February 1, 2024 • 37 mins
Uncover the chilling drama of ancient conflict as we journey through the shadows of the Peloponnesian War—revealing the political chaos of Corcyra, and the tragedy of Plataea. This episode uncovers the tales of rebellion, siege, and the sobering reality of political strife, all through the compelling lens of Thucydides' historical narratives. Be prepared to witness the darker side of human nature, where the lust for power leads to a breakdown in social order and a wave of indiscriminate violence that shook the very foundations of Ancient Greece.
Step into the political arena of Corcyra where calculated moves and internal turmoil illustrate the complexities of Greek politics. We navigate through the strategic decisions that inflamed tensions and trace the harrowing outcomes of a society caught in the crossfire of war. The episode lays bare the ruthless political manoeuvres in a landscape fraught with desperation and strategic miscalculations, providing you with a profound understanding of the motivations and consequences that characterized one of history's most infamous conflicts. Join us and experience the intensity of a period where the line between friend and foe was perilously thin.
💬 Stay Connected with Casting Through Ancient Greece
Follow us for updates, discussions, and more ancient Greek content:
🌐 Website
📸 Instagram
🐦 Twitter
📘 Facebook
🎙️ Love the show? Don’t forget to subscribe, leave a review, and share it with fellow history enthusiasts. Your support helps keep the stories of ancient Greece alive!
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:15):
Death thus raged in every shape and, as usually
happens in such times, there wasno length to which they did not
go.
Sons were killed by theirfathers and suppliants strayed
from the altar or slain upon it,while some were even walled up
in the temple of Dionysus anddied there Thucydides.
Hello, I'm Arcele and welcomeback to Casting through Ancient
(00:37):
Greece, episode 81, the Terrorof War.
Last episode, we had focused onthe events to do with the city
of Mitalini on Lesbos, revoltingfrom the Athenian Empire.
We had seen that a conspiracyon the island had developed
where Mitalini looked to takecontrol of the other cities of
the island so that it would growits power and influence.
Lesbos was one of the fewmembers in the Athenian Empire
(01:00):
that still retained a level ofautonomy.
They were well aware thatAthens would not look favourably
on their actions to undertakethis goal.
For this reason, mitalinilooked to keep their intentions
and actions as secret aspossible, though they had taken
steps to be ready for when therevolt could no longer be hidden
.
They had begun to fortify thecity and their port, while they
(01:22):
also looked to secure grain andmercenaries from the Black Sea
region.
Though, being in a region thatwas under Athenian influence.
There would be others lookingin on their actions, such as
cities hostile towards them, aswell as detractors within their
own walls.
This would see that Athenswould become aware of Mitalini's
actions before they were ready.
(01:43):
Athens would respond to this newcrisis developing within their
empire.
First, they had disbelieved thereports, but would soon send
forces to attempt to bring thegrowing situation under control.
Once confirming revolt was inthe works.
However, athens had not sentenough troops to be able to
force the situation back totheir favour.
With Mitalini's rejection ofAthenian demands, mitalini,
(02:05):
seeing they were now forced toact before they were ready,
looked to buy time.
They sent a delegation toAthens to negotiate, though not
expecting anything to come ofthis endeavour.
However, they had also sent asecret envoy to Sparta to try
and secure aid and help themresist the Athenians.
After some hesitancy on behalfof Sparta, a combined
Peloponnesian assembly wouldagree to help Mitalini.
(02:28):
This would first come with anagreed second invasion of Attica
for 428, though this operationwould come undone when many of
the Peloponnesians would fail topresent themselves on the
Corinthian Isthmus as it was nowharvesting time in their lands
and many felt they had completedtheir obligations for the year
already, though, with the comingof the new campaigning season
in 427, a land and navaloperation would commence.
(02:52):
The plan was to invade Atticato prevent the Athenian sending
forces out that could intercepttheir fleet or provide
reinforcements to Lesbos, whilethe naval contingent would
provide direct support toMitalini something the Spartans
had been wary of the previousyear the plan had been for the
Peloponnesian fleet to remain inAttica until the fleet had
reached Lesbos.
(03:12):
Though the naval contingent wasadvancing through the Aegean
very cautiously and with no wordcoming back to the land forces,
they were forced to march hometo their cities once the
supplies had been used up.
During this time, mitalini wasalso forced to surrender to the
Athenians who had receivedreinforcements.
The previous winter Divisionswithin the classes of their
(03:32):
oligarchic system on Lesbos hadproven to undermine their
ability to maintain firmresistance.
The revolt ended.
Athens now turned to thequestion of what should be done
to the people of Mitalini.
The initial motions in Athenswas to see that a ship was sent
out with orders to put to deathall the men and make slaves of
the rest, though the next day anassembly would be held to
(03:53):
revisit this decision.
After much debate, a moremoderate approach would be
decided upon.
Only those directly responsiblefor the revolt would be
executed and the rest of thecity would be spared.
Though the first ship had afull days head start, so the
second ship would need to makeall haste if the people of
Mitalini were to be spared.
With plenty of incentivesprovided to them, the rowers
(04:16):
would make it to Lesbos inrecord time, and made it just as
the decree of the first shipwas being read out.
They'd arrive just in timebefore the orders could be
carried out, saving Mitalinifrom its terrible fate.
This episode will be staying inthe years 428 and 427, as we
cover two other major eventsthat took place.
For the first part of theepisode, we'll be heading back
(04:39):
to the small polis of Plataeathat was still under siege from
the Peloponnesians and theOceans.
Here we will look at how thesiege developed, from where we
left it when it was firstestablished.
We will then look at what wouldbring about the surrender of
Plataea and its fate.
Then, for the rest of theepisode, we'll find ourselves
back over in the island ofCossara, where events had begun
(04:59):
that would ignite the conditionsfor the Peloponnesian war to
break out.
The island would find itself inrevolution, as the democrats
would seek to remain allied toAthens, while the aristocrats,
who thought they were beingenslaved by Athens, wanted to
form an alliance with thePeloponnesians.
So let's first head back to thepolicy of Plataea to start
(05:19):
things off this episode.
During the same winter that therevolt on Mitalini was taking
place, plataea, to the north ofAttica, was still under siege by
the Peloponnesian Alliance.
As we saw, plataea had been thetarget of Peloponnesian actions
for 429,.
Instead of the usual invasionof Attica, though, the Spartans,
at the head of thePeloponnesians, would file and
(05:40):
capture the city from assault.
What would develop would be anelaborate game of moves and
counter moves that would resultin a state of siege setting in.
As the campaign season came toa close, the majority of the
Peloponnesians would march backfor their homes, though the
Beotians within thePeloponnesian League, mainly the
Thebans, would commit forces tokeep Plataea under siege, along
(06:01):
with the remainingPeloponnesians.
This would remain the state ofaffairs into the winter of
428-427, though the effects ofthe siege would now have time to
take its toll within the polis.
Their provisions that had beenused to keep the defenders
within Plataea fed were nowbeginning to run out.
These had last longer than theywould have, since a great deal
(06:22):
of the population had beenevacuated and sent to Athens.
This had left 400 Plataean men,80 Athenians and 110 women
within the city walls.
This would be a testament tothe formidable nature of the
Plataeans defences, with such asmall force being able to
prevent the city's capture.
Though even this small forcewould only be able to hold out
for so long before they wouldrun out of provisions.
(06:45):
With this being their currentsituation and no help appearing
to be coming from Athens, adesperate plea would now be
proposed to try and break thesiege.
It would be put forward thattheir only chance of survival
would be to force their waythrough the besiegers' lines.
To do this, they would alsoneed to breach the wall that the
Peloponnesians had built aroundPlataea.
This proposal of a daringbreakout appears to have been
(07:07):
met with enthusiasm when firstput forward.
However, as the defenders hadtime to reflect on the situation
and what was required, many hadshrunk back from this course of
action.
This would see that only halfthose behind the walls were
willing.
The rest had deemed that thissort of action was far too risky
.
Just over 200 of the defenderswould continue with their plans
(07:29):
for the breakout of the siege,these entities would tell us
that they would constructladders in preparation for their
attempt.
They had to ensure that theseladders would be the right
height for when reaching thePeloponnesian walls, so they had
many count the number of brickslaid upon each other.
In this way, they were able tocome up with an accurate
estimation of the height thatthey would need to scale.
However, it was not as simpleas just being able to clear this
(07:52):
one wall.
These entities give us apicture of what lay ahead of the
men during this escape.
