August 30, 2024 • 68 mins
Can Ukraine's audacious tactics in the Kursk region really turn the tide in this complex conflict with Russia? Join us for an in-depth discussion featuring Malcolm Davis from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, as we explore the critical implications of these strategic maneuvers on both sides. Hear our analysis on why this conflict might drag on through 2025, hinging largely on Western military aid and potential shifts in the U.S. administration.
Discover why Ukraine's victory is not just a regional matter but a global imperative for maintaining the balance between authoritarian regimes and liberal democracies.
Can the European Union sustain the conflict if U.S. support dwindles under a future conservative administration? In our conversation with Anthony Constantini, we scrutinize the limitations Ukraine faces against Russia's vast reserves and explore how a shift in U.S. foreign policy could impact the European Union’s strategic position. We delve into the moral and strategic challenges of Ukraine's right to self-defense amidst continuous missile and drone attacks, with former Navy Commander and Norway Military Attache Hans Petter Midttun.
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Dana Lewis (00:00):
From your vantage point, is Ukraine losing this
war?
Malcolm Davis (00:05):
They're not losing, but they're not winning.
I think that's the challenge isthat the war is stalemated.
Anthony Constantini (00:11):
It's become increasingly clear that Ukraine
is, simply put, running out ofmen and running out of the
capabilities to pursue a reallylong-term war.
Dana Lewis (00:20):
They are not for the moment, rushing to take back
Kursk at any cost.
Hans Petter Midttun (00:27):
No, they do not.
But this is not an on-offswitch and I think a lot of
people would expect something tochange immediately, and I don't
think that was ever to beexpected.
The reality is that Ukraine has, by its action, stretched the
front line.
It's forced Russia toreconsider the disposition of
(00:55):
its forces.
Dana Lewis (00:55):
Hi everyone and welcome to another edition of
Backstory.
I'm Dana Lewis.
I took a break for part of thesummer.
I hope you had some relaxationtoo.
Time to get on with thediscussion.
Ukraine here's the question IsUkraine losing?
It seems like it could be.
It seems like Ukraine is unableto push Russia out of occupied
(01:18):
areas in the east, even withUkraine's bold land grab inside
Russia in Kursk.
And the bigger question what'sat stake?
Does Russia have bigger plansthat go beyond Ukraine?
I mean, a lot of people say itdoes.
Do we buy the argument?
Democracy and freedom are onthe line in Europe and beyond.
(01:39):
Well, different guests thisweek, different perspectives and
views, and that's the backstoryon Ukraine.
Malcolm Davis is with theAustralian Strategic Policy
Institute.
He's an expert on futurewarfare and military technology,
and just not future warfare butexisting warfare, and there is
(02:03):
a lot of it, malcolm, and Iwelcome you back to the podcast.
Can you give me a reality checkfrom your vantage point?
Is Ukraine losing this war?
Malcolm Davis (02:17):
They're not losing, but they're not winning.
I think that's the challenge isthat the war is stalemated.
Now.
Ukraine have made this veryaudacious and daring offensive
into the Kursk region andthey're holding on to most of
the territory that they'vecaptured, and clearly that's
humiliated Putin.
It's also made it morecomplicated for the Russians to
(02:40):
reinforce their military forcesinside Ukraine in the Donetsk
and Luhansk areas of the Donbass.
So the Ukrainians have actuallydone a rather bold and
audacious move that seems tohave paid off for the moment,
but at the same time, theRussians in the Donetsk region
are making advances towards keytowns such as Pokharaevsk, which
(03:04):
are important from a logisticsperspective, and the Ukrainians
are basically withdrawing fromthat area.
So it's possible that as theUkrainians take the territory in
Kursk, the Russians areadvancing in Donetsk, and so it
really is a case of stalematerather than the Ukrainians
winning or the Russians winning.
(03:26):
It's not over yet, and Isuspect this war will go well
into 2025 and maybe even beyond2025.
Dana Lewis (03:35):
Is Kursk a fool's errand of sorts?
They're pulling forces from the, from the eastern front, um,
and, as you've noted, therussians continue to kind of
bulldoze forward.
Every few days another villagefalls, or they, you know they
advance somewhere.
Not, it's not rapid, but it isconsistent.
(03:58):
Um, why spend your forces up incurse where, where you know the
ukrainians are probably goingto get pushed out of there
eventually anyway?
Malcolm Davis (04:08):
Well, it's uncertain as to whether the
Ukrainians will be forced out.
If the Ukrainians can finddefensible lines and hold that
territory, that gives them avaluable negotiating chip in any
future.
Dana Lewis (04:21):
I can argue with you and say, absolutely, they're
going to be pushed out of therebecause this is Russian
territory.
But three weeks in I would beblushing saying, well, maybe
you're right stand.
Malcolm Davis (04:45):
they are still pushing forward in some areas,
but I think that holding ontothat territory is important, if
they can, because it gives themthat valuable negotiating chip
in any future ceasefirenegotiations.
Secondly, the more territorythey can hold, the more
difficult it is for the Russiansto reinforce their forces in
the Donbass area and Donetsk andLuhansk and over time that then
does have a deleterious effecton Russian combat capability as
(05:08):
the Russians begin to run low onsupplies of fuel and munitions
and, essentially, food and otherthings like that.
So it evens out in probably2025.
Things will slow down in thesort of late spring, early sorry
the late autumn, early winter.
(05:28):
I've got it's sort of likegetting my seasons right in the
different hemispheres and Ithink that we'll see what
happens in the new year and Ithink also the Russians and
again.
Dana Lewis (05:41):
I've interrupted you and I'm not going to do it
again.
I apologize, but what do youmean it's going to even out?
I'm a bit turned upside downwith time as well.
Now You're saying that theRussians are running out and
Ukraine?
If right now Ukraine is on aback foot, you think in 2025
(06:04):
they won't be?
Malcolm Davis (06:06):
I think that if Western military assistance
continues to flow to Ukraine,then Ukraine can hang on.
They can't necessarily win, butthey can continue to blunt
Russian advances.
The Russians are makingadvances in some areas, but at
great cost.
Now the Russians have asuperior military industrial
(06:27):
capacity in terms of turning outmunitions and so forth.
So the key thing that willemerge in 2025 is, firstly, does
that Western military systemdry up?
If you have a change ofadministration in the US after
the presidential election andTrump gets back in, then I think
it is almost certain that thatUS military assistance will dry
up, in which case Europe will behard-pressed to fill the void
(06:49):
left by the US.
But at the same time, theRussians have got to step up
their military production andthey may have to think about a
mobilisation, and that will bepolitically unpopular for Putin
if he does go down the path ofmobilisation.
So it really does get into asituation of who can acquire or
(07:10):
produce the most munitions andwho can maintain their hold on
territory into 2025.
Dana Lewis (07:16):
I mean, I've traveled across Russia, I've
seen the big old Soviet Union.
Your head spins around when youenter some of these cities and
you realize all they ever didwas produce munitions.
All they ever did was producewarplanes or tanks or chemical
weapons or biological weapons.
I mean Ronald Reagan's evilempire.
(07:38):
And the fact is that we'repouring more and more money into
Ukraine and it doesn't seem tohave changed the battlefield.
Malcolm Davis (07:50):
Well, I think we have an obligation to do so,
because let's remember the factshere it was Russia that
launched this war.
They were the aggressors, theywere the ones that invaded
Ukraine, which is a sovereignnation state and a Western
democracy that invaded Ukraine,which is a sovereign nation
state and a Western democracy.
They did so because they soughtto essentially wipe Ukraine off
the face of the map.
They sought territorialexpansion.
(08:12):
That was against every singlerule in the rules-based
international order, and if wehadn't have poured that money
into Ukraine, if we hadn't havesupported Ukraine, then that
would have sent a terribleprecedent, not just in terms of
European security but in termsof, for example, how China
thinks about Taiwan.
So I think we had an obligation.
Dana Lewis (08:34):
They'll keep going, and I tend to think, just like
you do, that Putin will not befinished or satisfied.
Oh, absolutely.
Malcolm Davis (08:42):
Yeah, he's got much bigger plans than Ukraine
and I think that if he does winin Ukraine in, say, late 25 or
early 26, then he'll beemboldened to rebuild military
capacity as fast as possible andthen confront NATO directly in
the latter half of this decade,and once again that would be
(09:03):
coordinated with China in a moveagainst Taiwan.
So I do think that we have anobligation to defend Ukraine and
to ensure that it wins.
The challenge for us in doingso is threading that strategic
needle so that Ukraine wins andwe at the same time deter Putin
from reaching for tacticalnuclear weapons.
(09:25):
Because if Putin uses tacticalnuclear weapons in Ukraine, nato
are then obligated to respondat a conventional level and you
end up in an escalatory cyclewhich we're all trying to avoid,
it seems escalatory right nowto me.
Oh, it's escalatory, but it'sthe Russians that are escalating
.
Okay, what we're trying toavoid is that really big
escalation of a Russian attackon a NATO state conventionally,
(09:49):
or Russian use of tacticalnuclear weapons.
You know, for example, ifRussia did use tactical nuclear
weapons in Ukraine and we didn'trespond, then that would
embolden Putin even more to usemore tactical nuclear weapons
and it would send the messagenot only to the Russians but
also to the Chinese, to theNorth Koreans, to the Iranians,
that use of tactical nuclearweapons is okay.
(10:10):
So that would change the gamefor international security in a
major way.
So we're between the rock andthe hard place there if we're
presented with that scenario,and that's why I'm saying we do
have to step up in terms of ourdeterrence posture to make sure
that the Russians do not usetactical nuclear weapons under
any circumstances.
Dana Lewis (10:29):
And yet you heard Zelensky announced this week
that they have new weapons.
They appear to have thereporting from bloggers and the
press inside Ukraine, as itsounds like they have ballistic
missiles that can hit Moscow.
Can you imagine what is goingto happen and frankly I can't,
because I don't know where it'sgoing to go after that If a
(10:49):
ballistic missile hits theKremlin or starts exploding on
some target inside Moscow?
There have been drone attacksbefore, but they weren't very
significant, but a ballisticmissile actually hits someone, a
building, a government building, kills someone.
I mean, where does that goafter that?
Malcolm Davis (11:09):
I mean, that is a big step, but you know, to put
that into context, the Russiansjust launched a massive attack
with large numbers of ballisticmissiles on keep.
So I do think that theUkrainians are justified in
developing this capability andusing it.
Ukrainians are justified indeveloping this capability and
using it, and I do think they'rejustified in using it, given
that the Biden administration isquite illogically refusing to
(11:31):
let them use ATAKOMs againsttargets deep inside Russia.
So you know, yes, theUkrainians do have this new
ballistic missile.
They will certainly use it, I'msure.
And you know, a ballisticmissile will have much more
payload capacity than a drone,so it could create a lot more
damage.
And then it's really up to theRussians on how they respond to
that, and they've got a numberof choices.
(11:53):
They can launch massive attackson Kiev and other Ukrainian
cities, like they've been doingin the last few days, try to
inflict as much damage aspossible, or they can reach for
the tactical nukes.
And if they reach for thetactical nukes, then they know
that NATO must respondconventionally.
And then they're in an entirelynew war.
And are they prepared to godown that path, knowing that the
(12:13):
risk of escalation into astrategic nuclear exchange is
very real?
I'm not sure.
So I think that I once againsupport Ukraine in launching
attacks against Russia,including with this ballistic
missile on Moscow, if necessary.
But NATO has to do its bit andstep up and deter Russia from
using tactical nuclear weaponsin response.
Dana Lewis (12:36):
I mean, that's the big gamble and I was going to
ask you why is the Bidenadministration, do you think,
still stalling on supplying thenecessary weapons, or at least
lifting the restrictions on theweapons that they have already
supplied to the Ukrainians, toallow them to hit these air
bases or these S-300s or any ofthe aircraft that are launching
(13:03):
these glide bombs?
I mean, there was another 90drone attacks overnight.
The night before there wereanother 90 some odd or almost
100, you know rocket and droneattacks, 200 earlier in the week
.
I mean, the number of attackson Ukraine this week alone has
been head spinning.
Malcolm Davis (13:25):
Yeah, look, I mean I think the Biden
administration is terrified ofthe prospect of escalation to
use of nuclear weapons or theprospect of Russia retaliating
directly against NATO.
That's the two scenarios.
That keeps Biden and hisnational security advisor and
his secretary of state andsecretary of defense awake at
night, because what they don'twant to do is get sucked into a
(13:46):
war directly with Russia,because they know where that
leads.
But at the same time, if theydon't allow Ukraine to win and
Russia ultimately prevails andwins in, say, late 25 or 26,
that's exactly where they end upin the end, because Russia will
then threaten NATO.
So you know Biden does need tounderstand that.
(14:07):
You know it's important forUkraine to win, because if
Ukraine wins at the same time asNATO firmly and effectively
deters Russia from using nuclearweapons, then it's checkmate
for Russia and we defeat thatthreat once and for all.
Obviously, coming out of thatscenario, the US and NATO have
(14:28):
to stand firm along theireastern frontier indefinitely.
