July 26, 2024 • 40 mins
How did Athenian victories at Pylos and Sphacteria become the turning point in the Peloponnesian War? Discover how these pivotal moments forced Sparta to rethink their entire strategy and seek diplomatic solutions. We explore the newfound aggression in Athenian tactics as they aimed to isolate Sparta by targeting its allies, reshaping the geopolitical landscape of ancient Greece.
Uncover the dramatic and covert plans of Athenian generals Demosthenes and Hippocrates as they attempted to capture Megara amid its internal political chaos. The city, caught between conflicting factions, became a crucial battleground. Our narrative delves into the tense standoff that ensued when the plot was exposed, highlighting the complex interplay of local politics and strategic military operations.
Lastly, we shift our focus to the Athenian invasion of Boeotia and the consequential Battle of Delium. Learn about the strategic decisions and unique tactical formations employed by the Boeotians under Pagondas' command. From impassioned speeches to chaotic clashes, we unravel the heavy casualties and pivotal outcomes that redefined ancient Greek warfare. Tune in for an insightful analysis of these significant events and their lasting impact.
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Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 2 (00:16):
We can be confident that we shall have on our side
the gods whose temple they haveunlawfully fortified and now
hold, confident too in thefavourable appearance of the
victims we have sacrificed.
Let us go forward against themand show them that they must get
what they want by attackingpeople who will not defend
themselves.
But as for us, we make it apoint of honour always to fight
(00:39):
for the freedom of our countryand never unjustly to enslave
the country of others and fromus.
They will not get away withouthaving to fight for it.
Part of the speech delivered tothe Boeotians before the Battle
of Dillium, recounted byThucydides.
Hello, I'm Mark Selleck andwelcome back to Casting Through
Ancient Greece, episode 87,megara and Dillium.
(01:02):
87, megara and Dillium, theseventh year of the
Peloponnesian War, 424 BC, wouldsee the first major strategic
advantage shift to one of thebelligerents.
Before this point, both Athensand Sparta had been conducting
the war they thought to be overwithin a year or two in an
ever-increasing stalemate.
The Athenian victory at Pylosand Sphacteria would change that
(01:23):
, where a sizable contingent ofSpartiites were taken into
captivity as well as a largeamount of Peloponnesian ships in
Athens' possession.
For Sparta and thePeloponnesians, this was a major
setback For Sparta.
The capture of their citizenswas a huge blow due to the
importance that was placed onthis class within their society
(01:45):
class within their society,while the loss of their fleet at
Pylos would mean waging war onthe sea was going to become
almost impossible in the directaftermath, especially against an
enemy who had already held theadvantage at sea.
This shook Sparta as well asthe rest of the Greek world, and
would see the Spartans look toenter diplomatic talks, though
with not much being achieved forthe time being.
Back in Athens, the appetitefor this more offensive approach
(02:07):
to the war gained tractionwithin the Athenian assembly.
The moderates within theAthenian government had tried to
warn against this type ofapproach, though after
Sphacteria and seeing whatresulted, cleon and those with
the same outlook gained moresupport for their aggressive
approach.
This would then result in moreoffensive actions into the
Peloponnese, where similaractions were arranged.
(02:28):
The idea was to establish anumber of forts around the
Peloponnesian coast where raidscould be sent in against Spartan
lands or against their allies.
Being so close to thePeloponnese and in established
positions, these operationswould be able to take the
Peloponnesians by surprise, asthey would be launched at any
time in any place, with verylittle warning.
Athens' follow-up offensivesinto the Peloponnese would be
(02:52):
met with a lacklustre responseby the Spartans, who appear to
have been paralysed by the shockof bacteria.
It seems likely that Spartawould have been dealing with a
great debate on how to proceedwithin their own government
structure, but we are left tospeculate on this point, since
we are given no insight For thisepisode.
We are going to be staying in424 BC and we will be looking at
(03:15):
further offensive actions thatAthens would take while the
strategic advantage swung intheir favour.
We have covered over actionsthat had been directly targeted
at Sparta, but now we will seeAthens look to target their
allies.
Although the advantage was withAthens, they were looking to
increase this advantage byattempting to take Sparta's
allies out of the war.
This would be done to secureAthens from any further
(03:36):
invasions, while also removingthe threat of powerful allies
who could attack from otherareas outside the Peloponnese.
For the first part of theepisode, we will be focusing on
Athenian actions against thepolis of Megara who, as we have
seen, held a vital positionheading into the Corinthian
isthmus.
If this position could besecured, then it would be much
harder for the Peloponnesianarmy to march out and invade
(03:59):
Attica.
For the second part of theepisode, we will then turn to
the Athenians' push into Boeotia, an attempt to counter thieves
who had their eye on creating aBoeotian League under their
command.
The result of this push wouldsee a large set-piece battle
take place at Delium, where ashift in tactics amongst the
hoplite armies would take placeand where we will also get some
reports of a strange devicebeing used against the Athenians
(04:21):
.
If Athens could separate theseareas from the Peloponnesian
League, then Sparta would becomemore isolated and less options
open to them.
In their current state, thiswould put the Spartans in an
even worse position while tryingto conduct diplomatic
negotiations.
As we have seen in the series,megara had been a part of both
(04:42):
the Delian and PeloponnesianLeagues at different times.
Before the First PeloponnesianWar, they had been a part of
both the Delian andPeloponnesian leagues at
different times.
Before the First PeloponnesianWar, they had been a member of
the Peloponnesian League but,due to disputes with Corinth,
they would defect to the DelianLeague, which would be one of
the contributing factors to thebreakout of the First
Peloponnesian War in 460 BC.
However, after the ThirtyYears' Peace was made, megara
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would be forced to return to thePeloponnesian League.
Megara would once again become afocal point of both Athens and
Sparta as tensions between themincreased.
It lay on the Attic side of theCorinthianismis and was
recognised as a strategicallyimportant position.
If Athens held influence or hadcontrol of the city, it would
make defending their lands fareasier and make it far more
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difficult for an invader to comeout of the Peloponnese into
Attic territory.
For this reason, sparta lookedto also exert influence here, as
their plans, if war was toerupt, was to march this land
route into Athenian territory.
For Sparta, as well as otherPeloponnesian cities, megara was
also important from an economicstandpoint.
Megara had good tradingrelationships with many cities
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and islands throughout theAegean, many within the Adelian
League.
This trade network would thenextend into the Peloponnese from
Megara, effectively seeinggoods from the Eastern Greek
cities make their way into thePeloponnese via Megara.
By 432 BC, tensions betweenAthens and Sparta were reaching
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their height and both sides hadbeen planning for the
eventuality of war.
Athens would target Megaraeconomically in an attempt to
influence them politically, theywould impose sanctions on the
city, otherwise known as theMegarian Decree, which would ban
them from harbours andmarketplaces of those cities
within the Athenian Empire.
This effectively strangled theeconomy of Megara, but would
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also have a flow-on effect tothose cities in the Peloponnese
that traded with them.
Also, this action would inflamethe already increasing tensions
between Athens and Sparta, withit being cited by many
historians as one of the majorcontributors to the breakout of
the Second Peloponnesian War.
As one of the majorcontributors to the breakout of
the Second Peloponnesian War,megara would remain in the
Peloponnesian League, and Athenswas unable to force its will on
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the city for the time being.
This would see that Spartawould be able to lead a
Peloponnesian army into Atticaduring the opening of the
conflict, and every year afterup to 424 BC, athens would
direct limited raiding actionson Megara, but it would
ultimately hold out within thePeloponnesian League despite its
suffering under the sanctions.
(07:11):
For the first seven years of thePeloponnesian War, megara would
not be a major focus of Athens,though they would still mount
their raids into the surroundingareas regularly.
Instead, athens would initiallyremain on the defensive,
responding to Spartan moves.
Eventually, this would seeAthens focus on other areas
further away where both sideswould have interests.
Now, though, with Spartahumbled after Sphacteria, pylos
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and the subsequent raids of thePeloponnese, athens would turn
to Sparta's allies that borderedAttica.
The first in their sights wouldbe Megara.
The first in their sights wouldbe Magara, although Athens held
Spartan citizens hostage toprevent another invasion of
Attica, if they could takecontrol in and around Magara
they would further secure theirposition for the future.
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Also, by knocking out keyallies of Sparta, they would
ensure Sparta would be left withreduced influence at the
negotiation table.
With the economic strain thathad been affecting Megara over
the years, tensions within thecity had seen that the Democrats
had sent the oligarch factionmembers into exile.
This development had causedsome concern for the
Peloponnesians, who hadstationed a garrison nearby, at
(08:16):
Naseer, to keep watch.
The Megarian exiles had beencausing trouble for the
Democrats within the city, wherethey would harass those
travelling into the Peloponneseand would end up occupying the
port of Parge.
