November 22, 2024 • 41 mins
Welcome to another episode of Casting Through Ancient Greece! In this episode, we delve into one of the most pivotal yet precarious moments of the Peloponnesian War: the Peace of Nicias.
After a decade of bitter conflict between Athens and Sparta, the year 421 BCE brought a glimmer of hope for peace. Named after the Athenian general and statesman who negotiated it, the Peace of Nicias was a formal attempt to halt hostilities. But was it truly a step toward reconciliation or merely a pause before the inevitable resumption of war?
Join us as we explore:
- The events leading up to the peace agreement, including the devastating losses and shifting alliances that made both sides desperate for a truce.
- The terms of the treaty, and how it sought to restore balance between Athens and Sparta.
- The challenges and controversies that arose immediately after its ratification.
- Why the Peace of Nicias ultimately failed, setting the stage for the even bloodier conflicts to come in the Peloponnesian War.
Through this episode, we’ll examine how this fleeting moment of diplomacy offers a fascinating lens into the political, military, and social dynamics of ancient Greece.
Tune in to uncover the fragile nature of peace in a world constantly at war and the lessons it still holds for us today.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:15):
The foremost candidates for power in either
city Plastionax, son ofPausanias, king of Sparta, and
Nicias, son of Nicaratus, themost fortunate general of his
time.
Each desired peace moreardently than ever, thucydides.
Hello, I'm Mark Selleck, andwelcome back to Casting Through
Ancient Greece, episode 91, thePeace of Nicias.
(00:36):
In the wake of the campaigns of424, we have seen that both
Athens and Sparta were seeking apause in the war, with what
what it would seem thepossibility for a lasting peace.
Athens had some successes earlyin the year, but would suffer
setbacks as they tried to pushtheir advantage while Sparta had
been what it seemed like ahopeless position.
(00:57):
But then, encouraged by aturnaround in fortune of the
Athenians, this would end upleading to a truce being signed
that was to last one year, whilethe hope from factions within
each city-state would be that alonger-lasting peace would be
negotiated.
However, this peace, along withthe truce itself, were placed
in jeopardy with operationstaking place in Thrace with the
(01:17):
Spartan general Brasidas.
He had commenced operationswhen Athens was beginning to see
a reversal in their fortunes,where he would target the
possessions of the Athenians inthe resource-rich region of
Thrace.
His unorthodox approach for aSpartan would see many cities
revolt from Athens and opentheir gates to him.
However, the truce now riskedhalting the momentum he had
(01:38):
built up.
Brasidas would ignore the termsof the truce and continue
operations, citing timing issuesas a defence.
Would ignore the terms of thetruce and continue operations,
citing timing issues as adefence.
However, it appears allincluding the Spartans, that his
actions had breached the truce.
Athens would now send a forceto counter Brasidas, while
Sparta would send governmentrepresentatives to ensure
(01:58):
proceedings were being carriedout under government interests.
While almost certainly tryingto capitalise on Brasidas'
success, athens had sent forcesinto Thrace that began
countering Spartan efforts in423.
While almost certainly tryingto capitalise on Brassens'
success, athens had sent forcesinto Thrace that began
countering Spartan efforts in423, but they would end up
becoming tied down with thesiege of Sicone.
With the spring of 422, anotherfleet would be sent from Athens
with the Athenian general Cleonin command.
(02:19):
He had managed to convince theassembly, who appear to have
become more enraged at Sparta'sactions, to increase Athens'
commitment in the region toregaining their possessions and
defeating the Spartans.
Cleon's ultimate goal was torecapture Amphipolis, the most
important Athenian possession inThrace.
Cleon's campaign would beginwell, with some early victories,
(02:39):
though, once at Aeon and nowopposed by Brasidas and
Amphipolis, he would become morecautious Before being able to
gather enough troops to encirclethe city and place it under
siege.
Cleon would be challenged byBrasidas as he moved forward
with what would appear to be acore element of his force.
Brasidas would make it appearhe was readying to move against
the Athenian force observing thecity.
(03:01):
This would force Cleon towithdraw, thinking he was not
strong enough to fight a battlein the field.
However, this withdrawal wouldmake his force vulnerable and
Brasidas would take advantage ofthis, engaging the Athenians
from two directions as theysallied out of the walls.
The battle that developed wouldend up seeing the death of both
Brasidas and Cleon and wouldsee the Athenian element that
(03:22):
had been defeated sail back.
For Athens, once reaching Aeon,disorder Although Sparta had
retained Amphipolis, they werein a position where continued
operations were becoming moredifficult.
They were unable to march anyreinforcements into Thrace due
to Thessaly being hostile, whileAthens still posed a threat to
their garrisons in Thrace.
We also need to remember thatAthens still had over 120
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Spartaitites in captivity andSparta had no fleet to speak of.
This would see that more withinthe Spartan government were
becoming motivated to seek apeace, while Athens, on the
other hand, although in astronger position than Sparta
when viewed on paper, they had anumber of factors seeing that
peace was becoming moredesirable, with its seeming
war-weariness from its citizensbecoming one of the biggest
(04:07):
factors, and seeing more in theAssembly wanting negotiations to
begin with Sparta.
However, although negotiationswould begin to take place over
the winter, a resolution wouldnot come about right away.
As we finished off with lastepisode, although we could see
the desire for a negotiatedpeace to come about between the
two was becoming more favourablein both cities, the talks
(04:30):
taking place in the wake ofAmphipolis had yet come to a
resolution Heading into 421,.
Both sides would continue withtheir war footing as to continue
hostilities into a newcampaigning season.
A new campaigning season.
In the background, the Athenianfigure of Nicias, who the peace
would be named after due to thecentral role he would play,
would engage with the Spartanking, plastionax, in an attempt
(04:52):
to bring about terms acceptableto both sides.
As we have seen over the pastcouple of years, this kind of
negotiating had been takingplace but had netted nil results
thus far.
But with both sides appearingto be more motivated for peace,
these talks would finally getsomewhere this time around.
Thucydides also highlights thatthis point in time, after what
both sides had gone through andthe political situation in both
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Athens and Sparta, both were nowin a position where the peace
factions were at their height ofinfluence.
Nicias, as we had seen, hadrisen to be the leading figure
of those Athenian politiciansseeking a peaceful resolution.
He was now in a perfectposition to convince his fellow
citizens this was the right pathforward.
He had obtained a level ofmilitary respect higher than
(05:36):
anyone else of his time, withThucydides telling us he wished
to use this to advance hisagenda.
Thucydides would point outNiccius also had personal
motivations to seeking a peaceestablished where, it seems, he
tries to show that, althoughNiccius had virtue and was
looking out for Athens'interests, he also brings him
down a peg as, in Thucydides'opinion, he doesn't measure up
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to the standards set by Pericles.
He would write Niccius wishedto rest upon his laurels, to
find an immediate release fromthe toil and trouble for he
would write.
However, through Plutarch wecan also see other attributes
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that would make him a figurethat would eventually win around
most Athenians to his line ofthinking, in addition to the
popularity he had gained fromhis military experience.
He would also earn the respectthrough his piety by spending
generous amounts on religiousobservations and other services
to benefit the Athenian citizens, while he would also be seen as
the perfect candidate tocontinue the attempted
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negotiations with Sparta due tothe special relationship he had
developed with them.
He had earned the confidence ofthe Spartans due to the
kindness that he had affordedthe Spartan prisoners while held
captive in Athens.
To Sparta, nicias may havereminded them of Caimon from a
generation earlier.
On the other side, seeking peacewith Athens, was the Spartan
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king Plastianax, who hadoriginally led a Spartan army
towards Attica at the end of theFirst Peloponnesian War.
He had been exiled after thearmy returned home.
As negotiations between him andPericles took place, which
would see no battle develop,plastionax was accused of
(07:25):
accepting bribes from Periclesand would end up being exiled in
445.
In 427, plastionax had beenrecalled from exile after the
death of Archidamus, though hisenemies within Sparta would
accuse him of bribing the Pythiaat Delphi to convince the
Spartans to have him recalledand placed back in power While
back as one of the Spartan kings.
His enemies would continue tolean into this charge, with them
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bringing it up wheneveranything went wrong in Sparta,
insinuating Apollo was punishingSparta for Placinax's
disrespect of him.
Thucydides would presentPlacinax's distress at being
continually levelled with thesecharges as his motivations to
seeking peace.
He would write he thought thatin peacetime disasters would not
occur.
Also, that once the Spartansgot back their prisoners, his
enemies would have no basis fromwhich to attack him, whereas
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during a state of war, those inthe highest positions must
necessarily get blamed for everymisfortune that took place.
He was therefore extremelyanxious to come to terms with
Athens.
However, although this mighthave had some bearing on him
wanting to see peace established, it is also clear that
Plastinax had been in favour ofpeace with Athens from as far
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back as the First PeloponnesianWar.
His exile was a reaction to thetruce he worked out with
Pericles while on the march.
While when we hear about thepeace party in Sparta, he is
often associated with it, march,while when we hear about the
peace party in Sparta, he isoften associated with it Like
Nicias, he was also seen as thebest conduit to negotiations, as
he had been on friendly termswith certain Athenian families.
