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May 25, 2024 43 mins

The Athenian expedition to Sicily was an unexpected chapter in the Peloponnesian War, characterized by strategic missteps and unforeseen outcomes. As the Athenian fleet set out to aid their allies in Sicily against Syracuse, they found themselves caught in the whirlwind of war that stretched across the Greek world. From the Athenian prisoners on Sphacteria to the civil unrest in Corcyra, each event cascaded into the next, shaping the trajectory of the war. The delayed arrival of Athenian reinforcements to Sicily allowed Syracuse to regroup and counter-attack, leading to a stalemate that ultimately required Athenian withdrawal—a testament to the volatility of war and the importance of timely strategic decisions.

Amidst this complex backdrop, the Battle of Pylos stands as a testament to Athenian ingenuity and Spartan bravery. Demosthenes, the Athenian commander, overcame limited resources to construct strategic defenses at Pylos, setting the stage for a confrontation that would defy the expectations of both sides. The Spartans launched a ferocious assault, only to be repelled by the clever positioning and steadfastness of the Athenian defenders. The subsequent arrival of the Athenian fleet tipped the scales, demonstrating the razor-thin margin between victory and defeat in ancient warfare.

The political theatre that followed was equally charged. The peace negotiations between Athens and Sparta revealed the delicate balance of power and the grave consequences of political decisions. Sparta's willingness to negotiate due to the potential loss of their elite hoplites showcased the high stakes of the conflict. Yet, the breakdown of talks plunged the Greek world back into the throes of war, underscoring the fragility of peace in a time of unyielding ambition and honour.

The Siege of Sphacteria, a decisive engagement in the war, illustrated the strategic acumen of the Athenians under the joint command of Cleon and Demosthenes. Employing a mix of hoplites, archers, and light troops, the Athenians outmanoeuvred the Spartans, ultimately forcing a surrender that marked a watershed moment in Greek warfare. This victory, however, was not without its political machinations. The intense debates within the Athenian Assembly, the advocacy of Cleon, and the opposition from Nicias revealed the intricate relationship between military action and political manoeuvring.

The surrender of the Spartan forces on Sphacteria was a moment that altered the course of the Peloponnesian War. The image of Spartan warriors, famed for their indomitable spirit, surrendering to their Athenian captors was a stark contrast to their ancestors' last stand at Thermopylae. This historic event not only shifted the balance of power but also sent ripples through the societal structures of Sparta, igniting fears of helot uprisings and prompting desperate, yet futile, diplomatic efforts to reclaim Pylos and negotiate peace.

In sum, the Peloponnesian War's defining moments—from the Athenian naval might to the Spartan surrender on land—paint a vivid portrait of ancient warfare, political dynamics, and the enduring human quest for dominance. It's a narrative that continues to resonate through the ages, reminding us of the timeless lesso

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Transcript

Episode Transcript

Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:15):
Indeed, people could scarcely believe that those who
had surrendered were of the samestuff as the fallen, and an
Athenian ally, who sometimeafter insultingly asked one of
the prisoners from the island ifthose who had fallen were noble
and good men, received foranswer that the arrow would be
worth a great deal if it couldpick out a noble and good man

(00:35):
from the rest, in allusion tothe fact that the killed were
those whom the stones and arrowshappened to hit Thucydides.
Hello, I'm Mark Selleck andwelcome back to Casting Through
Ancient Greece, episode 85,surrender Asphacteria.
In our last few episodes wehave been looking at Athens'

(00:55):
activities in the West.
We had seen that Athens wouldbecome involved in the civil war
that developed on Corsaira.
This had broken out when agroup of Corsairan captives were
released by the Corinthians.
These men had been capturedduring the battles that had
taken place around the islandjust before the breakout of the
Peloponnesian War.
Now, after a number of years incaptivity and perhaps some

(01:16):
re-education by the Corinthians,they were sent back home.
This was done with the hopethat these men would be able to
change the pro-Athenian policythat had now developed there.
Corsaira had traditionally beenneutral.
However, the Peloponnesianswere hoping they could influence
policy on the island enough sothat they would come to their
side during the war.
The result of the repatriationof these men would eventually

(01:40):
lead to civil war breaking out.
Both Athens and Sparta wouldbecome involved, as both knew
the importance of the island.
Caesarea had the third largestfleet when it came to the Greek
cities of the mainland, thisbeing enough to help tip the
balance when it came to seapower.

(02:00):
Initially, athens had takensomewhat of an advisory role,
but would eventually come toassist the democratic side.
With a bit more enthusiasm, thedemocrats would come to regain
control of most of the island,with the oligarchs setting up a
camp across the mainland.
The civil war would continue,but with the Peloponnesian fleet
defeated and the democratsholding the island, athens would
depart.
The next action that leads usinto today's episode would come

(02:23):
when Athens would vote to sendan expedition to assist Leotini
on the island of Sicily againstSyracuse.
We did explore a range ofreasons why Athens may be
looking to engage in thiscampaign, as at first glance it
seemed to be a distraction fromthe focus of fighting the
Peloponnesians.
Here we saw that there may havebeen indirect means in harming

(02:43):
the Peloponnesians or gain anadvantage for themselves with
this action far west.
Initially, the Athenians, withtheir allies in southern Italy
and on Sicily, would succeed ingaining a foothold on the island
and expanding it.
At this point, where it lookedas though Athens held the
advantage, their allies wouldrequest reinforcements from
Athens that would help bring thecampaign to a close sooner.

