October 25, 2024 • 38 mins
Witness the dramatic power play between two iconic city-states as we pull back the curtain on the strategic chess match that was the conflict over Amphipolis. Could the overconfidence of Athenian generals have been their downfall against the cunning maneuvers of Spartan general Brasidas? This episode promises insights into the mind games and tactical genius that unfolded, unraveling how Brasidas turned the tables on Athens with diplomacy and strategy, charting an unexpected course through the battlegrounds of Thrace. Brace yourself for revelations on how an initial Athenian advantage, following their victories at Pylos and Sphacteria, was compromised by a series of unforeseen events in the region.
As we explore the siege that disrupted the Athenian dominance, we examine the compelling narrative of Cleon's overreach and Brasidas's audacious ambush tactics that caught Athens off guard. Journey with us through the aftermath of the Battle of Amphipolis, where the city's citizens hailed Brasidas as a saviour, leaving Athens to grapple with the ramifications of their loss. The episode shines a light on the shifting geopolitical landscape, where both Athens and Sparta faced unprecedented challenges, prompting strategic recalibrations and new alliances. From the battlefield to the broader political stage, this episode captures the essence of a pivotal moment in ancient history, rich in dramatic twists and strategic lessons that continue to resonate.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 2 (00:09):
The Battle of the Athenians.
As soon as Brasidas saw theAthenians in motion, he
descended himself from Sidiliumand entered Amphipolis.
He did not venture to go out inregular order against the
Athenians.
He mistrusted his strength andthought it inadequate to the
(00:29):
attempt.
Not in numbers these were notso unequal but in quality, the
flower of the Athenian armybeing in the field with the best
of the Lamnians and Embrerians.
He therefore prepared to assailthem by stratagem, thucydides.
Hello, I'm Mark Selleck andwelcome back to Casting Through
Ancient Greece, episode 90,clash Over Amphipolis.
(00:52):
The last couple of episodes wehave been focused on the events
taking place north of Greeklands, in Thracian territory.
Events within Greece itselfduring the war had quietened
down after the events of 424 BC.
This year had seen Athens gainan advantage over Sparta after
their victories at Pylos,sphacteria and other areas
around the Peloponnese.
However, athens would see theirhard-won advantage slip away as
(01:16):
they continued to put pressureon Sparta directly and through
their allies.
These campaigns in the laterpart of the year would not go
the Athenians' way and they'dalso suffered one of their
biggest losses in the war so far.
This would see Sparta regaintheir confidence to act against
Athens, however through indirectmeans, since Athens still held
over 120 of their citizenshostage.
(01:36):
This would see the Spartangeneral, brasidas, launch a
campaign focused on underminingAthens' influence in Thrace.
Brasidas launched a campaignfocused on undermining Athens'
influence in Thrace.
The region was rich in naturalresources such as wood and
precious metals, while alsobeing a strategic location for
overseeing overland trade comingfrom the east.
Over the past generations,athens had worked at exerting
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their influence into the region.
As the Athenian Empire grew,brasidas looked to disrupt
Athens' ability to takeadvantage of the region and its
resources, which would affecttheir ability to maintain their
war footing.
Brasidas would initially bevery successful in seeing many
cities switch sides through hissmart use of diplomacy out of
the ordinary for a Spartangeneral.
(02:18):
However, he did have thehurdles to overcome, such as
dealing with the notoriouslyunreliable Macedonian king
Perdiccas.
Hurdles to overcome, such asdealing with the notoriously
unreliable Macedonian kingPerdiccas, while also having to
rely on supplies from others andrecruiting from the local
populations.
Nevertheless, brasidas was ableto capture Amphipolis, with
then other cities opening theirgates to him.
The capture of Amphipolis hadalso seen the Athenian general
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and later historian, thucydidestried and exiled as he had been
in command of the region, withmore cities coming over to
Brasidas, athens looked to makearrangements to send a force to
Thrace to attempt to regaincontrol During the winter of
424-423,.
(03:02):
Athens and Sparta, however,would sign a years-long truce to
suspend hostilities.
Both had motivations for seeingthis truce in place, so the
terms appear to have beenarranged without much trouble.
However, the truce wouldinterrupt the momentum Brasidas
had on his side.
He would continue his campaign,initially arguing the next
cities would fall to him hadsurrendered before the signing
of the truce.
Though, with most aware of thetimeline, athens had become
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angry at this disregard of theterms.
Athens would end up respondingand sent a fleet with forces to
check Brasidas' campaign andattempt to reclaim their
possessions in Thrace.
In doing so, athens, movingfurther away from the past
moderate policies of Pericles,would vow to treat those
revolting with the harshestmeasures.
(03:43):
In response to Athens' moves,brasidas once again found
himself in a difficult position.
On the one hand, he wanted torespond effectively to Athens in
the area, but on the other, hehad been obliged to assist
Perdiccas in his campaignsduring the same period.
This would end up seeing thealliance between Macedon and
Brasidas fall apart andPerdiccas would end up looking
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back towards Athens for analliance, athens, after some
early setbacks, would begin toreclaim cities previously loyal
to them, where we had left them.
Last episode with Sicone undersiege, sparta had attempted to
reinforce Brasidas.
However, perdiccas had provedto be a useful ally this time
around, where he had been ableto prevent passage of the
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Spartan army through Thessaly,though the Spartans had been
able to slip some leading meninto Thrace, where, it appears,
the Spartan government waslooking to gain control of
Spartan actions in the northrather than Brasidas being left
to his own devices.
The situation in Thrace wasstill a contested one between
Athens and Sparta.
Though still under a truce,both would continue to influence
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the region militarily.
This episode we'll look atAthens' continued campaign to
regain control where anotherforce would sail for Thracian
lands.
This time around, the goal wasto try and recover Amphipolis,
the city that had seen thedomino effect of others break
away from Athens.
Here we will see the battlearound Amphipolis take place,
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along with the death ofimportant figures from both
Athens and Sparta.
Then we will see how a longerpeace would still be sought, and
one that could potentially seethe end of the war.
Actions up in Thrace would onceagain begin to pick up as the
summer of 422 approached, theforces led by Nicias and
Nicostratus were still in theregion after they had begun
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campaigning the previous year.
At this stage they were stilloccupied with the siege at
Sicone.
The truce that had been inplace from the previous year was
due to expire around March andit seems many in Athens were fed
up with Sparta's disregard ofthe terms of the truce.
Although Brasidas appears tohave ignored the terms early on
without Spartan governmentknowledge, the Spartans then
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looked to reinforce his positionand sent governors to
administer the captured cities.
It appears this had twoobjectives first, to rein in
Brasidas' initiative.
First to rein in Brasidas andsecondly, to attempt to hold on
to what had been won, with itseeming the Spartan government
was now complicit in breachingthe terms of the truce.
Some historians, such as DonaldKagan, put forward the idea
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that the Spartan agreement tothe truce was a ploy to buy
Brasidas time in Thrace.
However, I'm more inclined tobelieve that the Spartans had
made the agreement outside thisconsideration and only began
actively supporting Brasidas andbreaching the terms after
realising what he had gained atthe Athenians' expense.
A big reason for leaning thisway is due to Thucydides' report
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of the Spartan governmentattempting to gain control of
Brasidas' actions.
With a new year had also come anew round of elections, and
Cleon, who was back in Athens,would once again be elected to
office During the spring.
He was able to successfullydebate and convince the Athenian
assembly to allow him to sailfor Thrace with another force
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once the truce had expired.
This shows that in Athens therewere still leaders who were for
peace that had been voted inalong with Cleon, since debate
was required.
However, it also shows that theAthenians had lost patience
with the Spartan actions in thenorth.
Although a force had been sentthe previous year to attempt to
reclaim Athenian influence, theyhad now seen it necessary to
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increase their presence, to notonly take back their possessions
but to defeat the Spartanforces.
Cleon would be granted a fleetof 30 triremes, consisting of an
Athenian force of 1,200hoplites and 300 cavalry, while
a larger contingent of allieswould also join this expedition.
Cleon and his fleet would arrivein the waters around the
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Chalcedones, where they wouldfirst land at Sicone, making
camp with the Athenian armylaying siege to the city there.
Here the men were rested andsupplies taken in, while plans
were also made for the firstaction of the expedition.
The plan was to sail justacross the middle peninsula to
the tip where Tyrone was located.
This had been one of the earlycities taken by Brassidus after
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the fall of Amphipolis.