There were, in fact, two wallseach forming a circle, one
directed against Plataea and onefacing outwards, to guard
against any attack that might bemade from Athens.
Between the two walls was aspace of about 16 feet, and
(08:12):
inside this space were built thehuts where the men on guard
were quartered.
The building was continuous, sothat the impression made was
that of a thick wall withbattlements on each side of it,
every 10 battlements.
There were towers of some sizeand of the same breadth as the
wall, reaching right across fromits inner to its outer face.
A built so that there was noway past the towers, the only
(08:36):
way being through the middle ofthem.
It appears, though, that thePlataeans had some intel on the
besieges and would wait for astormy night before making their
move.
These entities would tell usthat, during the rainy and
stormy weather, they wouldabandon the battlements and
would take up positions in thetowers, as these provided
shelter.
When bad weather finally didarrive, the plan would spring
(08:58):
into action.
The roughly 200 men would havea number of close calls in their
attempt, but, after capturing acouple of watchtowers and
breaching the walls with theirladder, they would end up
clearing the Peloponnesian lines.
This force, although originallyreported by some who had turned
back to Plataea as beingdestroyed, would end up making
it to the safety of Athens.
However, the fate of those whoremained behind would not have
(09:21):
the same fortunate outcome.
The siege would continue throughthe winter and into the summer
of 427, where, finally, the lackof supplies, along with the
reduced numbers, would seed thePlataea could not mount an
effective defence.
This realisation had come whenthe Peloponnesians had attempted
an attack on one part of thewall.
They would find that they wouldbe met with very little
(09:44):
resistance.
Instead of continuing theattack and taking the polis by
storm, the Spartan commanderswould turn to negotiations
instead.
Residuities tells us this wasbecause Sparta had issued orders
that, if possible, plataeashould not be captured but be
seen to have come over to thePeloponnesians voluntarily.
This was supposedly due to aview to the future where, if a
(10:06):
peach treaty should be agreed to, it was thought cities that
were captured by force wouldhave to be given back.
It is also possible that, afterseeing how little resistance was
being encountered, the Spartansdid not want to risk losing men
in assault on the city that wason the edge of capitulation.
That could be achieved throughless forceful means.
However, if what the Sididesrecords is correct, it is
(10:28):
interesting to note that thiswould be our first hint that
Sparta did see that a negotiatedpeace was a possible outcome.
A herald would be sent into thecity in an attempt to secure
the Plataea's surrender.
The herald would make it knownthat the guilty would be
punished, but not without a fairtrial.
Being completely exhausted andon the edge of starvation, the
(10:49):
Plataea's would voluntarily giveover the city.
The defenders would be providedfor by the Peloponnesians,
seeing that they were fed andwarded.
However, this would only lastfor a few days until five
magistrates from Sparta wouldarrive to administer punishment
on the defenders.
Here, the promise of a fairtrial would seem to go by the
wayside, with the magistratesonly putting forward one
(11:10):
question have you done anythingto help the Spartans and their
allies in the present war?
It was clear that the Spartanshad already made up their minds
on the fate of the defenders ofthe Plataea.
However, they would entertainthe Plataeans to put forward
their case in a long speech.
This speech was articulated sowell that it put forward a
logical defence and evenembarrassed those who are
(11:31):
listening.
The Thebans, who were alsopresent, saw that what the
Plataeans put forward couldthreaten the predetermined
outcome that was probablydiscussed within the
Peloponnesian League, and theywould respond with their own
speech in an attempt to havethose listening put back on
course.
This would seem to have thedesired effect, as, instead of
being swayed by the Plataeanslong plea, the Spartans would
(11:52):
simply ask again have you doneanything to help the Spartans
and their allies in the presentwar, to which the Plataeans
would have to answer no?
Thucydides would tell us thateach man was asked this question
individually and as each oneanswered no, they were taken
away and executed.
This would see that almost 200of the defenders were put to
(12:13):
death, including 25 Athenianswho had been assisting Plataea.
The women who remained in thecity were made slaves and the
city itself was razed to theground.
New building projects wereconstructed at the site of the
Temple of Hera and eventually,the site of Plataea was handed
over to Thebes.
To finish off this chapteraround Plataea, thucydides would
(12:34):
tell us that the reason forSparta acting in such a
merciless way towards Plataeawas for political purposes.
As we have spoken about before,sparta recognised that, if the
Peloponnesian War was to drag on, thebes would be an important
ally to help exhaust Athens.
They were still looking to thislong game and needed to keep
Thebes as a willing participant.
There would be no better way todo this than hand over to them
(12:57):
the city in Biosha that had beena thorn in their side when it
came to try and unite the wholeregion under their leadership.
Thucydides would record thatthis was the end of Plataea.
As a polis, though, as he diedbefore the end of the
Peloponnesian War, he would notknow that Plataea would be
restored by Sparta in 386 BC.
(13:18):
So now that we have reached theresolution of the siege of
Plataea, we are now going toturn to the crisis that would
develop into civil war.
This would be on the island ofCassara, who had been central in
the road to the opening of thePeloponnesian War.
The island had put themselvesin alliance with Athens, but
divisions within their societywould soon see violence erupt.
The root of these troubleswould stem from before the
(13:40):
breakout of the PeloponnesianWar when, in 433, at the Battle
of Sabota that Cassara had facedoff against Corinth, 250
Cassareans had been takencaptive.
They had been brought back toCorinth and treated with respect
, and their loyalty won over.
Now, six years after theircapture, corinth would send them
back to their home island withthe hope that they would subvert
(14:02):
the Pro-Authenian policy withinCassara.
The beginnings of civil warwould find itself in the change
of policy these newlyrepatriated men would try and
put forward.
These men had only known thealliance with Athens for a short
time, unlike the rest of theisland.
However, to begin with, theCassareans did not suspect any
conspiracy and had believed thestory that the captives had been
(14:25):
released due to enormous ransombeing paid.
However, this ransom was acover provided by Corinth, who
were looking to spread troublewithin Cassara.
Once back on Cassara, these menwould begin work on attempting
to influence change in policy.
They would attempt to push forthe island to revert back to
their traditional position ofneutrality, rather than being
(14:45):
tied to another power.
In this way, they tried to havethe island remove itself from
the Athenial alliance.
However, it appears that theyhad recognised pushing for an
alliance with the Peloponnesianswould be a step too far and
would raise suspicions.
By arguing for a position ofneutrality, they would be able
to keep the appearance ofcredibility, since it had been
(15:05):
Cassara's traditional stance.
This would be a first step inthe island potentially ending up
as a Peloponnesian Leaguemember.
Incremental changes in policywould eventually lead to the
desired outcome.
If a change in policy could beaffected, this would greatly
damage Athens' position.
As you may remember from ourpast episodes, cassara had the
(15:26):
third largest fleet in the Greekworld, behind Athens and
Corinth.
If the Peloponnesians couldsecure Cassara as an ally, they
would be in a position tochallenge Athens on the sea.
A debate on Cassara would takeplace over the matter during an
assembly of the citizens, thoughthe groundwork laid by the
conspirators would not take holdwithin the wider community to
(15:46):
the extent they initiallydesired.
The assembly would vote thatthe defensive alliance with
Athens should remain in place.
However, they would also lookto preserve, as the Thetides
puts it, their friendlyrelations with the
Peloponnesians.
This could be seen as a smallstep to the greater objective.
As we had previously seen,cassara, although part of the
(16:07):
Athenian alliance, did not wantto take an offensive posture.
They also wanted a stablerelationship with the
Peloponnesian coast, since theywere located so close to it.
Athens, although normally in aposition to dictate policy to
the member states, appears tohave made a compromise with
Cassara so that their fleetcould be secure.
This would not be the end ofthe attempts to change the
(16:29):
policy in Cassara, with thereturned prisoners now looking
to another angle.
For this, they would focus onthe democratic figure of Pythias
, who was seen to look afterAthenian interests in Cassara.
A charge would be levelled athim in an attempt to undermine
Cassara's alliance with Athens,with him accused of permitting
Athens to enslave Cassara.
In essence, they were accusinghim of traitorous activities
(16:52):
towards the island.
However, at this stage, itwould seem this connection to
its alliance with Athens andtreasonous activities was a long
bow to draw for the citizens ofthe island.
Pythias would be acquitted ofall these charges and would now
retaliate.
Seeing conflict develop betweenthe two, he would target the
five richest men of those whowere opposing him with a charge
(17:15):
of religious violation.
