August 22, 2024 • 40 mins
What if one man's daring ambition could change the entire course of a war? In our latest episode, we dive into the dramatic events of 424 BC during the Peloponnesian War, spotlighting the audacious Spartan general Brasidas. We’ll recount Athens' initial victories, like the fortification at Pylos and the shocking Spartan surrender at Sphacteria, and their setbacks, including the failed attempts to control Megara and Boeotia and the devastating loss at the Battle of Delium.
Follow Brasidas as he embarks on his bold campaign northward through the dangerous landscapes of Thessaly, employing shrewd diplomacy to navigate his way to Amphipolis. Discover how he forged key alliances with local oligarchs and negotiated with powerful figures like Perdiccas and Arabaeus. Brasidas’ calculated risks and strategic brilliance not only secured crucial territories but also inspired cities to revolt against Athenian rule, significantly boosting Spartan influence in the region.
Finally, we unravel the intricate political manoeuvres and shifting allegiances that defined Brasidas' campaign. Learn how his moderate terms for surrender and shrewd tactics led to the strategic capture of Athenian positions and a reshaped power dynamic. This episode provides a captivating look at the twists and turns of 424 BC, highlighting how one leader's vision and strategy could turn the tide of war. Tune in for an enlightening exploration of ancient Greek history and the brilliant tactics of a Spartan hero.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:15):
The passage of Brasidas was a complete surprise
to the people in the city, andthe capture of many of those
outside, as well as the flightof the rest within the wall,
combine to produce greatconfusion among the citizens,
especially as they do not trustone another.
The capture of Amphipolisrecounted by Thucydides.
Hello, I'm Mark Selleck andwelcome back to Casting Through
(00:36):
Ancient Greece, episode 88,brassidus' Thracian Adventure.
The last couple of episodes, wehad been focused on the
offensives of Athens, where theywould, for the first time, take
the advantage during the war.
As we saw, this change in thestrategic situation would take
place in 424 BC.
Seven years into the war,demosthenes' insistence on
(00:58):
developing a fort onPeloponnesian soil while on the
way to Caesarea, would lead toan opportunity that would put
Sparta on the back foot.
The port at Pylos would seeSparta react to an enemy within
their territory.
In an attempt to surround theAthenian position at Pylos, the
island of Sphacteria, just offthe coast, would be occupied.
However, in the attempt to cutoff the Athenian fort, the
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Spartans themselves would becomeisolated.
When the Athenian fleet arrivedon the scene, a combination of
force and diplomacy would beemployed by the Spartans to make
contact with their Spartiites,though in the end, after an
Athenian assault on the island,the Spartans would be forced to
surrender their arms and go intoAthenian captivity, shocking
(01:41):
the Greek world.
Athens would then continuetheir offensive against the
Peloponnese into 424 byestablishing more forts off the
Peloponnesian coast.
At this stage, sparta failed toact in a decisive manner,
allowing the Athenians toconduct their operations without
any real opposition.
This had marked a point whereAthens now held a strategic
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advantage over Sparta and wereusing this situation in their
negotiations with Sparta toattempt to get the best peace
deal possible.
However, the Athenian offensivewould continue further, with an
ambitious operation arrangedthat would target Sparta's
allies.
The first would target Megara,on the Attic side of the
Corinthian isthmus.
The aim here was to have Megarafall into Athenian influence so
that access from thePeloponnese into Attica could be
better guarded.
The Athenians would takeadvantage of factional
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differences within Megara togain access to the port and the
city.
However, the plan would goastray when the oligarchs of the
city got wind of the democraticscheming with the Athenians.
This would see that the assaultstalled and allowed time for a
Peloponnesian force under thecommand of Brazidas to come up
and prevent the Athenian captureof Megara.
(02:50):
The other operation would targetthe Boeotians.
The first part of the plan wasto march inland from Neopactus
and then west towards Boeotia,capturing villages and forcing
the Boeotians to react.
The second part would see anAthenian force cross the Attic
border into Boeotia and occupyDelium around the same time.
This would see that theBoeotians would not be able to
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assemble their entire forceagainst the attack on Delium.
However, this operation wouldalso break down into failure,
with the coordination betweenthe Athenian allies and the
separate armies proving toocomplicated, with the
two-pronged attacks occurringsome time apart, enough time for
the Boeotians to regroup andmarch in full force against
Delium.
This would result in the Battleof Delium, where Athens would
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suffer its worst loss in the wayof hoplites in the
Peloponnesian War so far.
We would also find at Deliumnew tactics being used by Thebes
in hoplite battles, with muchheavier use of light troops,
mass phalanxes and flamethrowingsiege weapons.
These failed Athenianoperations and the defeat of
Delium would see that thependulum of strategic advantage
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begin to swing back again, forthese setbacks would encourage
the Spartans and would installsome more resolve when it came
to negotiations.
For this episode, we're going tolook at an expedition that the
Spartans were arranging thatwould head into Thracian lands.
This force would be led byBrasidas and he had begun
preparations just before theAthenian attack on Megara in
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which he would intervene, sincehe was assembling his forces
nearby.
Although Sparta was in aprecarious position by mid-424,
they were still looking toattack Athens where they could.
The confused response on thePeloponnese reacting to Athenian
incursions was one thing, butsomething had to be done to try
and improve Sparta's positionafter the disasters of the year.
(04:40):
So far, attacking Athensdirectly was out of the question
.
For the time being, athensstill had the Spartans captured
on Sphacteria as hostages.
Plus they were attemptingnegotiations.
Perhaps if they could attackthe Athenians indirectly through
regions outside Attica, theycould avoid the consequences of
a direct attack on Athens.
(05:00):
Realistically, the only regionoutside of Attica Sparta could
reach, where Athens hadinterests and they could be hurt
strategically, was up north inThrace.
Here, the main goal ofBrasidas' force was the city of
Amphipolis, being a source ofstrategic materials, with its
dense forested areas as well asgold and silver mines, while the
city was situated in a vitallocation that held control over
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passage on the Strymon River andthe coastal road heading east
to the Hellespont.
As we have seen before, thispath heading east was vital to
Athens' grain supply.
However, this plan of Brasidas'was a tricky one, as the rugged
region of Thrace had alwaysbeen a hostile land to outsiders
, which both the Athenians andPersians had learnt.
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While, to reach these lands,the Spartan force would need to
march through Thessaly onfriendly terms with Athens,
which was the most northernregion of Greece, though
Brasidas judged the risk waswell worth it, with Sparta
strategically on the back footon the Peloponnese, this would
help ease some pressure, ifsuccessful, while the timing for
the campaign seemed to bebetter than ever, with Boeotia
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north of Attica hostile toAthens, while Perdiccas, the
king of Macedon, had shown to bean unreliable ally to Athens
and had been willing to listento the Spartans.
However, these regions also hadtheir own motivations for
Spartan involvement up north, asAthenian incursions into
Boeotia were expected whilePerdiccas was fighting his own
war against the Lincistians,another tribal group within
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Macedonia.
Brasidas would put forward hisplan to the Spartan government
and, although a high degree ofrisk was involved, they had
recognised that Sparta needed totake some form of offensive
action against Athens, with thevarious regions in the northwest
openly hostile hostile or atleast unfriendly to Athens.
It was thought that they couldreasonably rely on them
supporting a Spartan campaign.
(06:52):
Having gained approval, brasidaswould then head east to Sicyon,
not far from Corinth, wherehe'd begin assembling his force
and where we had seen him lastepisode.
When we looked at Athens'attack on Megara, we would hear
that he had a force of 1,700 men, made up of 700 helots armed as
hoplites and 1,000 mercenaryhoplites from the Peloponnese.
Sending these 700 helots tofight as hoplites appears to
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have been another strategicconsideration.
As we had seen, the Mycenaeans,when being landed at Pylos,
were actively trying to incite anew helot revolt.
Sparta had gathered the mostable helots and sent them out of
the region, where they would beabsent for some time and, for
many, likely never to return.
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Brasidas had set out with hisarmy on their northward march,
where they would stop atHeraclea in Trachis, the last
friendly city, before enteringhostile lands.
Once reaching here, brasidaswould send envoys forward to
make contact with Pharsalus inThessalian territory.
Here he was able to makecontact with those who were
known to be friendly to Sparta.
The envoys had the mission ofsecuring escorts so that the
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army would be able to make itthrough Thessaly safely, even at
the best of times, most Greekswere very suspicious of
outsiders marching through theirterritory, especially an army.
Brasidas was in luck, though,as Thessaly, at this stage, was
not ruled by a democraticgovernment and he was instead
able to appeal to the localoligarchic ruling faction for
assistance.
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Brasidas would end up securinghis escort, but he would still
find that there were those inThessaly still hostile towards
him and would attempt to preventhis passage through the country
.
