December 15, 2023 • 49 mins
Back Story with Dana Lewis takes a hard look at Putin's tactics and the potential consequences that might arise from the withheld US funding for Ukraine. We're delighted to have Bill Browder, a leading voice on the matter, to break down the situation and forecast scenarios that could befall both nations. We also examine the possible repercussions for Ukraine and NATO should Trump make a comeback to the Oval Office.
Can Ukraine hold firm against Russia's onslaught? Thomas Kent, author of "How Russia Loses: Hubris and Miscalculation in Putin's Kremlin," joins us to illuminate Russia's missteps and miscalculations in their bid to control Ukraine. He reasons that if Russia emerges victorious, it would be through brute force rather than strategic diplomacy.
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Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:00):
Now Putin regularly talks out of both sides of his
mouth.
He says all sorts of stuff hedoesn't mean.
He doesn't say all sorts ofstuff he does mean.
I would.
Speaker 2 (00:09):
I mean he is a pathological liar, so I wouldn't
hang on any word that he saysPutin needs to find fanatic
supporters, because ordinaryRussians can see increasingly
that this war is not going well,that it's costing them
economically, that they can'ttravel to the West anymore, that
(00:33):
their country is viewed as apariah state.
Doesn't look good.
Speaker 3 (00:44):
Hi everyone and welcome to another edition of
Backstory.
I'm Dana Lewis On thisBackstory a tough week for
Ukraine.
The US has turned down fundingrequests to buy in $60 billion
to allow Ukraine to fight on andmaybe win against Russia.
What now?
Well, the Republicans aretrying to force Biden to give
ground on border issues, butincreasingly there are questions
(01:08):
and doubts.
Can Ukraine actually win andforce Putin's army out of
Eastern Ukraine?
Russia is the problem, and weinterview the author of a new
book how Does Russia Lose,thomas Ken, and it's obviously
about more than just Ukraine.
But first he has campaignedrelentlessly for sanctions on
Russia.
Bill Browder talks Ukraine'ssetbacks in Washington, putin
(01:34):
and ways to make Russia pay,including siphoning billions in
Russian cash that remain frozenin Europe.
Bill Browder is a tirelesscampaigner for sanctions against
Russia and he joins me now.
I believe you're in London,bill.
Speaker 1 (01:54):
That's correct.
Speaker 3 (01:55):
Welcome.
Good to talk to you again.
You too.
I'm just watching and trying towade through this never ending
annual news conference thatPutin holds, where he takes
questions supposedly spontaneousquestions from journalists and
the public.
I can tell you I've been inthat news conference in the
Kremlin many times where it is anegotiated question and they
(02:19):
come and they ask you in advanceif they're going to answer your
question.
What are you going to ask?
Inevitably, we used to changethem anyway as journalists, but
I can tell you that they are notvery spontaneous.
One of the first.
Speaker 1 (02:32):
Did you ever get a question in?
I did.
Speaker 3 (02:35):
Oh good, but I usually just changed it.
So, but yeah, I did get them inquite often.
Maybe that's a bad merit badgeright now to be wearing, but one
of the first questions from ajournalist asking why a female
journalist is getting somethinglike 14 years in prison, saying,
(02:56):
you know, should the criminalcode be changed?
It's harsh.
And Putin said, well, maybethese prison terms are too long.
Is he suddenly trying to be achampion of human rights?
Speaker 1 (03:08):
Now Putin regularly talks out of both sides of his
mouth.
He says all sorts of stuff hedoesn't mean.
He doesn't say all sorts ofstuff he doesn't mean.
I mean.
He is a pathological liar.
So I wouldn't hang on any wordthat he says as truth.
I wouldn't project fromanything he says to be a new
(03:29):
trend.
I think we've seen this guy.
I think you know the onedisadvantage he has is that
we've seen him for 23 years inaction.
He has a track record, a verybad track record, and so it's
not as if, you know, there'ssome mystery about this man.
He is a killer, he's a liar,he's a thief and he is a mass.
(03:55):
He is a genocidal mass murderer, and that's who he is, and
whatever words come out of hismouth don't really mean anything
.
Speaker 3 (04:03):
He's also asked by a journalist when is there gonna
be peace with Ukraine?
He says there'll be peace whenwe achieve our goals
denazification of Ukraine anddemilitarization of Ukraine.
Your reaction to that?
Speaker 1 (04:18):
Well, those are the same exact words that he said on
February 24th 2022.
Vladimir Putin has not changedhis approach towards Ukraine.
There's all these people outthere that are the sort of
pressuring Zelensky to cut adeal, et cetera, but there's no
deal to cut.
You know, if Putin, if Ukrainedecides to concede, then Putin
(04:42):
achieves all the objectives thathe set out to do on the very
first day of this nasty conflict.
Speaker 3 (04:48):
Should the Russians be so confident right now?
They obviously you know highfives and celebrations on
Russian television all this weekwhat they perceive to be a
pretty dark week for Ukraine interms of the US not going
through with the $60 billion inwar funding from the Biden
(05:09):
administration.
Speaker 1 (05:11):
Well, I mean, they're having a good week for sure,
but I wouldn't count theUkrainians out in any way, shape
or form.
First of all, the Ukrainianswill fight, whether they get US
aid or not, and the Ukrainianshave shown.
You know, three days into thiswar, they didn't have a whole
lot of US military aid and theyreally gave the Russians a run
(05:31):
for their money.
Secondly, I don't believe thatwe're at the stage right now
where the US is going toultimately cut off funding for
Ukraine.
I think that this is atemporary situation, this is a
tactical situation whereRepublicans are trying to extort
certain concessions from Bidenat the expense of Ukraine.
(05:53):
But at the end of the day, Ican't imagine and I could be
wrong about this, but I can'timagine that we'll be, you know,
into February next year and anaid package for Ukraine hasn't
been approved.
I think there's a longer termissue which the Russians haven't
yet started celebrating, whichis that if Trump were to be
elected, he would withdraw hewould absolutely withdraw
(06:14):
military aid for Ukraine, and atthat point then I don't believe
the Europeans have enoughresources to give the Ukrainians
what they need to sustain adefense.
Speaker 3 (06:25):
I mean, in fact, they have been celebrating the
coming of Trump on television.
Solovyoff and some of the otherpretty ugly Russian
commentators have been sayingyou know, not only will it be an
end to aid in Ukraine, it'll bean end to NATO, we will defeat
NATO.
Speaker 1 (06:43):
Well, there is a decent chance that if Trump
becomes president, he will tearup the NATO treaty.
As far as the US is concerned,he tried to do that, or he
thought about doing that, in hispast presidency, and it was
only because there was so manypatriots in the US government as
his national security advisor,as secretary of defense and
other people that that didn'thappen.
(07:05):
But I don't think that that'san impossibility.
And so you know, putin has hada big win this week in Congress.
As I said, I don't think thatthat's a permanent win.
I think that that eventuallythe Ukrainians will get their
money, but he's holding off.
He's holding on for the sort ofexistential win in November
2024.
Speaker 3 (07:25):
You said, europe can't do it alone.
You know, you have people likeDonald Tusk, the new, the new,
old prime minister of Poland,coming to power saying we need
to mobilize all of the Westright now, and he's really
calling on Europe to step uptheir game.
What would happen if the USdoesn't come up with money?
Will Europe then start toretreat as well, or do you think
(07:48):
they'll step up and try andfill the gaps somehow?
Speaker 1 (07:51):
Well, they're going to have to step up to some
extent because they're muchcloser to Ukraine and to Russia
than the US is.
I mean, there's one interestingsort of Hail Mary for Ukraine
here, which is that when the warstarted the West froze $350
(08:12):
billion of Russian central bankreserves, and about 220 billion
of those reserves are held inEuroclear in Belgium.
And it seems to be prettyobvious that if Russia has
created more than a trilliondollars of damage to Ukraine and
that money is frozen, thatthere's not a legal way to get
(08:35):
that money for the defense ofUkraine, and it may be the
necessity that forces that issue.
I've been in the EuropeanCommission in various other
places and everybody is sort ofbureaucratically trying to avoid
answering that question.
But I think when push comes toshove and when it's peace in the
world is at stake, theEuropeans may act more
(08:57):
decisively and that would solvethe funding problem.
Speaker 3 (09:00):
Well, let me push.
Maybe coming to shove prettyquickly, right?
So the original proposal Idon't want to say it's the
original proposal, but thelatest proposal is at least use
the interest from that 350billion.
At least use the interest andgive it to Ukraine.
That would be a mini steptowards taking all of the assets
and turning them over to Kiev.
Speaker 1 (09:20):
Well, I mean, it's just an absurdity If you can use
the interest, why not use theprinciple?
I mean, how is one more legalthan the other?
The issue that everybody issort of struggling with is
they're saying, oh my God, thisis violate sovereign immunity
and, oh my God, no one's goingto want to hold the Euro anymore
.
Well, first of all, it doesn'tviolate sovereign immunity,
because when a country invadesanother country, they create
(09:43):
damages which are need to besatisfied under a different law
called the law.
It's called the law oncountermeasures.
And secondly, I don't thinkpeople are going to start
transacting in Chinese and SaudiArabian currency because they
think the EU is such a dangerousplace to do business.