(08:54):
However, as we touched on at theend of last episode, although
negotiations were taking place.
No agreement had come about asthe campaigning season of 421
arrived.
What's interesting for thisyear is that we are told that
Sparta was preparing to invadeAttica for the first time since
424.
Previously, the Spartans hadavoided their yearly invasion
due to the Athenians holdingover 120 Spartiites hostage.
(09:18):
The fear had been that if theyhad attempted to march into
Athenian territory, these menwould be executed.
So why had Sparta decided thatthey now would take the risk?
Firstly, we need to wonder ifthe Spartans were serious about
actually setting foot on Atticsoil.
Thucydides tells us that duringthe spring, orders were sent out
from Sparta to all the otherPeloponnesian members to ready
(09:40):
their forces and materials forthe establishment of forts
within the Athenian territory.
To ready their forces andmaterials for the establishment
of forts within the Athenianterritory.
After telling us this, he thenadds that this was done in order
for the Athenians to be moreinclined to accept the terms
that had been offered in thenegotiations so far.
Here we can see Thucydidesinsinuating that the Spartans
didn't have the intention oflaunching this invasion, but
(10:00):
rather were looking to create aclimate of fear within Athens
that would see peace talksadvance and an agreement reached
, though it is possible thatSparta might have still invaded
if negotiations still continued.
Perhaps they were ready to callAthens bluff.
If they did execute theSpartiites, they would have
gotten rid of their bargainingchip when it came to hostilities
and for when negotiations didadvance.
(10:22):
And for when negotiations didadvance, however, the
Peloponnesians would not need toset foot in Attica, as, it
seems, word of the preparationsthat were being made had
convinced the Assembly in Athensto agree on terms to see a
peace put in place.
It would appear that an initialagreement took place that would
see hostilities halted and thenallow for the full terms of the
peace to be reached.
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Claims would be going back andforward, but finally an
agreement would come about.
The continuation of peace talksnow rested on both sides
agreeing to give back all thepossessions that had been
acquired by each during theyears of the war, though Athens
was to still hold on to Nicaea,the port near Megara.
The reasoning for thisconcession was due to Thebes
(11:04):
having successfully argued thatthey had not taken Plataea by
force, but due to an agreementreached with those of the city
freely.
Athens then, in turn,highlighted that this had been
the same situation, with theircontrol of Nicaea.
With this initial understandingin place.
Sparta then called for ameeting of all the Peloponnesian
members to gain a vote of thosewho were in favour of peace and
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would continue to be involvedin the terms.
However, the Boeotians,corinthians and Megarians would
not be in favour of peace asthey would lose out in the
current agreement, which sawareas they had interests in or
had previously controlled,remaining with Athens.
However, these objections tothe peace negotiations to take
place with Athens would not stopSparta from engaging in the
(11:47):
agreement.
As we have seen, sparta was atthe head of the Peloponnesian
League and did not need amajority vote to proceed with
how they wished, though it seemsit was only a few of the
Peloponnesian members who wereopposed.
These, however, were some ofSparta's most important allies
and, as we will see down thetrack, some would find reason to
oppose Sparta, with theiropposition being ignored.
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In the meantime, a peace wouldbe signed after the initial
agreement that had seen a haltto hostilities.
As the title of this episodesuggests, the peace that would
be signed would be known as thePeace of Nicias.
One of the central provisions ofthe Peace of Nicias was the
return of captives and prisonersof war.
During the conflict, bothAthens and Sparta had taken
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numerous prisoners from oneanother's forces.
These prisoners were a constantsource of tension and both
sides sought to pressure theother with a threat of execution
or enslavement.
Under the terms of the treaty,both Athens and Sparta agreed to
return these captives,signalling a commitment to end
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the cycle of personalretribution that had
characterised the war so far.
This provision was not justabout humanitarian concerns.
It was also a way todemonstrate goodwill and pave
the way for future cooperation.
However, while the treatystipulated the return of
prisoners, its enforcement wasnot straightforward.
Many prisoners had been kept inharsh conditions and the
logistics of returning largenumbers of captives posed
challenges.
(13:10):
Even so, the agreement markedan important gesture of
reconciliation and it was one ofthe more visible aspects of the
peace, signalling the attemptto re-establish trust between
the two warring states.
Additionally, the treatyrequired both sides to return
any captured land or possessionsthat had been taken during the
course of the war.
This provision was meant torestore the territorial status
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quo and ensure that neither sidegained permanent advantages in
the terms of land or resources.
In theory, this would allow thetwo powers to return to their
pre-war positions with nolasting territorial gains or
losses.
To return to their pre-warpositions, with no lasting
territorial gains or losses.
However, as was often the casein the Peloponnesian War, the
actual implementation of suchclauses was fraught with
difficulty, particularly giventhe complex web of alliances and
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the political significance ofcertain territories.
Another crucial aspect of thePeace of Nicias was the
restoration of alliances.
Both Athens and Sparta hadformed powerful alliances during
the war, with Athens leadingthe Delian League and Sparta
heading the Peloponnesian League.
The treaty required both sidesto restore their alliances to
their pre-war configurations,meaning that each city-state
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would return to its position ofleadership within the respective
alliance network.
For Athens, this meantreasserting control over the
cities and islands of the DelianLeague, many of which had
experienced varying levels ofautonomy during the conflict.
For Sparta, it meantreaffirming its influence over
the Peloponnesian League,including cities like Corinth
and Thebes.
However, this restoration ofalliances was problematic in
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practice because the agreementdid not include the allies of
either side in the formal treatynegotiations.
The smaller city-states, whichhad been dragged into the war
due to their obligations toeither Athens or Sparta, were
not fully consulted on theirpeace terms.
As a result, some of theseallies were dissatisfied with
the peace and were unwilling tofully comply with the treaty.
For example, many of Sparta'sallies, especially Corinth and
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Thebes, were dissatisfied withthe treaty and were unwilling to
follow its terms.
Corinth, in particular, hadlong opposed Athens and was not
willing to accept the renewedstatus quo.
These states did notparticipate directly in the
treaty negotiations and theiropposition to the peace led to
continued hostilities in someregions.
Athens faced similar challengeswith its own allies, many of
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whom resented the power dynamicswithin the Delian League and
were not fully content with theterms of the peace.
Consequently, while the peacecalled for the restoration of
alliances, the dissatisfactionof many of these allies made it
difficult to maintain the peacein practice.
A symbolic yet importantprovision of the Peace of Nicias
was the agreement to dismantlefortifications.
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Both Athens and Sparta hadbuilt significant fortifications
during the course of the war,particularly Athens, whose long
walls connected the city to itsport, the Piraeus.
These fortifications were seenas critical military assets and
symbols of the respectivecity-state strategic military
power.
The treaty called for bothsides to dismantle these
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fortifications, which wasintended to reduce the risk of
further military aggression.
The idea was to limit theability of each side to mobilize
forces quickly and to lessenthe potential of future
conflicts.
However, this provision wasfrequently circumvented in
practice.
Athens, for instance, wasreluctant to dismantle the long
walls which provided vitalprotection for the city and its
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maritime interests.
Similarly, sparta was unlikelyto dismantle its military
infrastructure, given itsmilitary ethos and reliance on
fortified positions.
While the clause aboutfortifications was a meaningful
symbol of peace, its actualimpact was limited.
Both sides continued tomaintain significant military
strength, and the dismantling offortifications was not either
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fully executed or not asignificant enough concession to
alter the balance of power ofthe Greek world.
As a result, this article ofthe treaty was more aspirational
and practical.
Was more aspirational andpractical.
The Peace of Nicias alsoincluded provisions regarding
the neutrality of certainregions, particularly areas that
were strategically significantto both Athens and Sparta.
One of the most notableexamples of this was the island
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of Melos, which was designated aneutral zone under the treaty.
The idea was that such neutralzones would prevent further
conflict in areas that were notdirectly involved in the rivalry
between the two superpowers.
Milos, in particular, had beena point of contention during the
war, and the designation of theisland as neutral was intended
to protect it from futureaggression.
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However, the establishment ofneutral zones was a difficult
concept to enforce.
Both Athens and Sparta hadimperial ambitions and saw these
regions not as neutral, but aspotential areas for future
expansion.
In practice, neutrality washard to maintain, especially
when one side or the other sawan opportunity to gain a
strategic advantage.
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Despite the intention behindthe neutral zones, this clause
did little to prevent conflictin key areas.
The situation of Melos, forinstance, would later escalate
in 416 BC, when Athens forciblysubjugated the island during the
Melian Dialogue.
This event highlighted thedifficulty in forcing neutrality
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, especially when the militaryobjectives of the powers
involved conflicted with suchprovisions.
Powers involved conflicted withsuch provisions.
The most important provision ofthe Peace of Nicias, however,
was the promise ofnon-aggression between Athens
and Sparta.
Both sides agreed to refrainfrom attacking one another for a
period of 50 years, a gesturethat was meant to provide
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long-term stability and securityin the Greek world.
