
Or you know, we're not doingthat system because we don't

(54:55):
like it, but I do want to talkto you about it because what
does it do?
And you know, sometimes theyoftentimes they were in a
battalion chief's role andthey're like, yeah, we are not
doing that.
And I got like five cases in thelast year where people were
promoted from battalion chief tooperations chief and they're
like, yeah, we, how do?
How fast can we start this?
Because I had no idea that thecompanies outside of my

(55:16):
battalion were doing what theywere doing or not doing what
they were doing, right, and itkind of comes back to that
experience thing that theirstreet credibility, that
person's street credibility.
When they were a fireman,company officer, battalion and a
battalion or in a area they sawthat they maybe didn't see what
was going on everywhere else.
And then they get to this otherposition and they're looking at

(55:38):
it from 30,000 feet and they'relike I own all of this and I'm
responsible for it and we'regoing to do something different
because we are all over theplace.
And I mean a very good friend ofmine at a large Metro city, you
know, made that transition fouror five years ago and was
totally against it SOP driven,his entire career worked in the

(55:58):
same district, didn't have, youknow, exposure to everybody, he
knew everybody, whatever, butdidn't have becomes the ops
chief.
And I was like no, we, how havewe gotten away with what we've
gotten away with?

Speaker 2 (56:14):
So well, and I think firefighters have this
perception of of chiefs andmaybe even their company
officers that well.
Why do we have to do it thisway?
Because when you're 25 andyou're two years into the job,
your perception and yourexperience level even though you
might be a very smart person isway different, as well as your

(56:35):
responsibility level.
When you're the company officer, now you're responsible for the
company.
When you become a battalionchief, now you're responsible
for everybody inside the hazardzone.
When you're the ops chief,you're responsible for everybody
on the fire department.
So that's how those decisionsare made, and you don't get it
until you get it.
I mean, once you land in thatseat, then your eyes open up and

(56:57):
you realize like well, now, nowit's different, and that's
that's when we see people makethat change.
Yeah Well, josh Bloom, chrisStewart, thanks so much for
hanging out.
We've had a great week again.
This is a week removed from FireRescue International in Orlando
, but that's where we'rerecording this right now.
I want to ask you to do me afavor.
If you haven't done so already,please like and subscribe our

(57:19):
podcast.
If you subscribe, you get it inyour inbox every week and you
don't miss one of them.
So we want you to be able tocontinue to support the
V-Shifter podcast that way Untilnext week.
Thanks so much for listening.
Thanks, guys, We'll talk to youlater.
Thanks, john, see you, we'llsee you next time.