I think if you're a dictatorabout to take over a foreign
(10:04):
country, you might feel a littleworried about your reserves in
foreign countries, but I don'tthink anyone else is.
But ultimately, if you're goingto take the interest, you might
as well take it all.
And the Ukrainians need thatmoney.
And of course, there's lots ofconcern about not wanting that
money to be stolen or wasted andthere's lots of ways of making
sure that doesn't happen.
But if the US ultimately cutsoff Ukraine from military aid,
(10:30):
ukrainians basically willcollapse if they don't get that,
and if the Ukrainians collapseand Putin succeeds in his
initial military objectives,then the next stop is Estonia,
latvia, lithuania, poland, andso Donald Tusk is right that we
need to get active, and we needto get active fast, with or
without the United States, andthis is the way to do.
(10:52):
It was with the money frozen atEuroclear in Belgium.
Speaker 3 (10:57):
So why do they always talk about that money?
You put it at $350 billion.
Speaker 1 (11:01):
Well, it's between $300 and $350 billion.
Nobody knows exactly.
How much is there.
Speaker 3 (11:07):
And some people have said it could even be $400
billion it could be.
Speaker 1 (11:10):
I don't know.
Nobody knows exactly.
I know that it's about $220billion at Euroclear, which is a
good start.
Speaker 3 (11:18):
So why do they always talk about maybe it should be
used for reconstruction?
Why isn't there a completeembrace of using that money to
simply let them defendthemselves and use it for arms?
Speaker 1 (11:33):
Well, the original fantasy among most heads of
state and policymakers was thatPutin was going to negotiate.
When he's not winning and hestarts to lose, he'll negotiate.
That's a fantasy based on lackof understanding of how Putin
operates.
Putin is a brutal dictator.
He doesn't care how manysoldiers he loses, he doesn't
care about the damage to hiseconomy, he can't show weakness
(11:55):
and he will never negotiate.
But the idea was he was goingto negotiate, the war was going
to end and that money would beused for reparations.
But the war is not ending, andso the conversation will very
quickly shift to defense, fromreconstruction, because you
can't have reconstruction untilyou have the war over, and you
can't have the war over untilUkraine either wins or
(12:15):
decisively pushes Russia back.
Speaker 3 (12:18):
Is there momentum?
I mean, I know you talk to alot of European leaders and you
travel Europe constantly.
Has that conversation changedand are they warming up to the
idea of accessing those fundsfor Ukraine?
Speaker 1 (12:32):
Well, the momentum has definitely changed in a lot
of different places.
I mean, the most stark exampleis here in the United Kingdom,
where the numbers are smaller Ithink it's about 28 billion
pounds, but still a big number.
And I've been going back andforth talking to government
officials here, and a year agothere was, like you know, they
were all just a bunch of lawyersand bureaucrats desperately
(12:57):
trying to avoid the issue underthe previous foreign secretary.
And then David Cameron, who isthe former prime minister, who's
really got a good head on hisshoulders, came out and said
explicitly exactly what we'retalking about here confiscating
the money for Ukraine and hesaid it in Washington at the
Aspen Institute conference lastweek.
Speaker 3 (13:19):
Right, and once one government does it and I think
Canada's moving in thatdirection as well once one
government does it, then youknow, it's like a house of cards
, right?
Speaker 1 (13:29):
Indeed, and also I should point out that the US,
while all this nastiness isgoing on around the aid package,
there's a piece of legislationcalled the repo act, which is
sponsored primarily, or I shouldsay initiated, by Republicans,
which is to confiscate the moneyin the US, at the US Federal
Reserve.
Speaker 3 (13:49):
What is that amount to?
How much is there?
Do you know?
Speaker 1 (13:53):
Well, there is again.
There's no transparency.
I've heard numbers varying from14 billion to 28 billion, but I
don't know the answer to that.
Sizable, sizable amounts.
Speaker 3 (14:05):
So Europe now is meeting this week as well.
You know there's a dizzyingamount of news taking place now,
but Europe is meeting andthey're supposed to consider 50
billion euros for Ukraine interms of different aid, some of
(14:26):
its grants, some of it will beforgiven.
That seems stalled with ViktorOrban who today says any
decisions have to be unanimous.
He is saying this today now,and any aid will have to be
enacted outside the EU budgetand also he will not allow EU
(14:47):
membership talks to begin withUkraine.
He won't allow it to happen.
Speaker 1 (14:53):
Well, Viktor Orban.
He's angling for something, sohe's using the veto power of any
individual member state to get30 billion that he wants
allocated to his country, whichhas been withheld because of all
sorts of nastiness that he's upto in Hungary.
I think he's just forcinganother issue which I think will
come very quickly to thesurface, which is this whole
(15:15):
concept of unanimity that everycountry in the European Union
has to agree on every singleforeign policy point.
That has to be changed, and ifyou can have one country which
is effectively a Putin-Trojanhorse inside the EU, that can't
possibly be allowed, and they'veallowed it for long enough.
But when it comes to thenational security of EU member
(15:40):
states being compromised by thispolicy, I think they're going
to have to find a way aroundthat.
Speaker 3 (15:46):
Can I just get your long-term view as we wrap up
here, bill?
Do you think that Ukraine canhold the line?
They're certainly not advancingright now.
They're dug in.
Do you think they can hold theline through the winter until
maybe they do get some more aid,or at least they get some of
(16:08):
these F-16 aircraft arriving?
Maybe Sweden steps up with theGripens to them?
It's not hopeless, but it isdire.
Speaker 1 (16:18):
I'm quite certain that Ukraine will hold the line.
It's just a question of whathuman cost they hold that line.
The lack of weapons means thatmore soldiers die.
I think what everyone needs tounderstand is that if Ukraine
were to lose or to capitulate,then all the women get raped,
(16:39):
all the children get taken away,all the men get tortured, and
so this is really a fight forsurvival, a fight to the death,
and so Ukraine's not going togive up.
It's just a question of howmany Ukrainians have to die
before we come around andfinally give them the support
they need 44 million people inthe original population of
(17:02):
Ukraine when this war began.
Speaker 3 (17:05):
Are you disappointed that your raison d'etre, your
big push for sanctionsrepeatedly, was to cut Russia
off and really make them pay andmake them feel the economic
pain, and that might destabilizePutin's stranglehold on power
in Russia?
Are you disappointed with thefact that so many Western
(17:29):
businesses continue to dobusiness in Russia?
Speaker 1 (17:32):
Well, absolutely, but I don't think there's that so
many Western businesses doingbusiness in Russia.
My analysis is that mostWestern businesses aren't doing
business in Russia.
There are a few that do, andit's like Western businesses
doing business in Nazi Germanyduring Hitler.
There's always going to beimmoral actors profit-maximizing
(17:58):
and trying to fill in the gap.
But I can also say that Putinis suffering.
Just because he's licking hislips right now and enjoying the
chaos in Washington doesn't meanthat he's not paid a huge,
monumental price for hismisadventure in Ukraine.
He's lost, according to bothUkrainian and US estimates, more
than 300,000 soldiers.
(18:19):
He's lost 5,000 tanks.
The economy is in a total stateof disarray.
I don't believe any of thisfake numbers coming out of
Russia.
They've lost the most importantcustomer for their most
important industry gas.
Europe is not going to everdepend on Russian natural gas
(18:39):
again.
More than a million young, ablemen have left the country.
Who could?
The drain, drain isincalculable.
This has been a disaster forPutin and he doesn't care.
He's not acting in the nationalinterest.
He's acting in his own personalinterest.
But this has been a terrible,terrible mistake for him and he
(19:01):
and his country are paying adevastating price.
Speaker 3 (19:05):
And his reaction will be just to hold on longer.
Speaker 1 (19:08):
Well, he can hold on longer because he doesn't
personally feel the pain and hedoesn't care what his people
feel.
Speaker 3 (19:17):
Paul Browder, it's always great to talk to you and
get your insight.
Thank you so much.
Speaker 1 (19:21):
Thank you.
Speaker 3 (19:27):
Thomas Kent is the author of how Russia Loses
Hubris and Miscalculation inPutin's Kremlin, and he joins me
now, thomas, welcome.
Speaker 2 (19:37):
Thank you.
Speaker 3 (19:38):
So look the first thing I note about your book.
First of all, the reason Iwanted to interview you is
because, you know, does Putinlose and does Russia lose, and
there's certainly be a lot ofdebate about that.
But in your book you paint apretty dark picture of Russia no
(20:00):
coherent ideology for others toadopt.
It's weak economically.
It's international venturesoffer nothing to poor people.
It's really a system that makesrich elite Russians richer.
Even at the same time, itconstantly derides the West as
being corrupt.
Speaker 2 (20:21):
Yeah, that's largely true.
It doesn't mean that Russiacan't still defy gravity and
advance its interests with verylittle behind it.
It does it mainly through thepower of information, slash
propaganda, but it does scoresome successes, and so it's a
(20:42):
little counterintuitive, whenthe world is in such turmoil and
some ships are falling, theKremlin's way, to think about
weaknesses and their influenceoperations.