Cleon was also able to take onmore hoplites from around Sycone
, since the siege could bemaintained with less troops.
With the fleet ready to sailonce again, they then commenced
their Thracian campaign.
The fleet would enter theharbour not far from Tyrone
where deserters from the citywere encountered.
Cleon would learn that Brasidaswas not in the city and the
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defenders were far from strongenough to come out and give him
battle.
Cleon used this information andthen prepared to take the city.
He would march with themajority of the army onto the
outer fortifications built bythe Spartans, while ten ships
were sent around the harbourdirectly to the city.
The Spartan commander in chargeof the garrison had learnt of
the Athenians' arrival in thearea and had sent off a
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messenger to Brasidas requestinghis assistance.
The garrison then, waiting forreinforcements to arrive,
hurried out to meet theapproaching Athenians manning
the fortifications.
They would find themselveshard-pressed and parts of the
fortifications fell to theAthenians.
It had also been noticed thatthe Athenian ships were sailing
towards the city.
The garrison, with theirdefences crumbling, fell back to
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the city to attempt to defendit against the flanking fleet.
However, the Athenian ships hadbeat them into the city and now
the garrison also had theAthenian army on their heels.
A melee within the city tookplace, with a number of the
garrison falling while the restwould be taken prisoner, leaving
Athens back in control ofTyrone.
Brasidas was only some sixkilometres from the city with
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his relief force when hereceived news that the Athenians
had captured it.
So he had turned around andmarched back to where he had set
out from.
Many historians have pointed outthe importance of this victory
and Cleon's tacticalintelligence, even though
Thucydides presents the battlelike most other small
engagements in his history.
Even though Thucydides presentsthe battle like most other
small engagements in his history, donald Kagan echoes other
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historians where he points outthat the obvious move for Cleon
to make was to head for Ziccone,as he did, but add his forces
to the siege and see the cityfall much quicker, as the city
had been where Athens' angerboiled over after its revolt.
However, it seems Brassidushave also anticipated this and
it may have been where hisforces were heading when Cleon
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entered the region.
It's possible Cleon hadanticipated Brasidas to act in
this way and had made land thereto convince him that this was
the Athenians' intention.
However, this had now leftTyrone vulnerable to attack,
with no effective mobile army inrange to assist, since it had
been drawn away.
These historians argue thatCleon had recognised Athens'
(10:29):
advantage over the sea andlooked to use it against
Brasidas, who was constrained toland movement.
This meant Cleon could move histroops faster and, to a degree,
surprise the Peloponnesians inwhere they would strike.
Next.
Cleon would have the Atheniansset up two trophies one by the
harbour where the flanking fleethad landed and one by the
fortifications in front of thecity.
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This way, he showed his troopsthat they had both been vital to
the capture of the city.
For the people of Tyrone, theirfate would have the women and
children turned into slaves,while the men would accompany
the captured Peloponnesians andbe sent to Athens.
Tyrone was now back underAthenian control and was the
first stepping stone in Cleon'scampaign to retake Amphipolis.
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He would place a garrison inthe city and would prepare the
rest of his forces to continueon in their campaign.
From Tyrone, the fleet wouldhead to the island of Thassos,
then, from here, it would headback to the Thracian coast and
land at Aeon, at the mouth ofthe Strymon.
Remembering here, aeon wasstill an Athenian possession as
it had been defended afterAmphipolis initially fell to
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Brasidas, while in the area,efforts were made to capture two
other cities nearby, one to thesoutheast and one to the
southwest.
Gallipas, to the southwest,would be captured, but Stagirius
in the southeast, would repelthe Athenian attempt.
It appears these attacks wereon a smaller scale and had the
intention of securing theAthenian position at Aeon while
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they prepared to attackAmphipolis.
Cleon's planning for the attackwould see his forces remain idle
for a time at Aeon.
He had sent envoys out to makecontact with both the Macedonian
king, perdiccas, and the kingof the Thracian Odomantinians.
He was seeking troops from bothto bolster his forces for their
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attack on the city.
Perdiccas was bound by thealliance he had made with the
Athenians to march with an armyto assist the Athenians in the
campaign, while the Thracianking was sought after.
As it appears, his interestswere to match the Athenians.
It seems the Thracian tribesthat had revolted and that were
assisting the Spartans were atodds with him.
Plus, he would have beenseeking to exert influence over
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as many tribal groups aspossible to expand his kingdom.
Brasidas would be kept informedof the preparations that Cleon
was making and would move aforce to some high ground not
far from Amphipolis, where hecould maintain an uninterrupted
view of the moves that would bemade.
At the same time, cleon wasawaiting his reinforcements.
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Brasidas would also takemeasures to see his own forces
grow.
He would call upon his ownThracian mercenaries as well as
cavalry and peltas from variousregions.
The majority of these forceswould be stationed within
Amphipolis, with only some 1,500of Brasidas' troops
accompanying him to the highground.
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The next part of Thucydides'account becomes a little
confusing.
As for a short passage, he nowpaints Cleon in a different
light to how he previouslyportrays him.
We get a picture of a commandernot respected by his men and
looked at as cowardly.
The cities would writeinactivity made the soldiers
discontented and their thoughtsbegan to turn to the comparison
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between the daring skill ofBrassidus and the incompetence
and weakness of their owncommander.
This is a strange passage as itflies in the face of how Cleon
has been treated in previouscampaigns and the beginning of
his current one.
If anything, we have seen howCleon was bold and looked to act
decisively.
One wonders if we are seeing abias slip in against Cleon while
(14:01):
he is up against Brasidas.
We had looked at last episodehow Cleon may have been the
instigator behind Thucydides'exile.
Perhaps when it came to Cleonhaving to face the same foe that
had bested Thucydides, hewanted to paint Cleon in a
negative light.
However, we can still turn toThucydides' account to paint a
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picture of events aroundAmphipolis.
It appears from Cleon's actionsthat he was preparing to gather
enough forces to lay siege toAmphipolis.
Thucydides tells us he wasforced to rashly send forces
against the city due todiscontent within his ranks.
However, it appears sending outa recon in force would be
necessary to plan an attack andeventually to besiege the city.
Cleon had reached a hill notfar from Amphibolus where he was
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able to get a good view of thecity and its surrounds.
Supposedly he was meant to havehad the view that, had he
brought up siege engines, hewould have been able to take the
city there and then, with theforce he had.
For a while he was observingthe city, he noticed that there
was no one manning the walls andno force was coming out to
challenge him.
This would see that Cleon feltconfident in being able to spend
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as much time as he wishedgathering intelligence and then
being able to safely withdrawback to Aeon.
However, brasidas had otherideas.
He had seen Cleon's advancefrom Aeon and had decided to
march his own forces back toAmphipolis.
The reasoning we are given isthat, even though roughly equal
in numbers, the quality of thesetroops were less than that of
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the Athenians.
He thought if he remained inplace, cleon would recognise
this and be encouraged to attackBrasidas, though thought his
best chances were to attempt toengage the Athenians on his own
terms, so hiding as muchinformation from the Cleon would
be key.
We also need to remember timewas not on the side of Brasidas.
He could not expect any helpcoming from Sparta, though as
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each day passed, the Athenianswere getting closer to gaining
their reinforcements and theirability to surround Amphibolus.
However, now with Cleon's reconin force, brasidas now saw an
opportunity to attack Cleon,while, in his false sense of
security, we are told that allthe troops were gathered so that
Brasidas could address them tobuild their morale, while also
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ensuring all were aware of theplan.
The plan would involve taking150 men to threaten the Athenian
position, also to reinforce theidea of a large attack being
arranged.
Brasidas had a large number oftroops positioned at what was
known as the Thracian gates,this being the closest to the
Athenians' position.
Cleon, upon his vantage point,would be able to view this
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gathering of troops.
This, he assumed, would havethe effect of Cleon withdrawing
from the hill back to Aeon.
The route this withdrawal wouldhave would see that the
Athenians would need to marchpast the walls of Amphipolis,
where gates into the city werelocated.
This would specifically takethem past the southern gate and
where, once Cleon no longer hadeyes on the movements behind the
walls of Amphipolis, brassiduswould order forces to the
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southern gate ready to take theAthenians by surprise.
This would then force theAthenians to stand and fight,
focusing on the immediate threat.
Then a reserve force would betaken out through the Thracian
gate and fall upon the Atheniansfrom the rear.