This would cut off Megara'slast sea connection that ran
through the Corinthian Gulf, andthey now could only rely on
supplies coming by road from thePeloponnese.
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However, the exiles andsuspicions of the mostly
oligarchic Peloponnesians wouldsee this was not the most
cooperative relationship.
Due to the difficulties thatMegara was facing, the people
within the city had begun totalk about how they could
survive into the future.
They would come to theconclusion that it would be best
for them to recall the exiles,in the hope that the attacks on
(08:58):
the road would stop and theywould regain their use of the
port of Parge.
It was hoped that this wouldthen ease some of the pressure
the city was facing, while alsoleaving them only one enemy to
focus on.
This recall of exiles had takenplace outside the authority of
the democratic leaders of thecity, and they now began to
worry about their future.
With their return, thedemocratic leaders saw things
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the other way to the people.
Instead, they now deemed it wasbest to hand over the city to
Athens than, rather, have theirrivals return to Megara.
As you can probably see, thetwo sides had very different
motivations for their views.
The people were suffering underthe conditions of the sanctions
that had been made worse bypart of their population being
exiled.
The leaders, on the other hand,were more worried about their
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their position and future, givenhow they treated the exiled
citizens.
With these concerns of theleaders, they would now enter
into talks with the Atheniangenerals.
This turn of events in Megarahad now seen a new opportunity
to take control of the city forAthens and instead of the
regular raids that wereconducted each year, they would
be able to make a more directattempt of removing the city
(10:05):
from the Peloponnesian League.
With the democratic leaders ofMegara, the Athenian generals
Demosthenes and Hippocrateswould devise a plan to take the
city.
As we have pointed out, aPeloponnesian garrison had been
stationed at the port of Nicaeato keep watch over the democrats
of Megara.
So the first Athenian moveswould be to occupy the long
(10:25):
walls connecting Megara toNicaea.
This would see that thePeloponnesians would be blocked
from coming out to support thecity.
Then, once this was achieved,the Democrats then planned to
hand over the city in an act ofbetrayal.
It appears that plans made withAthens were done secretly.
This would make it seem asthough the Athenians were acting
on their own accord.
(10:46):
Once they achieved theirinitial objective of the long
walls and made demands on thecity, the Democrats would then
be able to take steps to seethat the Athenians could capture
the city.
The Athenian fleet would sailfor the island of Minna, just
off the coast of Megara, with600 hoplites under the command
of Hippocrates.
From here, these forces wouldestablish themselves in a quarry
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which had been used to createthe stone walls connecting to
the port and city.
A second force, under thecommand of Demosthenes, would
come over land and setthemselves an ambush even closer
to the port of Nicaea, wherethey could observe the gates.
With the Athenians ready to taketheir initial objectives, the
plan would now be executed.
The plan was to ensure that theport gates would remain open
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long enough for the Athenians toenter from their positions.
This would be achieved througha routine action the Megarians
had undertaken regularly toconfuse the Athenians who had
been observing the Megariansfrom Manoa.
Previously, they had been inthe habit of taking a boat from
Nicaea down to the water, actingif they were going to go on a
raid After dark.
They would then carry the boatback up to the port on a cart,
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back inside the gates.
This was supposed to haveconfused the Athenians who were
blockading the Megarians, aswhen daylight came, the boat
would no longer be seen on thewater, this then giving the
impression the Bagerians hadslipped the Athenian blockade.
The Democrats would now use thisaction that had become routine
for the Peloponnesian guards atthe gates to create an
opportunity for the Athenians toenter.
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With the Athenians laying inambush and observing the gates.
The boat would be brought backup to the port.
The guards would open the gatesas usual, but this time the
Athenians would rush towards thegates while the boat prevented
them from being shut.
To ensure the boat would blockthe entrances long enough, the
Megarian Democrats would setupon the guards from within the
walls, killing them.
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With the commotion taking place,those Peloponnesians nearest to
the gates would now react andattempt to repel the attack.
A Plataean contingent hadaccompanied Demosthenes' force
and would defeat these forces,ensuring they held control of
the gate and allowed theAthenians to come pouring
through and make for the longwalls.
Here they would engage thegarrison, who for a time held
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firm.
But after some time and theattacks coming from the
Athenians as well as theMegarians, the garrison had
assumed that Megara had alsorisen up and the whole city was
against them.
The Peloponnesians wouldretreat from the walls and would
fall back with inside Nicaea asthe sun rose.
The Athenians now held controlof the wall and the people
inside Megara were confused bythe events taking place down by
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the port.
Now the Democrats inside Megarawould prepare to enact their
part of the plan to see the cityfall into Athenian hands.
Inside the city.
They had convinced the peoplethat to save their city from the
Athenians, they needed to marchout and oppose them.
It had been prearranged thatwhen the gates to the city were
opened to allow everyone tomarch out, the Athenians would
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also rush these gates, since theDemocrats would be amongst the
people exiting the gates.
The plan was to latherthemselves in olive oil, so the
Athenians would know that theywere acting on their side.
By this stage, the Athenianshad also been reinforced by
another 4,000 hoplites and 600cavalry that had marched
overland to help secure theirinitial positions, with the
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Athenians reinforced, waitingfor the gates to open and the
Democrats in the position at thegates ready to carry out their
plan.
What had so far gone as plannow began to falter.
One of those Megarians who waspart of the democratic plans
would seem to now develop amoral compass, realising what
was awaiting his fellowMegarians.
He would reveal the plot to theleaders of the oligarchs who
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came up onto the gates andattempted to convince the people
that the gates should remainclosed.
Thucydides tells us that theydid not reveal at this stage
that they were aware of the plotby the Democrats to betray the
city, but put themselves in aposition to ensure that they
could not open the gates.
As the day wore on, theAthenians became aware that
something had gone wrong insidethe city.
As the gates had not yet openedas arranged, it became apparent
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to the generals that they werenot going to be able to take the
city by assault, so insteadthey would focus on trying to
take full control of Nicaea fromthe Peloponnesian garrison by
blockading it.
The thought was that if theycould capture the port before
help could arrive, the Megaramight surrender to the Athenians
.
Athenian preparations werecarried out for the rest of the
day, and by the next thePeloponnesian garrison had
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become very concerned of theirposition.
They had no supplies or food,as this had usually come from
Megara itself.
They also felt completelyisolated and cut off from any
chance of rescue.
Remember, here the garrison hadbeen under the assumption that
they were under attack by notonly the Athenians but also the
whole of Megara.
With these concerns, thegarrison would take the decision
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to surrender on terms with theAthenians.
Athens now held Nicaea andwould go about demolishing the
long walls at the point where itmet Megara.
With this complete, they nowprepared for the next move
against Megara.
We had seen last episode thatSparta had been somewhat
paralysed by the events of 424.
To this point this seems tohave been a general perception,
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as the forces would be splitinto small detachments sent all
over the countryside in anattempt to counter Athenian
moves.
However, these forces would betoo small to have any real
effect.
But there would be one Spartanforce that appears to have not
been affected by thedemoralisation that had set in.
This probably had something todo with its commander, and we
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have come across him before.
This is, of course, brassidus,who, in Thucydides' account,
comes across as a commanderalways looking to take the
initiative.
Brassidus, at this timehappened to be in the area of
Sicyon and Corinth as he waspreparing to gather forces to
lead into Thrace.
This appears to be one exampleof the Spartans looking to take
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the initiative.
However, as we will see, only amodest number of Spartans would
be involved.
Brasidas had gotten the word ofthe fighting around Megara and
became concerned with thePeloponnesian garrison at Nicaea
.
And became concerned with thePeloponnesian garrison at Nicaea
, he sent an envoy off to makecontact with the Boeotians and
request them to send a force tomeet him on the north shore of
the Isthmus.
Brassidas set off with a forceof 2,700 Corinthians, 600
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Siconians, 400 Philistines, aswell as the troops that had
already been under his command.
He had intended to make forNicair as quickly as possible to
relieve the garrison, but uponarriving in the area he
discovered it had already fallen, so changed his approach.
The army made its way to thecoast where it was to meet the
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Boeotians and establish theircamp.
He then took 300 picked men inan attempt to remain undetected
and march towards Megara.
These movements had beencarried out under darkness to
help achieve this.
His objective was to try andprevent Megara falling into
Athenian control before theyknew what was happening, though
he would encounter resistancewith the two factions inside
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Megara once he made contact withthem.
Both were apprehensive ofSpartan intervention, the
Democrats thinking he woulddrive them out and restore the
oligarchs to a position of power, while the oligarchs feared
that, due to the Democrats' fearof Spartan intervention,
fighting would break out betweenthe factions in the city and it
would be lost.
In this manner, the Megariansappear to have hoped that the
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Athenians and Peloponnesianswould fight it out.
Then they could throw their lotin with the victorious side.