This charge would be successfuland, due to the sum of money
the guilty were required to pay,they would flee and seek
sanctuary in temples on theisland and beg for a
reassessment of the charges.
However, the penalty would beupheld.
Due to Pythias being a memberof the council that would take
on this role, he would convincehis colleagues to uphold the
(17:36):
original decision.
Now, though, the developments ofKassara were turned violent.
The returned prisoners wouldlearn that, with this victory
over their members, bethaias nowlooked to push Kassara's policy
further in Athens' favour.
Along with a defensive alliancethat was already in place, he
would seek to try and makeKassara a more complete ally
(17:56):
within the Athenian Empire, thisseeing the island being able to
act in an offensive manner.
This may be a point where thecitizens looked to align
themselves with either side ofKassarian politics.
Now that a policy could be seento be pulled in opposite
directions, even the democraticside was moving to make their
position more pro-Athenian.
The five guilty members wouldreunite with the other members
(18:19):
of their party and, having triedusing politics and law to
affect their agenda, they werenow turned to violence.
They would all align themselveswith daggers and would descend
on the council that Bethaias wasa member of.
They would kill him, along with60 others that were present.
However, a number of thosealigned with Bethaias' policies
were now able to escape andwould seek safety aboard an
(18:40):
Athenian trirem located in theport.
After this action, thosecommitting this massacre would
call an assembly so that theycould address the citizens of
the island and justify theiractions.
These entities would recordtheir justification.
What they had done was for thebest and would prevent the
island from being enslaved byAthens.
They propose that for thefuture, they should receive
(19:03):
neither side, except for onpeaceful terms and coming in not
more than one ship at a time.
Any greater number would beregarded as enemies.
This, on the surface, seemslike a measured approach,
treating both Athens andPeloponnesians the same, though
they probably knew all too wellthat, with this action, it would
be Athens that would respond.
(19:23):
So in this way, they werelooking to provide opposition to
Athens' involvement on Kassara.
In an attempt to try and keepAthens at bay, a delegation
would be sent to try and counterthe story of the Kassarian
Democratic refugees wouldprovide to prevent a response to
their revolution.
It's hard to believe that theyseriously thought that Athens
would be satisfied with what hadtaken place and leave them
(19:46):
alone.
The potential threat of theKassarian navy was too important
to ignore.
Perhaps their attempt atgaining talks with Athens was
more of an exercise in buyingtime so they could gain
Peloponnesian support.
Societies would tell us thatonce the delegation arrived in
Athens, they would be arrestedas revolutionaries.
Fighting on Kassara would nowbreak out between the Democrats
(20:09):
and who will now refer to as theoligarchic faction.
This appears to have beeninstigated by the arrival of a
Corinthian trirem, where Spartandelegates would also disembark
from.
This would mark a point wherethe oligarchs would organise an
attack on the Democrats of theisland and would see one of the
first pitch battles between thetwo sides.
However, the result would failto decide the fate of Kassara.
(20:31):
Although the Democrats weredefeated, they were able to
withdraw and capture a number ofhigh positions of the city,
with the Acropolis being one andthe seaward facing harbour,
while the oligarchs wouldcontrol the marketplace and the
harbour that faced the Greekmainland.
The Democrats would regroup andbegin building defensive works,
with just sporadic fightingtaking place over the next day.
(20:56):
Both sides, now entrenched intheir positions also looked to
garner more support for theirrespective sides.
They would focus on the slavepopulation of the island that
worked and resided in thesurrounding regions To try and
entice them to their side.
They would be offered thepromise of freedom.
The Democrats would be far moresuccessful in this attempt,
being able to attract themajority.
(21:16):
However, the oligarchs wouldalso receive reinforcements,
with some 800 mercenaries comingfrom the mainland.
It seems likely here that theSpartan delegation and Kassara
might have been instrumental insecuring these men.
The Democrats, after theseactivities, were in a more
advantageous position, being incontrol of the high ground and
(21:36):
having secured support from aslave population.
Fighting between the two sideswould now resume and due to this
democratic advantage they wouldbe victorious in this round of
fighting.
It appears the fighting wouldtake place in the streets, as
the cities would tell us thatthe women on the democratic side
assisted by throwing rift tilesfrom the houses at the enemy.
As night came on, the oligarchswere in full route and took
(22:01):
measures so that they would notall be slaughtered.
They would begin setting fireto all the houses around the
market to stop the Democratsadvance.
In doing this, they were sodesperate that they even
destroyed their own propertiesand risked destruction of the
city.
This setback would see that theCorinthian ship that had
brought the Spartan delegationdepart or risked being captured.
We would also see that themercenaries had had enough of
(22:24):
the defeats or had not been paidas they would make their way
back to the mainland.
However, this would not be theend of the revolution, as
troubles on Cassara had begun,both the Athenians and
Peloponnesians had been makingpreparations to sail for the
island.
The Peloponnesians would use 40ships that had been part of an
(22:44):
effort on Lesbos and, afterevading the Athenians, they had
made it back to the mainland.
After learning of therevolution breaking out, they
would strengthen this force andmake for the island in hope of
beating the Athenians there.
Athens, indeed, had alsoreceived word of the troubles
breaking out and would prepareto sail with 12 ships that they
had at Neopactus.
(23:05):
It would be the Athenians,under the command of Nicostratus
, that arrived first, and theywould look to try and bring
about a settlement between thetwo sides.
To help motivate a settlementbeing reached, the Athenians had
also brought with them a forceof 500 Messinian hoplites,
although what would be a rangewould seem to be thanks to a
mediation from Nicostratus, butwe do need to keep in mind the
(23:28):
outcome was to Athens' advantage.
The facilities would write hereonce endeavoured to bring about
a settlement and persuaded thetwo parties to agree together to
bring to trial 10 of theringleaders who were no longer
in the city, whilst the restwere to live in peace, making
terms with each other andentering into alliance with the
Athenians.
(23:50):
It would seem that the Athenianintervention had brought the
situation on Kossira undercontrol, though it appears that
the distrust and hatred that haddeveloped was too strong for
such a measured approach.
The 10 Ulegaks who were to betried fled, and when the
Athenians looked to depart theisland, the Democrats had
persuaded them to leave behindfive of their ships, while they
(24:11):
would send five of their ownwith crews to replace them.
The Democrats had convinced theAthenians that it did not trust
the Ulegaks to uphold theagreement.
This may have been a genuineconcern, but the Democrats would
also take measures tostrengthen their own position on
the island With the crews ofthe five ships that they were to
supply.
They had selected men who hadbeen part of the Ulegarchic
(24:32):
faction.
It would seem they wereattempting to weaken their
position on the island where theDemocrats could then do as they
pleased.
The Ulegaks saw what washappening here and feared some
sort of arrangement had beenhatched between Athens and the
Democrats.
They fled to the temples of theisland and would take up
sanctuary, fearing that theywould be taken back to Athens
(24:53):
with some terrible fate awaitingthem there.
The Athenians would attempt toreassure them that they had no
intention of taking them back toAthens, though the Ulegaks were
unmoved by their assurances.
The Democrats were now ready tohead out and kill the Ulegaks,
pointing out that theirbehaviour was proof that they
did not intend to be true to theagreement of the peace that was
(25:13):
worked out.
The situation was on the vergeof seeing a great slaughter
occur.
They had disarmed thosesympathetic to the Ulegaks, and
then they themselves would marchout to where the Ulegaks were
taking sanctuary.
However, the Athenians wereable to take measures that would
see that no further violencewould take place for now.
(25:35):
It was now, at this point, wherethe Peloponnesian fleet that
had been involved in theincident on Lesbos would arrive
at Kossara.
Their aim had been to try andbeat any major Athenian fleet
arriving on the island, and ontheir way they had picked up
another 13 Allied ships fromSalini, along with the Spartan
Brassidus, who was acting in anadvisory role.
With the arrival of this fleetin the waters around Kossara,
(25:58):
the Democrats looked to act anddefend their waters.
The Athenians, who were stillonly 12 ships strong, advised
against confronting thePeloponnesians in their
unorganised state and told themto unite in a combined force and
follow the Athenians.
Though this advice was ignoredand the disorganised and
undisciplined 60 Kossarian shipswent out to engage the
(26:18):
Peloponnesians, the two fleetswere nearly evenly matched in
numbers, but the KossarianDemocrats were easily defeated.
The Athenians had also gone outto oppose the enemy fleet and
would end up providing aneffective rearguard for the
Kossarians to make it back tothe island after their defeat.