This would appear to be theplan that Brasidas had in mind
and conveyed to his men and, aswe will see, would mostly unfold
as he envisioned.
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After Brasidas had finishedaddressing his forces, his plan
would get underway.
A body of troops had beengathering at the Thracian Gate,
while 150 picked men set out tothreaten the Athenian position.
With these actions taking place, word was sent to Cleon, who
came forward, where he was ableto observe all the movements
being made in the city below.
From his perspective, it lookedas though the Peloponnesians
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were assembling for a sally outof the city.
Cleon had not come forwardlooking to fight a battle, but
just to gather intelligence forthe upcoming siege.
He judged that hisreinforcements would not be able
to arrive in time, but he wouldhave enough time to organise a
withdrawal back to Aeon with theforces he had brought up.
The quickest route to withdrawalwould see the Athenian force
having to initially marchparallel to the walls of
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Amphipolis.
Cleon appears to have perhapsnot been so completely confident
in avoiding battle, as he wasfrustrated with the progress his
men were making, so personallyordered the entire force to
wheel around, placing theunarmoured side of his right
flank towards the walls ofAmphipolis.
This manoeuvre had seen thearmy quickly march past the
Thracian Gate and where Cleonhad seen the danger to his
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forces developing.
However, as the Athenians hadbeen preparing the withdrawal
and had been putting it intomotion, another force within
Amphipolis had been assemblingat the southern gates.
Cleon's men would also need tomarch past this position in the
wall.
As they fell back, though havingalready passed the Thracian
gate, cleon thought theimmediate danger to his men had
been avoided, brassidas, seeingthe Athenian movements and now
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in such a vulnerable position,ordered his men to attack with
the following words thosefellows will never stand before
us.
One can see by the way thattheir spears and heads are going
.
Troops, which do as they do,seldom stand a charge.
Quick someone, open the gates Ispoke of and let us be out at
them, with no fears for theresult, them with no fears for
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the result.
The Athenians were thencompletely taken by surprise as
a rush of forces led byBrassidas came pouring out of
the southern gate and fell uponthem.
This would see Cleon's forcestop and look to defend
themselves against this newthreat.
The Athenians' attention was nowcompletely focused on the
enemies coming from the southerngate.
While the Peloponnesians hadbeen attacking from the southern
gate, the other force now cameout of the Thracian gate to the
rear of the withdrawingAthenians.
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With the Athenians' attentionoccupied, these men came
charging down the road along thewall and crashed into the
unaware Athenians, now causingtotal panic among their ranks.
The left wing of the Athenianforce, which was furthest from
the walls, walls was able tobreak and fled back towards Eon.
However, it would be duringthis stage that Brasidas would
receive a wound and would fall,though the men around him were
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able to recover him and drag himaway from the action, this had
been carried out quickly and theAthenians had not become aware
that a Spartan general hadfallen.
An event like this in combat canhave an influential effect on
the battle, with it encouragingthe enemy while also harming the
morale of the general's army.
However, given the swiftness ofhim being taken from the
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fighting, it appears not manywere aware what had just taken
place.
The Athenian right wingremained engaged and appears to
have been able to gain somecohesion, for they were able to
find some high ground.
From here.
They were able to repulse theadvances of their Peloponnesians
a few times.
However, they would end upbeing surrounded and, after
suffering a barrage of missilefire, they would too now rout,
though they would now have toworry about the cavalry and
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peltas picking them off in theirvulnerable state.
Those who survived had made forthe rough terrain of the hills,
where the pursuit of the enemywas made more difficult.
From there, they wouldeventually make their way back
to Aeon In amongst the chaosthat took place when the
Athenians made their withdrawal.
We hear of Cleon being killedOnce again.
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How Thucydides describes itpossibly points to his bias over
him, as he is described asdying in a cowardly manner.
Points to his bias over him, ashe is described as dying in a
cowardly manner, supposedlyduring the stand of the right
wing.
Cleon is meant to have fled,with Thucydides seeming to
describe him as abandoning hismen.
We then hear he was overtakenby some enemy peltas, where one
cut him down as they passed by.
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As we saw, brasidas had alsofallen during the battle and was
taken back from the fighting.
With the battle now won, thosewho had rescued him from the
front line brought him back tothe city of Amphipolis as he was
still alive.
However, his injuries were toogreat to be treated effectively,
but he would learn of thevictory of his troops before he
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ended up succumbing to hiswounds.
So would be the end of one ofSparta's most imaginative and
courageous generals for ageneration.
Those at Amphipolis would treatBrasidas with the respect that
he had earned himself over hislife.
Thucydides describes a scenewithin the city.
After this, all the alliesattended in arms and buried
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Brasidas at the public's expense, in the city, in front of what
is now the marketplace, and thepeople of Amphibolus having
enclosed his tomb everafterwards, sacrificed to him as
a hero and have given him thehonour of games and annual
offerings.
The people of Amphibolus, inthe wake of Brasidas' death,
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would turn to destroying all themonuments that had celebrated
the Athenians' establishment ofthe colony.
They instead viewed Brasidas asbeing their preserver, and it
seems they are also looking tobe favoured by Sparta, since
Athenian recapture of the citywould surely mean a horrible
fate for many of them.
The Peloponnesians, now underthe command of Cloridus, would
strip the dead of their armourand establish trophies to mark
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the victory.
A local truce would be made sothat the dead of the athenians
could be returned to them.
The usidides tells us that somesix hundred of them were killed
in the fighting, while onlyseven of those who had been
within amphipolis would die inthe fighting.
When we see such a disparity innumbers like this, it is
tempting to dismiss them.
However, we need to keep inmind it does seem to fit with
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the trend of battles thatinvolve a major rout.
The actual engagement tends tosee very few casualties when
both sides are engaged.
The vast number of the deadcome from the side that routs
and are completely defencelessand vulnerable to the actions of
the enemy.
Routes and are completelydefenceless and vulnerable to
the actions of the enemy.
With the Athenian defeat ofAmphipolis, the survivors would
reorganise at Aeon but would notremain, as we hear that they
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would sail back for Athens.
The Peloponnesians, on theother hand, would remain in
control of the city and now lookto arrange themselves and the
city for the possibility ofanother Athenian attempt.
The Spartans had been aware ofthe campaign Cleon had been
embarking on, and they had takensome measures to try and filter
in more Spartan reinforcements.
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We are told that a 900-strongSpartan hoplite army had marched
up as far as Heraclea inTrachis.
However, they would remain herefor some time, with the
generals enacting reforms withinthe city.
This delay would mean that theywere still in Heraclea when the
Battle of Amphipolis took place.
By the time the Spartan forcegot moving again, the winter of
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422 had arrived.
This force would only penetrateas far as southern Thessaly
before they too would encounterstiff Thessalian opposition.
Thucydides indicates here thatthe usual resolve and
determination of the Spartanswas not on show here, for they
were turned back home with,apparently, news of the death of
Brasidas and the thought thatthe danger the Athenians posed
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had now passed.
He then continues to suggestthat the force did not have the
same determination for successin the region that Brasidas had,
with these reinforcing generalsand troops being aware of the
desire back in Sparta for peace.
The Battle of Amphipolis hadseen the death of two of the
most enthusiastic opponents ofpeace developing between the two
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sides.
We had seen.
Brasidas had basically ignoredthe terms of the truce that had
been put in effect, with himfinding them an annoyance.
In the face of his success inThrace, he was willing to risk
breaking the terms for continuedvictories at the expense of the
Athenians.
While Cleon had been at the headof those seeking an aggressive
approach to the war, hispolicies had been a contrast to
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those of Pericles.
Earlier in the war, as wepointed out, the Spartan
government was looking for a wayto come to a satisfactory peace
with Athens.
They were in no real positionto pursue the war as they had
desired, where we had seen theearly strategy had involved
invading Attica each year.
Now, though, they were in noposition to launch these
invasions.
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If they did, they risked theSpartiites captured at
Sphacteria being executed.
They no longer had the optionof supporting the revolts
throughout the islands of theAegean.
Their fleet had proved to beineffective in the face of the
Athenians, but at this stagethey didn't even possess a fleet
worth mentioning.
After its seizure at Pylos, theonly other option that had
(26:01):
presented itself, brasidas hadtaken on campaigning through
Thrace.
But here now the momentum hadbeen lost, with the Spartan
government gaining back controlover the operation.