(03:03):
Request reinforcements fromAthens that would help bring the
campaign to a close sooner.
Athens would agree to thisrequest and a fleet would be
prepared and sent off, thoughthey would arrive too late to be
of any offensive use indefeating Syracuse.
Events around this reinforcingfleet will be the focus of our
episode today.
We will see that they would notmake directly for Sicily and
would assist in other areasaround western Greece.
This would prove to be Athens'undoing in this first Sicilian

(03:26):
expedition, as Syracuse would beable to arrange a counter
attack against Athens' advances,seeing them having to fall back
to the southern Italian city ofRegium.
Had these reinforcementsarrived in time, they would have
probably been able to counterthe Syracusan attacks or reverse
them.
In the end, athens, with theirSicilian allies coming to a

(03:47):
truce on the island, would endup sailing home once the
reinforcing fleet did arrive.
So, as I said, it will be theactions around this reinforcing
fleet that we'll be focusing ontoday.
As we will see, they wouldbecome involved in a significant
engagement that would takeplace on the western coast of
the Peloponnese, while alsofurther assisting Corsaira.

(04:08):
So let's get started by lookingat the fleet that would be
arranged, their commanders andwhat orders they received.
Athens would answer the pleasmade by their allies on Sicily
to send more ships and men tohelp close the campaign out more
quickly.
Thucydides tells us that theAthenians found the idea of
wrapping up the campaign onSicily quickly favourable, while

(04:31):
they also saw that it would behelpful in gaining much-needed
experience for their crews.
However, as we will see whenlooking at the orders of the
fleet, it appears that Athenswas looking to deal with other
areas at the same time,therefore, killing two birds
with one stone.
Forty ships would be assembledto make up this fleet, with the
generals Eurymedon and Sophoclesin command.

(04:54):
Their orders, according toThucydides, would be, as they
sailed up the coast, to do whatthey could for the Corsairians
in the city, who were sufferingfrom the raids made on them by
the exiled party in themountains.
We had seen that the civil waron Corsaira had been ongoing
when we left events there a fewepisodes ago, but raids from the
oligarchs continued, with thembeing able to operate out of the

(05:16):
mountain regions of the island.
Also, the Peloponnesians hadreturned with a fleet of 60
ships to help support theoligarchs.
This increased activity sawthat Athens needed to make
another appearance to stopSparta's influence from gaining
traction.
However, there would also beanother part to these orders,
with Thucydides writing.
Demosthenes, since his returnfrom Icarnia, held no official

(05:41):
position, but the Atheniansallowed him, at his own request,
to make what use he liked ofthis fleet of theirs on their
way around the Peloponnese.
Why Demosthenes was allowed totravel with the fleet and
afforded this privilege is notreally spelled out to us, but it
seems he had become popular inAthens after his campaign the
previous year.

(06:02):
The orders given to Eurymedonand Sophocles were given in the
belief that the campaign onSicily was going all in their
favour, so there saw no rush forthe fleet to make it there.
This meant they could deal withmultiple issues with the same
force, something that would havebeen desirable now that money
and manpower was beginning to bemuch tighter.
The fleet would set sail fromthe Piraeus with their cause,

(06:24):
taking them around the south ofthe Peloponnese, then heading
north along the western side.
Not long after setting out, thecommanders received word that a
Peloponnesian fleet of 60 shipshad made it to Cusaira to aid
the oligarchs.
This would see that Eurymedonand Sophocles were eager to
waste no time in making it tothe island to help the Democrats
.
However, demosthenes had otherideas and it seems he had waited

(06:51):
until the fleet had set sailbefore revealing how he would
like to use the fleet.
As the fleet began up the westcoast of the Peloponnese,
demosthenes wanted the fleet tostop at Pylos.
However, with the news of thePeloponnesian fleet of Corsaira,
the commanders wanted tocontinue on.
However, mother Nature wouldsee to it that Demosthenes would
get his way when the fleet wasforced to seek shelter at Pylos

(07:12):
when a storm developed on theirapproach.
Now at Pylos, he would proposehis plan to Eurymedon and
Sophocles, where he wanted tofortify the place.
It seems Demosthenes had seenthe potential of the site.
In assisting in the Athenians'war effort.
Pylos was situated in aposition where Athens could
possibly incite revolt and workwith the Messenians and Helot

(07:33):
class.
In addition to this, pyloswould serve to benefit Athens'
war at sea as it was one of thelargest safe harbours in the
area.
Demosthenes would point out thatthe area was abundant in the
resources needed to constructthe forts, while the area was
relatively uninhabited, whilealso lying some distance from
Sparta.
This would mean the Athenianswould have plenty of time to