The Peloponnesians themselveshad also hampered their efforts
at following up their initialvictory, as the defeated
(26:40):
Neopactors were still fresh intheir heads and they didn't want
to make the same mistake.
Panic had broken out in Kassaira.
With his defeat on sea, it wasthought that the Peloponnesians
would land and attack the cityand rescue the oligarchs.
However, the Peloponnesians didnot take this action and would
take back the ships they hadcaptured and made camp on the
(27:01):
mainland, although Brassidusurged the Peloponnesian
commanders to attack the island,while the Democrats were
confused and frightened the nextday or two would just result in
raids in nearby regions.
This pause would be fatal tothe Peloponnesians' aims in
Kassaira.
Word would reach them that afleet of 60 Athenian ships was
approaching.
This Athenian fleet had beenwhat the Peloponnesians had been
(27:25):
worried about and had beaten toKassaira, though the decisive
actions after their victory atsea now took away the advantage
they had held.
During the early naval battle,they had been cautious of
engaging the 12 Athenian vessels, but now, with the imminent
arrival of 60 more, there was noway they were going to oppose
them.
Now they would depart the areaunder the cover of darkness and
(27:47):
would head for home.
It was now at this point wherethe restraint of the Democratic
faction was completely shakenoff.
The departure of thePeloponnesian fleet had taken
away the one threat ofretaliation for their actions
within the island.
To begin with, the Democratswould engage in political
executions targeting thepolitical rivals of the opposing
(28:07):
faction.
We here, of one instance, wereabout 50 oligarchs taking
sanctuary where convinced tocome out and face trial.
However, this was for allintents and purposes a show
trial when all were found guiltyand executed.
The remainder of the oligarchs,who had just witnessed what
took place then within theconfines of the sanctuary,
(28:28):
killed one another rather thanexperience their fate at the
hands of the enemy.
However, as the violencecontinued, it began targeting
those who were perceived asenemies now, this being a very
subjective distinction.
It would allow for acts ofviolence for personal
motivations to take place Withthe cover of this was all done
(28:48):
in the name of preservingdemocracy on Kusara, the
violence would end up seeing nobounds With, as the acidity says
, death thus raged in everyshape and, as usually happens at
such times, there was no lengthto which they did not go.
Sons were killed by theirfathers and suppliants dragged
from the altar or slain upon it,while some were even walled up
(29:09):
in the temple of Dionysus anddied there.
All morality that had existedon the island was now gone.
All that seemed to matter wasthe citizens party membership.
Loyalty to one's faction wasthe only virtue that now counted
, while dark and evil schemesdirected towards the enemy were
admired.
What must also be noted wasthat the Athenians were present
(29:32):
during the heights of theviolence and appeared to have
stood by and let it play out.
What is interesting here is that, before the violence had
erupted on this level and the 12Athenian ships were present,
the Athenian commander,nicostratus, had encouraged
restraint and compromise betweenthe two factions.
This has led some to believethat he was acting from a
perspective of that of themoderates in Athens.
(29:53):
However, with the arrival ofthe 60 additional Athenian ships
, with its commander Eurymedon,this moderate approach seems to
have been dispensed with, withhim now seeming to be in command
.
It's argued that he wasactively encouraging the
revolution, though not directlytaking part.
He seems to fall more in linewith the policies of Clion and
(30:13):
viewed the moderate's approachas being ineffective.
How much of this dynamic istrue is difficult to say, as it
is also possible that the changein situation, with Athens being
present in superior numbers andthe Peloponnesians retreating
to the mainland, may have seenAthens able to now encourage
their policy at will, now thatno strong threat could counter
them or their allies that theywere supporting.
(30:36):
However, there would be no clearresolution to the fighting of
Gassira, as we would hear.
The Athenian fleet would sailaway, this probably taking place
when it was seen that thedemocrats had gained control
over the island.
Plus, the close of thecampaigning season was also in
the mind of the naval commanders, though the fighting on the
island would continue, some 500oligarchs would escape Gassira
(30:58):
and establish forts along themainland opposite, where Gassira
had exerted some influence.
They would gain control ofthese lands, but would continue
to harass the democrats, whichwould cause a famine on the
island to break out.
The oligarchs would also tryand regain support from Sparta
and Corinth to try andre-establish them on the island,
but would fail on this bid.
Instead, they would secure theservices of some mercenaries and
(31:22):
would arrange their owncampaign against the democrats.
They would sail over with 600men and burn their ships this,
as the Thetides says so thatthey had no hope except in
becoming masters of the country.
We would hear that by the endof 427, they were able to
capture Mount Estonia and maketheir base there, while they
(31:43):
would then continue on theirstruggle, gaining command of the
countryside.
This would see that therevolution would not resolve
itself in 427, and the fightingwould continue, with the
democrats in control of the cityand the oligarchs controlling
the countryside.
This episode Around the Troubleson Kasara would give Thysedades
an opportunity in his historyof the Peloponnesian War to
(32:06):
portray the horrificconsequences of civil strife
during a time of war.
The conditions of the largerwar would make the internal
strife of Kasara so much morevolatile, as Thysedades would
write.
In peace there would have beenneither the pretext nor the wish
to make such an invitation.
But in war, with an alliance,always at the command of either
(32:26):
faction, for the hurt of theiradversaries and their own
corresponding advantage,opportunities for bringing in
the foreigner were never wantingto the revolutionary parties.
Thysedades saw civil war onKasara provided the blueprint
and what would play out in otherplaces, that civil strife would
emerge through thePeloponnesian War.
The democratic factions wouldbe able to call upon Athens to
(32:49):
assist, while the oligarchscould seek Spartan assistance.
So to close out our episodetoday, I want to quickly look at
some of the themes thatThysedades would highlight and
focus on during his account ofthe civil war in Kasara and that
would translate into otherrevolutions that would develop.
The first focus is on humannature and political instability
(33:09):
.
Thysedades uses the events ofKasara to explore the darker
aspects of human nature and thedestructive consequences of
political instability.
The civil war serves as anexample of how internal strife
and factionalism within acity-state can lead to violence,
betrayal and the breakdown ofsocial norms.
His account also illustratesthe devastating effects of civil
(33:31):
strife on the social fabric ofa community.
Thysedades describes thebreakdown of traditional values,
the collapse of moral standardsand the erosion of trust among
citizens.
The violence and brutality thatemerged during the civil war
highlight the fragility ofsocial order in Kasara.
Thysedades would also emphasisehow the civil war corrupts
(33:52):
language and distortscommunication.
He describes how words losetheir meaning, rhetoric becomes
a tool of manipulation andpeople struggle to distinguish
between truth and falsehood.
This breakdown in communicationcontributes to the chaos and
confusion during the conflict.
As I have already pointed out,kasara would be but one policy
(34:12):
that would see revolution duringthe Peloponnesian War.
Thysedades uses the events ofKasara as a case study to draw
broader lessons about thecylindrical nature of political
upheaval in civil conflict.
His narrative suggests thatsimilar patterns of strife can
reoccur in different places andtimes, emphasising the timeless
and universal aspects of humanbehaviour in times of crisis.
(34:34):
Thysedades' account of Kasarahas also been interpreted as a
critique on democracy.
He suggests that the excessesof democracy, including the
influence of demagogues and theunchecked power of the masses,
can contribute to politicalinstability and civil unrest.
This theme resonates with hisoverall analysis of the causes
(34:54):
and consequences of thePeloponnesian War, which we have
looked at previously.
So in Thysedades' presentationof the Civil War on Kasara, we
can see several significantthemes that would apply not just
to this conflict but othersthat would follow.
These are best summed up in hisexploration of human nature,
the impact of civil strife insociety, the corruption of
(35:15):
language and the broaderhistorical patterns and lessons
that can be drawn from suchconflicts.
However, as we have the benefitof nearly 2,500 years of
hindsight, we can seriously askhow many times these lessons
need to be learned.
Thank you everyone for yourcontinued support, and a big
shout out to all those who havefound some value in the series
and have been supporting you onPatreon and other various ways.
(35:37):
Your contribution has trulyhelped me grow the series.
If you have also found somevalue in the show and wish to
support the series, you can headto
wwwCastingThrAncientGreececomand click on the Support the
Series button, where you candiscover many ways to extend
your support to helping theseries grow.
Be sure to stay connected andupdate on what's happening in
the series and join me over onFacebook or Instagram at
(35:59):
CastingThrAncientGreece, or onTwitter at CastingGreece, and be
sure to subscribe to the seriesover at the
CastingThrAncientGreece website.
