September 11, 2024 • 51 mins
On Back Story with Dana Lewis this week, Israel's leader P.M. Netanyahu is seeking to drive a wedge into America's political landscape. Will it back fire? Former Israeli diplomat and advisor to multiple foreign ministers Alon Pinkas, believes Netanyahu is courting disaster.
And Pinkas says Trump's remarks in the election debate on Israel, amount to a "concentrated pile of nonsense". Kamala Harris he says is right to pursue a two state solution.
Israel and Gaza is one war to solve, but there are increasing calls for the Ukraine Russia war to enter ceasefire talks. Is there a path to peace, or at least a map to getting the shooting stopped? Colgate Political Science Prof. Masha Hedberg says the options for resolution are many, but neither side appears willing to put the brakes on now, but maybe later this year?
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Dana Lewis (00:00):
On Kamala Harris from Donald Trump.
She hates Israel.
At the same time, in her ownway, she hates the Arab
population because the wholeplace is going to get blown up.
Arabs, jews, jewish people,israel, israel will be gone,
said Trump last night.
Yeah, your reaction.
Alon Pinkas (00:18):
I mean a more concentrated pile of nonsense is
really hard to utter tradedpile of nonsense is really hard
to utter.
Masha Hedberg (00:29):
They're asking Zelensky to formulate more
realistic plans about whatUkraine can achieve militarily
this year.
So I do think Zelensky is undera great deal of pressure in a
way that I don't think Putin is.
Dana Lewis (00:50):
Hi everyone and welcome to another edition of
Backstory.
I'm Dana Lewis.
23 years ago, terrorists fromAl-Qaeda attacked the World
Trade Center in New York, 2,977people killed.
They also flew a plane into thePentagon, hijacked and crashed
another aircraft in Pennsylvania.
As a news correspondent for NBC, within days I would pack my
(01:13):
bag and head for Tajikistan andthen on into Afghanistan to
cover the beginning of the waron terror.
Now there is a war in Europebetween Russia and Ukraine,
started by Russia, and almost ayear of fighting in Gaza between
Hamas and Israel.
Is there a way out of thisescalating violence?
Well, we speak to one of myfavorites Israeli, alon Pincus,
(01:36):
on Gaza and a possible widerMiddle East war, and Masha
Hedberg has just written areport on possible solutions to
Russia-Ukraine.
Alon Pink has served as thechief of staff to two foreign
ministers.
He was a foreign policy advisorfor.
Alon Pinkas (01:59):
Yeah.
Dana Lewis (02:01):
They changed quickly.
Wait a minute now.
You were for Ehud Barak and youwere for Shimon Peres.
What are the other two?
Alon Pinkas (02:08):
Professor Shlomo Ben-Ami, who was foreign
minister, and David Levy, whowas foreign minister.
I was chief of staff to allfour.
Dana Lewis (02:16):
Wow, you've been on the government payroll for a
long time.
Alon Pinkas (02:19):
No, I told you, they changed quickly.
Government's fault.
Dana Lewis (02:23):
Okay, thank you for sending me.
You were also the ConsulGeneral of New York City.
I'm not redoing that intro.
We're going to let it play theway it is and I'm very impressed
, especially on who some ofthese were, and we're very lucky
to talk to Alon.
Here's the quote, because youand I were just talking off
camera about the debate lastnight On Kamala Harris from
(02:45):
Donald Trump.
She hates Israel.
At the same time, in her ownway, she hates the Arab
population because the wholeplace is going to get blown up.
Arabs, jews, jewish people,israel, israel will be gone,
said Trump last night.
Yeah, your reaction.
Alon Pinkas (03:01):
I mean, a more concentrated pile of nonsense is
really hard to utter.
He could have attacked her onthe you know, on the
Biden-Parrish administration'spolicy.
He could have attacked her forbeing a progressive liberal who
sides with the Palestinians,which is not true, but it would
(03:21):
have been a legitimate line ofattack.
Instead, he went low becauseyou know, this is what he does
and this is who he is.
She hates Israel and if she'spresident, Israel will be gone,
Israel will disappear, Israelwill be annihilated in two years
.
Dana Lewis (03:39):
So you let me jump in there.
Who's he reaching out to?
Is that evangelical voters, orwhere does he?
I mean, they spin that all thetime A evangelical voters B.
Alon Pinkas (04:02):
he's trying to create to make Israel.
He with the help of MrNetanyahu for a long time, to
make Israel a wedge issuebetween Democrats and
Republicans.
He thinks that if the war goeson and he accuses Harris of
being anti-Israeli, throwingIsrael under the bus,
threatening to curtail armsshipments, whatever you're going
to have a sizable group ofpeople who support Israel and
the US but are unhappy with them.
Then we're thinking maybe Ishouldn't vote, to come out and
(04:22):
vote.
Dana Lewis (04:23):
And you said Netanyahu does the same thing.
They're creating this so-calledwedge issue, and is that
dangerous for Israel?
Alon Pinkas (04:30):
Very dangerous.
Netanyahu has been doing it formany years.
I mean, he failed every time hetried to do so.
But you know, you go back toMarch 2015,.
His speech in Congress againstthe JCPOA, the Iran nuclear deal
, which essentially was a speechagainst Barack Obama.
You go back to his courting ofevangelicals during the Clinton
(04:52):
administration.
You go, you know it's endless,but you know it's a funny thing
that you mentioned Dana, becausehere's Trump saying that if
Kamala Harris is president,israel will be destroyed, and
here's Netanyahu saying that ifhe doesn't stay prime minister,
israel will be destroyed.
So what do these two have incommon?
That they're both talkingnonsense about this?
(05:15):
Now, but, if I may, on the verysame, it was a uniquely Trumpian
moment when he was asked byDavid Muir from ABC News what
would you have done differentlyon October 7th in terms of the
(05:35):
Hamas attack on Israel and theensuing war in Gaza?
And here's Trump saying if Iwere president, it would not
have happened.
How exactly is unclear.
And then the second sentence hesays and Putin would not have
invaded Ukraine.
Now that's genius, dana, thatreally is genius.
(05:55):
So if he were president onOctober 2023, putin would not
have invaded Ukraine in February2020.
Not the first time he said it.
Yeah, I know.
How he reconciles the timelineand the two issues is beyond me.
Aside from talking nonsense,what can I say?
Dana Lewis (06:20):
Well, he pushes out , he's a strongman image and the
world will roll out the carpetbefore him, unlike the Democrats
.
But I mean that's his messagingright.
But you know, today is and itstruck me, I don't know why,
because we've had 23 of them,but it's the 23rd anniversary of
9-11.
I know I was there in New Yorklooking at it.
(06:42):
Were you consul general?
Then yes.
I know I was there in New Yorklooking at it.
Were you consul general?
Then yes.
So when people draw a parallelbetween October, the 6th in
(07:04):
Israel and 9-11, is thatover-exaggeration?
Alon Pinkas (07:05):
Is it fair?
Look, the sources of bothattacks is radical Islamic
terrorism.
There's no question about that,and radical Islamic terrorism
should be dealt with forcefullyand with determination and
resoluteness.
However, if you look at thecontext, it's quite different.
No-transcript how I see it, butin their eyes this was an act
(08:18):
of resistance to an occupationthat's going on for 57 years,
since 1967, that Gaza isencircled, that Gaza is under
siege, that Gaza is starving, etcetera, et cetera, et cetera.
That and their twisted,distorted minds, justifies the
savage and barbaric attack ofOctober 7th.
(08:39):
So you know there aresimilarities.
But you know, and if you gointo the technology and the
tactics, both were surprises,both supposedly came out of the
blue.
In retrospect they didn't, andthe signs were there Washington
(09:10):
and Pennsylvania, where all fourjets crashed for all concern
that was out of the blue forIsrael.
Dana Lewis (09:19):
Misleading itself into thinking that Hamas is
deterred and would not dare dosomething on this scale.
That was out of the blue aswell.
But doesn't that play to?
You know?
23 years war on terror, I thinkwe just got.
We probably harvested a crop ofmore radical Islamic groups,
some of them on the rebound now,23 years later.
But for Netanyahu to stand infront of the Israeli public all
(09:41):
the time and say there's noleaving Gaza now, I mean, if we
do, hamas is just going toregroup and we have to defeat
them this time, just not allowthem to thrive in an enclosed
area.
That seems to, you know, playwith some of the Israeli public,
you know, with the caveat thatit should be the priority.
(10:03):
But yeah, staying in thePhiladelphia corridor waiting in
Gaza.
The Israelis seem to support me.
Alon Pinkas (10:13):
No, 90% of Israelis don't know what the
Philadelphia corridor is.
They don't understand why it'simportant.
Dozens of former generals havestood up and said it is totally
insignificant, particularly whenweighed against a hostage deal.
Netanyahu did nothing about thePhiladelphia corridor for 15
(10:36):
years as prime minister, withthe exception of two years in
which he was not, or almost twoyears in which he was not prime
minister.
In fact, when the war began, ittook him nine months before he
even devoted or allocated forcesto deal with the Philadelphia
corridor.
So this is just an excuse and apretext for him to prolong the
(10:58):
war.
Now, what you said, the premiseof what you said, is absolutely
right.
Israelis want to eradicateHamas, but Israelis also don't
understand the cost of doing so.