This promise of peace, ifupheld, could have brought about
a significant reduction inmilitary conflict, allowing both
Athens and Sparta to rebuildtheir economies after the years
of warfare.
So, as we can see, there are anumber of provisions within this
agreement that were supposed tohave seen both Athens and
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Sparta satisfied and contentwith the end of hostilities.
However, there were a number ofissues that existed and
limitations within the peacethat would see that it would not
hold for the period of timeintended.
One of the most significantlimitations of the peace of
Nicias was that it was notuniversally accepted by the
allies of both Athens and Sparta.
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While the treaty, on thesurface applied to the two main
belligerents, it did not bindtheir respective allies, many of
whom had been deeply involvedin the conflict and had their
own interests.
Both Athens and Sparta reliedon a complex web of alliances,
and the Peace of Nicias failedto address the grievances of
these secondary states.
In particular, sparta's allies,such as Corinth and Thebes,
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were not entirely satisfied withthe terms of the peace.
Corinth, a city-state that hadbeen a staunch opponent of
Athens throughout the war, didnot want to see Athens emerge
from the war with any form oflegitimacy.
Similarly, thebes, which hadbeen long at odds with Athens,
was unwilling to stop its ownhostilities.
These allies were not bound bythe treaty and saw no reason to
cease their ongoing campaignsagainst Athens.
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As a result.
While Athens and Sparta agreedto peace, the broader Greek
world was not unified in itsacceptance and hostilities
continued.
On the periphery, athens, too,had to contend with its own
allies.
The peace treaty, whichrestored the status quo pre-war,
did not address the desires ofAthens' subject states,
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particularly those in the DelianLeague.
Some of these allies wereunhappy with Athens' dominance
and the tribute they were forcedto pay.
They viewed the peace as atemporary measure rather than a
solution to the power imbalancesin the Greek world.
In essence, the failure tosecure the cooperation of all
the relevant parties meant thatthe peace was fragile and
incomplete from the start.
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Parties meant that the peacewas fragile and incomplete from
the start.
Another major flaw of the Peaceof Nicias was that it failed to
address the root cause of thePeloponnesian War.
At its core, the war had beendriven by the rivalry between
Athens and Sparta, two powerfulcity-states with fundamentally
different political systems,cultures and visions for the
Greek world.
Athens, with its democraticgovernment and maritime empire,
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sought to expand its influenceacross the Aegean.
Sparta, on the other hand, withits oligarchic government and
militaristic society, was intenton maintaining the status quo
and curbing the power of Athens.
The Peace of Nicias merelypaused the direct conflict
between the two superpowerswithout addressing this deeper
rivalry.
It did not resolve thefundamental issues of Athens'
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growing empire or Sparta'sdesire to check that growth.
The treaty temporarily haltedthe fighting, but did little to
resolve the political andideological divisions that had
fuelled the war.
Both Athens and Sparta remainedsuspicious of each other's
intentions, and the peaceprovided no framework for a
lasting settlement orreconciliation between the two
powers.
Moreover, the treaty did noteffectively deal with the
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internal tensions within theGreek world.
Many smaller city-statescontinued to be caught in the
crossfire of Athens and Sparta'srivalry.
The peace did not dismantle thecomplex web of alliances and
grievances that had developedover the course of the war.
As a result, even though thetwo main belligerents had agreed
to a ceasefire, the broaderconflict remained unresolved.
The peace was merely atemporary halt in the ongoing
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struggle for dominance betweenAthens and Sparta, with no
guarantee that hostilities wouldnot resume once the opportunity
arose.
The Peace of Nicias, despite itspromises of a prolonged halt in
hostilities, did not preventAthens from pursuing other
military ventures.
The most significant of thesewas the Sicilian Expedition of
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415 BC that we will be coveringin the future.
This was a bold and ambitiouscampaign by Athens to expand its
influence in Sicily and thewestern Mediterranean, aimed at
securing new resources andallies.
However, the expedition endedin disaster for Athens, with its
fleet destroyed and its forcesdecimated.
The Sicilian expeditionescalated tensions between
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Athens and Sparta, leadingdirectly to the resumption of
full-scale warfare.
Although the Peace of Niciashad been intended to limit
military actions between the twopowers, athens' decision to
embark on such an ambitious andprovocative campaign
demonstrated the fragile natureof the peace.
The fact that Athens couldlaunch such a large-scale
military operation withoutregard for the treaty's terms
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underscore how little realcommitment there was to lasting
peace.
The failure of the Sicilianexpedition had far-reaching
consequences for Athens,weakening its military and
economic strength.
It also emboldened Sparta andits allies, who saw Athens'
defeat as an opportunity tointensify their own military
efforts.
Ultimately, the resumption ofhostilities after the Sicilian
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failure revealed the weakness ofthe Peace of Nicias.
The agreement had not preventedthe war from reigniting, and
the political dynamics of theGreek world quickly pushed
Athens and Sparta back intoconflict.
Perhaps the most significantissue with the Peace of Nicias
was its lack of effectiveenforcement mechanisms.
While the treaty established aframework for peace, it did not
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provide any concrete means forensuring compliance.
Neither Athens nor Sparta wasbound by any legally enforceable
guarantees and neither side hadthe will or capacity to hold
their allies accountable forviolations of the truce.
The treaty relied largely ongoodwill, which was a weak
foundation given the deeplyentrenched animosity between the
two powers.
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As both sides slowly rebuilttheir military strength during
these years of peace, oldrivalries and suspicions
resurfaced.
The lack of any mechanisms toprevent military build-up or
aggression meant that bothAthens and Sparta could rearm at
will.
The peace lacked the safeguardsthat might have made it more
durable.
Tensions between the two powersremained high, and each side
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viewed the other's actions withsuspicion, making the peace
fragile and temporary at best.
Furthermore, the treaty did notprovide a lasting political
settlement or framework for thefuture diplomacy between Athens
and Sparta.
There was no comprehensiveagreement on the division of
influence in the Greek world,and no efforts were made to
address the political andmilitary concerns that had
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initially sparked the conflict.
As a result, the peace wasalways at risk of being
undermined by renewedcompetition for power.
Although with many issues andlimitations, the Peace of Nicias
would be signed in the springof 421 BC, with Thucydides
telling us it was almost to theday, ten years since the first
invasion of Attica.
Almost right away, sparta beganimplementing articles of the
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terms set out in the Peace.
The first action they wouldtake was to release all those
that had been taken captive inthe war thus far, while Athens
would do the same a short timelater.
The Spartans had also sentenvoys to Thrace, where they had
the task of relaying the termsand arranging cities to be
handed over to Athens.
However, resistance to Sparta'sorders would develop once they
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had reached Claridus andAmphipolis.
As we saw last episode, he wasthe Spartan general who had
taken over command after thedeath of Brasidas, supposedly.
Once the terms of the treatywere delivered to all the allies
of the Spartans in Thrace, manydid not like how they would
affect them and refused toaccept them.
Floridus had also expressed anopposition to the terms, as he
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was the commander in the regionand did not see how he was
supposed to ensure the allieswould be forced to accept them.
Floridus would travel back toSparta to defend his position
and wanted to see if the termsof the peace could be altered to
create a less tense atmospherein Thrace.
However, the peace had beensigned and Sparta was bound by
his provisions.
Floridus would be ordered backto Thrace, where he was told to
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arrange for Amphipolis to behanded over or, at the very
least, to ensure all Also inSparta around this time were the
envoys from many of Sparta'sPeloponnesian allies.
We had seen that a few had notbeen in favour of negotiating a
peace with Athens.
However, now, with it signed,they were present to learn of
(27:07):
the terms that were now to takeeffect.
Those who had originally beenopposed to the talks were not
willing to accept the terms thathad been signed unless fairer
provisions were made.
The Spartans were unable toconvince those opposing to come
around to the peace and had nochoice but to dismiss the envoys
, sending them back to theircities.
With the rift developing withinthe Peloponnesian League,
(27:31):
sparta also now looked tosecuring their position.
If we turn our memories back,we saw that the treaty Sparta
had with Argos was due to expire, and this had also played into
their fears of dealing withincreased hostility on the
Peloponnese.
So the Spartans had decidedtheir best course of action was
to go beyond the peace signedand also establish an alliance
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with Athens.
If this was in effect, thenArgos, without Athenian
assistance, would not pose agreat threat, while with Athens
as an ally, many of thePeloponnesians that were unhappy
with Sparta would be unlikelyto launch any campaign against
them.
After further talks with Athens, both sides would end up coming
to an agreement over analliance existing between
(28:11):
themselves off the back of thePisa Nicias.
At the heart of the alliance wasa mutual defence agreement,
with both Athens and Spartacommitted to coming to each
other's aid in the event of anattack.
This was a powerful andpractical provision, as it
secured both city-states fromthe possibility of external
threats.
It was particularly significantgiven the military prowess of
(28:34):
both Athens and Sparta, witheach having a formidable
standing army and navy.
By formalising this defencepact, athens and Sparta sought
to create a unified front thatwould deter other states from
taking aggressive actionsagainst them.