They face that Russian threatso long as the Putin regime is
in power.
The challenge there, of course,is they also face a threat in
the Indo-Pacific, with Chinaagainst Taiwan, and that demands
that the US and its allies,both in Europe and also in the
Indo-Pacific step up, increasedefence spending and go to a
(14:49):
pre-war period mindset andparadigm in terms of boosting
defence industrial capacity sothat they're ready to deter it.
If that deterrence fails,they're ready to fight.
And I'm not convinced at thispoint in time that Western
democracies have got themselvesinto that right frame of mind
yet.
Dana Lewis (15:07):
And the last question to you and I appreciate
your time is that, because noteverybody buys this argument
that this is a larger war, it isnot the Russia-Ukraine war that
this is a real struggle.
I don't want to say democraciesagainst autocracies, I don't
want to say democracies againstautocracies, but it is, you know
, the European liberal order,the Western liberal order,
(15:32):
fighting back Putin, who hasessentially declared war on them
.
And not everybody buys thatlarger global argument that
Putin's just going to keepcoming.
A lot of people think it couldjust stop in Ukraine and, you
(15:53):
know, push for a ceasefire, tryto do something that they did
like with the two Koreas andwait for Putin to push on.
He's getting older and whybring this to a full
confrontation right now?
Malcolm Davis (16:02):
Well, firstly, they should be thinking in terms
of a global confrontationbetween authoritarian states and
liberal democracies, becausethat's exactly what we're seeing
.
What you are seeing iscountries like China, russia,
north Korea and Iran workingtogether as authoritarian states
to confront Western democracies, to end a rules-based
(16:24):
international order that is ledby Western democracies, to end
democracy as a form ofgovernance and to create an
authoritarian world order forthe 21st century.
That's exactly what ishappening.
We're in this global conflictnow.
It's very different from thelast global conflict, be it the
Cold War or the Second World War, but nevertheless, the
potential for that globalconflict to end up in a hot
(16:45):
global conflict be it the ColdWar or the Second World War, but
nevertheless the potential forthat global conflict to end up
in a hot global war a World WarIII, if you like is quite real,
I think.
Second point is that manypeople are terrified of the
prospect of nuclear war, orescalation in that sense, and so
they don't want to take thehard decisions, to stand firm,
(17:05):
and they don't believe yet, inspite of Putin invading Ukraine
in 2022 and Xi Jinpingcontinually threatening Taiwan,
they don't believe thatauthoritarian states actually
will use force to achieve theirgeopolitical aims to achieve
their geopolitical aims.
(17:28):
And I think that we've beenlulled into this lazy strategic
timidity since the end of theCold War, where we are not
prepared to confront thepossibility of world war or
major power war or nuclear war.
And we need to get our heads outof that sort of strategic
timidity mindset and intorecognising that post-Cold War
(17:49):
interregnum that existed from1991 through to about, probably,
2014 is over and we need tostart thinking about an entirely
new, much more dangerousstrategic environment where we
are once again confronted byauthoritarian states in the same
way that we were in the late1930s, and Hal Brands has
(18:12):
written some excellent analysisin this regard, where he
directly compares the events nowthat are occurring this year
and in previous years with thelate 1930s, and the parallels
are quite apt.
So I do think it's reallyimportant for western
democracies to realize the fightthat we're in, to recognize
that it simply won't go away,that, even if putin eventually
(18:34):
dies, that the person replaceshim will be far worse, because,
believe me, there are nopro-western reformers in the
queue to basically lead Russia.
And that Xi Jinping isdetermined to impose unification
on Taiwan, even through the useof force, because he's got so
much politically invested inthat goal.
(18:56):
So you know, this is the fightthat we're in and we have to be
ready for it, and I think thatwe have little choice.
Dana Lewis (19:03):
I hope you're wrong , malcolm Davis, but I think
you're probably right, and so Iappreciate your, your, your
perspective, and it's late atnight in Australia, and thank
you so much.
Malcolm Davis (19:17):
It's my pleasure, always happy to help out.
Dana Lewis (19:23):
Anthony Constantini is a conservative writer for
the American Conservative, aconservative magazine.
He received a degree in armscontrol and strategic studies.
Anthony, nice to meet you.
Anthony Constantini (19:34):
Thank you very much.
Just to clarify I'm acontributor for American
Conservative.
I'm not formally employed bythem.
Dana Lewis (19:42):
Cool.
So let's just talk about what'shappening on the ground in
Ukraine right now.
More drones overnight, close toa hundred.
The night before, you know,there were a combination of
rockets and drones, and thenight before that and the night
before that, there are hundreds.
This week it seems like it isescalating right now, not
(20:03):
de-escalating in any way.
Anthony Constantini (20:06):
Yeah, no, I would say that that's certainly
true.
I think that a couple of weeksago you saw a decent amount of
even very, very pro-Ukrainianvoices in the West starting to
say maybe we need to have somemore negotiations, a little bit
more, and I think that there wasan argument that the war could
have been maybe drawn to somesort of long-term pause.
But I think that recent eventshave kind of shunted that off to
(20:30):
the side for the time being.
Dana Lewis (20:31):
You've written that you don't think Ukraine can win
in the East and that Russia isnot going to be pushed out of
the areas it's invaded andannexed.
Is that fair?
Anthony Constantini (20:44):
Yeah, that's a fair way to phrase what
I've said.
Yes, why do you think so?
I think it's just a matter ofwhat Ukraine can bring to the
table versus what Russia can.
In the very beginning of thewar, I wrote that Ukraine should
not jump to negotiations, thatthey should have pushed as hard
as they could, especially aftertheir fantastic Kharkiv
(21:06):
counteroffensive in late 2022.
But it's become increasinglyclear that Ukraine is, simply
put, running out of men andrunning out of the capabilities
to pursue a really long-term war, which would result in them
getting back Crimea, gettingback the east, and whereas
Russia simply has a large amountof individuals, it can just
(21:27):
kind of throw into the fire.
I can go into these ruralvillages where people have no
real political power outside ofMoscow, outside of St Petersburg
, and just pull as many peopleas they need.
They have the money and, morethan anything else, they have
the time.
So what would you say about thewisdom of Zelensky and his
(21:57):
generals launching thisoffensive inside Russia, in
Kursk?
But the problem is, wheneveryou engage in some sort of
military action, especially likethis, there has to be a clear
end goal, and to me, the endgoals either don't seem to exist
or don't seem feasible.
The Ukrainian government hasput forward that they're going
to use Kursk as a bargainingchip, which seems reasonable on
the surface, but when you lookat the fact that I mean, you had
(22:23):
Prokhorin get into Moscow,obelisk just last year, and
Putin was relatively unaffected,the idea that he's going to run
screaming to the negotiatingtable saying fine, fine, take
whatever you want, give me Kurskback, I just find it
unrealistic.
I lived in Voronezh for about ayear, which is a city 500
kilometers south of Moscow, andthey had a joke there which is
(22:44):
there?
were a lot of American studentsthere by the way, right, yeah,
there was a language programthere, and they had this joke
for decades, which was they'reall in the Kremlin, gathered
together, and they say, okay,the time for talk has passed, we
need to bomb the West.
And so one of them says, well,let's bomb London.
And somebody says, oh no, mymoney's there.
One of them says, let's justcarpet bomb France, and they say
(23:05):
, oh well, I have a villa there.
And they keep going on and onand on.
And then somebody says, well,what about Vronish?
And no one in the Kremlin hasanything to do with Vronish, so
they bomb there.
(23:26):
And, in the same way, kursk isnot some city that is crucially
do everything he can to just toget this back, especially when
the biggest area taken so far isI think its hand was about six
thousand inhabitants.
And so what it seems to me isthat putin is annoyed, obviously
, and probably embarrassed,because this is objectively
embarrassing, but he'll throwpeople at it, he'll wait.
Eventually ukraine will getpushed out of that, and then, at
the end of this incursion, theywon won't have taken any of
Russia's land.
(23:46):
Russia will have slowly chippedaway in the south, as they're
currently doing, and Ukrainewill be worse off.
They'll have less men, they'llhave less armaments and
potentially, if the UnitedStates government has changed
next year, they may have a muchless supportive American
government.
I can't see a way that thiswill work out in a positive way
for Ukraine.
Dana Lewis (24:07):
So let's talk about that possible government that
is led by, you know,conservatives and President
Trump, possibly.
You know he's saying he wantsto end the war right away and he
wants to stop spending moneyand, and, uh, he wants to end
american support.
Europe may continue to to fighton and in their supply to
(24:31):
ukraine and I I don't know howthat will work out and whether
they've got the necessary muscle.
A lot of people don't thinkthat they they'll be able to
keep ukraine going for very longwithout american support.
But what is the consensus, ifyou can even speak from that
perspective in conservativecircles right now?
On long term, do you just givePutin what he wanted?
(24:56):
You let him bite off a hugepiece of Ukraine.
In exchange for what and whatprice does he pay?
And what is the deterrent inthe future for him not going
after Lithuania or Estonia or,you know, the Baltics, or Poland
, and on and on?
Anthony Constantini (25:25):
now in conservative policy circles.
I think that if Harris were towin, there are enough Republican
senators who would vote to passmore Ukraine aid.
The Speaker of the House,should he be speaker next year,
he's already made clear he wouldcontinue to support aid.
But, that said, there is a kindof loose consensus forming that
the post-Cold War order thatthe United States did uphold is
(25:47):
something that no longer needsto be upheld, and I think that
when people and it's a fairquestion when people say, well,
what price should Putin pay?
What happens if Lithuania,estonia, come next Is a lot of,
especially when it comes tonational conservatives, who are
starkly different from what canbe called fusionist
conservatives or kind of bushconservative predecessors, is
(26:09):
that they don't really see itthrough that lens.
Um, putin is not that popularin the republican party.
When you look at polls, he'salmost as unpopular as he is in
in the democrats.
Um, he has.
I think the last poll I sawshowed his approval rating
something like 7% in theRepublican Party and 6% for the
(26:30):
Democrats.
Dana Lewis (26:31):
Yeah, Do they actually poll and ask people how
popular they think?
Anthony Constantini (26:36):
The amount of polls that people ask
Americans to give their approval?
Why, on?
Dana Lewis (26:42):
earth.
Would we be polling people,asking Americans what do they
think of the Russian leader?
I mean, is he in somepopularity contest inside the
Republican Party?
Anthony Constantini (26:54):
Well, it's a fair question.
I mean, those numbers came fromPew.
I believe I could double checkthat it was Pew or Gallup.
But they usually ask questionslike that pretty regularly, at
least in the US.
But this is all to say that atthe same time, it's not
necessarily a respect for anewfound respect for Russia that
(27:15):
is causing them to say we don'treally.
Dana Lewis (27:19):
I don't want to say that they don't care, but you
might be right if you did saythat you might be right.
Anthony Constantini (27:25):
There's more of a sense of and I don't
mean to just simply restateTrump's slogans, but a sense of
putting whatever would result inhelping America first.
And so what that would mean isit would be sad and I'm speaking
from their perspective, fromthe perspective of what would
likely be an incomingadministration it would be sad
(27:46):
if the Baltics were attacked.
But the Baltics are not ourresponsibility.
The Baltics is Europe'sresponsibility and the EU's.
Take Albert Golby, who's likelygoing to be Trump's national
security advisor.
He's made this point again andagain that Europe has a
fantastic weapons industry.
(28:07):
They have 400 and somethinglike 50 million people in the
European Union.
They have, with France, nuclearweapons, if you include the
United Kingdom, two nuclearweapon states.
There's a sense that the UnitedStates simply does not need to
take care of, for example,countries like Eastern Europe,
that Europe can take care ofEastern Europe, and so it's not
(28:29):
necessarily a question of well,should Putin pay this price, at
least coming from thisperspective of a new Republican
administration?
But why would we bother makinghim pay one when he didn't
really go after us?
He went after an order that weno longer care about, is the
thinking.
If they wanted to uphold thisorder, then sure that kind of
conversation would be held.
How do we make him pay for this?
(28:50):
But they don't really careabout upholding that world order
anymore.
They think that it wasdetrimental to American
interests.
Dana Lewis (28:59):
May as well give China Taiwan then.
Anthony Constantini (29:01):
Well, that's the thing.
Dana Lewis (29:04):
The argument is that you have to May as well,
give North Korea.
Anthony Constantini (29:06):
South Korea .
Well, if you uphold Americaninterests, then you don't.
Dana Lewis (29:09):
I'm saying, if you follow.
Anthony Constantini (29:10):
No, no sure .
But the thing is, if you upholdAmerican interests, then you
don't have to have a kind ofone-size-fits-all there.
You can say well, it would helpAmerica's interests to keep
China from breaking out of thefirst island chain, so we need
to keep them out of Taiwan, butit doesn't really matter to us
if Russia's territory moves abit into Ukraine's.
At least that's where thisthinking comes from.
(29:35):
That kind of one size fits allyou absolutely cannot do this
anywhere on the planet has kindof fallen by the wayside, and a
lot of that is due to the factthat we never really upheld that
thinking.