Away from Brasidas, therevolting cities found they were
no longer receiving support andwere being treated like subject
populations once again.
Had Sparta wanted to continuethe campaign here, they were now
(26:23):
in a position where they justcouldn't support it through lack
of manpower.
The Athenians' control of thesea, along with Perdiccas and
Thessaly remaining hostile,meant there was no way to reach
Dracian land via land or sea.
Here we see the options ofoffensive operations closing
themselves off to the Spartans.
But these factors were only oneside of the story.
(26:43):
For Sparta seeking peace Back onthe Peloponnese, they had now
also found themselves in a morethreatening position.
We had seen how Athens hadestablished forts around the
Peloponnese.
These still remained active andmeant Athens could strike into
the Peloponnesian territory asthey pleased.
Not only this, but these basesoffered locations that the
helots, under Spartan control,could desert to.
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The Spartans still rememberedthe great helot revolt of the
previous generation and fearedthat it could develop again with
Athenian support.
Added to these fears was thefact that Sparta still had
rivals on the Peloponnese, suchas Argos.
The 30 years truce that existedbetween them was due to expire
soon.
Argos, not hampered by war, hadrecovered from their defeats by
(27:28):
Sparta a couple of generationsearlier and now thrived.
Cleon had also approached theArgive democracy.
Knowing the truce was due toexpire soon.
He was looking to gain apowerful ally, peloponnese.
Surely, with the rivalry thatexisted between Sparta and Argos
, the Argives would have beeneager to take advantage of the
weak position Sparta was in, onthe back of a powerful Argos
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entering the war.
It was also feared that somePeloponnesian members would then
side with Argos, with themappearing to be Peloponnesian
League members more out ofnecessity at the moment.
Now, though, taking into accountSparta's reasons for seeking a
peace, athens would, on thesurface, seem as though a
continuation of war would be totheir advantage, though they too
(28:14):
were also seeking to establisha peace.
From what we can see, athenshad Sparta on the back foot.
424 had been a big year forAthens, seeing the favour tip in
their balance.
Even with the setbacks theAthenians suffered, sparta still
had to contend with potentialAthenian incursions around their
territory.
The Thracian campaign had beensomewhat a result of the
(28:36):
Athenian setbacks around Megara,boeotia and the defeat at
Delium, but now the situation inThrace was beginning to
stabilise.
It's for this reason that anoften cited motivation for
Athens seeking peace was due totheir financial situation.
We have previously spoken aboutthe stresses of the treasury in
funding the war.
If the treasury was in serioustrouble, athens may have wanted
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to bring peace as soon aspossible, as if it was left with
no funds, their security wouldbe in jeopardy.
Not only would they riskbankrupting themselves, if the
war continued on for longer thanforeseen, it would also be
difficult to respond to othersituations that may develop from
areas around their empire, notto mention maintaining their own
empire.
That was also a source ofsecurity.
(29:18):
However, we find Donald Kagan,among others, who argue that the
situation of the treasurydoesn't appear to be a
motivation in seeking peace.
The main argument here rests onthe fact that Thucydides
stresses the importance of moneyin the waging of war and
outlines Athens' financialsituation back in 431.
(29:38):
One example of this is duringthe speech that Thucydides
places in the mouth of Pericles,during his speech when war with
Sparta was being decided on.
The argument then continuesthat if this was the main
motivation for Athens seeking apeace, then surely Thucydides,
who understands the main rolemoney plays in waging war, would
highlight the lack of it.
Now, if anything, it has beenargued that, based off of yearly
(30:02):
estimates of Athens treasury,they still had enough money to
continue the war for at leastanother year, based off the
lower-end estimates, while thehigher-end would allow for
perhaps another five.
This also doesn't take intoaccount the emergency fund that
still existed.
If Sparta were on the edge ofdefeat, this might be enough to
win an outright victory, though,as we have seen before, nothing
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is certain in war.
Unforeseen events could end upbankrupting Athens.
However, this argument of thetreasury not being depleted I
don't think excludes financesbeing a factor in Athens' desire
for peace.
If we take the lower-endestimates, the Athenians would
have been aware that their fundscould dry up in the near future
, possibly before the war couldbe won.
I think Athens' desire to winhostilities came from a number
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of factors, not resting on asingle overarching reason.
I think the treasury providedone point that needed to be
considered, though other factorssuch as the regional economy,
war weariness from the citizens,the unity of the empire and the
change in political dynamicsall played a role.
Athens had sufferedPeloponnesian invasions for most
(31:08):
years of the war, which hadravaged their countryside and
destroyed many farms and crops.
At the moment, sparta avoidedentering Attica due to Athens
holding some of their menhostage.
However, this was onlytemporary and the situation
could change at any time.
If peace were arranged, manycould return to their lands and
begin reversing the damage whichhad been done.
(31:30):
This could mean the domesticagricultural situation within
Attica could be restored to itspre-war status sooner rather
than later.
This would also feed into thewar weariness of the citizens,
as many of these citizens whoworked the land had lost their
livelihoods and had been absentfrom their farms.
Since the beginning of the war,we had seen how many,
especially the hoplite class,had been frustrated, sitting
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behind Athens' walls while theirfarms and crops burnt.
Further, adding to thecitizens' morale issues was the
plague that had run havoc behindAthenian walls, with all that
had survived losing many familymembers.
Further, the hoplite class, aswell as many of the lower
classes now employed as rowers,were all becoming homesick.
They were constantly deployedon campaigns, away from their
(32:15):
homes and families.
All of this would also come toaffect the manpower Paul Athens
could call upon.
The war and plague had taken alarge toll on the fighting age
men.
If the war continued andexpanded, athens might find
itself stretched too far forvictory to be possible.
Another factor Athens had toconsider was its empire.
All the factors we have spokenabout could potentially see
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Athens in a weaker position.
One constant that appears totake place within empires is its
subject.
Populations tend to look atrebelling if they perceive
weakness.
This had already taken place anumber of times for Athens,
before and during the war.
If their empire began tocrumble due to their not being
able to maintain it due to lackof resources, then this could
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downgrade Athens' power in theregion and make them more
vulnerable to others.
However, it also appears now,with the death of Cleon, athens
was politically now in a betterposition to push the notion of a
peace agreement with citizens.
Cleon had wielded greatinfluence and had opposed
negotiating with Sparta.
However, there were still thosein power in Athens that
supported peace, the main figurethat would now come to
prominence was Nicias.
However, even with so manyreasons supporting peace on both
(33:31):
sides of the conflict, onewould not be negotiated right
away.
It appears there was still someopposition on both sides In
Sparta.
It is difficult for us tounderstand where it was coming
from, as we don't get a completepicture of the internal
politics In Athens, though thisis understandable, as support
for the continuation of war hadbeen strong with Cleon, it would
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probably take time for many ofhis supporters to be convinced
to look differently at thesituation.
While, although Nicias wouldgrow in influence, it wouldn't
happen overnight.
It would need debates withinthe assembly to win over others
to his side, as we will see nextepisode.
It appears many who stillsupported war saw that the
advantage was with Athens andSparta was on the ropes.
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It would take events in thefollowing spring to convince
them that perhaps this view ofvictory just around the corner
wasn't as close as they thought,and the reasons we outlined in
favour of peace now presentedthemselves as more important in
light of Sparta's actions.
Next episode we'll be turning tothe Peace of Nicias that would
end up being negotiated.
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This would be a peace that wassupposed to last 50 years.
However, this peace has alsoearned the nickname of the False
Peace.
And to close out this episode,I want to just leave you with
the introduction Donald Kaganprovides when introducing part 4
of his history of thePeloponnesian War.
The Peace of Nicias lasted nomore than 8 years and was
(34:56):
seriously damaged and broken inspirit at once and repeatedly,
before its formal demise in 414.
The central figure in Athensthroughout this period was
Nicias, the most lastinglyimportant Athenian political
leader since the death ofPericles.
His strengths and weaknesseswould be crucial to the course
of events.
A critical force in shaping thetreaty and bringing it into
(35:18):
being.
He also determined how it wouldbe carried out.
Thank you all for the supportand continuing to support the
series.
It is greatly appreciated.
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Patreon Archon members.
So a big shout out to NeilBennett, ali Ullman, nick
Kablifakis, paul from Inga,matthew and John for choosing to
(35:40):
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(36:01):
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me next episode where wecontinue the narrative in the
series.
The Battle of the Athenians.
