September 23, 2024 • 41 mins
What if the triumphs of a powerful city could gradually slip away? In this episode of Casting Through Ancient Greece, we explore how Athens' dominance began to erode, not through immediate disaster, but through a series of missteps and lost opportunities. Once at the height of its military and political influence, Athens' advantage waned as strategic errors and unsuccessful campaigns chipped away at its position. From remarkable victories, such as the capture of over 120 Spartiates, to the costly setback at the Battle of Delium.
As we unravel the political turmoil within Athens, the spotlight is on Thucydides’ trial and subsequent exile, a move driven by internal rivalries and the ambition of figures like Cleon. Explore the broader ramifications of Brasidas' triumphs, which sparked revolts and coerced Athens into a temporary truce with Sparta in 423 BC. We dissect the fragile peace terms, the breaches that ensued, and the precarious nature of maintaining a truce amidst the chaos of war. The political machinations and the struggle for control within Athens reveal the deep complexities and the relentless pressures of leadership during this tumultuous period.
The episode culminates with a detailed look at the military and diplomatic maneuvers that defined this phase of the Peloponnesian War. Follow the Athenians’ strategic repositioning to capture Mende and besiege Scione, supported by Perdiccas of Macedon who thwarted Spartan reinforcements. Uncover the shifting alliances within the Boeotian League and the regional conflicts that further complicated the war. From the failed Athenian attempts to reclaim territories to the nuanced interplay of power, this episode offers a comprehensive understanding of the intricate military strategies and political manoeuvres that shaped the course of this historical conflict.
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Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 2 (00:15):
In the midst of his designs upon the cities in
question, a trium arrived withcommissioners carrying round the
news of the armisticeThucydides.
Hello, I'm Mark Selleck andwelcome back to Casting Through
Ancient Greece, episode 89,carrying around the news of the
Armistice Thucydides.
Hello, I'm Mark Selleck andwelcome back to Casting Through
Ancient Greece, episode 89, theTenuous Truce.
Over the past year, we haveseen Athens go from a very
strong position in the war overSparta to now where they no
(00:38):
longer held an advantage as muchas they initially had.
This favourable position hadbegun with the Spartan surrender
as bacteria, with over 120Spartiites going into Athenian
captivity, while thePeloponnesian fleet had also
been neutralised, with Athensnot handing back over the ships
after holding them during atruce while negotiations had
taken place.
(00:58):
This action had seen Athensestablish a fort on the
Peloponnesian territory thatthey could mount raids from.
Also, athens now had a massivebargaining chip, holding the
core citizens of Spartan societyhostage.
This would see Athens with anadvantage in negotiations, while
also seeing their own homelandsecure for the short term from
(01:18):
invasion.
Further pressure would beplaced on Sparta as the
Athenians continued operationsinto Peloponnesian territory,
where they looked to replicatethe success at Pylos, this then
seeing them.
With multiple locations theycould raid the Peloponnese from
with very little notice.
(01:39):
Negotiations between Sparta andAthens continued, but although
we don't get any detailedaccounts of them, it seems
Athens repeatedly rejectedSpartan approaches, thinking
they could gain a peacecompletely favouring Athens.
Given the current situation,however, this advantage they
held would begin to slip.
This would be during thecontinued operations when Athens
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looked to target Sparta'sallies.
Firstly, their attempt atcapturing Magara would fail,
with some help from the Spartangeneral Brasidas preparing for
his own expedition, while anambitious two-prong attack
directed at the Boeotians wouldfail due to the over-complicated
nature of the operation.
This would end up resulting inthe Battle of Delium, where
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Athens would suffer its worstlosses in the war so far.
These reverses in fortune wouldhave an impact on negotiations,
where Sparta saw Athens nowvulnerable to attack.
This then brought us to lastepisode, where Brasidas launched
a campaign north into Thracianlands, looking at attacking
Athenians indirectly.
He had at his disposal only alimited force, but with help
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from allies within Thessaly, hewas able to make it into
Macedonian territory, where analliance had been arranged with
the Macedonian King Perdiccas.
Brasidas' main goal was tocapture Amphibolus, which he
would achieve then set aboutprying more areas away from
Athenian influence.
Although Thrace was well northof Athens, spartan influence in
(03:05):
the area would hurt Athenseconomically and diplomatically.
The region was rich inresources vital to Athens, with
its many forested areas andprecious metal mines.
Along with the naturalresources, amphipolis lay on the
coastal road that connected theeast to west and where much
trade Athens relied on travelled.
Ultimately, brasidas'expedition in 424 was successful
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, with many cities and villageshaving revolted from Athens or
been taken by his army.
Heading into 423 BC, athens wasno longer in the favourable
position they had been inmid-424, when attempting to
bring about peace terms on theirconditions.
Although holding forts inPeloponnesian territory, they
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had also been undermined intheir regional possessions,
seeing them needing to devoteresources in response.
Added to this, reverses infortune diplomatically, where
cities previously allied toAthens, as well as defeats on
(04:10):
the battlefield, would now haveAthens enemies, seeing them in a
far weaker position For thisepisode.
We are going to look at thepolitical and diplomatic
aftermath for Assiduza'scampaign during 424, while we'll
also look at the responseAthens would take to respond to
Sparta's involvement at Thrace.
We have seen how important thecity of Amphipolis was to Athens
in the series they had investedresources and citizens into
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establishing a colony in Thraceon the Strymon over the past
couple of generations.
The first attempt would fail inthis notoriously hostile land
to outsiders.
However, the second time arounda generation later, would bring
about an Athenian-establishedcolony.
As Athens grew in wealth andpower, the region had become
more important for security oftrade heading through the
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coastal road.
As well as the raw materialsfound at this location, the
timber from the dense forestswould be instrumental in keeping
the huge fleet supplied withships.
Brasidas' campaign had now putAthens' war effort in jeopardy,
potentially harming theirability to gather the resources
needed to continue the war.
As well as this, the campaignhad undermined Athens' position
(05:17):
in the region, with manyrevolting from them.
Another blow to the war economy, with the much-needed tribute
not coming in from these citiesanymore.
So, as you can imagine, when thenews of the loss of Amphipolis,
along with the revolt of othercities, made its way back to
Athens, panic set in with themlooking to explain the disaster
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and place blame somewhere.
Like with many setbacks, thisblame would be placed on one man
the general in command of thearea.
Commanding this northern regionof Athenian interests was
Thucydides, as we have seen.
He had attempted to make itback to Amphipolis before the
city surrendered.
However, he was too late.
He had landed at Aeon, where hewas able to beat off an attack
led by Brasidas, keeping hispossession in Athenian hands.
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This period had seen Cleon asthe figure in Athens with the
greatest influence at this point, and is often thought he would
charge Thucydides as being thescapegoat for the loss of
Amphipolis.
However, although they camefrom different viewpoints on
policy, laying blame with acommander due to failure was
pretty commonplace.
Often, the degree of theconsequences would also be a
(06:26):
factor.
Thucydides would end up beingput on trial and, for his part,
in the loss of Amphipolis, hewould be exiled for 20 years.
Because of this exile, he wouldalso argue he had been placed
in a perfect position to viewthe conflict, as he was now able
to freely move throughPeloponnesian territory, where
he would be able to view the warfrom their perspective.
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Given that Thucydides is ourmain source for the
Peloponnesian war and thereforethe actions around Amphipolis we
need to keep in mind, we aretaking his word for it on these
events, so some level ofscepticism is needed, especially
around the questions that he isinvolved in, such as was it
fair to lay the blame for theloss of Amphipolis with him.
The problem in answering thequestion of if Thucydides was to
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blame for the loss ofAmphipolis is down to the fact
that the most complete accountof the event is the one that
Thucydides himself reports Inhis history.
He does not directly addresshis sentence handed down to him
and what took place in the court.
Instead, his defense is foundin his history of events, where
he attempts to report in anobjective manner.
Perhaps what he says here islikely similar to the arguments
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he would have given in hishearing.
I would like to share whatDonald Kagan has put together in
his book the Peloponnesian War,from where he summarises the
elements from Thucydides'history in what would amount to
him defending his position.
The emergency arose, he mightsay, when Brasidas made a
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surprise attack on the bridgeover the Strymon.
The guard at the bridge wassmall, partly disloyal and
unprepared, so Brassidas took iteasily.
Responsibility for guarding thebridge belonged to Euclides,
the commander of the city.
The city was unprepared butmanaged to rally in time to
prevent the immediate treasonand sent for me for help.
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I was at Thassos at the timeand set out immediately to
relieve Amphipolis, if I could,but to save Eon at least.
I made amazingly good time,because I knew the dangers of
treason would be great and thatmy arrival could turn the tide
in our favour.