Upon reaching the river Onypus,he would be challenged by the
opposing factions, who deemedhis passage illegal.
They claimed that he had notsought the permission of the
people across their country.
Therefore, they were actingunlawfully.
(08:43):
Brasidas, still with his escort, now in a position where his
expedition could be well over,as he appears not to have had
the strength to deal with thischallenge, especially in the
face of a river crossing,instead of looking to force his
way, he would turn to diplomacyand instead address his accusers
.
He would say he came as afriend to the land of Thessaly
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and to its people.
It was against Athens, withwhom he was at war, not against
the Thessalians, that his armywas directed.
He knew of no quarrel betweenThessaly and Sparta to prevent
either party going through eachother's territory.
Now, if they refused himpermission he would certainly go
no further.
Nevertheless, he did not thinkit right that they should stop
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him.
After hearing what Brasidas hadto say, those opposing him
would abandon their position onthe opposite bank.
It seems this opposition hadbeen hastily arranged to march
out and intercept the Spartanforce, but was probably not
strong enough to feel confidentin fighting a pitched battle.
This had now freed the passageup to continue the march
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northward.
However, it appears that thoseescorting had become nervous of
the encounter and seemed tothink more opposition may
present itself.
For this reason, they nowadvised Brazidas that the march
should continue at full pacewithout halting.
The force would end up reachingthe safety of Pharsalus, where
his guides had come from andwhere the army could finally
rest for a period.
(10:07):
The march would then continue,with their guides taking him as
far as the region of Peribia,where others friendly to Sparta
would take Brasidas intoMacedonian territory, to the
town of Diom under Mount Olympus.
Brasidas had managed to navigatehis army through Thessaly
without having to face any armedresistance.
(10:27):
However, opposition to thismarch had emerged.
Even though he was able to talkhis way past it, it appears
there was still a large part ofThessaly that was hostile
towards Sparta.
His guides appeared to knowthis and, after their close call
at Anepias, they looked to movethe force through Thessaly
before the opposition factioncould arrange a large organised
army to prevent his passage byforce.
(10:48):
News of Brasidas' march out ofThessaly had made its way back
to Athens.
They knew too well that for theSpartans to march this far
north, they would have pleas forassistance to help them make
the journey.
They assumed that Perdiccas hadbeen at the centre of the
scheme, knowing his unreliablenature.
This march would then have theresult of Athens declaring war
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against Perdiccas, though thiswas probably a mere formality,
given the hostile tendenciestowards Athens even in a state
of peace.
Brasidas was now in Perdiccas'kingdom and required his good
will to hold so that hisexpedition to the Strymon could
continue.
With the Spartan force present.
Perdiccas now looked to takeadvantage of the additional
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forces in his own tribal warwith his neighbours.
To remain on friendly termswith Perdiccas, brasidas
initially agreed to marchagainst his enemies.
However, brasidas was probablynot very interested in fighting
any battles before making it tohis objective.
Instead, he would ratherincrease the size of his own
force.
So when reaching the borderwith Perdiccas' enemies, he
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insisted on allowing him toattempt negotiations with
Arabaeus, the king of theLincistian Macedonians.
Brasidas knew that Arabaeus wasopen to talks, as he previously
made it known that he wishedfor Brasidas to act as an
arbiter between himself andPerdiccas.
Brasidas was encouraged furtherto take on this role when many
villagers along the borderlandsmade it known they were willing
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to go into an alliance withSparta.
However, perdiccas had becomefrustrated with Brasidas
reminding him he was not thereto act as an arbiter but to
destroy his enemies while he,perdiccas, was maintaining half
of his army.
However, the interests of bothmen had now shifted apart.
Brasidas saw he was able toswell the men under his command
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for his real purpose withouthaving to fight beforehand,
while Perdiccas now saw theresources he was committing to
the Spartan force was beingwasted.
Given they were not going tosupport his operations, brasidas
would not be persuaded todispense with these negotiations
and would instead makearrangements so that no battle
would take place.
Perdiccas deemed that he hadbeen disrespected and reduced
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his support of Brasidas' force.
However, given he stillprovided some support shows, he
was cautious not to see theSpartans become openly hostile
to him.
By late August, brasidas waslooking to put in motion his
plans for attacking Amphipolis.
He had recognised the town ofAcanthus on the Chalcidian
Peninsula as being in excellentposition to establish a camp and
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direct operations towards histarget.
As being in excellent positionto establish a camp and direct
operations towards his target,however, for this he needed to
win over the people in the area,who were nervous of his
presence due to their cropsstill not being harvested.
He would find that the town'sopinions were divided between
two factions.
Again here, brassidas would notturn to force to get what he
wanted.
Instead, he would use diplomacyand address the people.
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Thucydides would set Brasidasapart from his fellow countrymen
when he would say he was not atall a bad speaker either for a
Spartan.
He would try and ease thepeople's suspicions of him being
in the area, while alsoappealing to their frustrations
with having to deal with theAthenians exerting their
interests in the area.
In the end, he was able toconvince them that he was there
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to assist them by outlining therisks he had taken by marching
all the way from Sparta fortheir benefit While he was there
to fight against the Atheniansinterests, which would see the
people of the Chalcidides befree once again from their
oppression.
However, he also saw the needto add in a threat that if they
refused to open the city gatesto his army, he would destroy
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all the unharvested cropsoutside the city walls.
Once Brassidas had finishedaddressing the people, they all
came together to cast theirballots on a vote of how to
proceed.
Thucydides tells us that thevote would go in Brassidas'
favour, with part of thepopulation swayed by his words,
while the other part werefrightened of his threats.
(14:48):
This would see Acanthus, whohad previously been under
Athenian influence, revolt fromAthens, while others in the
region would also follow suit,providing Brasidas with more
momentum in the area.
The summer had seen Brasidasget his army into Thrace, having
to navigate the dangers thatexisted on a march northward out
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of the Peloponnese, while thenhe had to gather support so that
he could attempt to wrestcontrol of parts of the region
from Athens.
Finally, after havingestablished the army on the
Chalcidian Peninsula and winningover the local cities, he was
ready to make an attempt onAmphipolis in December.
As we pointed out at the startof the episode, amphipolis was a
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strategic location due to itsposition in relation to the
trade routes, as well as anabundance of resources stemming
from nearby forests and mines.
Greeks had attempted to tamethis region within Thrace for
their own benefit, stretchingback over 80 years.
First, aristagoras from Miletushad attempted to establish a
colony, but would be driven outby the local population.
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A generation later, athenswould also attempt to settle the
area, sending out 10,000colonists, but the expedition
was destroyed by the Thracians.
Expedition was destroyed by theThracians.
Another generation later,athens would finally set up a
colony under Hagon, the son ofNicias, who was able to drive
out the local inhabitants andsecure the location.
From this time, athens nowbenefited greatly from the
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control they could exert overthe area and its resources.
Now, though, sparta was lookingto capture the city, harming
Athens' economy and diplomaticconnections in the area.
Brasidas, at the head of hisarmy, set out from his camp with
all haste through harsh weather, with storms and snow present.
During the march, he even urgedon the army through the night,
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as his goal was to arriveoutside Amphipolis without those
inside knowing his approach.
However, there were some withinthe region that were fully
aware of what was headingtowards the city, so had been in
talks with Brasidas and were toundermine the city from within
the walls.
The main driving force of theseconspirators was those who had
previously inhabited the islandof Andros.
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They had always resented theAthenians and it appears Athens
too did not trust them all toomuch.
They had always had designs onbreaking away from Athenian
influence and establishing theirown colony, and now saw
Brasidas' campaign as a perfectopportunity.
These colonists from Androsinhabited a city near Amphipolis
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named Argyllis, where Brasidasand his army would be received
before making the attack onAmphipolis itself.
It was from here that theconspirators would assist
Brassidus in overcoming the lasthurdle before reaching the
walls of Amphipolis.
To reach the city, the armyneeded to cross a bridge over
the Strymon, which was guardedby those from within the city.
However, through the badweather and assistance from
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Brassidus' latest allies, whoappeared to have friends amongst
the guards, he was able tocapture the crossing relatively
easily.
With this action, brasidas hadtaken control of all the area
surrounding the city.
As the inhabitants had beentaken completely by surprise,
this saw all those who haddwelled outside the city walls
rush for the safety ofAmphipolis.
(18:01):
It appears there were a numberof different groups or factions
who lived in and around the citywalls rushed for the safety of
Amphipolis.
It appears there were a numberof different groups or factions
who lived in and around the city, as Thucydides tells us that
the citizens within the wallswere mistrustful of each other.
He also gives the impressionthat it was an opinion of the
time that if Brasidas marchedstraight into the city it would
have fallen due to the surpriseand disunity within.