At the same time, the Bushadministration was pushing the
Bush doctrine of democratization.
They were best buddies withSaudi Arabia, who executes
people for being gay, and therewas a sense of look, if we're
going to be hypocritical anyway,why don't we at least be
(29:57):
hypocritical in US interests?
And so that's kind of what'sreally driven the party in that
direction.
Dana Lewis (30:12):
And so that's kind of what's really driven the
party in that direction.
Or, you know, post-cold Warthinking anymore and just give
Russia the Baltics or whateverthey want.
You know I shudder, but it'sinteresting.
And you think that that is amajority in the Trump circle, in
(30:38):
the Republican Party?
I mean, it's certainly not inthe Senate, I think.
Anthony Constantini (30:41):
but no, it's definitely not a majority
of the Senate Republican caucus.
And, to be clear, I'm notsaying that they're saying give
it to Russia.
But what they're saying is,europe has the capability to
defend itself and it clearlyjust does not want to.
And that's something I wouldmyself agree with is that I
think Europe has gotten very,very comfortable spending a lot
(31:03):
of money on social services butthen having the Americans kind
of come and spend money ondefense.
And what I think a lot ofEuropean leaders are worried
about in the back of their headsis that if America leaves,
they're going to have to eitherincrease taxes on an already
overtaxed tax base or cut socialservices, and I think that that
is panicking them.
But you're already seeing thishappen, for example, in Germany,
(31:24):
where you have the governmenteffectively saying we're not
going to give Ukraine any moremoney because we don't have it,
which obviously they do, butthey just don't want to spend it
.
And so there is this frustrationthat Europe is simply really
just refusing to pick up theball.
I mean, you had I think it waslast year or two years ago
Brussels tried to make this bigdeal about a new defense
(31:47):
spending fund, which soundedgreat until you saw that it was
$1.5 billion, which, for amilitary defense spending fund,
is kind of a drop in the bucket.
I think had Europe been lessresistant to Barack Obama's push
to raise defense spending 10years ago, I don't think you
would have this kind of um callit distaste coming from the
(32:07):
republican party toward europenow.
But they were very resistant,with barack obama saying, hey,
could you please do this.
They were extremely resistantwith trump, much more
aggressively, saying you need todo this you're talking about
the two 2.5 percent of gdp fornato membership yeah, yeah, yeah
, yeah, yeah, I'd say that.
And even when Obama was tryingto push them to sanction.
Dana Lewis (32:29):
By the way, these are trade partners, these are
cultural partners, these areclose allies.
Right, I mean, I would agreeyou didn't step up with the
money.
See you later.
It's not a Trump negotiatingposition, although a lot of
people think that's what it wasYou're saying.
There's actually a real corebelief that you know, to hell
with Europe.
Anthony Constantini (32:48):
I think the problem is had Europe, for
example, in over the last 30years?
And nobody expected them to dothis?
We, the United States, did notask them to do this and perhaps
that's that's America's mistake.
If Europe had said we are partof the West, we are all the West
and we love where we came from,we love cultural traditions,
you know that would be one thing.
But I think that Republicans,especially today, see a Europe
(33:09):
that is not saying that but isstill expecting America to
uphold its end of this bargain.
And I think and I can speak frompersonal experience, the amount
of times I've heard youcompletely selfish Americans,
you don't want to help us, butthen also, ha ha, you don't
spend any money on your ownhealth care.
Wow, this is just so pathetic.
And every time America says weare going to take some troops
(33:31):
out and we do want to spendmoney on our health care, it
gets to selfish again built upand just it's.
It's just kind of frustratedenough.
Republicans, at this point it'snot a majority in the senate.
Um, I think if donald trump waspresident, he would likely be
able to sustain um to you know,sustain a veto um, if he had, if
(33:54):
he it'd be, veto some largeukraine aid package.
Um, but if he's not president,those aid packages are likely
still going to keep rollinganthony costantini uh, nice to
meet you and and pleasure to getsome of your perspective.
Dana Lewis (34:08):
It's a bit jarring to hear somebody say it, but
it's not the first time I'veread it or understood that.
There are people that holdthose views so, and they are
probably gaining some groundwithin the Republican Party.
As this war plays out inUkraine and people say, okay,
the counter offensive didn'twork, we're pumping billions in
(34:30):
there.
At what point do we stop?
At what point do we get thefighting stopped and focus more
on American needs back home?
And that debate's happening alot and it's naive to pretend it
isn't so.
Thank you so much.
No, yeah, likewise, hans PeterMidtjian is a former Norwegian
(34:59):
Navy commander and he was postedto NATO.
Former Norwegian Navy commanderand he was posted to NATO and,
among others, he was in Ukraineas a naval attaché for Norway
and he regularly has been backin Kiev.
In fact, he was there just acouple of weeks ago.
Welcome, pete.
Hans Petter Midttun (35:15):
Thank you, Donna.
It's a pleasure meeting you.
Dana Lewis (35:19):
Look, you've written a pretty compelling
piece and that's why I wanted tointerview you on why the
restrictions on Ukraine need tobe lifted, and it's really part
of a growing chorus from somevery credible people on why the
West has to allow Ukraine to hitfurther into Russia with
(35:43):
Western weapons than it is now.
Can we just talk about that?
Because in this week whenUkraine has been pummeled with
hundreds of drones and missilesand bombs, it is especially
poignant right now.
Hans Petter Midttun (36:01):
Well, absolutely, and I've been
arguing in favour of this forquite a long time.
While the limitations to theuse of Western weapons is more
something of a new year date,from my perspective, this has
been a part of a borderconfrontation for such a long
(36:22):
time.
This is not only a questionabout Ukraine's right to defend
itself according tointernational law, but also
about its ability to defend us,europe and the West, and I find
it very odd that we, bysupporting Ukraine,
(36:43):
simultaneously imposerestrictions to what it can and
cannot do according tointernational law.
I mean, the UN Charter allowsUkraine to defend itself, for
that there is no questionwhatsoever.
But by imposing limitations towhat targets legal targets
ukraine can do, we we sort ofput infringements on how we
(37:07):
interpret, uh you um,international law.
I, I find it's uh do you really?
Dana Lewis (37:14):
because I, I, I don't if, if I'm able to jump in
here because we have um.
We've spent generations tryingto avoid war with Russia and the
Soviet Union.
Before that, we have spentincredible amounts of efforts in
(37:34):
arms control agreements, onsteering clear of a conflict
that could draw the world into anuclear exchange.
So why would it surprise youthen that the US administration
and others are so hesitant toallow weapons that they're
providing to Ukraine to be usedin an offensive matter inside
(37:58):
Russian territory?
And I know what I'm telling youis not news to you and I'm sure
you've given it lots of thought.
Hans Petter Midttun (38:04):
Well, it actually.
It takes you straight down tothis discussion about escalation
or the fear of escalation, andthere's several layers to that,
and one of them is that the oneof the most important battle
space on this war, and there'ssix domains the most important
of those domains is the fight inthe cognitive space, this fight
(38:27):
for the mind, and Russia hasused these 10 and a half years
to impose a fear in the West,being afraid of exactly what you
say, this fear of escalation,fear of this turning into a
border confrontation and anuclear war, end of days,
armageddon, absolutely.
But the point is that the fearof escalation defies logic in a
(38:53):
sense.
First of all, we have torecognize the fact that, in
respect to what we have done, inrespect of our policy, russia
has chosen still to turn peaceinto war.
They've chosen to escalate.
We have to recognize that atthe moment, or for actually the
last decade, russia hascontrolled or managed escalation
(39:15):
, while we have kept safedistance.
The only way you can actuallymanage escalation is that you
self-escalate to de-escalate,and we haven't done that.
But still that has not stoppedRussia from doing what it has
done, starting a full-scale warin Ukraine or in Europe, if you
(39:35):
like.
The other part of it is and itgoes a little bit to the heart
of this discussion about thefight and the battle on the
cognitive space.
Many don't really understandRussia.
They see diplomatic measures,negotiations, political talks as
a sign of weakness.
(39:56):
They only accept or respond tostrength, to strength, and what
we fear will provoke them isactually the opposite they are
provoked by our weakness, butthe fact that we have not
responded to their provocationfor more than 17 years, since
(40:17):
2007.
And lastly, if there wassomething to this aspect of
escalation, well, ukraine hascrossed the red lines so many
times that we should have seenthat escalation a long time ago.
Dana Lewis (40:47):
Even we, the West, have crossed inner circle to
take more serious action,whether that be attacking the
(41:10):
transportation lines that aremoving Western equipment into
Ukraine from places like Poland.
And so it's not that you knowthere were red lines.
We crossed the red lines, andthat's that you know.
We called them on their bluffand now let Ukraine do whatever
the hell they want.
I mean, in fact, there's stilla danger there, and those red
lines are not static.
Hans Petter Midttun (41:27):
No, they're not static, but we also have to
put into consideration therealities on the battlefield, if
you like.
You know the fight in thebattlefield, which consists of
nuclear threats or threat ofescalation, or World War III, or
whatever we call it.
It has no match.
It doesn't link up to therealities.
(41:47):
Firstly, it doesn't match theRussian doctrines.
It does not match the militarycapabilities and the ability to
explore these opportunities.
It does not match the falloutof such an action.
Only such a thing like thethreat of mutual destruction is
a part of the thing they need toassess before they actually go
(42:10):
to this step of escalating.
They need to consider theirrelationship to their
international partners, and soforth.
I know it's not full, but I'msaying there's more arguments in
this favor than in favor ofescalation.
The main point is still, though, is, irrespective of what we
have done, russia has chosen toescalate, and it still escalates
(42:33):
, and the only way you can getinto that OODA loop or in the
decision loop is to yourself bewilling to take that risk.
Dana Lewis (42:41):
So is the Kursk invasion by Ukraine a necessary
escalation.
Is it a wise thing thatZelensky has ordered his army to
do?
Hans Petter Midttun (42:54):
For me.
I've written an article onescalation and the red lines and
to me this is just anotherclear proof that the Russian
threat of escalation does not.
The red lines does not exist assuch.
I think it's smart because itshows to the Russian public that
(43:18):
the war is coming home.
Putin cannot protect Russiafrom the fallout of the war.
It undermines his regime.
Dana Lewis (43:27):
But it's also important for us because it's so
much easier to support uh oneon a battlefield who succeeds
and not, you know, withdrawingas we know I'm puzzled by it,
because at the same time thatzolensky has done this um, the
(43:48):
russians are advancing in theeast and it looks like some of
those battle lines are notcollapsing, but they're
certainly being pushed back.
Ukraine is losing ground, sothey're siphoning away some of
their muscle from the easternfront line to go into Kursk,
hoping to somehow influenceRussian public opinion, but
(44:08):
we're not seeing the Russianstake the bait.
Really are we?
They continue to push in theeast and taking more villages
and more settlements and theyare not, for the moment, rushing
to take back Kursk at any cost.
Hans Petter Midttun (44:24):
No, they do not.
But this is not an on-offswitch and I think a lot of
people would expect something tochange immediately, and I don't
think that was ever to beexpected.
The reality is that Ukraine has, by its action, stretched the
front line.
It's forced Russia toreconsider the disposition of
(44:45):
its forces.
It forces Russia to build up,relocate forces not only in
Kursk, but along the wholeinternational border to Ukraine.
Dana Lewis (44:56):
Belgorod as well.
Hans Petter Midttun (44:58):
So the long-term effect of this will be
far-reaching.
So I agree that Russia is sortof digging in, trying their best
.
We've seen a higher number ofclashes the last week than we've
seen in ages, but that's youknow, as autumn is setting in
and things will eventually stoptime, it's just a matter of time
.
Ukraine has forced Russia touse its reserves in Kursk, so
(45:24):
its ability to sustain thetemple that will be a fall in
the next upcoming weeks.
Dana Lewis (45:32):
Sorry, just to clarify you believe, not the
Ukraine temple, but the Russiantemple will falter, you believe?
Hans Petter Midttun (45:39):
It will falter in the weeks to come.
No doubt about it, Can you?
Dana Lewis (45:44):
you know, there's a bit of a mirage here, right In
the daily news cycle, where wewe don't tend to explain things
very well because we're runningfrom story to story to, you know
, headline to headline, andwhere we say well, you know, a
bunch more missiles were firedovernight, a bunch more areas
were, were, were hit by thosemissiles.
Um, another electrical grid, uh, a building for Ukrainians died
(46:07):
, and I don't mean to minimizethis, but five Ukrainians, three
Ukrainians, people get lost inthat.
How would you characterizewhat's happened in this past
week?
I mean, it is reallyunprecedented to have 200
rockets and missiles and theseglide bombs launched in one
(46:27):
night and then 90 the next night.
I mean, russia's really turningup the heat here yes, I know
I'm going to be done.
Hans Petter Midttun (46:35):
We have a short memory span, I think.
Now, when this war, full scalewar, started two and a half
years ago, russia launchedbetween 200 and 300 missiles a
day.
So this, this is notextraordinary.