Peloponnesians would fight itout, then they could throw their
lot in with the victorious side, with Brasidas not getting the
result he was seeking.
He returned to camp with hisforces to establish a new plan
of attack.
It was around this time that theBoeotians had arrived with a
considerable force 2,200hoplites and 600 cavalry.
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The Athenian actions aroundMegara had concerned the
Boeotians even before therequest for forces had come from
Brasidas.
If Megara and its surroundswere under Athenian control, it
would close off their land linkwith the Peloponnesians.
Brasidas, with the arrival ofthe Boeotians, would now have an
army numbering some 6,000troops.
Brasidas decided to hold hisground for now, as it provided
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him an advantageous position,while he was also hoping that
his arrival would cause the5,000 Athenians to pull back and
not attempt to take Megara.
Athens had taken the decision tonot make an attempt on Megara
at this stage.
Now that an army slightlylarger than theirs was in the
area, some light skirmishingwould take place between the
Peloponnesians and Athenians,but ultimately, brasidas'
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patience would be rewarded.
The majority of the Athenianforce, seeing a stalemate over
Megara develop, since neitherside would march on the other,
would leave the area and marchback into Attica.
However, a garrison would beleft behind to retain control of
the port of Nicaea.
With the Athenians departingthe area, brasidas would once
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again approach the Megarians,this time around.
Since the Athenian army haddeparted, he was now admitted
into the city.
The result of this would seethe exiled oligarchs take back
control of Megara, with many ofthe democrats involved in the
plot fleeing the city.
Those who remained would end upbeing identified by their
opponents and condemned, whileMegara itself would now be
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governed by a much narrowergovernment that would be on the
friendliest terms of Sparta andas fierce rivals with Athens
than it had ever been With thecrisis in the area now adverted.
Brasidas would now dismiss hisallied contingents, while he
would return to Corinth tocontinue preparations for his
campaign into Thrace.
The campaign of Brassidus willbe the main focus of our next
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episode.
After the failure at Megara,Athens would launch yet another
offensive, this time to thenorth of Boeotia.
This Athenian push north would,it seems, have been conceived
around the same time as the planon Megara, with both having a
similar objective, the main ideabeing to defeat and have
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Sparta's allies capitulate tothe Athenians.
Both areas were also importantto secure, as they were on the
border with Attica.
Megara was to try and preventeasy access for the Athenians
into Attica, while securing theBoeotian border would prevent
Athens being attacked from thenorth, draining resources away
from the focus of thePeloponnesians.
This plan appears to have beendesigned to further isolate
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Sparta while at the same timemaking Athenian borders even
more secure.
If this could be achieved, itwould put Sparta in an even
tougher position whennegotiating with Athens.
Even though the first part ofthe plan against Megara failed,
it didn't stop them fromcarrying out the second part
With the plans around theBoeotian invasion.
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Athens had the assistance ofmany democratic factions within
the various Boeotian cities.
For the most part, thesefactions were not in control of
their governments, but withAthenian help they looked to
change that.
Like at Megara, there would betwo points of effort.
The first would be in the west,commanded by Demosthenes, and
would see a force of 40 shipssail for Neopactus and meet with
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some of the democratic factionsin the area.
The plan had been for them toarrange so that the port of
Sophia and the Polis ofChaeronea would be betrayed to
the Athenians, giving them afoothold in the region.
The other main effort would bedirected at Dillium, near the
eastern coast of Boeotia andjust across the Attic border.
This two-pronged attack, we aretold by Thucydides, was to take
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place simultaneously.
This was designed to make surethat the Boeotians wouldn't be
able to mask their forcesagainst the incursion coming
from across the Attic borderWith the action in the west.
Attention was needed there asthere was a threat of these
cities going over to theAthenians.
It was hoped that with thecapture of these three locations
, a large uprising of theDemocrats throughout Boeotia
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might take place.
Otherwise, if this did noteventuate, as the Athenians
wished, they would hold keyfortified locations in enemy
territory that they could launchraiding actions from these
bases would also serve aslocations that those Boeotians
opposed to the current regimecould find refuge.
This would set up a similarsituation that had been taking
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place around the Peloponnese.
So this was the plan to takeplace and, given the period of
time it was taking place in andthe distance between the two
main efforts, there seems likethere could have been a lot that
could go wrong, and that it did.
Although the planning tookplace and the fleet had sent out
during the summer, it wouldn'tbe until the beginning of the
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winter that the Athenians wouldbegin to take action.
Thucydides doesn't give us muchin the way of why it took a
number of months from the fleetsailing for them to act in the
west.
He simply states that mistakeswere made about the dates on
which the two forces were to setout.
But, as Donald Kagan suggests,problems may have arisen due to
the democratic factions in thewest not being able to secure
the support they needed in thetime frame first outlined for
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the cities to be handed over tothe Athenians.
With such a delay occurring andDemosthenes relying on a number
of allies in the region tobolster his Athenians, the risk
greatly increased that his planswould not remain secret, the
risk greatly increased that hisplans would not remain secret.
Demosthenes would learn, whenfinally sailing onto Sophia,
that his plans had made it tothe ears of the Boeotians.
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The Athenian plans werebetrayed by a Phocaean to the
Spartans, who then ensured theBoeotians were aware of what was
being planned by the Atheniansin the west.
With this knowledge, Boeotiansfrom many cities were sent west
to help shore up these areasthat were the target of the
Athenians.
They were able to achieve thismobilization without much drama,
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as the Athenian forces,commanded by Hippocrates, had
not yet crossed the border intoBoeotia.
The result of this would seethat Demosthenes, when arriving
at Sefea, was unable to take theport, Both of Athens' targets
were greatly reinforced, andonce Demosthenes, when arriving
at Seville, was unable to takethe port, Both of Athens'
targets were greatly reinforced,and once Demosthenes worked out
the plans had been betrayed tothe enemy, the campaign in the
west stalled.
Finally, Hippocrates set outwith his army and made for
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Delium, though this movementtook place after the Boeotians
had already returned from thewest.
This indicates that some timeelapsed between Demosthenes'
launching his action andHippocrates crossing the border,
Beyond Thucydides' explanationthat there was some confusion
over the date to launch theinvasion.
It appears that Hippocrates mayhave been awaiting word from
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Demosthenes on the situation inthe west.
Given the delays that hadoccurred beforehand, However,
Hippocrates would make it toDelium with his army and would
begin fortifying it.
Thucydides gives us some detailon how this was done.
A ditch was dug all around thetemple and its precincts.
The earth thrown up from allthe digging was made to form a
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rampart in which stakes werefixed, Vinewood cut from the
temple grounds and thrown intogether with stones and bricks
from the houses nearby, whichwere demolished.
So they did everything thatthey could to raise the level of
the fortifications.
Wooden towers were put up wherenecessary and where temple
buildings were inadequate fordefence.
We are told that most of thesedefensive works were completed
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after five days of being atDelium, where the main part of
the army began withdrawingtowards the attic border.
A garrison was left in placeand hippocrates remained to
continue overseeing thefinishing touches of the
fortifications.
However, the Boeotians did notremain idle.
After hearing of the incursioninto their lands Over the five
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days that the construction wasgoing on at Delium, they began
assembling their forces.
Forces from throughout Boeotiawould march towards the Attic
border and assemble at Tanagra,not far from Delium.
Once the army had assembled, itwas discovered that the
Athenian army had already setout back towards Attica.
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The Boeotians were commanded by11 contingent generals, and
discussions took place to decidetheir next move.
All but one were in favour ofnot marching out to give battle,
since the Athenians weredeparting their territory.
However, the one man who was forengaging the Athenians happened
to also be in supreme command.
This was Pagondas from Thebes,and he would address the army,
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thinking the risk was well worthit, as he thought the Athenians
were vulnerable.
His speech would highlight thatwhat they faced was not the
battles of the past involvingdisputes over borderlands, but
the stakes were much higher,with their survival as
independent cities at risk.
He would highlight what his menwere fighting for their homes,
families, land and gods.
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These were the most importantfactors for these men, who were
generally from the agriculturalclass.
Armies defending theirhomelands tended to have better
success rates because of whatwas at stake for them
individually, so the commanderswould lean into this.
He would also remind the men oftheir responsibility in battle,
helping invoke the values ofsacrifice, while he would also
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take measures to ease the men'snerves.
By highlighting the bravery ofthe Boeotians, which would
prevail over numbers, Pigondaswas able to motivate and
persuade his army that attackingthe Athenians was the right
course of action to take.
His men had already beengathered in companies with their
weapons, so he was able to setout at once towards the
Athenians.
(28:04):
Although the Athenians hadturned to make their way back to
Attica, the Hoplites had rested, establishing a camp, and it's
this part of the Athenian armythat the Boeotians would march
on.
Hippocrates, still at Delium,would receive word of the
Boeotians on the move.