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However, once his army hadcrossed the bridge, he allowed
them to turn and plunder thesurrounding countryside.
As we have seen, he had alreadydemanded a lot from his troops
to get to this stage.
He probably saw it was prudentto allow his men rest and to
gather supplies and booty forthemselves.
We need to remember here alarge part of his hoplite force
were mercenaries.
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Often the promise of plunderwas a factor in securing the
loyalty of these troops.
However, another factorBrassidus was also likely
considering was the strength ofhis force.
A direct assault on the citywalls would have likely led to
many casualties.
His force was not that big, sohe would have been interested in
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preserving its strength whilehe could.
If we look back to how heconducted his operations up to
this point, it would make sensethat he would be continuing this
approach Once he did takeAmphipolis.
He would need to hold it and beable to defend against any
counterattack that would surelycome.
His force was unlikely to bereinforced in any timely manner,
if at all, so Brassidas wouldmake camp outside the city and
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would see if he could force someof those from inside the walls
to turn traitor and have thegates open to his army.
By this stage, the faction whoheld majority within the city
had managed to regain somecontrol back within the walls.
This would see the opportunityfor a quick assault on the walls
had now passed.
However, it appears the gateswere well guarded now, as they
were aware of some within thecity wanting to negotiate with
the Spartans.
The Athenian general Euclideswas in command of the defenders
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within Amphibolus, and he hadalso managed to send off a
message for reinforcements tocome to support him.
Half a day's sail away was thegeneral Thucydides with seven
triremes at the island ofThassos.
This is the same Thucydidesthat is currently making up the
majority of our primary sourcesfor the Peloponnesian War
through his history.
Once he had received word ofthe troubles Amphipolis was in,
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he set sail at once with the aimof arriving before those inside
would surrender.
He'd also had in mind the cityof Aeon.
If Amphipolis should fall, hewanted to ensure that he could
at least prevent this alsostrategically important location
falling into Spartan control.
Brasidas had received word thatThucydides had been recalled to
Amphipolis, which caused himsome concern.
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Supposedly, thucydides heldgreat influence within the
villages that were in the nearbymines, so could potentially
call on others to harass theSpartans from outside the walls.
Plus, if Thucydides did arrive,it would seem as though the
resolve of those withinAmphipolis would be strengthened
.
However, brasidas wouldn'tlaunch an assault on the city,
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but would approach them withvery lenient terms for surrender
.
Thucydides would give us whathe heard would be offered.
He therefore put forward verymoderate terms, making a
proclamation to the effect thatall who wished to do so, whether
from Amphipolis or Athenians,could remain in the city with
possession of their property andfull political rights
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guaranteed to them.
Could remain in the city withpossession of their property and
full political rightsguaranteed to them, and those
who did not wish to remain couldtake their property away with
them and leave within five days.
Although Euclides had managed toregain control amongst the
panic and stiffen the people'sresolve, it appears these terms
had now undermined this position.
It is unclear if the terms ontheir own, saw the mass of the
people swing in their opinions,or if those who were for
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negotiations had now used thesevery lenient terms to convince
others, if they rejected themand Brasidas did assault the
city and capture it, surely allthe men would be killed and the
rest of the population would besold into slavery.
Although Amphipolis was anAthenian possession, the
Athenians themselves only madeup a small proportion of the
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city's population, so weresomewhat at the mercy of the
majority.
If the Athenians were presentin great numbers, it seems
probable these terms would havenot been entertained, given how
we have seen them conductthemselves through the war so
far.
The situation with Amphipolisnow saw that the people were no
longer taking any notice of theorders Euclides was issuing.
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This made it clear to theAthenians of Amphipolis that
they had no power in preventingthe surrender of the city.
With this realisation, theywere glad that they had the
opportunity to leave the citysafely.
There was no way they wouldremain, given that they were in
small numbers and had not heldauthority with the people any
longer.
Brasidas would hold theinfluence behind the walls, and
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with this situation, how longcould their safety really be
guaranteed?
So the city of Amphibolus wouldsurrender to the light terms
given by Brasidas.
Due to the feelings of themajority of the population, of
the majority of the population,they had been relieved from the
great danger of resisting theSpartans.
With the promise of the terms,they saw them hold onto their
property and political rights.
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However, on the same day thatBrassa dissented and took
control of Amphipolis, thecities would arrive on the coast
at the city of Aeon.
Thucydides would arrive toolate to prevent the capture of
Amphipolis, though landing atAeon, he was able to prevent
this city also falling intoBrasidas' hands.
Upon arriving at Aeon,thucydides tells us, they would
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set about arranging the defencesof the city.
This effort would come just intime as Brasidas had set sail
some boats down the Strymon,with some land forces marching
in support.
Their aim was to capture theheadlands, which would see them
control the entrance to Aeon.
However, due to the defences atthe city being arranged,
thucydides was able to see thatboth the naval and land forces
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would be beaten off to wherethey would return, to Amphipolis
.
Brasidas, although failing tocapture Aeon, would continue to
work towards Spartan interestsin the region.
We would hear of a number ofcities and towns in the region
coming over to him after hissuccess at capturing Amphipolis.
As well as this, perticus wouldcome to Brasidas in Amphipolis,
where he would work incooperation with him, although
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Brasidas had not followed theactions he wanted on arriving in
his territory, brassidas nowheld a strategic position where,
no doubt, perdiccas saw his owninterests could be advanced.
This development in Thrace hadbecome quite concerning for
Athens.
Not only had it threatened thecontrol over trade and resources
, but, due to the moderateapproach that Brassidas was
taking in the campaign, athenswas concerned.
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More cities in the region wouldrevolt.
Athens had good reason for thisconcern.
Word had spread throughout thearea and cities who were under
Athenian influence wereembracing the idea of change.
Brasidas and his treatment ofAmphipolis had encouraged many
to attempt to shake off Atheniancontrol, with it seeming like
there was no negative effectscoming from allying themselves
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with the Spartans.
The cities would tell us thatthey made overtures to him,
begging him to march onto theirterritory, and vied with each
other in being the first torevolt.
Indeed, they fancied that thiswas a perfectly safe thing to do
.
However, as we have seen so farin the Peloponnesian War, there
were, at this stage, no surethings when it came to changes
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in circumstance.
Should Athens regain control inthe region, these cities would
have to pay a hefty price, asAthens would not forget who
would act against them.
With Amphipolis captured andother nearby cities presenting
favourable signs to revolt fromAthens, brasidas' position was
even more secure now.
This would allow him tocontinue campaigning and attempt
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to exert Spartan influencefurther, in turn harming Athens'
position up north.
His next major target was aregion called Actae, which was
in the same peninsula of theChalcidides that Xerxes had cut
his canal through and whereMount Athos stood.
A number of the smaller townsin this area would come over to
Brasidas, though the largertowns at Diem and Seine would
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hold out.
Brasidas would remain in thearea and his army ravaged their
lands, but the towns failed tofall to him.
The army then moved on to themiddle peninsula of the
Chalcidides, to Tironi, whichwas under Athenian control.
Perhaps reducing this townmight motivate the others to
surrender.
Apparently, some within thetown had invited Brasidas to
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march onto it, as they wereprepared to betray their town to
him.
So here it is difficult to knowif making Tyrone his target was
strategic in attempting toreduce the resistance in other
towns due to an Athenian townbeing captured, or was Brasidas
acting on an opportunity, givenhis plans around Sain and Diem
were not developing?
Nevertheless, brasidas hadmarched his army through the
(26:52):
night and arrived outside thetown before dawn.
The people inside were unawareof the presence of the army, but
the conspirators within hadbeen expecting this arrival and
had kept a lookout.
Some of them would secretlyhead out and meet with Brassidas
on his arrival, where plans totake the town would be put into
action.
Originally, the plan had beenfor 20 lightly armed men
(27:14):
concealing daggers to slip intothe town with help from the
conspirators.
Apparently, a number of thesemen would lose their nerve and
only seven would end up makingit inside.
They managed to slip throughthe fortifications near the sea
unnoticed, climbed the hill thatthe town rested on and took out
the guards on duty.
This then allowed them to makefor the gates and open them for
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the rest of the army to enterand capture the town.
During this operation, tensionhad set in, with Brassidas and
the army waiting outside.
As it appeared, things had notbeen developing in the time
frame.
First thought the army had beenformed up with 100 pelters out
front.
They were to be the first torush the gates when opened.
Finally, a signal fire was litafter the gates were opened and
(28:00):
the rest of the army would nowpour into the town.
Brassidas led part of the forcestraight up the hill to the top
of the town.
Others would occupy lowersections and various detachments
would branch off in alldirections, ensuring the whole
town was covered with forces.
Through these means, brassidaswas able to capture Tyrone while
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the citizens were still in astate of confusion.