It's extraordinary because wehaven't seen it for two and a
half years, if you like.
But this happened before andyou might argue that it's
(46:56):
triggered by the Kursk incursion.
Because it needs to demonstratethat it still has banks, still
the ability to hit.
But we will also see.
We have seen from thestatistics that Russia has not
the ability to sustain this kindof attack.
It will falter even at thisstage.
But it needs to demonstrate tothe Russian public that they
(47:17):
still have this ability to hurtUkraine.
Dana Lewis (47:20):
How are they hurting them?
I mean, as a military person,you know very well if I shoot at
you, if I fire it, you know Ithink somebody used the the
analogy yesterday if I fire thearrow, um, you're not just going
to intercept the arrow, you'recoming after the archer.
So why is ukraine unable?
What does the archer look like?
(47:42):
Where are they?
What, um?
And why is ukraine unable tostop it?
Hans Petter Midttun (47:49):
well?
Well, it takes us straight back, in a sense, to the discussion
about the western imposedlimitations, but it also a
discussion about what kind ofsupport have we provided?
You fail?
So just to provide you a bit ofstatistics, of statistics.
(48:13):
Since the full-scale warstarted, russia has launched
something reaching about 9,700missiles at Ukraine, about
14,200 drones.
It's an immense number.
On top of that, they areincreased.
Last year especially, theyincreased the use of guided
glide bombs against Ukraine.
Today, there are about 3,000,3,500 glide bombs dropped every
(48:35):
month.
Dana Lewis (48:36):
These are massive.
These are not just 500-poundbombs, which are scary enough,
these are massive.
Hans Petter Midttun (48:42):
It is absolutely massive and what
we're seeing is these bombsalone.
They are together withartillery and amylase.
They are raising ukrainiancities and villages to the
ground, massive destructions.
But we also seen that from thedrones and and missiles that
they have caused massivedestruction by themselves they
(49:04):
lost.
Ukraine has lost like half ofits energy capacity 9 gigawatts
lost this year by Russianstrikes and we are at a stage
where one fears that some regionof Ukraine will be.
People cannot live there duringthe frost period, when it
(49:25):
reaches minus 20 to 30 degreesin the worst case.
So the damage to Ukraine andthe destruction of Ukraine is
massive.
I mean, we're talking about likenearly $500 billion in cost of
rebuilding Ukraine after the war, rebuilding Ukraine after the
(49:46):
war.
Now, the reason I am not ableto stop this is that most of the
, the majority of these missileslike 45, at least close to 45%
of the missiles they're launchedwithin reach of Western
provided weapons.
We're talking about Iskander,the, the north korean ballistic
(50:10):
missiles.
We're also talking about sorry,you're saying within reach or
or beyond within which, yeah, um, they reach.
you know, outside is the rangeof the hymas, but inside the
range of systems like, uh, asnowstorm or the attack camps.
We're talking about more than4,000 missiles launched, where
(50:36):
they have managed to down about81 of them.
Just have a taste of that.
It's minuscule One missile shotdown Intercept.
More than 4,000.
Dana Lewis (50:46):
Yeah, that's minuscule numbers right.
Hans Petter Midttun (50:50):
Incredible shot down in intercept.
Yeah, that's minuscule numbers,right, incredible.
And the reason for that isthere's only one set of air
defense system capable ofstopping them today, and that's
patriot.
Ukraine has urgently andrepeatedly asked for up to 25
systems.
Batteries, um, that havereduced the numbers, recognizing
that they will not be given 25,ask for at least a minimum 7 to
(51:14):
11, and we're not even close tothat number, and the
consequence is, as we see,ukrainian cities and villages
and infrastructure are beingdevastated.
So we not only provide themwith the systems they need to
defend themselves, but we don'tallow them to hit the launches
before the missiles are launched, and I find that highly immoral
(51:35):
.
Dana Lewis (51:37):
So the the Archer um looks like what.
These are air bases that areflying aircraft.
These are our artillery umartillery and rocket launch
platforms.
These are ships at sea in theBlack Sea.
These are also air launchbombers that are coming long
(51:58):
range further away from theUkrainian border and they're
able to launch without evenentering or coming close to
Ukrainian airspace.
Hans Petter Midttun (52:08):
True, there's a wide range of them,
but if you see the statistics,the one they are struggling with
, that is the one launched closeto the border.
From the ballistic missiles,they're downing about 4.5% of
them.
On the missiles which have aballistic trajectory, like S-300
(52:34):
, s-400, used in secondary mode,they're downing 0.6% hardly
nothing.
Dana Lewis (52:43):
And they are close to the Ukrainian border.
The gloves were taken off andthe US administration and others
said okay, you can fire intoRussia, which they have done on
a limited basis, like some 19%of the area but if they give
Ukraine the full right to goafter those S-300s, for example,
would Ukraine be able to hitthem?
Hans Petter Midttun (53:05):
Well, it all goes down to intelligence,
of course, the real-timesituational awareness but they
have.
Ukraine has a far betterintelligence and situational
awareness than Russia have, notonly because of its own
capabilities, but also becauseof the support from the West, of
course, and we've seen that inother strikes that they've only
(53:29):
been enabled by a fantasticintelligence.
They reach fine targets.
I'm not saying it's going to beeasy, because they are mobile.
You need to sort of find thaton the way, you need to track
them and you need to hit themwhile they are setting up to
launch and that's a very, verysmall time given At least you
have that opportunity youthreaten Russian capabilities
(53:52):
and you force Russia to rethinktheir strategy.
We've seen that works already.
I mean, there's 16 airfieldswithin range of the attack camps
and Russia has moved theirairplanes, the fighter jets,
from them and to their field toavoid something they, russia,
thought would be in forcealready a long time ago.
(54:13):
You know the permission tostrike them, so they already
launched some of theircapabilities to their field.
Yeah, but we should not losetrack of all those other targets
left behind, which is allwithin range of the Western
provided weapons.
Dana Lewis (54:30):
Let me ask you two things, because I know time is
short.
The president of Ukraine,zelensky, said yesterday that
they have a new weapon.
There's a lot of speculationabout what he's talking about,
probably some kind of longerrange missile, high speed
ballistic, high-speed ballisticthat could hit Moscow.
Do you think that?
(54:51):
If that's in the cards, doesthat take us to a new level of
conflict?
Hans Petter Midttun (54:58):
I think it's been in the cards for a
long time, to be honest.
I mean, we have seen Ukrainestriking targets at the range
more than 1,800 kilometers.
They have slowly, over the lastyear and a half, expanded their
capability to attack targets inthe depth.
What Slenskine mentioned justdays ago was two things.
(55:18):
First is a new missile Slantdrone with a fuel, bar by bar,
bar turbine jets with a farlonger range of other
capabilities, bettercapabilities than the rather
simple drones that are sendingin these days.
(55:40):
And the second system isballistics.
Yesterday, I think, I noticedthat they have launched or
successfully completed thedevelopment of new ballistic
missile, which means it willhave an even greater impact on
Russia.
Now a ballistic trajectory isso much more difficult to stop
(56:01):
than anything else.
Ukraine expanding its abilityto wage war in Russia and
denying Russia the ability tocontinue its war in Ukraine,
irrespective of Western support.
I think it's a result of thelack of Western support.
(56:24):
Anyone who knows Ukraine knowsthat they will never, ever give
up in the face of russianrepercussion.
Dana Lewis (56:30):
They're fighting for their existence and they
will use whatever meansavailable for them to defeat
russia do you think all thistalk of talk, um in negotiation,
um, there's a lot of politicsin there, but the idea that
ukraine is suddenly gonna sitdown at the table with Russia
(56:51):
and allow Russia to, you know,bite off a chunk of the East,
that Zelensky would give thatkind of ground, or the Ukrainian
(57:12):
public would probably not allowhim to after this much time.
Or do you think they're gettingtired?
Hans Petter Midttun (57:17):
To be honest, there's no doubt that
Ukraine starts being tired.
It's just to start with that,because two and a half years of
war had a huge impact and younotice, I've seen that,
depending on what time of theyear I'm there, you can see that
people are getting tired, butthere's no way Ukraine will give
(57:38):
away any bit of territory.
The reason for that is theyrealise, recognise that this war
is essential for Russia.
They know that Russia, havingdone what it has done, having
played its card, it'sdemonstrated for the world their
imperial ambitions, if you like.
They know that if they acceptnegotiation, accept a peace
(58:04):
agreement, they know that itwill be temporary.
They have made more than 200talks and 20 ceasefires during
the eight years leading up tothe full-scale war From 2014?
.
Yeah from 2014 to 2022.
They only saw that turning intoa full-scale war because Russia
(58:24):
started the war in 2014.
They intend to see through.
They intend to defeat Ukraine1914, they intend to see through
.
They intend to defeat Ukraineand they intend to defeat
Ukraine to do the next step.
Dana Lewis (58:34):
Okay.
So the next step then andthat's my final question to you,
and I might have asupplementary in there and that
is that you've written articlesand criticism saying don't call
it the Russia-Ukraine war, andcriticism saying don't call it
the Russia-Ukraine war.
That badly bends reality.
(58:54):
Why do you say that?
Hans Petter Midttun (58:59):
I'm a little bit frustrated by the
term, to be honest.
I think it's highly misleading.
We sort of belittle a war thatis so much bigger.
We discussed that even when Iwas defense officer with my
colleagues at the time.
We recognized that, based onRussian doctrines, its
statements, its narrative, itsdisinformation, its actions,
(59:21):
this is a much broader war andyou don't have to take my word
for it.
I mean the European Union.
The EU parliament, in September2021, put out extremely
well-prepared documentsdiscussing the European Union
and its member states andconcluded that Russia is waging
(59:52):
a hybrid war against theEuropean Union and its member
states.
It's documented in its actionacross the United States and
Europe, everything from sabotageto liquidations, to terror.
There's a long list of Russianaggression already taking place.
This is already a much broaderconfrontation and what's
(01:00:14):
happening in the West is exactlywhat happened in Ukraine from
2014 to 2022.
It's exactly the same war.
It's worth mentioning andactually it's crucial to
recognize that Russia has notdefined Ukraine as its enemy.
It's actually explicitly saidthat Ukraine is not its enemy.
(01:00:38):
It has said the West, theWestern democracies, are just
that.
So the fact is, in its doctrine, it's in its actions, in its
statements, everything is done.
It's related to NATO, the USand Europe, but we have
belittled the war because it'sso much easier to discuss and
(01:01:01):
find solutions to a small warthan what the reality is.
Absolutely, it's a war fordummies.
Dana Lewis (01:01:10):
That's why Trump says he can end it within a week
of his presidency if he's backin the White House.
Hans Petter Midttun (01:01:16):
It has had that and it's absolutely
misleading.
But, that said, I'm not tooimpressed by how President Biden
goes about solving this wareither.
There's one key message I thinkpeople need to understand.
If you go back to 24 Februaryand the time after, you heard
(01:01:38):
all heads of state saying thatthis is a Russia-Ukraine war.
Ukraine is not a member of NATOand therefore is not eligible
for NATO collective defence.
All perfectly true.
The only problem with this isnone of them mention NATO's core
essential task number two.
(01:01:58):
Core essential task number two,that is, crisis management.
Crisis management is, to use apicture, is when you see there's
a fire in the, your neighbor'shouse and you decide to go, how
to put it out before itincreases in intensity and
spreads to your.
That's crisis management and anative study concept until june
(01:02:22):
2022.
After the first world warstarted said, in case of war or
conflicts which threaten thesecurity of the alliance, the
alliance will use a mix ofpolitical and military tools to
stop it.
Dana Lewis (01:02:39):
That war we're seeing today is exactly that war
, but no one NATO nor Biden norany heads of states talk about
(01:02:59):
that core, essential task crisismanagement, supporting the
freedom of Ukraine and stoppingRussia from advancing further,
and bolstering NATO forces inthe Baltics and elsewhere ready
if Russia wants to take anotherstep, whether they've done that
effectively or not there's a lotof people would debate that.
Hans Petter Midttun (01:03:23):
Well, it's not even open to debate, to be
honest, because before Russiadecided to do the full-scale
invasion 24th of February 22,they did 17 years of violation
of the international law.
They did 17 years of testing.
As a result, and they concludedthat we were not up to doing
(01:03:44):
what was our strategic ambitionto do crisis management.
Before they attacked, they musthave considered the opportunity
that NATO would intervene,because that was the ambition of
NATO.
They concluded that NATO wouldnot do that and by doing that,
(01:04:05):
they actually proven that NATOdeterrence do not work, that
they've actually proven thatNATO deterrence do not work.
We are fighting an uphillbattle to convince Russia that
when we say that we intend todefend every inch of the NATO
territory, that they believe us.
At the moment, I don't thinkthey believe us Because the
actions.
Dana Lewis (01:04:22):
That's a dangerous.
That's a dangerous, extremelydangerous.
Hans Petter Midttun (01:04:25):
It's extremely dangerous.
Dana Lewis (01:04:27):
Hans, you're a former Norwegian Navy commander,
I think.
Once a commander always adanger, extremely dangerous.