The alliance extended beyondjust Athens and Sparta, as it
included provisions forsupporting each other's allies.
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This was an important componentof the agreement, as both
Athens and Sparta controlledlarge networks of allies through
both their leagues.
The alliance ensured that bothpowers would come to the defense
of their allies if they wereattacked or threatened.
This provision also helpedsolidify Athens and Sparta's
influence over their respectivespheres of power, reinforcing
(29:15):
their dominance in the Greekworld.
The alliance also stipulatedthat Athens and Sparta would
cooperate in joint militarycampaigns when necessary.
This clause reflected thepragmatic understanding that,
despite their long-standingrivalry, both city-states shared
common interests in protectingtheir dominance over Greece.
If a third party posed a threatto either Athens or Sparta, the
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two powers would combine theirmilitary strength to deal with
the situation.
The prospect of a jointmilitary operation was a sign of
the temporary reconciliationbetween the two, allowing them
to act in concert rather thanadversaries, with this also
looking back to the time of thePersian invasions, where they
had both been members of theHellenic League.
(29:59):
Back to the time of the Persianinvasions, where they had both
been members of the HellenicLeague, a key feature of the
alliance was the principle ofnon-interference in the internal
affairs of each other's allies.
This provision was importantfor preserving the autonomy of
the states within theAthens-Dylians League and
Sparta's Peloponnesian League.
Neither Athens nor Sparta wouldseek to impose control over the
other's allies or interfere intheir internal politics.
This was meant to reassure thesmaller city-states within their
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respective spheres that theywould not be coerced into
supporting interests of thelarger powers, thus preserving
their independence.
The overreaching goal of thealliance was to prevent further
aggression and maintain thefragile peace established by the
Peace of Nicias.
By formalising this pact,athens and Sparta hoped to
signal their commitment to thepeace and reduce their chances
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of resuming hostilities.
Given the weariness of bothsides after the years of
fighting, the alliance was seenas a way to stabilise the region
and focus on rebuilding andconsolidating power rather than
continuing the costly anddestructive war.
Having seen the interactionsbetween Athens and Sparta over
the generations so far, thissudden switch to entering an
(31:07):
alliance probably seems a littleout of the ordinary.
After the Persian Wars, thesetwo had emerged as the most
powerful of the Greekcity-states and would clash
ideologically as well asmilitarily for the next almost
60 years.
So for both to enter into analliance through discussions
taking place over a couple ofmonths in 421 would have us
(31:28):
pause and question how effectivethis move was going to be in
resolving the tensions andhistory between Athens and
Sparta.
It's clear the idea was torestore the stability within
Greece.
However, many fundamentalproblems would remain,
presenting challenges andconsiderations for a
long-lasting alliance.
A number of these issues wouldbe similar to the limitations
(31:50):
and issues we went through whenlooking at the Peace of Nicias,
though I still think it is worthlooking at the issues of the
alliance, since this wasnegotiated separately and the
peace could have still existedwithout it.
One of the most obviousobstacles to the
Athenian-Spartan alliance wasthe deep-rooted mistrust and
rivalry between the twocity-states.
(32:10):
For decades, athens and Spartahad vied for dominance in the
Greek world.
Sparta, known for itsdisciplined and conservative
military state, viewed thedemocratic and ambitious
Athenians with suspicion, whileAthens saw Sparta's hegemonic
stance as a direct threat to itsown imperial pursuits.
This rivalry was not justpolitical but deeply ingrained
(32:32):
in the culture and ideologicalvalues of each state.
Years of warfare had fuelledanimosities, making it difficult
for either side to fully trustthe other's commitment.
Peace, although the peace ofNicias formally ended
hostilities, suspicions lingeredas each side doubted the
other's intentions andcommitment to the alliance.
The strategic objectives ofAthens and Sparta were also
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fundamentally at odds, creatingfurther friction within the
alliance.
Athens, with its empire basedon the Delian League, aimed at
expanding its influence acrossthe Aegean and beyond, seeking
economic advantage and greatersecurity for its citizens.
Meanwhile, sparta, with itsPeloponnesian League, was
primarily concerned with curbingAthenian power and maintaining
stability within its own sphereof influence.
(33:17):
Athenian power and maintainingstability within its own sphere
of influence.
The Pisanichius sought tobalance these competing goals,
but this balance provedprecarious.
While the treaty brought atemporary respite, it failed to
address the deeper ambitions ofboth states, leaving the
underlying competitionunresolved.
Compounding the strategicfriction was the challenge of
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unreliable allies.
Both Athens and Sparta enteredthe alliance with coalitions of
city-states that often hadinterests at odds with those of
their leaders.
Sparta's allies, includingpowerful states like Corinth and
Boeotia, expressed longdissatisfaction with the peace
and opposed reconciliation withAthens.
For these allies, peace withAthens threatened their own
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security and influence.
Athens faced similar pressures,especially from Argos, a
historical rival of Sparta.
Argos sought Athens' supportagainst Sparta's Peloponnesian
League, pressuring the Atheniansto pursue a more aggressive
stance.
This disunity among the alliesmade it difficult for Athens and
Sparta to act decisively inenforcing the terms of the peace
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and presented a constant threatto the alliance's stability.
Internal political pressureswithin both Athens and Sparta
further weakened the alliance.
In Athens, the peace of Niciasfaced opposition from
influential leaders who favouredmore aggressive policies, most
notably Alcibiades, acharismatic and ambitious
general.
Alcibiades saw the peace as anopportunity for Athens to pursue
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more adventurous goals,including the ill-fated Sicilian
expedition.
His faction's influenceundermined Nicias' efforts to
preserve the peace, and Athens'imperial ambitions soon
resurfaced.
In Sparta, the situation waslikewise strained.
Conservative elements withinSpartan society doubted the
wisdom of aligning with theirformer enemy and questioned the
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viability of the peace.
These internal divisions,combined with the factions that
favoured the return tohostilities, further eroded the
alliance from within.
The enforcement of the Peace ofNicias itself presented
considerable challenges.
The treaty stipulated that thereturn of captured territories
and release of prisoners, butnot all terms were honoured to
(35:26):
each party's satisfaction.
Many allies, particularly thoseassociated with Sparta, were
reluctant to return conqueredlands or to abandon their
allegiances, leading to frequentdisputes.
This failure to fully complywith the treaty's terms fuelled
resentment, as both Athens andSparta felt that the other side
was acting in bad faith.
The inability to enforce theseterms weakened the agreement and
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fuelled ongoing suspicions,making the peace increasingly
difficult to sustain.
The imperial aspirations ofAthens, especially its continued
efforts to expand its influence, ultimately pose one of the
most significant threats to thealliance.
The peace of Nicias wasintended as a framework for
maintaining the balances betweenthe two powers, yet Athens
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continued to seek newopportunities to enhance its
power and influence.
These ambitions, culminating inthe Sicilian expedition,
revealed the underlying realitythat Athens viewed the peace not
as a lasting settlement but asa chance to regroup and
strategize.
This aggressive pursuit ofexpansion directly contradicted
the spirit of the peaceagreement and reignited Sparta's
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fears for Athens' dominance.
Finally, the larger Greekpolitical landscape, with its
complex network of allies andrivalries, presented inherent
challenges to the stability ofany single agreement.
While the Peace of Nicias soughtto create a balance of power,
the many city-states of Greecehad competing interests that
were difficult to reconcile.
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This network of alliances meantthat even small conflicts or
grievances could quicklyescalate and undermine the peace
.
For instance, city-states likeArgos and Corinth saw the
alliance as an opportunity tomaneuver for their own advantage
, further destabilizing thefragile peace.
So, in conclusion, theAthenian-Spartan alliance of 421
(37:13):
BC, born out of the peace ofNicias, faced numerous
challenges that ultimatelyrendered it ineffective in
securing a lasting peace.
The profound mistrust betweenAthens and Sparta, conflicting
strategic goals, pressure fromunreliable allies, internal
political divisions,difficulties in enforcing the
treaty and the persistence ofAthenian imperial ambitions all
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contributed to the alliance'sfragility.
Rather than ending thePeloponnesian War, the peace
proved to be a temporaryreprieve that postponed the
conflict.
This period highlights thecomplexities and limitations of
diplomacy in ancient Greece,where alliances were often
tactical and temporary and theunderlying ambitions of powerful
city states made peacedifficult to maintain.
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And the underlying ambitions ofpowerful city-states made peace
difficult to maintain.
Now that we have looked at thearticles that were set in place
governing the peace, along withthe issues and shortcomings.
We will now continue thenarrative of events after the
Peace of Nicias had beenestablished.
In the following episodes wewill see how many of the issues
we have discussed this episodewould play out and we will see,
(38:19):
step by step, how the peacewould be undermined and
eventually a state of war comeback into place, continuing the
Peloponnesian War.
Thank you all for the supportand continuing to support the
series.
It is greatly appreciated.
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Patreon Archon members.
So a big shout out to NeilBennett, ali Ullman, nick
(38:40):
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support the series over onPatreon and supporting at the
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(39:01):
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me next episode where wecontinue the narrative in the
series.