If Euclides could have held onone more day, we would have
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thwarted Brasidas, but he didnot.
My quickness and foresightsaved Eon.
So, as we can see, thucydides inhis history attempts to shift
the blame away from himself andshows how he was able to come to
the rescue and was at leastable to save Eon from being
captured.
He shifts his blame in thedirection of Euclides, who he
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outlines as being responsiblefor the city.
Had he been able to have thecity under tighter control for
just a little longer, thucydideswould have been able to prevent
its falling.
Again, we need to keep in mindthat this is what Thucydides
himself tells us, and on thesurface it appears to be a
reasonable defence.
However, there are elementsover the incident he doesn't
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address.
The first thing we need to beaware of although Euclides was
in command of the city,thucydides held general command
over the region, thereforegiving him overall
responsibility.
While one big question thatremains unanswered is why was
Thucydides at the island ofThassos at the time?
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It seems very likely that thenews of Brasidas' march would
have been known to him, so it'sunclear why he didn't remain in
Thrace, given that Amphipolisand Aeon were Athens' two most
important possessions.
Given how easily Amphipolisfell, it's also a mystery why
measures to ensure Athenianloyalty were not undertaken.
However, this doesn't discountthe fact that Thucydides may
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well have been on legitimatebusiness in Thassos.
It just seems like a strangetime to leave Aeon when an army
commanded by a Spartan washeading into lands where
Athenian interests lay.
Ultimately, whatever the defenceThucydides gave was not good
enough to convince an Atheniancourt.
Perhaps he was unable tosatisfactorily answer what we
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had brought up.
However, there is still onefact that can give us pause.
If the punishment given to himwas excessive and other
motivations were at play, wehave already pointed out that
Cleon appears to have been theinstigator of the proceedings,
and the two had different ideason Athenian policy.
What seems strange.
If Athens was looking forscapegoats, why don't we hear of
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Euclides also being put ontrial, since he was directly
responsible for Amphipolis' fall?
Perhaps internal politics mayalso be playing out around this
issue.
When it comes down to it, it isdifficult for us to say who was
at fault for Amphipolis' fall.
Based on the information wehave and given what we have is
from the man who was at faultfor Amphipolis' fall, based on
the information we have, andgiven what we have is from the
man who was exiled.
Though whoever was to blamedidn't change the fact that it
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had taken place.
And now Athens had a crisisdeveloping around their interest
in Thrace, with the revoltstaking place up in Thrace and
more looking to develop ifBrasidas continued his campaign,
athens, heading into 423, wasnow in the mood to seek a truce.
For the time being.
This, athens hoped, would buythem time so that they could
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better respond to what wastaking place up north, while it
also opened the possibility of ageneral peace being negotiated
opened the possibility of ageneral peace being negotiated.
Sparta was also in favour ofthis truce taking place, as they
had issues of Athenian fortsdotted around their territory,
while Thucydides also says theSpartans suspecting the actual
fears of the Athenians andthinking that once they had
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enjoyed a respite from troubleand misery, they would be more
disposed to consent to areconciliation, to give back the
prisoners and to make a treatyfor the longer period.
So, with both Athens and Spartaseeing that a pause in the
conflict would benefitthemselves, they would conclude
an armistice.
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Though, with all negotiations,conditions of the truce that
both had to abide by had to beagreed upon.
First and foremost, the trucemandated a complete stop of
hostilities between Athens andSparta and their respective
allies.
All military operations were tostop immediately, ensuring that
no new battles or territorialgains would occur during the
truce.
This clause was vital inhalting the cycle of attacks and
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counterattacks that hadcharacterised the war up to this
point.
In addition, the agreementstipulated each side would
retain control of theterritories and cities they held
at the time of the truce'ssigning.
No attempts were to be made toalter the existing power balance
or reclaim lost lands throughforce lands through force.
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This preservation of the statusquo was central to maintaining
peace, as it prevented eitherside from gaining an advantage
while peace negotiations wereongoing.
In an effort to ensure fairnessand prevent either power from
using its truce to strengthentheir position, a clause was
included prohibiting theconstruction of new
fortifications.
Neither Athens nor Sparta couldbuild or expand any defensive
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structures during the truce,which was designed to prevent
one side from using the truce asan opportunity to fortify
strategic locations inpreparation for a resumption of
hostilities.
The temporary suspension ofexpansionist ambitions ensured
that both sides would benegotiating from a position of
military equality.
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The issues of prisoners of warwas also addressed in the truce.
While captives from both sideswere not immediately exchanged,
the agreement ensured theirhumane treatment and established
that they would retain thecaptivity until a long-term
peace settlement could bereached, that they would retain
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them in captivity until along-term peace settlement could
be reached.
This clause prevented theimmediate resumption of violence
over the fate of prisoners andallowed both sides to focus on
broader diplomatic issues.
The truce also sought to restoresome degree of normalcy and
stability to sacred andreligious sites.
A provision was made for therestoration or preservation of
temples that may have beendamaged during the earlier
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stages of the war.
This reflected the deep respectfor religious observance in the
Greek world, even duringwartime, and ensured that the
truce was not just a politicaland military agreement, but also
a gesture towards preservingcultural and spiritual heritage
a gesture towards preservingcultural and spiritual heritage.
Dispute resolution was a keyaspect in the truce.
Any disagreement that aroseduring the period would be
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resolved through arbitrationrather than military action.
This mechanism provided a meansto avoid further escalation and
ensured that the truce wouldhold even if smaller conflicts
or misunderstandings arose.
Neutral parties could serve asarbiters, which added a layer of
impartiality and fairness tothe process.
In addition to managingconflicts between Athens and
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Sparta, the truce also addressedthe neutrality of third-party
states.
Both powers agreed to leaveneutral city-states out of the
conflict and refrain fromattempting to sway them into
either side of alliance.
This provision reduced the riskof proxy conflicts and expanded
the scope of the peace toinclude a wider part of the
Greek world.
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The implementation of the trucewas carefully monitored through
diplomatic channels.
Both sides agreed to sendenvoys to ensure that the terms
were being respected.
These envoys played a criticalrole in facilitating ongoing
peace negotiations andmaintaining communication
between the two rival powers.
Finally, the truce included aclause respecting sacred and
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neutral territories, ensuringthat religious festivals and
sites would remain free frommilitary interference.
This reflected the broaderGreek tradition of suspending
warfare during religiousfestivals, such as the Olympic
truce.
Areas like the Sanctuary ofDelphi were thus shielded from
the broader conflict, preservingthe sanctity of these important
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locations.
Despite these well-definedterms, the one-year truce was
not entirely successful.
After both parties had agreed tothe terms, events in the north
would continue.
One of the first breaches ofthe truce would come when Scone,
on the Pele Peninsula, wouldrevolt from Athens.
Encouraged by Brasidas, who hadbeen campaigning in northern
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Greece, the citizens of Sconedeclared their loyalty to Sparta
.
In northern Greece, thecitizens of Skone declared their
loyalty to Sparta.
Brasidas, eager to weakenAthenian influence in the region
, readily accepted theirallegiance.
He crossed over by boat fromTyrone, where he had ended his
campaign in 424, and united thecity towards Sparta, seeing
factional disputes evaporate.
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He then had some of his troopsstationed there, as he had
designs on attacking othernearby Athenian possessions in
the future.
The news of the truce appears tohave frustrated Brasidas, who
had been achieving his goals inthe north.
With the actions in the northstill continuing, he would look
to victory rather than workingtowards peace.
However, in an attempt to stillact as he wished and not anger
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Sparta, while attempting toappease Athens, he would argue
the revolt had taken place justbefore the signing of the truce.
Sparta would accept this claimmade by him, although they
probably knew the truth and theywould view that they were
justified in classifying Sconeas theirs.
Though Athens didn't buy thedefence that Brasidas had
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presented, they knew the timingand how the events up north had
unfolded.
Although the truce had calledfor arbitration, athens refused
to fall back on this mechanismdue to the blatant disregard of
Brasidas.
They chose to instead followthe proposals of Cleon.
In their anger of the situation, the Athenians would vote to
destroy the city, put all themen to death and sell the women
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and children into slavery, andthis time there would be no
second thoughts about it.
This would see Athens continueto move further away from the
moderate policies of Periclesand in the direction of
deterrence through terrorproposed by Cleon.
In the meantime, brasidas wouldnow continue to push his
advantage in the region,although this time there would
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be no way to claim issues oftiming around the truce to
defend his actions.
Perhaps he had received word ofAthens' intentions and saw
there was no point in trying toprotect the interests of the
truce any longer.
The city of Mende would nowalso revolt from Athens, and
Brasidas would accept the rebelsinto his camp.