I hope you can join me nexttime when we continue the
narrative in the series.
Death thus raged in every shape and, as usually
happens in such times, there wasno length to which they did not
go.
Sons were killed by theirfathers and suppliants strayed
from the altar or slain upon it,while some were even walled up
in the temple of Dionysus anddied there Thucydides.
Hello, I'm Arcele and welcomeback to Casting through Ancient
(00:37):
Greece, episode 81, the Terrorof War.
Last episode, we had focused onthe events to do with the city
of Mitalini on Lesbos, revoltingfrom the Athenian Empire.
We had seen that a conspiracyon the island had developed
where Mitalini looked to takecontrol of the other cities of
the island so that it would growits power and influence.
Lesbos was one of the fewmembers in the Athenian Empire
(01:00):
that still retained a level ofautonomy.
They were well aware thatAthens would not look favourably
on their actions to undertakethis goal.
For this reason, mitalinilooked to keep their intentions
and actions as secret aspossible, though they had taken
steps to be ready for when therevolt could no longer be hidden
.
They had begun to fortify thecity and their port, while they
(01:22):
also looked to secure grain andmercenaries from the Black Sea
region.
Though, being in a region thatwas under Athenian influence.
There would be others lookingin on their actions, such as
cities hostile towards them, aswell as detractors within their
own walls.
This would see that Athenswould become aware of Mitalini's
actions before they were ready.
(01:43):
Athens would respond to this newcrisis developing within their
empire.
First, they had disbelieved thereports, but would soon send
forces to attempt to bring thegrowing situation under control.
Once confirming revolt was inthe works.
However, athens had not sentenough troops to be able to
force the situation back totheir favour.
With Mitalini's rejection ofAthenian demands, mitalini,
(02:05):
seeing they were now forced toact before they were ready,
looked to buy time.
They sent a delegation toAthens to negotiate, though not
expecting anything to come ofthis endeavour.
However, they had also sent asecret envoy to Sparta to try
and secure aid and help themresist the Athenians.
After some hesitancy on behalfof Sparta, a combined
Peloponnesian assembly wouldagree to help Mitalini.
(02:28):
This would first come with anagreed second invasion of Attica
for 428, though this operationwould come undone when many of
the Peloponnesians would fail topresent themselves on the
Corinthian Isthmus as it was nowharvesting time in their lands
and many felt they had completedtheir obligations for the year
already, though, with the comingof the new campaigning season
in 427, a land and navaloperation would commence.
(02:52):
The plan was to invade Atticato prevent the Athenian sending
forces out that could intercepttheir fleet or provide
reinforcements to Lesbos, whilethe naval contingent would
provide direct support toMitalini something the Spartans
had been wary of the previousyear the plan had been for the
Peloponnesian fleet to remain inAttica until the fleet had
reached Lesbos.
(03:12):
Though the naval contingent wasadvancing through the Aegean
very cautiously and with no wordcoming back to the land forces,
they were forced to march hometo their cities once the
supplies had been used up.
During this time, mitalini wasalso forced to surrender to the
Athenians who had receivedreinforcements.
The previous winter Divisionswithin the classes of their
(03:32):
oligarchic system on Lesbos hadproven to undermine their
ability to maintain firmresistance.
The revolt ended.
Athens now turned to thequestion of what should be done
to the people of Mitalini.
The initial motions in Athenswas to see that a ship was sent
out with orders to put to deathall the men and make slaves of
the rest, though the next day anassembly would be held to
(03:53):
revisit this decision.
After much debate, a moremoderate approach would be
decided upon.
Only those directly responsiblefor the revolt would be
executed and the rest of thecity would be spared.
Though the first ship had afull days head start, so the
second ship would need to makeall haste if the people of
Mitalini were to be spared.
With plenty of incentivesprovided to them, the rowers
(04:16):
would make it to Lesbos inrecord time, and made it just as
the decree of the first shipwas being read out.
They'd arrive just in timebefore the orders could be
carried out, saving Mitalinifrom its terrible fate.
This episode will be staying inthe years 428 and 427, as we
cover two other major eventsthat took place.
For the first part of theepisode, we'll be heading back
(04:39):
to the small polis of Plataeathat was still under siege from
the Peloponnesians and theOceans.
Here we will look at how thesiege developed, from where we
left it when it was firstestablished.
We will then look at what wouldbring about the surrender of
Plataea and its fate.
Then, for the rest of theepisode, we'll find ourselves
back over in the island ofCossara, where events had begun
(04:59):
that would ignite the conditionsfor the Peloponnesian war to
break out.
The island would find itself inrevolution, as the democrats
would seek to remain allied toAthens, while the aristocrats,
who thought they were beingenslaved by Athens, wanted to
form an alliance with thePeloponnesians.
So let's first head back to thepolicy of Plataea to start
(05:19):
things off this episode.
During the same winter that therevolt on Mitalini was taking
place, plataea, to the north ofAttica, was still under siege by
the Peloponnesian Alliance.
As we saw, plataea had been thetarget of Peloponnesian actions
for 429,.
Instead of the usual invasionof Attica, though, the Spartans,
at the head of thePeloponnesians, would file and
(05:40):
capture the city from assault.
What would develop would be anelaborate game of moves and
counter moves that would resultin a state of siege setting in.
As the campaign season came toa close, the majority of the
Peloponnesians would march backfor their homes, though the
Beotians within thePeloponnesian League, mainly the
Thebans, would commit forces tokeep Plataea under siege, along
(06:01):
with the remainingPeloponnesians.
This would remain the state ofaffairs into the winter of
428-427, though the effects ofthe siege would now have time to
take its toll within the polis.
Their provisions that had beenused to keep the defenders
within Plataea fed were nowbeginning to run out.
These had last longer than theywould have, since a great deal
(06:22):
of the population had beenevacuated and sent to Athens.
This had left 400 Plataean men,80 Athenians and 110 women
within the city walls.
This would be a testament tothe formidable nature of the
Plataeans defences, with such asmall force being able to
prevent the city's capture.
Though even this small forcewould only be able to hold out
for so long before they wouldrun out of provisions.
(06:45):
With this being their currentsituation and no help appearing
to be coming from Athens, adesperate plea would now be
proposed to try and break thesiege.
It would be put forward thattheir only chance of survival
would be to force their waythrough the besiegers' lines.
To do this, they would alsoneed to breach the wall that the
Peloponnesians had built aroundPlataea.
This proposal of a daringbreakout appears to have been
(07:07):
met with enthusiasm when firstput forward.
However, as the defenders hadtime to reflect on the situation
and what was required, many hadshrunk back from this course of
action.
This would see that only halfthose behind the walls were
willing.
The rest had deemed that thissort of action was far too risky
.
Just over 200 of the defenderswould continue with their plans
(07:29):
for the breakout of the siege,these entities would tell us
that they would constructladders in preparation for their
attempt.
They had to ensure that theseladders would be the right
height for when reaching thePeloponnesian walls, so they had
many count the number of brickslaid upon each other.
In this way, they were able tocome up with an accurate
estimation of the height thatthey would need to scale.
However, it was not as simpleas just being able to clear this
(07:52):
one wall.
These entities give us apicture of what lay ahead of the
men during this escape.
There were, in fact, two wallseach forming a circle, one
directed against Plataea and onefacing outwards, to guard
against any attack that might bemade from Athens.
Between the two walls was aspace of about 16 feet, and
(08:12):
inside this space were built thehuts where the men on guard
were quartered.
The building was continuous, sothat the impression made was
that of a thick wall withbattlements on each side of it,
every 10 battlements.
There were towers of some sizeand of the same breadth as the
wall, reaching right across fromits inner to its outer face.
A built so that there was noway past the towers, the only
(08:36):
way being through the middle ofthem.
It appears, though, that thePlataeans had some intel on the
besieges and would wait for astormy night before making their
move.
These entities would tell usthat, during the rainy and
stormy weather, they wouldabandon the battlements and
would take up positions in thetowers, as these provided
shelter.
When bad weather finally didarrive, the plan would spring
(08:58):
into action.
The roughly 200 men would havea number of close calls in their
attempt, but, after capturing acouple of watchtowers and
breaching the walls with theirladder, they would end up
clearing the Peloponnesian lines.
This force, although originallyreported by some who had turned
back to Plataea as beingdestroyed, would end up making
it to the safety of Athens.