He would send orders for thehoplites to form up in line of
(28:25):
battle, where he would then setout to join with the army.
He would leave in place atDelium a force of 300 cavalry to
guard against the attack thereor, if the situation arose, to
intervene in the main battle.
Meanwhile, the Boeotians hadcome up in the area of the
Athenians but halted putting ahill between the two armies,
where they then deployed theirline in the formation they had
(28:47):
wished to fight in.
Their forces included 7,000hoplites, over 10,000 light
troops, 1,000 cavalry and 500peltists.
The Thebans, who were the mostpowerful of the Boeotian cities,
would hold a position of honouron the right.
They had also been made awareof the Athenian cavalry force at
Delium so had to attach sometroops to deal with them if
(29:08):
needed.
The battle line the Boeotianswould deploy in was also
somewhat different to what we'reused to hearing about in
hoplite battles.
The main part of the battleline would be composed of the
heavier hoplites, but on thewings, we are told that the
light troops and cavalry wouldbe positioned.
This would see that during thebattle they could attempt to
threaten the Athenian flankswhile their line was engaged.
(29:30):
Another difference we hearabout is to do with the depth of
a hoplite contingent.
From most accounts we hearhoplite phalanxes would usually
deploy 8 ranks deep.
However, the Theban contingentwould deploy their phalanx 25
deep, this effectively settingup the right of the Boeotian
line as a battering ram.
The Athenians on the other sideof the hill had also deployed
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their line as Hippocrates, whowas now with the army, had
ordered.
They had roughly the samenumbers of the Boeotians, as
many of their light troops hadalready departed into Attica as
they had set out before thehoplites marched from Delium.
The hoplite line would be thestandard eight ranks deep, while
the flanks would only have thecavalry on either side.
Due to the lack of light,troops With the Athenians drawn
(30:16):
up.
Hippocrates went down the linedelivering a speech to encourage
the men before battle wasjoined Athenians, he began.
This will only be a shortspeech, but a short speech is as
good as a long one when it isaddressed to brave men.
I do not wish to rouse youremotions so much as to remind
you of the facts.
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I do not want any of you tothink that, because we are in
the country of foreigners, thisdanger into which we are
throwing ourselves does notconcern us.
We shall fight in their country, but we shall fight for our own
.
If we are victorious, thePeloponnesians, without the
support of the Boeotian cavalry,will never again invade our
land, and in one battle we'llboth gain this country and do
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much to free our own.
Go forward, then, to meet themin the spirit of the citizens of
a city which they are proud tocall the first in Hellas.
Hippocrates had only made ithalfway along the Athenian line
when the Boeotians could beheard singing their and began
advancing towards the Atheniansdown the hill.
With a surprise, the address tothe troops stopped and the
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Athenians also got underway.
Thucydides tells us that bothlines would clash at a run.
However, the extreme flanks ofboth would not meet, as their
advance was slowed down due togeographical considerations.
As with most hoplite battles,the initial struggle was
stubborn, as each side looked tobreak the will of the other.
Eventually, the Boeotian left,all the way up to the centre,
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was defeated by the Athenians.
The Thespians would take theheaviest casualties in this part
of the line, as, when the othercontingents gave way, the
Thespians would find themselvessurrounded.
We also hear from Thucydides, afriendly fire taking a toll on
the Athenians.
The encircling movement thattook place around the Thespians
would see parts of the Athenianline becoming confused and they
(32:05):
would strike down some of theirown.
However, on the Boeotian right,it was a different story, with
the Theban battering ram,pushing back the Athenians step
by step.
Pangondas, who was with theThebans, was able to see the
trouble that the left was in andwould try and stop the
Athenians being able to causemore havoc on the Boeotian line.
He would order two squadrons ofcavalry around the hill so they
(32:29):
would not be seen by theAthenians to where they would
emerge on the Athenian right,surprising them.
This action would have theresult of completely turning the
tide of battle in the favor ofthe Boeotians.
The Athenian right, once seeingthe cavalry appearing out of
nowhere, now thought thatanother army was marching on
their flank.
This had completely stopped theAthenians victorious advance
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and instead saw the Athenianright panic and fall back.
The panic that set in would nowstart spreading down the line,
seeing the entire Athenianbattle line in retreat.
This retreat was anything butorderly, as parts of the
Athenian line would flee in alldirections.
The Boeotian cavalry wouldcontinue the fighting by chasing
down.
Many of those fleeing until thecoming of night would bring a
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stop to the fighting.
The next day, those Athenianswho had retreated back to Delium
and nearby areas would returnto friendly territory by sea.
However, even after this defeat, Athens still held control of
Delium, with them leaving agarrison in place.
The Boeotians, in the aftermathof the battle, would establish
a trophy on the field, collectedup their own dead and stripped
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the Athenian dead and set aguard over them so that the
Athenians would have to come andnegotiate the release of them.
The army then marched back toTanagra, where plans were made
on how to proceed.
A series of complicatednegotiations would now take
place so that the Athenianscould recover their dead.
However, initially the Athenianherald would not secure the
(33:56):
release of the bodies.
The main sticking point wasthat the Athenians needed to
depart Boeotian territory beforethey could retrieve their
fallen.
Back in Tanagra, plans weregoing ahead for an assault to be
conducted on Delium, where theAthenians still held the
sanctuary.
A force was put together toattempt to bring the area back
under the ocean control.
This would be made up of lighttroops mostly consisting of
(34:19):
javelin throwers and slingers,while they would be reinforced
by 2,000 Corinthian hoplites.
A series of attacks would bemounted on the Athenians at
Delium, but it wasn't until astrange flame-throwing engine
was built that the garrisonwould be defeated.
Thucydides describes theconstruction of this machine.
They took a great beam sortedin two parts, both of which they
(34:42):
completely hollowed out, andthen fitted the two parts closer
together again, as in thejoints of a pipe.
A cauldron was then attachedwith chains to one end of the
beam, and an iron tube, curvingdown into the cauldron, was
inserted through the hollow partof the beam.
Much of the surface of the beamitself was plated in iron.
(35:03):
Thucydides then goes on to tellus how this machine was
employed against thefortifications at Delium.
They brought up this machinefrom some distance on carts to
the part of the wall that hadbeen principally constructed of
vines and other wood.
When it was close to the wall,they inserted into their end of
the beam large bellows and blewthrough them.
(35:25):
The blast, confined inside thetube, went straight into the
cauldron, which was filled withlighted coals, sulphur and pitch
, which was filled with lightedcoals, sulfur and pitch.
A great flame was produced,which set fire to the wall and
made it impossible for thedefenders to stay at their posts
.
This would see the fall ofDelium, with the defenders
fleeing from their position,which allowed the Boeotian
(35:48):
troops to now capture thefortifications.
Some of those Athenians fleeingwere killed or captured.
The rest of the garrison wereable to escape and return to
Attica by sea.
Finally, the Athenians wereable to secure the release of
those who had fallen during theBattle of Delium, with it now
being a week after the battletook place.
(36:08):
Now the Athenians could get apicture of their losses from the
battle.
Even in the aftermath it wouldhave been difficult to know how
badly they had suffered due tothe forces being scattered and
some still holding out inBoeotian territory.
However, now they would recovera great many light troops and
1,000 Athenian hoplites, of whomone was their general
(36:29):
Hippocrates Delian, would markthe greatest loss of troops in a
single battle for the Atheniansduring the Peloponnesian War.
So far, these Athenianoffensives to try and knock out
some of Sparta's allies hadfailed where, it seems, the
complicated nature of themovements, communications and
reliance on allies had seen theplan left open for many
(36:49):
opportunities for things to gowrong.
Even with this, Athens couldhope to gain some local
successes, but the tacticalbrilliance of the Theban
commander Pengondis outshone theAthenian commanders.
Heading into the late stages ofthe 424 campaigning season,
Athens had hoped to weakenSparta's positions further.
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However, with these defeats inthe west and in Boeotia, Sparta
was encouraged and would nowhold out in the face of what had
previously seemed like ahopeless position.
These defeats would also havepolitical ramifications back in
Athens, With the moderatesgaining more influence.
The aggressive policy of Cleonand his supporters had been
(37:30):
shown to be a failure and evenharm Athens' position.
Perhaps the policy wasn't areckless one in general, as if
things had gone to theAthenians' advantage.
A series of further successeswould have seen Athens in a
powerful position, butultimately, it seems the plan
that was put in place to follow.
This policy was far toocomplicated and open to too much
chance and factors out of theAthenians' control.
(37:53):
Perhaps, after the Athenians'great successes in the first
part of the year, they hadbecome overconfident and now
luck was turning against them.
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(38:16):
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series you © transcript EmilyBeynon you.
We can be confident that we shall have on our side
the gods whose temple they haveunlawfully fortified and now
hold, confident too in thefavourable appearance of the
victims we have sacrificed.