This further angered Athens,who now had arranged a force to
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move against both cities on thepeninsula.
Brasidas prepared for theirarrival.
He had forces in Scone and nowordered a garrison to occupy
Mende.
However, brasidas would now seehow thin his forces were.
Although he had recruitedlocals into his army, he had not
been able to swell his armyfurther, with the Spartans
having earlier refused to sendreinforcements.
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Now, when he needed every manhe had under his command, he
also had an ally in the regioncall upon him for assistance.
He was not able to refuse thisdue to him relying heavily on
the supplies Perdiccas providedhim.
Perdiccas had requestedBrasidas' help in combating the
Lysitanians once again, whichBrasidas was compelled to agree
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to if he were to keep his armysupplied.
The campaign began well, withthe Lysitanians being defeated.
However, perticus wanted toadvance deeper into their lands
and attack them again.
Brasidas, though, was mindfulof his absence from the
Chalcidides and wanted to returnas soon as possible.
In his mind, he had fulfilledhis duty to Perticus, but fierce
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disagreement would erupt overthe matter.
In addition to this, perticushad been waiting on Illyrian
reinforcements to arrive, butthey had failed to show.
It would eventually be learntthat they had defected to
Perdiccas' enemies.
This would now see Brasidas andPerdiccas look to withdraw from
their position in the face ofsuperior numbers assembling
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before them, although no clearplan of withdrawal had been
settled upon.
The Macedonians and theirallies retreated during the
night, leaving Brasidas and hisforce behind.
Brasidas was now in a toughposition, left to face
overwhelming numbers.
However, brasidas would use hisusual military brilliance to
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defend against the attackmounted on his forces and would
bring his army to safety.
Mounted on his forces and wouldbring his army to safety.
This episode inSpartan-Macedonian alliance
would be the final act, withPerdiccas now treating Brasidas
more as an enemy.
He saw that his interests wereno longer aligned and that it
was now in his best interest toget back on friendly terms with
the Athenians.
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While Brasidas had beencampaigning with Perdiccas,
athens had sent off a fleet toattempt to recover the cities
taken, in spite of the truce.
This expedition was led byNicias and Nicostratus, who had
the intention of not actingagainst the terms of the peace,
but to rectify the situation inThrace.
At the point of the truce beingsigned, the Athenian fleet,
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made up of 50 ships, including10 Chian vessels, established a
base at Potidaea to prepare forthe recovery of Mende and Scone.
The fleet had brought with it1,000 Athenian hoplites and 600
archers, while, once arriving,they would also be joined by
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1,000 Thracian mercenaries andpeltas from various friendly
towns in the region.
At this stage, brasidas wasstill absent, and the Athenians
would first focus on attackingMende.
Currently, the city wasdefended by the local
inhabitants, 300 men from Sconeand 700 Peloponnesians, with
them being under the command ofthe Spartan Polydamidas, while
Brasidas was absent.
Initially, pomidamidas and hisarmy occupied a hill outside the
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city where the Athenians wentin with a two-prong attack, One
led by Nicias and one byNicastratus.
Firstly, nicias attempted totake the hill with a
predominantly lightly armedforce by the way of the path
leading to the top.
However, this would beunsuccessful and Nicias himself
would suffer a wound in theattempt.
Next, nicastratus led the restof the Athenian force from a
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different direction, though theground was hard going.
This, along with the resistancethe defenders put up, would see
the Athenian force thrown intoutter confusion and were to only
narrowly escape total defeat.
With the failure of thetwo-pronged Athenian attack, the
defenders did not look to yieldtheir ground and, as the day
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was starting to come to an end,the Athenians retreated to their
camp.
With the Athenians departing,the field and night now falling,
the force under Polydamidasreturned within the walls of
Mende.
Nicias and Nicastratus wouldmake another attempt and the
next day would manoeuvre toattack the city from a different
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angle.
They would sail their ships toland their troops south of Mende
in the direction of Scone,where the Athenians would begin
ravaging the lands in an attemptto bring out the defenders.
However, while this washappening, spartan control
within the walls was weakeningthe repositioning of the
Athenians, had seen the Sconeantroops fear for their own city
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and they fled back to theirhomes during the night Within
Mende, as Polydamidas waspreparing his forces to attack.
The Democrats of the city nowrefused to fight and they would
end up rushing the Peloponnesiangarrison and opening the gates
to the Athenians.
Those Peloponnesians who werenot struck down in the surprise
assault would fall back into thecitadel of the city or would
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escape back to Scone.
The Athenians poured into thecity and although the gates had
been opened to them Thucydidestells us they acted as if they
had taken the city by storm,with the commanders having a
hard time controlling their menfrom slaughtering the
inhabitants.
However, finally, order wasbrought to the army and the
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Democrats were allowed to retaincivil rights, and they were
given the responsibility ofjudging those responsible for
the revolt.
The Peloponnesians would be cutoff in the citadel and a
blockade established on them toprevent their escape.
This would now see Mende backunder Athenian control and
preparations were now made toadvance onto Scone.
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As the Athenian army advancedsouth onto Scone, the people and
the Peloponnesian garrison inthe city came out to oppose them
.
They occupied a hill in frontof the city that would need to
be taken before advancing.
This time around, the Athenianattack would go in strong and
would defeat the defenders, whowould dislodge from their
position.
The Athenians then establishedtheir camp, along with a trophy,
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on this strong ground andturned to preparations for
besieging the city on thisstrong ground and turned to
preparations for besieging thecity.
During the operations ofsurrounding the city, those
Peloponnesians who had beenbesieged at Mende were able to
defeat the guards near the seato make their escape.
They would then make their waydown to Skone, where they would,
during the night, slip past thebesiegers and reinforce those
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inside the city.
Skone would be a prolongedsiege that would continue on
into 421 BC, but the Athenianswould finally capture the city
and fulfilled what Cleon hadvowed would be done.
Once the city was back inAthenian hands, the men were all
killed, while the women andchildren were sold into slavery.
The city and the landsurrounding it were given over
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to the Plataeans, who themselveshad suffered a similar fate at
the hands of the PeloponnesianLeague.
Around the same time that thesiege was developing around
Scone, perdiccas of Macedon sentoff a herald to meet with the
Athenians.
During the talks outside thecity, an armistice was
negotiated between theMacedonians and Athenians.
Once again, armistice wasnegotiated between the
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Macedonians and Athenians.
Once again, perticus had seenthat Athens was returning to the
region with a strong force andit was now in his interest to be
on friendly terms with them.
He was probably banking on thefact that the Athenians were
going to retake theirpossessions in the region.
He wanted to ensure that,during the Athenian recovery of
land and the look to securethese positions, perticus wanted
to see that he could benefit bygaining lands that he had been
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fighting over with other tribesin the nearby areas.
Although Athens would have beenwary of the request for an
alliance with Perdiccas due tohis past record with diplomatic
matters, the Athenians wouldhave seen it was, for the short
term at least, to theiradvantage to conclude an
agreement with him.
It was, for the short term atleast, to their advantage to
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conclude an agreement with him,firstly with Sparta, in the area
.
Athens would rather Perticus ontheir side.
This seeing, brasidas wouldlose his main supply arrangement
, while Perticus's forces wouldbe harassing the Spartans rather
than the Athenians.
It probably seemed likely.
If Athens had snubbedPerticus's offer, he probably
would have attempted to mendthings with Brasidas, meaning
Athens would have other hostileforces to worry about.
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For Athens, it was far betterto just have the rebels of the
area and the Peloponnesians toworry about while they attempted
to recover their possessions atThrace.
Nicias had shown he wasconcerned with how genuine the
alliance with Perdiccas was.
Once in place, he wouldchallenge alliance with
Perdiccas was once in place, hewould challenge how serious
Perdiccas was and sought proofof his sincerity.
(27:27):
Perdiccas would back up thealliance with an action against
the Spartans, who he had shownhe was no longer fond of.
Brasidas during his campaignhad been requesting
reinforcements from Sparta, withhis request mostly being
ignored.
However, sparta had finallydecided to send out a force to
meet up with him at Thrace.
Like Brasidas, this force wouldalso need to travel through
(27:51):
Thessaly to make contact.
This is where Perdiccas wouldshow his worth to the Athenians,
while it also suited his ownpurposes.
Perdiccas had maintained goodrelations with a number of
leaders within Thessalian tribesand would see to it that they
would deny the reinforcingSpartan force passage through
Thessaly.
The resistance this Spartanforce faced on trying to enter
(28:13):
Thessaly was far greater thanwhat Brasidas had encountered.
This would see that the bulk ofthe force was unable to enter
the territory.
Would see that the bulk of theforce was unable to enter the
territory.