Confusion and unable to respondto the events around them.
The only resistance theSpartans encountered was from a
50 strong Athenian hoplite forcethat had been resting in the
marketplace.
They too were surprised andwere only able to mount a token
resistance, with a few of thembeing killed and the rest
fleeing deeper into the city.
(28:43):
With Brasidas in control ofTyrone, he now continued his
policy of winning over thehearts and minds of the local
people of the area.
He extended an offer to thosewho had taken refuge in the town
with the Athenians that theycould return to their property
and their civil rights would behonoured.
He assured the locals of thearea that no reprisals would be
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carried out against them.
Many would return, andBrassidas also set about
ensuring civil strife would notbreak out between the factions
in the town, since one of thesehad assisted him in his capture
of the town, he would gather thepeople together and would
address them.
Thucydides records what he issupposed to have said to the
people, with this speechprobably being similar to how he
addressed the other citiesthroughout his campaign.
He said that it would not befair to think worse of those who
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had worked with him for thecapture of the city or to regard
them as traitors.
They had not aimed at enslavingthe city, nor had they taken
bribes for what they did, butacted entirely for the good of
Toroni and for its freedom.
Nor would it be right for thosewho had not taken a hand in the
work to imagine that they wouldnot share equally in its
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results.
He had not come to do harmeither to cities or individuals.
Addressing the people as suchhad the intention of seeing that
strife would not break out inthe city, making his job much
easier.
It's interesting in seeing howBrasidas conducted his campaign.
From what we have seen of theSpartans, his approach seems to
be out of character.
(30:12):
However, the way thatThucydides presents Brasidas
throughout his history showsthat he was not your typical
Spartan.
We also need to rememberBrasidas had not marched off
with a large army and washeavily reliant on locals in the
regions joining his forces.
Plus, if he was able to winover the locals of the area he
was looking to spread Spartaninfluence into, it would make
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managing the local populationmuch easier.
This would allow him tomaintain order in these areas
with far less troops, allowingmore to remain with his army
when marching on.
Winning the hearts and minds ofthe people was one challenge for
Brasidas, but while he was inthe process of this, he also had
an Athenian force that wasstill held up in the city.
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For him to maintain control andorder with the population, he
needed to rid the city of theenemy who could potentially stir
up ideas of revolt with someelements of the population.
He needed to rid the city ofthe enemy who could potentially
stir up ideas of revolt withsome elements of the population.
He had sent a herald to theAthenians who were in one
section of the city where heasked them to evacuate the
region.
He offered them to leave underan armistice where they could
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take all their belongings withthem.
However, the small Athenianforce refused to leave the city,
but asked for a truce lasting aday to be in effect so that
they could recover their dead.
Brasidas would grant thisrequest, but gave them two days
of truce.
Perhaps he was hoping, once theAthenians had collected their
fallen, they would be moreinclined to depart the city,
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though both sides would beginfortifying the houses around the
area they were held up in so todefend their positions.
After the Athenians hadcollected their dead, it had
become clear to Brasidas thatthey were not looking like
abandoning their positions anytime soon, so Brasidas would
attack the Athenians.
The Athenian defences werenothing to write home about with
(32:02):
them, consisting of somehastily fortified houses and a
poorly constructed wall.
Though being in a confinedspace, they were able to hold
off Brasidas' force for thefirst day of the attack.
On the second day, a siegeengine was brought up to help
deal with the defensive work.
This siege engine was equippedwith a device that would throw
fire at the wooden wall andhouses.
(32:25):
It was clear to the Athenianswhere the Spartans were looking
to bring the siege weapon up to,since the troops were slowly
advancing in a manner to protectthe engine as it came close to
the wall the Athenians to tryand counter the Spartan moves,
erected a tower on top of one ofthe houses, overlooking the
wall.
On top of this tower would belarge casts of water and stones
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to help extinguish the fires andharass those manning the engine
.
However, this Athenian attemptat countering the Spartans would
end up undermining theirdefence and their foothold in
the city.
With all the weight that wasbeing hauled up on top of the
tower, the house below washaving to support a great weight
.
Eventually, this became toomuch and the house collapsed
(33:07):
beneath the tower, with it alsocoming down.
Those Athenians near thecollapse understood what had
happened, but the loud crash washeard further off to those
defending other parts.
They had not seen what hadcaused the sound of destruction
and had now assumed that thefortifications had been stormed
by the Spartans.
They now lost all their nerveand fled to the sea where their
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ships had been anchored.
Seeing the panic developinginside the Athenian defences,
brasidas now ordered his forcesto charge the walls and take
advantage of the situation.
In doing this, brasidas wasable to capture the position and
killed those Athenians that hadremained to defend.
Thucydides tells us that justbefore the collapse of the tower
(33:49):
, brasidas was about to make anoffer to his men that the first
man to scale the walls would beawarded 30 silver mina.
However, before he could,disaster struck the Athenians,
which Brasidas interpreted as adivine intervention.
So instead he would give the 30mina to a temple devoted to
Athena that was nearby, thinkingthe goddess had a hand in the
(34:12):
collapse of the Athenian defence.
This would be the last actionof Brasidas in 424 BC.
The rest of the winter he wouldgo about consolidating the
gains that he had made, whilealso making preparations for
continued operations when thewarmer months of 423 would
approach.
So this brings us to the closeof the year of 424 BC and, as
(34:33):
you can probably see from thelast few episodes, it has been a
big year.
We've also seen a bit of aseesaw effect with the power
dynamics.
This year.
Things began extremely well forthe Athenians, with their
victories at Pylos, sphacteriaand further raids on the
Peloponnese.
This, for the first time, hadseen one of the powers gain a
(34:53):
strategic advantage.
Seven years into the war,sparta was on the back foot,
with over a hundred of theirSpartiites in Athenian captivity
, the class that was fundamentalto Spartan society.
Not only this, but thePeloponnesian fleet was
effectively neutralized withoutfighting Athens had taken
possession of it due to theterms of a truce, but would fail
to return it when negotiationsbroke down.
(35:15):
Athens would then continue tokeep up the pressure on Sparta
by mounting raids andestablishing other forts around
the Peloponnese.
While all this was taking place, negotiations were also being
carried out, but terms Spartawere looking for were denied by
the Athenians, with themthinking they held all the cards
.
Athens then continued to tryand increase the pressure on
(35:37):
Sparta, no doubt looking toforce them to their terms in
negotiations.
This time, campaigns directed atSparta's allies were mounted,
one focusing on Megara and theother on the Boeotians.
If successful, athens would notonly secure their own territory
into the future, but Spartawould lose important allies that
were instrumental in applyingpressure to Athens from multiple
(35:59):
directions.
Megara would see that the landroute out of the Peloponnese
into Attica closed off, whileBoeotia would see Athens not
having to worry about theirnorthern border as much.
However, the attack on Megarawould be foiled when Brasidas
was able to intervene on behalfof the Megarian oligarchs,
preventing the capture of Megaraitself, while the two-pronged
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attack on Boeotia would prove tobe too complicated for it to be
pulled off successfully andAthens would suffer its worst
defeat in battle during the war.
Yet these setbacks that Athenssuffered would see Sparta begin
to recover their resolve in thewar, making the negotiations
swing back away from theadvantage Athens had to this
point.
Athens would also sufferfurther setbacks with the loss
(36:44):
of influence in Thracianterritories.
This was a result of theexpedition led by the Spartan
General Brasidas we had seen.
He was preparing to launch thismarch north during a low point
in the year for Sparta.
The forces he would commandwere made up by very few
Spartans, but rather men fromallies, the helot class and
mercenaries, and even with thishis force was quite small.
(37:06):
However, with agreements withthe Macedonian king, perdiccas,
and the promise of liberation tothe various cities around the
Chalcidides, he hoped to growthis force.
Brasidas, as we saw thisepisode, was successful in
wresting cities away fromAthenian influence, while also
having to deal with theunreliable nature of Perdiccas.
He had shown himself to be agreat strategist where he
(37:29):
recognised the limitations hewas working with.
He used diplomacy a great dealin gaining his victories in the
face of limited resources at hisdisposal, but was also able to
use force when necessary to gainimportant positions.
As we have said, the result ofBrasidas' Thracian adventure
would see Athenian influencetake a hit in the north.
(37:49):
However, his expedition was notover yet and he would continue
to prepare for more action.
However, next episode we aregoing to turn to the
negotiations that had beentaking place between Sparta and
Athens, as 424BC had seen thesituation change between them.
The following year would see atruce develop between the two.
(38:10):
Sparta had now gained back someconfidence, while Athens was
not in the highly advantageousposition.
They were midway through 424.
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series.
The passage of Brasidas was a complete surprise
to the people in the city, andthe capture of many of those
outside, as well as the flightof the rest within the wall,
combine to produce greatconfusion among the citizens,
especially as they do not trustone another.