As soon as Brasidas saw theAthenians in motion, he
descended himself from Sidiliumand entered Amphipolis.
He did not venture to go out inregular order against the
Athenians.
He mistrusted his strength andthought it inadequate to the
(00:29):
attempt.
Not in numbers these were notso unequal but in quality, the
flower of the Athenian armybeing in the field with the best
of the Lamnians and Embrerians.
He therefore prepared to assailthem by stratagem, thucydides.
Hello, I'm Mark Selleck andwelcome back to Casting Through
Ancient Greece, episode 90,clash Over Amphipolis.
(00:52):
The last couple of episodes wehave been focused on the events
taking place north of Greeklands, in Thracian territory.
Events within Greece itselfduring the war had quietened
down after the events of 424 BC.
This year had seen Athens gainan advantage over Sparta after
their victories at Pylos,sphacteria and other areas
around the Peloponnese.
However, athens would see theirhard-won advantage slip away as
(01:16):
they continued to put pressureon Sparta directly and through
their allies.
These campaigns in the laterpart of the year would not go
the Athenians' way and they'dalso suffered one of their
biggest losses in the war so far.
This would see Sparta regaintheir confidence to act against
Athens, however through indirectmeans, since Athens still held
over 120 of their citizenshostage.
(01:36):
This would see the Spartangeneral, brasidas, launch a
campaign focused on underminingAthens' influence in Thrace.
Brasidas launched a campaignfocused on undermining Athens'
influence in Thrace.
The region was rich in naturalresources such as wood and
precious metals, while alsobeing a strategic location for
overseeing overland trade comingfrom the east.
Over the past generations,athens had worked at exerting
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their influence into the region.
As the Athenian Empire grew,brasidas looked to disrupt
Athens' ability to takeadvantage of the region and its
resources, which would affecttheir ability to maintain their
war footing.
Brasidas would initially bevery successful in seeing many
cities switch sides through hissmart use of diplomacy out of
the ordinary for a Spartangeneral.
(02:18):
However, he did have thehurdles to overcome, such as
dealing with the notoriouslyunreliable Macedonian king
Perdiccas.
Hurdles to overcome, such asdealing with the notoriously
unreliable Macedonian kingPerdiccas, while also having to
rely on supplies from others andrecruiting from the local
populations.
Nevertheless, brasidas was ableto capture Amphipolis, with
then other cities opening theirgates to him.
The capture of Amphipolis hadalso seen the Athenian general
(02:42):
and later historian, thucydidestried and exiled as he had been
in command of the region, withmore cities coming over to
Brasidas, athens looked to makearrangements to send a force to
Thrace to attempt to regaincontrol During the winter of
424-423,.
(03:02):
Athens and Sparta, however,would sign a years-long truce to
suspend hostilities.
Both had motivations for seeingthis truce in place, so the
terms appear to have beenarranged without much trouble.
However, the truce wouldinterrupt the momentum Brasidas
had on his side.
He would continue his campaign,initially arguing the next
cities would fall to him hadsurrendered before the signing
of the truce.
Though, with most aware of thetimeline, athens had become
(03:23):
angry at this disregard of theterms.
Athens would end up respondingand sent a fleet with forces to
check Brasidas' campaign andattempt to reclaim their
possessions in Thrace.
In doing so, athens, movingfurther away from the past
moderate policies of Pericles,would vow to treat those
revolting with the harshestmeasures.
(03:43):
In response to Athens' moves,brasidas once again found
himself in a difficult position.
On the one hand, he wanted torespond effectively to Athens in
the area, but on the other, hehad been obliged to assist
Perdiccas in his campaignsduring the same period.
This would end up seeing thealliance between Macedon and
Brasidas fall apart andPerdiccas would end up looking
(04:03):
back towards Athens for analliance, athens, after some
early setbacks, would begin toreclaim cities previously loyal
to them, where we had left them.
Last episode with Sicone undersiege, sparta had attempted to
reinforce Brasidas.
However, perdiccas had provedto be a useful ally this time
around, where he had been ableto prevent passage of the
(04:24):
Spartan army through Thessaly,though the Spartans had been
able to slip some leading meninto Thrace, where, it appears,
the Spartan government waslooking to gain control of
Spartan actions in the northrather than Brasidas being left
to his own devices.
The situation in Thrace wasstill a contested one between
Athens and Sparta.
Though still under a truce,both would continue to influence
(04:47):
the region militarily.
This episode we'll look atAthens' continued campaign to
regain control where anotherforce would sail for Thracian
lands.
This time around, the goal wasto try and recover Amphipolis,
the city that had seen thedomino effect of others break
away from Athens.
Here we will see the battlearound Amphipolis take place,
(05:07):
along with the death ofimportant figures from both
Athens and Sparta.
Then we will see how a longerpeace would still be sought, and
one that could potentially seethe end of the war.
Actions up in Thrace would onceagain begin to pick up as the
summer of 422 approached, theforces led by Nicias and
Nicostratus were still in theregion after they had begun
(05:27):
campaigning the previous year.
At this stage they were stilloccupied with the siege at
Sicone.
The truce that had been inplace from the previous year was
due to expire around March andit seems many in Athens were fed
up with Sparta's disregard ofthe terms of the truce.
Although Brasidas appears tohave ignored the terms early on
without Spartan governmentknowledge, the Spartans then
(05:49):
looked to reinforce his positionand sent governors to
administer the captured cities.
It appears this had twoobjectives first, to rein in
Brasidas' initiative.
First to rein in Brasidas andsecondly, to attempt to hold on
to what had been won, with itseeming the Spartan government
was now complicit in breachingthe terms of the truce.
Some historians, such as DonaldKagan, put forward the idea
(06:11):
that the Spartan agreement tothe truce was a ploy to buy
Brasidas time in Thrace.
However, I'm more inclined tobelieve that the Spartans had
made the agreement outside thisconsideration and only began
actively supporting Brasidas andbreaching the terms after
realising what he had gained atthe Athenians' expense.
A big reason for leaning thisway is due to Thucydides' report
(06:32):
of the Spartan governmentattempting to gain control of
Brasidas' actions.
With a new year had also come anew round of elections, and
Cleon, who was back in Athens,would once again be elected to
office During the spring.
He was able to successfullydebate and convince the Athenian
assembly to allow him to sailfor Thrace with another force
(06:53):
once the truce had expired.
This shows that in Athens therewere still leaders who were for
peace that had been voted inalong with Cleon, since debate
was required.
However, it also shows that theAthenians had lost patience
with the Spartan actions in thenorth.
Although a force had been sentthe previous year to attempt to
reclaim Athenian influence, theyhad now seen it necessary to
(07:15):
increase their presence, to notonly take back their possessions
but to defeat the Spartanforces.
Cleon would be granted a fleetof 30 triremes, consisting of an
Athenian force of 1,200hoplites and 300 cavalry, while
a larger contingent of allieswould also join this expedition.
Cleon and his fleet would arrivein the waters around the
(07:36):
Chalcedones, where they wouldfirst land at Sicone, making
camp with the Athenian armylaying siege to the city there.
Here the men were rested andsupplies taken in, while plans
were also made for the firstaction of the expedition.
The plan was to sail justacross the middle peninsula to
the tip where Tyrone was located.
This had been one of the earlycities taken by Brassidus after
(07:58):
the fall of Amphipolis.
Cleon was also able to take onmore hoplites from around Sycone
, since the siege could bemaintained with less troops.
With the fleet ready to sailonce again, they then commenced
their Thracian campaign.
The fleet would enter theharbour not far from Tyrone
where deserters from the citywere encountered.
Cleon would learn that Brasidaswas not in the city and the
(08:19):
defenders were far from strongenough to come out and give him
battle.
Cleon used this information andthen prepared to take the city.
He would march with themajority of the army onto the
outer fortifications built bythe Spartans, while ten ships
were sent around the harbourdirectly to the city.
The Spartan commander in chargeof the garrison had learnt of
the Athenians' arrival in thearea and had sent off a
(08:41):
messenger to Brasidas requestinghis assistance.
The garrison then, waiting forreinforcements to arrive,
hurried out to meet theapproaching Athenians manning
the fortifications.
They would find themselveshard-pressed and parts of the
fortifications fell to theAthenians.
It had also been noticed thatthe Athenian ships were sailing
towards the city.
The garrison, with theirdefences crumbling, fell back to
(09:03):
the city to attempt to defendit against the flanking fleet.