Had this army made it intoThrace, it is quite possible
that the year's truce may havecome to an end very quickly with
a larger Spartan force in theregion.
However, a small detachment didmake it into Thrace, made up of
(28:35):
three Spartan generals alongwith some trusted younger
Spartans.
These generals had beencommissioned by the Spartan
government to see what Brasidaswas up to and wanted Spartan
oversight in the region.
This probably had something todo with Sparta being
uncomfortable with Brasidas'actions during the truce.
During this period there wasalso the indication that what we
(28:56):
call the Peace Party was backwith more influence in Sparta,
as these men were from thatfaction and were looking to keep
to the terms of the truce so amore stable peace could be
negotiated.
The Spartan intention here wasto have the commanders and other
leaders to post themselves inthe various cities to act as
governors.
This would see each city with aclear command structure and,
(29:18):
most importantly, one that hadthe Spartan government's
interests at hand.
Up to this point, it had beenmen directly under Brasidas'
command that were taking onthese roles.
Now, though, an officialSpartan policy could be
maintained even when thesecities were so far from Sparta.
However, this move by Spartahad now damaged Brasidas'
(29:39):
reputation in the region.
So far, cities had been goingover to him, with minimal
fighting having to take place.
In return for these citiesdefecting, he had allowed them
to maintain their politicalrights and were free to mostly
govern themselves.
Now, though, with the officialSpartan policy being followed in
the region, it would seem theart of smart diplomacy may now
(30:00):
disappear, with less imaginativemeans relied upon to keep order
and control over these cities.
This flood of cities handingthemselves over to Brasidas
because of his reputation in howhe handled matters would begin
to stop.
To the cities of Thrace, theywere now faced with the prospect
of swapping one mastercontrolling their affairs for
another.
(30:20):
Prospect of swapping one mastercontrolling their affairs for
another.
Although the truce had subduedevents unfolding within Greece,
there were still somedevelopments taking place, these
in and around cities allied toeither Sparta or Athens.
Both Athens and Sparta hadavoided conflict within Greece
to avoid breaking the truce,though Brasidas' controversial
actions in Thrace being theexception, though Brasidas'
(30:45):
controversial actions in Thracebeing the exception.
But these allies of Sparta andAthens still looked to take
advantage over their ownsituation and, with their nearby
rivals In Boeotia, thieves nowhad an opportunity to act
against Thespia, a city west ofthem, still in Boeotian
territory.
Although Thespia was part of theBoeotian League and therefore
part of the Peloponnesian League, thebes saw reason that action
(31:07):
had to be taken against the city.
The previous year, theThespians had fought alongside
Thebes at the Battle of Deliumand had taken heavy casualties.
This seems it may now have someconnection to Thebes accusing
the city of having sympathiesfor Athens or, as Thucydides
says, they had the charge ofAtticism levelled against them.
Although Thucydides doesn'tspell things out for us, it
(31:31):
appears this suffering at Deliummay have changed the political
opinion within Thespio.
The city had lost a great dealof its fighting aged men at
Delium and, although a victory,it may not have felt as so for
the thespians.
This may have led to democraticelements in the city being able
to spread their influence andpossible overtures may have gone
(31:51):
in the direction of Athens.
As we had seen, the creation ofthe Boeotian League was not
something that a lot of citieswent into willingly.
Like other leagues, it wasentered into by cities due to
being compelled to, due to powerstructures in the region or for
one's own state of security inthe face of other threats.
However, if another optionpresented itself that appeared
(32:15):
more in line with theirinterests, cities were likely to
at least entertain negotiations.
As I said, this is probably ourbest guess on the situation,
given the one-line Thucydidesgives us.
However, although the sufferingat Delium may have led to the
shift in policy at Thespia, ithad also weakened the city
greatly.
Once thieves had gotten wind ofthe possible rebellious
(32:37):
activities, they decided to actas we have seen within the
Peloponnesian League and theAthenian Empire.
If a city looked to leave, theywould be treated as a revolting
city.
For a league to maintain itsstrength, it had to retain its
unity.
Thebes felt confident inmarching out to Thespia and
proceeded to dismantle theirwalls.
With the majority of theThespian fighting men having
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become casualties the previousyear, they were in a very weak
position to defend themselves.
Thespia was also situated onlevel ground.
Most cities were built on highground for better defence, so
this destruction of their wallswould make them extremely
vulnerable to any army morepowerful than they were.
This would then have the effectof the government within
Thespia to fall back in linewith Thebes, who was at the head
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of the Boeotian League, or riskthe destruction of the city.
The other event that Thucydidesfound notable to report as
taking place during the summerof 423 did not involve
combatants, but was the resultof a supposed accident within
the city of Argos.
At this stage, argos hadmanaged to mainly remain neutral
in the Peloponnesian War, andas we continue, we will see how
(33:45):
this stance would bring thempopularity from other cities.
This would end up seeing themgain enough political influence
to challenge Sparta and Athensin the near future.
However, during the summer, theTemple of Hera in the city was
burnt down by the long-servingpriestess.
This was through an accidentwhere the priestess rested a
torch near some garlands andfell asleep.
(34:06):
By the time she awoke to thefire, a huge blaze had taken
over.
She was able to escape, butthrough fear of the Argives, she
fled the city.
This was the temple that hadbeen built during Argos's early
stages in the 8th century andserved as its main sacred space.
However, over the next 10 years, a new temple to Hera would be
(34:28):
constructed, though there aresuggestions that the planning
for this new temple was not areplacement for the burnt down
one, as there had been plans fora new construction before this
to accommodate the growth of theArgive state.
These were the main events totake place in and around Greece
in relation to the PeloponnesianWar for the summer of 423.
(34:50):
Heading into the winter, spartaand Athens outside of Thrace
remained quiet towards oneanother.
Within the Peloponnese, however, the cities of Tygia and
Mantinea, who had always hadterritorial disputes, would
engage in a regional war withtheir respective allies.
The battle that developed wouldsee an undecided result, with
both sides having defeatedopposite wings and both would
(35:13):
claim victory.
This battle appears to haveconcluded the current round of
hostilities between the two,with both sides having suffered
heavy casualties.
While up in Thrace, brasidas,with the Athenian counterattack
going on, would attempt one morepush to disrupt their position.
His target was the Athenianbase at Potidaea.
(35:33):
If this could be taken, itwould severely undermine Athens'
position in the area.
Perhaps now, with Spartangovernment representatives in
the area and Athens' push torecapture the revolting cities,
brasidas saw this as his lastchance to make a daring push to
bring the advantage back to himand with it support for his
campaign from Sparta.
Brasidas, again, would not lookto fight a decisive battle for
(35:57):
the city due to the size of hisarmy, with a number of his
troops tied up with garrisonduties in other cities, he would
look to try and take the cityby surprise at night.
He had succeeded in having aladder placed on the walls of
the city, unnoticed, though,before the men of the assaulting
force could be brought up.
The attempt on the wall wasdiscovered by the garrison.
(36:19):
The alarm now raised.
Brassidas saw that his surpriseattempt had failed, since his
forces had not yet breached thewall.
He fell back to his men and ledthem off while it was still
dark and they were to escapefrom the area.
This would see the end of theaction in Thrace for 423.
However, next episode we'll bereturning to the region where
(36:42):
the Athenians would ramp uptheir efforts in recapturing the
rebellious cities and otherpossessions.
Cleon would also make for theregion with an army, and we
would see a battle develop overthe city.
That had seen Brasidas' strikeat the Athenians begin and
Phippolis this year had markedthe first time a truce had taken
(37:02):
place in the war, with hopesthat a longer peace could be
negotiated.
Brasidas' campaign had put thetruce and the potential peace at
risk, with his actions takingplace shortly after this
arrangement.
Although the Spartan governmentwanted a peace to exist with
Athens, they had also seenBrasidas had gained an advantage
for them in the north.
They were willing to accept hisreasoning that he had taken
(37:25):
Scone before the truce was ineffect, since it helped their
position.
However, it seems clear theydid not truly believe this, as
they would eventually sendreinforcements to the north and
even though they were preventedpassage through Thessaly, the
commanders and other officialsmade it into the region.
Here a number would be assignedto the various cities Sparta
had under their control.
(37:45):
This an attempt to run theiraffairs in accordance with the
Spartan government wishes, notBrasidas'.
They saw that his actions wereharming their ability to
negotiate a lasting peace.
The truce in place was now fastapproaching its end, with it
supposed to be in place for oneyear.
However, it was hoped that thepeace could still be possible
(38:09):
even with Brasidas' actions thathad seen suspicion and anger in
Athens grow with each new movehe had made.