Let us go forward against themand show them that they must get
what they want by attackingpeople who will not defend
themselves.
But as for us, we make it apoint of honour always to fight
(00:39):
for the freedom of our countryand never unjustly to enslave
the country of others and fromus.
They will not get away withouthaving to fight for it.
Part of the speech delivered tothe Boeotians before the Battle
of Dillium, recounted byThucydides.
Hello, I'm Mark Selleck andwelcome back to Casting Through
Ancient Greece, episode 87,megara and Dillium.
(01:02):
87, megara and Dillium, theseventh year of the
Peloponnesian War, 424 BC, wouldsee the first major strategic
advantage shift to one of thebelligerents.
Before this point, both Athensand Sparta had been conducting
the war they thought to be overwithin a year or two in an
ever-increasing stalemate.
The Athenian victory at Pylosand Sphacteria would change that
(01:23):
, where a sizable contingent ofSpartiites were taken into
captivity as well as a largeamount of Peloponnesian ships in
Athens' possession.
For Sparta and thePeloponnesians, this was a major
setback For Sparta.
The capture of their citizenswas a huge blow due to the
importance that was placed onthis class within their society
(01:45):
class within their society,while the loss of their fleet at
Pylos would mean waging war onthe sea was going to become
almost impossible in the directaftermath, especially against an
enemy who had already held theadvantage at sea.
This shook Sparta as well asthe rest of the Greek world, and
would see the Spartans look toenter diplomatic talks, though
with not much being achieved forthe time being.
Back in Athens, the appetitefor this more offensive approach
(02:07):
to the war gained tractionwithin the Athenian assembly.
The moderates within theAthenian government had tried to
warn against this type ofapproach, though after
Sphacteria and seeing whatresulted, cleon and those with
the same outlook gained moresupport for their aggressive
approach.
This would then result in moreoffensive actions into the
Peloponnese, where similaractions were arranged.
(02:28):
The idea was to establish anumber of forts around the
Peloponnesian coast where raidscould be sent in against Spartan
lands or against their allies.
Being so close to thePeloponnese and in established
positions, these operationswould be able to take the
Peloponnesians by surprise, asthey would be launched at any
time in any place, with verylittle warning.
Athens' follow-up offensivesinto the Peloponnese would be
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met with a lacklustre responseby the Spartans, who appear to
have been paralysed by the shockof bacteria.
It seems likely that Spartawould have been dealing with a
great debate on how to proceedwithin their own government
structure, but we are left tospeculate on this point, since
we are given no insight For thisepisode.
We are going to be staying in424 BC and we will be looking at
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further offensive actions thatAthens would take while the
strategic advantage swung intheir favour.
We have covered over actionsthat had been directly targeted
at Sparta, but now we will seeAthens look to target their
allies.
Although the advantage was withAthens, they were looking to
increase this advantage byattempting to take Sparta's
allies out of the war.
This would be done to secureAthens from any further
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invasions, while also removingthe threat of powerful allies
who could attack from otherareas outside the Peloponnese.
For the first part of theepisode, we will be focusing on
Athenian actions against thepolis of Megara who, as we have
seen, held a vital positionheading into the Corinthian
isthmus.
If this position could besecured, then it would be much
harder for the Peloponnesianarmy to march out and invade
(03:59):
Attica.
For the second part of theepisode, we will then turn to
the Athenians' push into Boeotia, an attempt to counter thieves
who had their eye on creating aBoeotian League under their
command.
The result of this push wouldsee a large set-piece battle
take place at Delium, where ashift in tactics amongst the
hoplite armies would take placeand where we will also get some
reports of a strange devicebeing used against the Athenians
(04:21):
.
If Athens could separate theseareas from the Peloponnesian
League, then Sparta would becomemore isolated and less options
open to them.
In their current state, thiswould put the Spartans in an
even worse position while tryingto conduct diplomatic
negotiations.
As we have seen in the series,megara had been a part of both
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the Delian and PeloponnesianLeagues at different times.
Before the First PeloponnesianWar, they had been a part of
both the Delian andPeloponnesian leagues at
different times.
Before the First PeloponnesianWar, they had been a member of
the Peloponnesian League but,due to disputes with Corinth,
they would defect to the DelianLeague, which would be one of
the contributing factors to thebreakout of the First
Peloponnesian War in 460 BC.
However, after the ThirtyYears' Peace was made, megara
(05:03):
would be forced to return to thePeloponnesian League.
Megara would once again become afocal point of both Athens and
Sparta as tensions between themincreased.
It lay on the Attic side of theCorinthianismis and was
recognised as a strategicallyimportant position.
If Athens held influence or hadcontrol of the city, it would
make defending their lands fareasier and make it far more
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difficult for an invader to comeout of the Peloponnese into
Attic territory.
For this reason, sparta lookedto also exert influence here, as
their plans, if war was toerupt, was to march this land
route into Athenian territory.
For Sparta, as well as otherPeloponnesian cities, megara was
also important from an economicstandpoint.
Megara had good tradingrelationships with many cities
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and islands throughout theAegean, many within the Adelian
League.
This trade network would thenextend into the Peloponnese from
Megara, effectively seeinggoods from the Eastern Greek
cities make their way into thePeloponnese via Megara.
By 432 BC, tensions betweenAthens and Sparta were reaching
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their height and both sides hadbeen planning for the
eventuality of war.
Athens would target Megaraeconomically in an attempt to
influence them politically, theywould impose sanctions on the
city, otherwise known as theMegarian Decree, which would ban
them from harbours andmarketplaces of those cities
within the Athenian Empire.
This effectively strangled theeconomy of Megara, but would
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also have a flow-on effect tothose cities in the Peloponnese
that traded with them.
Also, this action would inflamethe already increasing tensions
between Athens and Sparta, withit being cited by many
historians as one of the majorcontributors to the breakout of
the Second Peloponnesian War.
As one of the majorcontributors to the breakout of
the Second Peloponnesian War,megara would remain in the
Peloponnesian League, and Athenswas unable to force its will on
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the city for the time being.
This would see that Spartawould be able to lead a
Peloponnesian army into Atticaduring the opening of the
conflict, and every year afterup to 424 BC, athens would
direct limited raiding actionson Megara, but it would
ultimately hold out within thePeloponnesian League despite its
suffering under the sanctions.
(07:11):
For the first seven years of thePeloponnesian War, megara would
not be a major focus of Athens,though they would still mount
their raids into the surroundingareas regularly.
Instead, athens would initiallyremain on the defensive,
responding to Spartan moves.
Eventually, this would seeAthens focus on other areas
further away where both sideswould have interests.
Now, though, with Spartahumbled after Sphacteria, pylos
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and the subsequent raids of thePeloponnese, athens would turn
to Sparta's allies that borderedAttica.
The first in their sights wouldbe Megara.
The first in their sights wouldbe Magara, although Athens held
Spartan citizens hostage toprevent another invasion of
Attica, if they could takecontrol in and around Magara
they would further secure theirposition for the future.
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Also, by knocking out keyallies of Sparta, they would
ensure Sparta would be left withreduced influence at the
negotiation table.
With the economic strain thathad been affecting Megara over
the years, tensions within thecity had seen that the Democrats
had sent the oligarch factionmembers into exile.
This development had causedsome concern for the
Peloponnesians, who hadstationed a garrison nearby, at
(08:16):
Naseer, to keep watch.
The Megarian exiles had beencausing trouble for the
Democrats within the city, wherethey would harass those
travelling into the Peloponneseand would end up occupying the
port of Parge.
This would cut off Megara'slast sea connection that ran
through the Corinthian Gulf, andthey now could only rely on
supplies coming by road from thePeloponnese.
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However, the exiles andsuspicions of the mostly
oligarchic Peloponnesians wouldsee this was not the most
cooperative relationship.
Due to the difficulties thatMegara was facing, the people
within the city had begun totalk about how they could
survive into the future.
They would come to theconclusion that it would be best
for them to recall the exiles,in the hope that the attacks on
(08:58):
the road would stop and theywould regain their use of the
port of Parge.
It was hoped that this wouldthen ease some of the pressure
the city was facing, while alsoleaving them only one enemy to
focus on.
This recall of exiles had takenplace outside the authority of
the democratic leaders of thecity, and they now began to
worry about their future.
With their return, thedemocratic leaders saw things
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the other way to the people.
Instead, they now deemed it wasbest to hand over the city to
Athens than, rather, have theirrivals return to Megara.
As you can probably see, thetwo sides had very different
motivations for their views.
The people were suffering underthe conditions of the sanctions
that had been made worse bypart of their population being
exiled.
The leaders, on the other hand,were more worried about their
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their position and future, givenhow they treated the exiled
citizens.
With these concerns of theleaders, they would now enter
into talks with the Atheniangenerals.