The capture of Amphipolisrecounted by Thucydides.
Hello, I'm Mark Selleck andwelcome back to Casting Through
(00:36):
Ancient Greece, episode 88,brassidus' Thracian Adventure.
The last couple of episodes, wehad been focused on the
offensives of Athens, where theywould, for the first time, take
the advantage during the war.
As we saw, this change in thestrategic situation would take
place in 424 BC.
Seven years into the war,demosthenes' insistence on
(00:58):
developing a fort onPeloponnesian soil while on the
way to Caesarea, would lead toan opportunity that would put
Sparta on the back foot.
The port at Pylos would seeSparta react to an enemy within
their territory.
In an attempt to surround theAthenian position at Pylos, the
island of Sphacteria, just offthe coast, would be occupied.
However, in the attempt to cutoff the Athenian fort, the
(01:20):
Spartans themselves would becomeisolated.
When the Athenian fleet arrivedon the scene, a combination of
force and diplomacy would beemployed by the Spartans to make
contact with their Spartiites,though in the end, after an
Athenian assault on the island,the Spartans would be forced to
surrender their arms and go intoAthenian captivity, shocking
(01:41):
the Greek world.
Athens would then continuetheir offensive against the
Peloponnese into 424 byestablishing more forts off the
Peloponnesian coast.
At this stage, sparta failed toact in a decisive manner,
allowing the Athenians toconduct their operations without
any real opposition.
This had marked a point whereAthens now held a strategic
(02:06):
advantage over Sparta and wereusing this situation in their
negotiations with Sparta toattempt to get the best peace
deal possible.
However, the Athenian offensivewould continue further, with an
ambitious operation arrangedthat would target Sparta's
allies.
The first would target Megara,on the Attic side of the
Corinthian isthmus.
The aim here was to have Megarafall into Athenian influence so
that access from thePeloponnese into Attica could be
better guarded.
The Athenians would takeadvantage of factional
(02:28):
differences within Megara togain access to the port and the
city.
However, the plan would goastray when the oligarchs of the
city got wind of the democraticscheming with the Athenians.
This would see that the assaultstalled and allowed time for a
Peloponnesian force under thecommand of Brazidas to come up
and prevent the Athenian captureof Megara.
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The other operation would targetthe Boeotians.
The first part of the plan wasto march inland from Neopactus
and then west towards Boeotia,capturing villages and forcing
the Boeotians to react.
The second part would see anAthenian force cross the Attic
border into Boeotia and occupyDelium around the same time.
This would see that theBoeotians would not be able to
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assemble their entire forceagainst the attack on Delium.
However, this operation wouldalso break down into failure,
with the coordination betweenthe Athenian allies and the
separate armies proving toocomplicated, with the
two-pronged attacks occurringsome time apart, enough time for
the Boeotians to regroup andmarch in full force against
Delium.
This would result in the Battleof Delium, where Athens would
(03:33):
suffer its worst loss in the wayof hoplites in the
Peloponnesian War so far.
We would also find at Deliumnew tactics being used by Thebes
in hoplite battles, with muchheavier use of light troops,
mass phalanxes and flamethrowingsiege weapons.
These failed Athenianoperations and the defeat of
Delium would see that thependulum of strategic advantage
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begin to swing back again, forthese setbacks would encourage
the Spartans and would installsome more resolve when it came
to negotiations.
For this episode, we're going tolook at an expedition that the
Spartans were arranging thatwould head into Thracian lands.
This force would be led byBrasidas and he had begun
preparations just before theAthenian attack on Megara in
(04:18):
which he would intervene, sincehe was assembling his forces
nearby.
Although Sparta was in aprecarious position by mid-424,
they were still looking toattack Athens where they could.
The confused response on thePeloponnese reacting to Athenian
incursions was one thing, butsomething had to be done to try
and improve Sparta's positionafter the disasters of the year.
(04:40):
So far, attacking Athensdirectly was out of the question
.
For the time being, athensstill had the Spartans captured
on Sphacteria as hostages.
Plus they were attemptingnegotiations.
Perhaps if they could attackthe Athenians indirectly through
regions outside Attica, theycould avoid the consequences of
a direct attack on Athens.
(05:00):
Realistically, the only regionoutside of Attica Sparta could
reach, where Athens hadinterests and they could be hurt
strategically, was up north inThrace.
Here, the main goal ofBrasidas' force was the city of
Amphipolis, being a source ofstrategic materials, with its
dense forested areas as well asgold and silver mines, while the
city was situated in a vitallocation that held control over
(05:23):
passage on the Strymon River andthe coastal road heading east
to the Hellespont.
As we have seen before, thispath heading east was vital to
Athens' grain supply.
However, this plan of Brasidas'was a tricky one, as the rugged
region of Thrace had alwaysbeen a hostile land to outsiders
, which both the Athenians andPersians had learnt.
(05:43):
While, to reach these lands,the Spartan force would need to
march through Thessaly onfriendly terms with Athens,
which was the most northernregion of Greece, though
Brasidas judged the risk waswell worth it, with Sparta
strategically on the back footon the Peloponnese, this would
help ease some pressure, ifsuccessful, while the timing for
the campaign seemed to bebetter than ever, with Boeotia
(06:06):
north of Attica hostile toAthens, while Perdiccas, the
king of Macedon, had shown to bean unreliable ally to Athens
and had been willing to listento the Spartans.
However, these regions also hadtheir own motivations for
Spartan involvement up north, asAthenian incursions into
Boeotia were expected whilePerdiccas was fighting his own
war against the Lincistians,another tribal group within
(06:29):
Macedonia.
Brasidas would put forward hisplan to the Spartan government
and, although a high degree ofrisk was involved, they had
recognised that Sparta needed totake some form of offensive
action against Athens, with thevarious regions in the northwest
openly hostile hostile or atleast unfriendly to Athens.
It was thought that they couldreasonably rely on them
supporting a Spartan campaign.
(06:52):
Having gained approval, brasidaswould then head east to Sicyon,
not far from Corinth, wherehe'd begin assembling his force
and where we had seen him lastepisode.
When we looked at Athens'attack on Megara, we would hear
that he had a force of 1,700 men, made up of 700 helots armed as
hoplites and 1,000 mercenaryhoplites from the Peloponnese.
Sending these 700 helots tofight as hoplites appears to
(07:16):
have been another strategicconsideration.
As we had seen, the Mycenaeans,when being landed at Pylos,
were actively trying to incite anew helot revolt.
Sparta had gathered the mostable helots and sent them out of
the region, where they would beabsent for some time and, for
many, likely never to return.
(07:36):
Brasidas had set out with hisarmy on their northward march,
where they would stop atHeraclea in Trachis, the last
friendly city, before enteringhostile lands.
Once reaching here, brasidaswould send envoys forward to
make contact with Pharsalus inThessalian territory.
Here he was able to makecontact with those who were
known to be friendly to Sparta.
The envoys had the mission ofsecuring escorts so that the
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army would be able to make itthrough Thessaly safely, even at
the best of times, most Greekswere very suspicious of
outsiders marching through theirterritory, especially an army.
Brasidas was in luck, though,as Thessaly, at this stage, was
not ruled by a democraticgovernment and he was instead
able to appeal to the localoligarchic ruling faction for
assistance.
(08:22):
Brasidas would end up securinghis escort, but he would still
find that there were those inThessaly still hostile towards
him and would attempt to preventhis passage through the country
.
Upon reaching the river Onypus,he would be challenged by the
opposing factions, who deemedhis passage illegal.
They claimed that he had notsought the permission of the
people across their country.
Therefore, they were actingunlawfully.
(08:43):
Brasidas, still with his escort, now in a position where his
expedition could be well over,as he appears not to have had
the strength to deal with thischallenge, especially in the
face of a river crossing,instead of looking to force his
way, he would turn to diplomacyand instead address his accusers
.
He would say he came as afriend to the land of Thessaly
(09:04):
and to its people.
It was against Athens, withwhom he was at war, not against
the Thessalians, that his armywas directed.
He knew of no quarrel betweenThessaly and Sparta to prevent
either party going through eachother's territory.
Now, if they refused himpermission he would certainly go
no further.
Nevertheless, he did not thinkit right that they should stop
(09:26):
him.
After hearing what Brasidas hadto say, those opposing him
would abandon their position onthe opposite bank.
It seems this opposition hadbeen hastily arranged to march
out and intercept the Spartanforce, but was probably not
strong enough to feel confidentin fighting a pitched battle.
This had now freed the passageup to continue the march
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northward.
However, it appears that thoseescorting had become nervous of
the encounter and seemed tothink more opposition may
present itself.
For this reason, they nowadvised Brazidas that the march
should continue at full pacewithout halting.