However, the Athenian ships hadbeat them into the city and now
the garrison also had theAthenian army on their heels.
A melee within the city tookplace, with a number of the
garrison falling while the restwould be taken prisoner, leaving
Athens back in control ofTyrone.
Brasidas was only some sixkilometres from the city with
(09:25):
his relief force when hereceived news that the Athenians
had captured it.
So he had turned around andmarched back to where he had set
out from.
Many historians have pointed outthe importance of this victory
and Cleon's tacticalintelligence, even though
Thucydides presents the battlelike most other small
engagements in his history.
Even though Thucydides presentsthe battle like most other
small engagements in his history, donald Kagan echoes other
(09:47):
historians where he points outthat the obvious move for Cleon
to make was to head for Ziccone,as he did, but add his forces
to the siege and see the cityfall much quicker, as the city
had been where Athens' angerboiled over after its revolt.
However, it seems Brassidushave also anticipated this and
it may have been where hisforces were heading when Cleon
(10:08):
entered the region.
It's possible Cleon hadanticipated Brasidas to act in
this way and had made land thereto convince him that this was
the Athenians' intention.
However, this had now leftTyrone vulnerable to attack,
with no effective mobile army inrange to assist, since it had
been drawn away.
These historians argue thatCleon had recognised Athens'
(10:29):
advantage over the sea andlooked to use it against
Brasidas, who was constrained toland movement.
This meant Cleon could move histroops faster and, to a degree,
surprise the Peloponnesians inwhere they would strike.
Next.
Cleon would have the Atheniansset up two trophies one by the
harbour where the flanking fleethad landed and one by the
fortifications in front of thecity.
(10:51):
This way, he showed his troopsthat they had both been vital to
the capture of the city.
For the people of Tyrone, theirfate would have the women and
children turned into slaves,while the men would accompany
the captured Peloponnesians andbe sent to Athens.
Tyrone was now back underAthenian control and was the
first stepping stone in Cleon'scampaign to retake Amphipolis.
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He would place a garrison inthe city and would prepare the
rest of his forces to continueon in their campaign.
From Tyrone, the fleet wouldhead to the island of Thassos,
then, from here, it would headback to the Thracian coast and
land at Aeon, at the mouth ofthe Strymon.
Remembering here, aeon wasstill an Athenian possession as
it had been defended afterAmphipolis initially fell to
(11:34):
Brasidas, while in the area,efforts were made to capture two
other cities nearby, one to thesoutheast and one to the
southwest.
Gallipas, to the southwest,would be captured, but Stagirius
in the southeast, would repelthe Athenian attempt.
It appears these attacks wereon a smaller scale and had the
intention of securing theAthenian position at Aeon while
(11:56):
they prepared to attackAmphipolis.
Cleon's planning for the attackwould see his forces remain idle
for a time at Aeon.
He had sent envoys out to makecontact with both the Macedonian
king, perdiccas, and the kingof the Thracian Odomantinians.
He was seeking troops from bothto bolster his forces for their
(12:16):
attack on the city.
Perdiccas was bound by thealliance he had made with the
Athenians to march with an armyto assist the Athenians in the
campaign, while the Thracianking was sought after.
As it appears, his interestswere to match the Athenians.
It seems the Thracian tribesthat had revolted and that were
assisting the Spartans were atodds with him.
Plus, he would have beenseeking to exert influence over
(12:38):
as many tribal groups aspossible to expand his kingdom.
Brasidas would be kept informedof the preparations that Cleon
was making and would move aforce to some high ground not
far from Amphipolis, where hecould maintain an uninterrupted
view of the moves that would bemade.
At the same time, cleon wasawaiting his reinforcements.
(12:59):
Brasidas would also takemeasures to see his own forces
grow.
He would call upon his ownThracian mercenaries as well as
cavalry and peltas from variousregions.
The majority of these forceswould be stationed within
Amphipolis, with only some 1,500of Brasidas' troops
accompanying him to the highground.
(13:19):
The next part of Thucydides'account becomes a little
confusing.
As for a short passage, he nowpaints Cleon in a different
light to how he previouslyportrays him.
We get a picture of a commandernot respected by his men and
looked at as cowardly.
The cities would writeinactivity made the soldiers
discontented and their thoughtsbegan to turn to the comparison
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between the daring skill ofBrassidus and the incompetence
and weakness of their owncommander.
This is a strange passage as itflies in the face of how Cleon
has been treated in previouscampaigns and the beginning of
his current one.
If anything, we have seen howCleon was bold and looked to act
decisively.
One wonders if we are seeing abias slip in against Cleon while
(14:01):
he is up against Brasidas.
We had looked at last episodehow Cleon may have been the
instigator behind Thucydides'exile.
Perhaps when it came to Cleonhaving to face the same foe that
had bested Thucydides, hewanted to paint Cleon in a
negative light.
However, we can still turn toThucydides' account to paint a
(14:24):
picture of events aroundAmphipolis.
It appears from Cleon's actionsthat he was preparing to gather
enough forces to lay siege toAmphipolis.
Thucydides tells us he wasforced to rashly send forces
against the city due todiscontent within his ranks.
However, it appears sending outa recon in force would be
necessary to plan an attack andeventually to besiege the city.
Cleon had reached a hill notfar from Amphibolus where he was
(14:45):
able to get a good view of thecity and its surrounds.
Supposedly he was meant to havehad the view that, had he
brought up siege engines, hewould have been able to take the
city there and then, with theforce he had.
For a while he was observingthe city, he noticed that there
was no one manning the walls andno force was coming out to
challenge him.
This would see that Cleon feltconfident in being able to spend
(15:07):
as much time as he wishedgathering intelligence and then
being able to safely withdrawback to Aeon.
However, brasidas had otherideas.
He had seen Cleon's advancefrom Aeon and had decided to
march his own forces back toAmphipolis.
The reasoning we are given isthat, even though roughly equal
in numbers, the quality of thesetroops were less than that of
(15:27):
the Athenians.
He thought if he remained inplace, cleon would recognise
this and be encouraged to attackBrasidas, though thought his
best chances were to attempt toengage the Athenians on his own
terms, so hiding as muchinformation from the Cleon would
be key.
We also need to remember timewas not on the side of Brasidas.
He could not expect any helpcoming from Sparta, though as
(15:50):
each day passed, the Athenianswere getting closer to gaining
their reinforcements and theirability to surround Amphibolus.
However, now with Cleon's reconin force, brasidas now saw an
opportunity to attack Cleon,while, in his false sense of
security, we are told that allthe troops were gathered so that
Brasidas could address them tobuild their morale, while also
(16:11):
ensuring all were aware of theplan.
The plan would involve taking150 men to threaten the Athenian
position, also to reinforce theidea of a large attack being
arranged.
Brasidas had a large number oftroops positioned at what was
known as the Thracian gates,this being the closest to the
Athenians' position.
Cleon, upon his vantage point,would be able to view this
(16:33):
gathering of troops.
This, he assumed, would havethe effect of Cleon withdrawing
from the hill back to Aeon.
The route this withdrawal wouldhave would see that the
Athenians would need to marchpast the walls of Amphipolis,
where gates into the city werelocated.
This would specifically takethem past the southern gate and
where, once Cleon no longer hadeyes on the movements behind the
walls of Amphipolis, brassiduswould order forces to the
(16:55):
southern gate ready to take theAthenians by surprise.
This would then force theAthenians to stand and fight,
focusing on the immediate threat.
Then a reserve force would betaken out through the Thracian
gate and fall upon the Atheniansfrom the rear.
This would appear to be theplan that Brasidas had in mind
and conveyed to his men and, aswe will see, would mostly unfold
as he envisioned.
(17:18):
After Brasidas had finishedaddressing his forces, his plan
would get underway.
A body of troops had beengathering at the Thracian Gate,
while 150 picked men set out tothreaten the Athenian position.
With these actions taking place, word was sent to Cleon, who
came forward, where he was ableto observe all the movements
being made in the city below.
From his perspective, it lookedas though the Peloponnesians
(17:40):
were assembling for a sally outof the city.
Cleon had not come forwardlooking to fight a battle, but
just to gather intelligence forthe upcoming siege.
He judged that hisreinforcements would not be able
to arrive in time, but he wouldhave enough time to organise a
withdrawal back to Aeon with theforces he had brought up.
The quickest route to withdrawalwould see the Athenian force
having to initially marchparallel to the walls of
(18:01):
Amphipolis.
