December 14, 2023 • 41 mins
Are you ready to cross the threshold of time and enter the world of Ancient Greece during the tumultuous political shifts post-Pericles' rule? I invite you to join us on this journey, where we scrutinize the uprising on Lesbos and its profound implications on Spartan maneuvers and Athens' retaliation. As power vacuums arise in Athens, new intriguing figures such as Nikies and Cleon rise to prominence. We delve into the fascinating personas of these men and how Cleon, a successful demagogue, secures his influence. We also shed light on the essence of a demagogue in the realm of Ancient Greek politics and its enduring sway.
Strap in as we navigate through the strategic negotiations and invasion preparations post the Olympic festival. We'll also analyse the Mytileneans desperate efforts to garner support from the Peloponnesian League. Watch as events on Lesbos unfold with the Athenians establishing a camp, and the Mytileneans strive to unite the island under their leadership. Lastly, brace yourselves as we explore the chilling decision of the Athenians in the wake of the failed Mytilenean revolt - a decision that echoes through the annals of history as an epoch-defining moment in the landscape of the Peloponnesian War.
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Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:15):
Next day, however, there was a sudden change of
feeling and people began tothink how cruel and how
unprecedented such a decisionwas, to destroy not only the
guilty but the entire populationof the state Thucydides.
Hello, I'm Mark Sellick andwelcome back to Casting through
Ancient Greece, episode 80, theFate of Mitalini.
(00:37):
We've now finished with theevents of the third year of the
war and, as you have seen, a lothas been taking place in this
early stage of the conflict.
We saw that a resolution hadbeen reached in the siege that
had been taking place at Potidia.
Both sides probably relievedthat this had taken place.
However, the political classand Athens had been displeased
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with the outcome, believing theycould have secured a more
complete victory there.
Though, even with thisresolution and Athens regaining
control of Potidia, much of theChalcedides were still hostile
towards Athens.
This had seen a fresh offensiveopened by Athens to attempt to
secure their control in theregion.
However, we would witness oneof the early examples of lighter
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troops being able to defeat theheavier armed hotlights.
Athens would be forced to fallback into Potidia, though would
retain control of the city.
Last episode, we also saw thefirst naval engagement that
would take place between Spartaand Athens.
This would take place in theCorinthian Gulf, not far from
the Athenian port in the regionat Neopactus.
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It would begin as aPeloponnesian operation and
would be launched with citiesfriendly to the Peloponnesians
seeking assistance in expandingtheir influence.
This would also have theintention of removing Athenian
influence, a prospect Corinthwas very enthusiastic about,
since they held a lot ofinterests in the area.
However, the Peloponnesianfleet would be split and not act
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as a united force, which wouldsee the land offensive and the
west fail, while it would alsoprovide Formio, who was in
command of a small Athenianfleet in the region, a chance to
sail out and challenge thePeloponnesian actions.
This would end up seeing twonaval engagements take place.
The first would be against theCorinthians and Sacconians who
had sailed from Corinth afterthe Spartan force had already
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arrived on the west coast.
Formio, although outnumberedmore than two to one, would
engage this fleet as he saw theywould be laden down with extra
troops and supplies to supportthe land campaign.
This would see his fleet havethe advantage of speed and
manoeuvrability.
The resulting battle would bean overwhelming victory for the
Athenians, though Sparta,withdrawing from their defeat on
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land, would meet back up withthe defeated Corinthians and
Sacconians, where preparationsfor an assault on the Athenians
was being planned.
Now that the wholePeloponnesian fleet had united,
this second attempt would getoff to a promising start, with
them having essentially defeatedhalf the Athenian fleet in one
manoeuvre, though thePeloponnesians act in splitting
their forces would once againlead to a disastrous result.
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With a little luck and beingable to focus on a single ship
that separated from anotherdetachment, the Athenians were
able to inflict panic into theoverconfident Peloponnesians,
which would end up spreading tothe main fleet, while the
imminent arrival of Athenianreinforcements would see the
Peloponnesians call off anycontinued effort against
Neopactors.
The Spartan commanders weredesperate to deliver some
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success for the year and wouldattempt an ambitious assault on
Athens' own home port at thePiraeus.
Though being late in thecampaigning season, the weather
and perhaps some nerves on thecommander's part would see this
attempt foiled, also bringing aclose to operations for 429 BC.
For this episode, we'll beheading into 428 BC, where in
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Athens, the political landscapeand its dynamic had changed.
The death of Pericles theprevious year would bring to a
close an era of Athenianpolitics that had been dominated
by him.
New figures would now emerge todrive Athenian policy forward
through the war.
Our focus today will be on afresh rebellion within the
Athenian Empire taking place onLesbos, which would also
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motivate Spartan actions for theyear.
Much of our focus will also beon how Athens would respond to
this revolt, while Athenianpolitics was adjusting to the
departure of Pericles.
It is probably no surprise.
With the departure of Periclesfrom the pages of history, great
change would occur in thepolitical landscape in Athens.
Pericles had influencedAthenian policies for decades
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and had only very brief absencesduring his career.
One can ask, given theinfluence of his policies, was
there someone else who couldhave picked up from where he
left off to continue Athensthrough the war?
There had been part of hisinner circle.
Well, for the first part of theanswer to this question, we can
probably turn to the greattragedy of the plague.
This had laid many low,including a number of Pericles'
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associates.
Perhaps his natural successormay have been among these men.
However, the acidities providesthe second part of our answer
with those who still remained.
He would tell us that those whowere aligned with Pericles were
more on an equal level witheach other.
This would see that one of themwas not able to gain the
support of the rest and a levelof unity that Pericles had been
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able to command.
With this being the situation,now politics and Athens would
begin to open up for otherfigures that would have factions
forming behind them.
The two main influential figuresthat would emerge to the
forefront after Pericles' deathwould be Nikies and Cleon, and
we would be told that these twomen were very different in
character to each other.
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Nikies, we are told, had thequalities of what we could
describe as a gentleman today,with him leading his life with
strict attention to virtue.
Cleon, on the other hand, isoften described as a warmonger,
a demagogue and a vulgarian.
This term, demagogue, is onethat will start to see more and
more as the years go by.
It is the term used to describea political leader who seeks
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support by appealing to thedesires and prejudices of
ordinary people rather than byusing rational argument.
So it is probably no surprisethat Cleon had gained influence
through his skills of being ableto appeal to the masses by
addressing their emotions andusing rhetoric to back up his
policies and claims.
On the other hand, we would betold that, due to the nature of
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Nikies, he would use his wealthto gain influence on his side of
the house, plutarch would tellus that he would fund dramas,
sporting events, festivals andbuilding projects to gain
popularity.
Although these men had theirdifferences, they also had some
similarities in their backgroundand thoughts on policy.
Both would be from this new andupcoming class of politicians
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who were not from a nobleupbringing but had risen in
importance through economicsuccess.
Nikies had become wealthythrough the business of renting
slaves to be used in the silvermines at Lorien, while Cleon
would gain his through a tannerybusiness he inherited from his
father.
When it came to the currentsituation in Athens, neither men
favoured peace negotiationswith Sparta and both would seek
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policies for winning the war inthe coming years.
This would see that in thecurrent crisis, both had
virtually identical interests,with Donald Kagan outlining
these the Empire must be keptsafe for Athens, the Athenians
must be imbued with a spirit tocarry on the war, resources must
be husband and new ones found,and some strategy must be
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developed to resume offensiveoperations.
Kagan also suggests that,although they would head
different factions, there is noreason to believe that both men
were not cooperating to a largedegree in these first few years
after Pericles' death.
The interests would see thatthere would be motivations to do
so and to outmanoeuvre anyfaction with interests counter
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to theirs.
So now that we have a briefunderstanding of how the
political landscape was lookingafter the departure of Pericles,
let's now look to the newcrisis that would develop for
Athens within their empire, asthe war continued into 428 BC.
The campaigning season of 428would begin much the same as the
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previous years, with Spartalaunching an invasion where they
would once again return toAttica.
Athens would treat thisinvasion like the others,
remaining behind their walls,with only the cavalry coming out
to harass the lighter troopsfrom massing to lay waste to the
areas close to the Athenianwalls.
The Peloponnesians, led onceagain by Archedamus, would
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remain in Attica for just undera month, ravaging the areas not
yet touched and those showingsigns of regrowth.
This invasion seems to have notlasted as long as the previous
years, but if Athens thoughtthat they had finally caught
themselves a break, they wouldsoon be brought back to the
realities of this conflict.
While the Peloponnesians wereravaging Attica, and even before
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, the island of Lesbos wasconspiring a revolt from the
Athenian Empire.
This would cause great stresswithin Athens if Lesbos broke
away.
It was one of the biggestallies, along with Chios, within
the empire that still retainedtheir autonomy and supplied a
fleet to the empire rather thantribute.