It's extremely dangerous.
Hans, you're a mid-toon, aformer Norwegian Navy commander,
I think.
Once a commander, always acommander, former naval attaché
for Norway to, among otherplaces, including NATO and
Ukraine.
Thank you so much for yourthoughts and time, sir.
I appreciate it.
Hans Petter Midttun (01:04:43):
Thank you so much for having me.
It was great talking to you,Dan.
Dana Lewis (01:04:46):
And that's our backstory for this week.
No-transcript.
From your vantage point, is Ukraine losing this
war?
Malcolm Davis (00:05):
They're not losing, but they're not winning.
I think that's the challenge isthat the war is stalemated.
Anthony Constantini (00:11):
It's become increasingly clear that Ukraine
is, simply put, running out ofmen and running out of the
capabilities to pursue a reallylong-term war.
Dana Lewis (00:20):
They are not for the moment, rushing to take back
Kursk at any cost.
Hans Petter Midttun (00:27):
No, they do not.
But this is not an on-offswitch and I think a lot of
people would expect something tochange immediately, and I don't
think that was ever to beexpected.
The reality is that Ukraine has, by its action, stretched the
front line.
It's forced Russia toreconsider the disposition of
(00:55):
its forces.
Dana Lewis (00:55):
Hi everyone and welcome to another edition of
Backstory.
I'm Dana Lewis.
I took a break for part of thesummer.
I hope you had some relaxationtoo.
Time to get on with thediscussion.
Ukraine here's the question IsUkraine losing?
It seems like it could be.
It seems like Ukraine is unableto push Russia out of occupied
(01:18):
areas in the east, even withUkraine's bold land grab inside
Russia in Kursk.
And the bigger question what'sat stake?
Does Russia have bigger plansthat go beyond Ukraine?
I mean, a lot of people say itdoes.
Do we buy the argument?
Democracy and freedom are onthe line in Europe and beyond.
(01:39):
Well, different guests thisweek, different perspectives and
views, and that's the backstoryon Ukraine.
Malcolm Davis is with theAustralian Strategic Policy
Institute.
He's an expert on futurewarfare and military technology,
and just not future warfare butexisting warfare, and there is
(02:03):
a lot of it, malcolm, and Iwelcome you back to the podcast.
Can you give me a reality checkfrom your vantage point?
Is Ukraine losing this war?
Malcolm Davis (02:17):
They're not losing, but they're not winning.
I think that's the challenge isthat the war is stalemated.
Now.
Ukraine have made this veryaudacious and daring offensive
into the Kursk region andthey're holding on to most of
the territory that they'vecaptured, and clearly that's
humiliated Putin.
It's also made it morecomplicated for the Russians to
(02:40):
reinforce their military forcesinside Ukraine in the Donetsk
and Luhansk areas of the Donbass.
So the Ukrainians have actuallydone a rather bold and
audacious move that seems tohave paid off for the moment,
but at the same time, theRussians in the Donetsk region
are making advances towards keytowns such as Pokharaevsk, which
(03:04):
are important from a logisticsperspective, and the Ukrainians
are basically withdrawing fromthat area.
So it's possible that as theUkrainians take the territory in
Kursk, the Russians areadvancing in Donetsk, and so it
really is a case of stalematerather than the Ukrainians
winning or the Russians winning.
(03:26):
It's not over yet, and Isuspect this war will go well
into 2025 and maybe even beyond2025.
Dana Lewis (03:35):
Is Kursk a fool's errand of sorts?
They're pulling forces from the, from the eastern front, um,
and, as you've noted, therussians continue to kind of
bulldoze forward.
Every few days another villagefalls, or they, you know they
advance somewhere.
Not, it's not rapid, but it isconsistent.
(03:58):
Um, why spend your forces up incurse where, where you know the
ukrainians are probably goingto get pushed out of there
eventually anyway?
Malcolm Davis (04:08):
Well, it's uncertain as to whether the
Ukrainians will be forced out.
If the Ukrainians can finddefensible lines and hold that
territory, that gives them avaluable negotiating chip in any
future.
Dana Lewis (04:21):
I can argue with you and say, absolutely, they're
going to be pushed out of therebecause this is Russian
territory.
But three weeks in I would beblushing saying, well, maybe
you're right stand.
Malcolm Davis (04:45):
they are still pushing forward in some areas,
but I think that holding ontothat territory is important, if
they can, because it gives themthat valuable negotiating chip
in any future ceasefirenegotiations.
Secondly, the more territorythey can hold, the more
difficult it is for the Russiansto reinforce their forces in
the Donbass area and Donetsk andLuhansk and over time that then
does have a deleterious effecton Russian combat capability as
(05:08):
the Russians begin to run low onsupplies of fuel and munitions
and, essentially, food and otherthings like that.
So it evens out in probably2025.
Things will slow down in thesort of late spring, early sorry
the late autumn, early winter.
(05:28):
I've got it's sort of likegetting my seasons right in the
different hemispheres and Ithink that we'll see what
happens in the new year and Ithink also the Russians and
again.
Dana Lewis (05:41):
I've interrupted you and I'm not going to do it
again.
I apologize, but what do youmean it's going to even out?
I'm a bit turned upside downwith time as well.
Now You're saying that theRussians are running out and
Ukraine?
If right now Ukraine is on aback foot, you think in 2025
(06:04):
they won't be?
Malcolm Davis (06:06):
I think that if Western military assistance
continues to flow to Ukraine,then Ukraine can hang on.
They can't necessarily win, butthey can continue to blunt
Russian advances.
The Russians are makingadvances in some areas, but at
great cost.
Now the Russians have asuperior military industrial
(06:27):
capacity in terms of turning outmunitions and so forth.
So the key thing that willemerge in 2025 is, firstly, does
that Western military systemdry up?
If you have a change ofadministration in the US after
the presidential election andTrump gets back in, then I think
it is almost certain that thatUS military assistance will dry
up, in which case Europe will behard-pressed to fill the void
(06:49):
left by the US.
But at the same time, theRussians have got to step up
their military production andthey may have to think about a
mobilisation, and that will bepolitically unpopular for Putin
if he does go down the path ofmobilisation.
So it really does get into asituation of who can acquire or
(07:10):
produce the most munitions andwho can maintain their hold on
territory into 2025.
Dana Lewis (07:16):
I mean, I've traveled across Russia, I've
seen the big old Soviet Union.
Your head spins around when youenter some of these cities and
you realize all they ever didwas produce munitions.
All they ever did was producewarplanes or tanks or chemical
weapons or biological weapons.
I mean Ronald Reagan's evilempire.
(07:38):
And the fact is that we'repouring more and more money into
Ukraine and it doesn't seem tohave changed the battlefield.
Malcolm Davis (07:50):
Well, I think we have an obligation to do so,
because let's remember the factshere it was Russia that
launched this war.
They were the aggressors, theywere the ones that invaded
Ukraine, which is a sovereignnation state and a Western
democracy that invaded Ukraine,which is a sovereign nation
state and a Western democracy.
They did so because they soughtto essentially wipe Ukraine off
the face of the map.
They sought territorialexpansion.
(08:12):
That was against every singlerule in the rules-based
international order, and if wehadn't have poured that money
into Ukraine, if we hadn't havesupported Ukraine, then that
would have sent a terribleprecedent, not just in terms of
European security but in termsof, for example, how China
thinks about Taiwan.
So I think we had an obligation.
Dana Lewis (08:34):
They'll keep going, and I tend to think, just like
you do, that Putin will not befinished or satisfied.
Oh, absolutely.
Malcolm Davis (08:42):
Yeah, he's got much bigger plans than Ukraine
and I think that if he does winin Ukraine in, say, late 25 or
early 26, then he'll beemboldened to rebuild military
capacity as fast as possible andthen confront NATO directly in
the latter half of this decade,and once again that would be
(09:03):
coordinated with China in a moveagainst Taiwan.
So I do think that we have anobligation to defend Ukraine and
to ensure that it wins.
The challenge for us in doingso is threading that strategic
needle so that Ukraine wins andwe at the same time deter Putin
from reaching for tacticalnuclear weapons.
(09:25):
Because if Putin uses tacticalnuclear weapons in Ukraine, nato
are then obligated to respondat a conventional level and you
end up in an escalatory cyclewhich we're all trying to avoid,
it seems escalatory right nowto me.
Oh, it's escalatory, but it'sthe Russians that are escalating
.
Okay, what we're trying toavoid is that really big
escalation of a Russian attackon a NATO state conventionally,
(09:49):
or Russian use of tacticalnuclear weapons.
You know, for example, ifRussia did use tactical nuclear
weapons in Ukraine and we didn'trespond, then that would
embolden Putin even more to usemore tactical nuclear weapons
and it would send the messagenot only to the Russians but
also to the Chinese, to theNorth Koreans, to the Iranians,
that use of tactical nuclearweapons is okay.
(10:10):
So that would change the gamefor international security in a
major way.
So we're between the rock andthe hard place there if we're
presented with that scenario,and that's why I'm saying we do
have to step up in terms of ourdeterrence posture to make sure
that the Russians do not usetactical nuclear weapons under
any circumstances.
Dana Lewis (10:29):
And yet you heard Zelensky announced this week
that they have new weapons.
They appear to have thereporting from bloggers and the
press inside Ukraine, as itsounds like they have ballistic
missiles that can hit Moscow.
Can you imagine what is goingto happen and frankly I can't,
because I don't know where it'sgoing to go after that If a
(10:49):
ballistic missile hits theKremlin or starts exploding on
some target inside Moscow?
There have been drone attacksbefore, but they weren't very
significant, but a ballisticmissile actually hits someone, a
building, a government building, kills someone.
I mean, where does that goafter that?
Malcolm Davis (11:09):
I mean, that is a big step, but you know, to put
that into context, the Russiansjust launched a massive attack
with large numbers of ballisticmissiles on keep.
So I do think that theUkrainians are justified in
developing this capability andusing it.
Ukrainians are justified indeveloping this capability and
using it, and I do think they'rejustified in using it, given
that the Biden administration isquite illogically refusing to
(11:31):
let them use ATAKOMs againsttargets deep inside Russia.
So you know, yes, theUkrainians do have this new
ballistic missile.
They will certainly use it, I'msure.
And you know, a ballisticmissile will have much more
payload capacity than a drone,so it could create a lot more
damage.
And then it's really up to theRussians on how they respond to
that, and they've got a numberof choices.
(11:53):
They can launch massive attackson Kiev and other Ukrainian
cities, like they've been doingin the last few days, try to
inflict as much damage aspossible, or they can reach for
the tactical nukes.
And if they reach for thetactical nukes, then they know
that NATO must respondconventionally.
And then they're in an entirelynew war.
And are they prepared to godown that path, knowing that the
(12:13):
risk of escalation into astrategic nuclear exchange is
very real?
I'm not sure.
So I think that I once againsupport Ukraine in launching
attacks against Russia,including with this ballistic
missile on Moscow, if necessary.
But NATO has to do its bit andstep up and deter Russia from
using tactical nuclear weaponsin response.
Dana Lewis (12:36):
I mean, that's the big gamble and I was going to
ask you why is the Bidenadministration, do you think,
still stalling on supplying thenecessary weapons, or at least
lifting the restrictions on theweapons that they have already
supplied to the Ukrainians, toallow them to hit these air
bases or these S-300s or any ofthe aircraft that are launching
(13:03):
these glide bombs?
I mean, there was another 90drone attacks overnight.
The night before there wereanother 90 some odd or almost
100, you know rocket and droneattacks, 200 earlier in the week
.
I mean, the number of attackson Ukraine this week alone has
been head spinning.
Malcolm Davis (13:25):
Yeah, look, I mean I think the Biden
administration is terrified ofthe prospect of escalation to
use of nuclear weapons or theprospect of Russia retaliating
directly against NATO.
That's the two scenarios.
That keeps Biden and hisnational security advisor and
his secretary of state andsecretary of defense awake at
night, because what they don'twant to do is get sucked into a
(13:46):
war directly with Russia,because they know where that
leads.
But at the same time, if theydon't allow Ukraine to win and
Russia ultimately prevails andwins in, say, late 25 or 26,
that's exactly where they end upin the end, because Russia will
then threaten NATO.
So you know Biden does need tounderstand that.
(14:07):
You know it's important forUkraine to win, because if
Ukraine wins at the same time asNATO firmly and effectively
deters Russia from using nuclearweapons, then it's checkmate
for Russia and we defeat thatthreat once and for all.
Obviously, coming out of thatscenario, the US and NATO have
(14:28):
to stand firm along theireastern frontier indefinitely.
They face that Russian threatso long as the Putin regime is
in power.
The challenge there, of course,is they also face a threat in
the Indo-Pacific, with Chinaagainst Taiwan, and that demands
that the US and its allies,both in Europe and also in the
Indo-Pacific step up, increasedefence spending and go to a
(14:49):
pre-war period mindset andparadigm in terms of boosting
defence industrial capacity sothat they're ready to deter it.
If that deterrence fails,they're ready to fight.