But maybe that makes it evenmore important to focus on the
kinds of miscalculations thatthey have made and how we can
(21:03):
recognize them as they continueto pop up and what's still going
to be a long struggle.
Speaker 3 (21:10):
All right, I want to talk to you more about that.
But you mentioned how Putinstumbled and fumbled repeatedly,
and you do, I think, sixcountry kind of studies in the
book and you say that Ukrainewas actually Putin's to lose and
he lost it.
Do you think that you stillhold that view, given this
(21:35):
momentous week as you and I aredoing this interview?
President Zelensky of Ukrainereally is largely leaving
Washington without any kind offunding commitment for his war
effort into the next year, andPutin is boasting more and more
publicly.
This is just a matter of timeuntil he gets what he wants in
Ukraine.
Speaker 2 (21:55):
Well, you know, the focus of the book is on Russian
influence weaknesses at variouspoints.
If they succeed somehow inUkraine, it will be a turnabout
from a really reverse influencecampaign that they ran from 2000
(22:17):
to 2022, which is to say,turning Ukraine from a country
where, at the beginning of the2000s, putin was probably the
most popular political figureamong Ukrainians into an
implacable enemy.
So I look at the things thatRussia did that hurt its own
(22:40):
interests in Ukraine and turn itinto an enemy.
Now, if they win by brute force, then they win by brute force,
but it doesn't mean that theyhad any kind of influence
victory.
It just means that ultimatelythey had more tanks than the
West was willing to give Ukraine.
Speaker 3 (22:57):
I guess.
I mean there were revolutionsin Ukraine and there were a lot
of people who didn't supportPutin in the 2000s and you know,
yanukovych was Putin at onepoint before the Orange
Revolution.
I mean I was in Ukrainecovering the election and Putin
was openly campaigning forYanukovych and in the end
(23:21):
Yanukovych lost that election.
So there was a lot of growingsuspicion about Russia even at
that point.
Speaker 2 (23:28):
There was.
But one of the reasons for thatwas because of the way the
Russians bungled their relationswith Ukraine.
Russia had everything going forit in Ukraine, a population
that was similar ethnically theywere pretty much everyone spoke
Russian had its economy closelylinked.
(23:50):
It was sort of like the UnitedStates and Canada.
I mean it could have been likethat, but the Russians, through
bluster, through threats,through overreaching, managed to
turn all that around and madethemselves an enemy.
I mean, it's certainly true thatthe West was up to its elbows
(24:13):
in trying to at various points.
So we also suffered someUkraine fatigue at various
periods.
But the West certainly was upto its elbows in trying to turn
Ukraine in a Western direction.
But there were very strongforces uniting Russia and
Ukraine.
If the Russians had been ableto conceive of Ukraine having
(24:39):
good relations with the West butalso strong relations with
Russia, perhaps even being inthe EU but not in NATO, I mean,
all these things were possible.
As a matter of fact, putinhimself spoke wistfully about
the relationship between the USand Canada and between Germany
and Austria in terms of whatcould have been with Ukraine,
(25:02):
and that didn't happen.
Speaker 3 (25:06):
You study propaganda and disinformation.
I'm struck today watching a10-minute clip of Russian TV
channels and I regularly look atthe highlights from the night
before.
But this is 10 minutes, kind ofthe worst of, and it is a hate
(25:26):
assembly line.
So before we talk about Russiaand its propaganda aimed at the
West and I think some of it isstill aimed at the West anyway
but internally, you know,russians talk about Ukrainians
being possessed by the devil.
If we can't convince them,we'll kill them.
(25:48):
Those who don't want to livewith us will be shot, cutting
off the heads of Ukrainians.
There are jokes about rapingUkrainian grandmothers on
Russian television.
Denazification by any means, bykilling millions if it's
necessary.
Drown the Ukrainian childrenwho don't agree with Russians.
(26:10):
Destroy Kiev, if necessary.
So our Russian flag sits there.
Dmitry Solovyova, who you'llknow as one of the main
propagandists on television,likened the war to cleansing a
cat of worms.
The worms are Ukrainians, thecleanse cat is Russia.
Sergei Markov he calls Ukrainea sinkhole that leads to hell
(26:32):
and will cease to exist.
Chechen fighters who are, youknow, doing their own media
propaganda.
You talk about marching on toBerlin.
And Solovyova again, it's aholy war.
If Russia doesn't win, theworld will cease to exist.
I mean, I would use the termdisgusting, but beyond that it's
(26:55):
certainly.
This is the assembly line thatRussians watch nightly.
And when does it stop beingpropaganda?
And it just becomes a wide heldbelief that the Kremlin has
sold and stuffed down thethroats of Russians.
And where does that lead?
What does that lead?
Speaker 2 (27:14):
Russian verbiage on this subject has really evolved.
At the time when the invasiontook place, or just before when,
in the summer before, whenPutin was issuing his 5,000-word
manifesto about therelationship between Russia and
Ukraine, the language was I mean, it was not comforting to
(27:38):
Ukraine, but it was stillquasi-diplomatic about how
Russia didn't have it in for theUkrainians, that it had it in
for a government that washolding Ukrainians hostage, but
these were brother peoples andthey were going to advance
together and so forth.
And in the course of thecampaign military campaign the
(28:00):
whole tenor of it has changedand now we see, in a matter of
fact, for a year or so we haveseen the kind of things that you
refer to.
Why is this happening?
I would think there are acouple reasons, but the main
thing is that Putin needs tofind fanatic supporters, because
ordinary Russians can seeincreasingly that this war is
(28:25):
not going well, that it'scosting them economically, that
they can't travel to the Westanymore, that their country is
viewed as a pariah state doesn'tlook good.
I mean, it's certainly truethat Russians can't get out in
protest, but we see in polls andthings that Russians saying
that increasingly they wish thiswar would end, which is a
(28:48):
different narrative thanRussians saying all we care
about is winning.
They just sort of want it overat this point.
So where does Putin find hisreal allies?
Well, russia has a very strongright wing, very nationalist,
very religious.
The Russian Orthodox Church hasbeen brought into this, which
(29:09):
is pushing some elements of itare pushing an apocalyptic
messianic line along the linesof that.
This is the ultimate fight forChristendom against the decadent
and immoral West, that Ukraineis just one battlefield in a
(29:30):
much larger existential war, andif it comes to a purifying
nuclear conflict, well so be it.
God will sort it all out at theend and it will be the Russians
who will triumph, because theyare the ones who have fought for
Christianity and Christianvalues.
(29:52):
And it had to happen sooner orlater.
And if it does on their watch,so be it.
I mean.
Speaker 3 (30:02):
I have to shake my head, and it's just gotten more
bizarre over the period of thewar since February of 2021.
And where does that end?
And when does that translateinto somebody actually doing
something beyond what we thoughtRussia was capable to do?
(30:23):
I mean, it's really dangerous.
Speaker 2 (30:27):
It's really dangerous .
They have backed themselvesinto something of a corner here.
I mean they could always switch.
I mean Putin could always agreeto some kind of a deal and
Russia suddenly say he'sdenazified Ukraine, we can be
brothers again.
Yeah, yeah, sort of declarevictory in some way or another.
(30:50):
I mean, it wouldn't make anysense, but that's never stopped
Russian propaganda.
So they could.
They could somehow say it'sbeen a great victory, and you
know whatever they want.
So they have to decide are theygoing to, you know,
increasingly push this, thisline, or are they going to, you
know, make some kind ofconcession, the?
(31:13):
What they're calculating ismight they actually win this war
in such a way that I mean, notdestroy the, the, the government
in Kiev, but at least hold allthe Ukrainian territory they've
captured, make it a frozenconflict, humiliate the West?
If so, then they don't have todo anything in terms of either,
you know, declaring a fakevictory or using nuclear weapons
(31:38):
.
But if it turns out that theyreally cannot manage this
conflict, then you know theycould do anything potentially.
Now I don't think personallywhat do I know?
But I don't think personallythat the Russian establishment,
including the militaryestablishment, is really going
(31:58):
to go and nuke the world.
But they seem to have convincedsome people in the West that
they might and therefore theWest has, I think, probably to
some degree set some limitsaround itself.
I mean, it's it's been deterred.
Speaker 3 (32:15):
You know we don't want to work through it, it's
not even part of the calculus onwhether, for instance, long
range weapons like the attackarms are provided if the Crimea
is going to come under attackand the Kirch bridge is going to
be taken out.
And certainly that's been partof the internal debate,
certainly in the US, I think,when they've been talking about
how far do we go in allowingUkraine to attack Russian forces
(32:39):
, whether they be inside Russiaor inside Ukraine.
And that's still a calculation,right, because that's and that
feeds into the criticism ofPresident Biden's administration
about this slow drip of weaponsand an escalation, rather than
just allowing Ukraine to bearmed with the kinds of things
that would allow it to win.
They've been very reluctant on,you know, first giving armor,
(33:04):
then M1 Abrams tanks, maybeF-16s, ok, a few F-16s, and
there's been that slow, slowbuild, slow drip.
Speaker 2 (33:15):
Biden published an op-ed in the New York Times a
couple months after the warstarted, called something like
what we Will and Will Not Do inUkraine, and it was quite clear
there that I mean he said thatwe're not going to aid Ukraine
in attacking Russia, and any youknow military person will tell
you that in trying to repel aninvasion, what you need to do is
(33:38):
to strike the enemy's rear.