However, the fate of those whoremained behind would not have
(09:21):
the same fortunate outcome.
The siege would continue throughthe winter and into the summer
of 427, where, finally, the lackof supplies, along with the
reduced numbers, would seed thePlataea could not mount an
effective defence.
This realisation had come whenthe Peloponnesians had attempted
an attack on one part of thewall.
They would find that they wouldbe met with very little
(09:44):
resistance.
Instead of continuing theattack and taking the polis by
storm, the Spartan commanderswould turn to negotiations
instead.
Residuities tells us this wasbecause Sparta had issued orders
that, if possible, plataeashould not be captured but be
seen to have come over to thePeloponnesians voluntarily.
This was supposedly due to aview to the future where, if a
(10:06):
peach treaty should be agreed to, it was thought cities that
were captured by force wouldhave to be given back.
It is also possible that, afterseeing how little resistance was
being encountered, the Spartansdid not want to risk losing men
in assault on the city that wason the edge of capitulation.
That could be achieved throughless forceful means.
However, if what the Sididesrecords is correct, it is
(10:28):
interesting to note that thiswould be our first hint that
Sparta did see that a negotiatedpeace was a possible outcome.
A herald would be sent into thecity in an attempt to secure
the Plataea's surrender.
The herald would make it knownthat the guilty would be
punished, but not without a fairtrial.
Being completely exhausted andon the edge of starvation, the
(10:49):
Plataea's would voluntarily giveover the city.
The defenders would be providedfor by the Peloponnesians,
seeing that they were fed andwarded.
However, this would only lastfor a few days until five
magistrates from Sparta wouldarrive to administer punishment
on the defenders.
Here, the promise of a fairtrial would seem to go by the
wayside, with the magistratesonly putting forward one
(11:10):
question have you done anythingto help the Spartans and their
allies in the present war?
It was clear that the Spartanshad already made up their minds
on the fate of the defenders ofthe Plataea.
However, they would entertainthe Plataeans to put forward
their case in a long speech.
This speech was articulated sowell that it put forward a
logical defence and evenembarrassed those who are
(11:31):
listening.
The Thebans, who were alsopresent, saw that what the
Plataeans put forward couldthreaten the predetermined
outcome that was probablydiscussed within the
Peloponnesian League, and theywould respond with their own
speech in an attempt to havethose listening put back on
course.
This would seem to have thedesired effect, as, instead of
being swayed by the Plataeanslong plea, the Spartans would
(11:52):
simply ask again have you doneanything to help the Spartans
and their allies in the presentwar, to which the Plataeans
would have to answer no?
Thucydides would tell us thateach man was asked this question
individually and as each oneanswered no, they were taken
away and executed.
This would see that almost 200of the defenders were put to
(12:13):
death, including 25 Athenianswho had been assisting Plataea.
The women who remained in thecity were made slaves and the
city itself was razed to theground.
New building projects wereconstructed at the site of the
Temple of Hera and eventually,the site of Plataea was handed
over to Thebes.
To finish off this chapteraround Plataea, thucydides would
(12:34):
tell us that the reason forSparta acting in such a
merciless way towards Plataeawas for political purposes.
As we have spoken about before,sparta recognised that, if the
Peloponnesian War was to drag on, thebes would be an important
ally to help exhaust Athens.
They were still looking to thislong game and needed to keep
Thebes as a willing participant.
There would be no better way todo this than hand over to them
(12:57):
the city in Biosha that had beena thorn in their side when it
came to try and unite the wholeregion under their leadership.
Thucydides would record thatthis was the end of Plataea.
As a polis, though, as he diedbefore the end of the
Peloponnesian War, he would notknow that Plataea would be
restored by Sparta in 386 BC.
(13:18):
So now that we have reached theresolution of the siege of
Plataea, we are now going toturn to the crisis that would
develop into civil war.
This would be on the island ofCassara, who had been central in
the road to the opening of thePeloponnesian War.
The island had put themselvesin alliance with Athens, but
divisions within their societywould soon see violence erupt.
The root of these troubleswould stem from before the
(13:40):
breakout of the PeloponnesianWar when, in 433, at the Battle
of Sabota that Cassara had facedoff against Corinth, 250
Cassareans had been takencaptive.
They had been brought back toCorinth and treated with respect
, and their loyalty won over.
Now, six years after theircapture, corinth would send them
back to their home island withthe hope that they would subvert
(14:02):
the Pro-Authenian policy withinCassara.
The beginnings of civil warwould find itself in the change
of policy these newlyrepatriated men would try and
put forward.
These men had only known thealliance with Athens for a short
time, unlike the rest of theisland.
However, to begin with, theCassareans did not suspect any
conspiracy and had believed thestory that the captives had been
(14:25):
released due to enormous ransombeing paid.
However, this ransom was acover provided by Corinth, who
were looking to spread troublewithin Cassara.
Once back on Cassara, these menwould begin work on attempting
to influence change in policy.
They would attempt to push forthe island to revert back to
their traditional position ofneutrality, rather than being
(14:45):
tied to another power.
In this way, they tried to havethe island remove itself from
the Athenial alliance.
However, it appears that theyhad recognised pushing for an
alliance with the Peloponnesianswould be a step too far and
would raise suspicions.
By arguing for a position ofneutrality, they would be able
to keep the appearance ofcredibility, since it had been
(15:05):
Cassara's traditional stance.
This would be a first step inthe island potentially ending up
as a Peloponnesian Leaguemember.
Incremental changes in policywould eventually lead to the
desired outcome.
If a change in policy could beaffected, this would greatly
damage Athens' position.
As you may remember from ourpast episodes, cassara had the
(15:26):
third largest fleet in the Greekworld, behind Athens and
Corinth.
If the Peloponnesians couldsecure Cassara as an ally, they
would be in a position tochallenge Athens on the sea.
A debate on Cassara would takeplace over the matter during an
assembly of the citizens, thoughthe groundwork laid by the
conspirators would not take holdwithin the wider community to
(15:46):
the extent they initiallydesired.
The assembly would vote thatthe defensive alliance with
Athens should remain in place.
However, they would also lookto preserve, as the Thetides
puts it, their friendlyrelations with the
Peloponnesians.
This could be seen as a smallstep to the greater objective.
As we had previously seen,cassara, although part of the
(16:07):
Athenian alliance, did not wantto take an offensive posture.
They also wanted a stablerelationship with the
Peloponnesian coast, since theywere located so close to it.
Athens, although normally in aposition to dictate policy to
the member states, appears tohave made a compromise with
Cassara so that their fleetcould be secure.
This would not be the end ofthe attempts to change the
(16:29):
policy in Cassara, with thereturned prisoners now looking
to another angle.
For this, they would focus onthe democratic figure of Pythias
, who was seen to look afterAthenian interests in Cassara.
A charge would be levelled athim in an attempt to undermine
Cassara's alliance with Athens,with him accused of permitting
Athens to enslave Cassara.
In essence, they were accusinghim of traitorous activities
(16:52):
towards the island.
However, at this stage, itwould seem this connection to
its alliance with Athens andtreasonous activities was a long
bow to draw for the citizens ofthe island.
Pythias would be acquitted ofall these charges and would now
retaliate.
Seeing conflict develop betweenthe two, he would target the
five richest men of those whowere opposing him with a charge
(17:15):
of religious violation.
This charge would be successfuland, due to the sum of money
the guilty were required to pay,they would flee and seek
sanctuary in temples on theisland and beg for a
reassessment of the charges.
However, the penalty would beupheld.
Due to Pythias being a memberof the council that would take
on this role, he would convincehis colleagues to uphold the
(17:36):
original decision.
Now, though, the developments ofKassara were turned violent.
The returned prisoners wouldlearn that, with this victory
over their members, bethaias nowlooked to push Kassara's policy
further in Athens' favour.
Along with a defensive alliancethat was already in place, he
would seek to try and makeKassara a more complete ally
(17:56):
within the Athenian Empire, thisseeing the island being able to
act in an offensive manner.
This may be a point where thecitizens looked to align
themselves with either side ofKassarian politics.
Now that a policy could be seento be pulled in opposite
directions, even the democraticside was moving to make their
position more pro-Athenian.
The five guilty members wouldreunite with the other members
(18:19):
of their party and, having triedusing politics and law to
affect their agenda, they werenow turned to violence.
They would all align themselveswith daggers and would descend
on the council that Bethaias wasa member of.
They would kill him, along with60 others that were present.