And I'm not convinced at thispoint in time that Western
democracies have got themselvesinto that right frame of mind
yet.
Dana Lewis (15:07):
And the last question to you and I appreciate
your time is that, because noteverybody buys this argument
that this is a larger war, it isnot the Russia-Ukraine war that
this is a real struggle.
I don't want to say democraciesagainst autocracies, I don't
want to say democracies againstautocracies, but it is, you know
, the European liberal order,the Western liberal order,
(15:32):
fighting back Putin, who hasessentially declared war on them
.
And not everybody buys thatlarger global argument that
Putin's just going to keepcoming.
A lot of people think it couldjust stop in Ukraine and, you
(15:53):
know, push for a ceasefire, tryto do something that they did
like with the two Koreas andwait for Putin to push on.
He's getting older and whybring this to a full
confrontation right now?
Malcolm Davis (16:02):
Well, firstly, they should be thinking in terms
of a global confrontationbetween authoritarian states and
liberal democracies, becausethat's exactly what we're seeing
.
What you are seeing iscountries like China, russia,
north Korea and Iran workingtogether as authoritarian states
to confront Western democracies, to end a rules-based
(16:24):
international order that is ledby Western democracies, to end
democracy as a form ofgovernance and to create an
authoritarian world order forthe 21st century.
That's exactly what ishappening.
We're in this global conflictnow.
It's very different from thelast global conflict, be it the
Cold War or the Second World War, but nevertheless, the
potential for that globalconflict to end up in a hot
(16:45):
global conflict be it the ColdWar or the Second World War, but
nevertheless the potential forthat global conflict to end up
in a hot global war a World WarIII, if you like is quite real,
I think.
Second point is that manypeople are terrified of the
prospect of nuclear war, orescalation in that sense, and so
they don't want to take thehard decisions, to stand firm,
(17:05):
and they don't believe yet, inspite of Putin invading Ukraine
in 2022 and Xi Jinpingcontinually threatening Taiwan,
they don't believe thatauthoritarian states actually
will use force to achieve theirgeopolitical aims to achieve
their geopolitical aims.
(17:28):
And I think that we've beenlulled into this lazy strategic
timidity since the end of theCold War, where we are not
prepared to confront thepossibility of world war or
major power war or nuclear war.
And we need to get our heads outof that sort of strategic
timidity mindset and intorecognising that post-Cold War
(17:49):
interregnum that existed from1991 through to about, probably,
2014 is over and we need tostart thinking about an entirely
new, much more dangerousstrategic environment where we
are once again confronted byauthoritarian states in the same
way that we were in the late1930s, and Hal Brands has
(18:12):
written some excellent analysisin this regard, where he
directly compares the events nowthat are occurring this year
and in previous years with thelate 1930s, and the parallels
are quite apt.
So I do think it's reallyimportant for western
democracies to realize the fightthat we're in, to recognize
that it simply won't go away,that, even if putin eventually
(18:34):
dies, that the person replaceshim will be far worse, because,
believe me, there are nopro-western reformers in the
queue to basically lead Russia.
And that Xi Jinping isdetermined to impose unification
on Taiwan, even through the useof force, because he's got so
much politically invested inthat goal.
(18:56):
So you know, this is the fightthat we're in and we have to be
ready for it, and I think thatwe have little choice.
Dana Lewis (19:03):
I hope you're wrong , malcolm Davis, but I think
you're probably right, and so Iappreciate your, your, your
perspective, and it's late atnight in Australia, and thank
you so much.
Malcolm Davis (19:17):
It's my pleasure, always happy to help out.
Dana Lewis (19:23):
Anthony Constantini is a conservative writer for
the American Conservative, aconservative magazine.
He received a degree in armscontrol and strategic studies.
Anthony, nice to meet you.
Anthony Constantini (19:34):
Thank you very much.
Just to clarify I'm acontributor for American
Conservative.
I'm not formally employed bythem.
Dana Lewis (19:42):
Cool.
So let's just talk about what'shappening on the ground in
Ukraine right now.
More drones overnight, close toa hundred.
The night before, you know,there were a combination of
rockets and drones, and thenight before that and the night
before that, there are hundreds.
This week it seems like it isescalating right now, not
(20:03):
de-escalating in any way.
Anthony Constantini (20:06):
Yeah, no, I would say that that's certainly
true.
I think that a couple of weeksago you saw a decent amount of
even very, very pro-Ukrainianvoices in the West starting to
say maybe we need to have somemore negotiations, a little bit
more, and I think that there wasan argument that the war could
have been maybe drawn to somesort of long-term pause.
But I think that recent eventshave kind of shunted that off to
(20:30):
the side for the time being.
Dana Lewis (20:31):
You've written that you don't think Ukraine can win
in the East and that Russia isnot going to be pushed out of
the areas it's invaded andannexed.
Is that fair?
Anthony Constantini (20:44):
Yeah, that's a fair way to phrase what
I've said.
Yes, why do you think so?
I think it's just a matter ofwhat Ukraine can bring to the
table versus what Russia can.
In the very beginning of thewar, I wrote that Ukraine should
not jump to negotiations, thatthey should have pushed as hard
as they could, especially aftertheir fantastic Kharkiv
(21:06):
counteroffensive in late 2022.
But it's become increasinglyclear that Ukraine is, simply
put, running out of men andrunning out of the capabilities
to pursue a really long-term war, which would result in them
getting back Crimea, gettingback the east, and whereas
Russia simply has a large amountof individuals, it can just
(21:27):
kind of throw into the fire.
I can go into these ruralvillages where people have no
real political power outside ofMoscow, outside of St Petersburg
, and just pull as many peopleas they need.
They have the money and, morethan anything else, they have
the time.
So what would you say about thewisdom of Zelensky and his
(21:57):
generals launching thisoffensive inside Russia, in
Kursk?
But the problem is, wheneveryou engage in some sort of
military action, especially likethis, there has to be a clear
end goal, and to me, the endgoals either don't seem to exist
or don't seem feasible.
The Ukrainian government hasput forward that they're going
to use Kursk as a bargainingchip, which seems reasonable on
the surface, but when you lookat the fact that I mean, you had
(22:23):
Prokhorin get into Moscow,obelisk just last year, and
Putin was relatively unaffected,the idea that he's going to run
screaming to the negotiatingtable saying fine, fine, take
whatever you want, give me Kurskback, I just find it
unrealistic.
I lived in Voronezh for about ayear, which is a city 500
kilometers south of Moscow, andthey had a joke there which is
(22:44):
there?
were a lot of American studentsthere by the way, right, yeah,
there was a language programthere, and they had this joke
for decades, which was they'reall in the Kremlin, gathered
together, and they say, okay,the time for talk has passed, we
need to bomb the West.
And so one of them says, well,let's bomb London.
And somebody says, oh no, mymoney's there.
One of them says, let's justcarpet bomb France, and they say
(23:05):
, oh well, I have a villa there.
And they keep going on and onand on.
And then somebody says, well,what about Vronish?
And no one in the Kremlin hasanything to do with Vronish, so
they bomb there.
(23:26):
And, in the same way, kursk isnot some city that is crucially
do everything he can to just toget this back, especially when
the biggest area taken so far isI think its hand was about six
thousand inhabitants.
And so what it seems to me isthat putin is annoyed, obviously
, and probably embarrassed,because this is objectively
embarrassing, but he'll throwpeople at it, he'll wait.
Eventually ukraine will getpushed out of that, and then, at
the end of this incursion, theywon won't have taken any of
Russia's land.
(23:46):
Russia will have slowly chippedaway in the south, as they're
currently doing, and Ukrainewill be worse off.
They'll have less men, they'llhave less armaments and
potentially, if the UnitedStates government has changed
next year, they may have a muchless supportive American
government.
I can't see a way that thiswill work out in a positive way
for Ukraine.
Dana Lewis (24:07):
So let's talk about that possible government that
is led by, you know,conservatives and President
Trump, possibly.
You know he's saying he wantsto end the war right away and he
wants to stop spending moneyand, and, uh, he wants to end
american support.
Europe may continue to to fighton and in their supply to
(24:31):
ukraine and I I don't know howthat will work out and whether
they've got the necessary muscle.
A lot of people don't thinkthat they they'll be able to
keep ukraine going for very longwithout american support.
But what is the consensus, ifyou can even speak from that
perspective in conservativecircles right now?
On long term, do you just givePutin what he wanted?
(24:56):
You let him bite off a hugepiece of Ukraine.
In exchange for what and whatprice does he pay?
And what is the deterrent inthe future for him not going
after Lithuania or Estonia or,you know, the Baltics, or Poland
, and on and on?
Anthony Constantini (25:25):
now in conservative policy circles.
I think that if Harris were towin, there are enough Republican
senators who would vote to passmore Ukraine aid.
The Speaker of the House,should he be speaker next year,
he's already made clear he wouldcontinue to support aid.
But, that said, there is a kindof loose consensus forming that
the post-Cold War order thatthe United States did uphold is
(25:47):
something that no longer needsto be upheld, and I think that
when people and it's a fairquestion when people say, well,
what price should Putin pay?
What happens if Lithuania,estonia, come next Is a lot of,
especially when it comes tonational conservatives, who are
starkly different from what canbe called fusionist
conservatives or kind of bushconservative predecessors, is
(26:09):
that they don't really see itthrough that lens.
Um, putin is not that popularin the republican party.
When you look at polls, he'salmost as unpopular as he is in
in the democrats.
Um, he has.
I think the last poll I sawshowed his approval rating
something like 7% in theRepublican Party and 6% for the
(26:30):
Democrats.
Dana Lewis (26:31):
Yeah, Do they actually poll and ask people how
popular they think?
Anthony Constantini (26:36):
The amount of polls that people ask
Americans to give their approval?
Why, on?
Dana Lewis (26:42):
earth.
Would we be polling people,asking Americans what do they
think of the Russian leader?
I mean, is he in somepopularity contest inside the
Republican Party?
Anthony Constantini (26:54):
Well, it's a fair question.
I mean, those numbers came fromPew.
I believe I could double checkthat it was Pew or Gallup.
But they usually ask questionslike that pretty regularly, at
least in the US.
But this is all to say that atthe same time, it's not
necessarily a respect for anewfound respect for Russia that
(27:15):
is causing them to say we don'treally.
Dana Lewis (27:19):
I don't want to say that they don't care, but you
might be right if you did saythat you might be right.
Anthony Constantini (27:25):
There's more of a sense of and I don't
mean to just simply restateTrump's slogans, but a sense of
putting whatever would result inhelping America first.
And so what that would mean isit would be sad and I'm speaking
from their perspective, fromthe perspective of what would
likely be an incomingadministration it would be sad
(27:46):
if the Baltics were attacked.
But the Baltics are not ourresponsibility.
The Baltics is Europe'sresponsibility and the EU's.
Take Albert Golby, who's likelygoing to be Trump's national
security advisor.
He's made this point again andagain that Europe has a
fantastic weapons industry.
(28:07):
They have 400 and somethinglike 50 million people in the
European Union.
They have, with France, nuclearweapons, if you include the
United Kingdom, two nuclearweapon states.
There's a sense that the UnitedStates simply does not need to
take care of, for example,countries like Eastern Europe,
that Europe can take care ofEastern Europe, and so it's not
(28:29):
necessarily a question of well,should Putin pay this price, at
least coming from thisperspective of a new Republican
administration?
But why would we bother makinghim pay one when he didn't
really go after us?
He went after an order that weno longer care about, is the
thinking.
If they wanted to uphold thisorder, then sure that kind of
conversation would be held.
How do we make him pay for this?
(28:50):
But they don't really careabout upholding that world order
anymore.
They think that it wasdetrimental to American
interests.
Dana Lewis (28:59):
May as well give China Taiwan then.
Anthony Constantini (29:01):
Well, that's the thing.
Dana Lewis (29:04):
The argument is that you have to May as well,
give North Korea.
Anthony Constantini (29:06):
South Korea .
Well, if you uphold Americaninterests, then you don't.
Dana Lewis (29:09):
I'm saying, if you follow.
Anthony Constantini (29:10):
No, no sure .
But the thing is, if you upholdAmerican interests, then you
don't have to have a kind ofone-size-fits-all there.
You can say well, it would helpAmerica's interests to keep
China from breaking out of thefirst island chain, so we need
to keep them out of Taiwan, butit doesn't really matter to us
if Russia's territory moves abit into Ukraine's.
At least that's where thisthinking comes from.
(29:35):
That kind of one size fits allyou absolutely cannot do this
anywhere on the planet has kindof fallen by the wayside, and a
lot of that is due to the factthat we never really upheld that
thinking.
At the same time, the Bushadministration was pushing the
Bush doctrine of democratization.
They were best buddies withSaudi Arabia, who executes
people for being gay, and therewas a sense of look, if we're
going to be hypocritical anyway,why don't we at least be
(29:57):
hypocritical in US interests?
And so that's kind of what'sreally driven the party in that
direction.
Dana Lewis (30:12):
And so that's kind of what's really driven the
party in that direction.