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(38:30):
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me next episode where wecontinue the narrative in the
series you.
In the midst of his designs upon the cities in
question, a trium arrived withcommissioners carrying round the
news of the armisticeThucydides.
Hello, I'm Mark Selleck andwelcome back to Casting Through
Ancient Greece, episode 89,carrying around the news of the
Armistice Thucydides.
Hello, I'm Mark Selleck andwelcome back to Casting Through
Ancient Greece, episode 89, theTenuous Truce.
Over the past year, we haveseen Athens go from a very
strong position in the war overSparta to now where they no
(00:38):
longer held an advantage as muchas they initially had.
This favourable position hadbegun with the Spartan surrender
as bacteria, with over 120Spartiites going into Athenian
captivity, while thePeloponnesian fleet had also
been neutralised, with Athensnot handing back over the ships
after holding them during atruce while negotiations had
taken place.
(00:58):
This action had seen Athensestablish a fort on the
Peloponnesian territory thatthey could mount raids from.
Also, athens now had a massivebargaining chip, holding the
core citizens of Spartan societyhostage.
This would see Athens with anadvantage in negotiations, while
also seeing their own homelandsecure for the short term from
(01:18):
invasion.
Further pressure would beplaced on Sparta as the
Athenians continued operationsinto Peloponnesian territory,
where they looked to replicatethe success at Pylos, this then
seeing them.
With multiple locations theycould raid the Peloponnese from
with very little notice.
(01:39):
Negotiations between Sparta andAthens continued, but although
we don't get any detailedaccounts of them, it seems
Athens repeatedly rejectedSpartan approaches, thinking
they could gain a peacecompletely favouring Athens.
Given the current situation,however, this advantage they
held would begin to slip.
This would be during thecontinued operations when Athens
(01:59):
looked to target Sparta'sallies.
Firstly, their attempt atcapturing Magara would fail,
with some help from the Spartangeneral Brasidas preparing for
his own expedition, while anambitious two-prong attack
directed at the Boeotians wouldfail due to the over-complicated
nature of the operation.
This would end up resulting inthe Battle of Delium, where
(02:21):
Athens would suffer its worstlosses in the war so far.
These reverses in fortune wouldhave an impact on negotiations,
where Sparta saw Athens nowvulnerable to attack.
This then brought us to lastepisode, where Brasidas launched
a campaign north into Thracianlands, looking at attacking
Athenians indirectly.
He had at his disposal only alimited force, but with help
(02:45):
from allies within Thessaly, hewas able to make it into
Macedonian territory, where analliance had been arranged with
the Macedonian King Perdiccas.
Brasidas' main goal was tocapture Amphibolus, which he
would achieve then set aboutprying more areas away from
Athenian influence.
Although Thrace was well northof Athens, spartan influence in
(03:05):
the area would hurt Athenseconomically and diplomatically.
The region was rich inresources vital to Athens, with
its many forested areas andprecious metal mines.
Along with the naturalresources, amphipolis lay on the
coastal road that connected theeast to west and where much
trade Athens relied on travelled.
Ultimately, brasidas'expedition in 424 was successful
(03:30):
, with many cities and villageshaving revolted from Athens or
been taken by his army.
Heading into 423 BC, athens wasno longer in the favourable
position they had been inmid-424, when attempting to
bring about peace terms on theirconditions.
Although holding forts inPeloponnesian territory, they
(03:50):
had also been undermined intheir regional possessions,
seeing them needing to devoteresources in response.
Added to this, reverses infortune diplomatically, where
cities previously allied toAthens, as well as defeats on
(04:10):
the battlefield, would now haveAthens enemies, seeing them in a
far weaker position For thisepisode.
We are going to look at thepolitical and diplomatic
aftermath for Assiduza'scampaign during 424, while we'll
also look at the responseAthens would take to respond to
Sparta's involvement at Thrace.
We have seen how important thecity of Amphipolis was to Athens
in the series they had investedresources and citizens into
(04:32):
establishing a colony in Thraceon the Strymon over the past
couple of generations.
The first attempt would fail inthis notoriously hostile land
to outsiders.
However, the second time arounda generation later, would bring
about an Athenian-establishedcolony.
As Athens grew in wealth andpower, the region had become
more important for security oftrade heading through the
(04:53):
coastal road.
As well as the raw materialsfound at this location, the
timber from the dense forestswould be instrumental in keeping
the huge fleet supplied withships.
Brasidas' campaign had now putAthens' war effort in jeopardy,
potentially harming theirability to gather the resources
needed to continue the war.
As well as this, the campaignhad undermined Athens' position
(05:17):
in the region, with manyrevolting from them.
Another blow to the war economy, with the much-needed tribute
not coming in from these citiesanymore.
So, as you can imagine, when thenews of the loss of Amphipolis,
along with the revolt of othercities, made its way back to
Athens, panic set in with themlooking to explain the disaster
(05:41):
and place blame somewhere.
Like with many setbacks, thisblame would be placed on one man
the general in command of thearea.
Commanding this northern regionof Athenian interests was
Thucydides, as we have seen.
He had attempted to make itback to Amphipolis before the
city surrendered.
However, he was too late.
He had landed at Aeon, where hewas able to beat off an attack
led by Brasidas, keeping hispossession in Athenian hands.
(06:04):
This period had seen Cleon asthe figure in Athens with the
greatest influence at this point, and is often thought he would
charge Thucydides as being thescapegoat for the loss of
Amphipolis.
However, although they camefrom different viewpoints on
policy, laying blame with acommander due to failure was
pretty commonplace.
Often, the degree of theconsequences would also be a
(06:26):
factor.
Thucydides would end up beingput on trial and, for his part,
in the loss of Amphipolis, hewould be exiled for 20 years.
Because of this exile, he wouldalso argue he had been placed
in a perfect position to viewthe conflict, as he was now able
to freely move throughPeloponnesian territory, where
he would be able to view the warfrom their perspective.
(06:49):
Given that Thucydides is ourmain source for the
Peloponnesian war and thereforethe actions around Amphipolis we
need to keep in mind, we aretaking his word for it on these
events, so some level ofscepticism is needed, especially
around the questions that he isinvolved in, such as was it
fair to lay the blame for theloss of Amphipolis with him.
The problem in answering thequestion of if Thucydides was to
(07:14):
blame for the loss ofAmphipolis is down to the fact
that the most complete accountof the event is the one that
Thucydides himself reports Inhis history.
He does not directly addresshis sentence handed down to him
and what took place in the court.
Instead, his defense is foundin his history of events, where
he attempts to report in anobjective manner.
Perhaps what he says here islikely similar to the arguments
(07:38):
he would have given in hishearing.
I would like to share whatDonald Kagan has put together in
his book the Peloponnesian War,from where he summarises the
elements from Thucydides'history in what would amount to
him defending his position.
The emergency arose, he mightsay, when Brasidas made a
(07:58):
surprise attack on the bridgeover the Strymon.
The guard at the bridge wassmall, partly disloyal and
unprepared, so Brassidas took iteasily.
Responsibility for guarding thebridge belonged to Euclides,
the commander of the city.
The city was unprepared butmanaged to rally in time to
prevent the immediate treasonand sent for me for help.
(08:20):
I was at Thassos at the timeand set out immediately to
relieve Amphipolis, if I could,but to save Eon at least.
I made amazingly good time,because I knew the dangers of
treason would be great and thatmy arrival could turn the tide
in our favour.
If Euclides could have held onone more day, we would have
(08:40):
thwarted Brasidas, but he didnot.
My quickness and foresightsaved Eon.
So, as we can see, thucydides inhis history attempts to shift
the blame away from himself andshows how he was able to come to
the rescue and was at leastable to save Eon from being
captured.
He shifts his blame in thedirection of Euclides, who he
(09:02):
outlines as being responsiblefor the city.
Had he been able to have thecity under tighter control for
just a little longer, thucydideswould have been able to prevent
its falling.
Again, we need to keep in mindthat this is what Thucydides
himself tells us, and on thesurface it appears to be a
reasonable defence.
However, there are elementsover the incident he doesn't
(09:23):
address.
The first thing we need to beaware of although Euclides was
in command of the city,thucydides held general command
over the region, thereforegiving him overall
responsibility.
While one big question thatremains unanswered is why was
Thucydides at the island ofThassos at the time?
(09:43):
It seems very likely that thenews of Brasidas' march would
have been known to him, so it'sunclear why he didn't remain in
Thrace, given that Amphipolisand Aeon were Athens' two most
important possessions.
Given how easily Amphipolisfell, it's also a mystery why
measures to ensure Athenianloyalty were not undertaken.
However, this doesn't discountthe fact that Thucydides may
(10:04):
well have been on legitimatebusiness in Thassos.