The force would end up reachingthe safety of Pharsalus, where
his guides had come from andwhere the army could finally
rest for a period.
(10:07):
The march would then continue,with their guides taking him as
far as the region of Peribia,where others friendly to Sparta
would take Brasidas intoMacedonian territory, to the
town of Diom under Mount Olympus.
Brasidas had managed to navigatehis army through Thessaly
without having to face any armedresistance.
(10:27):
However, opposition to thismarch had emerged.
Even though he was able to talkhis way past it, it appears
there was still a large part ofThessaly that was hostile
towards Sparta.
His guides appeared to knowthis and, after their close call
at Anepias, they looked to movethe force through Thessaly
before the opposition factioncould arrange a large organised
army to prevent his passage byforce.
(10:48):
News of Brasidas' march out ofThessaly had made its way back
to Athens.
They knew too well that for theSpartans to march this far
north, they would have pleas forassistance to help them make
the journey.
They assumed that Perdiccas hadbeen at the centre of the
scheme, knowing his unreliablenature.
This march would then have theresult of Athens declaring war
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against Perdiccas, though thiswas probably a mere formality,
given the hostile tendenciestowards Athens even in a state
of peace.
Brasidas was now in Perdiccas'kingdom and required his good
will to hold so that hisexpedition to the Strymon could
continue.
With the Spartan force present.
Perdiccas now looked to takeadvantage of the additional
(11:32):
forces in his own tribal warwith his neighbours.
To remain on friendly termswith Perdiccas, brasidas
initially agreed to marchagainst his enemies.
However, brasidas was probablynot very interested in fighting
any battles before making it tohis objective.
Instead, he would ratherincrease the size of his own
force.
So when reaching the borderwith Perdiccas' enemies, he
(11:53):
insisted on allowing him toattempt negotiations with
Arabaeus, the king of theLincistian Macedonians.
Brasidas knew that Arabaeus wasopen to talks, as he previously
made it known that he wishedfor Brasidas to act as an
arbiter between himself andPerdiccas.
Brasidas was encouraged furtherto take on this role when many
villagers along the borderlandsmade it known they were willing
(12:15):
to go into an alliance withSparta.
However, perdiccas had becomefrustrated with Brasidas
reminding him he was not thereto act as an arbiter but to
destroy his enemies while he,perdiccas, was maintaining half
of his army.
However, the interests of bothmen had now shifted apart.
Brasidas saw he was able toswell the men under his command
(12:36):
for his real purpose withouthaving to fight beforehand,
while Perdiccas now saw theresources he was committing to
the Spartan force was beingwasted.
Given they were not going tosupport his operations, brasidas
would not be persuaded todispense with these negotiations
and would instead makearrangements so that no battle
would take place.
Perdiccas deemed that he hadbeen disrespected and reduced
(12:59):
his support of Brasidas' force.
However, given he stillprovided some support shows, he
was cautious not to see theSpartans become openly hostile
to him.
By late August, brasidas waslooking to put in motion his
plans for attacking Amphipolis.
He had recognised the town ofAcanthus on the Chalcidian
Peninsula as being in excellentposition to establish a camp and
(13:21):
direct operations towards histarget.
As being in excellent positionto establish a camp and direct
operations towards his target,however, for this he needed to
win over the people in the area,who were nervous of his
presence due to their cropsstill not being harvested.
He would find that the town'sopinions were divided between
two factions.
Again here, brassidas would notturn to force to get what he
wanted.
Instead, he would use diplomacyand address the people.
(13:44):
Thucydides would set Brasidasapart from his fellow countrymen
when he would say he was not atall a bad speaker either for a
Spartan.
He would try and ease thepeople's suspicions of him being
in the area, while alsoappealing to their frustrations
with having to deal with theAthenians exerting their
interests in the area.
In the end, he was able toconvince them that he was there
(14:06):
to assist them by outlining therisks he had taken by marching
all the way from Sparta fortheir benefit While he was there
to fight against the Atheniansinterests, which would see the
people of the Chalcidides befree once again from their
oppression.
However, he also saw the needto add in a threat that if they
refused to open the city gatesto his army, he would destroy
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all the unharvested cropsoutside the city walls.
Once Brassidas had finishedaddressing the people, they all
came together to cast theirballots on a vote of how to
proceed.
Thucydides tells us that thevote would go in Brassidas'
favour, with part of thepopulation swayed by his words,
while the other part werefrightened of his threats.
(14:48):
This would see Acanthus, whohad previously been under
Athenian influence, revolt fromAthens, while others in the
region would also follow suit,providing Brasidas with more
momentum in the area.
The summer had seen Brasidasget his army into Thrace, having
to navigate the dangers thatexisted on a march northward out
(15:09):
of the Peloponnese, while thenhe had to gather support so that
he could attempt to wrestcontrol of parts of the region
from Athens.
Finally, after havingestablished the army on the
Chalcidian Peninsula and winningover the local cities, he was
ready to make an attempt onAmphipolis in December.
As we pointed out at the startof the episode, amphipolis was a
(15:29):
strategic location due to itsposition in relation to the
trade routes, as well as anabundance of resources stemming
from nearby forests and mines.
Greeks had attempted to tamethis region within Thrace for
their own benefit, stretchingback over 80 years.
First, aristagoras from Miletushad attempted to establish a
colony, but would be driven outby the local population.
(15:51):
A generation later, athenswould also attempt to settle the
area, sending out 10,000colonists, but the expedition
was destroyed by the Thracians.
Expedition was destroyed by theThracians.
Another generation later,athens would finally set up a
colony under Hagon, the son ofNicias, who was able to drive
out the local inhabitants andsecure the location.
From this time, athens nowbenefited greatly from the
(16:14):
control they could exert overthe area and its resources.
Now, though, sparta was lookingto capture the city, harming
Athens' economy and diplomaticconnections in the area.
Brasidas, at the head of hisarmy, set out from his camp with
all haste through harsh weather, with storms and snow present.
During the march, he even urgedon the army through the night,
(16:35):
as his goal was to arriveoutside Amphipolis without those
inside knowing his approach.
However, there were some withinthe region that were fully
aware of what was headingtowards the city, so had been in
talks with Brasidas and were toundermine the city from within
the walls.
The main driving force of theseconspirators was those who had
previously inhabited the islandof Andros.
(16:56):
They had always resented theAthenians and it appears Athens
too did not trust them all toomuch.
They had always had designs onbreaking away from Athenian
influence and establishing theirown colony, and now saw
Brasidas' campaign as a perfectopportunity.
These colonists from Androsinhabited a city near Amphipolis
(17:17):
named Argyllis, where Brasidasand his army would be received
before making the attack onAmphipolis itself.
It was from here that theconspirators would assist
Brassidus in overcoming the lasthurdle before reaching the
walls of Amphipolis.
To reach the city, the armyneeded to cross a bridge over
the Strymon, which was guardedby those from within the city.
However, through the badweather and assistance from
(17:40):
Brassidus' latest allies, whoappeared to have friends amongst
the guards, he was able tocapture the crossing relatively
easily.
With this action, brasidas hadtaken control of all the area
surrounding the city.
As the inhabitants had beentaken completely by surprise,
this saw all those who haddwelled outside the city walls
rush for the safety ofAmphipolis.
(18:01):
It appears there were a numberof different groups or factions
who lived in and around the citywalls rushed for the safety of
Amphipolis.
It appears there were a numberof different groups or factions
who lived in and around the city, as Thucydides tells us that
the citizens within the wallswere mistrustful of each other.
He also gives the impressionthat it was an opinion of the
time that if Brasidas marchedstraight into the city it would
have fallen due to the surpriseand disunity within.
(18:22):
However, once his army hadcrossed the bridge, he allowed
them to turn and plunder thesurrounding countryside.
As we have seen, he had alreadydemanded a lot from his troops
to get to this stage.
He probably saw it was prudentto allow his men rest and to
gather supplies and booty forthemselves.
We need to remember here alarge part of his hoplite force
were mercenaries.
(18:42):
Often the promise of plunderwas a factor in securing the
loyalty of these troops.
However, another factorBrassidus was also likely
considering was the strength ofhis force.
A direct assault on the citywalls would have likely led to
many casualties.
His force was not that big, sohe would have been interested in
(19:02):
preserving its strength whilehe could.
If we look back to how heconducted his operations up to
this point, it would make sensethat he would be continuing this
approach Once he did takeAmphipolis.
He would need to hold it and beable to defend against any
counterattack that would surelycome.
His force was unlikely to bereinforced in any timely manner,
if at all, so Brassidas wouldmake camp outside the city and
(19:33):
would see if he could force someof those from inside the walls
to turn traitor and have thegates open to his army.