However, a number of thosealigned with Bethaias' policies
were now able to escape andwould seek safety aboard an
(18:40):
Athenian trirem located in theport.
After this action, thosecommitting this massacre would
call an assembly so that theycould address the citizens of
the island and justify theiractions.
These entities would recordtheir justification.
What they had done was for thebest and would prevent the
island from being enslaved byAthens.
They propose that for thefuture, they should receive
(19:03):
neither side, except for onpeaceful terms and coming in not
more than one ship at a time.
Any greater number would beregarded as enemies.
This, on the surface, seemslike a measured approach,
treating both Athens andPeloponnesians the same, though
they probably knew all too wellthat, with this action, it would
be Athens that would respond.
(19:23):
So in this way, they werelooking to provide opposition to
Athens' involvement on Kassara.
In an attempt to try and keepAthens at bay, a delegation
would be sent to try and counterthe story of the Kassarian
Democratic refugees wouldprovide to prevent a response to
their revolution.
It's hard to believe that theyseriously thought that Athens
would be satisfied with what hadtaken place and leave them
(19:46):
alone.
The potential threat of theKassarian navy was too important
to ignore.
Perhaps their attempt atgaining talks with Athens was
more of an exercise in buyingtime so they could gain
Peloponnesian support.
Societies would tell us thatonce the delegation arrived in
Athens, they would be arrestedas revolutionaries.
Fighting on Kassara would nowbreak out between the Democrats
(20:09):
and who will now refer to as theoligarchic faction.
This appears to have beeninstigated by the arrival of a
Corinthian trirem, where Spartandelegates would also disembark
from.
This would mark a point wherethe oligarchs would organise an
attack on the Democrats of theisland and would see one of the
first pitch battles between thetwo sides.
However, the result would failto decide the fate of Kassara.
(20:31):
Although the Democrats weredefeated, they were able to
withdraw and capture a number ofhigh positions of the city,
with the Acropolis being one andthe seaward facing harbour,
while the oligarchs wouldcontrol the marketplace and the
harbour that faced the Greekmainland.
The Democrats would regroup andbegin building defensive works,
with just sporadic fightingtaking place over the next day.
(20:56):
Both sides, now entrenched intheir positions also looked to
garner more support for theirrespective sides.
They would focus on the slavepopulation of the island that
worked and resided in thesurrounding regions To try and
entice them to their side.
They would be offered thepromise of freedom.
The Democrats would be far moresuccessful in this attempt,
being able to attract themajority.
(21:16):
However, the oligarchs wouldalso receive reinforcements,
with some 800 mercenaries comingfrom the mainland.
It seems likely here that theSpartan delegation and Kassara
might have been instrumental insecuring these men.
The Democrats, after theseactivities, were in a more
advantageous position, being incontrol of the high ground and
(21:36):
having secured support from aslave population.
Fighting between the two sideswould now resume and due to this
democratic advantage they wouldbe victorious in this round of
fighting.
It appears the fighting wouldtake place in the streets, as
the cities would tell us thatthe women on the democratic side
assisted by throwing rift tilesfrom the houses at the enemy.
As night came on, the oligarchswere in full route and took
(22:01):
measures so that they would notall be slaughtered.
They would begin setting fireto all the houses around the
market to stop the Democratsadvance.
In doing this, they were sodesperate that they even
destroyed their own propertiesand risked destruction of the
city.
This setback would see that theCorinthian ship that had
brought the Spartan delegationdepart or risked being captured.
We would also see that themercenaries had had enough of
(22:24):
the defeats or had not been paidas they would make their way
back to the mainland.
However, this would not be theend of the revolution, as
troubles on Cassara had begun,both the Athenians and
Peloponnesians had been makingpreparations to sail for the
island.
The Peloponnesians would use 40ships that had been part of an
(22:44):
effort on Lesbos and, afterevading the Athenians, they had
made it back to the mainland.
After learning of therevolution breaking out, they
would strengthen this force andmake for the island in hope of
beating the Athenians there.
Athens, indeed, had alsoreceived word of the troubles
breaking out and would prepareto sail with 12 ships that they
had at Neopactus.
(23:05):
It would be the Athenians,under the command of Nicostratus
, that arrived first, and theywould look to try and bring
about a settlement between thetwo sides.
To help motivate a settlementbeing reached, the Athenians had
also brought with them a forceof 500 Messinian hoplites,
although what would be a rangewould seem to be thanks to a
mediation from Nicostratus, butwe do need to keep in mind the
(23:28):
outcome was to Athens' advantage.
The facilities would write hereonce endeavoured to bring about
a settlement and persuaded thetwo parties to agree together to
bring to trial 10 of theringleaders who were no longer
in the city, whilst the restwere to live in peace, making
terms with each other andentering into alliance with the
Athenians.
(23:50):
It would seem that the Athenianintervention had brought the
situation on Kossira undercontrol, though it appears that
the distrust and hatred that haddeveloped was too strong for
such a measured approach.
The 10 Ulegaks who were to betried fled, and when the
Athenians looked to depart theisland, the Democrats had
persuaded them to leave behindfive of their ships, while they
(24:11):
would send five of their ownwith crews to replace them.
The Democrats had convinced theAthenians that it did not trust
the Ulegaks to uphold theagreement.
This may have been a genuineconcern, but the Democrats would
also take measures tostrengthen their own position on
the island With the crews ofthe five ships that they were to
supply.
They had selected men who hadbeen part of the Ulegarchic
(24:32):
faction.
It would seem they wereattempting to weaken their
position on the island where theDemocrats could then do as they
pleased.
The Ulegaks saw what washappening here and feared some
sort of arrangement had beenhatched between Athens and the
Democrats.
They fled to the temples of theisland and would take up
sanctuary, fearing that theywould be taken back to Athens
(24:53):
with some terrible fate awaitingthem there.
The Athenians would attempt toreassure them that they had no
intention of taking them back toAthens, though the Ulegaks were
unmoved by their assurances.
The Democrats were now ready tohead out and kill the Ulegaks,
pointing out that theirbehaviour was proof that they
did not intend to be true to theagreement of the peace that was
(25:13):
worked out.
The situation was on the vergeof seeing a great slaughter
occur.
They had disarmed thosesympathetic to the Ulegaks, and
then they themselves would marchout to where the Ulegaks were
taking sanctuary.
However, the Athenians wereable to take measures that would
see that no further violencewould take place for now.
(25:35):
It was now, at this point, wherethe Peloponnesian fleet that
had been involved in theincident on Lesbos would arrive
at Kossara.
Their aim had been to try andbeat any major Athenian fleet
arriving on the island, and ontheir way they had picked up
another 13 Allied ships fromSalini, along with the Spartan
Brassidus, who was acting in anadvisory role.
With the arrival of this fleetin the waters around Kossara,
(25:58):
the Democrats looked to act anddefend their waters.
The Athenians, who were stillonly 12 ships strong, advised
against confronting thePeloponnesians in their
unorganised state and told themto unite in a combined force and
follow the Athenians.
Though this advice was ignoredand the disorganised and
undisciplined 60 Kossarian shipswent out to engage the
(26:18):
Peloponnesians, the two fleetswere nearly evenly matched in
numbers, but the KossarianDemocrats were easily defeated.
The Athenians had also gone outto oppose the enemy fleet and
would end up providing aneffective rearguard for the
Kossarians to make it back tothe island after their defeat.
The Peloponnesians themselveshad also hampered their efforts
at following up their initialvictory, as the defeated
(26:40):
Neopactors were still fresh intheir heads and they didn't want
to make the same mistake.
Panic had broken out in Kassaira.
With his defeat on sea, it wasthought that the Peloponnesians
would land and attack the cityand rescue the oligarchs.
However, the Peloponnesians didnot take this action and would
take back the ships they hadcaptured and made camp on the
(27:01):
mainland, although Brassidusurged the Peloponnesian
commanders to attack the island,while the Democrats were
confused and frightened the nextday or two would just result in
raids in nearby regions.
This pause would be fatal tothe Peloponnesians' aims in
Kassaira.
Word would reach them that afleet of 60 Athenian ships was
approaching.
This Athenian fleet had beenwhat the Peloponnesians had been
(27:25):
worried about and had beaten toKassaira, though the decisive
actions after their victory atsea now took away the advantage
they had held.
During the early naval battle,they had been cautious of
engaging the 12 Athenian vessels, but now, with the imminent
arrival of 60 more, there was noway they were going to oppose
them.