The foremost candidates for power in either
city Plastionax, son ofPausanias, king of Sparta, and
Nicias, son of Nicaratus, themost fortunate general of his
time.
Each desired peace moreardently than ever, thucydides.
Hello, I'm Mark Selleck, andwelcome back to Casting Through
Ancient Greece, episode 91, thePeace of Nicias.
(00:36):
In the wake of the campaigns of424, we have seen that both
Athens and Sparta were seeking apause in the war, with what
what it would seem thepossibility for a lasting peace.
Athens had some successes earlyin the year, but would suffer
setbacks as they tried to pushtheir advantage while Sparta had
been what it seemed like ahopeless position.
(00:57):
But then, encouraged by aturnaround in fortune of the
Athenians, this would end upleading to a truce being signed
that was to last one year, whilethe hope from factions within
each city-state would be that alonger-lasting peace would be
negotiated.
However, this peace, along withthe truce itself, were placed
in jeopardy with operationstaking place in Thrace with the
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Spartan general Brasidas.
He had commenced operationswhen Athens was beginning to see
a reversal in their fortunes,where he would target the
possessions of the Athenians inthe resource-rich region of
Thrace.
His unorthodox approach for aSpartan would see many cities
revolt from Athens and opentheir gates to him.
However, the truce now riskedhalting the momentum he had
(01:38):
built up.
Brasidas would ignore the termsof the truce and continue
operations, citing timing issuesas a defence.
Would ignore the terms of thetruce and continue operations,
citing timing issues as adefence.
However, it appears allincluding the Spartans, that his
actions had breached the truce.
Athens would now send a forceto counter Brasidas, while
Sparta would send governmentrepresentatives to ensure
(01:58):
proceedings were being carriedout under government interests.
While almost certainly tryingto capitalise on Brasidas'
success, athens had sent forcesinto Thrace that began
countering Spartan efforts in423.
While almost certainly tryingto capitalise on Brassens'
success, athens had sent forcesinto Thrace that began
countering Spartan efforts in423, but they would end up
becoming tied down with thesiege of Sicone.
With the spring of 422, anotherfleet would be sent from Athens
with the Athenian general Cleonin command.
(02:19):
He had managed to convince theassembly, who appear to have
become more enraged at Sparta'sactions, to increase Athens'
commitment in the region toregaining their possessions and
defeating the Spartans.
Cleon's ultimate goal was torecapture Amphipolis, the most
important Athenian possession inThrace.
Cleon's campaign would beginwell, with some early victories,
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though, once at Aeon and nowopposed by Brasidas and
Amphipolis, he would become morecautious Before being able to
gather enough troops to encirclethe city and place it under
siege.
Cleon would be challenged byBrasidas as he moved forward
with what would appear to be acore element of his force.
Brasidas would make it appearhe was readying to move against
the Athenian force observing thecity.
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This would force Cleon towithdraw, thinking he was not
strong enough to fight a battlein the field.
However, this withdrawal wouldmake his force vulnerable and
Brasidas would take advantage ofthis, engaging the Athenians
from two directions as theysallied out of the walls.
The battle that developed wouldend up seeing the death of both
Brasidas and Cleon and wouldsee the Athenian element that
(03:22):
had been defeated sail back.
For Athens, once reaching Aeon,disorder Although Sparta had
retained Amphipolis, they werein a position where continued
operations were becoming moredifficult.
They were unable to march anyreinforcements into Thrace due
to Thessaly being hostile, whileAthens still posed a threat to
their garrisons in Thrace.
We also need to remember thatAthens still had over 120
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Spartaitites in captivity andSparta had no fleet to speak of.
This would see that more withinthe Spartan government were
becoming motivated to seek apeace, while Athens, on the
other hand, although in astronger position than Sparta
when viewed on paper, they had anumber of factors seeing that
peace was becoming moredesirable, with its seeming
war-weariness from its citizensbecoming one of the biggest
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factors, and seeing more in theAssembly wanting negotiations to
begin with Sparta.
However, although negotiationswould begin to take place over
the winter, a resolution wouldnot come about right away.
As we finished off with lastepisode, although we could see
the desire for a negotiatedpeace to come about between the
two was becoming more favourablein both cities, the talks
(04:30):
taking place in the wake ofAmphipolis had yet come to a
resolution Heading into 421,.
Both sides would continue withtheir war footing as to continue
hostilities into a newcampaigning season.
A new campaigning season.
In the background, the Athenianfigure of Nicias, who the peace
would be named after due to thecentral role he would play,
would engage with the Spartanking, plastionax, in an attempt
(04:52):
to bring about terms acceptableto both sides.
As we have seen over the pastcouple of years, this kind of
negotiating had been takingplace but had netted nil results
thus far.
But with both sides appearingto be more motivated for peace,
these talks would finally getsomewhere this time around.
Thucydides also highlights thatthis point in time, after what
both sides had gone through andthe political situation in both
(05:14):
Athens and Sparta, both were nowin a position where the peace
factions were at their height ofinfluence.
Nicias, as we had seen, hadrisen to be the leading figure
of those Athenian politiciansseeking a peaceful resolution.
He was now in a perfectposition to convince his fellow
citizens this was the right pathforward.
He had obtained a level ofmilitary respect higher than
(05:36):
anyone else of his time, withThucydides telling us he wished
to use this to advance hisagenda.
Thucydides would point outNiccius also had personal
motivations to seeking a peaceestablished where, it seems, he
tries to show that, althoughNiccius had virtue and was
looking out for Athens'interests, he also brings him
down a peg as, in Thucydides'opinion, he doesn't measure up
(05:58):
to the standards set by Pericles.
He would write Niccius wishedto rest upon his laurels, to
find an immediate release fromthe toil and trouble for he
would write.
However, through Plutarch wecan also see other attributes
(06:19):
that would make him a figurethat would eventually win around
most Athenians to his line ofthinking, in addition to the
popularity he had gained fromhis military experience.
He would also earn the respectthrough his piety by spending
generous amounts on religiousobservations and other services
to benefit the Athenian citizens, while he would also be seen as
the perfect candidate tocontinue the attempted
(06:41):
negotiations with Sparta due tothe special relationship he had
developed with them.
He had earned the confidence ofthe Spartans due to the
kindness that he had affordedthe Spartan prisoners while held
captive in Athens.
To Sparta, nicias may havereminded them of Caimon from a
generation earlier.
On the other side, seeking peacewith Athens, was the Spartan
(07:03):
king Plastianax, who hadoriginally led a Spartan army
towards Attica at the end of theFirst Peloponnesian War.
He had been exiled after thearmy returned home.
As negotiations between him andPericles took place, which
would see no battle develop,plastionax was accused of
(07:25):
accepting bribes from Periclesand would end up being exiled in
445.
In 427, plastionax had beenrecalled from exile after the
death of Archidamus, though hisenemies within Sparta would
accuse him of bribing the Pythiaat Delphi to convince the
Spartans to have him recalledand placed back in power While
back as one of the Spartan kings.
His enemies would continue tolean into this charge, with them
(07:52):
bringing it up wheneveranything went wrong in Sparta,
insinuating Apollo was punishingSparta for Placinax's
disrespect of him.
Thucydides would presentPlacinax's distress at being
continually levelled with thesecharges as his motivations to
seeking peace.
He would write he thought thatin peacetime disasters would not
occur.
Also, that once the Spartansgot back their prisoners, his
enemies would have no basis fromwhich to attack him, whereas
(08:13):
during a state of war, those inthe highest positions must
necessarily get blamed for everymisfortune that took place.
He was therefore extremelyanxious to come to terms with
Athens.
However, although this mighthave had some bearing on him
wanting to see peace established, it is also clear that
Plastinax had been in favour ofpeace with Athens from as far
(08:33):
back as the First PeloponnesianWar.
His exile was a reaction to thetruce he worked out with
Pericles while on the march.
While when we hear about thepeace party in Sparta, he is
often associated with it, march,while when we hear about the
peace party in Sparta, he isoften associated with it Like
Nicias, he was also seen as thebest conduit to negotiations, as
he had been on friendly termswith certain Athenian families.
(08:54):
However, as we touched on at theend of last episode, although
negotiations were taking place.
No agreement had come about asthe campaigning season of 421
arrived.
What's interesting for thisyear is that we are told that
Sparta was preparing to invadeAttica for the first time since
424.
Previously, the Spartans hadavoided their yearly invasion
due to the Athenians holdingover 120 Spartiites hostage.
(09:18):
The fear had been that if theyhad attempted to march into
Athenian territory, these menwould be executed.
So why had Sparta decided thatthey now would take the risk?
Firstly, we need to wonder ifthe Spartans were serious about
actually setting foot on Atticsoil.
Thucydides tells us that duringthe spring, orders were sent out
from Sparta to all the otherPeloponnesian members to ready
(09:40):
their forces and materials forthe establishment of forts
within the Athenian territory.
To ready their forces andmaterials for the establishment
of forts within the Athenianterritory.
After telling us this, he thenadds that this was done in order
for the Athenians to be moreinclined to accept the terms
that had been offered in thenegotiations so far.