The cost of doing so isoccupying the Gaza Strip.
When he says we will not leavethe Gaza Strip, what does he
mean?
That the status quo that existsnow will be extended.
(11:24):
Fine, so call us ceasefire.
If you're leaving the forcesthere, you're not going further
in no incursions, no furtheroccupation, no further
conquering.
Then why not call for aceasefire?
If you want to choke them, youdon't need to fight, you just
choke them.
(11:44):
Right them.
You don't need to fight, youjust choke them, right.
It's not making sense, otherthan it is a lame and unserious
excuse for him to prolong thewar for his own reasons.
One of those reasons I'm tyingthe two issues we've discussed
until now, dana.
One of those issues is that hereached he Netanyahu reached the
conclusion that it is best forhim to extend the war, prolong
(12:07):
the war, not seek a ceasefireslash hostage deal until after
the election in America.
He thinks this is his side ofplaying the Israel as a wedge
issue.
Dana Lewis (12:21):
Because the American election brings him.
Alon Pinkas (12:24):
Well, he hopes Trump will win.
He's not making a secret ofthat, by the way.
If Trump wins and says to him,you have two weeks to end this
war, he will end that war.
But you know, this is mespeculating on speculation,
speculating about a conversationthat's based on a speculation
(12:44):
that but he wants Trump.
Dana Lewis (12:46):
Because?
Why?
Because the Republicans are notpushing a two-state solution.
Alon Pinkas (12:50):
Because the Republicans don't give a damn
about what's going on in theIsraeli-Palestinian issue.
Dana Lewis (12:56):
All right, you've called Netanyahu a vile messiah
leading a cult of death and lies, and a rogue prime minister is
turning Israel into a roguestate.
Some of the articles that youwrite in Arez.
You know you don't pull anypunches, right, and do you
actually?
Is that harsh on Netanyahu?
(13:18):
Yeah, is it in your?
Also your reading of somethingelse?
You said that what he says inHebrew and what he says in
English are two different thingsand to understand them you
should listen to his Hebrew.
Alon Pinkas (13:30):
Yeah, well, even his Hebrew has some version, but
certainly when compared to howhe speaks in English, it's an
entirely different person.
In English he makes all thesespurious claims that you know.
He intends to seek a ceasefire,he wants an agreement, he's
working hard, he's okay InHebrew.
(13:51):
He doesn't even bother to saythose things.
He says, as you accuratelydescribed it we need to stay in
Gaza.
This war will not end untilHamas is destroyed.
Otherwise, I'm quoting you,quoting him, otherwise they will
regroup, etc.
Etc.
Now, yeah, well, look, I don'tpull any punches because he
(14:12):
earned it, because you know, Ithink he has caused severe I
don't want to say irreversible,because there's no such thing
but he has caused severe damageto Israel internally in terms of
society, the cohesiveness, theIsraeli narrative, how people
(14:35):
relate to each other.
He caused a complete disconnectbetween the military and the
government, between the militaryand the government.
He caused an unarmed at thispoint, a nonviolent civil war
between his core base and theso-called elites, and he has
(14:57):
tarnished Israel's brandinternationally in a way that is
almost unprecedented.
I cannot recall, and I'veresearched this.
I'd love to hear someone tellme that there is a precedent.
I have never seen a democracydiminishing itself or destroying
its self-value the way he hasdone to Israel.
(15:21):
I've seen other countries dothat.
Dana Lewis (15:23):
Yeah, but not a democracy very quickly, because
I know we're out of time.
Um gaza, I mean alone you.
You live in israel.
You follow this minute byminute.
People are confused now.
They don't understand whereit's headed, what is the way out
of it.
Is there going to be a?
(15:45):
You know a lot of people.
You know even israelis.
73.5 percent of israelis arepessimistic about the likelihood
of a deal.
Where are we headed?
Where are we?
Alon Pinkas (15:55):
now.
Well, they're pessimistic abouta deal because they don't trust
Netanyahu.
70% support a deal, Not becausethey see some kind of
compromise or conciliation withHamas, but because they don't
trust Netanyahu.
It's not headed anywhere untilafter the American election.
(16:20):
Let me repeat what I said a fewmoments ago I don't, you know.
The issue right now, believe itor not, is not even gossip, but
the renewed potential forescalation in both the West Bank
, but also in Lebanon, vis-a-visHezbollah and with Iran.
(16:41):
This all serves a narrativeNathaniel's narrative that this
was not about a Hamas attack onthe 7th of October, but this is
a broad war, 360 degreeencirclement, a civilizational
conflict, which is why, ofcourse, he is absolved of any
responsibility, because you knowhow could he avoid it, how
(17:03):
could he have, you know, avoidedit altogether.
This is a false and flawednarrative.
That's why I don't pull anypunches.
Dana Lewis (17:15):
Are you concerned?
People don't understand thedifference.
A lot of my friends wouldn'teven understand the difference
between Gaza and the West Bank alot of them.
But I spent years as a reporterin the West Bank.
A lot of it was secular, notvery radical.
Hamas was a minor minor groupwith the Islamic Jihad and
others.
I mean the PLO dominated there.
(17:37):
There were lots of moderates.
This week alone, I mean, we'veseen this fired up in Jenin and
elsewhere.
Are you worried about what theWest Bank is becoming?
Is it just becoming anotherGaza right now and very quickly
deteriorating?
Alon Pinkas (17:53):
Yeah, I am, I am.
You're absolutely right.
You know, there's enough blameon both sides and there's no
point in relitigating the factthat there hasn't been a
political process for over adecade.
I mean, the last time anythingwas tried was when John Kerry
was Secretary of State in 2014and came here in what became an
(18:18):
exercise in futility, trying toresuscitate some kind of a peace
process not even a politicalprocess, let's not even be
pretentious and call it a peaceprocess and occupation remained
intact and settlements grew andthe military friction or
(18:45):
interaction between Israel andthe Palestinian population in
the West Bank grew.
Israel consistently anddeliberately, by design,
weakened the Palestinianauthority, which, to begin with,
was sort of borderlinedysfunctional, with a lot of
corruption there.
But Netanyahu was happy to dohis part.
(19:06):
I was happy.
That's why, in his twistedlogic, he even strengthened
hamas, because if you strengthenhamas, by extension, you weaken
the palestinian authority, andwhen you do that, when people
pressure you, why not engage thepalestinian?
He said me I want peace, butlook, look at them.
I, you know you can't talk tothem.
(19:27):
They're radicalizing as wespeak, there's no one to talk.
I said you know what?
Fine, you're right, you'remaking a point.
What is your alternative?
Because see, here's the thingwhat if the Palestinians
renounce armed struggle and justask to be annexed to Israel?
You want us, you have us, oneby national state.
(19:50):
We're just asking for one thingone man, one vote.
Uh, we want to be enfranchised.
Um, we don't want a palestinianstate.
You've turned the palestinianstate into a?
Um impossibility, uh, somethingthat's unfeasible and not
viable.
Israel would never go alongwith that.
Well, what would is do then?
My point is we don't want you.
(20:12):
If you don't want us, then getthe hell out.
But here's my problem with MrNetanyahu.
I can understand hisreservations, fears and
anxieties over a Palestinianstate Truly I can.
If not a Palestinian state,what then?
(20:35):
Because he, in 15 years inpower, not once did he come up
with an idea, not once.
Dana Lewis (20:43):
Do you have?
Does Alon Pincus have asolution?
Alon Pinkas (20:49):
There are various solutions out there.
We could shoot them downConfederation between Israel,
Jordan and the Palestinianentity.
A Kosovo-like NATO protectorate, A state in the making, a
gradual state in the making.
Dana Lewis (21:10):
Without, maybe not an armed state, maybe don't
control the borders.
Alon Pinkas (21:14):
They won't.
No, no control, demilitarized.
Without any control of theborders, you don't touch
Jerusalem.
In the next five years, theissue of Jerusalem.
There are a lot of ideas thatcan be entertained or at least
be a platform on which you candevelop some kind of a process.
(21:35):
You don't have to have theexact, detailed nuts and bolts,
level and results in front ofyou.
Let's start with this.
He hasn't done any of that, anyof that.
Dana Lewis (21:48):
The key is and correct me, because you know,
what do I know but the key is ifyou actually had a sincere
government that wanted toresolve the Palestinian issue
with the Palestinians, there arePalestinian moderates out there
that you can talk to and youcould probably come up with.
I mean, a lot of the solutionsare already known.
Alon Pinkas (22:11):
I mean, that's my point.
This is not reinventing slicedbread.
This is not a eureka moment.
Oh, here's a solution no oneever thought, or a modality that
no one ever thought.
It's all there.
It's all there.
More of the same is bad.
So triangulate, take a littlefrom here and a little from here
(22:35):
and a little from here, but forthat you need some kind of a
vision and goodwill.
Neither side has those.
Dana Lewis (22:43):
Right and moderates that will reassure one another
that they're not going to turnweapons on each other the next
day.
Right, and they are there.
I mean, those people are thereon both sides.
Alon Pinkas (22:53):
Yep.
Dana Lewis (22:54):
Alon Pincus.
I wish we had more time.
Thank you so much, sir, mypleasure, Dana.
Alon Pinkas (22:59):
Thank you.