This plot for revolt would beginin the most powerful city of
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the island of Lesbos, that ofMitalini, who had an oligarchic
government.
Some other lesser city-stateson the island, also thought to
be oligarchic in nature, wouldalso follow Mitalini's lead,
though one democratic town onthe North Coast had its own
independent policies and hadsometimes been hostile with the
others.
The preparations for thisrevolt had also begun before the
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campaigning season of 428 hadstarted.
Mitalini had been constructingdefensive walls, preparing their
harbour and increasing the sizeof their navy.
They would also use their tradelink to the Black Sea to secure
increased stores of grain andpurchase the use of mercenary
bowmen.
However, these would take timeto arrive.
With all these preparations inmotion, it would only be a
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matter of time before theirscheme would get out.
Mitalini had detractors thenearby island of Tenedos and the
democratic elements on Lesbos,while there would also be
dissenters within their own cityas well.
Through these channels, athenswould learn of what was being
put in motion on Lesbos.
With the cat out of the bag,mitalini would be forced to act
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even though they had notcompleted all the preparations
they would have liked.
Once Athens caught wind of whatwas being arranged on Lesbos,
the Ossidides would point outthat they did not want to
believe such an enterprise wasin the works.
He says that they wanted tobelieve what they had been told
was not true.
Their hardships for the war andplague seeing them not want to
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have to deal with another crisis.
However, if Athens did nothing,this would be a huge blow to
the city that was running low onmoney and men to man the fleet.
Lesbos was a source of manpowerfor the fleet, while they were
also an untapped resource inmoney, since they had not yet
been forced to provide tribute.
An embassy would be arranged tomake for Lesbos to get to the
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bottom of what Mitalini was upto.
They were able to confirm thata conspiracy on Lesbos was
underway and the Athenian envoyshad failed to convince Mitalini
to abandon it.
Athens now had another crisisto deal with and looked to take
the initiative to try and stampit out as soon as possible.
A fleet of 40 ships was makingits preparations to sail around
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the Peloponnes, though theywould now be diverted to Lesbos.
The fleet had been informed ifthey made haste to cross the
Aegean.
They might well surprise theisland, as a religious festival
was underway that saw much ofthe population involved.
However, the Athenian planswere reported back to Mitalini.
Being a democracy, it can bevery difficult keeping plans
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secret when so many people needto be present to vote on actions
to be undertaken.
Back in Mitalini, arrangementsfor the festival were abandoned,
and the defensive works thathad not yet been completed were
manned.
When the Athenian fleet didarrive, they quickly learnt that
their arrival had been expected, so they would not be able to
surprise the island intosubmission.
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Instead, they now providedorders for Mitalini to take down
its walls and hand over itsfleet, though these orders were
ignored, and now the Atheniansdeclared hostilities over the
city, a half-hearted effort tochallenge the Athenian fleet was
deployed in the harbour, butthe Athenians were able to drive
them towards the shore.
With the situation developingas it was, the commanders of
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Mitalini saw what talks with theAthenians, where they looked to
negotiate some sort of truce tosave their ships.
It would appear Athens was in aposition of strength here, but
the Zedites would tell us thatthey would accept an armistice
they, mitalini, was proposing,the reason here being that the
Athenian commanders did notthink they were in a strong
position to take the rest of theisland and would need
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additional forces.
This would give Mitalini somebreathing room now that their
plan for revolt had been foundout before they had made their
preparations.
To try and buy themselves somemore time, they would now turn
to diplomatic talks.
Representatives would be sentto Athens to try and convince
them of their innocentintentions and seek to have the
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Athenian fleet recalled, thoughit would appear they did not
expect these talks to befavourable Beyond the time it
may buy them.
So while this mission wasundertaken, a secret envoy was
sent to Sparta to try andnegotiate assistance.
One of the motivations forrebelling against Athens was
apparently so that Mitalinicould unite the entire island
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under their leadership, though,while part of the Athenian
Empire, this sort of policy wasdiscouraged by Athens not
wanting larger power unitsforming within their league.
However, they would also seekSparta's help, where they would
present their officialmotivations for wanting to
revolt.
Mitalini had previouslyattempted to join the
Peloponnesian League before thewar had broken out, but Sparta
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had refused, this being duringthe period that both Athens and
Sparta were looking to keep ineffect the provisions of the 30
years peace, mitalini would endup sending two separate envoys
to Sparta to try and secureSpartan military aid.
However, these attempts wouldbe met with a somewhat air of
indifference.
It's thought here that Spartawas not very enthusiastic of
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becoming involved in supportinga revolt across the other side
of the Aegean.
Firstly, the initialencouragement for revolt had not
come from Sparta but from theBiosians, who shared their
common Aeolian connection.
Plus, after the previous year'snaval engagements against
Athens, this probably would havenot seen them too enthusiastic
about the prospect of meetingAthens on the water again.
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Though even with this, theSpartans did not want to dismiss
a chance at undermining theAthenian alliance.
So they would tell the envoysto travel to Olympia, and at the
completion of the festivaltaking place there they could
put forward their case to therest of the Peloponnesians who
would be in attendance.
Sparta were to get involved insuch a demanding operation that
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would divert resources away fromany mainland venture, they
needed to make sure that therest of the Peloponnesians would
be on board.
After the Olympic festival hadbeen completed, the Middoleneans
would be given the opportunityto address the various members
of the Peloponnesian League thatwere gathered in the sacred
precinct of Zeus.
The envoy from Middolene had ahuge task ahead of him to
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convince the Peloponnesians thatthey should come to their aid.
The envoy would put to the sideMiddolene's ambition for
control on Lesbos and wouldinstead focus on the ideals that
Sparta had supposedly gone towar with Athens over the Cedars
would have the envoy deliverquite a long speech in
attempting to do this.
During the speech, he wouldpoint out that the Peloponnesian
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intervention in Lesbos wouldserve the larger cause of Greek
freedom and the aims of thePeloponnesian League.
The envoy would also speakabout Athens' encroachment on
the autonomy of the variousallies, while Middolene would be
the next victim if their revoltshould fail.
These points would directlyaddress the justified reason
that Sparta would go to war forthe freedom of all Greeks.
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He would then try to point outthat the timing for action in
the Aegean was perfect, whereThysedides would have the envoy
say Never has there been such anopportunity.
Owing to the plague and theexpenses that they have incurred
, the Athenians are in a stateof exhaustion.
Part of their fleet is sailingaround your coasts and the rest
is engaged in blockading us.
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It is improbable that they haveany ships in reserve, and if
you invade for the second timethis summer, with naval and
military forces at the same time.
They will either be unable toresist your fleet or will have
to withdraw their own from yourshores and from ours.
It's interesting to see in thisargument put forward that aid
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for the Mitalenians was notsought through direct military
action on Lesbos.
Instead, they were proposingfor a combined naval and land
operation to be directed atAttica.
This prospect would be muchmore palatable to the
Peloponnesians and especiallySparta.
This would mean that they wouldnot need to engage in a
long-range naval campaign thatwould have been seen as very
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unappealing.
It seems very likely thatMitaleni knew the Spartans'
hesitancy at engaging inoperations deep in the Athenian
Empire.
So look to a proposal thatwould have been the best chance
at succeeding.
The main strategy in what wasput forward would be to attempt
to draw off the Athenian forcesfrom Lesbos so that Mitaleni
would be able to continue theirplans for a control of the
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island.
Obviously, to show that thiswas not all about their
predicament, they would alsohighlight how the Peloponnesian
actions would also aid their ownsituation.
Then, to complete their speechto the Peloponnesians, the envoy
would try and convince themthat the war would not be
decided in Attica, but rather inthe wider Athenian Empire,
while they would also reinforcethe Spartans' justified reason
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for war in the first place.
But if you give us your wholehearted support, you will gain
for yourself a state which has alarge navy, which is a thing
you need most.
You will be in a much betterposition for breaking the power
of the Athenians by detachingher allies from her, since the
others will be greatlyencouraged to come over to you,
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and you will clear yourselvesthe charge that has been made
against you of not helping thosewho revolt.
Once you come forward in therole of liberators, you will
find that your strength in waris enormously increased.
We have outlined the mainpoints made in the address given
by the envoy from Mitaleni,though the Cedades would spend
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several pages outlining what wassaid.
Nevertheless, the arguments putforward would be enough for the
Spartans and Peloponnesians toagree to the proposals put
forward.
The Mitalenians and theirallies would be welcomed into
the Peloponnesian League, whilepreparations would now be made
to launch another invasion intoAttica.
The various allies would beordered to gather two thirds of
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their forces at the Ismus, whilepreparations were made to haul
the Triremes to carry the forcesover the Corinthian Ismus,
where they could then belaunched into the Seronic Gulf
and sailed directly into Attica.