So this was our calculus goingin.
Speaker 3 (33:45):
So this propaganda internally that we've talked
about certainly convinced a lotof Russians of the need to fight
the West and to be victoriousover Ukraine.
And then externally I meanyou've seen the propaganda
machine go into overdrive thisweek, and quite successfully.
I would ask you to weigh it andmeasure it, but it seems
(34:07):
successful in the sense thatPutin has said we're winning,
it's just a question of time.
The assembly line of weapons iscoming online and getting
stronger all the time, and theRepublicans, who at first were
holding hostage funding toUkraine over the Mexican border
and immigration issues, haveslowly kind of turned the
(34:29):
attention more to well, can thatwar ever be won?
And maybe Putin's right.
And why are we just going tokeep pouring billions of dollars
into something that's a warthat's never ending?
Speaker 2 (34:46):
Well, of course, the White House points out that
these billions of dollars do notwind up getting buried in
Ukraine.
Most of it goes to Americanarms makers.
So this is.
You could view it as a jobsprogram if you wanted to, if you
want to just be calculatingabout it.
Well, you know, people seem tohave forgotten that wars can
(35:07):
take a while and they go throughphases.
In World War II, you know, welost, you know, whole aircraft
carriers with thousands ofpeople on board, and that was
part of the cost of doingbusiness.
We are in a world where weexpect instant satisfaction.
Now, of course, we couldadvance our satisfaction, I'm
sure, by giving Ukraine moreweapons faster.
(35:29):
We could have done that a longtime ago.
But the fact is, ukraine is abig country.
It's got a lot of people.
It's got no choice.
Essentially, it will.
The Russians have shown it howthey handle people in
territories that they conquer.
So I don't think Ukraine isgoing to give up and the
(35:52):
question for us will be do wewant to be with them in the long
term or do we not?
And from the standpoint of USpolitics it's not my area of
expertise, but the Republicanshave claimed Thomas, it's
nobody's area of expertise rightnow because it's such a mirage,
(36:14):
but what's going?
on.
Well, I mean, the Republicanshave claimed that Biden lost
Afghanistan, and I guess theymight want to think about
whether they want it said thatthe Republicans lost Ukraine.
All these foreign adventureshad their repercussions
(36:36):
domestically.
Speaker 3 (36:38):
So I want to ask you two questions before I let you
go, and you've been verygenerous with your time.
First of all, in your book, Ithought it was very interesting
how you talk about Russia'smiscalculations, if I can term
it as that, and you say thatPutin has this vertical power
structure in a very small circleand he thinks that other
(36:59):
countries work like that.
In a way and he tends to,quoting from your book tends to
ally itself, russia withauthoritarian leaders who
eventually fall from power,fails to build deep people to
people ties, overestimatespolitical and its economic and
political strengths,underestimates the power of laws
(37:21):
, international organizationsand pro-democracy forces, and it
is often not prepared forconcerted resistant efforts.
So what's the miscalculationthere?
Speaker 2 (37:33):
Well, the miscalculation is all of those
that a lot of Russia's appeal,so to speak, in the world is
basically a propaganda appeal.
In much of the Global South,for example, russia provides
almost nothing in the way offoreign aid, assistance,
(37:54):
ideological inspiration oranything compared to the massive
amounts of investment in tradefrom the West, the effort by the
US, the EU, to help buildsustainable institutions that
will actually improve people'slives.
As I said, russia manages todefy gravity in many places
(38:18):
simply through the power ofpropaganda and the occasional on
the ground little project orspeech or military visit or
something like that.
So the answer is, in my view,that since the West has so many
(38:40):
advantages, it should simplyinstrumentalize the one tool
that it almost never uses, whichis information.
Western information policy isextremely tentative, extremely
risk averse.
(39:01):
We tend to think that if wereally get out there in the
information domain, on thesocial networks and using
influencers and doing all thesethings and posters and stickers
and campaigning for Westerninterests, including the
interests of democratic forceswithin individual countries,
(39:22):
their civil society and so forth, people tend to imagine that if
we start doing this, we willsomehow immediately slide into
doing disinformation and lyingand so forth.
Now my feeling is, in Westerninformation, we should always
tell the truth, but there's alot of truth to tell, and we
(39:44):
tend to shy away fromconfronting propaganda and
disinformation with informationoperations of our own.
When you consider that Russiaand other authoritarian states
too tend to operate above all inthe information realm and are
(40:05):
expert at creating entireillusions of their benevolence,
of their wealth, of theirsuccess and so forth, then it
would have seemed to me thatmaybe something's lacking in
terms of you could call it ourpublic diplomacy, you could call
it our propaganda, you couldcall it our clear exposition of
(40:30):
who we are and what we stand forand how that has made us
relatively successful countries.
Speaker 3 (40:38):
And in terms of winning against Russia.
Who is that aimed at?
In terms of getting the wordout better about who the West is
and what we have to offer, whois that aimed at?
Is that aimed at some of thecountries that Russia is wooing
and trying to draw away from theWest?
(40:59):
Or is that aimed at Russiansthemselves?
Speaker 2 (41:02):
It could be either way.
The State Department hastiptoed in descending some
videos out aimed at Russiancitizens, but I think the
biggest at-risk area at themoment is obviously areas in the
global South, to some degree indeveloped countries, developed
(41:25):
Western countries, where youjust want to take these Russian
errors and say really, can youpossibly believe this?
Isn't this contradictory towhat they said yesterday?
And what exactly is Russia'splan to make Ivory Coast rich?
They have no plan for anythingreally, except for their own
(41:51):
benefit in various parts of theworld.
I mean, back in the day youcould credit them with communist
ideology.
Speaker 3 (42:00):
That made sense to some of its power politics too,
Isn't it locally where they sendin the Wagner group to prop up
a wobbly dictatorship or awobbly administration?
They provide some arms and inreturn get some diamonds and
some gas.
Speaker 2 (42:17):
Yeah, they do, and that's their tactic of yoking
their fortunes to the strengthof a top layer in a country and
sending in mercenaries tosupport a corrupt government and
oppress the people.
You got to say is that much ofa long-term strategy?
(42:38):
Does that do any benefit forthe people?
Answer no.
So who is pointing that out inan aggressive and assertive way
instead of just sort of wringingour hands?
When you think about a countrythat comes under Russian
influence, we tend to say, oh OK, lost that one, let's look on
(43:00):
the next.
I mean, you don't losecountries for very long.
If you make an effort, everywill not end this year or even
next year, I trust.
So all of these countries andissues that we feel well, we
lost on that one, let's look atanother country because that's
gone.
I mean, russia never looks atit that way.
(43:23):
They suffer defeats all thetime and keep coming back.
So why should we feel thatevery loss is the end?
It does take fortitude and itdoes take some belief in our own
societies.
And if we're hypnotized,largely by ourselves, into
(43:46):
believing that democracy is afailed experiment and our
countries are endlessly corrupt,then yeah, we will lose.
But if we look at free marketsand free societies as being
basically the major way thatcountries have become prosperous
(44:07):
, then you have a different view.
Speaker 3 (44:12):
Yeah, it's really a good point that you're making.
Do you read President Putin'sannouncement that he's running
again?
He changed the Constitution.
Maybe we're going to have thisguy around until 2036,
potentially.
Do you read his desire to stayin the Kremlin as a strength or
(44:34):
do you see it as a weakness,because any change in Russia
right now, especially at the top, could potentially bring the
house down?
Speaker 2 (44:45):
Well, I don't think he has any choice.
I don't think there's anyone hewould trust other than himself
to stay in power, and you haveno idea.
He has no idea of who couldsucceed him or who could succeed
him after the immediate firstperson who succeeds him, and
he's got a warrant out againsthim from the International
(45:06):
Criminal Court.
So if I were he, I'd stay theretoo and I keep a gun under my
coat and isolate myself andinsulate myself and be very
careful with those around me.
He may last forever.
I have no idea.
I never predict Russianpolitics, but I would say that
(45:30):
if he were to, I think it wouldbe highly dangerous for him to
say well, I've done everything Ican.
I'm now, you know, leadingSochi for a quiet retirement and
I trust all will go well.
Speaker 3 (45:42):
Thomas Kent, the author of how Russia Loses,
great to meet you and I hope wecan do it again, and I
appreciate your time.
A pleasure, thanks so much, andthat's our back story.
This week, during Putin'sphonion program, a western
journalist watched some of thequestions electronically scroll
across the big screen, questionsthat were never asked
(46:02):
Interesting reading.
There's plenty of praise forPutin.
How do we make sure Putin livesforever?
One message reads a strongPutin is a strong Russia reads
another.
But there are critical textstoo.
Does Putin want to end the war?
The demer give it in the jobtoo long.
When will power change inRussia?
(46:23):
And there's this one.
Could you tell me how to moveto the Russia that we see on TV
here?
Many Russians who hate the warand, by extension, putin, have
left the country and are livingin Central Asia, dubai, europe,
cyprus, israel.