Or, you know, post-cold Warthinking anymore and just give
Russia the Baltics or whateverthey want.
You know I shudder, but it'sinteresting.
And you think that that is amajority in the Trump circle, in
(30:38):
the Republican Party?
I mean, it's certainly not inthe Senate, I think.
Anthony Constantini (30:41):
but no, it's definitely not a majority
of the Senate Republican caucus.
And, to be clear, I'm notsaying that they're saying give
it to Russia.
But what they're saying is,europe has the capability to
defend itself and it clearlyjust does not want to.
And that's something I wouldmyself agree with is that I
think Europe has gotten very,very comfortable spending a lot
(31:03):
of money on social services butthen having the Americans kind
of come and spend money ondefense.
And what I think a lot ofEuropean leaders are worried
about in the back of their headsis that if America leaves,
they're going to have to eitherincrease taxes on an already
overtaxed tax base or cut socialservices, and I think that that
is panicking them.
But you're already seeing thishappen, for example, in Germany,
(31:24):
where you have the governmenteffectively saying we're not
going to give Ukraine any moremoney because we don't have it,
which obviously they do, butthey just don't want to spend it
.
And so there is this frustrationthat Europe is simply really
just refusing to pick up theball.
I mean, you had I think it waslast year or two years ago
Brussels tried to make this bigdeal about a new defense
(31:47):
spending fund, which soundedgreat until you saw that it was
$1.5 billion, which, for amilitary defense spending fund,
is kind of a drop in the bucket.
I think had Europe been lessresistant to Barack Obama's push
to raise defense spending 10years ago, I don't think you
would have this kind of um callit distaste coming from the
(32:07):
republican party toward europenow.
But they were very resistant,with barack obama saying, hey,
could you please do this.
They were extremely resistantwith trump, much more
aggressively, saying you need todo this you're talking about
the two 2.5 percent of gdp fornato membership yeah, yeah, yeah
, yeah, yeah, I'd say that.
And even when Obama was tryingto push them to sanction.
Dana Lewis (32:29):
By the way, these are trade partners, these are
cultural partners, these areclose allies.
Right, I mean, I would agreeyou didn't step up with the
money.
See you later.
It's not a Trump negotiatingposition, although a lot of
people think that's what it wasYou're saying.
There's actually a real corebelief that you know, to hell
with Europe.
Anthony Constantini (32:48):
I think the problem is had Europe, for
example, in over the last 30years?
And nobody expected them to dothis?
We, the United States, did notask them to do this and perhaps
that's that's America's mistake.
If Europe had said we are partof the West, we are all the West
and we love where we came from,we love cultural traditions,
you know that would be one thing.
But I think that Republicans,especially today, see a Europe
(33:09):
that is not saying that but isstill expecting America to
uphold its end of this bargain.
And I think and I can speak frompersonal experience, the amount
of times I've heard youcompletely selfish Americans,
you don't want to help us, butthen also, ha ha, you don't
spend any money on your ownhealth care.
Wow, this is just so pathetic.
And every time America says weare going to take some troops
(33:31):
out and we do want to spendmoney on our health care, it
gets to selfish again built upand just it's.
It's just kind of frustratedenough.
Republicans, at this point it'snot a majority in the senate.
Um, I think if donald trump waspresident, he would likely be
able to sustain um to you know,sustain a veto um, if he had, if
(33:54):
he it'd be, veto some largeukraine aid package.
Um, but if he's not president,those aid packages are likely
still going to keep rollinganthony costantini uh, nice to
meet you and and pleasure to getsome of your perspective.
Dana Lewis (34:08):
It's a bit jarring to hear somebody say it, but
it's not the first time I'veread it or understood that.
There are people that holdthose views so, and they are
probably gaining some groundwithin the Republican Party.
As this war plays out inUkraine and people say, okay,
the counter offensive didn'twork, we're pumping billions in
(34:30):
there.
At what point do we stop?
At what point do we get thefighting stopped and focus more
on American needs back home?
And that debate's happening alot and it's naive to pretend it
isn't so.
Thank you so much.
No, yeah, likewise, hans PeterMidtjian is a former Norwegian
(34:59):
Navy commander and he was postedto NATO.
Former Norwegian Navy commanderand he was posted to NATO and,
among others, he was in Ukraineas a naval attaché for Norway
and he regularly has been backin Kiev.
In fact, he was there just acouple of weeks ago.
Welcome, pete.
Hans Petter Midttun (35:15):
Thank you, Donna.
It's a pleasure meeting you.
Dana Lewis (35:19):
Look, you've written a pretty compelling
piece and that's why I wanted tointerview you on why the
restrictions on Ukraine need tobe lifted, and it's really part
of a growing chorus from somevery credible people on why the
West has to allow Ukraine to hitfurther into Russia with
(35:43):
Western weapons than it is now.
Can we just talk about that?
Because in this week whenUkraine has been pummeled with
hundreds of drones and missilesand bombs, it is especially
poignant right now.
Hans Petter Midttun (36:01):
Well, absolutely, and I've been
arguing in favour of this forquite a long time.
While the limitations to theuse of Western weapons is more
something of a new year date,from my perspective, this has
been a part of a borderconfrontation for such a long
(36:22):
time.
This is not only a questionabout Ukraine's right to defend
itself according tointernational law, but also
about its ability to defend us,europe and the West, and I find
it very odd that we, bysupporting Ukraine,
(36:43):
simultaneously imposerestrictions to what it can and
cannot do according tointernational law.
I mean, the UN Charter allowsUkraine to defend itself, for
that there is no questionwhatsoever.
But by imposing limitations towhat targets legal targets
ukraine can do, we we sort ofput infringements on how we
(37:07):
interpret, uh you um,international law.
I, I find it's uh do you really?
Dana Lewis (37:14):
because I, I, I don't if, if I'm able to jump in
here because we have um.
We've spent generations tryingto avoid war with Russia and the
Soviet Union.
Before that, we have spentincredible amounts of efforts in
(37:34):
arms control agreements, onsteering clear of a conflict
that could draw the world into anuclear exchange.
So why would it surprise youthen that the US administration
and others are so hesitant toallow weapons that they're
providing to Ukraine to be usedin an offensive matter inside
(37:58):
Russian territory?
And I know what I'm telling youis not news to you and I'm sure
you've given it lots of thought.
Hans Petter Midttun (38:04):
Well, it actually.
It takes you straight down tothis discussion about escalation
or the fear of escalation, andthere's several layers to that,
and one of them is that the oneof the most important battle
space on this war, and there'ssix domains the most important
of those domains is the fight inthe cognitive space, this fight
(38:27):
for the mind, and Russia hasused these 10 and a half years
to impose a fear in the West,being afraid of exactly what you
say, this fear of escalation,fear of this turning into a
border confrontation and anuclear war, end of days,
armageddon, absolutely.
But the point is that the fearof escalation defies logic in a
(38:53):
sense.
First of all, we have torecognize the fact that, in
respect to what we have done, inrespect of our policy, russia
has chosen still to turn peaceinto war.
They've chosen to escalate.
We have to recognize that atthe moment, or for actually the
last decade, russia hascontrolled or managed escalation
(39:15):
, while we have kept safedistance.
The only way you can actuallymanage escalation is that you
self-escalate to de-escalate,and we haven't done that.
But still that has not stoppedRussia from doing what it has
done, starting a full-scale warin Ukraine or in Europe, if you
(39:35):
like.
The other part of it is and itgoes a little bit to the heart
of this discussion about thefight and the battle on the
cognitive space.
Many don't really understandRussia.
They see diplomatic measures,negotiations, political talks as
a sign of weakness.
(39:56):
They only accept or respond tostrength, to strength, and what
we fear will provoke them isactually the opposite they are
provoked by our weakness, butthe fact that we have not
responded to their provocationfor more than 17 years, since
(40:17):
2007.
And lastly, if there wassomething to this aspect of
escalation, well, ukraine hascrossed the red lines so many
times that we should have seenthat escalation a long time ago.
Dana Lewis (40:47):
Even we, the West, have crossed inner circle to
take more serious action,whether that be attacking the
(41:10):
transportation lines that aremoving Western equipment into
Ukraine from places like Poland.
And so it's not that you knowthere were red lines.
We crossed the red lines, andthat's that you know.
We called them on their bluffand now let Ukraine do whatever
the hell they want.
I mean, in fact, there's stilla danger there, and those red
lines are not static.
Hans Petter Midttun (41:27):
No, they're not static, but we also have to
put into consideration therealities on the battlefield, if
you like.
You know the fight in thebattlefield, which consists of
nuclear threats or threat ofescalation, or World War III, or
whatever we call it.
It has no match.
It doesn't link up to therealities.
(41:47):
Firstly, it doesn't match theRussian doctrines.
It does not match the militarycapabilities and the ability to
explore these opportunities.
It does not match the falloutof such an action.
Only such a thing like thethreat of mutual destruction is
a part of the thing they need toassess before they actually go
(42:10):
to this step of escalating.
They need to consider theirrelationship to their
international partners, and soforth.
I know it's not full, but I'msaying there's more arguments in
this favor than in favor ofescalation.
The main point is still, though, is, irrespective of what we
have done, russia has chosen toescalate, and it still escalates
(42:33):
, and the only way you can getinto that OODA loop or in the
decision loop is to yourself bewilling to take that risk.
Dana Lewis (42:41):
So is the Kursk invasion by Ukraine a necessary
escalation.
Is it a wise thing thatZelensky has ordered his army to
do?
Hans Petter Midttun (42:54):
For me.
I've written an article onescalation and the red lines and
to me this is just anotherclear proof that the Russian
threat of escalation does not.
The red lines does not exist assuch.
I think it's smart because itshows to the Russian public that
(43:18):
the war is coming home.
Putin cannot protect Russiafrom the fallout of the war.
It undermines his regime.
Dana Lewis (43:27):
But it's also important for us because it's so
much easier to support uh oneon a battlefield who succeeds
and not, you know, withdrawingas we know I'm puzzled by it,
because at the same time thatzolensky has done this um, the
(43:48):
russians are advancing in theeast and it looks like some of
those battle lines are notcollapsing, but they're
certainly being pushed back.
Ukraine is losing ground, sothey're siphoning away some of
their muscle from the easternfront line to go into Kursk,
hoping to somehow influenceRussian public opinion, but
(44:08):
we're not seeing the Russianstake the bait.
Really are we?
They continue to push in theeast and taking more villages
and more settlements and theyare not, for the moment, rushing
to take back Kursk at any cost.
Hans Petter Midttun (44:24):
No, they do not.
But this is not an on-offswitch and I think a lot of
people would expect something tochange immediately, and I don't
think that was ever to beexpected.
The reality is that Ukraine has, by its action, stretched the
front line.
It's forced Russia toreconsider the disposition of
(44:45):
its forces.
It forces Russia to build up,relocate forces not only in
Kursk, but along the wholeinternational border to Ukraine.
Dana Lewis (44:56):
Belgorod as well.
Hans Petter Midttun (44:58):
So the long-term effect of this will be
far-reaching.
So I agree that Russia is sortof digging in, trying their best
.
We've seen a higher number ofclashes the last week than we've
seen in ages, but that's youknow, as autumn is setting in
and things will eventually stoptime, it's just a matter of time
.
Ukraine has forced Russia touse its reserves in Kursk, so
(45:24):
its ability to sustain thetemple that will be a fall in
the next upcoming weeks.
Dana Lewis (45:32):
Sorry, just to clarify you believe, not the
Ukraine temple, but the Russiantemple will falter, you believe?
Hans Petter Midttun (45:39):
It will falter in the weeks to come.
No doubt about it, Can you?
Dana Lewis (45:44):
you know, there's a bit of a mirage here, right In
the daily news cycle, where wewe don't tend to explain things
very well because we're runningfrom story to story to, you know
, headline to headline, andwhere we say well, you know, a
bunch more missiles were firedovernight, a bunch more areas
were, were, were hit by thosemissiles.
Um, another electrical grid, uh, a building for Ukrainians died
(46:07):
, and I don't mean to minimizethis, but five Ukrainians, three
Ukrainians, people get lost inthat.
How would you characterizewhat's happened in this past
week?
I mean, it is reallyunprecedented to have 200
rockets and missiles and theseglide bombs launched in one
(46:27):
night and then 90 the next night.
I mean, russia's really turningup the heat here yes, I know
I'm going to be done.
Hans Petter Midttun (46:35):
We have a short memory span, I think.
Now, when this war, full scalewar, started two and a half
years ago, russia launchedbetween 200 and 300 missiles a
day.
So this, this is notextraordinary.
It's extraordinary because wehaven't seen it for two and a
half years, if you like.
But this happened before andyou might argue that it's
(46:56):
triggered by the Kursk incursion.
Because it needs to demonstratethat it still has banks, still
the ability to hit.
But we will also see.
We have seen from thestatistics that Russia has not
the ability to sustain this kindof attack.
It will falter even at thisstage.
But it needs to demonstrate tothe Russian public that they
(47:17):
still have this ability to hurtUkraine.
Dana Lewis (47:20):
How are they hurting them?