In these preparations, we wouldhear that the Spartans were
energetic.
However, their allies woulddrag their feet, as it was the
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season for harvesting theircrops and they would have
thought that their militaryobligations had been already
completed for this season.
While these envoys were offattempting to gain Spartan help,
actions had been taking placeon Lesbos.
As we had seen, the Atheniansdid not press their attack on
Mitaleni, as they thought theylacked the strength to sustain a
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campaign against the wholeisland, though, after the naval
action that had taken place, theAthenians had landed on the
island and established a camp.
There was perhaps a lull whileMitaleni was having its talks
with the Athenians, but with thefailure of these, it then seems
they would attempt actionagainst the Athenians before
reinforcements could arrive.
We would hear that the forcesof Mitaleni would come out from
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their city and attack theAthenians camped outside here.
They would get the better ofthe Athenians, though did not
follow up this victory WithAthenians.
They had also viewed themselvesnot strong enough to take on
the Athenians offensively.
It would appear they wereawaiting the outcome of the
talks with the Peloponnesians,but they could either receive
reinforcements themselves or seethe Athenians drawn away
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through an attack in Attica.
It seems Mitaleni was moreinterested in targeting the
other cities of the island forthe purpose of uniting all under
their leadership, rather thantaking the Athenians on.
So instead of continuing theirattacks on the Athenians, they
retreated back into Mitaleni.
This would allow the Atheniansto recover and, after they saw
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no new attacks would come theirway, they would turn their minds
to preparing to defend againstrenewed attacks by establishing
themselves in stronger positionson the island.
This would see the Athenianscall upon allies to sail to the
island to reinforce them.
Once this was done, theAthenians were then able to
establish two fortificationsoutside Mitaleni that would
block the use of the port there.
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However, they were still farfrom an overwhelming force, with
the Athenians only managing toexert control in the areas
immediately outside theirpositions.
This would become apparent withcontinued operations being
undertaken by the two factionsof the island.
Back in Athens, they had becomeaware of the Peloponnesians'
plan to invade Attica again inan attempt to draw off ships
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from Lesbos.
So while the Peloponnesianswere putting their operation
into action, the Athenians wouldplan their response.
They had judged that theSpartans assumed that the
Athenians were in a weak stateand unable to react in multiple
theatres.
This was a point that Mitalenihad used to persuade the
Peloponnesians into supportingthem.
Athens looked to show thePeloponnesians that they were
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still as strong as ever.
To do this, they would notrecall any ships from Lesbos,
but would still manage to put tosea another 100 triremes.
Athens did not have the rollersto support such a feat, so many
of the hoplite class andresident aliens were put into
service as rollers.
The fleet would not be the samequality they were in the
previous years, but its purposewas to give the impression of
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strength.
The Athenian fleet would belaunched and its operations
would be directed at thePeloponnesian coastline, raiding
coastal areas at will.
This would all take place whilethe Peloponnesians were
deploying themselves back withinAttica.
The Athenian effort, coupledwith other factors, would see
Sparta realize that Athens wasnot as weak as they had been led
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to believe.
Though the failure of some oftheir allies to assemble on the
Isthmus for the campaign, aswell as a separate Athenian
fleet of 30 ships that had beendeployed before the troubles on
Lesbos, would see that thesecond invasion of Attica was
called off, the Atheniansremained in their positions on
Lesbos, but Middolene was stillable to launch attacks on other
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cities of the island.
Athens was not able to do muchto help the democratic cities of
Lesbos, so further action wasneeded.
Word was sent back to Athens tosend reinforcements so that the
army on Lesbos could starttaking action against Middolene.
Athens, now free of thePeloponnesian invasion, would
send 100 hoplites, commanded byParshis.
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To further highlight the severeshortage of roles in Athens,
the citadiers would tell us thatthe hoplites themselves would
row the triremes for the journeyto Lesbos.
Once arriving, the Athenianswere now strong enough to
operate outside of their camps.
They would construct a wallaround Middolene, completely
surrounding it on land.
A number of forts would also bebuilt along the wall that would
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be garrisoned by the hoplites.
With the completion of thiswall, middolene was now
completely under siege.
The navy had been able toblockade the city from the sea,
but now they were closed in byland, unable to launch their
attacks on the other cities theyhad previously been free to do.
By this stage, the winter of 428was now coming on, which would
see the closing of anothercampaigning season.
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During this period, athenswould also take measures to
secure more funds to continuefueling their war effort, ships
would be sent out to a number ofcities where a direct tax was
imposed on these cities.
This system of direct taxationwas not a common occurrence in
these times, even though for usit seems quite normal.
The Greeks saw this as anattack on their autonomy and
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property rights.
Often, these types of taxeswould first start out in
response to funding a crisiswhich would normally be a major
war.
For example, in modern times,the British would first
introduce an income tax to helppay for their wars against
Napoleon, while here inAustralia our income tax would
be in response to the FirstWorld War.
However, these impositionduring 428 BC would see that
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some cities would respond in ahostile nature.
With this, it is telling us,one ill-fated mission on the far
eastern end of the AthenianEmpire, in the Carriot lands,
where just about all were lostDuring the winter.
Sparta would also be active.
Although they had withdrawnTraumatica due to the Athenian
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raids on their coastlines, theywere planning for a renewed
effort for 427.
This effort also had theintention of assisting Midalini
directly, and a messenger fromSparta had been sent across the
Aegean to Lesbos, who was ableto slip into the city past the
Athenian blockade.
The Sparta do arrived was namedAlcidius and had come to advise
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Midalini of the Peloponnesiansattention to invade Attica once
again in 427, while a fleet of42 ships would also be sent to
Lesbos to assist Midalini.
This news brought by Alcidiuswould also encourage the city
and were now motivated to holdout against the Athenian siege.
With the coming of the campaignseason of 427, the
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Peloponnesians would send offtheir fleet to Lesbos, while
also invading Attica with theirland forces.
The intention here was toprevent Athens from sending out
additional ships to respond tothe Peloponnesian fleet by
keeping their forces in Athensbusy.
It would also appear thatArchidamus, who had been leading
the Peloponnesians in theprevious years, was now ill and
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dying or had already died, asthis time around the invasion
was not led by him and would endup hearing that his son, aegis,
would come to succeed him laterin 427.
This dual theatre operation bySparta would not end up
achieving the results that hadbeen intended.
The Peloponnesian army inAttica would devastate the
countryside, with this being oneof the worst years that Attica
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had endured.
The Peloponnesians would stayon longer than normal as there
had been awaiting news of thefleet's progress on Lesbos,
since it was their objective totie down the Athenians and
prevent them to launch theirships into the Aegean.
Though, with no news arrivingand the army now having expended
all its supplies, they wereforced to march back for the
Peloponnes.
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These attendees would tell usthat the Peloponnesian fleet had
sailed around the Peloponnesbefore heading into the Aegean
with caution.
They were very aware that if anAthenian fleet caught them on
the sea, they were probablygoing to be severely unmatched.
They were able to avoid anycontact with the Athenians and
had reached Delos, but onceleaving and arriving at the
(27:16):
island of Icarus, they wouldlearn that Mitalini had
surrendered to the Athenians onLesbos.
Once obtaining more informationon what had taken place, the
Peloponnesians now discussedwhat actions they should take.
Proposals for continuing theoffensive operations would be
argued, with one seeking to havethe fleet continue to Lesbos
and take the Athenians bysurprise.
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Another sought to insteaddirect the fleet in support of
the Oenian cities, looking tobreak away from the Athenian
Empire.
This would undermine theAthenians' income in these
regions, while it could alsospark a larger rebellion once it
was seen Athens did not rulethe seas.
In addition to this, diplomaticconnections could also then be
opened up with the Persians.
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However, the Spartan commanderwas not convinced of these
arguments and instead wanted tosail the fleet back to the
Peloponnes as quickly aspossible, before an Athenian
fleet would be encountered.
Before setting back out, theSpartans would damage their
reputation with some cities inthe Aegean that had looked on
them favorably when they startedexecuting prisoners they had
(28:20):
taken during their travelsthrough the region.
They would release the restonce becoming aware of what
their actions were doing, butthe damage had been done.
With the fleet now lighteningtheir load, they made their way
back to the Greek mainland.
The Athenians would end upgetting word of the
Peloponnesians' position andwould give chase, though the
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Peloponnesians would avoidmaking land and risk the open
seas until reaching thePeloponnes.
By doing this, they were ableto avoid a sea battle with the
Athenians giving up the chase.
The slow progress of thePeloponnesian fleet when they
had set out to support Lesboswould see that they would fail
to reach the island to supportmiddle Oenian time.
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The full blockade of the cityhad meant that no supplies were
able to make it into thedefenders.
