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February 2, 2025 β€’ 39 mins

Have you ever wondered how ancient empires managed the delicate dance of diplomacy and warfare? In this gripping episode, we unravel the complex strategies and political chess moves of the Peloponnesian War, spotlighting the pivotal period following 424 BC. Witness the dramatic rise and fall of Athens and Sparta as we dissect significant events like the Spartan defeats at Pylos and Sphacteria and Athens' bold military ventures. We also examine how setbacks at Megara and Delium fueled Sparta's resolve, leading to urgent peace negotiations. With a special focus on the cunning Spartan general Brasidas and his diplomatic ingenuity in Thrace, we unpack how his actions led to the revolt of key cities against Athens, culminating in the battle at Amphipolis and the fragile Peace of Nicias in 421 BC.

But the story doesn't end with the signing of a treaty. Journey through the tangled web of alliances and political intrigue as cities like Corinth and Elis contemplate breaking free from Spartan dominance by joining the Argive League. We explore the strategic calculations and shifting allegiances that marked this era, including the influence of differing governmental systems on these decisions. As tensions rise, experience the secret negotiations and alliance formations that unfolded between Athens and Sparta, highlighting the undercurrents of distrust and preparation for renewed hostilities. This episode provides a rare glimpse into the fragile power dynamics and the precarious balance of peace during one of history's most tumultuous times.

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Transcript

Episode Transcript

Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:15):
The Argives therefore prepared to receive into their
alliance any Hellenic state thatwished to join.
The first to come over to themwere the Mantineans and their
allies, through fear of SpartaThucydides.
Hello, I'm Mark Selick andwelcome back to Casting through
Ancient Greece, episode 92,birth of the Argive League.

(00:36):
We saw, with the year of 424 BC, a series of actions had taken
place that would see theconfidence of both Sparta and
Athens fluctuate.
Sparta had lost their fleet andover 120 Spartites after the
defeat at Pylos and Sphacteria,while Athens would then follow
up their success with furtherraids on the Peloponnese and the

(00:57):
construction of forts withinSpartan territory.
This had seen Athens appear tohold a strategic advantage over
Sparta, while Sparta would seemto retreat inward and remain on
the defensive and becomereactionary.
However, athens, with thissuccess, may have become
overconfident and pushed forambitious campaigns late in the
season.
The first would be targeted atMegara, but, due to a small

(01:20):
Spartan army being in the andthe leadership of the Spartan
general Brasidas, the Athenianswould be defeated and prevented
from bending Megara to theirwill.
The next campaign would be evenmore complicated, with it
directed to be focused on twoseparate areas in Boeotia.
Simultaneously, however, therewould be issues of unreliable
allies, as well as communicationand coordination problems.

(01:42):
All of this would lead to theAthenians' worst defeat of the
war so far, at Delium.
These Athenian setbacks wouldsee some resolve reinserted back
into the Spartans, while Athenswould come back down to reality
.
This would then see both lookto negotiate a truce, where they
would then hope to see an endto the war agreed upon.
However, these negotiationswould continue on for some time

(02:05):
and campaigning would continue.
Sparta now looked to avoidinvading Attic territory due to
their citizens being heldhostage.
Instead, the force thatBrasidas had been commanding at
the time of the Athenian attackon Megara marched north into
Thracian territory.
Here, brasidas looked to wage acampaign against Athens,
indirectly focusing on resourcesand trade routes.
Brasidas looked to wage acampaign against Athens,
indirectly focusing on resourcesand trade routes.

(02:26):
Brasidas' approach wasunorthodox for a Spartan, where
he was able to win over manycities through diplomacy and
fair treatment.
This would end up seeing manyin the region revolt from Athens
, including the strategicallyplaced city of Amphipolis.
However, during Brasidas'campaign, a truce would end up
being signed between Sparta andAthens.
Brasidas would claim ignoranceand continue to take advantage

(02:49):
of the momentum he had built.
Athens would respond, angeredby this disregard of the terms,
sending a fleet to bring therebellious cities under control
and stop Brasidas, though thisinitial force would end up being
bogged down in the siege ofZicone.
This initial force would end upbeing bogged down in the siege
of Zicone.
Another force under the commandof Cleon would be sent out the

(03:10):
next year where, it appears,amphipolis was his main target.
After some initial successes,cleon would arrive at Aeon, not
far from Amphipolis, toestablish camp where
preparations would be made forthe city to be besieged.
While these preparations wereunderway, cleon set out with a
force to gain some intelligenceon the Spartan position at
Amphipolis.
Brassidus would become aware ofthe Athenian movements and then

(03:30):
prepared his force to have themfall into his trap.
These preparations would seeCleon withdraw from his position
, but this would see theAthenians have to march by the
walls of Amphipolis.
The Spartans would sally out ofthe walls from a direction
Cleon was not expecting, whileanother force would come and
attack them from the rear.
The battle outside Amphipoliswould see the Athenians rout,

(03:52):
though both Cleon and Brasidaswould be killed during the
action.
The situation in Thrace wouldsee both sides lose any momentum
they had, and both Sparta andAthens were motivated more than
ever to seek a peace settlement.
Talks would continue into 421BC where, on the eve of the
campaigning season, a settlementwould be reached.