Many of them were prominentRussians, patriots who can't
stand to send their kids to diein Ukraine and just can't stand
(46:46):
to see freedoms in human rightsgo backwards in Russia, to see
Russia set back decades by Putinin his inner circle Tragic, but
here we are In Europe, and therest of the world just has to
isolate Russia and confront ittoo.
I'm Dana Lewis.
Thanks for listening toBackstory and I'll talk to you
(47:07):
again soon.
Now Putin regularly talks out of both sides of his
mouth.
He says all sorts of stuff hedoesn't mean.
He doesn't say all sorts ofstuff he does mean.
I would.
Speaker 2 (00:09):
I mean he is a pathological liar, so I wouldn't
hang on any word that he saysPutin needs to find fanatic
supporters, because ordinaryRussians can see increasingly
that this war is not going well,that it's costing them
economically, that they can'ttravel to the West anymore, that
(00:33):
their country is viewed as apariah state.
Doesn't look good.
Speaker 3 (00:44):
Hi everyone and welcome to another edition of
Backstory.
I'm Dana Lewis On thisBackstory a tough week for
Ukraine.
The US has turned down fundingrequests to buy in $60 billion
to allow Ukraine to fight on andmaybe win against Russia.
What now?
Well, the Republicans aretrying to force Biden to give
ground on border issues, butincreasingly there are questions
(01:08):
and doubts.
Can Ukraine actually win andforce Putin's army out of
Eastern Ukraine?
Russia is the problem, and weinterview the author of a new
book how Does Russia Lose,thomas Ken, and it's obviously
about more than just Ukraine.
But first he has campaignedrelentlessly for sanctions on
Russia.
Bill Browder talks Ukraine'ssetbacks in Washington, putin
(01:34):
and ways to make Russia pay,including siphoning billions in
Russian cash that remain frozenin Europe.
Bill Browder is a tirelesscampaigner for sanctions against
Russia and he joins me now.
I believe you're in London,bill.
Speaker 1 (01:54):
That's correct.
Speaker 3 (01:55):
Welcome.
Good to talk to you again.
You too.
I'm just watching and trying towade through this never ending
annual news conference thatPutin holds, where he takes
questions supposedly spontaneousquestions from journalists and
the public.
I can tell you I've been inthat news conference in the
Kremlin many times where it is anegotiated question and they
(02:19):
come and they ask you in advanceif they're going to answer your
question.
What are you going to ask?
Inevitably, we used to changethem anyway as journalists, but
I can tell you that they are notvery spontaneous.
One of the first.
Speaker 1 (02:32):
Did you ever get a question in?
I did.
Speaker 3 (02:35):
Oh good, but I usually just changed it.
So, but yeah, I did get them inquite often.
Maybe that's a bad merit badgeright now to be wearing, but one
of the first questions from ajournalist asking why a female
journalist is getting somethinglike 14 years in prison, saying,
(02:56):
you know, should the criminalcode be changed?
It's harsh.
And Putin said, well, maybethese prison terms are too long.
Is he suddenly trying to be achampion of human rights?
Speaker 1 (03:08):
Now Putin regularly talks out of both sides of his
mouth.
He says all sorts of stuff hedoesn't mean.
He doesn't say all sorts ofstuff he doesn't mean.
I mean.
He is a pathological liar.
So I wouldn't hang on any wordthat he says as truth.
I wouldn't project fromanything he says to be a new
(03:29):
trend.
I think we've seen this guy.
I think you know the onedisadvantage he has is that
we've seen him for 23 years inaction.
He has a track record, a verybad track record, and so it's
not as if, you know, there'ssome mystery about this man.
He is a killer, he's a liar,he's a thief and he is a mass.
(03:55):
He is a genocidal mass murderer, and that's who he is, and
whatever words come out of hismouth don't really mean anything
.
Speaker 3 (04:03):
He's also asked by a journalist when is there gonna
be peace with Ukraine?
He says there'll be peace whenwe achieve our goals
denazification of Ukraine anddemilitarization of Ukraine.
Your reaction to that?
Speaker 1 (04:18):
Well, those are the same exact words that he said on
February 24th 2022.
Vladimir Putin has not changedhis approach towards Ukraine.
There's all these people outthere that are the sort of
pressuring Zelensky to cut adeal, et cetera, but there's no
deal to cut.
You know, if Putin, if Ukrainedecides to concede, then Putin
(04:42):
achieves all the objectives thathe set out to do on the very
first day of this nasty conflict.
Speaker 3 (04:48):
Should the Russians be so confident right now?
They obviously you know highfives and celebrations on
Russian television all this weekwhat they perceive to be a
pretty dark week for Ukraine interms of the US not going
through with the $60 billion inwar funding from the Biden
(05:09):
administration.
Speaker 1 (05:11):
Well, I mean, they're having a good week for sure,
but I wouldn't count theUkrainians out in any way, shape
or form.
First of all, the Ukrainianswill fight, whether they get US
aid or not, and the Ukrainianshave shown.
You know, three days into thiswar, they didn't have a whole
lot of US military aid and theyreally gave the Russians a run
(05:31):
for their money.
Secondly, I don't believe thatwe're at the stage right now
where the US is going toultimately cut off funding for
Ukraine.
I think that this is atemporary situation, this is a
tactical situation whereRepublicans are trying to extort
certain concessions from Bidenat the expense of Ukraine.
(05:53):
But at the end of the day, Ican't imagine and I could be
wrong about this, but I can'timagine that we'll be, you know,
into February next year and anaid package for Ukraine hasn't
been approved.
I think there's a longer termissue which the Russians haven't
yet started celebrating, whichis that if Trump were to be
elected, he would withdraw hewould absolutely withdraw
(06:14):
military aid for Ukraine, and atthat point then I don't believe
the Europeans have enoughresources to give the Ukrainians
what they need to sustain adefense.
Speaker 3 (06:25):
I mean, in fact, they have been celebrating the
coming of Trump on television.
Solovyoff and some of the otherpretty ugly Russian
commentators have been sayingyou know, not only will it be an
end to aid in Ukraine, it'll bean end to NATO, we will defeat
NATO.
Speaker 1 (06:43):
Well, there is a decent chance that if Trump
becomes president, he will tearup the NATO treaty.
As far as the US is concerned,he tried to do that, or he
thought about doing that, in hispast presidency, and it was
only because there was so manypatriots in the US government as
his national security advisor,as secretary of defense and
other people that that didn'thappen.
(07:05):
But I don't think that that'san impossibility.
And so you know, putin has hada big win this week in Congress.
As I said, I don't think thatthat's a permanent win.
I think that that eventuallythe Ukrainians will get their
money, but he's holding off.
He's holding on for the sort ofexistential win in November
2024.
Speaker 3 (07:25):
You said, europe can't do it alone.
You know, you have people likeDonald Tusk, the new, the new,
old prime minister of Poland,coming to power saying we need
to mobilize all of the Westright now, and he's really
calling on Europe to step uptheir game.
What would happen if the USdoesn't come up with money?
Will Europe then start toretreat as well, or do you think
(07:48):
they'll step up and try andfill the gaps somehow?
Speaker 1 (07:51):
Well, they're going to have to step up to some
extent because they're muchcloser to Ukraine and to Russia
than the US is.
I mean, there's one interestingsort of Hail Mary for Ukraine
here, which is that when the warstarted the West froze $350
(08:12):
billion of Russian central bankreserves, and about 220 billion
of those reserves are held inEuroclear in Belgium.
And it seems to be prettyobvious that if Russia has
created more than a trilliondollars of damage to Ukraine and
that money is frozen, thatthere's not a legal way to get
(08:35):
that money for the defense ofUkraine, and it may be the
necessity that forces that issue.
I've been in the EuropeanCommission in various other
places and everybody is sort ofbureaucratically trying to avoid
answering that question.
But I think when push comes toshove and when it's peace in the
world is at stake, theEuropeans may act more
(08:57):
decisively and that would solvethe funding problem.
Speaker 3 (09:00):
Well, let me push.
Maybe coming to shove prettyquickly, right?
So the original proposal Idon't want to say it's the
original proposal, but thelatest proposal is at least use
the interest from that 350billion.
At least use the interest andgive it to Ukraine.
That would be a mini steptowards taking all of the assets
and turning them over to Kiev.
Speaker 1 (09:20):
Well, I mean, it's just an absurdity If you can use
the interest, why not use theprinciple?
I mean, how is one more legalthan the other?
The issue that everybody issort of struggling with is
they're saying, oh my God, thisis violate sovereign immunity
and, oh my God, no one's goingto want to hold the Euro anymore
.
Well, first of all, it doesn'tviolate sovereign immunity,
because when a country invadesanother country, they create
(09:43):
damages which are need to besatisfied under a different law
called the law.
It's called the law oncountermeasures.
And secondly, I don't thinkpeople are going to start
transacting in Chinese and SaudiArabian currency because they
think the EU is such a dangerousplace to do business.
I think if you're a dictatorabout to take over a foreign
(10:04):
country, you might feel a littleworried about your reserves in
foreign countries, but I don'tthink anyone else is.
But ultimately, if you're goingto take the interest, you might
as well take it all.
And the Ukrainians need thatmoney.