Seeing that a timely responsefrom the Peloponnesians was
needed, though, mitolini wouldreach a point of crisis with
their food supply.
Before they could arrive, anadvisor from Sparta was present
in the city and, seeing thedesperate state of the situation
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, had proposed a desperate planto attempt to break the siege.
This would call for the peopleof Mitolini to breach the
Athenian wall that had beenbuilt around the city.
However, mitolini lacked theappropriate numbers of hoplites
for this task.
It's then here the Cittadistells us the curious step of
providing hoplite equipment tothe lower classes within the
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city, this taking place in alogarchic system.
Once all the people had beenarmed, they would then seek to
be treated on equal terms,wanting an equal share in the
food rations.
In this crisis would develop amove to democratic principles,
as we are seen with Athens'development, once a group of
people become important to acity's survival or prosperity,
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more concessions politically, tothe group were needed.
If these demands were not met,this group threatened to come to
terms with the Athenians andsurrender the city.
With this internal crisis nowdeveloping, the government of
Mitolini had seen their positionas hopeless.
Extending concessions to thelower classes would completely
dismantle their oligarchicsystem, though they were also in
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no position to prevent thesurrender of the city.
So it was determined that itshould be the current government
who should come to terms withthe Athenians.
This, they thought, wouldafford them the best outcome.
So, with the Peloponnesianstill and the Aegean, mitolini
would surrender to the Athenians.
The Cittadis would record theterms of surrender as follows
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Athens was to have the right toact as she saw fit with regard
to the people of Mitolini andthe army was allowed to enter
the city.
The Mitolinians were to sendrepresentatives to Athens to put
their case and until theserepresentatives returned,
parshis was to undertake not toimprison or enslave or kill any
of the population.
Once Parshis had returned toLesbos from his pursuit of the
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Peloponnesian fleet, he would goabout reducing the various
cities on the island who hadbeen allied to Mitolini.
Then, when back in the sea tothe revolt, he would send back
to Athens those he saw asresponsible for the revolt, as
well as the Spartan advisor.
From here, athens would thenlook to decide on the fate of
Mitolini.
In the wake of their failedrevolt from the Empire, the
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context that the considerationsfor Mitalini's fate would be on
the backdrop of Atheniansexperience after the four years
of the Peloponnesian war, theyhad suffered invasions of their
lands year after year, whilealso having to contend with the
plague and its resurgence.
Now, one of the more importantallies had attempted to revolt
when the financial situation inthe empire was becoming tight.
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Not only this, but thePeloponnesians had been able to
penetrate deep within the Aegean, where Athens had seen itself
as holding naval supremacy.
This would probably see many ofthose ready to debate the issue
on Mitalini being afraid andangry of Athens' current
situation.
Before any talks on thePinnocks in Athens would take
place, these emotions would behighlighted with their initial
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actions.
They would put the Spartan whohad been advising the Mitalians
to death without a trial.
This had even occurred after hehad offered to persuade the
Spartans to abandon their siegeof Plataea in exchange for his
life.
However, after the execution ofthe Spartan advisor, debate in
Athens on Mitalini's fate woulddevelop.
(32:47):
We don't get any of thespeeches that would be delivered
through Thucydides, but wewould hear that, in their
current mood, they would decidethat not only are those who were
in their custody should be putto death, but all the men of
Mitalini as well.
They would then make slays ofall the women and children of
the city.
Thucydides would also point outthat the extreme nature of this
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decision would result.
Due to the revolt being longpremeditated and due to Mitalini
not being a subject state likemany others within the empire,
with this decision being made, atri-ring would be sent out at
once to take these orders toParches still on Lesbos to carry
out at once.
However, the next day, it wouldseem, some had had time to cool
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their emotions over thesituation around Mitalini.
This would see that theModerates within Athens were
able to see a special assemblybeing called to reconsider the
decision made the previous day.
This would see, in Thucydides'account, two figures put forward
on each side of the new debatethat of Cleon, who we have met
before, and Diodotus, who wouldbe representing a good
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proportion of the Moderatesviews.
However, there would be othersthat would address the assembly,
it appears.
These two, however, would be onthe far ends of the debate.
The Athenian Assembly was nowconvened to decide the fate of
rebellious Mitalini.
Cleon, the Athenian statesmanwho Thucydides describes as
being the most violent of thecitizens, argued for the
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complete destruction of Mitalinias a deterrent to other
rebellious allies.
He believed that leniency wouldencourage more uprisings and
that a harsh response wasnecessary to maintain Athenian
dominance.
Diodotus, on the other hand,spoke in favour of a more
moderate approach.
He argued against punishing theentire population of Mitalini,
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suggesting that only thosedirectly involved in the
rebellion should face severeconsequences, diodotus believing
that Athens should demonstratemercy and wisdom in its
governance to foster long-termloyalty among its allies.
The debate was intense, withemotions running high among the
Athenian citizens.
Cleon's argument appealed tothe fear of further revolts,
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emphasising the need for astrong and decisive message.
Diodotus, however, appealed tothe reason and compassion,
urging the assembly to considerthe potential negative
consequences of a harsh response.
I must point out that thisdebate is represented by quite
lengthy speeches in Thucydides'account, and I have just looked
(35:21):
to sum up the main points of howeach man spoke.
If you are interested inchecking out the full debate,
you can find it beginning inThucydides' history of the
Peloponnesian War, at Chapter 3,paragraph 36.
In the end, the AthenianAssembly narrowly voted in
favour of Diodotus' proposal.
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The decision was to spare themajority of Mitalini's
population and execute onlythose directly responsible for
the revolt.
However, even this action washarsh and arbitrary, as the men
that Parshers had sent back toAthens were done so on his own
judgement of their involvement.
No trial in Athens would beheld for this roughly thousand
(36:03):
guilty Mitalians, and they wouldbe put to death.
This debate over the fate ofMitalini reflected the ongoing
tension in Athenian politicsbetween a more aggressive and
punitive approach, representedby figures like Cleon, and a
more measured and diplomaticstance, exemplified by voices
like Diodotus.
It showcased the complexitiesof decision making in times of
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war and the moral dilemmas facedby powerful states in handling
rebellious subjects.
So a ship was dispatched inhaste to deliver the news and
prevent the previous order oftotal destruction from being
carried out.
The first ship carrying theorders for the death of all the
men and enslavement of the restof the population had a full
(36:47):
day's head start.
To help motivate, the rowers ofthe second ship sent out the
Mitalian envoys in Athens,provided food and drink to them
all and promised them a rewardif they could make it to Lesbos
before the first ship.
The second ship would set outat a fast pace as they left the
Piraeus and out into the Aegean.
They would refuse to take stopsfor eating and sleep in a
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number of the usual locationsalong the way.
Even though they took thesemeasures and had no wind against
them, when they came uponLesbos they could see that the
first ship had already arrived,however, the second crew still
put on land and rushed toMitalini where, fortunately, the
decree had only just arrived.
A short time before them, theywere able to interrupt Parshis,
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who was in the process ofreading out the initial decree,
and were able to prevent themassacre from unfolding.
The fate of Mitalini had restedon a razor's edge, and by so
little did they escape theirdanger.
So the people who were still inMitolini had escaped death and
enslavement, but Athens wouldnow take measures that would see
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that the city and the areas ofcontrol had come under their
influence.
The defensive works of the citywere taken down and the land
was divided up and handed overto the Athenian shareholders who
, the Mitolinians, would have topay rent to.
Mitolini and the towns it hadpreviously controlled were now
all under Athenian influence,this seeing this previously
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somewhat autonomous city in theAthenian Empire now a subject
state of Athens.
For this episode, I had for themost part decided to follow this
developing story of the revolton Lesbos to its conclusion.
This saw us move through 428 BCand into 427, where the revolt
had come to an end andMitolinians fate was decided.
(38:35):
Next series episode will beremaining in these years, as we
will be returning to thesituation of Plataea.
As you may remember, sparta hadmarched onto this small polis
during the invasion of 429 andhad placed it under siege.
Now we shall return to thesiege and look what was taking
place and look at how the siegewould end and what this would
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mean for Plataea and Athens,while we will also be looking at
some civil unrest that would bedeveloping on an island that we
had featured when looking atthe road to war.
Thank you, everyone for yourcontinued support and a big
shout out to all those who havefound some value in the series
and have been supported onPatreon and other various ways.
Your contribution has trulyhelped me grow the series.
(39:16):
If you have also found somevalue in the show and wish to
support the series, you can headto
wwwCastingThranchingGreececomand click on the support the
series button, where you candiscover many ways to extend
your support to helping theseries grow.
Be sure to stay connected andupdate on what's happening in
the series and join me over onFacebook or Instagram at Casting
to RanchantGreece or on Twitterat CastingGreece, and be sure
(39:39):
to subscribe to the series overat the Casting to RanchantGreece
website.