Dana Lewis (23:04):
Masha Hedberg is an assistant professor of
political science at ColgateUniversity and she joins me now
from New York.
Hi, Masha, Great to meet you.
Masha Hedberg (23:12):
Good morning Dana.
Good to meet you.
Oh, I'm sorry.
Dana Lewis (23:16):
Everybody increasingly is talking about
peace between Russia and Ukraine, not because there appears to
be a promise of peace, butbecause this war has been
dragging on, now into its thirdyear, and people are looking for
, you know, pathways to peace.
(23:37):
And that was all what you havewritten about and documented and
given a lot of great backgroundon the report that you've
written, and that's why I wantedto interview you.
Interview you and what struckme that I really didn't
understand until you kind ofwrapped it up for me is that
(23:57):
there have been already some 25proposals on ending the fighting
.
Am I overstating that?
Masha Hedberg (24:03):
number.
I don't think you'reoverstating that number.
I think you're understatingthat number.
What I found?
There've been a gamut of ideas.
I picked 25 because that was animaginable number.
These were 25 of the moreprominent ones, but I guarantee
you that if I had cast the netmore widely, I would have found
(24:26):
additional proposals of whatcould be considered a proposal,
even if they call themselvessomething else.
Dana Lewis (24:32):
Did you, in examining all these proposals,
see a path forward?
Easy question, very difficult.
You have to weigh so much inanswering that right.
Masha Hedberg (24:48):
I personally think that there are a number of
routes to consider.
Unfortunately, there isn'tgoing to be one path that is
going to thrill everyone.
The least worst option and hope, hoping that you know that will
(25:11):
satisfy enough of each side'sdemands to make peace possible.
Right, but was I inspired byjust one approach that I read?
Unfortunately no.
Dana Lewis (25:25):
Okay.
So why don't we chip away at it?
And it begins, it seems to me,that anything that would be
considered would be a phased-inapproach.
So there isn't going to be agrand summit I mean, who knows?
But there isn't going to be agrand summit where they
establish a ceasefire and saythese are the ways forward for
(25:48):
peace and there's a grandagreement, the waves forward for
peace and there's a grandagreement.
Masha Hedberg (25:52):
Originally, I think that was the hope, and a
lot of the proposals do envisionsome grand agreement that,
quite frankly, satisfies all ofUkraine's demands.
But there is this.
Originally, in the beginning,the earlier proposals saw
precisely that that there wouldbe a grand agreement that
resolves a lot of theoutstanding issues, whether it
(26:13):
is the status of Ukraine as aneutral country or a NATO member
, the territorial question.
So I think early on, ourambitions, our hopes, were quite
maximalist.
Now I think you're right.
Realistically speaking, we arelooking at a much slower
approach where the two sidesmight be able to find agreement
(26:35):
on smaller issues, might be ableto agree to a ceasefire.
You say it is.
Then, is that the core of theconflict to begin with?
That, you think, going to beone of the thorniest issues?
to resolve because it is binaryyes or no right, there's very
(27:17):
little room for compromise,although there's some ways of, I
think, creating an adequatesecurity architecture even if
NATO is off the table.
But I think the other reallythorny issue is going to be one
of territory, and I don't meanCrimea, but I mean the territory
that Russia now partially orfully controls and that it
(27:38):
acquired control over after 2022.
Dana Lewis (27:41):
How close do you think?
Masha Hedberg (27:43):
Sorry, go ahead.
I think these are the two mainissues, right the future status
of Ukraine as a non-aligned,possibly non-nuclear, power and
the territorial question.
Dana Lewis (27:54):
How close do you think we were to some kind of a
deal in the spring of 2022 inWidenegg?
Masha Hedberg (28:05):
there are credible reports that say that
the two sides were closer to adeal that would that might have
halted the fighting.
At that point I was not there,but given the recent reporting,
given the documents that I'veread, it seems that a deal might
have been possible.
But remember, at the timethings were moving so quickly,
(28:29):
right, that it's really hard tosay the deal could have been
broken off at any point.
But I do think the two sideshad agreed well, one to keep
Ukraine neutral in return forvery, very strong security
guarantees by some biginternational players.
(28:49):
And, what's interesting, thetwo sides had agreed to postpone
the question of territory tolater negotiations.
So already you see that theidea that we can't resolve all
issues at the same time is kindof prominently on display.
Dana Lewis (29:05):
It's kind of prominently on display In terms
of an armed Ukraine.
The deal was that Ukraine wouldlay down its arms, become a
neutral state, maybe disarmaltogether.
I mean, it seems like we'rejust so far beyond that now.
The suggestion that Ukrainewould ever now give up its arms
(29:26):
and demilitarize is prettyfar-fetched, Would you agree?
Masha Hedberg (29:30):
I would agree.
I think right now we are veryfar-fetched and the kind of
limits on Ukraine's militarythat Russia wanted back in 2022
no longer seem feasible.
But you can think of that'sanother thorny issue that will
have to be confronted.
Is that will have to beconfronted?
(29:55):
Is you know how do you create aUkrainian military that is kind
of strong enough to withstandany future aggression or at
least deter any futureaggression, while also kind of
getting Russia to agree to thosekind of much higher limits on
Ukrainian reserves, firepower,military in general?
Dana Lewis (30:17):
I mean that gets pretty complicated, right.
I mean we can spend a lot oftime talking about it or not,
but I think if you're going tostart talking about an armed
Ukraine, but it would only be adefensive force, then you start
getting into all sorts oflong-term negotiations about the
kind of weapons it would have.
Could they reach Russia?
You know, medium-range missiles, short-range I mean.
(30:41):
Those negotiations could takeyears.
I mean they're very complicated.
Masha Hedberg (30:46):
Negotiations could take years.
I mean, they're verycomplicated.
Those negotiations could takeyears.
But what was interesting is tosee that a number of proposals,
particularly recent ones, havebegun to consider precisely
those questions that if Ukraineagrees to some limits on its
military, then Russia would alsoneed to agree not to position
troops With the border ofUkraine.
(31:07):
There have been some ideasabout who would be a credible
monitor.
So we're kind of getting to theidea that to get peace we're
not going to have to, we're notgoing to resolve.
We have to resolve both the bigissues, but probably start
smaller and then build up toheck what happens to Crimea and
(31:31):
Ukraine would.
Dana Lewis (31:33):
You discussed this in what you've written, but I
mean, many other people havetalked about it as well.
Okay, so you want, if you wantthe fighting to stop, and you
don't want Ukraine in NATO thenwhat does Ukraine get in return?
And what they would want aresecurity guarantees.
And the only way thoseguarantees mean anything it
can't be a promise betweenRussia and Ukraine then you have
(31:54):
to have, you know, people likemaybe Turkey, the United States,
different countries in Europe,that would guarantee the
security of Ukraine if Russiawere to rearm, regroup, relaunch
a war.
So in a way, there's a bit ofsmoke and mirrors there on.
(32:14):
Ok, if Ukraine was to shelveNATO membership, if, if, if,
they would in fact probably havesecurity guarantors that are in
NATO.
Fair enough.
Masha Hedberg (32:28):
Fair enough.
I think that's what a lot ofthe plans suggest, that then the
United States, the EU, perhapsother NATO members would be the
major guarantors.
There have been also someproposals that it would just be
the EU, that one of the thingsthat if NATO membership is off
the table, eu membership iscertainly still on the EU, that
one of the things that if NATOmembership is off the table, eu
membership is certainly still onthe table, and say that we
(32:52):
forget that EU membership alsocomes with some security
commitments.
I'm not sure that would besatisfying to Ukraine.
Dana Lewis (33:04):
Can you fill that out a bit?
I mean, that's a new one on me.
What would be the securitycommitments if you're a member
of the EU, if there's a Europeanarmy formed?
You mean?
Masha Hedberg (33:15):
Well, there are.
Yes, there's this less knownstipulation that EU members have
to come to the defense of otherEU members in case of
aggression.
Right.
Eu members in case ofaggression, right?
Obviously, the question is, dothey have the capacity to come
to each other's aid without theaid of NATO?
Right?
But there is some idea thatthere are also security
(33:37):
obligations as part of the EUmembership.
They're not well-developed, butInteresting.
Dana Lewis (33:44):
Can you talk to the notion of giving up territory?
I mean Crimea probably is setin a special place versus the
eastern regions that Putin hasillegally annexed.
Masha Hedberg (34:09):
I cannot envision a realistic scenario
under which Russia gives upCrimea, but there was this idea,
at least in the early attemptsat negotiation in 2022, in
spring 2022, where Ukraineseemed to suggest that Crimea
could be subject to futurenegotiations and Russia seemed
to agree to future negotiationsand Russia seemed to agree.
Whether we believe this or not,but there was this kind of it
(34:30):
was set down in writing that,all right, we can negotiate over
Crimea, which at the timeseemed like a surprising
concession by Russia.
But, let's say, crimea is offthe table.
What happens to the territoriesthat Russia now partially,
wholly, controls?
Some different ideas.
(34:51):
I think the more plausible oneis that, well, russia retains de
facto control, but Ukrainedoesn't recognize it formally,
right, and again, we make theseterritories subject to future
negotiations.
Not ideal.