And of course, there's lots ofconcern about not wanting that
money to be stolen or wasted andthere's lots of ways of making
sure that doesn't happen.
But if the US ultimately cutsoff Ukraine from military aid,
(10:30):
ukrainians basically willcollapse if they don't get that,
and if the Ukrainians collapseand Putin succeeds in his
initial military objectives,then the next stop is Estonia,
latvia, lithuania, poland, andso Donald Tusk is right that we
need to get active, and we needto get active fast, with or
without the United States, andthis is the way to do.
(10:52):
It was with the money frozen atEuroclear in Belgium.
Speaker 3 (10:57):
So why do they always talk about that money?
You put it at $350 billion.
Speaker 1 (11:01):
Well, it's between $300 and $350 billion.
Nobody knows exactly.
How much is there.
Speaker 3 (11:07):
And some people have said it could even be $400
billion it could be.
Speaker 1 (11:10):
I don't know.
Nobody knows exactly.
I know that it's about $220billion at Euroclear, which is a
good start.
Speaker 3 (11:18):
So why do they always talk about maybe it should be
used for reconstruction?
Why isn't there a completeembrace of using that money to
simply let them defendthemselves and use it for arms?
Speaker 1 (11:33):
Well, the original fantasy among most heads of
state and policymakers was thatPutin was going to negotiate.
When he's not winning and hestarts to lose, he'll negotiate.
That's a fantasy based on lackof understanding of how Putin
operates.
Putin is a brutal dictator.
He doesn't care how manysoldiers he loses, he doesn't
care about the damage to hiseconomy, he can't show weakness
(11:55):
and he will never negotiate.
But the idea was he was goingto negotiate, the war was going
to end and that money would beused for reparations.
But the war is not ending, andso the conversation will very
quickly shift to defense, fromreconstruction, because you
can't have reconstruction untilyou have the war over, and you
can't have the war over untilUkraine either wins or
(12:15):
decisively pushes Russia back.
Speaker 3 (12:18):
Is there momentum?
I mean, I know you talk to alot of European leaders and you
travel Europe constantly.
Has that conversation changedand are they warming up to the
idea of accessing those fundsfor Ukraine?
Speaker 1 (12:32):
Well, the momentum has definitely changed in a lot
of different places.
I mean, the most stark exampleis here in the United Kingdom,
where the numbers are smaller Ithink it's about 28 billion
pounds, but still a big number.
And I've been going back andforth talking to government
officials here, and a year agothere was, like you know, they
were all just a bunch of lawyersand bureaucrats desperately
(12:57):
trying to avoid the issue underthe previous foreign secretary.
And then David Cameron, who isthe former prime minister, who's
really got a good head on hisshoulders, came out and said
explicitly exactly what we'retalking about here confiscating
the money for Ukraine and hesaid it in Washington at the
Aspen Institute conference lastweek.
Speaker 3 (13:19):
Right, and once one government does it and I think
Canada's moving in thatdirection as well once one
government does it, then youknow, it's like a house of cards
, right?
Speaker 1 (13:29):
Indeed, and also I should point out that the US,
while all this nastiness isgoing on around the aid package,
there's a piece of legislationcalled the repo act, which is
sponsored primarily, or I shouldsay initiated, by Republicans,
which is to confiscate the moneyin the US, at the US Federal
Reserve.
Speaker 3 (13:49):
What is that amount to?
How much is there?
Do you know?
Speaker 1 (13:53):
Well, there is again.
There's no transparency.
I've heard numbers varying from14 billion to 28 billion, but I
don't know the answer to that.
Sizable, sizable amounts.
Speaker 3 (14:05):
So Europe now is meeting this week as well.
You know there's a dizzyingamount of news taking place now,
but Europe is meeting andthey're supposed to consider 50
billion euros for Ukraine interms of different aid, some of
(14:26):
its grants, some of it will beforgiven.
That seems stalled with ViktorOrban who today says any
decisions have to be unanimous.
He is saying this today now,and any aid will have to be
enacted outside the EU budgetand also he will not allow EU
(14:47):
membership talks to begin withUkraine.
He won't allow it to happen.
Speaker 1 (14:53):
Well, Viktor Orban.
He's angling for something, sohe's using the veto power of any
individual member state to get30 billion that he wants
allocated to his country, whichhas been withheld because of all
sorts of nastiness that he's upto in Hungary.
I think he's just forcinganother issue which I think will
come very quickly to thesurface, which is this whole
(15:15):
concept of unanimity that everycountry in the European Union
has to agree on every singleforeign policy point.
That has to be changed, and ifyou can have one country which
is effectively a Putin-Trojanhorse inside the EU, that can't
possibly be allowed, and they'veallowed it for long enough.
But when it comes to thenational security of EU member
(15:40):
states being compromised by thispolicy, I think they're going
to have to find a way aroundthat.
Speaker 3 (15:46):
Can I just get your long-term view as we wrap up
here, bill?
Do you think that Ukraine canhold the line?
They're certainly not advancingright now.
They're dug in.
Do you think they can hold theline through the winter until
maybe they do get some more aid,or at least they get some of
(16:08):
these F-16 aircraft arriving?
Maybe Sweden steps up with theGripens to them?
It's not hopeless, but it isdire.
Speaker 1 (16:18):
I'm quite certain that Ukraine will hold the line.
It's just a question of whathuman cost they hold that line.
The lack of weapons means thatmore soldiers die.
I think what everyone needs tounderstand is that if Ukraine
were to lose or to capitulate,then all the women get raped,
(16:39):
all the children get taken away,all the men get tortured, and
so this is really a fight forsurvival, a fight to the death,
and so Ukraine's not going togive up.
It's just a question of howmany Ukrainians have to die
before we come around andfinally give them the support
they need 44 million people inthe original population of
(17:02):
Ukraine when this war began.
Speaker 3 (17:05):
Are you disappointed that your raison d'etre, your
big push for sanctionsrepeatedly, was to cut Russia
off and really make them pay andmake them feel the economic
pain, and that might destabilizePutin's stranglehold on power
in Russia?
Are you disappointed with thefact that so many Western
(17:29):
businesses continue to dobusiness in Russia?
Speaker 1 (17:32):
Well, absolutely, but I don't think there's that so
many Western businesses doingbusiness in Russia.
My analysis is that mostWestern businesses aren't doing
business in Russia.
There are a few that do, andit's like Western businesses
doing business in Nazi Germanyduring Hitler.
There's always going to beimmoral actors profit-maximizing
(17:58):
and trying to fill in the gap.
But I can also say that Putinis suffering.
Just because he's licking hislips right now and enjoying the
chaos in Washington doesn't meanthat he's not paid a huge,
monumental price for hismisadventure in Ukraine.
He's lost, according to bothUkrainian and US estimates, more
than 300,000 soldiers.
(18:19):
He's lost 5,000 tanks.
The economy is in a total stateof disarray.
I don't believe any of thisfake numbers coming out of
Russia.
They've lost the most importantcustomer for their most
important industry gas.
Europe is not going to everdepend on Russian natural gas
(18:39):
again.
More than a million young, ablemen have left the country.
Who could?
The drain, drain isincalculable.
This has been a disaster forPutin and he doesn't care.
He's not acting in the nationalinterest.
He's acting in his own personalinterest.
But this has been a terrible,terrible mistake for him and he
(19:01):
and his country are paying adevastating price.
Speaker 3 (19:05):
And his reaction will be just to hold on longer.
Speaker 1 (19:08):
Well, he can hold on longer because he doesn't
personally feel the pain and hedoesn't care what his people
feel.
Speaker 3 (19:17):
Paul Browder, it's always great to talk to you and
get your insight.
Thank you so much.
Speaker 1 (19:21):
Thank you.
Speaker 3 (19:27):
Thomas Kent is the author of how Russia Loses
Hubris and Miscalculation inPutin's Kremlin, and he joins me
now, thomas, welcome.
Speaker 2 (19:37):
Thank you.
Speaker 3 (19:38):
So look the first thing I note about your book.
First of all, the reason Iwanted to interview you is
because, you know, does Putinlose and does Russia lose, and
there's certainly be a lot ofdebate about that.
But in your book you paint apretty dark picture of Russia no
(20:00):
coherent ideology for others toadopt.
It's weak economically.
It's international venturesoffer nothing to poor people.
It's really a system that makesrich elite Russians richer.
Even at the same time, itconstantly derides the West as
being corrupt.
Speaker 2 (20:21):
Yeah, that's largely true.
It doesn't mean that Russiacan't still defy gravity and
advance its interests with verylittle behind it.
It does it mainly through thepower of information, slash
propaganda, but it does scoresome successes, and so it's a
(20:42):
little counterintuitive, whenthe world is in such turmoil and
some ships are falling, theKremlin's way, to think about
weaknesses and their influenceoperations.
But maybe that makes it evenmore important to focus on the
kinds of miscalculations thatthey have made and how we can
(21:03):
recognize them as they continueto pop up and what's still going
to be a long struggle.
Speaker 3 (21:10):
All right, I want to talk to you more about that.
But you mentioned how Putinstumbled and fumbled repeatedly,
and you do, I think, sixcountry kind of studies in the
book and you say that Ukrainewas actually Putin's to lose and
he lost it.