I hope you can join me nexttime when we continue the
narrative in the series.
Next day, however, there was a sudden change of
feeling and people began tothink how cruel and how
unprecedented such a decisionwas, to destroy not only the
guilty but the entire populationof the state Thucydides.
Hello, I'm Mark Sellick andwelcome back to Casting through
Ancient Greece, episode 80, theFate of Mitalini.
(00:37):
We've now finished with theevents of the third year of the
war and, as you have seen, a lothas been taking place in this
early stage of the conflict.
We saw that a resolution hadbeen reached in the siege that
had been taking place at Potidia.
Both sides probably relievedthat this had taken place.
However, the political classand Athens had been displeased
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with the outcome, believing theycould have secured a more
complete victory there.
Though, even with thisresolution and Athens regaining
control of Potidia, much of theChalcedides were still hostile
towards Athens.
This had seen a fresh offensiveopened by Athens to attempt to
secure their control in theregion.
However, we would witness oneof the early examples of lighter
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troops being able to defeat theheavier armed hotlights.
Athens would be forced to fallback into Potidia, though would
retain control of the city.
Last episode, we also saw thefirst naval engagement that
would take place between Spartaand Athens.
This would take place in theCorinthian Gulf, not far from
the Athenian port in the regionat Neopactus.
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It would begin as aPeloponnesian operation and
would be launched with citiesfriendly to the Peloponnesians
seeking assistance in expandingtheir influence.
This would also have theintention of removing Athenian
influence, a prospect Corinthwas very enthusiastic about,
since they held a lot ofinterests in the area.
However, the Peloponnesianfleet would be split and not act
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as a united force, which wouldsee the land offensive and the
west fail, while it would alsoprovide Formio, who was in
command of a small Athenianfleet in the region, a chance to
sail out and challenge thePeloponnesian actions.
This would end up seeing twonaval engagements take place.
The first would be against theCorinthians and Sacconians who
had sailed from Corinth afterthe Spartan force had already
(02:20):
arrived on the west coast.
Formio, although outnumberedmore than two to one, would
engage this fleet as he saw theywould be laden down with extra
troops and supplies to supportthe land campaign.
This would see his fleet havethe advantage of speed and
manoeuvrability.
The resulting battle would bean overwhelming victory for the
Athenians, though Sparta,withdrawing from their defeat on
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land, would meet back up withthe defeated Corinthians and
Sacconians, where preparationsfor an assault on the Athenians
was being planned.
Now that the wholePeloponnesian fleet had united,
this second attempt would getoff to a promising start, with
them having essentially defeatedhalf the Athenian fleet in one
manoeuvre, though thePeloponnesians act in splitting
their forces would once againlead to a disastrous result.
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With a little luck and beingable to focus on a single ship
that separated from anotherdetachment, the Athenians were
able to inflict panic into theoverconfident Peloponnesians,
which would end up spreading tothe main fleet, while the
imminent arrival of Athenianreinforcements would see the
Peloponnesians call off anycontinued effort against
Neopactors.
The Spartan commanders weredesperate to deliver some
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success for the year and wouldattempt an ambitious assault on
Athens' own home port at thePiraeus.
Though being late in thecampaigning season, the weather
and perhaps some nerves on thecommander's part would see this
attempt foiled, also bringing aclose to operations for 429 BC.
For this episode, we'll beheading into 428 BC, where in
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Athens, the political landscapeand its dynamic had changed.
The death of Pericles theprevious year would bring to a
close an era of Athenianpolitics that had been dominated
by him.
New figures would now emerge todrive Athenian policy forward
through the war.
Our focus today will be on afresh rebellion within the
Athenian Empire taking place onLesbos, which would also
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motivate Spartan actions for theyear.
Much of our focus will also beon how Athens would respond to
this revolt, while Athenianpolitics was adjusting to the
departure of Pericles.
It is probably no surprise.
With the departure of Periclesfrom the pages of history, great
change would occur in thepolitical landscape in Athens.
Pericles had influencedAthenian policies for decades
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and had only very brief absencesduring his career.
One can ask, given theinfluence of his policies, was
there someone else who couldhave picked up from where he
left off to continue Athensthrough the war?
There had been part of hisinner circle.
Well, for the first part of theanswer to this question, we can
probably turn to the greattragedy of the plague.
This had laid many low,including a number of Pericles'
(04:54):
associates.
Perhaps his natural successormay have been among these men.
However, the acidities providesthe second part of our answer
with those who still remained.
He would tell us that those whowere aligned with Pericles were
more on an equal level witheach other.
This would see that one of themwas not able to gain the
support of the rest and a levelof unity that Pericles had been
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able to command.
With this being the situation,now politics and Athens would
begin to open up for otherfigures that would have factions
forming behind them.
The two main influential figuresthat would emerge to the
forefront after Pericles' deathwould be Nikies and Cleon, and
we would be told that these twomen were very different in
character to each other.
(05:36):
Nikies, we are told, had thequalities of what we could
describe as a gentleman today,with him leading his life with
strict attention to virtue.
Cleon, on the other hand, isoften described as a warmonger,
a demagogue and a vulgarian.
This term, demagogue, is onethat will start to see more and
more as the years go by.
It is the term used to describea political leader who seeks
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support by appealing to thedesires and prejudices of
ordinary people rather than byusing rational argument.
So it is probably no surprisethat Cleon had gained influence
through his skills of being ableto appeal to the masses by
addressing their emotions andusing rhetoric to back up his
policies and claims.
On the other hand, we would betold that, due to the nature of
(06:22):
Nikies, he would use his wealthto gain influence on his side of
the house, plutarch would tellus that he would fund dramas,
sporting events, festivals andbuilding projects to gain
popularity.
Although these men had theirdifferences, they also had some
similarities in their backgroundand thoughts on policy.
Both would be from this new andupcoming class of politicians
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who were not from a nobleupbringing but had risen in
importance through economicsuccess.
Nikies had become wealthythrough the business of renting
slaves to be used in the silvermines at Lorien, while Cleon
would gain his through a tannerybusiness he inherited from his
father.
When it came to the currentsituation in Athens, neither men
favoured peace negotiationswith Sparta and both would seek
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policies for winning the war inthe coming years.
This would see that in thecurrent crisis, both had
virtually identical interests,with Donald Kagan outlining
these the Empire must be keptsafe for Athens, the Athenians
must be imbued with a spirit tocarry on the war, resources must
be husband and new ones found,and some strategy must be
(07:29):
developed to resume offensiveoperations.
Kagan also suggests that,although they would head
different factions, there is noreason to believe that both men
were not cooperating to a largedegree in these first few years
after Pericles' death.
The interests would see thatthere would be motivations to do
so and to outmanoeuvre anyfaction with interests counter
(07:50):
to theirs.
So now that we have a briefunderstanding of how the
political landscape was lookingafter the departure of Pericles,
let's now look to the newcrisis that would develop for
Athens within their empire, asthe war continued into 428 BC.
The campaigning season of 428would begin much the same as the
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previous years, with Spartalaunching an invasion where they
would once again return toAttica.
Athens would treat thisinvasion like the others,
remaining behind their walls,with only the cavalry coming out
to harass the lighter troopsfrom massing to lay waste to the
areas close to the Athenianwalls.
The Peloponnesians, led onceagain by Archedamus, would
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remain in Attica for just undera month, ravaging the areas not
yet touched and those showingsigns of regrowth.
This invasion seems to have notlasted as long as the previous
years, but if Athens thoughtthat they had finally caught
themselves a break, they wouldsoon be brought back to the
realities of this conflict.
While the Peloponnesians wereravaging Attica, and even before
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, the island of Lesbos wasconspiring a revolt from the
Athenian Empire.
This would cause great stresswithin Athens if Lesbos broke
away.
It was one of the biggestallies, along with Chios, within
the empire that still retainedtheir autonomy and supplied a
fleet to the empire rather thantribute.
This plot for revolt would beginin the most powerful city of
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the island of Lesbos, that ofMitalini, who had an oligarchic
government.
Some other lesser city-stateson the island, also thought to
be oligarchic in nature, wouldalso follow Mitalini's lead,
though one democratic town onthe North Coast had its own
independent policies and hadsometimes been hostile with the
others.
The preparations for thisrevolt had also begun before the
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campaigning season of 428 hadstarted.
Mitalini had been constructingdefensive walls, preparing their
harbour and increasing the sizeof their navy.
They would also use their tradelink to the Black Sea to secure
increased stores of grain andpurchase the use of mercenary
bowmen.
However, these would take timeto arrive.
With all these preparations inmotion, it would only be a
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matter of time before theirscheme would get out.
Mitalini had detractors thenearby island of Tenedos and the
democratic elements on Lesbos,while there would also be
dissenters within their own cityas well.