It just seems like a strangetime to leave Aeon when an army
commanded by a Spartan washeading into lands where
Athenian interests lay.
Ultimately, whatever the defenceThucydides gave was not good
enough to convince an Atheniancourt.
Perhaps he was unable tosatisfactorily answer what we
(10:25):
had brought up.
However, there is still onefact that can give us pause.
If the punishment given to himwas excessive and other
motivations were at play, wehave already pointed out that
Cleon appears to have been theinstigator of the proceedings,
and the two had different ideason Athenian policy.
What seems strange.
If Athens was looking forscapegoats, why don't we hear of
(10:47):
Euclides also being put ontrial, since he was directly
responsible for Amphipolis' fall?
Perhaps internal politics mayalso be playing out around this
issue.
When it comes down to it, it isdifficult for us to say who was
at fault for Amphipolis' fall.
Based on the information wehave and given what we have is
from the man who was at faultfor Amphipolis' fall, based on
the information we have, andgiven what we have is from the
man who was exiled.
Though whoever was to blamedidn't change the fact that it
(11:11):
had taken place.
And now Athens had a crisisdeveloping around their interest
in Thrace, with the revoltstaking place up in Thrace and
more looking to develop ifBrasidas continued his campaign,
athens, heading into 423, wasnow in the mood to seek a truce.
For the time being.
This, athens hoped, would buythem time so that they could
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better respond to what wastaking place up north, while it
also opened the possibility of ageneral peace being negotiated
opened the possibility of ageneral peace being negotiated.
Sparta was also in favour ofthis truce taking place, as they
had issues of Athenian fortsdotted around their territory,
while Thucydides also says theSpartans suspecting the actual
fears of the Athenians andthinking that once they had
(11:54):
enjoyed a respite from troubleand misery, they would be more
disposed to consent to areconciliation, to give back the
prisoners and to make a treatyfor the longer period.
So, with both Athens and Spartaseeing that a pause in the
conflict would benefitthemselves, they would conclude
an armistice.
(12:19):
Though, with all negotiations,conditions of the truce that
both had to abide by had to beagreed upon.
First and foremost, the trucemandated a complete stop of
hostilities between Athens andSparta and their respective
allies.
All military operations were tostop immediately, ensuring that
no new battles or territorialgains would occur during the
truce.
This clause was vital inhalting the cycle of attacks and
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counterattacks that hadcharacterised the war up to this
point.
In addition, the agreementstipulated each side would
retain control of theterritories and cities they held
at the time of the truce'ssigning.
No attempts were to be made toalter the existing power balance
or reclaim lost lands throughforce lands through force.
(13:03):
This preservation of the statusquo was central to maintaining
peace, as it prevented eitherside from gaining an advantage
while peace negotiations wereongoing.
In an effort to ensure fairnessand prevent either power from
using its truce to strengthentheir position, a clause was
included prohibiting theconstruction of new
fortifications.
Neither Athens nor Sparta couldbuild or expand any defensive
(13:24):
structures during the truce,which was designed to prevent
one side from using the truce asan opportunity to fortify
strategic locations inpreparation for a resumption of
hostilities.
The temporary suspension ofexpansionist ambitions ensured
that both sides would benegotiating from a position of
military equality.
(13:44):
The issues of prisoners of warwas also addressed in the truce.
While captives from both sideswere not immediately exchanged,
the agreement ensured theirhumane treatment and established
that they would retain thecaptivity until a long-term
peace settlement could bereached, that they would retain
(14:04):
them in captivity until along-term peace settlement could
be reached.
This clause prevented theimmediate resumption of violence
over the fate of prisoners andallowed both sides to focus on
broader diplomatic issues.
The truce also sought to restoresome degree of normalcy and
stability to sacred andreligious sites.
A provision was made for therestoration or preservation of
temples that may have beendamaged during the earlier
(14:25):
stages of the war.
This reflected the deep respectfor religious observance in the
Greek world, even duringwartime, and ensured that the
truce was not just a politicaland military agreement, but also
a gesture towards preservingcultural and spiritual heritage
a gesture towards preservingcultural and spiritual heritage.
Dispute resolution was a keyaspect in the truce.
Any disagreement that aroseduring the period would be
(14:48):
resolved through arbitrationrather than military action.
This mechanism provided a meansto avoid further escalation and
ensured that the truce wouldhold even if smaller conflicts
or misunderstandings arose.
Neutral parties could serve asarbiters, which added a layer of
impartiality and fairness tothe process.
In addition to managingconflicts between Athens and
(15:11):
Sparta, the truce also addressedthe neutrality of third-party
states.
Both powers agreed to leaveneutral city-states out of the
conflict and refrain fromattempting to sway them into
either side of alliance.
This provision reduced the riskof proxy conflicts and expanded
the scope of the peace toinclude a wider part of the
Greek world.
(15:33):
The implementation of the trucewas carefully monitored through
diplomatic channels.
Both sides agreed to sendenvoys to ensure that the terms
were being respected.
These envoys played a criticalrole in facilitating ongoing
peace negotiations andmaintaining communication
between the two rival powers.
Finally, the truce included aclause respecting sacred and
(15:54):
neutral territories, ensuringthat religious festivals and
sites would remain free frommilitary interference.
This reflected the broaderGreek tradition of suspending
warfare during religiousfestivals, such as the Olympic
truce.
Areas like the Sanctuary ofDelphi were thus shielded from
the broader conflict, preservingthe sanctity of these important
(16:14):
locations.
Despite these well-definedterms, the one-year truce was
not entirely successful.
After both parties had agreed tothe terms, events in the north
would continue.
One of the first breaches ofthe truce would come when Scone,
on the Pele Peninsula, wouldrevolt from Athens.
Encouraged by Brasidas, who hadbeen campaigning in northern
(16:38):
Greece, the citizens of Sconedeclared their loyalty to Sparta
.
In northern Greece, thecitizens of Skone declared their
loyalty to Sparta.
Brasidas, eager to weakenAthenian influence in the region
, readily accepted theirallegiance.
He crossed over by boat fromTyrone, where he had ended his
campaign in 424, and united thecity towards Sparta, seeing
factional disputes evaporate.
(16:59):
He then had some of his troopsstationed there, as he had
designs on attacking othernearby Athenian possessions in
the future.
The news of the truce appears tohave frustrated Brasidas, who
had been achieving his goals inthe north.
With the actions in the northstill continuing, he would look
to victory rather than workingtowards peace.
However, in an attempt to stillact as he wished and not anger
(17:22):
Sparta, while attempting toappease Athens, he would argue
the revolt had taken place justbefore the signing of the truce.
Sparta would accept this claimmade by him, although they
probably knew the truth and theywould view that they were
justified in classifying Sconeas theirs.
Though Athens didn't buy thedefence that Brasidas had
(17:42):
presented, they knew the timingand how the events up north had
unfolded.
Although the truce had calledfor arbitration, athens refused
to fall back on this mechanismdue to the blatant disregard of
Brasidas.
They chose to instead followthe proposals of Cleon.
In their anger of the situation, the Athenians would vote to
destroy the city, put all themen to death and sell the women
(18:05):
and children into slavery, andthis time there would be no
second thoughts about it.
This would see Athens continueto move further away from the
moderate policies of Periclesand in the direction of
deterrence through terrorproposed by Cleon.
In the meantime, brasidas wouldnow continue to push his
advantage in the region,although this time there would
(18:27):
be no way to claim issues oftiming around the truce to
defend his actions.
Perhaps he had received word ofAthens' intentions and saw
there was no point in trying toprotect the interests of the
truce any longer.
The city of Mende would nowalso revolt from Athens, and
Brasidas would accept the rebelsinto his camp.
This further angered Athens,who now had arranged a force to
(18:49):
move against both cities on thepeninsula.
Brasidas prepared for theirarrival.
He had forces in Scone and nowordered a garrison to occupy
Mende.
However, brasidas would now seehow thin his forces were.
Although he had recruitedlocals into his army, he had not
been able to swell his armyfurther, with the Spartans
having earlier refused to sendreinforcements.
(19:10):
Now, when he needed every manhe had under his command, he
also had an ally in the regioncall upon him for assistance.
He was not able to refuse thisdue to him relying heavily on
the supplies Perdiccas providedhim.
Perdiccas had requestedBrasidas' help in combating the
Lysitanians once again, whichBrasidas was compelled to agree
(19:33):
to if he were to keep his armysupplied.
The campaign began well, withthe Lysitanians being defeated.
However, perticus wanted toadvance deeper into their lands
and attack them again.
Brasidas, though, was mindfulof his absence from the
Chalcidides and wanted to returnas soon as possible.