By this stage, the faction whoheld majority within the city
had managed to regain somecontrol back within the walls.
This would see the opportunityfor a quick assault on the walls
had now passed.
However, it appears the gateswere well guarded now, as they
were aware of some within thecity wanting to negotiate with
the Spartans.
The Athenian general Euclideswas in command of the defenders
(19:56):
within Amphibolus, and he hadalso managed to send off a
message for reinforcements tocome to support him.
Half a day's sail away was thegeneral Thucydides with seven
triremes at the island ofThassos.
This is the same Thucydidesthat is currently making up the
majority of our primary sourcesfor the Peloponnesian War
through his history.
Once he had received word ofthe troubles Amphipolis was in,
(20:19):
he set sail at once with the aimof arriving before those inside
would surrender.
He'd also had in mind the cityof Aeon.
If Amphipolis should fall, hewanted to ensure that he could
at least prevent this alsostrategically important location
falling into Spartan control.
Brasidas had received word thatThucydides had been recalled to
Amphipolis, which caused himsome concern.
(20:41):
Supposedly, thucydides heldgreat influence within the
villages that were in the nearbymines, so could potentially
call on others to harass theSpartans from outside the walls.
Plus, if Thucydides did arrive,it would seem as though the
resolve of those withinAmphipolis would be strengthened
.
However, brasidas wouldn'tlaunch an assault on the city,
(21:01):
but would approach them withvery lenient terms for surrender
.
Thucydides would give us whathe heard would be offered.
He therefore put forward verymoderate terms, making a
proclamation to the effect thatall who wished to do so, whether
from Amphipolis or Athenians,could remain in the city with
possession of their property andfull political rights
(21:22):
guaranteed to them.
Could remain in the city withpossession of their property and
full political rightsguaranteed to them, and those
who did not wish to remain couldtake their property away with
them and leave within five days.
Although Euclides had managed toregain control amongst the
panic and stiffen the people'sresolve, it appears these terms
had now undermined this position.
It is unclear if the terms ontheir own, saw the mass of the
people swing in their opinions,or if those who were for
(21:46):
negotiations had now used thesevery lenient terms to convince
others, if they rejected themand Brasidas did assault the
city and capture it, surely allthe men would be killed and the
rest of the population would besold into slavery.
Although Amphipolis was anAthenian possession, the
Athenians themselves only madeup a small proportion of the
(22:06):
city's population, so weresomewhat at the mercy of the
majority.
If the Athenians were presentin great numbers, it seems
probable these terms would havenot been entertained, given how
we have seen them conductthemselves through the war so
far.
The situation with Amphipolisnow saw that the people were no
longer taking any notice of theorders Euclides was issuing.
(22:26):
This made it clear to theAthenians of Amphipolis that
they had no power in preventingthe surrender of the city.
With this realisation, theywere glad that they had the
opportunity to leave the citysafely.
There was no way they wouldremain, given that they were in
small numbers and had not heldauthority with the people any
longer.
Brasidas would hold theinfluence behind the walls, and
(22:48):
with this situation, how longcould their safety really be
guaranteed?
So the city of Amphibolus wouldsurrender to the light terms
given by Brasidas.
Due to the feelings of themajority of the population, of
the majority of the population,they had been relieved from the
great danger of resisting theSpartans.
With the promise of the terms,they saw them hold onto their
property and political rights.
(23:09):
However, on the same day thatBrassa dissented and took
control of Amphipolis, thecities would arrive on the coast
at the city of Aeon.
Thucydides would arrive toolate to prevent the capture of
Amphipolis, though landing atAeon, he was able to prevent
this city also falling intoBrasidas' hands.
Upon arriving at Aeon,thucydides tells us, they would
(23:31):
set about arranging the defencesof the city.
This effort would come just intime as Brasidas had set sail
some boats down the Strymon,with some land forces marching
in support.
Their aim was to capture theheadlands, which would see them
control the entrance to Aeon.
However, due to the defences atthe city being arranged,
thucydides was able to see thatboth the naval and land forces
(23:54):
would be beaten off to wherethey would return, to Amphipolis
.
Brasidas, although failing tocapture Aeon, would continue to
work towards Spartan interestsin the region.
We would hear of a number ofcities and towns in the region
coming over to him after hissuccess at capturing Amphipolis.
As well as this, perticus wouldcome to Brasidas in Amphipolis,
where he would work incooperation with him, although
(24:17):
Brasidas had not followed theactions he wanted on arriving in
his territory, brassidas nowheld a strategic position where,
no doubt, perdiccas saw his owninterests could be advanced.
This development in Thrace hadbecome quite concerning for
Athens.
Not only had it threatened thecontrol over trade and resources
, but, due to the moderateapproach that Brassidas was
taking in the campaign, athenswas concerned.
(24:40):
More cities in the region wouldrevolt.
Athens had good reason for thisconcern.
Word had spread throughout thearea and cities who were under
Athenian influence wereembracing the idea of change.
Brasidas and his treatment ofAmphipolis had encouraged many
to attempt to shake off Atheniancontrol, with it seeming like
there was no negative effectscoming from allying themselves
(25:00):
with the Spartans.
The cities would tell us thatthey made overtures to him,
begging him to march onto theirterritory, and vied with each
other in being the first torevolt.
Indeed, they fancied that thiswas a perfectly safe thing to do
.
However, as we have seen so farin the Peloponnesian War, there
were, at this stage, no surethings when it came to changes
(25:22):
in circumstance.
Should Athens regain control inthe region, these cities would
have to pay a hefty price, asAthens would not forget who
would act against them.
With Amphipolis captured andother nearby cities presenting
favourable signs to revolt fromAthens, brasidas' position was
even more secure now.
This would allow him tocontinue campaigning and attempt
(25:45):
to exert Spartan influencefurther, in turn harming Athens'
position up north.
His next major target was aregion called Actae, which was
in the same peninsula of theChalcidides that Xerxes had cut
his canal through and whereMount Athos stood.
A number of the smaller townsin this area would come over to
Brasidas, though the largertowns at Diem and Seine would
(26:08):
hold out.
Brasidas would remain in thearea and his army ravaged their
lands, but the towns failed tofall to him.
The army then moved on to themiddle peninsula of the
Chalcidides, to Tironi, whichwas under Athenian control.
Perhaps reducing this townmight motivate the others to
surrender.
Apparently, some within thetown had invited Brasidas to
(26:29):
march onto it, as they wereprepared to betray their town to
him.
So here it is difficult to knowif making Tyrone his target was
strategic in attempting toreduce the resistance in other
towns due to an Athenian townbeing captured, or was Brasidas
acting on an opportunity, givenhis plans around Sain and Diem
were not developing?
Nevertheless, brasidas hadmarched his army through the
(26:52):
night and arrived outside thetown before dawn.
The people inside were unawareof the presence of the army, but
the conspirators within hadbeen expecting this arrival and
had kept a lookout.
Some of them would secretlyhead out and meet with Brassidas
on his arrival, where plans totake the town would be put into
action.
Originally, the plan had beenfor 20 lightly armed men
(27:14):
concealing daggers to slip intothe town with help from the
conspirators.
Apparently, a number of thesemen would lose their nerve and
only seven would end up makingit inside.
They managed to slip throughthe fortifications near the sea
unnoticed, climbed the hill thatthe town rested on and took out
the guards on duty.
This then allowed them to makefor the gates and open them for
(27:37):
the rest of the army to enterand capture the town.
During this operation, tensionhad set in, with Brassidas and
the army waiting outside.
As it appeared, things had notbeen developing in the time
frame.
First thought the army had beenformed up with 100 pelters out
front.
They were to be the first torush the gates when opened.
Finally, a signal fire was litafter the gates were opened and
(28:00):
the rest of the army would nowpour into the town.
Brassidas led part of the forcestraight up the hill to the top
of the town.
Others would occupy lowersections and various detachments
would branch off in alldirections, ensuring the whole
town was covered with forces.
Through these means, brassidaswas able to capture Tyrone while
(28:23):
the citizens were still in astate of confusion.
Confusion and unable to respondto the events around them.
The only resistance theSpartans encountered was from a
50 strong Athenian hoplite forcethat had been resting in the
marketplace.
They too were surprised andwere only able to mount a token
resistance, with a few of thembeing killed and the rest
fleeing deeper into the city.
(28:43):
With Brasidas in control ofTyrone, he now continued his
policy of winning over thehearts and minds of the local
people of the area.
He extended an offer to thosewho had taken refuge in the town
with the Athenians that theycould return to their property
and their civil rights would behonoured.
He assured the locals of thearea that no reprisals would be
(29:05):
carried out against them.
Many would return, andBrassidas also set about
ensuring civil strife would notbreak out between the factions
in the town, since one of thesehad assisted him in his capture
of the town, he would gather thepeople together and would
address them.