(07:55):
construct their fortificationsbefore the Peloponnesians would
be able to challenge them,though, once explaining his plan
to Eurymedon and Sophocles,thucydides would tell us that
they would respond with that, ifhe wanted to waste Athenian
money, he should find plenty ofother desolate headlands around
the Peloponnese to occupy, apartfrom this one.
With the commanders not takinghis proposal seriously,

(08:19):
demosthenes would then try andforce their hand by convincing
the men under their command.
However, he would also fail inconvincing them of the merits of
his plan.
The fleet was now stuck atPylos and having to wait for the
bad weather to pass, though asthe days went by, the men began
to become bored.
It seems, then, that they hadbecome more willing to take part

(08:41):
in the planned fortificationsand started arranging themselves
into work groups to carry outthe construction for the fort.
Much of the location wasnaturally positioned as a
stronghold, but the fortifyingthat was carried out we hear as
being somewhat rudimentary dueto the lack of tools the men had
to work with.
We are told that the workswould take six days to complete

(09:02):
and, once the bad weather hadpassed, eurymedon and Sophocles
would leave a small group of menwith Demosthenes and five ships
, before then sailing with therest of the fleet for Caesarea.
At this stage, sparta had sentoff its army, along with the
Peloponnesian forces under thecommand of Aegis, for the annual
invasion of Attica.
Back on the Peloponnese, theSpartans, still within their

(09:25):
city, were engaged incelebrating a festival.
While this festival was takingplace, word would arrive that
the Athenians had landed atPylos and were constructing a
fort.
The Spartans, at this stage,were not concerned with this
development and saw no reasonthat they should conclude their
festival early.
With the reports they hadreceived, they assumed the
Athenians would withdraw ontheir approach.

(09:46):
Like in previous years, whenAthens had landed on the
Peloponnese, all thefortifications would be easily
dealt with.
However, these reports wouldalso end up reaching Aegis in
Attica, who would take the newsmore seriously.
This would see Aegis withdrawhis forces from Attica early,
seeing this being the shortestinvasion of the war so far, just

(10:07):
15 days, though Thucydides doesindicate that this news may not
have been the only reason thearmy withdrew.
This year's invasion had seenthe Peloponnesian force under
the greatest hardship than theprevious years.
They had left before theircrops were ripe, so were
marching with reduced level ofprovisions, while the weather
for this campaigning season wasunusually wet.

(10:29):
So news of the Athenianinvasion may have provided a
convenient excuse to pull out ofAttica early, rather than
admitting to the hardship thatthey were facing.
Once Aegis had returned toSparta, a Spartan force, along
with allied cities near Pylos,were arranged to march onto the
Athenian position.
The various contingents wereordered to make for Pylos as

(10:50):
quickly as possible, with theresult seeing the various
elements arriving in a staggeredmanner.
Sparta had also sent out ordersto the 60 ships that had been
at Corsaira to depart and makefor the coastline near Pylos.
By this stage the Athenianfleet was in the area of Kosara,
but the Peloponnesian fleet wasable to sail away unnoticed

(11:15):
Back at Pylos.
Demosthenes had somehow managedto get wind of the Spartan
response and sent two ships offto Eurymedon and Sophocles to
inform them of the trouble hewas now facing and to request
their assistance.
The Athenian fleet that was nowat Zinchanthos would comply
with the request and would setsail for Demosthenes' position.
At once, the Spartan land forces, with some of their allies, had
arrived outside Pylos, whilethe Peloponnesian fleet had also

(11:37):
arrived on the coast.
This now saw a plan of attackbeing devised to take
Demosthenes' position.
The Spartans were prepared toassault the fortifications, but
first took measures to protecttheir position should the
assault fail.
They had received word of theAthenian fleet making its way
for Pylos, so they wanted toblock the entrances to the
harbours, making it harder forthe fleet to support Demosthenes

(12:00):
.
To do this, they would occupythe island of Sphacteria, which
was just off the coast and layjust across the harbour,
creating narrow entrances.
This would prevent theAthenians making use of it,
while they would block up theentrances, with the ships
preventing access to the harbour.
If the Spartans achieved thisand held their position, they

(12:22):
would be able to prevent a navalbattle at sea and could effect
a surrender of Pylos, with itcompletely under siege.
The Spartan plan would now beimplemented, with lots chosen
for the men to go over andoccupy Sphacteria.
It would seem that this planwas put into effect and some
time passed, as we would hearthat a few parties had completed
their spell of duty before weare told the final party of

(12:44):
hoplites numbering 420, beingsent to take up their turn.
Meanwhile, in the fortificationsat Pylos, demosthenes could see
the Spartan preparations onland and at sea developing.
He had only limited men andresources to try and protect his
position, where the quality ofmuch of his equipment and some
of the troops were questionable.