Through these channels, athenswould learn of what was being
put in motion on Lesbos.
With the cat out of the bag,mitalini would be forced to act
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even though they had notcompleted all the preparations
they would have liked.
Once Athens caught wind of whatwas being arranged on Lesbos,
the Ossidides would point outthat they did not want to
believe such an enterprise wasin the works.
He says that they wanted tobelieve what they had been told
was not true.
Their hardships for the war andplague seeing them not want to
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have to deal with another crisis.
However, if Athens did nothing,this would be a huge blow to
the city that was running low onmoney and men to man the fleet.
Lesbos was a source of manpowerfor the fleet, while they were
also an untapped resource inmoney, since they had not yet
been forced to provide tribute.
An embassy would be arranged tomake for Lesbos to get to the
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bottom of what Mitalini was upto.
They were able to confirm thata conspiracy on Lesbos was
underway and the Athenian envoyshad failed to convince Mitalini
to abandon it.
Athens now had another crisisto deal with and looked to take
the initiative to try and stampit out as soon as possible.
A fleet of 40 ships was makingits preparations to sail around
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the Peloponnes, though theywould now be diverted to Lesbos.
The fleet had been informed ifthey made haste to cross the
Aegean.
They might well surprise theisland, as a religious festival
was underway that saw much ofthe population involved.
However, the Athenian planswere reported back to Mitalini.
Being a democracy, it can bevery difficult keeping plans
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secret when so many people needto be present to vote on actions
to be undertaken.
Back in Mitalini, arrangementsfor the festival were abandoned,
and the defensive works thathad not yet been completed were
manned.
When the Athenian fleet didarrive, they quickly learnt that
their arrival had been expected, so they would not be able to
surprise the island intosubmission.
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Instead, they now providedorders for Mitalini to take down
its walls and hand over itsfleet, though these orders were
ignored, and now the Atheniansdeclared hostilities over the
city, a half-hearted effort tochallenge the Athenian fleet was
deployed in the harbour, butthe Athenians were able to drive
them towards the shore.
With the situation developingas it was, the commanders of
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Mitalini saw what talks with theAthenians, where they looked to
negotiate some sort of truce tosave their ships.
It would appear Athens was in aposition of strength here, but
the Zedites would tell us thatthey would accept an armistice
they, mitalini, was proposing,the reason here being that the
Athenian commanders did notthink they were in a strong
position to take the rest of theisland and would need
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additional forces.
This would give Mitalini somebreathing room now that their
plan for revolt had been foundout before they had made their
preparations.
To try and buy themselves somemore time, they would now turn
to diplomatic talks.
Representatives would be sentto Athens to try and convince
them of their innocentintentions and seek to have the
(13:09):
Athenian fleet recalled, thoughit would appear they did not
expect these talks to befavourable Beyond the time it
may buy them.
So while this mission wasundertaken, a secret envoy was
sent to Sparta to try andnegotiate assistance.
One of the motivations forrebelling against Athens was
apparently so that Mitalinicould unite the entire island
(13:31):
under their leadership, though,while part of the Athenian
Empire, this sort of policy wasdiscouraged by Athens not
wanting larger power unitsforming within their league.
However, they would also seekSparta's help, where they would
present their officialmotivations for wanting to
revolt.
Mitalini had previouslyattempted to join the
Peloponnesian League before thewar had broken out, but Sparta
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had refused, this being duringthe period that both Athens and
Sparta were looking to keep ineffect the provisions of the 30
years peace, mitalini would endup sending two separate envoys
to Sparta to try and secureSpartan military aid.
However, these attempts wouldbe met with a somewhat air of
indifference.
It's thought here that Spartawas not very enthusiastic of
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becoming involved in supportinga revolt across the other side
of the Aegean.
Firstly, the initialencouragement for revolt had not
come from Sparta but from theBiosians, who shared their
common Aeolian connection.
Plus, after the previous year'snaval engagements against
Athens, this probably would havenot seen them too enthusiastic
about the prospect of meetingAthens on the water again.
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Though even with this, theSpartans did not want to dismiss
a chance at undermining theAthenian alliance.
So they would tell the envoysto travel to Olympia, and at the
completion of the festivaltaking place there they could
put forward their case to therest of the Peloponnesians who
would be in attendance.
Sparta were to get involved insuch a demanding operation that
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would divert resources away fromany mainland venture, they
needed to make sure that therest of the Peloponnesians would
be on board.
After the Olympic festival hadbeen completed, the Middoleneans
would be given the opportunityto address the various members
of the Peloponnesian League thatwere gathered in the sacred
precinct of Zeus.
The envoy from Middolene had ahuge task ahead of him to
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convince the Peloponnesians thatthey should come to their aid.
The envoy would put to the sideMiddolene's ambition for
control on Lesbos and wouldinstead focus on the ideals that
Sparta had supposedly gone towar with Athens over the Cedars
would have the envoy deliverquite a long speech in
attempting to do this.
During the speech, he wouldpoint out that the Peloponnesian
(15:43):
intervention in Lesbos wouldserve the larger cause of Greek
freedom and the aims of thePeloponnesian League.
The envoy would also speakabout Athens' encroachment on
the autonomy of the variousallies, while Middolene would be
the next victim if their revoltshould fail.
These points would directlyaddress the justified reason
that Sparta would go to war forthe freedom of all Greeks.
(16:06):
He would then try to point outthat the timing for action in
the Aegean was perfect, whereThysedides would have the envoy
say Never has there been such anopportunity.
Owing to the plague and theexpenses that they have incurred
, the Athenians are in a stateof exhaustion.
Part of their fleet is sailingaround your coasts and the rest
is engaged in blockading us.
(16:27):
It is improbable that they haveany ships in reserve, and if
you invade for the second timethis summer, with naval and
military forces at the same time.
They will either be unable toresist your fleet or will have
to withdraw their own from yourshores and from ours.
It's interesting to see in thisargument put forward that aid
(16:48):
for the Mitalenians was notsought through direct military
action on Lesbos.
Instead, they were proposingfor a combined naval and land
operation to be directed atAttica.
This prospect would be muchmore palatable to the
Peloponnesians and especiallySparta.
This would mean that they wouldnot need to engage in a
long-range naval campaign thatwould have been seen as very
(17:08):
unappealing.
It seems very likely thatMitaleni knew the Spartans'
hesitancy at engaging inoperations deep in the Athenian
Empire.
So look to a proposal thatwould have been the best chance
at succeeding.
The main strategy in what wasput forward would be to attempt
to draw off the Athenian forcesfrom Lesbos so that Mitaleni
would be able to continue theirplans for a control of the
(17:30):
island.
Obviously, to show that thiswas not all about their
predicament, they would alsohighlight how the Peloponnesian
actions would also aid their ownsituation.
Then, to complete their speechto the Peloponnesians, the envoy
would try and convince themthat the war would not be
decided in Attica, but rather inthe wider Athenian Empire,
while they would also reinforcethe Spartans' justified reason
(17:52):
for war in the first place.
But if you give us your wholehearted support, you will gain
for yourself a state which has alarge navy, which is a thing
you need most.
You will be in a much betterposition for breaking the power
of the Athenians by detachingher allies from her, since the
others will be greatlyencouraged to come over to you,
(18:13):
and you will clear yourselvesthe charge that has been made
against you of not helping thosewho revolt.
Once you come forward in therole of liberators, you will
find that your strength in waris enormously increased.
We have outlined the mainpoints made in the address given
by the envoy from Mitaleni,though the Cedades would spend
(18:34):
several pages outlining what wassaid.
Nevertheless, the arguments putforward would be enough for the
Spartans and Peloponnesians toagree to the proposals put
forward.
The Mitalenians and theirallies would be welcomed into
the Peloponnesian League, whilepreparations would now be made
to launch another invasion intoAttica.
The various allies would beordered to gather two thirds of
(18:56):
their forces at the Ismus, whilepreparations were made to haul
the Triremes to carry the forcesover the Corinthian Ismus,
where they could then belaunched into the Seronic Gulf
and sailed directly into Attica.
In these preparations, we wouldhear that the Spartans were
energetic.
However, their allies woulddrag their feet, as it was the
(19:16):
season for harvesting theircrops and they would have
thought that their militaryobligations had been already
completed for this season.
While these envoys were offattempting to gain Spartan help,
actions had been taking placeon Lesbos.
As we had seen, the Atheniansdid not press their attack on
Mitaleni, as they thought theylacked the strength to sustain a
(19:37):
campaign against the wholeisland, though, after the naval
action that had taken place, theAthenians had landed on the
island and established a camp.
There was perhaps a lull whileMitaleni was having its talks
with the Athenians, but with thefailure of these, it then seems
they would attempt actionagainst the Athenians before
reinforcements could arrive.