Thucydides records what he issupposed to have said to the
people, with this speechprobably being similar to how he
addressed the other citiesthroughout his campaign.
He said that it would not befair to think worse of those who
(29:30):
had worked with him for thecapture of the city or to regard
them as traitors.
They had not aimed at enslavingthe city, nor had they taken
bribes for what they did, butacted entirely for the good of
Toroni and for its freedom.
Nor would it be right for thosewho had not taken a hand in the
work to imagine that they wouldnot share equally in its
(29:51):
results.
He had not come to do harmeither to cities or individuals.
Addressing the people as suchhad the intention of seeing that
strife would not break out inthe city, making his job much
easier.
It's interesting in seeing howBrasidas conducted his campaign.
From what we have seen of theSpartans, his approach seems to
be out of character.
(30:12):
However, the way thatThucydides presents Brasidas
throughout his history showsthat he was not your typical
Spartan.
We also need to rememberBrasidas had not marched off
with a large army and washeavily reliant on locals in the
regions joining his forces.
Plus, if he was able to winover the locals of the area he
was looking to spread Spartaninfluence into, it would make
(30:34):
managing the local populationmuch easier.
This would allow him tomaintain order in these areas
with far less troops, allowingmore to remain with his army
when marching on.
Winning the hearts and minds ofthe people was one challenge for
Brasidas, but while he was inthe process of this, he also had
an Athenian force that wasstill held up in the city.
(30:55):
For him to maintain control andorder with the population, he
needed to rid the city of theenemy who could potentially stir
up ideas of revolt with someelements of the population.
He needed to rid the city ofthe enemy who could potentially
stir up ideas of revolt withsome elements of the population.
He had sent a herald to theAthenians who were in one
section of the city where heasked them to evacuate the
region.
He offered them to leave underan armistice where they could
(31:17):
take all their belongings withthem.
However, the small Athenianforce refused to leave the city,
but asked for a truce lasting aday to be in effect so that
they could recover their dead.
Brasidas would grant thisrequest, but gave them two days
of truce.
Perhaps he was hoping, once theAthenians had collected their
fallen, they would be moreinclined to depart the city,
(31:40):
though both sides would beginfortifying the houses around the
area they were held up in so todefend their positions.
After the Athenians hadcollected their dead, it had
become clear to Brasidas thatthey were not looking like
abandoning their positions anytime soon, so Brasidas would
attack the Athenians.
The Athenian defences werenothing to write home about with
(32:02):
them, consisting of somehastily fortified houses and a
poorly constructed wall.
Though being in a confinedspace, they were able to hold
off Brasidas' force for thefirst day of the attack.
On the second day, a siegeengine was brought up to help
deal with the defensive work.
This siege engine was equippedwith a device that would throw
fire at the wooden wall andhouses.
(32:25):
It was clear to the Athenianswhere the Spartans were looking
to bring the siege weapon up to,since the troops were slowly
advancing in a manner to protectthe engine as it came close to
the wall the Athenians to tryand counter the Spartan moves,
erected a tower on top of one ofthe houses, overlooking the
wall.
On top of this tower would belarge casts of water and stones
(32:46):
to help extinguish the fires andharass those manning the engine
.
However, this Athenian attemptat countering the Spartans would
end up undermining theirdefence and their foothold in
the city.
With all the weight that wasbeing hauled up on top of the
tower, the house below washaving to support a great weight
.
Eventually, this became toomuch and the house collapsed
(33:07):
beneath the tower, with it alsocoming down.
Those Athenians near thecollapse understood what had
happened, but the loud crash washeard further off to those
defending other parts.
They had not seen what hadcaused the sound of destruction
and had now assumed that thefortifications had been stormed
by the Spartans.
They now lost all their nerveand fled to the sea where their
(33:29):
ships had been anchored.
Seeing the panic developinginside the Athenian defences,
brasidas now ordered his forcesto charge the walls and take
advantage of the situation.
In doing this, brasidas wasable to capture the position and
killed those Athenians that hadremained to defend.
Thucydides tells us that justbefore the collapse of the tower
(33:49):
, brasidas was about to make anoffer to his men that the first
man to scale the walls would beawarded 30 silver mina.
However, before he could,disaster struck the Athenians,
which Brasidas interpreted as adivine intervention.
So instead he would give the 30mina to a temple devoted to
Athena that was nearby, thinkingthe goddess had a hand in the
(34:12):
collapse of the Athenian defence.
This would be the last actionof Brasidas in 424 BC.
The rest of the winter he wouldgo about consolidating the
gains that he had made, whilealso making preparations for
continued operations when thewarmer months of 423 would
approach.
So this brings us to the closeof the year of 424 BC and, as
(34:33):
you can probably see from thelast few episodes, it has been a
big year.
We've also seen a bit of aseesaw effect with the power
dynamics.
This year.
Things began extremely well forthe Athenians, with their
victories at Pylos, sphacteriaand further raids on the
Peloponnese.
This, for the first time, hadseen one of the powers gain a
(34:53):
strategic advantage.
Seven years into the war,sparta was on the back foot,
with over a hundred of theirSpartiites in Athenian captivity
, the class that was fundamentalto Spartan society.
Not only this, but thePeloponnesian fleet was
effectively neutralized withoutfighting Athens had taken
possession of it due to theterms of a truce, but would fail
to return it when negotiationsbroke down.
(35:15):
Athens would then continue tokeep up the pressure on Sparta
by mounting raids andestablishing other forts around
the Peloponnese.
While all this was taking place, negotiations were also being
carried out, but terms Spartawere looking for were denied by
the Athenians, with themthinking they held all the cards
.
Athens then continued to tryand increase the pressure on
(35:37):
Sparta, no doubt looking toforce them to their terms in
negotiations.
This time, campaigns directed atSparta's allies were mounted,
one focusing on Megara and theother on the Boeotians.
If successful, athens would notonly secure their own territory
into the future, but Spartawould lose important allies that
were instrumental in applyingpressure to Athens from multiple
(35:59):
directions.
Megara would see that the landroute out of the Peloponnese
into Attica closed off, whileBoeotia would see Athens not
having to worry about theirnorthern border as much.
However, the attack on Megarawould be foiled when Brasidas
was able to intervene on behalfof the Megarian oligarchs,
preventing the capture of Megaraitself, while the two-pronged
(36:20):
attack on Boeotia would prove tobe too complicated for it to be
pulled off successfully andAthens would suffer its worst
defeat in battle during the war.
Yet these setbacks that Athenssuffered would see Sparta begin
to recover their resolve in thewar, making the negotiations
swing back away from theadvantage Athens had to this
point.
Athens would also sufferfurther setbacks with the loss
(36:44):
of influence in Thracianterritories.
This was a result of theexpedition led by the Spartan
General Brasidas we had seen.
He was preparing to launch thismarch north during a low point
in the year for Sparta.
The forces he would commandwere made up by very few
Spartans, but rather men fromallies, the helot class and
mercenaries, and even with thishis force was quite small.
(37:06):
However, with agreements withthe Macedonian king, perdiccas,
and the promise of liberation tothe various cities around the
Chalcidides, he hoped to growthis force.
Brasidas, as we saw thisepisode, was successful in
wresting cities away fromAthenian influence, while also
having to deal with theunreliable nature of Perdiccas.
He had shown himself to be agreat strategist where he
(37:29):
recognised the limitations hewas working with.
He used diplomacy a great dealin gaining his victories in the
face of limited resources at hisdisposal, but was also able to
use force when necessary to gainimportant positions.
As we have said, the result ofBrasidas' Thracian adventure
would see Athenian influencetake a hit in the north.
(37:49):
However, his expedition was notover yet and he would continue
to prepare for more action.
However, next episode we aregoing to turn to the
negotiations that had beentaking place between Sparta and
Athens, as 424BC had seen thesituation change between them.
The following year would see atruce develop between the two.
(38:10):
Sparta had now gained back someconfidence, while Athens was
not in the highly advantageousposition.
They were midway through 424.
Thank you all for the supportand continuing to support the
series.
It is greatly appreciated.
I'd like to give an extraspecial thank you to all my
Patreon Archon members, so a bigshout out to Neil Bennett, ali
(38:33):
Ullman, nick Kabifakis, paulVermingen-Matthew and John for
choosing to support the seriesover on Patreon and supporting
at the Archon level.
If you've also found some valuein the series and wish to
support the show, you can headto wwwcastingthoranxiagreasecom
and click on the support theseries button, where you can
find the link to Patreon as wellas many other ways to support
(38:55):
the show.
Be sure to stay connected andupdated on what's happening in
the series and join me over onFacebook or Instagram at Casting
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Once again, thanks for thesupport and I hope you can join
me next episode where wecontinue the narrative in the
series.
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