This turn of events in Megarahad now seen a new opportunity
to take control of the city forAthens and instead of the
regular raids that wereconducted each year, they would
be able to make a more directattempt of removing the city
(10:05):
from the Peloponnesian League.
With the democratic leaders ofMegara, the Athenian generals
Demosthenes and Hippocrateswould devise a plan to take the
city.
As we have pointed out, aPeloponnesian garrison had been
stationed at the port of Nicaeato keep watch over the democrats
of Megara.
So the first Athenian moveswould be to occupy the long
(10:25):
walls connecting Megara toNicaea.
This would see that thePeloponnesians would be blocked
from coming out to support thecity.
Then, once this was achieved,the Democrats then planned to
hand over the city in an act ofbetrayal.
It appears that plans made withAthens were done secretly.
This would make it seem asthough the Athenians were acting
on their own accord.
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Once they achieved theirinitial objective of the long
walls and made demands on thecity, the Democrats would then
be able to take steps to seethat the Athenians could capture
the city.
The Athenian fleet would sailfor the island of Minna, just
off the coast of Megara, with600 hoplites under the command
of Hippocrates.
From here, these forces wouldestablish themselves in a quarry
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which had been used to createthe stone walls connecting to
the port and city.
A second force, under thecommand of Demosthenes, would
come over land and setthemselves an ambush even closer
to the port of Nicaea, wherethey could observe the gates.
With the Athenians ready to taketheir initial objectives, the
plan would now be executed.
The plan was to ensure that theport gates would remain open
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long enough for the Athenians toenter from their positions.
This would be achieved througha routine action the Megarians
had undertaken regularly toconfuse the Athenians who had
been observing the Megariansfrom Manoa.
Previously, they had been inthe habit of taking a boat from
Nicaea down to the water, actingif they were going to go on a
raid After dark.
They would then carry the boatback up to the port on a cart,
(11:54):
back inside the gates.
This was supposed to haveconfused the Athenians who were
blockading the Megarians, aswhen daylight came, the boat
would no longer be seen on thewater, this then giving the
impression the Bagerians hadslipped the Athenian blockade.
The Democrats would now use thisaction that had become routine
for the Peloponnesian guards atthe gates to create an
opportunity for the Athenians toenter.
(12:16):
With the Athenians laying inambush and observing the gates.
The boat would be brought backup to the port.
The guards would open the gatesas usual, but this time the
Athenians would rush towards thegates while the boat prevented
them from being shut.
To ensure the boat would blockthe entrances long enough, the
Megarian Democrats would setupon the guards from within the
walls, killing them.
(12:38):
With the commotion taking place,those Peloponnesians nearest to
the gates would now react andattempt to repel the attack.
A Plataean contingent hadaccompanied Demosthenes' force
and would defeat these forces,ensuring they held control of
the gate and allowed theAthenians to come pouring
through and make for the longwalls.
Here they would engage thegarrison, who for a time held
(12:58):
firm.
But after some time and theattacks coming from the
Athenians as well as theMegarians, the garrison had
assumed that Megara had alsorisen up and the whole city was
against them.
The Peloponnesians wouldretreat from the walls and would
fall back with inside Nicaea asthe sun rose.
The Athenians now held controlof the wall and the people
inside Megara were confused bythe events taking place down by
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the port.
Now the Democrats inside Megarawould prepare to enact their
part of the plan to see the cityfall into Athenian hands.
Inside the city.
They had convinced the peoplethat to save their city from the
Athenians, they needed to marchout and oppose them.
It had been prearranged thatwhen the gates to the city were
opened to allow everyone tomarch out, the Athenians would
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also rush these gates, since theDemocrats would be amongst the
people exiting the gates.
The plan was to latherthemselves in olive oil, so the
Athenians would know that theywere acting on their side.
By this stage, the Athenianshad also been reinforced by
another 4,000 hoplites and 600cavalry that had marched
overland to help secure theirinitial positions, with the
(14:10):
Athenians reinforced, waitingfor the gates to open and the
Democrats in the position at thegates ready to carry out their
plan.
What had so far gone as plannow began to falter.
One of those Megarians who waspart of the democratic plans
would seem to now develop amoral compass, realising what
was awaiting his fellowMegarians.
He would reveal the plot to theleaders of the oligarchs who
(14:30):
came up onto the gates andattempted to convince the people
that the gates should remainclosed.
Thucydides tells us that theydid not reveal at this stage
that they were aware of the plotby the Democrats to betray the
city, but put themselves in aposition to ensure that they
could not open the gates.
As the day wore on, theAthenians became aware that
something had gone wrong insidethe city.
As the gates had not yet openedas arranged, it became apparent
(14:56):
to the generals that they werenot going to be able to take the
city by assault, so insteadthey would focus on trying to
take full control of Nicaea fromthe Peloponnesian garrison by
blockading it.
The thought was that if theycould capture the port before
help could arrive, the Megaramight surrender to the Athenians
.
Athenian preparations werecarried out for the rest of the
day, and by the next thePeloponnesian garrison had
(15:17):
become very concerned of theirposition.
They had no supplies or food,as this had usually come from
Megara itself.
They also felt completelyisolated and cut off from any
chance of rescue.
Remember, here the garrison hadbeen under the assumption that
they were under attack by notonly the Athenians but also the
whole of Megara.
With these concerns, thegarrison would take the decision
(15:39):
to surrender on terms with theAthenians.
Athens now held Nicaea andwould go about demolishing the
long walls at the point where itmet Megara.
With this complete, they nowprepared for the next move
against Megara.
We had seen last episode thatSparta had been somewhat
paralysed by the events of 424.
To this point this seems tohave been a general perception,
(16:03):
as the forces would be splitinto small detachments sent all
over the countryside in anattempt to counter Athenian
moves.
However, these forces would betoo small to have any real
effect.
But there would be one Spartanforce that appears to have not
been affected by thedemoralisation that had set in.
This probably had something todo with its commander, and we
(16:23):
have come across him before.
This is, of course, brassidus,who, in Thucydides' account,
comes across as a commanderalways looking to take the
initiative.
Brassidus, at this timehappened to be in the area of
Sicyon and Corinth as he waspreparing to gather forces to
lead into Thrace.
This appears to be one exampleof the Spartans looking to take
(16:44):
the initiative.
However, as we will see, only amodest number of Spartans would
be involved.
Brasidas had gotten the word ofthe fighting around Megara and
became concerned with thePeloponnesian garrison at Nicaea
.
And became concerned with thePeloponnesian garrison at Nicaea
, he sent an envoy off to makecontact with the Boeotians and
request them to send a force tomeet him on the north shore of
the Isthmus.
Brassidas set off with a forceof 2,700 Corinthians, 600
(17:09):
Siconians, 400 Philistines, aswell as the troops that had
already been under his command.
He had intended to make forNicair as quickly as possible to
relieve the garrison, but uponarriving in the area he
discovered it had already fallen, so changed his approach.
The army made its way to thecoast where it was to meet the
(17:29):
Boeotians and establish theircamp.
He then took 300 picked men inan attempt to remain undetected
and march towards Megara.
These movements had beencarried out under darkness to
help achieve this.
His objective was to try andprevent Megara falling into
Athenian control before theyknew what was happening, though
he would encounter resistancewith the two factions inside
(17:51):
Megara once he made contact withthem.
Both were apprehensive ofSpartan intervention, the
Democrats thinking he woulddrive them out and restore the
oligarchs to a position of power, while the oligarchs feared
that, due to the Democrats' fearof Spartan intervention,
fighting would break out betweenthe factions in the city and it
would be lost.
In this manner, the Megariansappear to have hoped that the
(18:12):
Athenians and Peloponnesianswould fight it out.
Then they could throw their lotin with the victorious side.
Peloponnesians would fight itout, then they could throw their
lot in with the victorious side, with Brasidas not getting the
result he was seeking.
He returned to camp with hisforces to establish a new plan
of attack.
It was around this time that theBoeotians had arrived with a
considerable force 2,200hoplites and 600 cavalry.
(18:33):
The Athenian actions aroundMegara had concerned the
Boeotians even before therequest for forces had come from
Brasidas.
If Megara and its surroundswere under Athenian control, it
would close off their land linkwith the Peloponnesians.
Brasidas, with the arrival ofthe Boeotians, would now have an
army numbering some 6,000troops.
Brasidas decided to hold hisground for now, as it provided
(18:57):
him an advantageous position,while he was also hoping that
his arrival would cause the5,000 Athenians to pull back and
not attempt to take Megara.
Athens had taken the decision tonot make an attempt on Megara
at this stage.
Now that an army slightlylarger than theirs was in the
area, some light skirmishingwould take place between the
Peloponnesians and Athenians,but ultimately, brasidas'
(19:20):
patience would be rewarded.