Cleon appears to have perhapsnot been so completely confident
in avoiding battle, as he wasfrustrated with the progress his
men were making, so personallyordered the entire force to
wheel around, placing theunarmoured side of his right
flank towards the walls ofAmphipolis.
This manoeuvre had seen thearmy quickly march past the
Thracian Gate and where Cleonhad seen the danger to his
(18:23):
forces developing.
However, as the Athenians hadbeen preparing the withdrawal
and had been putting it intomotion, another force within
Amphipolis had been assemblingat the southern gates.
Cleon's men would also need tomarch past this position in the
wall.
As they fell back, though havingalready passed the Thracian
gate, cleon thought theimmediate danger to his men had
been avoided, brassidas, seeingthe Athenian movements and now
(18:47):
in such a vulnerable position,ordered his men to attack with
the following words thosefellows will never stand before
us.
One can see by the way thattheir spears and heads are going
.
Troops, which do as they do,seldom stand a charge.
Quick someone, open the gates Ispoke of and let us be out at
them, with no fears for theresult, them with no fears for
(19:13):
the result.
The Athenians were thencompletely taken by surprise as
a rush of forces led byBrassidas came pouring out of
the southern gate and fell uponthem.
This would see Cleon's forcestop and look to defend
themselves against this newthreat.
The Athenians' attention was nowcompletely focused on the
enemies coming from the southerngate.
While the Peloponnesians hadbeen attacking from the southern
gate, the other force now cameout of the Thracian gate to the
rear of the withdrawingAthenians.
(19:34):
With the Athenians' attentionoccupied, these men came
charging down the road along thewall and crashed into the
unaware Athenians, now causingtotal panic among their ranks.
The left wing of the Athenianforce, which was furthest from
the walls, walls was able tobreak and fled back towards Eon.
However, it would be duringthis stage that Brasidas would
receive a wound and would fall,though the men around him were
(19:57):
able to recover him and drag himaway from the action, this had
been carried out quickly and theAthenians had not become aware
that a Spartan general hadfallen.
An event like this in combat canhave an influential effect on
the battle, with it encouragingthe enemy while also harming the
morale of the general's army.
However, given the swiftness ofhim being taken from the
(20:21):
fighting, it appears not manywere aware what had just taken
place.
The Athenian right wingremained engaged and appears to
have been able to gain somecohesion, for they were able to
find some high ground.
From here.
They were able to repulse theadvances of their Peloponnesians
a few times.
However, they would end upbeing surrounded and, after
suffering a barrage of missilefire, they would too now rout,
though they would now have toworry about the cavalry and
(20:42):
peltas picking them off in theirvulnerable state.
Those who survived had made forthe rough terrain of the hills,
where the pursuit of the enemywas made more difficult.
From there, they wouldeventually make their way back
to Aeon In amongst the chaosthat took place when the
Athenians made their withdrawal.
We hear of Cleon being killedOnce again.
(21:03):
How Thucydides describes itpossibly points to his bias over
him, as he is described asdying in a cowardly manner.
Points to his bias over him, ashe is described as dying in a
cowardly manner, supposedlyduring the stand of the right
wing.
Cleon is meant to have fled,with Thucydides seeming to
describe him as abandoning hismen.
We then hear he was overtakenby some enemy peltas, where one
cut him down as they passed by.
(21:23):
As we saw, brasidas had alsofallen during the battle and was
taken back from the fighting.
With the battle now won, thosewho had rescued him from the
front line brought him back tothe city of Amphipolis as he was
still alive.
However, his injuries were toogreat to be treated effectively,
but he would learn of thevictory of his troops before he
(21:44):
ended up succumbing to hiswounds.
So would be the end of one ofSparta's most imaginative and
courageous generals for ageneration.
Those at Amphipolis would treatBrasidas with the respect that
he had earned himself over hislife.
Thucydides describes a scenewithin the city.
After this, all the alliesattended in arms and buried
(22:06):
Brasidas at the public's expense, in the city, in front of what
is now the marketplace, and thepeople of Amphibolus having
enclosed his tomb everafterwards, sacrificed to him as
a hero and have given him thehonour of games and annual
offerings.
The people of Amphibolus, inthe wake of Brasidas' death,
(22:27):
would turn to destroying all themonuments that had celebrated
the Athenians' establishment ofthe colony.
They instead viewed Brasidas asbeing their preserver, and it
seems they are also looking tobe favoured by Sparta, since
Athenian recapture of the citywould surely mean a horrible
fate for many of them.
The Peloponnesians, now underthe command of Cloridus, would
strip the dead of their armourand establish trophies to mark
(22:49):
the victory.
A local truce would be made sothat the dead of the athenians
could be returned to them.
The usidides tells us that somesix hundred of them were killed
in the fighting, while onlyseven of those who had been
within amphipolis would die inthe fighting.
When we see such a disparity innumbers like this, it is
tempting to dismiss them.
However, we need to keep inmind it does seem to fit with
(23:12):
the trend of battles thatinvolve a major rout.
The actual engagement tends tosee very few casualties when
both sides are engaged.
The vast number of the deadcome from the side that routs
and are completely defencelessand vulnerable to the actions of
the enemy.
Routes and are completelydefenceless and vulnerable to
the actions of the enemy.
With the Athenian defeat ofAmphipolis, the survivors would
reorganise at Aeon but would notremain, as we hear that they
(23:34):
would sail back for Athens.
The Peloponnesians, on theother hand, would remain in
control of the city and now lookto arrange themselves and the
city for the possibility ofanother Athenian attempt.
The Spartans had been aware ofthe campaign Cleon had been
embarking on, and they had takensome measures to try and filter
in more Spartan reinforcements.
(23:54):
We are told that a 900-strongSpartan hoplite army had marched
up as far as Heraclea inTrachis.
However, they would remain herefor some time, with the
generals enacting reforms withinthe city.
This delay would mean that theywere still in Heraclea when the
Battle of Amphipolis took place.
By the time the Spartan forcegot moving again, the winter of
(24:15):
422 had arrived.
This force would only penetrateas far as southern Thessaly
before they too would encounterstiff Thessalian opposition.
Thucydides indicates here thatthe usual resolve and
determination of the Spartanswas not on show here, for they
were turned back home with,apparently, news of the death of
Brasidas and the thought thatthe danger the Athenians posed
(24:38):
had now passed.
He then continues to suggestthat the force did not have the
same determination for successin the region that Brasidas had,
with these reinforcing generalsand troops being aware of the
desire back in Sparta for peace.
The Battle of Amphipolis hadseen the death of two of the
most enthusiastic opponents ofpeace developing between the two
(24:59):
sides.
We had seen.
Brasidas had basically ignoredthe terms of the truce that had
been put in effect, with himfinding them an annoyance.
In the face of his success inThrace, he was willing to risk
breaking the terms for continuedvictories at the expense of the
Athenians.
While Cleon had been at the headof those seeking an aggressive
approach to the war, hispolicies had been a contrast to
(25:20):
those of Pericles.
Earlier in the war, as wepointed out, the Spartan
government was looking for a wayto come to a satisfactory peace
with Athens.
They were in no real positionto pursue the war as they had
desired, where we had seen theearly strategy had involved
invading Attica each year.
Now, though, they were in noposition to launch these
invasions.
(25:41):
If they did, they risked theSpartiites captured at
Sphacteria being executed.
They no longer had the optionof supporting the revolts
throughout the islands of theAegean.
Their fleet had proved to beineffective in the face of the
Athenians, but at this stagethey didn't even possess a fleet
worth mentioning.
After its seizure at Pylos, theonly other option that had
(26:01):
presented itself, brasidas hadtaken on campaigning through
Thrace.
But here now the momentum hadbeen lost, with the Spartan
government gaining back controlover the operation.
Away from Brasidas, therevolting cities found they were
no longer receiving support andwere being treated like subject
populations once again.
Had Sparta wanted to continuethe campaign here, they were now
(26:23):
in a position where they justcouldn't support it through lack
of manpower.
The Athenians' control of thesea, along with Perdiccas and
Thessaly remaining hostile,meant there was no way to reach
Dracian land via land or sea.
Here we see the options ofoffensive operations closing
themselves off to the Spartans.
But these factors were only oneside of the story.
(26:43):
For Sparta seeking peace Back onthe Peloponnese, they had now
also found themselves in a morethreatening position.