Dana Lewis (35:09):
Yeah, not ideal, because it's not a frozen
conflict in the sense that thenyou know, Russia continues to
educate, to absorb those peoplefrom those regions to the point
that they would never want toreturn to Ukraine.
(35:31):
That would be Ukraine'sargument, right.
Masha Hedberg (35:36):
Well, some people argue that, in return,
ukraine gets to join the EU.
Or, you know, the idea is thiswhat is negotiable, what is not?
Some people propose thatterritory is negotiable.
Ukraine's status as anindependent, sovereign nation is
not.
So you might be able to.
Or the argument is that Ukraineshould be willing to
(35:58):
temporarily cede control, butnot formally renounce those
territories.
Control but not, you know,formally renounce those
territories.
Develop, grow further,democratize, right, and then who
knows what happens in 10 years?
Right, a lot can happen in 10years, 15 years.
Again, it's not a proposalthat's going to be loved by
(36:22):
anybody, right?
But it is again a proposalthat's been put out there for
consideration, because thealternative is continued
fighting.
But it's not clear thatcontinued fighting will help
resolve the territorial issueeither.
Dana Lewis (36:38):
Why not a kind of North-South Korea armistice,
where you stop shooting,everybody moves back two
kilometers and we freeze theconflict?
What is wrong?
Is that practical at all, orwhat do you think is wrong with
that?
Masha Hedberg (36:56):
Actually, there has been one proposal that says
that this is a good model tofollow, that right now the
United States and allies armUkraine as much as possible in
order to put it in a goodposition, but eventually we will
end up with a negotiatedarmistice.
So we fight and talk and atsome point, when both sides
(37:19):
decide that the fighting is nolonger worth it, we freeze the
conflict along whatever line,whatever battlefield line exists
at the time, and I have heard anumber of people say this is
possibly the most that we willget right.
So North and South Korea havesigned an armistice.
(37:39):
The armistice has held fordecades, but technically they're
still at war.
I think the big differencebetween that example.
Dana Lewis (37:50):
You can't exactly call that a success story either
, because they seem like they'reon the verge of war at
different times.
Masha Hedberg (37:56):
I think that's why people often say that an
armistice is not only unidealbut unstable.
You don't want perpetualtensions on the border between
Russia and Ukraine, right.
This will not only destabilizethat region but will have
spillover effects on Europe,right.
(38:18):
But is it better than continuedfighting that just causes more
death and destruction?
You know people take differentsides on that one, but I think
the difference between North andSouth Korea then and Ukraine
and Russia now is that rememberNorth and South Korea, we had a
bipolar world, we had the UnitedStates and we had the Soviet
(38:41):
Union, and right now therearen't two other big players
that can restrain the twobelligerents.
That no longer exists.
Dana Lewis (38:58):
So you've discussed a lot of the stated.
I mean, it's the statedphilosophy of a lot of different
people in Europe and in the US,and probably in Russia too,
that all this talk doesn'tmatter.
What really matters is whathappens on the ground.
And if you're able to driveyour argument on the ground, if
you're able to take territory,that's the most convincing
(39:21):
negotiating position of all.
The difficulty is that itdoesn't seem to be very
conclusive on either way.
Masha Hedberg (39:31):
Yes, I think why we haven't seen credible
negotiations is both sides stillthink they can make decisive
military gains that then skewthe negotiations in their favor,
the negotiations in their favor.
But we've also seen the pasttwo years where decisive
(39:53):
military victories have becomefew and far between, yeah, these
halting grinding advances.
Ukraine, for a while, was inlargely kind of a defensive
posture, obviously before Kursk,right.
So Ukraine is still capable ofmilitary surprises and I think
(40:23):
both sides still think they canwin the argument through
military means.
Right, and we're probably goingto see this for another year,
were probably going to see thisfor another year.
But I think it's becoming clearand clear that both sides are
very capable of inflictingdamage on each other.
But you know, militarily, Idon't see Ukraine capturing all
the territory that Russia hasgained since 2022.
(40:45):
Right, but we also don't seeRussia marching again on Kiev
and this time taking it by force.
Dana Lewis (40:55):
Right.
But Ukraine argues.
You know, bringing the war hometo Russians will convince Putin
that he's got to stop thefighting.
How much stock do you put inthat when you see them?
You know even this week firingdrones into Moscow they hit an
apartment building, hitting gasplants, trying to strike at
airports and freezing airspaceover Russia, increasingly having
(41:19):
long range missile capabilityand drone capability that
reaches pretty deep, 1,800kilometers inside Russia.
Masha Hedberg (41:30):
I agree, but it does reach pretty deep.
Those kind of attacks withinRussia have increased, but I
don't see Ukraine having enoughdrones, military capacity to
really shift the calculus in theKremlin Right.
Like if you think aboutsomething like the Kursk
Incursion daring, well-planned,really well-executed.
Dana Lewis (41:57):
But what did it change?
Masha Hedberg (41:58):
What did it change?
It certainly didn't change theway that the people in the
Kremlin or the Russian DefenseMinistry have thought about
their plans for further gains ineastern Ukraine, and I don't
see the Russian leadershipchanging course unless Ukraine
(42:19):
can really inflict serious,decisive damage, and I think the
potential for that is morelimited than Can you quickly
give me your thoughts onleadership?
Dana Lewis (42:39):
We often talk about leadership in the Kremlin and
how long President Putin canremain in power and how long
will he and who will succeed him, but we often don't pay much
attention to the Ukrainianleadership, and there have been
a lot of internal changesrecently and I think there's a
lot of things that are not beingspoken about in terms of
(42:59):
Zelensky's leadership and thosearound him and how Ukrainians
might be feeling about getting,you know, worn down and tired,
and how long is this going to goon?
I mean, they certainly seemcommitted and it's their country
(43:20):
to defend, but there's pressureon both leaderships, do you
agree?
Masha Hedberg (43:25):
I think there's more pressure on Zelensky than
there is on Putin, just by thenature of the politics in those
countries.
I think Zelensky is under agreat deal of pressure, but not
just from the Ukrainian public.
I think Zelensky is under agreat deal of pressure from
other Western governments.
What we see right now, I thinkUS Secretary of State Anthony
(43:50):
Blinken and the UK ForeignSecretary are visiting Kiev
right and again from what we'veread, they're asking Zelensky to
formulate more realistic plansabout what Ukraine can achieve
militarily this year, right.
So I do think Zelensky is undera great deal of pressure in a
(44:13):
way that I don't think Putin is.
But in terms of the Ukrainianpublic, yes, every indication is
that people are tired, peopleare weary of the war, people
want to return to normal lifeand that is exactly how you
would expect people to be right.
(44:34):
We all like our normal life, butit is also interesting that
when you look at opinion polls,still a majority of Ukrainians
do not support a negotiatedsettlement that makes Ukraine a
neutral state and that seedslarge swaths of territory in
(44:56):
eastern and southern Ukraine.
So I think the Ukrainian publicis still willing to live with
the dangers, the horrors, theeconomic and social dislocation,
at least for the time being.
In Russia you still see muchsupport for the government right
(45:18):
as well as though you do see anincreasing support for a
negotiated settlement.
But, interesting, when you askRussians what a negotiated
settlement would look like, atleast a third say the only kind
of acceptable negotiatedsettlement is the one that
results in a neutral Ukraine andRussia gets to keep the
territory it now wholly orpartially controls.
Dana Lewis (45:42):
Well, and the information that they have to
form that opinion is prettynarrow, based on
state-controlled media right, sothat could change pretty
quickly if the Kremlin decidesto program nightly television a
different way.
Masha Hedberg (45:57):
I think it would be easier for the Kremlin to
portray whatever they get as avictory right than it will be
for Zelensky and the Ukrainiangovernment.
Again, there are significantdifferences in the politics of
those two countries that makePutin's tasks easier.
Dana Lewis (46:19):
Just to wrap it up, do you want to make a
prediction on where we go in thenext 12 months, 18 months or
maybe shorter?
Masha Hedberg (46:29):
12 months, 18 months or maybe shorter, given
the unpredictability of politicsin both Europe and the United
States particularly the UnitedStates and the fact that this is
an election year where theresults are predictable Right.
Dana Lewis (46:45):
We should just mention, as we're recording this
we're doing this one day afterthe US presidential debate
between Trump and Kamala Harris,where, you know, trump again
said that the war would be overin 24 hours and Harris said,
essentially, your peace plan issurrender and you know,
president Putin would eat youfor lunch.
Quote unquote.
Masha Hedberg (47:07):
Thank you for filling that in, but exactly
this is the environment in whichyou're asking me to make a
prediction about the next 12months.
So I will do so, but I do sowith many, many cabinets.
I actually think that,unfortunately, for the next 12
months, we see continuedattempts to score military
(47:28):
victories.
I think we will find ourselvesin the same position we find
ourselves now, and we end up atthe negotiating table with
negotiations that are morelikely to favor Russia's
positions than Ukraine's, but Ithink concessions will need to
(47:49):
be made on both sides.
Dana Lewis (47:53):
Masha Hedberg, it's great to meet you, great to
talk to you and, yeah, thank youso much from the political
science department at ColgateUniversity.
Thank you, masha.
Masha Hedberg (48:02):
Thank you, Dana.
I really pleasure to meet youand have a wonderful afternoon
in London.
Dana Lewis (48:07):
And that's our backstory this week.