Now they would depart the areaunder the cover of darkness and
(27:47):
would head for home.
It was now at this point wherethe restraint of the Democratic
faction was completely shakenoff.
The departure of thePeloponnesian fleet had taken
away the one threat ofretaliation for their actions
within the island.
To begin with, the Democratswould engage in political
executions targeting thepolitical rivals of the opposing
(28:07):
faction.
We here, of one instance, wereabout 50 oligarchs taking
sanctuary where convinced tocome out and face trial.
However, this was for allintents and purposes a show
trial when all were found guiltyand executed.
The remainder of the oligarchs,who had just witnessed what
took place then within theconfines of the sanctuary,
(28:28):
killed one another rather thanexperience their fate at the
hands of the enemy.
However, as the violencecontinued, it began targeting
those who were perceived asenemies now, this being a very
subjective distinction.
It would allow for acts ofviolence for personal
motivations to take place Withthe cover of this was all done
(28:48):
in the name of preservingdemocracy on Kusara, the
violence would end up seeing nobounds With, as the acidity says
, death thus raged in everyshape and, as usually happens at
such times, there was no lengthto which they did not go.
Sons were killed by theirfathers and suppliants dragged
from the altar or slain upon it,while some were even walled up
(29:09):
in the temple of Dionysus anddied there.
All morality that had existedon the island was now gone.
All that seemed to matter wasthe citizens party membership.
Loyalty to one's faction wasthe only virtue that now counted
, while dark and evil schemesdirected towards the enemy were
admired.
What must also be noted wasthat the Athenians were present
(29:32):
during the heights of theviolence and appeared to have
stood by and let it play out.
What is interesting here is that, before the violence had
erupted on this level and the 12Athenian ships were present,
the Athenian commander,nicostratus, had encouraged
restraint and compromise betweenthe two factions.
This has led some to believethat he was acting from a
perspective of that of themoderates in Athens.
(29:53):
However, with the arrival ofthe 60 additional Athenian ships
, with its commander Eurymedon,this moderate approach seems to
have been dispensed with, withhim now seeming to be in command
.
It's argued that he wasactively encouraging the
revolution, though not directlytaking part.
He seems to fall more in linewith the policies of Clion and
(30:13):
viewed the moderate's approachas being ineffective.
How much of this dynamic istrue is difficult to say, as it
is also possible that the changein situation, with Athens being
present in superior numbers andthe Peloponnesians retreating
to the mainland, may have seenAthens able to now encourage
their policy at will, now thatno strong threat could counter
them or their allies that theywere supporting.
(30:36):
However, there would be no clearresolution to the fighting of
Gassira, as we would hear.
The Athenian fleet would sailaway, this probably taking place
when it was seen that thedemocrats had gained control
over the island.
Plus, the close of thecampaigning season was also in
the mind of the naval commanders, though the fighting on the
island would continue, some 500oligarchs would escape Gassira
(30:58):
and establish forts along themainland opposite, where Gassira
had exerted some influence.
They would gain control ofthese lands, but would continue
to harass the democrats, whichwould cause a famine on the
island to break out.
The oligarchs would also tryand regain support from Sparta
and Corinth to try andre-establish them on the island,
but would fail on this bid.
Instead, they would secure theservices of some mercenaries and
(31:22):
would arrange their owncampaign against the democrats.
They would sail over with 600men and burn their ships this,
as the Thetides says so thatthey had no hope except in
becoming masters of the country.
We would hear that by the endof 427, they were able to
capture Mount Estonia and maketheir base there, while they
(31:43):
would then continue on theirstruggle, gaining command of the
countryside.
This would see that therevolution would not resolve
itself in 427, and the fightingwould continue, with the
democrats in control of the cityand the oligarchs controlling
the countryside.
This episode Around the Troubleson Kasara would give Thysedades
an opportunity in his historyof the Peloponnesian War to
(32:06):
portray the horrificconsequences of civil strife
during a time of war.
The conditions of the largerwar would make the internal
strife of Kasara so much morevolatile, as Thysedades would
write.
In peace there would have beenneither the pretext nor the wish
to make such an invitation.
But in war, with an alliance,always at the command of either
(32:26):
faction, for the hurt of theiradversaries and their own
corresponding advantage,opportunities for bringing in
the foreigner were never wantingto the revolutionary parties.
Thysedades saw civil war onKasara provided the blueprint
and what would play out in otherplaces, that civil strife would
emerge through thePeloponnesian War.
The democratic factions wouldbe able to call upon Athens to
(32:49):
assist, while the oligarchscould seek Spartan assistance.
So to close out our episodetoday, I want to quickly look at
some of the themes thatThysedades would highlight and
focus on during his account ofthe civil war in Kasara and that
would translate into otherrevolutions that would develop.
The first focus is on humannature and political instability
(33:09):
.
Thysedades uses the events ofKasara to explore the darker
aspects of human nature and thedestructive consequences of
political instability.
The civil war serves as anexample of how internal strife
and factionalism within acity-state can lead to violence,
betrayal and the breakdown ofsocial norms.
His account also illustratesthe devastating effects of civil
(33:31):
strife on the social fabric ofa community.
Thysedades describes thebreakdown of traditional values,
the collapse of moral standardsand the erosion of trust among
citizens.
The violence and brutality thatemerged during the civil war
highlight the fragility ofsocial order in Kasara.
Thysedades would also emphasisehow the civil war corrupts
(33:52):
language and distortscommunication.
He describes how words losetheir meaning, rhetoric becomes
a tool of manipulation andpeople struggle to distinguish
between truth and falsehood.
This breakdown in communicationcontributes to the chaos and
confusion during the conflict.
As I have already pointed out,kasara would be but one policy
(34:12):
that would see revolution duringthe Peloponnesian War.
Thysedades uses the events ofKasara as a case study to draw
broader lessons about thecylindrical nature of political
upheaval in civil conflict.
His narrative suggests thatsimilar patterns of strife can
reoccur in different places andtimes, emphasising the timeless
and universal aspects of humanbehaviour in times of crisis.
(34:34):
Thysedades' account of Kasarahas also been interpreted as a
critique on democracy.
He suggests that the excessesof democracy, including the
influence of demagogues and theunchecked power of the masses,
can contribute to politicalinstability and civil unrest.
This theme resonates with hisoverall analysis of the causes
(34:54):
and consequences of thePeloponnesian War, which we have
looked at previously.
So in Thysedades' presentationof the Civil War on Kasara, we
can see several significantthemes that would apply not just
to this conflict but othersthat would follow.
These are best summed up in hisexploration of human nature,
the impact of civil strife insociety, the corruption of
(35:15):
language and the broaderhistorical patterns and lessons
that can be drawn from suchconflicts.
However, as we have the benefitof nearly 2,500 years of
hindsight, we can seriously askhow many times these lessons
need to be learned.
Thank you everyone for yourcontinued support, and a big
shout out to all those who havefound some value in the series
and have been supporting you onPatreon and other various ways.
(35:37):
Your contribution has trulyhelped me grow the series.
If you have also found somevalue in the show and wish to
support the series, you can headto
wwwCastingThrAncientGreececomand click on the Support the
Series button, where you candiscover many ways to extend
your support to helping theseries grow.
Be sure to stay connected andupdate on what's happening in
the series and join me over onFacebook or Instagram at
(35:59):
CastingThrAncientGreece, or onTwitter at CastingGreece, and be
sure to subscribe to the seriesover at the
CastingThrAncientGreece website.
I hope you can join me nexttime when we continue the
narrative in the series.
Popular Podcasts
Stuff You Should Know
If you've ever wanted to know about champagne, satanism, the Stonewall Uprising, chaos theory, LSD, El Nino, true crime and Rosa Parks, then look no further. Josh and Chuck have you covered.
Law & Order: Criminal Justice System - Season 1 & Season 2
Season Two Out Now! Law & Order: Criminal Justice System tells the real stories behind the landmark cases that have shaped how the most dangerous and influential criminals in America are prosecuted. In its second season, the series tackles the threat of terrorism in the United States. From the rise of extremist political groups in the 60s to domestic lone wolves in the modern day, we explore how organizations like the FBI and Joint Terrorism Take Force have evolved to fight back against a multitude of terrorist threats.
Dateline NBC
Current and classic episodes, featuring compelling true-crime mysteries, powerful documentaries and in-depth investigations. Follow now to get the latest episodes of Dateline NBC completely free, or subscribe to Dateline Premium for ad-free listening and exclusive bonus content: DatelinePremium.com