We had seen how Athens hadestablished forts around the
Peloponnese.
These still remained active andmeant Athens could strike into
the Peloponnesian territory asthey pleased.
Not only this, but these basesoffered locations that the
helots, under Spartan control,could desert to.
(27:05):
The Spartans still rememberedthe great helot revolt of the
previous generation and fearedthat it could develop again with
Athenian support.
Added to these fears was thefact that Sparta still had
rivals on the Peloponnese, suchas Argos.
The 30 years truce that existedbetween them was due to expire
soon.
Argos, not hampered by war, hadrecovered from their defeats by
(27:28):
Sparta a couple of generationsearlier and now thrived.
Cleon had also approached theArgive democracy.
Knowing the truce was due toexpire soon.
He was looking to gain apowerful ally, peloponnese.
Surely, with the rivalry thatexisted between Sparta and Argos
, the Argives would have beeneager to take advantage of the
weak position Sparta was in, onthe back of a powerful Argos
(27:52):
entering the war.
It was also feared that somePeloponnesian members would then
side with Argos, with themappearing to be Peloponnesian
League members more out ofnecessity at the moment.
Now, though, taking into accountSparta's reasons for seeking a
peace, athens would, on thesurface, seem as though a
continuation of war would be totheir advantage, though they too
(28:14):
were also seeking to establisha peace.
From what we can see, athenshad Sparta on the back foot.
424 had been a big year forAthens, seeing the favour tip in
their balance.
Even with the setbacks theAthenians suffered, sparta still
had to contend with potentialAthenian incursions around their
territory.
The Thracian campaign had beensomewhat a result of the
(28:36):
Athenian setbacks around Megara,boeotia and the defeat at
Delium, but now the situation inThrace was beginning to
stabilise.
It's for this reason that anoften cited motivation for
Athens seeking peace was due totheir financial situation.
We have previously spoken aboutthe stresses of the treasury in
funding the war.
If the treasury was in serioustrouble, athens may have wanted
(28:57):
to bring peace as soon aspossible, as if it was left with
no funds, their security wouldbe in jeopardy.
Not only would they riskbankrupting themselves, if the
war continued on for longer thanforeseen, it would also be
difficult to respond to othersituations that may develop from
areas around their empire, notto mention maintaining their own
empire.
That was also a source ofsecurity.
(29:18):
However, we find Donald Kagan,among others, who argue that the
situation of the treasurydoesn't appear to be a
motivation in seeking peace.
The main argument here rests onthe fact that Thucydides
stresses the importance of moneyin the waging of war and
outlines Athens' financialsituation back in 431.
(29:38):
One example of this is duringthe speech that Thucydides
places in the mouth of Pericles,during his speech when war with
Sparta was being decided on.
The argument then continuesthat if this was the main
motivation for Athens seeking apeace, then surely Thucydides,
who understands the main rolemoney plays in waging war, would
highlight the lack of it.
Now, if anything, it has beenargued that, based off of yearly
(30:02):
estimates of Athens treasury,they still had enough money to
continue the war for at leastanother year, based off the
lower-end estimates, while thehigher-end would allow for
perhaps another five.
This also doesn't take intoaccount the emergency fund that
still existed.
If Sparta were on the edge ofdefeat, this might be enough to
win an outright victory, though,as we have seen before, nothing
(30:23):
is certain in war.
Unforeseen events could end upbankrupting Athens.
However, this argument of thetreasury not being depleted I
don't think excludes financesbeing a factor in Athens' desire
for peace.
If we take the lower-endestimates, the Athenians would
have been aware that their fundscould dry up in the near future
, possibly before the war couldbe won.
I think Athens' desire to winhostilities came from a number
(30:47):
of factors, not resting on asingle overarching reason.
I think the treasury providedone point that needed to be
considered, though other factorssuch as the regional economy,
war weariness from the citizens,the unity of the empire and the
change in political dynamicsall played a role.
Athens had sufferedPeloponnesian invasions for most
(31:08):
years of the war, which hadravaged their countryside and
destroyed many farms and crops.
At the moment, sparta avoidedentering Attica due to Athens
holding some of their menhostage.
However, this was onlytemporary and the situation
could change at any time.
If peace were arranged, manycould return to their lands and
begin reversing the damage whichhad been done.
(31:30):
This could mean the domesticagricultural situation within
Attica could be restored to itspre-war status sooner rather
than later.
This would also feed into thewar weariness of the citizens,
as many of these citizens whoworked the land had lost their
livelihoods and had been absentfrom their farms.
Since the beginning of the war,we had seen how many,
especially the hoplite class,had been frustrated, sitting
(31:52):
behind Athens' walls while theirfarms and crops burnt.
Further, adding to thecitizens' morale issues was the
plague that had run havoc behindAthenian walls, with all that
had survived losing many familymembers.
Further, the hoplite class, aswell as many of the lower
classes now employed as rowers,were all becoming homesick.
They were constantly deployedon campaigns, away from their
(32:15):
homes and families.
All of this would also come toaffect the manpower Paul Athens
could call upon.
The war and plague had taken alarge toll on the fighting age
men.
If the war continued andexpanded, athens might find
itself stretched too far forvictory to be possible.
Another factor Athens had toconsider was its empire.
All the factors we have spokenabout could potentially see
(32:38):
Athens in a weaker position.
One constant that appears totake place within empires is its
subject.
Populations tend to look atrebelling if they perceive
weakness.
This had already taken place anumber of times for Athens,
before and during the war.
If their empire began tocrumble due to their not being
able to maintain it due to lackof resources, then this could
(33:06):
downgrade Athens' power in theregion and make them more
vulnerable to others.
However, it also appears now,with the death of Cleon, athens
was politically now in a betterposition to push the notion of a
peace agreement with citizens.
Cleon had wielded greatinfluence and had opposed
negotiating with Sparta.
However, there were still thosein power in Athens that
supported peace, the main figurethat would now come to
prominence was Nicias.
However, even with so manyreasons supporting peace on both
(33:31):
sides of the conflict, onewould not be negotiated right
away.
It appears there was still someopposition on both sides In
Sparta.
It is difficult for us tounderstand where it was coming
from, as we don't get a completepicture of the internal
politics In Athens, though thisis understandable, as support
for the continuation of war hadbeen strong with Cleon, it would
(33:52):
probably take time for many ofhis supporters to be convinced
to look differently at thesituation.
While, although Nicias wouldgrow in influence, it wouldn't
happen overnight.
It would need debates withinthe assembly to win over others
to his side, as we will see nextepisode.
It appears many who stillsupported war saw that the
advantage was with Athens andSparta was on the ropes.
(34:14):
It would take events in thefollowing spring to convince
them that perhaps this view ofvictory just around the corner
wasn't as close as they thought,and the reasons we outlined in
favour of peace now presentedthemselves as more important in
light of Sparta's actions.
Next episode we'll be turning tothe Peace of Nicias that would
end up being negotiated.
(34:34):
This would be a peace that wassupposed to last 50 years.
However, this peace has alsoearned the nickname of the False
Peace.
And to close out this episode,I want to just leave you with
the introduction Donald Kaganprovides when introducing part 4
of his history of thePeloponnesian War.
The Peace of Nicias lasted nomore than 8 years and was
(34:56):
seriously damaged and broken inspirit at once and repeatedly,
before its formal demise in 414.
The central figure in Athensthroughout this period was
Nicias, the most lastinglyimportant Athenian political
leader since the death ofPericles.
His strengths and weaknesseswould be crucial to the course
of events.
A critical force in shaping thetreaty and bringing it into
(35:18):
being.
He also determined how it wouldbe carried out.
Thank you all for the supportand continuing to support the
series.
It is greatly appreciated.
I'd like to give an extraspecial thank you to all my
Patreon Archon members.
So a big shout out to NeilBennett, ali Ullman, nick
Kablifakis, paul from Inga,matthew and John for choosing to
(35:40):
support the series over onPatreon and supporting at the
Archon level.
If you've also found some valuein the series and wish to
support the show, you can headto wwwcastingthoranxiagreasecom
and click on the support theseries button where you can find
the link to Patreon as well asmany other ways to support the
show.
Be sure to stay connected andupdated on what's happening in
(36:01):
the series and join me over onFacebook or Instagram at Casting
Thoranxiagrease, or onInstagram at Casting
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Once again, thanks for thesupport and I hope you can join
me next episode where wecontinue the narrative in the
series.
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