(13:05):
However, demosthenes wouldattempt to use as best he could
the resources he had.
The ships that had remainedwith him were brought up on the
shore and protected in astockade where the men who
crewed them were now tasked withprotecting them.
The majority of the bestequipped men were placed in the
most fortified part of thedefensive works that looked out

(13:25):
over the land.
Their instructions were to meetany attack that would come from
the land forces towards thedefensive position.
Another smaller, heavily armedforce with support from some
archers also assembled.
They would be deployed outsidethe fortifications, defending
against any attempt at landingtroops from the sea.
The fortifications defendingagainst any attempt at landing

(13:47):
troops from the sea.
Demosthenes had identified aweak point in the defensive
works that he thought theSpartans might try to exploit
from the seaward side, so lookedto try and mitigate this soft
spot Once Demosthenes made hisdefensive plans.
He would gather the mentogether so he could address
them with the intention ofmotivating and encouraging them.
Thucydides would record himsaying Soldiers and comrades, in

(14:09):
this adventure, I hope thatnone of you in our present
strait will think to show hiswit by exactly calculating all
the perils that encompass us.
He then continues on, are forus if we will only stand fast
and not throw away our advantageoverawed by the numbers of the
enemy.
He then continues on outliningthe elements in the Athenians'

(14:47):
favour, such as the difficultnature of the terrain provided
and that they do not lose theirheads but hold their ground.
He addresses the superiornumbers of the Peloponnesians,
saying that these should notworry them, since only small
detachments will be able toengage them at a time.
The main point Demosthenesseems to be trying to get across

(15:09):
to his men was all they neededto do was to hold their ground
and not let panic take over.
He would then close with.
I therefore consider that hisdifficulties may be fairly set
against our numericaldeficiencies.
He would then close with tostand his ground and not to be
frightened away by the surf andthe terrors of the ship sailing

(15:31):
in, to stand fast in theirpresent emergency, beat back the
enemy at the water's edge andsave yourselves and this place.

(15:51):
With the troops now addressedand morale at its height, they
now moved to take up theirpositions and meet the Spartan
attack.
The Spartans, having deployedboth on land and at sea, were
now ready to launch theirassault on the fortified
positions of Pylos.
As Demosthenes had assured hismen, the Spartans came up in
detachments, with only a fewships being able to come up at a

(16:12):
time.
However, the Spartans came onwith enthusiasm and vigour, with
those not engaged cheering themon.
Brasidas, the Spartan generalwe have met before, would
distinguish himself during thisaction.
He had command of a triremewhere he would motivate the
captains to force a landing sothey could attack the Athenian
position.

(16:32):
The difficult nature of thecoastline had seen the other
Spartan captains hesitant atlanding their ships for fear of
damaging them.
However, brasidas urged them on, yelling that they should
disregard the safety of theirships.
The most important factor wasgetting their troops ashore and
capturing the enemy's forts ontheir own lands.
Even though Brasidas was ableto convince the Spartans to run

(16:55):
their ships aground and get moremen to the shoreline, they
would be met with a determinedresistance, thucydides would
record the moment when Brasidas'ship would come ashore.
As he was trying to land, theAthenians fell upon him and,
after receiving many wounds, hefainted and fell down into the
bows of the ship.
However, brasidas would surviveand we will be seeing him

(17:19):
appear again during the war.
The other Spartan ships had alsocontinued to follow his example
, but even with theirdetermination, they could not
force the landing.
The ground before them and theAthenians standing strong still
proved to greater difficulty intheir attempt.
It's at this stage inThucydides' account where he
points out an amusing point.

(17:40):
He reflects on the situationthat the Athenians were fighting
a land battle in Spartanterritory while the Spartans
were in a naval engagement,attempting to force a landing on
their own lands, as it was wellknown during this time that
Sparta prided itself on itsreputation as a land power and
Athens on its sea power status.
However, both now foundthemselves in the other's domain

(18:02):
.
These attacks would continuefor two days, with no progress
by the Spartans being made.
On the third day, they wouldabandon this attempt and would
switch tact, looking toconstruct siege engines and
attempt a landing on morefavourable ground, though, where
the walls were more formidable.
However, it was during thistime that the Athenian fleet

(18:23):
that had set out from Sankynthoswould arrive on the scene.
At this stage, the Athenianfleet numbered 50 ships.
Having received somereinforcements from Neopactus
and Chios, the fleet, whencoming in view of the area
around Pylos, decided to maketheir way to a nearby
uninhabited island to lay anchor.
The site they were met with onthe approach to Pylos was one

(18:47):
with hoplites occupying themainland and the enemy ships in
the harbour with no signs ofsailing out to meet them.
With no options to put in atPylos, the Athenians would need
to regroup and plan their nextmove, so would pass the night on
the island of Prote.
The next day, the Athenianfleet prepared itself for battle
.
Their plan was to try andentice the Peloponnesian fleet

(19:09):
out into the open waters.
However, if they did not do asthe Athenians had hoped for, the
backup plan called for thefleet to infiltrate the harbour
and attack them in there.
Though, fortunately for theAthenians, the Spartans had
failed to block the entranceswith their ships, they had
instead been on shore attendingto their ships to have them
ready for battle.