I watched the US debate lastnight.
I think Kamala Harris's remarkthat Putin would eat Donald
Trump for lunch Tough talk, butrealistically Trump's only
solution to that war would be tolet Russia win.
And that's not a plan.
It's surrender, capitulationand then what Putin moves on.
(48:29):
To fill in the blank, I'm DanaLewis.
Thanks for listening toBackstory.
No-transcript.
On Kamala Harris from Donald Trump.
She hates Israel.
At the same time, in her ownway, she hates the Arab
population because the wholeplace is going to get blown up.
Arabs, jews, jewish people,israel, israel will be gone,
said Trump last night.
Yeah, your reaction.
Alon Pinkas (00:18):
I mean a more concentrated pile of nonsense is
really hard to utter tradedpile of nonsense is really hard
to utter.
Masha Hedberg (00:29):
They're asking Zelensky to formulate more
realistic plans about whatUkraine can achieve militarily
this year.
So I do think Zelensky is undera great deal of pressure in a
way that I don't think Putin is.
Dana Lewis (00:50):
Hi everyone and welcome to another edition of
Backstory.
I'm Dana Lewis.
23 years ago, terrorists fromAl-Qaeda attacked the World
Trade Center in New York, 2,977people killed.
They also flew a plane into thePentagon, hijacked and crashed
another aircraft in Pennsylvania.
As a news correspondent for NBC, within days I would pack my
(01:13):
bag and head for Tajikistan andthen on into Afghanistan to
cover the beginning of the waron terror.
Now there is a war in Europebetween Russia and Ukraine,
started by Russia, and almost ayear of fighting in Gaza between
Hamas and Israel.
Is there a way out of thisescalating violence?
Well, we speak to one of myfavorites Israeli, alon Pincus,
(01:36):
on Gaza and a possible widerMiddle East war, and Masha
Hedberg has just written areport on possible solutions to
Russia-Ukraine.
Alon Pink has served as thechief of staff to two foreign
ministers.
He was a foreign policy advisorfor.
Alon Pinkas (01:59):
Yeah.
Dana Lewis (02:01):
They changed quickly.
Wait a minute now.
You were for Ehud Barak and youwere for Shimon Peres.
What are the other two?
Alon Pinkas (02:08):
Professor Shlomo Ben-Ami, who was foreign
minister, and David Levy, whowas foreign minister.
I was chief of staff to allfour.
Dana Lewis (02:16):
Wow, you've been on the government payroll for a
long time.
Alon Pinkas (02:19):
No, I told you, they changed quickly.
Government's fault.
Dana Lewis (02:23):
Okay, thank you for sending me.
You were also the ConsulGeneral of New York City.
I'm not redoing that intro.
We're going to let it play theway it is and I'm very impressed
, especially on who some ofthese were, and we're very lucky
to talk to Alon.
Here's the quote, because youand I were just talking off
camera about the debate lastnight On Kamala Harris from
(02:45):
Donald Trump.
She hates Israel.
At the same time, in her ownway, she hates the Arab
population because the wholeplace is going to get blown up.
Arabs, jews, jewish people,israel, israel will be gone,
said Trump last night.
Yeah, your reaction.
Alon Pinkas (03:01):
I mean, a more concentrated pile of nonsense is
really hard to utter.
He could have attacked her onthe you know, on the
Biden-Parrish administration'spolicy.
He could have attacked her forbeing a progressive liberal who
sides with the Palestinians,which is not true, but it would
(03:21):
have been a legitimate line ofattack.
Instead, he went low becauseyou know, this is what he does
and this is who he is.
She hates Israel and if she'spresident, Israel will be gone,
Israel will disappear, Israelwill be annihilated in two years
.
Dana Lewis (03:39):
So you let me jump in there.
Who's he reaching out to?
Is that evangelical voters, orwhere does he?
I mean, they spin that all thetime A evangelical voters B.
Alon Pinkas (04:02):
he's trying to create to make Israel.
He with the help of MrNetanyahu for a long time, to
make Israel a wedge issuebetween Democrats and
Republicans.
He thinks that if the war goeson and he accuses Harris of
being anti-Israeli, throwingIsrael under the bus,
threatening to curtail armsshipments, whatever you're going
to have a sizable group ofpeople who support Israel and
the US but are unhappy with them.
Then we're thinking maybe Ishouldn't vote, to come out and
(04:22):
vote.
Dana Lewis (04:23):
And you said Netanyahu does the same thing.
They're creating this so-calledwedge issue, and is that
dangerous for Israel?
Alon Pinkas (04:30):
Very dangerous.
Netanyahu has been doing it formany years.
I mean, he failed every time hetried to do so.
But you know, you go back toMarch 2015,.
His speech in Congress againstthe JCPOA, the Iran nuclear deal
, which essentially was a speechagainst Barack Obama.
You go back to his courting ofevangelicals during the Clinton
(04:52):
administration.
You go, you know it's endless,but you know it's a funny thing
that you mentioned Dana, becausehere's Trump saying that if
Kamala Harris is president,israel will be destroyed, and
here's Netanyahu saying that ifhe doesn't stay prime minister,
israel will be destroyed.
So what do these two have incommon?
That they're both talkingnonsense about this?
(05:15):
Now, but, if I may, on the verysame, it was a uniquely Trumpian
moment when he was asked byDavid Muir from ABC News what
would you have done differentlyon October 7th in terms of the
(05:35):
Hamas attack on Israel and theensuing war in Gaza?
And here's Trump saying if Iwere president, it would not
have happened.
How exactly is unclear.
And then the second sentence hesays and Putin would not have
invaded Ukraine.
Now that's genius, dana, thatreally is genius.
(05:55):
So if he were president onOctober 2023, putin would not
have invaded Ukraine in February2020.
Not the first time he said it.
Yeah, I know.
How he reconciles the timelineand the two issues is beyond me.
Aside from talking nonsense,what can I say?
Dana Lewis (06:20):
Well, he pushes out , he's a strongman image and the
world will roll out the carpetbefore him, unlike the Democrats
.
But I mean that's his messagingright.
But you know, today is and itstruck me, I don't know why,
because we've had 23 of them,but it's the 23rd anniversary of
9-11.
I know I was there in New Yorklooking at it.
(06:42):
Were you consul general?
Then yes.
I know I was there in New Yorklooking at it.
Were you consul general?
Then yes.
So when people draw a parallelbetween October, the 6th in
(07:04):
Israel and 9-11, is thatover-exaggeration?
Alon Pinkas (07:05):
Is it fair?
Look, the sources of bothattacks is radical Islamic
terrorism.
There's no question about that,and radical Islamic terrorism
should be dealt with forcefullyand with determination and
resoluteness.
However, if you look at thecontext, it's quite different.
No-transcript how I see it, butin their eyes this was an act
(08:18):
of resistance to an occupationthat's going on for 57 years,
since 1967, that Gaza isencircled, that Gaza is under
siege, that Gaza is starving, etcetera, et cetera, et cetera.
That and their twisted,distorted minds, justifies the
savage and barbaric attack ofOctober 7th.
(08:39):
So you know there aresimilarities.
But you know, and if you gointo the technology and the
tactics, both were surprises,both supposedly came out of the
blue.
In retrospect they didn't, andthe signs were there Washington
(09:10):
and Pennsylvania, where all fourjets crashed for all concern
that was out of the blue forIsrael.
Dana Lewis (09:19):
Misleading itself into thinking that Hamas is
deterred and would not dare dosomething on this scale.
That was out of the blue aswell.
But doesn't that play to?
You know?
23 years war on terror, I thinkwe just got.
We probably harvested a crop ofmore radical Islamic groups,
some of them on the rebound now,23 years later.
But for Netanyahu to stand infront of the Israeli public all
(09:41):
the time and say there's noleaving Gaza now, I mean, if we
do, hamas is just going toregroup and we have to defeat
them this time, just not allowthem to thrive in an enclosed
area.
That seems to, you know, playwith some of the Israeli public,
you know, with the caveat thatit should be the priority.
(10:03):
But yeah, staying in thePhiladelphia corridor waiting in
Gaza.
The Israelis seem to support me.
Alon Pinkas (10:13):
No, 90% of Israelis don't know what the
Philadelphia corridor is.
They don't understand why it'simportant.
Dozens of former generals havestood up and said it is totally
insignificant, particularly whenweighed against a hostage deal.
Netanyahu did nothing about thePhiladelphia corridor for 15
(10:36):
years as prime minister, withthe exception of two years in
which he was not, or almost twoyears in which he was not prime
minister.
In fact, when the war began, ittook him nine months before he
even devoted or allocated forcesto deal with the Philadelphia
corridor.
So this is just an excuse and apretext for him to prolong the
(10:58):
war.
Now, what you said, the premiseof what you said, is absolutely
right.
Israelis want to eradicateHamas, but Israelis also don't
understand the cost of doing so.
The cost of doing so isoccupying the Gaza Strip.
When he says we will not leavethe Gaza Strip, what does he
mean?
That the status quo that existsnow will be extended.
(11:24):
Fine, so call us ceasefire.
If you're leaving the forcesthere, you're not going further
in no incursions, no furtheroccupation, no further
conquering.
Then why not call for aceasefire?
If you want to choke them, youdon't need to fight, you just
choke them.