(04:12):
This would see a peace signedon, both sides agreeing for a
pause in the conflict and areturn to the pre-war status quo
, with both sides agreeing toreturn captured territories and
prisoners of war.
Key allies on both sides wererequired to join the agreement,
though some, like the Boeotiansand Corinthians, refused to
comply.
Despite its ambitious terms,the peace was tenuous and would

(04:34):
last only six years, underminedby ongoing skirmishes, shifting
alliances and growing distrustbetween the two city-states.
For this episode, we are goingto focus on some of the allies
of both Athens and Spartadirectly after the signing of
the Peace of Nicias, where wewill see the beginning of its
unravelling.
As we have seen, both Athensand Sparta had been working on

(04:57):
negotiating some form of peacesince 424 BC.
However, nothing had beenforthcoming during these three
years.
This had probably come down tothe position both were in during
different periods in this time,the perceived advantages or
weaknesses having a bearing onwhat concessions would be
accepted or rejected.
For instance, after thedevastating defeat at Sphacteria

(05:19):
, sparta had gone from aposition of approximate equal
strength to Athens to one oftheir lowest points of the war
so far.
Talks had begun shortly afterand although numerous
delegations were being sent,nothing could be agreed upon.
It appears Athens felt they werenegotiating from a position of
power and were looking to gain apeace to their advantage.
They would see them come todominate the smaller powers of

(05:41):
Greece, though the Spartanswould continue to resist the
terms that would see Athenselevated in this way.
Further actions around thePeloponnese would see Athens
reinforced in their views oftheir dominance, where they
began setting forts up aroundSpartan-controlled territory and
where it seemed Sparta could dolittle but react with just

(06:01):
token resistance.
This would see that it appearedthat the Athenians had become
closed off to any concessionsthe Spartans were seeking.
However, athens' perceiveddominance would take a hit later
in the year when they looked topush the dominance further,
targeting Sparta's allies.
This is where Athens wouldsuffer defeats and even the
biggest loss in the battle sofar For the negotiations.

(06:23):
This would see Sparta seek evenmore concessions now that a
crack in Athens' advantage inGreece had been exposed.
Sparta had even sent anexpedition under Brasidas to
target Athenian interests up inThrace to show the Athenians.
They were not untouchable.
These developments appear to nowshow Athens was more inclined
to move on some requests made bySparta where a truce between

(06:46):
the two would be signed.
This truce had the intention ofseeing a longer lasting peace
established.
However, the actions ofPrasidus had seen this
opportunity almost wasted away.
After the Athenian defeatedAmphipolis, the death of
Prasidus and Cleon, both sideswould go back to negotiating a
larger peace.
And Cleon, both sides would goback to negotiating a larger

(07:08):
peace.
Athens was still in a powerfulposition, with its navy free to
do as it wished, though thecitizens were becoming severely
war-weary after the constanttrials they had to endure.
Sparta, although victorious atAmphipolis, was now in a
position where they were nolonger in a position to campaign
.
They were unable to feedreinforcements into the region,
and the Spartan government hadoverridden Brasadus' strategy,
seeing the relationships it hadmade with the Thracian cities

(07:30):
harmed.
This had effectively seen theone region Sparta could attack
Athens through now closed off tothem.
It was in this environment thatthe Peace of Nicias would be
established.
However, as we discussed lastepisode, the terms that both had
arrived at would see the allieson both sides extremely
dissatisfied, as has beenevident in the series.