I mean, as a military person,you know very well if I shoot at
you, if I fire it, you know Ithink somebody used the the
analogy yesterday if I fire thearrow, um, you're not just going
to intercept the arrow, you'recoming after the archer.
So why is ukraine unable?
What does the archer look like?
(47:42):
Where are they?
What, um?
And why is ukraine unable tostop it?
Hans Petter Midttun (47:49):
well?
Well, it takes us straight back, in a sense, to the discussion
about the western imposedlimitations, but it also a
discussion about what kind ofsupport have we provided?
You fail?
So just to provide you a bit ofstatistics, of statistics.
(48:13):
Since the full-scale warstarted, russia has launched
something reaching about 9,700missiles at Ukraine, about
14,200 drones.
It's an immense number.
On top of that, they areincreased.
Last year especially, theyincreased the use of guided
glide bombs against Ukraine.
Today, there are about 3,000,3,500 glide bombs dropped every
(48:35):
month.
Dana Lewis (48:36):
These are massive.
These are not just 500-poundbombs, which are scary enough,
these are massive.
Hans Petter Midttun (48:42):
It is absolutely massive and what
we're seeing is these bombsalone.
They are together withartillery and amylase.
They are raising ukrainiancities and villages to the
ground, massive destructions.
But we also seen that from thedrones and and missiles that
they have caused massivedestruction by themselves they
(49:04):
lost.
Ukraine has lost like half ofits energy capacity 9 gigawatts
lost this year by Russianstrikes and we are at a stage
where one fears that some regionof Ukraine will be.
People cannot live there duringthe frost period, when it
(49:25):
reaches minus 20 to 30 degreesin the worst case.
So the damage to Ukraine andthe destruction of Ukraine is
massive.
I mean, we're talking about likenearly $500 billion in cost of
rebuilding Ukraine after the war, rebuilding Ukraine after the
(49:46):
war.
Now, the reason I am not ableto stop this is that most of the
, the majority of these missileslike 45, at least close to 45%
of the missiles they're launchedwithin reach of Western
provided weapons.
We're talking about Iskander,the, the north korean ballistic
(50:10):
missiles.
We're also talking about sorry,you're saying within reach or
or beyond within which, yeah, um, they reach.
you know, outside is the rangeof the hymas, but inside the
range of systems like, uh, asnowstorm or the attack camps.
We're talking about more than4,000 missiles launched, where
(50:36):
they have managed to down about81 of them.
Just have a taste of that.
It's minuscule One missile shotdown Intercept.
More than 4,000.
Dana Lewis (50:46):
Yeah, that's minuscule numbers right.
Hans Petter Midttun (50:50):
Incredible shot down in intercept.
Yeah, that's minuscule numbers,right, incredible.
And the reason for that isthere's only one set of air
defense system capable ofstopping them today, and that's
patriot.
Ukraine has urgently andrepeatedly asked for up to 25
systems.
Batteries, um, that havereduced the numbers, recognizing
that they will not be given 25,ask for at least a minimum 7 to
(51:14):
11, and we're not even close tothat number, and the
consequence is, as we see,ukrainian cities and villages
and infrastructure are beingdevastated.
So we not only provide themwith the systems they need to
defend themselves, but we don'tallow them to hit the launches
before the missiles are launched, and I find that highly immoral
(51:35):
.
Dana Lewis (51:37):
So the the Archer um looks like what.
These are air bases that areflying aircraft.
These are our artillery umartillery and rocket launch
platforms.
These are ships at sea in theBlack Sea.
These are also air launchbombers that are coming long
(51:58):
range further away from theUkrainian border and they're
able to launch without evenentering or coming close to
Ukrainian airspace.
Hans Petter Midttun (52:08):
True, there's a wide range of them,
but if you see the statistics,the one they are struggling with
, that is the one launched closeto the border.
From the ballistic missiles,they're downing about 4.5% of
them.
On the missiles which have aballistic trajectory, like S-300
(52:34):
, s-400, used in secondary mode,they're downing 0.6% hardly
nothing.
Dana Lewis (52:43):
And they are close to the Ukrainian border.
The gloves were taken off andthe US administration and others
said okay, you can fire intoRussia, which they have done on
a limited basis, like some 19%of the area but if they give
Ukraine the full right to goafter those S-300s, for example,
would Ukraine be able to hitthem?
Hans Petter Midttun (53:05):
Well, it all goes down to intelligence,
of course, the real-timesituational awareness but they
have.
Ukraine has a far betterintelligence and situational
awareness than Russia have, notonly because of its own
capabilities, but also becauseof the support from the West, of
course, and we've seen that inother strikes that they've only
(53:29):
been enabled by a fantasticintelligence.
They reach fine targets.
I'm not saying it's going to beeasy, because they are mobile.
You need to sort of find thaton the way, you need to track
them and you need to hit themwhile they are setting up to
launch and that's a very, verysmall time given At least you
have that opportunity youthreaten Russian capabilities
(53:52):
and you force Russia to rethinktheir strategy.
We've seen that works already.
I mean, there's 16 airfieldswithin range of the attack camps
and Russia has moved theirairplanes, the fighter jets,
from them and to their field toavoid something they, russia,
thought would be in forcealready a long time ago.
(54:13):
You know the permission tostrike them, so they already
launched some of theircapabilities to their field.
Yeah, but we should not losetrack of all those other targets
left behind, which is allwithin range of the Western
provided weapons.
Dana Lewis (54:30):
Let me ask you two things, because I know time is
short.
The president of Ukraine,zelensky, said yesterday that
they have a new weapon.
There's a lot of speculationabout what he's talking about,
probably some kind of longerrange missile, high speed
ballistic, high-speed ballisticthat could hit Moscow.
Do you think that?
(54:51):
If that's in the cards, doesthat take us to a new level of
conflict?
Hans Petter Midttun (54:58):
I think it's been in the cards for a
long time, to be honest.
I mean, we have seen Ukrainestriking targets at the range
more than 1,800 kilometers.
They have slowly, over the lastyear and a half, expanded their
capability to attack targets inthe depth.
What Slenskine mentioned justdays ago was two things.
(55:18):
First is a new missile Slantdrone with a fuel, bar by bar,
bar turbine jets with a farlonger range of other
capabilities, bettercapabilities than the rather
simple drones that are sendingin these days.
(55:40):
And the second system isballistics.
Yesterday, I think, I noticedthat they have launched or
successfully completed thedevelopment of new ballistic
missile, which means it willhave an even greater impact on
Russia.
Now a ballistic trajectory isso much more difficult to stop
(56:01):
than anything else.
Ukraine expanding its abilityto wage war in Russia and
denying Russia the ability tocontinue its war in Ukraine,
irrespective of Western support.
I think it's a result of thelack of Western support.
(56:24):
Anyone who knows Ukraine knowsthat they will never, ever give
up in the face of russianrepercussion.
Dana Lewis (56:30):
They're fighting for their existence and they
will use whatever meansavailable for them to defeat
russia do you think all thistalk of talk, um in negotiation,
um, there's a lot of politicsin there, but the idea that
ukraine is suddenly gonna sitdown at the table with Russia
(56:51):
and allow Russia to, you know,bite off a chunk of the East,
that Zelensky would give thatkind of ground, or the Ukrainian
(57:12):
public would probably not allowhim to after this much time.
Or do you think they're gettingtired?
Hans Petter Midttun (57:17):
To be honest, there's no doubt that
Ukraine starts being tired.
It's just to start with that,because two and a half years of
war had a huge impact and younotice, I've seen that,
depending on what time of theyear I'm there, you can see that
people are getting tired, butthere's no way Ukraine will give
(57:38):
away any bit of territory.
The reason for that is theyrealise, recognise that this war
is essential for Russia.
They know that Russia, havingdone what it has done, having
played its card, it'sdemonstrated for the world their
imperial ambitions, if you like.
They know that if they acceptnegotiation, accept a peace
(58:04):
agreement, they know that itwill be temporary.
They have made more than 200talks and 20 ceasefires during
the eight years leading up tothe full-scale war From 2014?
.
Yeah from 2014 to 2022.
They only saw that turning intoa full-scale war because Russia
(58:24):
started the war in 2014.
They intend to see through.
They intend to defeat Ukraine1914, they intend to see through
.
They intend to defeat Ukraineand they intend to defeat
Ukraine to do the next step.
Dana Lewis (58:34):
Okay.
So the next step then andthat's my final question to you,
and I might have asupplementary in there and that
is that you've written articlesand criticism saying don't call
it the Russia-Ukraine war, andcriticism saying don't call it
the Russia-Ukraine war.
That badly bends reality.
(58:54):
Why do you say that?
Hans Petter Midttun (58:59):
I'm a little bit frustrated by the
term, to be honest.
I think it's highly misleading.
We sort of belittle a war thatis so much bigger.
We discussed that even when Iwas defense officer with my
colleagues at the time.
We recognized that, based onRussian doctrines, its
statements, its narrative, itsdisinformation, its actions,
(59:21):
this is a much broader war andyou don't have to take my word
for it.
I mean the European Union.
The EU parliament, in September2021, put out extremely
well-prepared documentsdiscussing the European Union
and its member states andconcluded that Russia is waging
(59:52):
a hybrid war against theEuropean Union and its member
states.
It's documented in its actionacross the United States and
Europe, everything from sabotageto liquidations, to terror.
There's a long list of Russianaggression already taking place.
This is already a much broaderconfrontation and what's
(01:00:14):
happening in the West is exactlywhat happened in Ukraine from
2014 to 2022.
It's exactly the same war.
It's worth mentioning andactually it's crucial to
recognize that Russia has notdefined Ukraine as its enemy.
It's actually explicitly saidthat Ukraine is not its enemy.
(01:00:38):
It has said the West, theWestern democracies, are just
that.
So the fact is, in its doctrine, it's in its actions, in its
statements, everything is done.
It's related to NATO, the USand Europe, but we have
belittled the war because it'sso much easier to discuss and
(01:01:01):
find solutions to a small warthan what the reality is.
Absolutely, it's a war fordummies.
Dana Lewis (01:01:10):
That's why Trump says he can end it within a week
of his presidency if he's backin the White House.
Hans Petter Midttun (01:01:16):
It has had that and it's absolutely
misleading.
But, that said, I'm not tooimpressed by how President Biden
goes about solving this wareither.
There's one key message I thinkpeople need to understand.
If you go back to 24 Februaryand the time after, you heard
(01:01:38):
all heads of state saying thatthis is a Russia-Ukraine war.
Ukraine is not a member of NATOand therefore is not eligible
for NATO collective defence.
All perfectly true.
The only problem with this isnone of them mention NATO's core
essential task number two.
(01:01:58):
Core essential task number two,that is, crisis management.
Crisis management is, to use apicture, is when you see there's
a fire in the, your neighbor'shouse and you decide to go, how
to put it out before itincreases in intensity and
spreads to your.
That's crisis management and anative study concept until june
(01:02:22):
2022.
After the first world warstarted said, in case of war or
conflicts which threaten thesecurity of the alliance, the
alliance will use a mix ofpolitical and military tools to
stop it.
Dana Lewis (01:02:39):
That war we're seeing today is exactly that war
, but no one NATO nor Biden norany heads of states talk about
(01:02:59):
that core, essential task crisismanagement, supporting the
freedom of Ukraine and stoppingRussia from advancing further,
and bolstering NATO forces inthe Baltics and elsewhere ready
if Russia wants to take anotherstep, whether they've done that
effectively or not there's a lotof people would debate that.
Hans Petter Midttun (01:03:23):
Well, it's not even open to debate, to be
honest, because before Russiadecided to do the full-scale
invasion 24th of February 22,they did 17 years of violation
of the international law.
They did 17 years of testing.
As a result, and they concludedthat we were not up to doing
(01:03:44):
what was our strategic ambitionto do crisis management.
Before they attacked, they musthave considered the opportunity
that NATO would intervene,because that was the ambition of
NATO.
They concluded that NATO wouldnot do that and by doing that,
(01:04:05):
they actually proven that NATOdeterrence do not work, that
they've actually proven thatNATO deterrence do not work.
We are fighting an uphillbattle to convince Russia that
when we say that we intend todefend every inch of the NATO
territory, that they believe us.
At the moment, I don't thinkthey believe us Because the
actions.
Dana Lewis (01:04:22):
That's a dangerous.
That's a dangerous, extremelydangerous.
Hans Petter Midttun (01:04:25):
It's extremely dangerous.
Dana Lewis (01:04:27):
Hans, you're a former Norwegian Navy commander,
I think.
Once a commander always adanger, extremely dangerous.
It's extremely dangerous.
Hans, you're a mid-toon, aformer Norwegian Navy commander,
I think.
Once a commander, always acommander, former naval attaché
for Norway to, among otherplaces, including NATO and
Ukraine.
Thank you so much for yourthoughts and time, sir.
I appreciate it.
Hans Petter Midttun (01:04:43):
Thank you so much for having me.
It was great talking to you,Dan.
Dana Lewis (01:04:46):
And that's our backstory for this week.
No-transcript.
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