(11:44):
Right them.
You don't need to fight, youjust choke them, right.
It's not making sense, otherthan it is a lame and unserious
excuse for him to prolong thewar for his own reasons.
One of those reasons I'm tyingthe two issues we've discussed
until now, dana.
One of those issues is that hereached he Netanyahu reached the
conclusion that it is best forhim to extend the war, prolong
(12:07):
the war, not seek a ceasefireslash hostage deal until after
the election in America.
He thinks this is his side ofplaying the Israel as a wedge
issue.
Dana Lewis (12:21):
Because the American election brings him.
Alon Pinkas (12:24):
Well, he hopes Trump will win.
He's not making a secret ofthat, by the way.
If Trump wins and says to him,you have two weeks to end this
war, he will end that war.
But you know, this is mespeculating on speculation,
speculating about a conversationthat's based on a speculation
(12:44):
that but he wants Trump.
Dana Lewis (12:46):
Because?
Why?
Because the Republicans are notpushing a two-state solution.
Alon Pinkas (12:50):
Because the Republicans don't give a damn
about what's going on in theIsraeli-Palestinian issue.
Dana Lewis (12:56):
All right, you've called Netanyahu a vile messiah
leading a cult of death and lies, and a rogue prime minister is
turning Israel into a roguestate.
Some of the articles that youwrite in Arez.
You know you don't pull anypunches, right, and do you
actually?
Is that harsh on Netanyahu?
(13:18):
Yeah, is it in your?
Also your reading of somethingelse?
You said that what he says inHebrew and what he says in
English are two different thingsand to understand them you
should listen to his Hebrew.
Alon Pinkas (13:30):
Yeah, well, even his Hebrew has some version, but
certainly when compared to howhe speaks in English, it's an
entirely different person.
In English he makes all thesespurious claims that you know.
He intends to seek a ceasefire,he wants an agreement, he's
working hard, he's okay InHebrew.
(13:51):
He doesn't even bother to saythose things.
He says, as you accuratelydescribed it we need to stay in
Gaza.
This war will not end untilHamas is destroyed.
Otherwise, I'm quoting you,quoting him, otherwise they will
regroup, etc.
Etc.
Now, yeah, well, look, I don'tpull any punches because he
(14:12):
earned it, because you know, Ithink he has caused severe I
don't want to say irreversible,because there's no such thing
but he has caused severe damageto Israel internally in terms of
society, the cohesiveness, theIsraeli narrative, how people
(14:35):
relate to each other.
He caused a complete disconnectbetween the military and the
government, between the militaryand the government.
He caused an unarmed at thispoint, a nonviolent civil war
between his core base and theso-called elites, and he has
(14:57):
tarnished Israel's brandinternationally in a way that is
almost unprecedented.
I cannot recall, and I'veresearched this.
I'd love to hear someone tellme that there is a precedent.
I have never seen a democracydiminishing itself or destroying
its self-value the way he hasdone to Israel.
(15:21):
I've seen other countries dothat.
Dana Lewis (15:23):
Yeah, but not a democracy very quickly, because
I know we're out of time.
Um gaza, I mean alone you.
You live in israel.
You follow this minute byminute.
People are confused now.
They don't understand whereit's headed, what is the way out
of it.
Is there going to be a?
(15:45):
You know a lot of people.
You know even israelis.
73.5 percent of israelis arepessimistic about the likelihood
of a deal.
Where are we headed?
Where are we?
Alon Pinkas (15:55):
now.
Well, they're pessimistic abouta deal because they don't trust
Netanyahu.
70% support a deal, Not becausethey see some kind of
compromise or conciliation withHamas, but because they don't
trust Netanyahu.
It's not headed anywhere untilafter the American election.
(16:20):
Let me repeat what I said a fewmoments ago I don't, you know.
The issue right now, believe itor not, is not even gossip, but
the renewed potential forescalation in both the West Bank
, but also in Lebanon, vis-a-visHezbollah and with Iran.
(16:41):
This all serves a narrativeNathaniel's narrative that this
was not about a Hamas attack onthe 7th of October, but this is
a broad war, 360 degreeencirclement, a civilizational
conflict, which is why, ofcourse, he is absolved of any
responsibility, because you knowhow could he avoid it, how
(17:03):
could he have, you know, avoidedit altogether.
This is a false and flawednarrative.
That's why I don't pull anypunches.
Dana Lewis (17:15):
Are you concerned?
People don't understand thedifference.
A lot of my friends wouldn'teven understand the difference
between Gaza and the West Bank alot of them.
But I spent years as a reporterin the West Bank.
A lot of it was secular, notvery radical.
Hamas was a minor minor groupwith the Islamic Jihad and
others.
I mean the PLO dominated there.
(17:37):
There were lots of moderates.
This week alone, I mean, we'veseen this fired up in Jenin and
elsewhere.
Are you worried about what theWest Bank is becoming?
Is it just becoming anotherGaza right now and very quickly
deteriorating?
Alon Pinkas (17:53):
Yeah, I am, I am.
You're absolutely right.
You know, there's enough blameon both sides and there's no
point in relitigating the factthat there hasn't been a
political process for over adecade.
I mean, the last time anythingwas tried was when John Kerry
was Secretary of State in 2014and came here in what became an
(18:18):
exercise in futility, trying toresuscitate some kind of a peace
process not even a politicalprocess, let's not even be
pretentious and call it a peaceprocess and occupation remained
intact and settlements grew andthe military friction or
(18:45):
interaction between Israel andthe Palestinian population in
the West Bank grew.
Israel consistently anddeliberately, by design,
weakened the Palestinianauthority, which, to begin with,
was sort of borderlinedysfunctional, with a lot of
corruption there.
But Netanyahu was happy to dohis part.
(19:06):
I was happy.
That's why, in his twistedlogic, he even strengthened
hamas, because if you strengthenhamas, by extension, you weaken
the palestinian authority, andwhen you do that, when people
pressure you, why not engage thepalestinian?
He said me I want peace, butlook, look at them.
I, you know you can't talk tothem.
(19:27):
They're radicalizing as wespeak, there's no one to talk.
I said you know what?
Fine, you're right, you'remaking a point.
What is your alternative?
Because see, here's the thingwhat if the Palestinians
renounce armed struggle and justask to be annexed to Israel?
You want us, you have us, oneby national state.
(19:50):
We're just asking for one thingone man, one vote.
Uh, we want to be enfranchised.
Um, we don't want a palestinianstate.
You've turned the palestinianstate into a?
Um impossibility, uh, somethingthat's unfeasible and not
viable.
Israel would never go alongwith that.
Well, what would is do then?
My point is we don't want you.
(20:12):
If you don't want us, then getthe hell out.
But here's my problem with MrNetanyahu.
I can understand hisreservations, fears and
anxieties over a Palestinianstate Truly I can.
If not a Palestinian state,what then?
(20:35):
Because he, in 15 years inpower, not once did he come up
with an idea, not once.
Dana Lewis (20:43):
Do you have?
Does Alon Pincus have asolution?
Alon Pinkas (20:49):
There are various solutions out there.
We could shoot them downConfederation between Israel,
Jordan and the Palestinianentity.
A Kosovo-like NATO protectorate, A state in the making, a
gradual state in the making.
Dana Lewis (21:10):
Without, maybe not an armed state, maybe don't
control the borders.
Alon Pinkas (21:14):
They won't.
No, no control, demilitarized.
Without any control of theborders, you don't touch
Jerusalem.
In the next five years, theissue of Jerusalem.
There are a lot of ideas thatcan be entertained or at least
be a platform on which you candevelop some kind of a process.
(21:35):
You don't have to have theexact, detailed nuts and bolts,
level and results in front ofyou.
Let's start with this.
He hasn't done any of that, anyof that.
Dana Lewis (21:48):
The key is and correct me, because you know,
what do I know but the key is ifyou actually had a sincere
government that wanted toresolve the Palestinian issue
with the Palestinians, there arePalestinian moderates out there
that you can talk to and youcould probably come up with.
I mean, a lot of the solutionsare already known.
Alon Pinkas (22:11):
I mean, that's my point.
This is not reinventing slicedbread.
This is not a eureka moment.
Oh, here's a solution no oneever thought, or a modality that
no one ever thought.
It's all there.
It's all there.
More of the same is bad.
So triangulate, take a littlefrom here and a little from here
(22:35):
and a little from here, but forthat you need some kind of a
vision and goodwill.
Neither side has those.
Dana Lewis (22:43):
Right and moderates that will reassure one another
that they're not going to turnweapons on each other the next
day.
Right, and they are there.
I mean, those people are thereon both sides.
Alon Pinkas (22:53):
Yep.
Dana Lewis (22:54):
Alon Pincus.
I wish we had more time.
Thank you so much, sir, mypleasure, Dana.
Alon Pinkas (22:59):
Thank you.
Dana Lewis (23:04):
Masha Hedberg is an assistant professor of
political science at ColgateUniversity and she joins me now
from New York.
Hi, Masha, Great to meet you.
Masha Hedberg (23:12):
Good morning Dana.
Good to meet you.
Oh, I'm sorry.
Dana Lewis (23:16):
Everybody increasingly is talking about
peace between Russia and Ukraine, not because there appears to
be a promise of peace, butbecause this war has been
dragging on, now into its thirdyear, and people are looking for
, you know, pathways to peace.