Do you think that you stillhold that view, given this
(21:35):
momentous week as you and I aredoing this interview?
President Zelensky of Ukrainereally is largely leaving
Washington without any kind offunding commitment for his war
effort into the next year, andPutin is boasting more and more
publicly.
This is just a matter of timeuntil he gets what he wants in
Ukraine.
Speaker 2 (21:55):
Well, you know, the focus of the book is on Russian
influence weaknesses at variouspoints.
If they succeed somehow inUkraine, it will be a turnabout
from a really reverse influencecampaign that they ran from 2000
(22:17):
to 2022, which is to say,turning Ukraine from a country
where, at the beginning of the2000s, putin was probably the
most popular political figureamong Ukrainians into an
implacable enemy.
So I look at the things thatRussia did that hurt its own
(22:40):
interests in Ukraine and turn itinto an enemy.
Now, if they win by brute force, then they win by brute force,
but it doesn't mean that theyhad any kind of influence
victory.
It just means that ultimatelythey had more tanks than the
West was willing to give Ukraine.
Speaker 3 (22:57):
I guess.
I mean there were revolutionsin Ukraine and there were a lot
of people who didn't supportPutin in the 2000s and you know,
yanukovych was Putin at onepoint before the Orange
Revolution.
I mean I was in Ukrainecovering the election and Putin
was openly campaigning forYanukovych and in the end
(23:21):
Yanukovych lost that election.
So there was a lot of growingsuspicion about Russia even at
that point.
Speaker 2 (23:28):
There was.
But one of the reasons for thatwas because of the way the
Russians bungled their relationswith Ukraine.
Russia had everything going forit in Ukraine, a population
that was similar ethnically theywere pretty much everyone spoke
Russian had its economy closelylinked.
(23:50):
It was sort of like the UnitedStates and Canada.
I mean it could have been likethat, but the Russians, through
bluster, through threats,through overreaching, managed to
turn all that around and madethemselves an enemy.
I mean, it's certainly true thatthe West was up to its elbows
(24:13):
in trying to at various points.
So we also suffered someUkraine fatigue at various
periods.
But the West certainly was upto its elbows in trying to turn
Ukraine in a Western direction.
But there were very strongforces uniting Russia and
Ukraine.
If the Russians had been ableto conceive of Ukraine having
(24:39):
good relations with the West butalso strong relations with
Russia, perhaps even being inthe EU but not in NATO, I mean,
all these things were possible.
As a matter of fact, putinhimself spoke wistfully about
the relationship between the USand Canada and between Germany
and Austria in terms of whatcould have been with Ukraine,
(25:02):
and that didn't happen.
Speaker 3 (25:06):
You study propaganda and disinformation.
I'm struck today watching a10-minute clip of Russian TV
channels and I regularly look atthe highlights from the night
before.
But this is 10 minutes, kind ofthe worst of, and it is a hate
(25:26):
assembly line.
So before we talk about Russiaand its propaganda aimed at the
West and I think some of it isstill aimed at the West anyway
but internally, you know,russians talk about Ukrainians
being possessed by the devil.
If we can't convince them,we'll kill them.
(25:48):
Those who don't want to livewith us will be shot, cutting
off the heads of Ukrainians.
There are jokes about rapingUkrainian grandmothers on
Russian television.
Denazification by any means, bykilling millions if it's
necessary.
Drown the Ukrainian childrenwho don't agree with Russians.
(26:10):
Destroy Kiev, if necessary.
So our Russian flag sits there.
Dmitry Solovyova, who you'llknow as one of the main
propagandists on television,likened the war to cleansing a
cat of worms.
The worms are Ukrainians, thecleanse cat is Russia.
Sergei Markov he calls Ukrainea sinkhole that leads to hell
(26:32):
and will cease to exist.
Chechen fighters who are, youknow, doing their own media
propaganda.
You talk about marching on toBerlin.
And Solovyova again, it's aholy war.
If Russia doesn't win, theworld will cease to exist.
I mean, I would use the termdisgusting, but beyond that it's
(26:55):
certainly.
This is the assembly line thatRussians watch nightly.
And when does it stop beingpropaganda?
And it just becomes a wide heldbelief that the Kremlin has
sold and stuffed down thethroats of Russians.
And where does that lead?
What does that lead?
Speaker 2 (27:14):
Russian verbiage on this subject has really evolved.
At the time when the invasiontook place, or just before when,
in the summer before, whenPutin was issuing his 5,000-word
manifesto about therelationship between Russia and
Ukraine, the language was I mean, it was not comforting to
(27:38):
Ukraine, but it was stillquasi-diplomatic about how
Russia didn't have it in for theUkrainians, that it had it in
for a government that washolding Ukrainians hostage, but
these were brother peoples andthey were going to advance
together and so forth.
And in the course of thecampaign military campaign the
(28:00):
whole tenor of it has changedand now we see, in a matter of
fact, for a year or so we haveseen the kind of things that you
refer to.
Why is this happening?
I would think there are acouple reasons, but the main
thing is that Putin needs tofind fanatic supporters, because
ordinary Russians can seeincreasingly that this war is
(28:25):
not going well, that it'scosting them economically, that
they can't travel to the Westanymore, that their country is
viewed as a pariah state doesn'tlook good.
I mean, it's certainly truethat Russians can't get out in
protest, but we see in polls andthings that Russians saying
that increasingly they wish thiswar would end, which is a
(28:48):
different narrative thanRussians saying all we care
about is winning.
They just sort of want it overat this point.
So where does Putin find hisreal allies?
Well, russia has a very strongright wing, very nationalist,
very religious.
The Russian Orthodox Church hasbeen brought into this, which
(29:09):
is pushing some elements of itare pushing an apocalyptic
messianic line along the linesof that.
This is the ultimate fight forChristendom against the decadent
and immoral West, that Ukraineis just one battlefield in a
(29:30):
much larger existential war, andif it comes to a purifying
nuclear conflict, well so be it.
God will sort it all out at theend and it will be the Russians
who will triumph, because theyare the ones who have fought for
Christianity and Christianvalues.
(29:52):
And it had to happen sooner orlater.
And if it does on their watch,so be it.
I mean.
Speaker 3 (30:02):
I have to shake my head, and it's just gotten more
bizarre over the period of thewar since February of 2021.
And where does that end?
And when does that translateinto somebody actually doing
something beyond what we thoughtRussia was capable to do?
(30:23):
I mean, it's really dangerous.
Speaker 2 (30:27):
It's really dangerous .
They have backed themselvesinto something of a corner here.
I mean they could always switch.
I mean Putin could always agreeto some kind of a deal and
Russia suddenly say he'sdenazified Ukraine, we can be
brothers again.
Yeah, yeah, sort of declarevictory in some way or another.
(30:50):
I mean, it wouldn't make anysense, but that's never stopped
Russian propaganda.
So they could.
They could somehow say it'sbeen a great victory, and you
know whatever they want.
So they have to decide are theygoing to, you know,
increasingly push this, thisline, or are they going to, you
know, make some kind ofconcession, the?
(31:13):
What they're calculating ismight they actually win this war
in such a way that I mean, notdestroy the, the, the government
in Kiev, but at least hold allthe Ukrainian territory they've
captured, make it a frozenconflict, humiliate the West?
If so, then they don't have todo anything in terms of either,
you know, declaring a fakevictory or using nuclear weapons
(31:38):
.
But if it turns out that theyreally cannot manage this
conflict, then you know theycould do anything potentially.
Now I don't think personallywhat do I know?
But I don't think personallythat the Russian establishment,
including the militaryestablishment, is really going
(31:58):
to go and nuke the world.
But they seem to have convincedsome people in the West that
they might and therefore theWest has, I think, probably to
some degree set some limitsaround itself.
I mean, it's it's been deterred.
Speaker 3 (32:15):
You know we don't want to work through it, it's
not even part of the calculus onwhether, for instance, long
range weapons like the attackarms are provided if the Crimea
is going to come under attackand the Kirch bridge is going to
be taken out.
And certainly that's been partof the internal debate,
certainly in the US, I think,when they've been talking about
how far do we go in allowingUkraine to attack Russian forces
(32:39):
, whether they be inside Russiaor inside Ukraine.
And that's still a calculation,right, because that's and that
feeds into the criticism ofPresident Biden's administration
about this slow drip of weaponsand an escalation, rather than
just allowing Ukraine to bearmed with the kinds of things
that would allow it to win.
They've been very reluctant on,you know, first giving armor,
(33:04):
then M1 Abrams tanks, maybeF-16s, ok, a few F-16s, and
there's been that slow, slowbuild, slow drip.
Speaker 2 (33:15):
Biden published an op-ed in the New York Times a
couple months after the warstarted, called something like
what we Will and Will Not Do inUkraine, and it was quite clear
there that I mean he said thatwe're not going to aid Ukraine
in attacking Russia, and any youknow military person will tell
you that in trying to repel aninvasion, what you need to do is
(33:38):
to strike the enemy's rear.
So this was our calculus goingin.
Speaker 3 (33:45):
So this propaganda internally that we've talked
about certainly convinced a lotof Russians of the need to fight
the West and to be victoriousover Ukraine.