In his mind, he had fulfilledhis duty to Perticus, but fierce
(19:55):
disagreement would erupt overthe matter.
In addition to this, perticushad been waiting on Illyrian
reinforcements to arrive, butthey had failed to show.
It would eventually be learntthat they had defected to
Perdiccas' enemies.
This would now see Brasidas andPerdiccas look to withdraw from
their position in the face ofsuperior numbers assembling
(20:16):
before them, although no clearplan of withdrawal had been
settled upon.
The Macedonians and theirallies retreated during the
night, leaving Brasidas and hisforce behind.
Brasidas was now in a toughposition, left to face
overwhelming numbers.
However, brasidas would use hisusual military brilliance to
(20:36):
defend against the attackmounted on his forces and would
bring his army to safety.
Mounted on his forces and wouldbring his army to safety.
This episode inSpartan-Macedonian alliance
would be the final act, withPerdiccas now treating Brasidas
more as an enemy.
He saw that his interests wereno longer aligned and that it
was now in his best interest toget back on friendly terms with
the Athenians.
(20:59):
While Brasidas had beencampaigning with Perdiccas,
athens had sent off a fleet toattempt to recover the cities
taken, in spite of the truce.
This expedition was led byNicias and Nicostratus, who had
the intention of not actingagainst the terms of the peace,
but to rectify the situation inThrace.
At the point of the truce beingsigned, the Athenian fleet,
(21:20):
made up of 50 ships, including10 Chian vessels, established a
base at Potidaea to prepare forthe recovery of Mende and Scone.
The fleet had brought with it1,000 Athenian hoplites and 600
archers, while, once arriving,they would also be joined by
(21:42):
1,000 Thracian mercenaries andpeltas from various friendly
towns in the region.
At this stage, brasidas wasstill absent, and the Athenians
would first focus on attackingMende.
Currently, the city wasdefended by the local
inhabitants, 300 men from Sconeand 700 Peloponnesians, with
them being under the command ofthe Spartan Polydamidas, while
Brasidas was absent.
Initially, pomidamidas and hisarmy occupied a hill outside the
(22:04):
city where the Athenians wentin with a two-prong attack, One
led by Nicias and one byNicastratus.
Firstly, nicias attempted totake the hill with a
predominantly lightly armedforce by the way of the path
leading to the top.
However, this would beunsuccessful and Nicias himself
would suffer a wound in theattempt.
Next, nicastratus led the restof the Athenian force from a
(22:28):
different direction, though theground was hard going.
This, along with the resistancethe defenders put up, would see
the Athenian force thrown intoutter confusion and were to only
narrowly escape total defeat.
With the failure of thetwo-pronged Athenian attack, the
defenders did not look to yieldtheir ground and, as the day
(22:48):
was starting to come to an end,the Athenians retreated to their
camp.
With the Athenians departing,the field and night now falling,
the force under Polydamidasreturned within the walls of
Mende.
Nicias and Nicastratus wouldmake another attempt and the
next day would manoeuvre toattack the city from a different
(23:08):
angle.
They would sail their ships toland their troops south of Mende
in the direction of Scone,where the Athenians would begin
ravaging the lands in an attemptto bring out the defenders.
However, while this washappening, spartan control
within the walls was weakeningthe repositioning of the
Athenians, had seen the Sconeantroops fear for their own city
(23:30):
and they fled back to theirhomes during the night Within
Mende, as Polydamidas waspreparing his forces to attack.
The Democrats of the city nowrefused to fight and they would
end up rushing the Peloponnesiangarrison and opening the gates
to the Athenians.
Those Peloponnesians who werenot struck down in the surprise
assault would fall back into thecitadel of the city or would
(23:52):
escape back to Scone.
The Athenians poured into thecity and although the gates had
been opened to them Thucydidestells us they acted as if they
had taken the city by storm,with the commanders having a
hard time controlling their menfrom slaughtering the
inhabitants.
However, finally, order wasbrought to the army and the
(24:13):
Democrats were allowed to retaincivil rights, and they were
given the responsibility ofjudging those responsible for
the revolt.
The Peloponnesians would be cutoff in the citadel and a
blockade established on them toprevent their escape.
This would now see Mende backunder Athenian control and
preparations were now made toadvance onto Scone.
(24:34):
As the Athenian army advancedsouth onto Scone, the people and
the Peloponnesian garrison inthe city came out to oppose them
.
They occupied a hill in frontof the city that would need to
be taken before advancing.
This time around, the Athenianattack would go in strong and
would defeat the defenders, whowould dislodge from their
position.
The Athenians then establishedtheir camp, along with a trophy,
(24:57):
on this strong ground andturned to preparations for
besieging the city on thisstrong ground and turned to
preparations for besieging thecity.
During the operations ofsurrounding the city, those
Peloponnesians who had beenbesieged at Mende were able to
defeat the guards near the seato make their escape.
They would then make their waydown to Skone, where they would,
during the night, slip past thebesiegers and reinforce those
(25:17):
inside the city.
Skone would be a prolongedsiege that would continue on
into 421 BC, but the Athenianswould finally capture the city
and fulfilled what Cleon hadvowed would be done.
Once the city was back inAthenian hands, the men were all
killed, while the women andchildren were sold into slavery.
The city and the landsurrounding it were given over
(25:40):
to the Plataeans, who themselveshad suffered a similar fate at
the hands of the PeloponnesianLeague.
Around the same time that thesiege was developing around
Scone, perdiccas of Macedon sentoff a herald to meet with the
Athenians.
During the talks outside thecity, an armistice was
negotiated between theMacedonians and Athenians.
Once again, armistice wasnegotiated between the
(26:04):
Macedonians and Athenians.
Once again, perticus had seenthat Athens was returning to the
region with a strong force andit was now in his interest to be
on friendly terms with them.
He was probably banking on thefact that the Athenians were
going to retake theirpossessions in the region.
He wanted to ensure that,during the Athenian recovery of
land and the look to securethese positions, perticus wanted
to see that he could benefit bygaining lands that he had been
(26:24):
fighting over with other tribesin the nearby areas.
Although Athens would have beenwary of the request for an
alliance with Perdiccas due tohis past record with diplomatic
matters, the Athenians wouldhave seen it was, for the short
term at least, to theiradvantage to conclude an
agreement with him.
It was, for the short term atleast, to their advantage to
(26:45):
conclude an agreement with him,firstly with Sparta, in the area
.
Athens would rather Perticus ontheir side.
This seeing, brasidas wouldlose his main supply arrangement
, while Perticus's forces wouldbe harassing the Spartans rather
than the Athenians.
It probably seemed likely.
If Athens had snubbedPerticus's offer, he probably
would have attempted to mendthings with Brasidas, meaning
Athens would have other hostileforces to worry about.
(27:06):
For Athens, it was far betterto just have the rebels of the
area and the Peloponnesians toworry about while they attempted
to recover their possessions atThrace.
Nicias had shown he wasconcerned with how genuine the
alliance with Perdiccas was.
Once in place, he wouldchallenge alliance with
Perdiccas was once in place, hewould challenge how serious
Perdiccas was and sought proofof his sincerity.
(27:27):
Perdiccas would back up thealliance with an action against
the Spartans, who he had shownhe was no longer fond of.
Brasidas during his campaignhad been requesting
reinforcements from Sparta, withhis request mostly being
ignored.
However, sparta had finallydecided to send out a force to
meet up with him at Thrace.
Like Brasidas, this force wouldalso need to travel through
(27:51):
Thessaly to make contact.
This is where Perdiccas wouldshow his worth to the Athenians,
while it also suited his ownpurposes.
Perdiccas had maintained goodrelations with a number of
leaders within Thessalian tribesand would see to it that they
would deny the reinforcingSpartan force passage through
Thessaly.
The resistance this Spartanforce faced on trying to enter
(28:13):
Thessaly was far greater thanwhat Brasidas had encountered.
This would see that the bulk ofthe force was unable to enter
the territory.
Would see that the bulk of theforce was unable to enter the
territory.
Had this army made it intoThrace, it is quite possible
that the year's truce may havecome to an end very quickly with
a larger Spartan force in theregion.
However, a small detachment didmake it into Thrace, made up of
(28:35):
three Spartan generals alongwith some trusted younger
Spartans.
These generals had beencommissioned by the Spartan
government to see what Brasidaswas up to and wanted Spartan
oversight in the region.
This probably had something todo with Sparta being
uncomfortable with Brasidas'actions during the truce.
During this period there wasalso the indication that what we
(28:56):
call the Peace Party was backwith more influence in Sparta,
as these men were from thatfaction and were looking to keep
to the terms of the truce so amore stable peace could be
negotiated.