(19:29):
The Athenians, seeing thisopportunity, now sailed the
fleet towards the harbour,splitting the fleet up so they
could enter from both entrances,making sure to get their ships
in as quickly as possible.
The Spartans had become awareof the Athenians' approach and
had ordered their crews to getthe ships out on the water and
meet the threat.
By the time the Athenians hadentered, the Spartans managed to

(19:50):
have the main part of theirfleet out in line of battle.
Seeing the enemy ships out onthe water, the Athenian fleet
now fell upon them in strength.
This had the result of puttingthe Peloponnesian fleet to
flight, where the Athenianscontinued to pursue and do what
they could in the limited spaceof the harbour.
A desperate fight along theshore of the mainland would

(20:11):
unfold.
After the Athenians haddisabled and captured a number
of enemy ships, they had thenturned to ramming and attempting
to capture Peloponnesian shipsthat had not yet set out from
the shore.
The Spartan forces on landrushed into the sea in
desperation, fully armoured, totry and prevent the ships on the
shore being taken.
The struggle was equallyintense for both sides, with the

(20:33):
Spartans trying to prevent thelosses of their ships and their
men on Sphacteria from being cutoff and their men on Sphacteria
from being cut off, while theAthenians were trying to take
full advantage of their initialvictory, with them attempting to
disable the entirePeloponnesian fleet, with
exhaustion and losses takingtheir toll on both sides.
The engagement was broken off.
The Spartans had managed tosave their ships on the

(20:55):
shoreline, but had lost a numberin the initial clash outside
the harbour.
Athens, though, was able toclaim victory in the battle,
being able to establish a trophyand controlling terms over
returning the Peloponnesian dead.
They would also secure thecaptured ships and wrecks before
making their way back to theircamp.
The result of the battle hadnow also seen the Spartan troops

(21:18):
on Sphacteria cut off from therest of the forces of the
mainland.
Athens, seeing this, nowpatrolled the island to ensure
their isolation would continue.
The Peloponnesians could dolittle at this stage just look
out over the harbour, seeing theAthenian ships between them and
the garrison on Sphacteria.
With the arrival of the news inSparta of 420 of their hoplites

(21:39):
being cut off, the Spartangovernment took the situation
very seriously.
They sent representatives toPylos so they could assess the
situation for themselves andmake a judgement on how to
proceed.
Not long after the arrival ofthe Spartan officials, they
quickly saw that it was going tobe impossible to relieve the
men on the island.
This would then see the Spartanofficials seek a truce with the

(22:03):
intention of negotiating alarger peace.
This point in the war would seeone of the biggest surprises
when it came to the Spartans'reputation.
On the surface, it would seemstrange that a militaristic
state of Sparta would seek peaceover the sake of 420 men,
though if we look a littledeeper in what this meant for
Sparta, we can understand theirconcern.

(22:24):
These 420 men on Specteria madeup around 10% of the entire
Spartan hoplite force, while atleast 180 of these Spartans were
also from the best families ofSparta.
To lose one-tenth of their bestforces in one action would be
devastating, while for Spartathis would also pose a problem
on a societal level.

(22:44):
As we have seen, the Spartans,when it came to their citizens,
practiced a strict system ofeugenics to produce the best
male citizens possible.
This was a slow process, and if10% of their male citizens were
lost, it would take some timeto recover process.
And if 10% of their malecitizens were lost, it would

(23:05):
take some time to recover.
Athens would accept the trucewhere they were still able to
blockade the island but hadagreed not to attack it.
Athens would allow rations tobe taken over to the men trapped
on the island under theirsupervision.
For Sparta's part, they wouldnot attack the fort at Pylos or
attempt to send any ships onSphacteria, while they also
agreed to turn over their fleetas hostages to the Athenians.
With these terms of the trucein effect, spartan officials

(23:28):
would be now transported by anAthenian ship to Athens so that
they could engage in peace talks.
The truce around Pylos was toremain in effect until the
Spartan envoys returned fromthese talks.
Athens held the advantage in theterms of the truce.
They had control of thePeloponnesian fleet and could
decimate the Spartan fightingforce.
The Spartans were in anunfavourable situation and had

(23:51):
to place all their trust in thehope that Athens would honour
the terms of the truce, thoughwhen it came down to it, sparta
had no choice but to accept theterms, given the situation
before them In Athens, theSpartan envoys delivered their
terms of peace to exist betweenthe two.
They conceded to the assemblythat Athens had gained the upper
hand, though were careful topoint out that the fundamental

(24:14):
shift in the balance of powerhad not yet occurred.
They therefore advised thatAthens should accept peace now
that they held the advantage theenvoys proposed in exchange for
the return of the men fromBacteria, they would enter into
an offensive and defensivealliance with Athens.
However, no territorial changeswere raised, with the