(07:51):
So far, the city-states ofGreece, when it comes down to it
, were operating their policiesbased off their self-interests,
like countries do in our moderntimes.
For many, the leagues that hadbeen created were seen as
assisting in these interests, orfor others, it was seen as
something that had to betolerated in the face of larger
powers.
However, with these outlooks,any change in the diplomatic and

(08:14):
political systems could seethese subject city-states
re-evaluate their positions.
The peace of Nicias and itscomplete disregard of Sparta's
and Athens' allies would seethis as a moment where many
would look to move in waysbetter served to their interests
, including some of Sparta'slargest allies.
Corinth had been the largest andone of the most enthusiastic

(08:36):
allies of Sparta and had beenthe power that saw the tensions
against Athens go from tense tocompletely hostile, bringing the
opening of hostilities.
Athens go from tense tocompletely hostile, bringing the
opening of hostilities.
The Peace of Nicias had leftthe Corinthians outraged with
the terms of the peace.
Seeing Athens remain in controlover territories, they saw that
they had claims to For Corinth.

(08:56):
They saw the peace as a meansof pushing for the enslavement
of the Peloponnese.
With Athens and Sparta inalliance, they would not be
strong enough to challenge anymoves that would see this a
reality.
The Corinthians now looked tosee a new league established,
one that could stand against themajor powers.
To do this, corinthiandelegates would travel to Argos,

(09:16):
the next largest power on thePeloponnese and one that had a
history with Sparta.
One would imagine it wouldn'tbe too difficult to play on
Argos' paranoia and fears ofSparta to move defensively
against them.
Thucydides records the openingof the talks that were made
there.
The Corinthians first turnedaside to Argos and opened

(09:37):
negotiations with some of themen in office there, pointing
out that Sparta could have nogood end in view but only the
subjugation of the Peloponneseor she would have never entered
into a treaty and alliance withthe once detested Athenians, and
that the duty of consulting forthe safety of the Peloponnese
had now fallen upon Argos, whoshould immediately pass a decree

(09:58):
inviting any Hellenic statethat chose to make a defensive
alliance with the Argives.
After the Corinthian delegationhad put forward their argument
and left back to Corinth, themen who had been present took
the proposal back to the Argivegovernment to be discussed.
The following discussionswithin the government and
proposals put forward to thepeople of Argos would see the

(10:20):
motion passed in favour of theCorinthians' suggestion.
Argos would now establish aboard of twelve men who had the
responsibility of negotiatingany alliances with cities that
wished to join, apart from theAthenians and Spartans.
Thucydides tells us that Argosdid not need all that much
convincing from Corinth, perhapsjust needing validation and the

(10:44):
knowledge that there were manycities fearful of the big powers
.
They had been of the view thatwar with Sparta was inevitable,
and now was the best time to seeit develop.
The treaty they had in placewith Sparta was about to expire
and Argos had always had designson spreading their influence
through the Peloponnese.
Sparta was at its lowest pointin many years, while Argos,

(11:05):
having been in a neutral statein the war, had flourished and
seen its population thrive.
The first cities to come toseek an alliance with Argos and
see the establishment of theLeague was that of the
Menteneans and their own allies.
Part of their motivation wasfear of Sparta, as during the
Peloponnesian War so far, theyhad profited largely by

(11:25):
subjugating many smallervillages and cities around
Arcadia.
Now that Sparta was not focusedon Athens, they thought that
they would now turn theirattention to the conquests that
the Mentinaeans had made and theinfluence in Arcadia they had
established.
This move by Mentantinea andtheir allies would now see many
other city-states in thePeloponnese begin serious talks
within their own governments ashow they should act.

(11:47):
Many saw that the Mantineanswouldn't have defected without
good reason and perhaps had moreof a picture of Sparta's
intentions in the region.
This would see that many morewere now in favour of seeking to
protect their independencethrough the protection of a
different alliance.
Sparta had known that theCorinthians were not at all

(12:08):
pleased with the terms that hadbeen arranged with the Athenians
.
They had tried to argue inAthens that certain provisions
be renegotiated so thatCorinth's interests would also
be taken into account, Thoughthey also still had a deep
distrust of Athens, and one getsthe impression they were not at
a point where they were readyto see peace come about.
However, sparta had dismissedCorinth along with the other

(12:30):
Peloponnesian League membersthat had come seeking an
alteration in the terms.
It would seem likely thatSparta would have been paying
attention to the politicalgoings-on in other various
city-states, as if they hadbasically sent them all away
without any compromise, anaction, surely, that would see
resentment build.
Word would end up back inSparta that Corinth had been in

(12:51):
talks with Argos over a newalliance and potential league of
city-states outside Sparta andAthens' control.
This would see Sparta beratethe Corinthians, accusing them
of being instigators of this newleague, an action that could
see the new peace destabilized.
The Corinthians were alsoreminded that they were in a
breach of the oaths that theyhad made when becoming part of

(13:11):
the Peloponnesian League.
They were to have the sameallies and enemies as Sparta and
were to abide by the decisionsof the Peloponnesian League.
Spartan ambassadors hadattended Corinth to seek an
answer to the charges, alongwith other city-states that had
opposed the peace terms.
We have seen that the mainmotivator in these city-states
opposing the terms boiled downto their own interests.