Here we can see Thucydidesinsinuating that the Spartans
didn't have the intention oflaunching this invasion, but
(10:00):
rather were looking to create aclimate of fear within Athens
that would see peace talksadvance and an agreement reached
, though it is possible thatSparta might have still invaded
if negotiations still continued.
Perhaps they were ready to callAthens bluff.
If they did execute theSpartiites, they would have
gotten rid of their bargainingchip when it came to hostilities
and for when negotiations didadvance.
(10:22):
And for when negotiations didadvance, however, the
Peloponnesians would not need toset foot in Attica, as, it
seems, word of the preparationsthat were being made had
convinced the Assembly in Athensto agree on terms to see a
peace put in place.
It would appear that an initialagreement took place that would
see hostilities halted and thenallow for the full terms of the
peace to be reached.
(10:42):
Claims would be going back andforward, but finally an
agreement would come about.
The continuation of peace talksnow rested on both sides
agreeing to give back all thepossessions that had been
acquired by each during theyears of the war, though Athens
was to still hold on to Nicaea,the port near Megara.
The reasoning for thisconcession was due to Thebes
(11:04):
having successfully argued thatthey had not taken Plataea by
force, but due to an agreementreached with those of the city
freely.
Athens then, in turn,highlighted that this had been
the same situation, with theircontrol of Nicaea.
With this initial understandingin place.
Sparta then called for ameeting of all the Peloponnesian
members to gain a vote of thosewho were in favour of peace and
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would continue to be involvedin the terms.
However, the Boeotians,corinthians and Megarians would
not be in favour of peace asthey would lose out in the
current agreement, which sawareas they had interests in or
had previously controlled,remaining with Athens.
However, these objections tothe peace negotiations to take
place with Athens would not stopSparta from engaging in the
(11:47):
agreement.
As we have seen, sparta was atthe head of the Peloponnesian
League and did not need amajority vote to proceed with
how they wished, though it seemsit was only a few of the
Peloponnesian members who wereopposed.
These, however, were some ofSparta's most important allies
and, as we will see down thetrack, some would find reason to
oppose Sparta, with theiropposition being ignored.
(12:08):
In the meantime, a peace wouldbe signed after the initial
agreement that had seen a haltto hostilities.
As the title of this episodesuggests, the peace that would
be signed would be known as thePeace of Nicias.
One of the central provisions ofthe Peace of Nicias was the
return of captives and prisonersof war.
During the conflict, bothAthens and Sparta had taken
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numerous prisoners from oneanother's forces.
These prisoners were a constantsource of tension and both
sides sought to pressure theother with a threat of execution
or enslavement.
Under the terms of the treaty,both Athens and Sparta agreed to
return these captives,signalling a commitment to end
(12:50):
the cycle of personalretribution that had
characterised the war so far.
This provision was not justabout humanitarian concerns.
It was also a way todemonstrate goodwill and pave
the way for future cooperation.
However, while the treatystipulated the return of
prisoners, its enforcement wasnot straightforward.
Many prisoners had been kept inharsh conditions and the
logistics of returning largenumbers of captives posed
challenges.
(13:10):
Even so, the agreement markedan important gesture of
reconciliation and it was one ofthe more visible aspects of the
peace, signalling the attemptto re-establish trust between
the two warring states.
Additionally, the treatyrequired both sides to return
any captured land or possessionsthat had been taken during the
course of the war.
This provision was meant torestore the territorial status
(13:32):
quo and ensure that neither sidegained permanent advantages in
the terms of land or resources.
In theory, this would allow thetwo powers to return to their
pre-war positions with nolasting territorial gains or
losses.
To return to their pre-warpositions, with no lasting
territorial gains or losses.
However, as was often the casein the Peloponnesian War, the
actual implementation of suchclauses was fraught with
difficulty, particularly giventhe complex web of alliances and
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the political significance ofcertain territories.
Another crucial aspect of thePeace of Nicias was the
restoration of alliances.
Both Athens and Sparta hadformed powerful alliances during
the war, with Athens leadingthe Delian League and Sparta
heading the Peloponnesian League.
The treaty required both sidesto restore their alliances to
their pre-war configurations,meaning that each city-state
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would return to its position ofleadership within the respective
alliance network.
For Athens, this meantreasserting control over the
cities and islands of the DelianLeague, many of which had
experienced varying levels ofautonomy during the conflict.
For Sparta, it meantreaffirming its influence over
the Peloponnesian League,including cities like Corinth
and Thebes.
However, this restoration ofalliances was problematic in
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practice because the agreementdid not include the allies of
either side in the formal treatynegotiations.
The smaller city-states, whichhad been dragged into the war
due to their obligations toeither Athens or Sparta, were
not fully consulted on theirpeace terms.
As a result, some of theseallies were dissatisfied with
the peace and were unwilling tofully comply with the treaty.
For example, many of Sparta'sallies, especially Corinth and
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Thebes, were dissatisfied withthe treaty and were unwilling to
follow its terms.
Corinth, in particular, hadlong opposed Athens and was not
willing to accept the renewedstatus quo.
These states did notparticipate directly in the
treaty negotiations and theiropposition to the peace led to
continued hostilities in someregions.
Athens faced similar challengeswith its own allies, many of
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whom resented the power dynamicswithin the Delian League and
were not fully content with theterms of the peace.
Consequently, while the peacecalled for the restoration of
alliances, the dissatisfactionof many of these allies made it
difficult to maintain the peacein practice.
A symbolic yet importantprovision of the Peace of Nicias
was the agreement to dismantlefortifications.
(15:49):
Both Athens and Sparta hadbuilt significant fortifications
during the course of the war,particularly Athens, whose long
walls connected the city to itsport, the Piraeus.
These fortifications were seenas critical military assets and
symbols of the respectivecity-state strategic military
power.
The treaty called for bothsides to dismantle these
(16:10):
fortifications, which wasintended to reduce the risk of
further military aggression.
The idea was to limit theability of each side to mobilize
forces quickly and to lessenthe potential of future
conflicts.
However, this provision wasfrequently circumvented in
practice.
Athens, for instance, wasreluctant to dismantle the long
walls which provided vitalprotection for the city and its
(16:32):
maritime interests.
Similarly, sparta was unlikelyto dismantle its military
infrastructure, given itsmilitary ethos and reliance on
fortified positions.
While the clause aboutfortifications was a meaningful
symbol of peace, its actualimpact was limited.
Both sides continued tomaintain significant military
strength, and the dismantling offortifications was not either
(16:55):
fully executed or not asignificant enough concession to
alter the balance of power ofthe Greek world.
As a result, this article ofthe treaty was more aspirational
and practical.
Was more aspirational andpractical.
The Peace of Nicias alsoincluded provisions regarding
the neutrality of certainregions, particularly areas that
were strategically significantto both Athens and Sparta.
One of the most notableexamples of this was the island
(17:19):
of Melos, which was designated aneutral zone under the treaty.
The idea was that such neutralzones would prevent further
conflict in areas that were notdirectly involved in the rivalry
between the two superpowers.
Milos, in particular, had beena point of contention during the
war, and the designation of theisland as neutral was intended
to protect it from futureaggression.
(17:40):
However, the establishment ofneutral zones was a difficult
concept to enforce.
Both Athens and Sparta hadimperial ambitions and saw these
regions not as neutral, but aspotential areas for future
expansion.
In practice, neutrality washard to maintain, especially
when one side or the other sawan opportunity to gain a
strategic advantage.
(18:00):
Despite the intention behindthe neutral zones, this clause
did little to prevent conflictin key areas.
The situation of Melos, forinstance, would later escalate
in 416 BC, when Athens forciblysubjugated the island during the
Melian Dialogue.
This event highlighted thedifficulty in forcing neutrality
(18:20):
, especially when the militaryobjectives of the powers
involved conflicted with suchprovisions.
Powers involved conflicted withsuch provisions.
The most important provision ofthe Peace of Nicias, however,
was the promise ofnon-aggression between Athens
and Sparta.
Both sides agreed to refrainfrom attacking one another for a
period of 50 years, a gesturethat was meant to provide
(18:41):
long-term stability and securityin the Greek world.
This promise of peace, ifupheld, could have brought about
a significant reduction inmilitary conflict, allowing both
Athens and Sparta to rebuildtheir economies after the years
of warfare.
So, as we can see, there are anumber of provisions within this
agreement that were supposed tohave seen both Athens and
(19:01):
Sparta satisfied and contentwith the end of hostilities.
However, there were a number ofissues that existed and
limitations within the peacethat would see that it would not
hold for the period of timeintended.
One of the most significantlimitations of the peace of
Nicias was that it was notuniversally accepted by the
allies of both Athens and Sparta.
(19:21):
While the treaty, on thesurface applied to the two main
belligerents, it did not bindtheir respective allies, many of
whom had been deeply involvedin the conflict and had their
own interests.
Both Athens and Sparta reliedon a complex web of alliances,
and the Peace of Nicias failedto address the grievances of
these secondary states.
In particular, sparta's allies,such as Corinth and Thebes,
(19:44):
were not entirely satisfied withthe terms of the peace.