(24:35):
implication that Athens wouldstill retain a foothold in the
northwest, while also stillcontrolling Aegina.
However, this would also meanthat Athens would give retain a
foothold in the northwest, whilealso still controlling Aegina.
However, this would also meanthat Athens would give up any
claims on restoring Plataea,since it was still under
Peloponnesian control, thoughthe Spartans had been of the
assumption that Athens had beenwanting to make peace even

(24:58):
before the situation at Pylos,so were confident their offer
would be accepted.
However, although on the face ofit it seemed this is the peace
that Pericles had been seekingthrough his period, sparta had
shown that they still believethey were the preeminent power
in Greece.
Pericles had wanted to convinceSparta that they did not have
the power to defeat Athens.
Sparta's belief was that theystill did have this power, but

(25:21):
currently they were in adisadvantageous position.
With this thinking on Sparta'sbehalf, the Athenians could see
that if a peace were settled on,it was unlikely it would
survive.
In all likelihood, they wouldend up in the power struggle
that had occurred in the lead upto the war.
With this in the backs of theAthenians' minds.
Along with the currentsituation, the Athenians saw

(25:42):
they could seek more.
In the backs of the Athenians'minds, along with the current
situation, the Athenians sawthey could seek more in the way
of concessions.
Cleon would address theassembly and convince them that
they should deliver thefollowing terms in response to
the Spartans, as Thucydideswould record First, the men
should surrender themselves intheir arms and be brought back
to Athens.
Then Sparta must give backNicaea, pegae, trozen and Achaea

(26:03):
, all of which places had notbeen conquered in the war but
had been given up by Athens inthe terms of the previous peace
treaty, which had been made atthe time a difficulty when
Athens was in much greater needof peace than she was at the
moment.
To this, sparta wanted tonegotiate in private with a
committee, though Cleon wouldbegin to accuse them of ill

(26:25):
intentions due to wanting thenegotiations to be surrounded in
secrecy.
He would tell them that if theyhad honourable intentions, they
should present them in the opento the assembly.
Now, however, the Spartanswould choose not to say anything
further and would break offdiscussions.
In the end, they were notwilling to discuss the possible
betrayal of their allies inpublic.

(26:47):
With the breakdown of the peacetalks would also come a
breakdown in the terms of thetruce.
The Spartans would request thereturn of their ships, as had
been arranged, once the trucehad ended.
However, the Athenians wouldargue that the Spartans had
breached the terms of the trucewith the supposed attack on the
walls of Pylos, while alsociting some other technicalities

(27:07):
.
The Spartans denied theaccusations and made formal
protests, though ultimately theywould head back to Pylos to
prepare for continued fighting.
Hostilities would once againcontinue, with the Athenians
ensuring that Sphacteria wouldremain isolated.
During the days, the Athenianswould have two ships sail around

(27:27):
the island in oppositedirections, keeping up a
constant patrol.
During the nights, they woulddeploy the whole fleet anchored
around the island, maintaining apicket On the mainland.
The Spartans continued theirattacks against the walls of
Pylos, though always looking outfor opportunities to reach the
men of Sphacteria.

(27:47):
The Athenians had expected theSpartans to surrender on
Sphacteria in short time, as theisland was a desert with no
food and only brackish wateravailable to drink.
However, the Spartans wouldhold out devising ways to
overcome these challenges.
They had offered great rewardsto men and freedom to helots if

(28:10):
they could cross the blockadeand deliver food and water.
Many risked it all to gainthese rewards, and enough of
them would make it through,taking advantage of the darkness
and favourable winds to the,where they would keep the
Spartans from being starved intosurrender.
In fact, the blockade continuedon for longer than expected, so
that the Athenians themselveswere beginning to suffer from
lack of provisions.
As time went on, without theSpartans capitulating, morale

(28:33):
also began to suffer.
During this prolongedengagement, the Athenians only
had access to a small spring andpylos, while their camp and the
conditions they operated inwere very cramped.
Back in Athens, the news of thehardships faced and the
situation with Sparta were beingfollowed closely.
They had started to becomeworried with the fleet's

(28:53):
condition and Sparta'sdetermination as more time
passed.
They feared that if a siege didnot end soon in their favour,
they would have to break it offas winter approached, while
thoughts of regret were alsostarting to enter some men's
minds over not accepting theearlier Spartan terms.
Starting to enter some men'sminds over not accepting the
earlier Spartan terms.
Some had believed that Sparta'sunwillingness to continue

(29:13):
negotiations and their failureto surrender was due to factors
Athens had not anticipated this.
They saw as Sparta, believingthey were in a strong position.
Opinion in Athens was nowgrowing against Cleon, who had
pushed for harsher terms forSparta.
It was also around this timethat Demosthenes had sent a
proposal to the Assembly torequest reinforcements, with the

(29:36):
intention of taking Sphacteriaand forcing a surrender through
arms.
His plan would see him look toemploy light troops, as he had
done in his previous campaign.
Many of these troops were readyand waiting in Athens, while
more could be called upon fromtheir allies.
Cleon would advocate forDemosthenes' request.
It was in his interest to do so.