We would hear that the forcesof Mitaleni would come out from
(19:58):
their city and attack theAthenians camped outside here.
They would get the better ofthe Athenians, though did not
follow up this victory WithAthenians.
They had also viewed themselvesnot strong enough to take on
the Athenians offensively.
It would appear they wereawaiting the outcome of the
talks with the Peloponnesians,but they could either receive
reinforcements themselves or seethe Athenians drawn away
(20:20):
through an attack in Attica.
It seems Mitaleni was moreinterested in targeting the
other cities of the island forthe purpose of uniting all under
their leadership, rather thantaking the Athenians on.
So instead of continuing theirattacks on the Athenians, they
retreated back into Mitaleni.
This would allow the Atheniansto recover and, after they saw
(20:41):
no new attacks would come theirway, they would turn their minds
to preparing to defend againstrenewed attacks by establishing
themselves in stronger positionson the island.
This would see the Athenianscall upon allies to sail to the
island to reinforce them.
Once this was done, theAthenians were then able to
establish two fortificationsoutside Mitaleni that would
block the use of the port there.
(21:02):
However, they were still farfrom an overwhelming force, with
the Athenians only managing toexert control in the areas
immediately outside theirpositions.
This would become apparent withcontinued operations being
undertaken by the two factionsof the island.
Back in Athens, they had becomeaware of the Peloponnesians'
plan to invade Attica again inan attempt to draw off ships
(21:25):
from Lesbos.
So while the Peloponnesianswere putting their operation
into action, the Athenians wouldplan their response.
They had judged that theSpartans assumed that the
Athenians were in a weak stateand unable to react in multiple
theatres.
This was a point that Mitalenihad used to persuade the
Peloponnesians into supportingthem.
Athens looked to show thePeloponnesians that they were
(21:46):
still as strong as ever.
To do this, they would notrecall any ships from Lesbos,
but would still manage to put tosea another 100 triremes.
Athens did not have the rollersto support such a feat, so many
of the hoplite class andresident aliens were put into
service as rollers.
The fleet would not be the samequality they were in the
previous years, but its purposewas to give the impression of
(22:09):
strength.
The Athenian fleet would belaunched and its operations
would be directed at thePeloponnesian coastline, raiding
coastal areas at will.
This would all take place whilethe Peloponnesians were
deploying themselves back withinAttica.
The Athenian effort, coupledwith other factors, would see
Sparta realize that Athens wasnot as weak as they had been led
(22:31):
to believe.
Though the failure of some oftheir allies to assemble on the
Isthmus for the campaign, aswell as a separate Athenian
fleet of 30 ships that had beendeployed before the troubles on
Lesbos, would see that thesecond invasion of Attica was
called off, the Atheniansremained in their positions on
Lesbos, but Middolene was stillable to launch attacks on other
(22:52):
cities of the island.
Athens was not able to do muchto help the democratic cities of
Lesbos, so further action wasneeded.
Word was sent back to Athens tosend reinforcements so that the
army on Lesbos could starttaking action against Middolene.
Athens, now free of thePeloponnesian invasion, would
send 100 hoplites, commanded byParshis.
(23:13):
To further highlight the severeshortage of roles in Athens,
the citadiers would tell us thatthe hoplites themselves would
row the triremes for the journeyto Lesbos.
Once arriving, the Athenianswere now strong enough to
operate outside of their camps.
They would construct a wallaround Middolene, completely
surrounding it on land.
A number of forts would also bebuilt along the wall that would
(23:36):
be garrisoned by the hoplites.
With the completion of thiswall, middolene was now
completely under siege.
The navy had been able toblockade the city from the sea,
but now they were closed in byland, unable to launch their
attacks on the other cities theyhad previously been free to do.
By this stage, the winter of 428was now coming on, which would
see the closing of anothercampaigning season.
(23:58):
During this period, athenswould also take measures to
secure more funds to continuefueling their war effort, ships
would be sent out to a number ofcities where a direct tax was
imposed on these cities.
This system of direct taxationwas not a common occurrence in
these times, even though for usit seems quite normal.
The Greeks saw this as anattack on their autonomy and
(24:21):
property rights.
Often, these types of taxeswould first start out in
response to funding a crisiswhich would normally be a major
war.
For example, in modern times,the British would first
introduce an income tax to helppay for their wars against
Napoleon, while here inAustralia our income tax would
be in response to the FirstWorld War.
However, these impositionduring 428 BC would see that
(24:45):
some cities would respond in ahostile nature.
With this, it is telling us,one ill-fated mission on the far
eastern end of the AthenianEmpire, in the Carriot lands,
where just about all were lostDuring the winter.
Sparta would also be active.
Although they had withdrawnTraumatica due to the Athenian
(25:06):
raids on their coastlines, theywere planning for a renewed
effort for 427.
This effort also had theintention of assisting Midalini
directly, and a messenger fromSparta had been sent across the
Aegean to Lesbos, who was ableto slip into the city past the
Athenian blockade.
The Sparta do arrived was namedAlcidius and had come to advise
(25:29):
Midalini of the Peloponnesiansattention to invade Attica once
again in 427, while a fleet of42 ships would also be sent to
Lesbos to assist Midalini.
This news brought by Alcidiuswould also encourage the city
and were now motivated to holdout against the Athenian siege.
With the coming of the campaignseason of 427, the
(25:50):
Peloponnesians would send offtheir fleet to Lesbos, while
also invading Attica with theirland forces.
The intention here was toprevent Athens from sending out
additional ships to respond tothe Peloponnesian fleet by
keeping their forces in Athensbusy.
It would also appear thatArchidamus, who had been leading
the Peloponnesians in theprevious years, was now ill and
(26:10):
dying or had already died, asthis time around the invasion
was not led by him and would endup hearing that his son, aegis,
would come to succeed him laterin 427.
This dual theatre operation bySparta would not end up
achieving the results that hadbeen intended.
The Peloponnesian army inAttica would devastate the
countryside, with this being oneof the worst years that Attica
(26:34):
had endured.
The Peloponnesians would stayon longer than normal as there
had been awaiting news of thefleet's progress on Lesbos,
since it was their objective totie down the Athenians and
prevent them to launch theirships into the Aegean.
Though, with no news arrivingand the army now having expended
all its supplies, they wereforced to march back for the
Peloponnes.
(26:54):
These attendees would tell usthat the Peloponnesian fleet had
sailed around the Peloponnesbefore heading into the Aegean
with caution.
They were very aware that if anAthenian fleet caught them on
the sea, they were probablygoing to be severely unmatched.
They were able to avoid anycontact with the Athenians and
had reached Delos, but onceleaving and arriving at the
(27:16):
island of Icarus, they wouldlearn that Mitalini had
surrendered to the Athenians onLesbos.
Once obtaining more informationon what had taken place, the
Peloponnesians now discussedwhat actions they should take.
Proposals for continuing theoffensive operations would be
argued, with one seeking to havethe fleet continue to Lesbos
and take the Athenians bysurprise.
(27:36):
Another sought to insteaddirect the fleet in support of
the Oenian cities, looking tobreak away from the Athenian
Empire.
This would undermine theAthenians' income in these
regions, while it could alsospark a larger rebellion once it
was seen Athens did not rulethe seas.
In addition to this, diplomaticconnections could also then be
opened up with the Persians.
(27:58):
However, the Spartan commanderwas not convinced of these
arguments and instead wanted tosail the fleet back to the
Peloponnes as quickly aspossible, before an Athenian
fleet would be encountered.
Before setting back out, theSpartans would damage their
reputation with some cities inthe Aegean that had looked on
them favorably when they startedexecuting prisoners they had
(28:20):
taken during their travelsthrough the region.
They would release the restonce becoming aware of what
their actions were doing, butthe damage had been done.
With the fleet now lighteningtheir load, they made their way
back to the Greek mainland.
The Athenians would end upgetting word of the
Peloponnesians' position andwould give chase, though the
(28:42):
Peloponnesians would avoidmaking land and risk the open
seas until reaching thePeloponnes.
By doing this, they were ableto avoid a sea battle with the
Athenians giving up the chase.
The slow progress of thePeloponnesian fleet when they
had set out to support Lesboswould see that they would fail
to reach the island to supportmiddle Oenian time.
(29:03):
The full blockade of the cityhad meant that no supplies were
able to make it into thedefenders.
Seeing that a timely responsefrom the Peloponnesians was
needed, though, mitolini wouldreach a point of crisis with
their food supply.
Before they could arrive, anadvisor from Sparta was present
in the city and, seeing thedesperate state of the situation
(29:24):
, had proposed a desperate planto attempt to break the siege.
This would call for the peopleof Mitolini to breach the
Athenian wall that had beenbuilt around the city.