Corinth, a city-state that hadbeen a staunch opponent of
Athens throughout the war, didnot want to see Athens emerge
from the war with any form oflegitimacy.
Similarly, thebes, which hadbeen long at odds with Athens,
was unwilling to stop its ownhostilities.
These allies were not bound bythe treaty and saw no reason to
cease their ongoing campaignsagainst Athens.
(20:05):
As a result.
While Athens and Sparta agreedto peace, the broader Greek
world was not unified in itsacceptance and hostilities
continued.
On the periphery, athens, too,had to contend with its own
allies.
The peace treaty, whichrestored the status quo pre-war,
did not address the desires ofAthens' subject states,
(20:26):
particularly those in the DelianLeague.
Some of these allies wereunhappy with Athens' dominance
and the tribute they were forcedto pay.
They viewed the peace as atemporary measure rather than a
solution to the power imbalancesin the Greek world.
In essence, the failure tosecure the cooperation of all
the relevant parties meant thatthe peace was fragile and
incomplete from the start.
(20:46):
Parties meant that the peacewas fragile and incomplete from
the start.
Another major flaw of the Peaceof Nicias was that it failed to
address the root cause of thePeloponnesian War.
At its core, the war had beendriven by the rivalry between
Athens and Sparta, two powerfulcity-states with fundamentally
different political systems,cultures and visions for the
Greek world.
Athens, with its democraticgovernment and maritime empire,
(21:09):
sought to expand its influenceacross the Aegean.
Sparta, on the other hand, withits oligarchic government and
militaristic society, was intenton maintaining the status quo
and curbing the power of Athens.
The Peace of Nicias merelypaused the direct conflict
between the two superpowerswithout addressing this deeper
rivalry.
It did not resolve thefundamental issues of Athens'
(21:30):
growing empire or Sparta'sdesire to check that growth.
The treaty temporarily haltedthe fighting, but did little to
resolve the political andideological divisions that had
fuelled the war.
Both Athens and Sparta remainedsuspicious of each other's
intentions, and the peaceprovided no framework for a
lasting settlement orreconciliation between the two
powers.
Moreover, the treaty did noteffectively deal with the
(21:54):
internal tensions within theGreek world.
Many smaller city-statescontinued to be caught in the
crossfire of Athens and Sparta'srivalry.
The peace did not dismantle thecomplex web of alliances and
grievances that had developedover the course of the war.
As a result, even though thetwo main belligerents had agreed
to a ceasefire, the broaderconflict remained unresolved.
The peace was merely atemporary halt in the ongoing
(22:18):
struggle for dominance betweenAthens and Sparta, with no
guarantee that hostilities wouldnot resume once the opportunity
arose.
The Peace of Nicias, despite itspromises of a prolonged halt in
hostilities, did not preventAthens from pursuing other
military ventures.
The most significant of thesewas the Sicilian Expedition of
(22:38):
415 BC that we will be coveringin the future.
This was a bold and ambitiouscampaign by Athens to expand its
influence in Sicily and thewestern Mediterranean, aimed at
securing new resources andallies.
However, the expedition endedin disaster for Athens, with its
fleet destroyed and its forcesdecimated.
The Sicilian expeditionescalated tensions between
(23:01):
Athens and Sparta, leadingdirectly to the resumption of
full-scale warfare.
Although the Peace of Niciashad been intended to limit
military actions between the twopowers, athens' decision to
embark on such an ambitious andprovocative campaign
demonstrated the fragile natureof the peace.
The fact that Athens couldlaunch such a large-scale
military operation withoutregard for the treaty's terms
(23:23):
underscore how little realcommitment there was to lasting
peace.
The failure of the Sicilianexpedition had far-reaching
consequences for Athens,weakening its military and
economic strength.
It also emboldened Sparta andits allies, who saw Athens'
defeat as an opportunity tointensify their own military
efforts.
Ultimately, the resumption ofhostilities after the Sicilian
(23:46):
failure revealed the weakness ofthe Peace of Nicias.
The agreement had not preventedthe war from reigniting, and
the political dynamics of theGreek world quickly pushed
Athens and Sparta back intoconflict.
Perhaps the most significantissue with the Peace of Nicias
was its lack of effectiveenforcement mechanisms.
While the treaty established aframework for peace, it did not
(24:09):
provide any concrete means forensuring compliance.
Neither Athens nor Sparta wasbound by any legally enforceable
guarantees and neither side hadthe will or capacity to hold
their allies accountable forviolations of the truce.
The treaty relied largely ongoodwill, which was a weak
foundation given the deeplyentrenched animosity between the
two powers.
(24:30):
As both sides slowly rebuilttheir military strength during
these years of peace, oldrivalries and suspicions
resurfaced.
The lack of any mechanisms toprevent military build-up or
aggression meant that bothAthens and Sparta could rearm at
will.
The peace lacked the safeguardsthat might have made it more
durable.
Tensions between the two powersremained high, and each side
(24:53):
viewed the other's actions withsuspicion, making the peace
fragile and temporary at best.
Furthermore, the treaty did notprovide a lasting political
settlement or framework for thefuture diplomacy between Athens
and Sparta.
There was no comprehensiveagreement on the division of
influence in the Greek world,and no efforts were made to
address the political andmilitary concerns that had
(25:14):
initially sparked the conflict.
As a result, the peace wasalways at risk of being
undermined by renewedcompetition for power.
Although with many issues andlimitations, the Peace of Nicias
would be signed in the springof 421 BC, with Thucydides
telling us it was almost to theday, ten years since the first
invasion of Attica.
Almost right away, sparta beganimplementing articles of the
(25:38):
terms set out in the Peace.
The first action they wouldtake was to release all those
that had been taken captive inthe war thus far, while Athens
would do the same a short timelater.
The Spartans had also sentenvoys to Thrace, where they had
the task of relaying the termsand arranging cities to be
handed over to Athens.
However, resistance to Sparta'sorders would develop once they
(26:00):
had reached Claridus andAmphipolis.
As we saw last episode, he wasthe Spartan general who had
taken over command after thedeath of Brasidas, supposedly.
Once the terms of the treatywere delivered to all the allies
of the Spartans in Thrace, manydid not like how they would
affect them and refused toaccept them.
Floridus had also expressed anopposition to the terms, as he
(26:22):
was the commander in the regionand did not see how he was
supposed to ensure the allieswould be forced to accept them.
Floridus would travel back toSparta to defend his position
and wanted to see if the termsof the peace could be altered to
create a less tense atmospherein Thrace.
However, the peace had beensigned and Sparta was bound by
his provisions.
Floridus would be ordered backto Thrace, where he was told to
(26:46):
arrange for Amphipolis to behanded over or, at the very
least, to ensure all Also inSparta around this time were the
envoys from many of Sparta'sPeloponnesian allies.
We had seen that a few had notbeen in favour of negotiating a
peace with Athens.
However, now, with it signed,they were present to learn of
(27:07):
the terms that were now to takeeffect.
Those who had originally beenopposed to the talks were not
willing to accept the terms thathad been signed unless fairer
provisions were made.
The Spartans were unable toconvince those opposing to come
around to the peace and had nochoice but to dismiss the envoys
, sending them back to theircities.
With the rift developing withinthe Peloponnesian League,
(27:31):
sparta also now looked tosecuring their position.
If we turn our memories back,we saw that the treaty Sparta
had with Argos was due to expire, and this had also played into
their fears of dealing withincreased hostility on the
Peloponnese.
So the Spartans had decidedtheir best course of action was
to go beyond the peace signedand also establish an alliance
(27:51):
with Athens.
If this was in effect, thenArgos, without Athenian
assistance, would not pose agreat threat, while with Athens
as an ally, many of thePeloponnesians that were unhappy
with Sparta would be unlikelyto launch any campaign against
them.
After further talks with Athens, both sides would end up coming
to an agreement over analliance existing between
(28:11):
themselves off the back of thePisa Nicias.
At the heart of the alliance wasa mutual defence agreement,
with both Athens and Spartacommitted to coming to each
other's aid in the event of anattack.
This was a powerful andpractical provision, as it
secured both city-states fromthe possibility of external
threats.
It was particularly significantgiven the military prowess of
(28:34):
both Athens and Sparta, witheach having a formidable
standing army and navy.
By formalising this defencepact, athens and Sparta sought
to create a unified front thatwould deter other states from
taking aggressive actionsagainst them.
The alliance extended beyondjust Athens and Sparta, as it
included provisions forsupporting each other's allies.
(28:54):
This was an important componentof the agreement, as both
Athens and Sparta controlledlarge networks of allies through
both their leagues.
The alliance ensured that bothpowers would come to the defense
of their allies if they wereattacked or threatened.
This provision also helpedsolidify Athens and Sparta's
influence over their respectivespheres of power, reinforcing
(29:15):
their dominance in the Greekworld.
The alliance also stipulatedthat Athens and Sparta would
cooperate in joint militarycampaigns when necessary.
This clause reflected thepragmatic understanding that,
despite their long-standingrivalry, both city-states shared
common interests in protectingtheir dominance over Greece.