(29:58):
He had been the loudestproponent of rejecting Sparta's
offer and would certainly beheld accountable if Sparta was
able to rescue their men.
Opposition had also developedduring the assembly, with Nicias
, who favoured a negotiatedpeace with Sparta, arguing
against the reinforcements.
He thought capturing theSpartans would just inflame

(30:18):
tensions further and see Athensemboldened to take a more
aggressive approach in the war.
He wanted to delay thereinforcements long enough in
the hope that some sort ofarrangement could be made.
Enough in the hope that somesort of arrangement could be
made.
In the end, the reinforcementswould be agreed to, though not
before a series of challengesfrom the Assembly, cleon and
Nicias would take place.
I don't want to get too boggeddown in these exchanges as they

(30:41):
will take a fair bit of time andwe still have a bit to cover,
though these would centre aroundCleon calling the men coming
from Pylos liars because of thesituation they reported.
He would be challenged to gosee the situation for himself
and report back.
Cleon would point to this asbeing a waste of time and
instead put focus back ondispatching reinforcements right

(31:02):
away, it seems.
Then Nicias was given commandof this fleet that was to be
sent, but after some more gamesfrom Cleon he would end up
commanding the reinforcements,perhaps down the track.
We will look at this episode inmore detail when we look at the
rivalry between Cleon andNicias, but for the meantime you
can see the whole exchange inThucydides' work, book 4, from

(31:24):
paragraph 27.
Cleon would set out with hisfleet taking Lemnian and Imbrium
troops, peltus Romanos and 400archers from various cities.
With this force, and whatawaited him at Pylos?
He pledged that within 20 dayshe would either bring back the
Spartans as captives or killthem on the spot.
Cleon had also namedDemosthenes as his co-general.

(31:47):
Since he had put forward theplan that Cleon got behind, he
also named Demosthenes as hisco-general, since he had put
forward the plan that Cleon gotbehind.
Word was sent to Demosthenes atPylos that reinforcements were
on their way and Cleon departedwith his fleet very soon after.
Demosthenes appears to havefavoured the idea of landing
troops on the island even beforethe request of the reinforcing
light troops, though he hadinitially been wary about

(32:10):
sending his troops to land there.
Sphacteria was heavily woodedand the Athenians were not aware
of the positions and size ofthe Spartan force, leading
Demosthenes to think his forcescould easily be ambushed when
landing.
However, some undisciplinedaction by some Athenian troops
would end up leading to afortunate outcome for
Demosthenes.
Due to the cramped livingquarters of the Athenians, a few

(32:33):
soldiers decided to head to thetip of Facteria where they
could prepare a meal and, foronce, enjoy it.
Supposedly, they had selectedan area that would prevent them
being surprised, but onlypermitted the landing of a small
number of men.
Somehow, in their preparationsof their meal, parts of the
wooded areas caught fire and,with it not noticed in time, it

(32:54):
spread quickly with the windcoming up.
The result was that just aboutthe entire wooded area of the
island was consumed by fire bythe next day, the concealment
that the Spartans had enjoyedwas now completely gone and
Demosthenes was able to see theentire Spartan force and avenues
of approach that had previouslybeen hidden to him.

(33:14):
Now, more confident, demosthenesbegan to plan for an assault of
the island, while during thesepreparations, clown would arrive
with the light troops thatwould be instrumental to
Demosthenes' plan.
While the preparations werebeing made, the generals sent an
envoy to the Spartans on themainland to see if they would
come to a settlement, whichinvolved surrender of the men of
the island with their arms.

(33:35):
This attempt at diplomacy wasrejected, so preparations for
the landing went ahead.
The next night, the forces wereembarked on the ships that
would carry them to the island,where they would make for the
sites on both the harbour sideand the seaward side of the
island.
An advanced force of around 800would land just before dawn,

(33:56):
where they would wipe out asmall group of 30 Spartans near
the coast.
They had been caught bysurprise, not being alarmed at
the ships, since this had becomea normal sight through the
night.
The rest of the Spartan forcewas stationed near the centre of
the island, protecting the onlywater supply.
Once they had broken, the restof the Spartan force was
stationed near the centre of theisland, protecting the only
water supply.
Once they had broken, the restof the Athenians had landed on
the island.
This seeing around 800 hoplites, 800 archers, over 2,000 light

(34:20):
troops now on the island, whilethey would also be supported by
8,000 of the rowers that hadcome over.
That had come over.
Demosthenes' plan had thesetroops divided up into companies
of 200 men where they wouldmove out and occupy high points
around the island.
This would result in seeing theSpartans having enemies in all

(34:40):
directions.
This deployment would also seethat if the Spartans attacked
one point, they would face thecrossfire from other companies
nearby.
The fundamental idea for theAthenians was not to directly
engage the Spartans but attackfrom a distance.
For once, the Hoplites wereproviding the supporting role,
defending the light troops ifthe need arose.
The Spartan force would learnthe Athenian strategy the hard