However, mitolini lacked theappropriate numbers of hoplites
for this task.
It's then here the Cittadistells us the curious step of
providing hoplite equipment tothe lower classes within the
(29:44):
city, this taking place in alogarchic system.
Once all the people had beenarmed, they would then seek to
be treated on equal terms,wanting an equal share in the
food rations.
In this crisis would develop amove to democratic principles,
as we are seen with Athens'development, once a group of
people become important to acity's survival or prosperity,
(30:06):
more concessions politically, tothe group were needed.
If these demands were not met,this group threatened to come to
terms with the Athenians andsurrender the city.
With this internal crisis nowdeveloping, the government of
Mitolini had seen their positionas hopeless.
Extending concessions to thelower classes would completely
dismantle their oligarchicsystem, though they were also in
(30:29):
no position to prevent thesurrender of the city.
So it was determined that itshould be the current government
who should come to terms withthe Athenians.
This, they thought, wouldafford them the best outcome.
So, with the Peloponnesianstill and the Aegean, mitolini
would surrender to the Athenians.
The Cittadis would record theterms of surrender as follows
(30:51):
Athens was to have the right toact as she saw fit with regard
to the people of Mitolini andthe army was allowed to enter
the city.
The Mitolinians were to sendrepresentatives to Athens to put
their case and until theserepresentatives returned,
parshis was to undertake not toimprison or enslave or kill any
of the population.
Once Parshis had returned toLesbos from his pursuit of the
(31:16):
Peloponnesian fleet, he would goabout reducing the various
cities on the island who hadbeen allied to Mitolini.
Then, when back in the sea tothe revolt, he would send back
to Athens those he saw asresponsible for the revolt, as
well as the Spartan advisor.
From here, athens would thenlook to decide on the fate of
Mitolini.
In the wake of their failedrevolt from the Empire, the
(31:40):
context that the considerationsfor Mitalini's fate would be on
the backdrop of Atheniansexperience after the four years
of the Peloponnesian war, theyhad suffered invasions of their
lands year after year, whilealso having to contend with the
plague and its resurgence.
Now, one of the more importantallies had attempted to revolt
when the financial situation inthe empire was becoming tight.
(32:02):
Not only this, but thePeloponnesians had been able to
penetrate deep within the Aegean, where Athens had seen itself
as holding naval supremacy.
This would probably see many ofthose ready to debate the issue
on Mitalini being afraid andangry of Athens' current
situation.
Before any talks on thePinnocks in Athens would take
place, these emotions would behighlighted with their initial
(32:26):
actions.
They would put the Spartan whohad been advising the Mitalians
to death without a trial.
This had even occurred after hehad offered to persuade the
Spartans to abandon their siegeof Plataea in exchange for his
life.
However, after the execution ofthe Spartan advisor, debate in
Athens on Mitalini's fate woulddevelop.
(32:47):
We don't get any of thespeeches that would be delivered
through Thucydides, but wewould hear that, in their
current mood, they would decidethat not only are those who were
in their custody should be putto death, but all the men of
Mitalini as well.
They would then make slays ofall the women and children of
the city.
Thucydides would also point outthat the extreme nature of this
(33:08):
decision would result.
Due to the revolt being longpremeditated and due to Mitalini
not being a subject state likemany others within the empire,
with this decision being made, atri-ring would be sent out at
once to take these orders toParches still on Lesbos to carry
out at once.
However, the next day, it wouldseem, some had had time to cool
(33:30):
their emotions over thesituation around Mitalini.
This would see that theModerates within Athens were
able to see a special assemblybeing called to reconsider the
decision made the previous day.
This would see, in Thucydides'account, two figures put forward
on each side of the new debatethat of Cleon, who we have met
before, and Diodotus, who wouldbe representing a good
(33:53):
proportion of the Moderatesviews.
However, there would be othersthat would address the assembly,
it appears.
These two, however, would be onthe far ends of the debate.
The Athenian Assembly was nowconvened to decide the fate of
rebellious Mitalini.
Cleon, the Athenian statesmanwho Thucydides describes as
being the most violent of thecitizens, argued for the
(34:16):
complete destruction of Mitalinias a deterrent to other
rebellious allies.
He believed that leniency wouldencourage more uprisings and
that a harsh response wasnecessary to maintain Athenian
dominance.
Diodotus, on the other hand,spoke in favour of a more
moderate approach.
He argued against punishing theentire population of Mitalini,
(34:37):
suggesting that only thosedirectly involved in the
rebellion should face severeconsequences, diodotus believing
that Athens should demonstratemercy and wisdom in its
governance to foster long-termloyalty among its allies.
The debate was intense, withemotions running high among the
Athenian citizens.
Cleon's argument appealed tothe fear of further revolts,
(35:00):
emphasising the need for astrong and decisive message.
Diodotus, however, appealed tothe reason and compassion,
urging the assembly to considerthe potential negative
consequences of a harsh response.
I must point out that thisdebate is represented by quite
lengthy speeches in Thucydides'account, and I have just looked
(35:21):
to sum up the main points of howeach man spoke.
If you are interested inchecking out the full debate,
you can find it beginning inThucydides' history of the
Peloponnesian War, at Chapter 3,paragraph 36.
In the end, the AthenianAssembly narrowly voted in
favour of Diodotus' proposal.
(35:42):
The decision was to spare themajority of Mitalini's
population and execute onlythose directly responsible for
the revolt.
However, even this action washarsh and arbitrary, as the men
that Parshers had sent back toAthens were done so on his own
judgement of their involvement.
No trial in Athens would beheld for this roughly thousand
(36:03):
guilty Mitalians, and they wouldbe put to death.
This debate over the fate ofMitalini reflected the ongoing
tension in Athenian politicsbetween a more aggressive and
punitive approach, representedby figures like Cleon, and a
more measured and diplomaticstance, exemplified by voices
like Diodotus.
It showcased the complexitiesof decision making in times of
(36:26):
war and the moral dilemmas facedby powerful states in handling
rebellious subjects.
So a ship was dispatched inhaste to deliver the news and
prevent the previous order oftotal destruction from being
carried out.
The first ship carrying theorders for the death of all the
men and enslavement of the restof the population had a full
(36:47):
day's head start.
To help motivate, the rowers ofthe second ship sent out the
Mitalian envoys in Athens,provided food and drink to them
all and promised them a rewardif they could make it to Lesbos
before the first ship.
The second ship would set outat a fast pace as they left the
Piraeus and out into the Aegean.
They would refuse to take stopsfor eating and sleep in a
(37:08):
number of the usual locationsalong the way.
Even though they took thesemeasures and had no wind against
them, when they came uponLesbos they could see that the
first ship had already arrived,however, the second crew still
put on land and rushed toMitalini where, fortunately, the
decree had only just arrived.
A short time before them, theywere able to interrupt Parshis,
(37:31):
who was in the process ofreading out the initial decree,
and were able to prevent themassacre from unfolding.
The fate of Mitalini had restedon a razor's edge, and by so
little did they escape theirdanger.
So the people who were still inMitolini had escaped death and
enslavement, but Athens wouldnow take measures that would see
(37:52):
that the city and the areas ofcontrol had come under their
influence.
The defensive works of the citywere taken down and the land
was divided up and handed overto the Athenian shareholders who
, the Mitolinians, would have topay rent to.
Mitolini and the towns it hadpreviously controlled were now
all under Athenian influence,this seeing this previously
(38:13):
somewhat autonomous city in theAthenian Empire now a subject
state of Athens.
For this episode, I had for themost part decided to follow this
developing story of the revolton Lesbos to its conclusion.
This saw us move through 428 BCand into 427, where the revolt
had come to an end andMitolinians fate was decided.
(38:35):
Next series episode will beremaining in these years, as we
will be returning to thesituation of Plataea.
As you may remember, sparta hadmarched onto this small polis
during the invasion of 429 andhad placed it under siege.
Now we shall return to thesiege and look what was taking
place and look at how the siegewould end and what this would
(38:55):
mean for Plataea and Athens,while we will also be looking at
some civil unrest that would bedeveloping on an island that we
had featured when looking atthe road to war.
Thank you, everyone for yourcontinued support and a big
shout out to all those who havefound some value in the series
and have been supported onPatreon and other various ways.
Your contribution has trulyhelped me grow the series.
(39:16):
If you have also found somevalue in the show and wish to
support the series, you can headto
wwwCastingThranchingGreececomand click on the support the
series button, where you candiscover many ways to extend
your support to helping theseries grow.
Be sure to stay connected andupdate on what's happening in
the series and join me over onFacebook or Instagram at Casting
to RanchantGreece or on Twitterat CastingGreece, and be sure
(39:39):
to subscribe to the series overat the Casting to RanchantGreece
website.
I hope you can join me nexttime when we continue the
narrative in the series.
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