The Spartan intention here wasto have the commanders and other
leaders to post themselves inthe various cities to act as
governors.
This would see each city with aclear command structure and,
(29:18):
most importantly, one that hadthe Spartan government's
interests at hand.
Up to this point, it had beenmen directly under Brasidas'
command that were taking onthese roles.
Now, though, an officialSpartan policy could be
maintained even when thesecities were so far from Sparta.
However, this move by Spartahad now damaged Brasidas'
(29:39):
reputation in the region.
So far, cities had been goingover to him, with minimal
fighting having to take place.
In return for these citiesdefecting, he had allowed them
to maintain their politicalrights and were free to mostly
govern themselves.
Now, though, with the officialSpartan policy being followed in
the region, it would seem theart of smart diplomacy may now
(30:00):
disappear, with less imaginativemeans relied upon to keep order
and control over these cities.
This flood of cities handingthemselves over to Brasidas
because of his reputation in howhe handled matters would begin
to stop.
To the cities of Thrace, theywere now faced with the prospect
of swapping one mastercontrolling their affairs for
another.
(30:20):
Prospect of swapping one mastercontrolling their affairs for
another.
Although the truce had subduedevents unfolding within Greece,
there were still somedevelopments taking place, these
in and around cities allied toeither Sparta or Athens.
Both Athens and Sparta hadavoided conflict within Greece
to avoid breaking the truce,though Brasidas' controversial
actions in Thrace being theexception, though Brasidas'
(30:45):
controversial actions in Thracebeing the exception.
But these allies of Sparta andAthens still looked to take
advantage over their ownsituation and, with their nearby
rivals In Boeotia, thieves nowhad an opportunity to act
against Thespia, a city west ofthem, still in Boeotian
territory.
Although Thespia was part of theBoeotian League and therefore
part of the Peloponnesian League, thebes saw reason that action
(31:07):
had to be taken against the city.
The previous year, theThespians had fought alongside
Thebes at the Battle of Deliumand had taken heavy casualties.
This seems it may now have someconnection to Thebes accusing
the city of having sympathiesfor Athens or, as Thucydides
says, they had the charge ofAtticism levelled against them.
Although Thucydides doesn'tspell things out for us, it
(31:31):
appears this suffering at Deliummay have changed the political
opinion within Thespio.
The city had lost a great dealof its fighting aged men at
Delium and, although a victory,it may not have felt as so for
the thespians.
This may have led to democraticelements in the city being able
to spread their influence andpossible overtures may have gone
(31:51):
in the direction of Athens.
As we had seen, the creation ofthe Boeotian League was not
something that a lot of citieswent into willingly.
Like other leagues, it wasentered into by cities due to
being compelled to, due to powerstructures in the region or for
one's own state of security inthe face of other threats.
However, if another optionpresented itself that appeared
(32:15):
more in line with theirinterests, cities were likely to
at least entertain negotiations.
As I said, this is probably ourbest guess on the situation,
given the one-line Thucydidesgives us.
However, although the sufferingat Delium may have led to the
shift in policy at Thespia, ithad also weakened the city
greatly.
Once thieves had gotten wind ofthe possible rebellious
(32:37):
activities, they decided to actas we have seen within the
Peloponnesian League and theAthenian Empire.
If a city looked to leave, theywould be treated as a revolting
city.
For a league to maintain itsstrength, it had to retain its
unity.
Thebes felt confident inmarching out to Thespia and
proceeded to dismantle theirwalls.
With the majority of theThespian fighting men having
(32:59):
become casualties the previousyear, they were in a very weak
position to defend themselves.
Thespia was also situated onlevel ground.
Most cities were built on highground for better defence, so
this destruction of their wallswould make them extremely
vulnerable to any army morepowerful than they were.
This would then have the effectof the government within
Thespia to fall back in linewith Thebes, who was at the head
(33:22):
of the Boeotian League, or riskthe destruction of the city.
The other event that Thucydidesfound notable to report as
taking place during the summerof 423 did not involve
combatants, but was the resultof a supposed accident within
the city of Argos.
At this stage, argos hadmanaged to mainly remain neutral
in the Peloponnesian War, andas we continue, we will see how
(33:45):
this stance would bring thempopularity from other cities.
This would end up seeing themgain enough political influence
to challenge Sparta and Athensin the near future.
However, during the summer, theTemple of Hera in the city was
burnt down by the long-servingpriestess.
This was through an accidentwhere the priestess rested a
torch near some garlands andfell asleep.
(34:06):
By the time she awoke to thefire, a huge blaze had taken
over.
She was able to escape, butthrough fear of the Argives, she
fled the city.
This was the temple that hadbeen built during Argos's early
stages in the 8th century andserved as its main sacred space.
However, over the next 10 years, a new temple to Hera would be
(34:28):
constructed, though there aresuggestions that the planning
for this new temple was not areplacement for the burnt down
one, as there had been plans fora new construction before this
to accommodate the growth of theArgive state.
These were the main events totake place in and around Greece
in relation to the PeloponnesianWar for the summer of 423.
(34:50):
Heading into the winter, spartaand Athens outside of Thrace
remained quiet towards oneanother.
Within the Peloponnese, however, the cities of Tygia and
Mantinea, who had always hadterritorial disputes, would
engage in a regional war withtheir respective allies.
The battle that developed wouldsee an undecided result, with
both sides having defeatedopposite wings and both would
(35:13):
claim victory.
This battle appears to haveconcluded the current round of
hostilities between the two,with both sides having suffered
heavy casualties.
While up in Thrace, brasidas,with the Athenian counterattack
going on, would attempt one morepush to disrupt their position.
His target was the Athenianbase at Potidaea.
(35:33):
If this could be taken, itwould severely undermine Athens'
position in the area.
Perhaps now, with Spartangovernment representatives in
the area and Athens' push torecapture the revolting cities,
brasidas saw this as his lastchance to make a daring push to
bring the advantage back to himand with it support for his
campaign from Sparta.
Brasidas, again, would not lookto fight a decisive battle for
(35:57):
the city due to the size of hisarmy, with a number of his
troops tied up with garrisonduties in other cities, he would
look to try and take the cityby surprise at night.
He had succeeded in having aladder placed on the walls of
the city, unnoticed, though,before the men of the assaulting
force could be brought up.
The attempt on the wall wasdiscovered by the garrison.
(36:19):
The alarm now raised.
Brassidas saw that his surpriseattempt had failed, since his
forces had not yet breached thewall.
He fell back to his men and ledthem off while it was still
dark and they were to escapefrom the area.
This would see the end of theaction in Thrace for 423.
However, next episode we'll bereturning to the region where
(36:42):
the Athenians would ramp uptheir efforts in recapturing the
rebellious cities and otherpossessions.
Cleon would also make for theregion with an army, and we
would see a battle develop overthe city.
That had seen Brasidas' strikeat the Athenians begin and
Phippolis this year had markedthe first time a truce had taken
(37:02):
place in the war, with hopesthat a longer peace could be
negotiated.
Brasidas' campaign had put thetruce and the potential peace at
risk, with his actions takingplace shortly after this
arrangement.
Although the Spartan governmentwanted a peace to exist with
Athens, they had also seenBrasidas had gained an advantage
for them in the north.
They were willing to accept hisreasoning that he had taken
(37:25):
Scone before the truce was ineffect, since it helped their
position.
However, it seems clear theydid not truly believe this, as
they would eventually sendreinforcements to the north and
even though they were preventedpassage through Thessaly, the
commanders and other officialsmade it into the region.
Here a number would be assignedto the various cities Sparta
had under their control.
(37:45):
This an attempt to run theiraffairs in accordance with the
Spartan government wishes, notBrasidas'.
They saw that his actions wereharming their ability to
negotiate a lasting peace.
The truce in place was now fastapproaching its end, with it
supposed to be in place for oneyear.
However, it was hoped that thepeace could still be possible
(38:09):
even with Brasidas' actions thathad seen suspicion and anger in
Athens grow with each new movehe had made.
Thank you all for the supportand continuing to support the
series.
It is greatly appreciated.
I'd like to give an extraspecial thank you to all my
Patreon Archon members, so a bigshout out to Neil Bennett, ali
(38:30):
Ullman, nick Kabifakis, paulfrom Inga, matthew and John for
choosing to support the seriesover on Patreon and supporting
at the Archon level.
If you've also found some valuein the series and wish to
support the show, you can headto wwwcastingthoranxiagreasecom
and click on the support theseries button, where you can
find the link to Patreon as wellas many other ways to support
(38:52):
the show.
Be sure to stay connected andupdated on what's happening in
the series and join me over onFacebook or Instagram at Casting
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me next episode where wecontinue the narrative in the
series you.
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