The majority of the Athenianforce, seeing a stalemate over
Megara develop, since neitherside would march on the other,
would leave the area and marchback into Attica.
However, a garrison would beleft behind to retain control of
the port of Nicaea.
With the Athenians departingthe area, brasidas would once
(19:40):
again approach the Megarians,this time around.
Since the Athenian army haddeparted, he was now admitted
into the city.
The result of this would seethe exiled oligarchs take back
control of Megara, with many ofthe democrats involved in the
plot fleeing the city.
Those who remained would end upbeing identified by their
opponents and condemned, whileMegara itself would now be
(20:02):
governed by a much narrowergovernment that would be on the
friendliest terms of Sparta andas fierce rivals with Athens
than it had ever been With thecrisis in the area now adverted.
Brasidas would now dismiss hisallied contingents, while he
would return to Corinth tocontinue preparations for his
campaign into Thrace.
The campaign of Brassidus willbe the main focus of our next
(20:24):
episode.
After the failure at Megara,Athens would launch yet another
offensive, this time to thenorth of Boeotia.
This Athenian push north would,it seems, have been conceived
around the same time as the planon Megara, with both having a
similar objective, the main ideabeing to defeat and have
(20:44):
Sparta's allies capitulate tothe Athenians.
Both areas were also importantto secure, as they were on the
border with Attica.
Megara was to try and preventeasy access for the Athenians
into Attica, while securing theBoeotian border would prevent
Athens being attacked from thenorth, draining resources away
from the focus of thePeloponnesians.
This plan appears to have beendesigned to further isolate
(21:07):
Sparta while at the same timemaking Athenian borders even
more secure.
If this could be achieved, itwould put Sparta in an even
tougher position whennegotiating with Athens.
Even though the first part ofthe plan against Megara failed,
it didn't stop them fromcarrying out the second part
With the plans around theBoeotian invasion.
(21:28):
Athens had the assistance ofmany democratic factions within
the various Boeotian cities.
For the most part, thesefactions were not in control of
their governments, but withAthenian help they looked to
change that.
Like at Megara, there would betwo points of effort.
The first would be in the west,commanded by Demosthenes, and
would see a force of 40 shipssail for Neopactus and meet with
(21:50):
some of the democratic factionsin the area.
The plan had been for them toarrange so that the port of
Sophia and the Polis ofChaeronea would be betrayed to
the Athenians, giving them afoothold in the region.
The other main effort would bedirected at Dillium, near the
eastern coast of Boeotia andjust across the Attic border.
This two-pronged attack, we aretold by Thucydides, was to take
(22:13):
place simultaneously.
This was designed to make surethat the Boeotians wouldn't be
able to mask their forcesagainst the incursion coming
from across the Attic borderWith the action in the west.
Attention was needed there asthere was a threat of these
cities going over to theAthenians.
It was hoped that with thecapture of these three locations
, a large uprising of theDemocrats throughout Boeotia
(22:36):
might take place.
Otherwise, if this did noteventuate, as the Athenians
wished, they would hold keyfortified locations in enemy
territory that they could launchraiding actions from these
bases would also serve aslocations that those Boeotians
opposed to the current regimecould find refuge.
This would set up a similarsituation that had been taking
(22:56):
place around the Peloponnese.
So this was the plan to takeplace and, given the period of
time it was taking place in andthe distance between the two
main efforts, there seems likethere could have been a lot that
could go wrong, and that it did.
Although the planning tookplace and the fleet had sent out
during the summer, it wouldn'tbe until the beginning of the
(23:20):
winter that the Athenians wouldbegin to take action.
Thucydides doesn't give us muchin the way of why it took a
number of months from the fleetsailing for them to act in the
west.
He simply states that mistakeswere made about the dates on
which the two forces were to setout.
But, as Donald Kagan suggests,problems may have arisen due to
the democratic factions in thewest not being able to secure
the support they needed in thetime frame first outlined for
(23:43):
the cities to be handed over tothe Athenians.
With such a delay occurring andDemosthenes relying on a number
of allies in the region tobolster his Athenians, the risk
greatly increased that his planswould not remain secret, the
risk greatly increased that hisplans would not remain secret.
Demosthenes would learn, whenfinally sailing onto Sophia,
that his plans had made it tothe ears of the Boeotians.
(24:05):
The Athenian plans werebetrayed by a Phocaean to the
Spartans, who then ensured theBoeotians were aware of what was
being planned by the Atheniansin the west.
With this knowledge, Boeotiansfrom many cities were sent west
to help shore up these areasthat were the target of the
Athenians.
They were able to achieve thismobilization without much drama,
(24:26):
as the Athenian forces,commanded by Hippocrates, had
not yet crossed the border intoBoeotia.
The result of this would seethat Demosthenes, when arriving
at Sefea, was unable to take theport, Both of Athens' targets
were greatly reinforced, andonce Demosthenes, when arriving
at Seville, was unable to takethe port, Both of Athens'
targets were greatly reinforced,and once Demosthenes worked out
the plans had been betrayed tothe enemy, the campaign in the
west stalled.
Finally, Hippocrates set outwith his army and made for
(24:50):
Delium, though this movementtook place after the Boeotians
had already returned from thewest.
This indicates that some timeelapsed between Demosthenes'
launching his action andHippocrates crossing the border,
Beyond Thucydides' explanationthat there was some confusion
over the date to launch theinvasion.
It appears that Hippocrates mayhave been awaiting word from
(25:11):
Demosthenes on the situation inthe west.
Given the delays that hadoccurred beforehand, However,
Hippocrates would make it toDelium with his army and would
begin fortifying it.
Thucydides gives us some detailon how this was done.
A ditch was dug all around thetemple and its precincts.
The earth thrown up from allthe digging was made to form a
(25:33):
rampart in which stakes werefixed, Vinewood cut from the
temple grounds and thrown intogether with stones and bricks
from the houses nearby, whichwere demolished.
So they did everything thatthey could to raise the level of
the fortifications.
Wooden towers were put up wherenecessary and where temple
buildings were inadequate fordefence.
We are told that most of thesedefensive works were completed
(25:56):
after five days of being atDelium, where the main part of
the army began withdrawingtowards the attic border.
A garrison was left in placeand hippocrates remained to
continue overseeing thefinishing touches of the
fortifications.
However, the Boeotians did notremain idle.
After hearing of the incursioninto their lands Over the five
(26:17):
days that the construction wasgoing on at Delium, they began
assembling their forces.
Forces from throughout Boeotiawould march towards the Attic
border and assemble at Tanagra,not far from Delium.
Once the army had assembled, itwas discovered that the
Athenian army had already setout back towards Attica.
(26:37):
The Boeotians were commanded by11 contingent generals, and
discussions took place to decidetheir next move.
All but one were in favour ofnot marching out to give battle,
since the Athenians weredeparting their territory.
However, the one man who was forengaging the Athenians happened
to also be in supreme command.
This was Pagondas from Thebes,and he would address the army,
(27:01):
thinking the risk was well worthit, as he thought the Athenians
were vulnerable.
His speech would highlight thatwhat they faced was not the
battles of the past involvingdisputes over borderlands, but
the stakes were much higher,with their survival as
independent cities at risk.
He would highlight what his menwere fighting for their homes,
families, land and gods.
(27:22):
These were the most importantfactors for these men, who were
generally from the agriculturalclass.
Armies defending theirhomelands tended to have better
success rates because of whatwas at stake for them
individually, so the commanderswould lean into this.
He would also remind the men oftheir responsibility in battle,
helping invoke the values ofsacrifice, while he would also
(27:44):
take measures to ease the men'snerves.
By highlighting the bravery ofthe Boeotians, which would
prevail over numbers, Pigondaswas able to motivate and
persuade his army that attackingthe Athenians was the right
course of action to take.
His men had already beengathered in companies with their
weapons, so he was able to setout at once towards the
Athenians.
(28:04):
Although the Athenians hadturned to make their way back to
Attica, the Hoplites had rested, establishing a camp, and it's
this part of the Athenian armythat the Boeotians would march
on.
Hippocrates, still at Delium,would receive word of the
Boeotians on the move.
He would send orders for thehoplites to form up in line of
(28:25):
battle, where he would then setout to join with the army.
He would leave in place atDelium a force of 300 cavalry to
guard against the attack thereor, if the situation arose, to
intervene in the main battle.
Meanwhile, the Boeotians hadcome up in the area of the
Athenians but halted putting ahill between the two armies,
where they then deployed theirline in the formation they had
(28:47):
wished to fight in.
Their forces included 7,000hoplites, over 10,000 light
troops, 1,000 cavalry and 500peltists.
The Thebans, who were the mostpowerful of the Boeotian cities,
would hold a position of honouron the right.
They had also been made awareof the Athenian cavalry force at
Delium so had to attach sometroops to deal with them if
(29:08):
needed.