(23:37):
And that was all what you havewritten about and documented and
given a lot of great backgroundon the report that you've
written, and that's why I wantedto interview you.
Interview you and what struckme that I really didn't
understand until you kind ofwrapped it up for me is that
(23:57):
there have been already some 25proposals on ending the fighting
.
Am I overstating that?
Masha Hedberg (24:03):
number.
I don't think you'reoverstating that number.
I think you're understatingthat number.
What I found?
There've been a gamut of ideas.
I picked 25 because that was animaginable number.
These were 25 of the moreprominent ones, but I guarantee
you that if I had cast the netmore widely, I would have found
(24:26):
additional proposals of whatcould be considered a proposal,
even if they call themselvessomething else.
Dana Lewis (24:32):
Did you, in examining all these proposals,
see a path forward?
Easy question, very difficult.
You have to weigh so much inanswering that right.
Masha Hedberg (24:48):
I personally think that there are a number of
routes to consider.
Unfortunately, there isn'tgoing to be one path that is
going to thrill everyone.
The least worst option and hope, hoping that you know that will
(25:11):
satisfy enough of each side'sdemands to make peace possible.
Right, but was I inspired byjust one approach that I read?
Unfortunately no.
Dana Lewis (25:25):
Okay.
So why don't we chip away at it?
And it begins, it seems to me,that anything that would be
considered would be a phased-inapproach.
So there isn't going to be agrand summit I mean, who knows?
But there isn't going to be agrand summit where they
establish a ceasefire and saythese are the ways forward for
(25:48):
peace and there's a grandagreement, the waves forward for
peace and there's a grandagreement.
Masha Hedberg (25:52):
Originally, I think that was the hope, and a
lot of the proposals do envisionsome grand agreement that,
quite frankly, satisfies all ofUkraine's demands.
But there is this.
Originally, in the beginning,the earlier proposals saw
precisely that that there wouldbe a grand agreement that
resolves a lot of theoutstanding issues, whether it
(26:13):
is the status of Ukraine as aneutral country or a NATO member
, the territorial question.
So I think early on, ourambitions, our hopes, were quite
maximalist.
Now I think you're right.
Realistically speaking, we arelooking at a much slower
approach where the two sidesmight be able to find agreement
(26:35):
on smaller issues, might be ableto agree to a ceasefire.
You say it is.
Then, is that the core of theconflict to begin with?
That, you think, going to beone of the thorniest issues?
to resolve because it is binaryyes or no right, there's very
(27:17):
little room for compromise,although there's some ways of, I
think, creating an adequatesecurity architecture even if
NATO is off the table.
But I think the other reallythorny issue is going to be one
of territory, and I don't meanCrimea, but I mean the territory
that Russia now partially orfully controls and that it
(27:38):
acquired control over after 2022.
Dana Lewis (27:41):
How close do you think?
Masha Hedberg (27:43):
Sorry, go ahead.
I think these are the two mainissues, right the future status
of Ukraine as a non-aligned,possibly non-nuclear, power and
the territorial question.
Dana Lewis (27:54):
How close do you think we were to some kind of a
deal in the spring of 2022 inWidenegg?
Masha Hedberg (28:05):
there are credible reports that say that
the two sides were closer to adeal that would that might have
halted the fighting.
At that point I was not there,but given the recent reporting,
given the documents that I'veread, it seems that a deal might
have been possible.
But remember, at the timethings were moving so quickly,
(28:29):
right, that it's really hard tosay the deal could have been
broken off at any point.
But I do think the two sideshad agreed well, one to keep
Ukraine neutral in return forvery, very strong security
guarantees by some biginternational players.
(28:49):
And, what's interesting, thetwo sides had agreed to postpone
the question of territory tolater negotiations.
So already you see that theidea that we can't resolve all
issues at the same time is kindof prominently on display.
Dana Lewis (29:05):
It's kind of prominently on display In terms
of an armed Ukraine.
The deal was that Ukraine wouldlay down its arms, become a
neutral state, maybe disarmaltogether.
I mean, it seems like we'rejust so far beyond that now.
The suggestion that Ukrainewould ever now give up its arms
(29:26):
and demilitarize is prettyfar-fetched, Would you agree?
Masha Hedberg (29:30):
I would agree.
I think right now we are veryfar-fetched and the kind of
limits on Ukraine's militarythat Russia wanted back in 2022
no longer seem feasible.
But you can think of that'sanother thorny issue that will
have to be confronted.
Is that will have to beconfronted?
(29:55):
Is you know how do you create aUkrainian military that is kind
of strong enough to withstandany future aggression or at
least deter any futureaggression, while also kind of
getting Russia to agree to thosekind of much higher limits on
Ukrainian reserves, firepower,military in general?
Dana Lewis (30:17):
I mean that gets pretty complicated, right.
I mean we can spend a lot oftime talking about it or not,
but I think if you're going tostart talking about an armed
Ukraine, but it would only be adefensive force, then you start
getting into all sorts oflong-term negotiations about the
kind of weapons it would have.
Could they reach Russia?
You know, medium-range missiles, short-range I mean.
(30:41):
Those negotiations could takeyears.
I mean they're very complicated.
Masha Hedberg (30:46):
Negotiations could take years.
I mean, they're verycomplicated.
Those negotiations could takeyears.
But what was interesting is tosee that a number of proposals,
particularly recent ones, havebegun to consider precisely
those questions that if Ukraineagrees to some limits on its
military, then Russia would alsoneed to agree not to position
troops With the border ofUkraine.
(31:07):
There have been some ideasabout who would be a credible
monitor.
So we're kind of getting to theidea that to get peace we're
not going to have to, we're notgoing to resolve.
We have to resolve both the bigissues, but probably start
smaller and then build up toheck what happens to Crimea and
(31:31):
Ukraine would.
Dana Lewis (31:33):
You discussed this in what you've written, but I
mean, many other people havetalked about it as well.
Okay, so you want, if you wantthe fighting to stop, and you
don't want Ukraine in NATO thenwhat does Ukraine get in return?
And what they would want aresecurity guarantees.
And the only way thoseguarantees mean anything it
can't be a promise betweenRussia and Ukraine then you have
(31:54):
to have, you know, people likemaybe Turkey, the United States,
different countries in Europe,that would guarantee the
security of Ukraine if Russiawere to rearm, regroup, relaunch
a war.
So in a way, there's a bit ofsmoke and mirrors there on.
(32:14):
Ok, if Ukraine was to shelveNATO membership, if, if, if,
they would in fact probably havesecurity guarantors that are in
NATO.
Fair enough.
Masha Hedberg (32:28):
Fair enough.
I think that's what a lot ofthe plans suggest, that then the
United States, the EU, perhapsother NATO members would be the
major guarantors.
There have been also someproposals that it would just be
the EU, that one of the thingsthat if NATO membership is off
the table, eu membership iscertainly still on the EU, that
one of the things that if NATOmembership is off the table, eu
membership is certainly still onthe table, and say that we
(32:52):
forget that EU membership alsocomes with some security
commitments.
I'm not sure that would besatisfying to Ukraine.
Dana Lewis (33:04):
Can you fill that out a bit?
I mean, that's a new one on me.
What would be the securitycommitments if you're a member
of the EU, if there's a Europeanarmy formed?
You mean?
Masha Hedberg (33:15):
Well, there are.
Yes, there's this less knownstipulation that EU members have
to come to the defense of otherEU members in case of
aggression.
Right.
Eu members in case ofaggression, right?
Obviously, the question is, dothey have the capacity to come
to each other's aid without theaid of NATO?
Right?
But there is some idea thatthere are also security
(33:37):
obligations as part of the EUmembership.
They're not well-developed, butInteresting.
Dana Lewis (33:44):
Can you talk to the notion of giving up territory?
I mean Crimea probably is setin a special place versus the
eastern regions that Putin hasillegally annexed.
Masha Hedberg (34:09):
I cannot envision a realistic scenario
under which Russia gives upCrimea, but there was this idea,
at least in the early attemptsat negotiation in 2022, in
spring 2022, where Ukraineseemed to suggest that Crimea
could be subject to futurenegotiations and Russia seemed
to agree to future negotiationsand Russia seemed to agree.
Whether we believe this or not,but there was this kind of it
(34:30):
was set down in writing that,all right, we can negotiate over
Crimea, which at the timeseemed like a surprising
concession by Russia.
But, let's say, crimea is offthe table.
What happens to the territoriesthat Russia now partially,
wholly, controls?
Some different ideas.
(34:51):
I think the more plausible oneis that, well, russia retains de
facto control, but Ukrainedoesn't recognize it formally,
right, and again, we make theseterritories subject to future
negotiations.
Not ideal.
Dana Lewis (35:09):
Yeah, not ideal, because it's not a frozen
conflict in the sense that thenyou know, Russia continues to
educate, to absorb those peoplefrom those regions to the point
that they would never want toreturn to Ukraine.
(35:31):
That would be Ukraine'sargument, right.
Masha Hedberg (35:36):
Well, some people argue that, in return,
ukraine gets to join the EU.
Or, you know, the idea is thiswhat is negotiable, what is not?
Some people propose thatterritory is negotiable.