And then externally I meanyou've seen the propaganda
machine go into overdrive thisweek, and quite successfully.
I would ask you to weigh it andmeasure it, but it seems
(34:07):
successful in the sense thatPutin has said we're winning,
it's just a question of time.
The assembly line of weapons iscoming online and getting
stronger all the time, and theRepublicans, who at first were
holding hostage funding toUkraine over the Mexican border
and immigration issues, haveslowly kind of turned the
(34:29):
attention more to well, can thatwar ever be won?
And maybe Putin's right.
And why are we just going tokeep pouring billions of dollars
into something that's a warthat's never ending?
Speaker 2 (34:46):
Well, of course, the White House points out that
these billions of dollars do notwind up getting buried in
Ukraine.
Most of it goes to Americanarms makers.
So this is.
You could view it as a jobsprogram if you wanted to, if you
want to just be calculatingabout it.
Well, you know, people seem tohave forgotten that wars can
(35:07):
take a while and they go throughphases.
In World War II, you know, welost, you know, whole aircraft
carriers with thousands ofpeople on board, and that was
part of the cost of doingbusiness.
We are in a world where weexpect instant satisfaction.
Now, of course, we couldadvance our satisfaction, I'm
sure, by giving Ukraine moreweapons faster.
(35:29):
We could have done that a longtime ago.
But the fact is, ukraine is abig country.
It's got a lot of people.
It's got no choice.
Essentially, it will.
The Russians have shown it howthey handle people in
territories that they conquer.
So I don't think Ukraine isgoing to give up and the
(35:52):
question for us will be do wewant to be with them in the long
term or do we not?
And from the standpoint of USpolitics it's not my area of
expertise, but the Republicanshave claimed Thomas, it's
nobody's area of expertise rightnow because it's such a mirage,
(36:14):
but what's going?
on.
Well, I mean, the Republicanshave claimed that Biden lost
Afghanistan, and I guess theymight want to think about
whether they want it said thatthe Republicans lost Ukraine.
All these foreign adventureshad their repercussions
(36:36):
domestically.
Speaker 3 (36:38):
So I want to ask you two questions before I let you
go, and you've been verygenerous with your time.
First of all, in your book, Ithought it was very interesting
how you talk about Russia'smiscalculations, if I can term
it as that, and you say thatPutin has this vertical power
structure in a very small circleand he thinks that other
(36:59):
countries work like that.
In a way and he tends to,quoting from your book tends to
ally itself, russia withauthoritarian leaders who
eventually fall from power,fails to build deep people to
people ties, overestimatespolitical and its economic and
political strengths,underestimates the power of laws
(37:21):
, international organizationsand pro-democracy forces, and it
is often not prepared forconcerted resistant efforts.
So what's the miscalculationthere?
Speaker 2 (37:33):
Well, the miscalculation is all of those
that a lot of Russia's appeal,so to speak, in the world is
basically a propaganda appeal.
In much of the Global South,for example, russia provides
almost nothing in the way offoreign aid, assistance,
(37:54):
ideological inspiration oranything compared to the massive
amounts of investment in tradefrom the West, the effort by the
US, the EU, to help buildsustainable institutions that
will actually improve people'slives.
As I said, russia manages todefy gravity in many places
(38:18):
simply through the power ofpropaganda and the occasional on
the ground little project orspeech or military visit or
something like that.
So the answer is, in my view,that since the West has so many
(38:40):
advantages, it should simplyinstrumentalize the one tool
that it almost never uses, whichis information.
Western information policy isextremely tentative, extremely
risk averse.
(39:01):
We tend to think that if wereally get out there in the
information domain, on thesocial networks and using
influencers and doing all thesethings and posters and stickers
and campaigning for Westerninterests, including the
interests of democratic forceswithin individual countries,
(39:22):
their civil society and so forth, people tend to imagine that if
we start doing this, we willsomehow immediately slide into
doing disinformation and lyingand so forth.
Now my feeling is, in Westerninformation, we should always
tell the truth, but there's alot of truth to tell, and we
(39:44):
tend to shy away fromconfronting propaganda and
disinformation with informationoperations of our own.
When you consider that Russiaand other authoritarian states
too tend to operate above all inthe information realm and are
(40:05):
expert at creating entireillusions of their benevolence,
of their wealth, of theirsuccess and so forth, then it
would have seemed to me thatmaybe something's lacking in
terms of you could call it ourpublic diplomacy, you could call
it our propaganda, you couldcall it our clear exposition of
(40:30):
who we are and what we stand forand how that has made us
relatively successful countries.
Speaker 3 (40:38):
And in terms of winning against Russia.
Who is that aimed at?
In terms of getting the wordout better about who the West is
and what we have to offer, whois that aimed at?
Is that aimed at some of thecountries that Russia is wooing
and trying to draw away from theWest?
(40:59):
Or is that aimed at Russiansthemselves?
Speaker 2 (41:02):
It could be either way.
The State Department hastiptoed in descending some
videos out aimed at Russiancitizens, but I think the
biggest at-risk area at themoment is obviously areas in the
global South, to some degree indeveloped countries, developed
(41:25):
Western countries, where youjust want to take these Russian
errors and say really, can youpossibly believe this?
Isn't this contradictory towhat they said yesterday?
And what exactly is Russia'splan to make Ivory Coast rich?
They have no plan for anythingreally, except for their own
(41:51):
benefit in various parts of theworld.
I mean, back in the day youcould credit them with communist
ideology.
Speaker 3 (42:00):
That made sense to some of its power politics too,
Isn't it locally where they sendin the Wagner group to prop up
a wobbly dictatorship or awobbly administration?
They provide some arms and inreturn get some diamonds and
some gas.
Speaker 2 (42:17):
Yeah, they do, and that's their tactic of yoking
their fortunes to the strengthof a top layer in a country and
sending in mercenaries tosupport a corrupt government and
oppress the people.
You got to say is that much ofa long-term strategy?
(42:38):
Does that do any benefit forthe people?
Answer no.
So who is pointing that out inan aggressive and assertive way
instead of just sort of wringingour hands?
When you think about a countrythat comes under Russian
influence, we tend to say, oh OK, lost that one, let's look on
(43:00):
the next.
I mean, you don't losecountries for very long.
If you make an effort, everywill not end this year or even
next year, I trust.
So all of these countries andissues that we feel well, we
lost on that one, let's look atanother country because that's
gone.
I mean, russia never looks atit that way.
(43:23):
They suffer defeats all thetime and keep coming back.
So why should we feel thatevery loss is the end?
It does take fortitude and itdoes take some belief in our own
societies.
And if we're hypnotized,largely by ourselves, into
(43:46):
believing that democracy is afailed experiment and our
countries are endlessly corrupt,then yeah, we will lose.
But if we look at free marketsand free societies as being
basically the major way thatcountries have become prosperous
(44:07):
, then you have a different view.
Speaker 3 (44:12):
Yeah, it's really a good point that you're making.
Do you read President Putin'sannouncement that he's running
again?
He changed the Constitution.
Maybe we're going to have thisguy around until 2036,
potentially.
Do you read his desire to stayin the Kremlin as a strength or
(44:34):
do you see it as a weakness,because any change in Russia
right now, especially at the top, could potentially bring the
house down?
Speaker 2 (44:45):
Well, I don't think he has any choice.
I don't think there's anyone hewould trust other than himself
to stay in power, and you haveno idea.
He has no idea of who couldsucceed him or who could succeed
him after the immediate firstperson who succeeds him, and
he's got a warrant out againsthim from the International
(45:06):
Criminal Court.
So if I were he, I'd stay theretoo and I keep a gun under my
coat and isolate myself andinsulate myself and be very
careful with those around me.
He may last forever.
I have no idea.
I never predict Russianpolitics, but I would say that
(45:30):
if he were to, I think it wouldbe highly dangerous for him to
say well, I've done everything Ican.
I'm now, you know, leadingSochi for a quiet retirement and
I trust all will go well.
Speaker 3 (45:42):
Thomas Kent, the author of how Russia Loses,
great to meet you and I hope wecan do it again, and I
appreciate your time.
A pleasure, thanks so much, andthat's our back story.
This week, during Putin'sphonion program, a western
journalist watched some of thequestions electronically scroll
across the big screen, questionsthat were never asked
(46:02):
Interesting reading.
There's plenty of praise forPutin.
How do we make sure Putin livesforever?
One message reads a strongPutin is a strong Russia reads
another.
But there are critical textstoo.
Does Putin want to end the war?
The demer give it in the jobtoo long.
When will power change inRussia?
(46:23):
And there's this one.
Could you tell me how to moveto the Russia that we see on TV
here?
Many Russians who hate the warand, by extension, putin, have
left the country and are livingin Central Asia, dubai, europe,
cyprus, israel.
Many of them were prominentRussians, patriots who can't
stand to send their kids to diein Ukraine and just can't stand
(46:46):
to see freedoms in human rightsgo backwards in Russia, to see
Russia set back decades by Putinin his inner circle Tragic, but
here we are In Europe, and therest of the world just has to
isolate Russia and confront ittoo.
I'm Dana Lewis.
Thanks for listening toBackstory and I'll talk to you
(47:07):
again soon.
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