(35:05):
way as they tried to engage theAthenians deployed with the
Hoplites in the centre of theircompany, ranged troops in the
rear and light troops on theflank.
The Athenians would hold theirground as the Spartans advanced
the whole time, being pepperedwith missiles and harassed on
the flanks by the light troopsIf the light troops didn't get
close enough to engage theSpartan hoplites, they would be

(35:26):
routed, but the Spartans lackedthe ability to pursue these
light troops in the roughterrain.
Ultimately, this tacticemployed by Demosthenes would
check the Spartan advances.
With the continued skirmishing,the Spartan forces started to
become noticeably tired, whichmade the Athenian forces even
more confident.
This was when the Athenians nowstarted taking the fight to the

(35:48):
Spartans.
The light troops would rush up,shouting and hurling javelins,
arrows and stones at theSpartans from all directions.
After not too long, greatclouds of dust would be on all
sides of the Spartans, who werenow effectively blinded and
unable to attack or defendeffectively, with confusion all
round them and their casualtiespiling up.

(36:08):
Those who could withdrew backto the fort that had been
constructed not far up north onthe island, all the while, the
light troops harassed them.
Once the Spartans were insidethe confines of their fort, the
Athenians had a much harder timeassaulting them.
Whenever and wherever theAthenians attacked, the Spartans
were able to repulse them dueto the nature of the ground they

(36:29):
were defending.
Attacked, the Spartans wereable to repulse them due to the
nature of the ground they weredefending.
The terrain in this locationalso prevented the Athenians
attacking the Spartan rear orflanks.
They could only make frontalassaults, with the Spartans on
the defensive and the Atheniansunable to dislodge them.
A stalemate now developed Withthis.
The Mycenaean commander came toCleon and Demosthenes requesting

(36:49):
some archers and light troopsto make a trek through the rough
ground to where they could endup in the enemy's rear.
The request was granted and thelight force was able to
traverse the ground undetectedto where they would emerge on
the high ground in the Spartanrear.
This now saw the defendersthreatened from both sides to
where Thucydides would comparethe situation to the 300

(37:11):
Spartans on the last day atThermopylae.
With the Spartans now takingfire from the rear and having to
resist the main Athenian forcefrom the front, nau began to
give way and retreated.
The exhaustion, lack of foodand water had also taken its
toll, contributing to thebreakdown of discipline and
morale.
The Athenians were now in aposition to where they could

(37:33):
effectively wipe out theSpartans, though Cleon and
Demosthenes would call a halt tothe battle.
The thinking here was that theywanted to take the Spartans
alive, as they would be worthmuch more to the Athenians as
hostages.
A proclamation was made to theexhausted defenders and, with
hearing the offer, most of themlowered their shields.

(37:54):
Negotiations for surrender beganto take place on the island.
However, the Spartans wanted tosend back to the mainland to
get advice on how to proceed.
The Athenians would not allowany Spartans to leave the island
, so called the Spartans to sendheralds from the mainland.
Messages were carried back andforward for some time, to where,
finally, a herald returned tothe trapped Spartans with the

(38:15):
message the Spartans bid you todecide for yourselves so long as
you do nothing dishonourable.
Being completely exhausted anddemoralised, the Spartans opted
for a different approach thanthat of their ancestors at
Thermopylae 55 years earlier.
To the shock of the Greek world, the Spartan forces surrendered
themselves and their arms tothe Athenians.

(38:35):
In all the 420 Spartans thatbegan the defence, 228 would
survive and be taken intoAthenian captivity.
Of these would be 120Spartiites.
The blockade of Sphacteria hadlasted 72 days and, with the
Spartan surrender on the islandwould also end the standoff at
Pylos.

(38:55):
Both the Athenians and Spartanswould withdraw and make their
way back to their cities.
Though the Athenians stillretained control of the fort at
Pylos, it appears the situationhad greatly changed.
The Athenians felt they had alarge enough bargaining chip,
while the Spartans had much todiscuss and come to terms with.
As Thucydides writes, nothingthat happened in the war

(39:18):
surprised the Hellenes so muchas this.
It was the general opinion thatno force or famine could make
the Spartans give up their arms,but that they would fight on as
they could and die with them intheir hands.
The Athenians' intention was tokeep the captured Spartans until
a peace was negotiated to endthe war.
However, they also served as adeterrent to the Spartans from

(39:42):
attacking Attica, should theyinvade.
The Spartan prisoners would bebrought out and put to death for
the invaders to see.
Meanwhile, at Pylos,mycenaeians from Neopactus would
return to their old lands andbegin mounting incursions into
Lyconia where they could.
This would now see helots begindeserting and raise concerns of
a revolt marching in Spartanlands.

(40:03):
This would become a seriousmatter for the Spartans who had,
in living memory, already dealtwith a major helot revolt.
Attempts would be made to tryand recover Pylos and to capture
Sparta diplomatically withAthens.
However, athens, in theposition they were now, kept
seeking more and more in theterms of peace.
One after another, each Spartanenvoy sent to try and effect

(40:26):
the terms would be sent away andno peace would be forthcoming
for now.
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