Ukraine's status as anindependent, sovereign nation is
not.
So you might be able to.
Or the argument is that Ukraineshould be willing to
(35:58):
temporarily cede control, butnot formally renounce those
territories.
Control but not, you know,formally renounce those
territories.
Develop, grow further,democratize, right, and then who
knows what happens in 10 years?
Right, a lot can happen in 10years, 15 years.
Again, it's not a proposalthat's going to be loved by
(36:22):
anybody, right?
But it is again a proposalthat's been put out there for
consideration, because thealternative is continued
fighting.
But it's not clear thatcontinued fighting will help
resolve the territorial issueeither.
Dana Lewis (36:38):
Why not a kind of North-South Korea armistice,
where you stop shooting,everybody moves back two
kilometers and we freeze theconflict?
What is wrong?
Is that practical at all, orwhat do you think is wrong with
that?
Masha Hedberg (36:56):
Actually, there has been one proposal that says
that this is a good model tofollow, that right now the
United States and allies armUkraine as much as possible in
order to put it in a goodposition, but eventually we will
end up with a negotiatedarmistice.
So we fight and talk and atsome point, when both sides
(37:19):
decide that the fighting is nolonger worth it, we freeze the
conflict along whatever line,whatever battlefield line exists
at the time, and I have heard anumber of people say this is
possibly the most that we willget right.
So North and South Korea havesigned an armistice.
(37:39):
The armistice has held fordecades, but technically they're
still at war.
I think the big differencebetween that example.
Dana Lewis (37:50):
You can't exactly call that a success story either
, because they seem like they'reon the verge of war at
different times.
Masha Hedberg (37:56):
I think that's why people often say that an
armistice is not only unidealbut unstable.
You don't want perpetualtensions on the border between
Russia and Ukraine, right.
This will not only destabilizethat region but will have
spillover effects on Europe,right.
(38:18):
But is it better than continuedfighting that just causes more
death and destruction?
You know people take differentsides on that one, but I think
the difference between North andSouth Korea then and Ukraine
and Russia now is that rememberNorth and South Korea, we had a
bipolar world, we had the UnitedStates and we had the Soviet
(38:41):
Union, and right now therearen't two other big players
that can restrain the twobelligerents.
That no longer exists.
Dana Lewis (38:58):
So you've discussed a lot of the stated.
I mean, it's the statedphilosophy of a lot of different
people in Europe and in the US,and probably in Russia too,
that all this talk doesn'tmatter.
What really matters is whathappens on the ground.
And if you're able to driveyour argument on the ground, if
you're able to take territory,that's the most convincing
(39:21):
negotiating position of all.
The difficulty is that itdoesn't seem to be very
conclusive on either way.
Masha Hedberg (39:31):
Yes, I think why we haven't seen credible
negotiations is both sides stillthink they can make decisive
military gains that then skewthe negotiations in their favor,
the negotiations in their favor.
But we've also seen the pasttwo years where decisive
(39:53):
military victories have becomefew and far between, yeah, these
halting grinding advances.
Ukraine, for a while, was inlargely kind of a defensive
posture, obviously before Kursk,right.
So Ukraine is still capable ofmilitary surprises and I think
(40:23):
both sides still think they canwin the argument through
military means.
Right, and we're probably goingto see this for another year,
were probably going to see thisfor another year.
But I think it's becoming clearand clear that both sides are
very capable of inflictingdamage on each other.
But you know, militarily, Idon't see Ukraine capturing all
the territory that Russia hasgained since 2022.
(40:45):
Right, but we also don't seeRussia marching again on Kiev
and this time taking it by force.
Dana Lewis (40:55):
Right.
But Ukraine argues.
You know, bringing the war hometo Russians will convince Putin
that he's got to stop thefighting.
How much stock do you put inthat when you see them?
You know even this week firingdrones into Moscow they hit an
apartment building, hitting gasplants, trying to strike at
airports and freezing airspaceover Russia, increasingly having
(41:19):
long range missile capabilityand drone capability that
reaches pretty deep, 1,800kilometers inside Russia.
Masha Hedberg (41:30):
I agree, but it does reach pretty deep.
Those kind of attacks withinRussia have increased, but I
don't see Ukraine having enoughdrones, military capacity to
really shift the calculus in theKremlin Right.
Like if you think aboutsomething like the Kursk
Incursion daring, well-planned,really well-executed.
Dana Lewis (41:57):
But what did it change?
Masha Hedberg (41:58):
What did it change?
It certainly didn't change theway that the people in the
Kremlin or the Russian DefenseMinistry have thought about
their plans for further gains ineastern Ukraine, and I don't
see the Russian leadershipchanging course unless Ukraine
(42:19):
can really inflict serious,decisive damage, and I think the
potential for that is morelimited than Can you quickly
give me your thoughts onleadership?
Dana Lewis (42:39):
We often talk about leadership in the Kremlin and
how long President Putin canremain in power and how long
will he and who will succeed him, but we often don't pay much
attention to the Ukrainianleadership, and there have been
a lot of internal changesrecently and I think there's a
lot of things that are not beingspoken about in terms of
(42:59):
Zelensky's leadership and thosearound him and how Ukrainians
might be feeling about getting,you know, worn down and tired,
and how long is this going to goon?
I mean, they certainly seemcommitted and it's their country
(43:20):
to defend, but there's pressureon both leaderships, do you
agree?
Masha Hedberg (43:25):
I think there's more pressure on Zelensky than
there is on Putin, just by thenature of the politics in those
countries.
I think Zelensky is under agreat deal of pressure, but not
just from the Ukrainian public.
I think Zelensky is under agreat deal of pressure from
other Western governments.
What we see right now, I thinkUS Secretary of State Anthony
(43:50):
Blinken and the UK ForeignSecretary are visiting Kiev
right and again from what we'veread, they're asking Zelensky to
formulate more realistic plansabout what Ukraine can achieve
militarily this year, right.
So I do think Zelensky is undera great deal of pressure in a
(44:13):
way that I don't think Putin is.
But in terms of the Ukrainianpublic, yes, every indication is
that people are tired, peopleare weary of the war, people
want to return to normal lifeand that is exactly how you
would expect people to be right.
(44:34):
We all like our normal life, butit is also interesting that
when you look at opinion polls,still a majority of Ukrainians
do not support a negotiatedsettlement that makes Ukraine a
neutral state and that seedslarge swaths of territory in
(44:56):
eastern and southern Ukraine.
So I think the Ukrainian publicis still willing to live with
the dangers, the horrors, theeconomic and social dislocation,
at least for the time being.
In Russia you still see muchsupport for the government right
(45:18):
as well as though you do see anincreasing support for a
negotiated settlement.
But, interesting, when you askRussians what a negotiated
settlement would look like, atleast a third say the only kind
of acceptable negotiatedsettlement is the one that
results in a neutral Ukraine andRussia gets to keep the
territory it now wholly orpartially controls.
Dana Lewis (45:42):
Well, and the information that they have to
form that opinion is prettynarrow, based on
state-controlled media right, sothat could change pretty
quickly if the Kremlin decidesto program nightly television a
different way.
Masha Hedberg (45:57):
I think it would be easier for the Kremlin to
portray whatever they get as avictory right than it will be
for Zelensky and the Ukrainiangovernment.
Again, there are significantdifferences in the politics of
those two countries that makePutin's tasks easier.
Dana Lewis (46:19):
Just to wrap it up, do you want to make a
prediction on where we go in thenext 12 months, 18 months or
maybe shorter?
Masha Hedberg (46:29):
12 months, 18 months or maybe shorter, given
the unpredictability of politicsin both Europe and the United
States particularly the UnitedStates and the fact that this is
an election year where theresults are predictable Right.
Dana Lewis (46:45):
We should just mention, as we're recording this
we're doing this one day afterthe US presidential debate
between Trump and Kamala Harris,where, you know, trump again
said that the war would be overin 24 hours and Harris said,
essentially, your peace plan issurrender and you know,
president Putin would eat youfor lunch.
Quote unquote.
Masha Hedberg (47:07):
Thank you for filling that in, but exactly
this is the environment in whichyou're asking me to make a
prediction about the next 12months.
So I will do so, but I do sowith many, many cabinets.
I actually think that,unfortunately, for the next 12
months, we see continuedattempts to score military
(47:28):
victories.
I think we will find ourselvesin the same position we find
ourselves now, and we end up atthe negotiating table with
negotiations that are morelikely to favor Russia's
positions than Ukraine's, but Ithink concessions will need to
(47:49):
be made on both sides.
Dana Lewis (47:53):
Masha Hedberg, it's great to meet you, great to
talk to you and, yeah, thank youso much from the political
science department at ColgateUniversity.
Thank you, masha.
Masha Hedberg (48:02):
Thank you, Dana.
I really pleasure to meet youand have a wonderful afternoon
in London.
Dana Lewis (48:07):
And that's our backstory this week.
I watched the US debate lastnight.
I think Kamala Harris's remarkthat Putin would eat Donald
Trump for lunch Tough talk, butrealistically Trump's only
solution to that war would be tolet Russia win.
And that's not a plan.
It's surrender, capitulationand then what Putin moves on.
(48:29):
To fill in the blank, I'm DanaLewis.
Thanks for listening toBackstory.
No-transcript.
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