The battle line the Boeotianswould deploy in was also
somewhat different to what we'reused to hearing about in
hoplite battles.
The main part of the battleline would be composed of the
heavier hoplites, but on thewings, we are told that the
light troops and cavalry wouldbe positioned.
This would see that during thebattle they could attempt to
threaten the Athenian flankswhile their line was engaged.
(29:30):
Another difference we hearabout is to do with the depth of
a hoplite contingent.
From most accounts we hearhoplite phalanxes would usually
deploy 8 ranks deep.
However, the Theban contingentwould deploy their phalanx 25
deep, this effectively settingup the right of the Boeotian
line as a battering ram.
The Athenians on the other sideof the hill had also deployed
(29:53):
their line as Hippocrates, whowas now with the army, had
ordered.
They had roughly the samenumbers of the Boeotians, as
many of their light troops hadalready departed into Attica as
they had set out before thehoplites marched from Delium.
The hoplite line would be thestandard eight ranks deep, while
the flanks would only have thecavalry on either side.
Due to the lack of light,troops With the Athenians drawn
(30:16):
up.
Hippocrates went down the linedelivering a speech to encourage
the men before battle wasjoined Athenians, he began.
This will only be a shortspeech, but a short speech is as
good as a long one when it isaddressed to brave men.
I do not wish to rouse youremotions so much as to remind
you of the facts.
(30:36):
I do not want any of you tothink that, because we are in
the country of foreigners, thisdanger into which we are
throwing ourselves does notconcern us.
We shall fight in their country, but we shall fight for our own
.
If we are victorious, thePeloponnesians, without the
support of the Boeotian cavalry,will never again invade our
land, and in one battle we'llboth gain this country and do
(30:59):
much to free our own.
Go forward, then, to meet themin the spirit of the citizens of
a city which they are proud tocall the first in Hellas.
Hippocrates had only made ithalfway along the Athenian line
when the Boeotians could beheard singing their and began
advancing towards the Atheniansdown the hill.
With a surprise, the address tothe troops stopped and the
(31:21):
Athenians also got underway.
Thucydides tells us that bothlines would clash at a run.
However, the extreme flanks ofboth would not meet, as their
advance was slowed down due togeographical considerations.
As with most hoplite battles,the initial struggle was
stubborn, as each side looked tobreak the will of the other.
Eventually, the Boeotian left,all the way up to the centre,
(31:44):
was defeated by the Athenians.
The Thespians would take theheaviest casualties in this part
of the line, as, when the othercontingents gave way, the
Thespians would find themselvessurrounded.
We also hear from Thucydides, afriendly fire taking a toll on
the Athenians.
The encircling movement thattook place around the Thespians
would see parts of the Athenianline becoming confused and they
(32:05):
would strike down some of theirown.
However, on the Boeotian right,it was a different story, with
the Theban battering ram,pushing back the Athenians step
by step.
Pangondas, who was with theThebans, was able to see the
trouble that the left was in andwould try and stop the
Athenians being able to causemore havoc on the Boeotian line.
He would order two squadrons ofcavalry around the hill so they
(32:29):
would not be seen by theAthenians to where they would
emerge on the Athenian right,surprising them.
This action would have theresult of completely turning the
tide of battle in the favor ofthe Boeotians.
The Athenian right, once seeingthe cavalry appearing out of
nowhere, now thought thatanother army was marching on
their flank.
This had completely stopped theAthenians victorious advance
(32:51):
and instead saw the Athenianright panic and fall back.
The panic that set in would nowstart spreading down the line,
seeing the entire Athenianbattle line in retreat.
This retreat was anything butorderly, as parts of the
Athenian line would flee in alldirections.
The Boeotian cavalry wouldcontinue the fighting by chasing
down.
Many of those fleeing until thecoming of night would bring a
(33:13):
stop to the fighting.
The next day, those Athenianswho had retreated back to Delium
and nearby areas would returnto friendly territory by sea.
However, even after this defeat, Athens still held control of
Delium, with them leaving agarrison in place.
The Boeotians, in the aftermathof the battle, would establish
a trophy on the field, collectedup their own dead and stripped
(33:35):
the Athenian dead and set aguard over them so that the
Athenians would have to come andnegotiate the release of them.
The army then marched back toTanagra, where plans were made
on how to proceed.
A series of complicatednegotiations would now take
place so that the Athenianscould recover their dead.
However, initially the Athenianherald would not secure the
(33:56):
release of the bodies.
The main sticking point wasthat the Athenians needed to
depart Boeotian territory beforethey could retrieve their
fallen.
Back in Tanagra, plans weregoing ahead for an assault to be
conducted on Delium, where theAthenians still held the
sanctuary.
A force was put together toattempt to bring the area back
under the ocean control.
This would be made up of lighttroops mostly consisting of
(34:19):
javelin throwers and slingers,while they would be reinforced
by 2,000 Corinthian hoplites.
A series of attacks would bemounted on the Athenians at
Delium, but it wasn't until astrange flame-throwing engine
was built that the garrisonwould be defeated.
Thucydides describes theconstruction of this machine.
They took a great beam sortedin two parts, both of which they
(34:42):
completely hollowed out, andthen fitted the two parts closer
together again, as in thejoints of a pipe.
A cauldron was then attachedwith chains to one end of the
beam, and an iron tube, curvingdown into the cauldron, was
inserted through the hollow partof the beam.
Much of the surface of the beamitself was plated in iron.
(35:03):
Thucydides then goes on to tellus how this machine was
employed against thefortifications at Delium.
They brought up this machinefrom some distance on carts to
the part of the wall that hadbeen principally constructed of
vines and other wood.
When it was close to the wall,they inserted into their end of
the beam large bellows and blewthrough them.
(35:25):
The blast, confined inside thetube, went straight into the
cauldron, which was filled withlighted coals, sulphur and pitch
, which was filled with lightedcoals, sulfur and pitch.
A great flame was produced,which set fire to the wall and
made it impossible for thedefenders to stay at their posts
.
This would see the fall ofDelium, with the defenders
fleeing from their position,which allowed the Boeotian
(35:48):
troops to now capture thefortifications.
Some of those Athenians fleeingwere killed or captured.
The rest of the garrison wereable to escape and return to
Attica by sea.
Finally, the Athenians wereable to secure the release of
those who had fallen during theBattle of Delium, with it now
being a week after the battletook place.
(36:08):
Now the Athenians could get apicture of their losses from the
battle.
Even in the aftermath it wouldhave been difficult to know how
badly they had suffered due tothe forces being scattered and
some still holding out inBoeotian territory.
However, now they would recovera great many light troops and
1,000 Athenian hoplites, of whomone was their general
(36:29):
Hippocrates Delian, would markthe greatest loss of troops in a
single battle for the Atheniansduring the Peloponnesian War.
So far, these Athenianoffensives to try and knock out
some of Sparta's allies hadfailed where, it seems, the
complicated nature of themovements, communications and
reliance on allies had seen theplan left open for many
(36:49):
opportunities for things to gowrong.
Even with this, Athens couldhope to gain some local
successes, but the tacticalbrilliance of the Theban
commander Pengondis outshone theAthenian commanders.
Heading into the late stages ofthe 424 campaigning season,
Athens had hoped to weakenSparta's positions further.
(37:10):
However, with these defeats inthe west and in Boeotia, Sparta
was encouraged and would nowhold out in the face of what had
previously seemed like ahopeless position.
These defeats would also havepolitical ramifications back in
Athens, With the moderatesgaining more influence.
The aggressive policy of Cleonand his supporters had been
(37:30):
shown to be a failure and evenharm Athens' position.
Perhaps the policy wasn't areckless one in general, as if
things had gone to theAthenians' advantage.
A series of further successeswould have seen Athens in a
powerful position, butultimately, it seems the plan
that was put in place to follow.
This policy was far toocomplicated and open to too much
chance and factors out of theAthenians' control.
(37:53):
Perhaps, after the Athenians'great successes in the first
part of the year, they hadbecome overconfident and now
luck was turning against them.
Thank you all for the supportand continuing to support the
series.
It is greatly appreciated.
I'd like to give an extraspecial thank you to all my
Patreon Archon members.
So a big shout out to NeilBennett, Ali Ullman, Nick
(38:16):
Kablifakis, PaulVermingen-Matthew and John for
choosing to support the seriesover on Patreon and supporting
at the Archon level.
If you've also found some valuein the series and wish to
support the show, you can headto wwwcastingthoranxiangreasecom
and click on the support theseries button, where you can
find the link to Patreon as wellas many other ways to support
(38:38):
the show.
Be sure to stay connected andupdated on what's happening in
the series and join me over onFacebook or Instagram at Casting
Transient Grease or on Twitterat Casting Grease.
Once again, thanks for thesupport and I hope you can join
me next episode where wecontinue the narrative in the
series you © transcript EmilyBeynon you.
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