If a third party posed a threatto either Athens or Sparta, the
(29:38):
two powers would combine theirmilitary strength to deal with
the situation.
The prospect of a jointmilitary operation was a sign of
the temporary reconciliationbetween the two, allowing them
to act in concert rather thanadversaries, with this also
looking back to the time of thePersian invasions, where they
had both been members of theHellenic League.
(29:59):
Back to the time of the Persianinvasions, where they had both
been members of the HellenicLeague, a key feature of the
alliance was the principle ofnon-interference in the internal
affairs of each other's allies.
This provision was importantfor preserving the autonomy of
the states within theAthens-Dylians League and
Sparta's Peloponnesian League.
Neither Athens nor Sparta wouldseek to impose control over the
other's allies or interfere intheir internal politics.
This was meant to reassure thesmaller city-states within their
(30:23):
respective spheres that theywould not be coerced into
supporting interests of thelarger powers, thus preserving
their independence.
The overreaching goal of thealliance was to prevent further
aggression and maintain thefragile peace established by the
Peace of Nicias.
By formalising this pact,athens and Sparta hoped to
signal their commitment to thepeace and reduce their chances
(30:45):
of resuming hostilities.
Given the weariness of bothsides after the years of
fighting, the alliance was seenas a way to stabilise the region
and focus on rebuilding andconsolidating power rather than
continuing the costly anddestructive war.
Having seen the interactionsbetween Athens and Sparta over
the generations so far, thissudden switch to entering an
(31:07):
alliance probably seems a littleout of the ordinary.
After the Persian Wars, thesetwo had emerged as the most
powerful of the Greekcity-states and would clash
ideologically as well asmilitarily for the next almost
60 years.
So for both to enter into analliance through discussions
taking place over a couple ofmonths in 421 would have us
(31:28):
pause and question how effectivethis move was going to be in
resolving the tensions andhistory between Athens and
Sparta.
It's clear the idea was torestore the stability within
Greece.
However, many fundamentalproblems would remain,
presenting challenges andconsiderations for a
long-lasting alliance.
A number of these issues wouldbe similar to the limitations
(31:50):
and issues we went through whenlooking at the Peace of Nicias,
though I still think it is worthlooking at the issues of the
alliance, since this wasnegotiated separately and the
peace could have still existedwithout it.
One of the most obviousobstacles to the
Athenian-Spartan alliance wasthe deep-rooted mistrust and
rivalry between the twocity-states.
(32:10):
For decades, athens and Spartahad vied for dominance in the
Greek world.
Sparta, known for itsdisciplined and conservative
military state, viewed thedemocratic and ambitious
Athenians with suspicion, whileAthens saw Sparta's hegemonic
stance as a direct threat to itsown imperial pursuits.
This rivalry was not justpolitical but deeply ingrained
(32:32):
in the culture and ideologicalvalues of each state.
Years of warfare had fuelledanimosities, making it difficult
for either side to fully trustthe other's commitment.
Peace, although the peace ofNicias formally ended
hostilities, suspicions lingeredas each side doubted the
other's intentions andcommitment to the alliance.
The strategic objectives ofAthens and Sparta were also
(32:54):
fundamentally at odds, creatingfurther friction within the
alliance.
Athens, with its empire basedon the Delian League, aimed at
expanding its influence acrossthe Aegean and beyond, seeking
economic advantage and greatersecurity for its citizens.
Meanwhile, sparta, with itsPeloponnesian League, was
primarily concerned with curbingAthenian power and maintaining
stability within its own sphereof influence.
(33:17):
Athenian power and maintainingstability within its own sphere
of influence.
The Pisanichius sought tobalance these competing goals,
but this balance provedprecarious.
While the treaty brought atemporary respite, it failed to
address the deeper ambitions ofboth states, leaving the
underlying competitionunresolved.
Compounding the strategicfriction was the challenge of
(33:37):
unreliable allies.
Both Athens and Sparta enteredthe alliance with coalitions of
city-states that often hadinterests at odds with those of
their leaders.
Sparta's allies, includingpowerful states like Corinth and
Boeotia, expressed longdissatisfaction with the peace
and opposed reconciliation withAthens.
For these allies, peace withAthens threatened their own
(33:58):
security and influence.
Athens faced similar pressures,especially from Argos, a
historical rival of Sparta.
Argos sought Athens' supportagainst Sparta's Peloponnesian
League, pressuring the Atheniansto pursue a more aggressive
stance.
This disunity among the alliesmade it difficult for Athens and
Sparta to act decisively inenforcing the terms of the peace
(34:18):
and presented a constant threatto the alliance's stability.
Internal political pressureswithin both Athens and Sparta
further weakened the alliance.
In Athens, the peace of Niciasfaced opposition from
influential leaders who favouredmore aggressive policies, most
notably Alcibiades, acharismatic and ambitious
general.
Alcibiades saw the peace as anopportunity for Athens to pursue
(34:42):
more adventurous goals,including the ill-fated Sicilian
expedition.
His faction's influenceundermined Nicias' efforts to
preserve the peace, and Athens'imperial ambitions soon
resurfaced.
In Sparta, the situation waslikewise strained.
Conservative elements withinSpartan society doubted the
wisdom of aligning with theirformer enemy and questioned the
(35:04):
viability of the peace.
These internal divisions,combined with the factions that
favoured the return tohostilities, further eroded the
alliance from within.
The enforcement of the Peace ofNicias itself presented
considerable challenges.
The treaty stipulated that thereturn of captured territories
and release of prisoners, butnot all terms were honoured to
(35:26):
each party's satisfaction.
Many allies, particularly thoseassociated with Sparta, were
reluctant to return conqueredlands or to abandon their
allegiances, leading to frequentdisputes.
This failure to fully complywith the treaty's terms fuelled
resentment, as both Athens andSparta felt that the other side
was acting in bad faith.
The inability to enforce theseterms weakened the agreement and
(35:49):
fuelled ongoing suspicions,making the peace increasingly
difficult to sustain.
The imperial aspirations ofAthens, especially its continued
efforts to expand its influence, ultimately pose one of the
most significant threats to thealliance.
The peace of Nicias wasintended as a framework for
maintaining the balances betweenthe two powers, yet Athens
(36:10):
continued to seek newopportunities to enhance its
power and influence.
These ambitions, culminating inthe Sicilian expedition,
revealed the underlying realitythat Athens viewed the peace not
as a lasting settlement but asa chance to regroup and
strategize.
This aggressive pursuit ofexpansion directly contradicted
the spirit of the peaceagreement and reignited Sparta's
(36:31):
fears for Athens' dominance.
Finally, the larger Greekpolitical landscape, with its
complex network of allies andrivalries, presented inherent
challenges to the stability ofany single agreement.
While the Peace of Nicias soughtto create a balance of power,
the many city-states of Greecehad competing interests that
were difficult to reconcile.
(36:51):
This network of alliances meantthat even small conflicts or
grievances could quicklyescalate and undermine the peace
.
For instance, city-states likeArgos and Corinth saw the
alliance as an opportunity tomaneuver for their own advantage
, further destabilizing thefragile peace.
So, in conclusion, theAthenian-Spartan alliance of 421
(37:13):
BC, born out of the peace ofNicias, faced numerous
challenges that ultimatelyrendered it ineffective in
securing a lasting peace.
The profound mistrust betweenAthens and Sparta, conflicting
strategic goals, pressure fromunreliable allies, internal
political divisions,difficulties in enforcing the
treaty and the persistence ofAthenian imperial ambitions all
(37:35):
contributed to the alliance'sfragility.
Rather than ending thePeloponnesian War, the peace
proved to be a temporaryreprieve that postponed the
conflict.
This period highlights thecomplexities and limitations of
diplomacy in ancient Greece,where alliances were often
tactical and temporary and theunderlying ambitions of powerful
city states made peacedifficult to maintain.
(37:57):
And the underlying ambitions ofpowerful city-states made peace
difficult to maintain.
Now that we have looked at thearticles that were set in place
governing the peace, along withthe issues and shortcomings.
We will now continue thenarrative of events after the
Peace of Nicias had beenestablished.
In the following episodes wewill see how many of the issues
we have discussed this episodewould play out and we will see,
(38:19):
step by step, how the peacewould be undermined and
eventually a state of war comeback into place, continuing the
Peloponnesian War.
Thank you all for the supportand continuing to support the
series.
It is greatly appreciated.
I'd like to give an extraspecial thank you to all my
Patreon Archon members.
So a big shout out to NeilBennett, ali Ullman, nick
(38:40):
Kabifakis, paul Flamingo-Matthewand John for choosing to
support the series over onPatreon and supporting at the
Archon level.
If you've also found some valuein the series and wish to
support the show, you can headto wwwcastingthraneshipgreececom
and click on the support theseries button, where you can
find the link to Patreon as wellas many other ways to support
(39:01):
the show.
Be sure to stay connected andupdated on what's happening in
the series and join me over onFacebook or Instagram at Casting
Throne of Greece or on Twitterat Casting Greece.
Once again, thanks for thesupport and I hope you can join
me next episode where wecontinue the narrative in the
series.
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