(13:33):
However, corinth would keepthis to themselves for now and
instead highlighted otherreasons that showed that they
had obligations outside of theircontrol.
They would point to oaths theyhad made with Potidaea and their
friends in the Chalcidides, whowere still under Athenian
control.
If they were to accept thepeace of Michaeus, then they
would be in breach of theseoaths and risk offending the

(13:53):
gods that these oaths were madeunder.
They also pulled up Sparta on atechnicality in reference to
not accepting the decisionhanded down by the Peloponnesian
League, a provision existedthat stated that these decisions
arrived at by the League wereoverarching unless the gods and
heroes stand in their way, thisCorinth pointed to, since these

(14:16):
oaths made with the others wouldsee them having abandoned their
oaths to certain gods.
These were the argumentsCorinth made in reference to
rejecting the peace of Nicias.
As for the league under Argos,the representatives said that
they would confer with theirfriends and do what was right
With this.
The Spartan envoys would headhome, while others from Argos,

(14:39):
who were also in Corinth at thetime, attempted to urge Corinth
to make the alliance with themat once, while others from Argos
, who were also in Corinth atthe time, attempted to urge
Corinth to make the alliancewith them at once.
However, their response wouldbe to attend the next congress
in the city, where they would bein a better position to make
their next move.

(14:59):
It seems Corinth now, knowingSparta was aware of their
dealings, needed to weigh up therisks and benefits to pursue
this course of action, whileSparta's reaction to their
arguments over the oaths andrejection of the terms of the
peace of Nicias would also havean impact on the direction that
they would push for After theSpartan delegation had left.

(15:21):
One from Elis showed up inCorinth to discuss the details
of an alliance.
They quickly concluded one withCorinth, who then advised them
to continue on to Argos to makearrangements to join the new
Argive League.
The Aelians also had theirmotivations for shifting away
from Sparta.
They had, before thePeloponnesian War, been called
into a war by the Lepreims, whowere fighting some Akkadian

(15:43):
cities.
In return, the Lepreims offeredhalf their lands to Elis,
though upon the end of the warElis allowed them to retain
these lands but in return askedfor one talent of tribute.
Though after years of payingthis tribute, leprium decided
the breakout of thePeloponnesian War was a good
excuse to stop paying, thematter was put to Sparta for

(16:05):
arbitration, since both werepart of the Peloponnesian League
.
Though Ellis quickly saw thefairness of proceedings
questionable, they decided toturn to force to regain the
tribute payments.
But Sparta put its supportbehind Leprium During the last
few years.
Ellis really had no choice butto remain a Peloponnesian League
member.
However, with other powerfulPeloponnesian cities breaking

(16:27):
away, it now appeared there wasanother option.
Elis, while in Argos, would beone of the first cities to
conclude an agreement with Argos, seeing the new league
officially come into being.
This step would see Corinth,who had wanted to turn to
discussions internally on howbest to proceed now, also threw

(16:48):
their lot in with the new ArgiveLeague.
In turn, they would also bringwith them a number of Chalcidian
cities within Thrace.
As you may remember, many ofthese cities had just gone
through a couple of years of warwith Athens and Sparta.
In their lands, many had beenunder Athenian control and
initially were enthusiasticabout the Spartan presence,
though after the death ofBrasidas it quickly became
apparent both Spartan andAthenian control were just as

(17:09):
bad as each other.
The formation of a new leaguesaw that there was the
possibility of becoming freecities once again.
However, some other powerfulcities of the Peloponnesian
League, those in Boeotia and theMegarians, remained on the
fence.
A couple of factors saw thatthey did not want to act and
abandon Sparta, taking a riskthey could potentially see

(17:29):
further destabilisation to theircities.
Firstly, sparta had left bothalone, giving them no reason to
go seeking an alliance elsewhere.
Sparta had basically allowedthem to do as they pleased for
now.
Also, both the Boeotians andMegara had systems of government
that differed from thoseentering the League in Argos,
these cities having some form ofdemocratic system in place,

(17:53):
while their oligarchic systemswere more similar to that of
what Sparta had in place.
They saw that this differencein governing systems could also
see extra problems created ifthey were to enter into this new
league.
With the Argive League nowformed and gaining new members,
both Corinth and Argos saw thatif other city-states could be
convinced to break from Sparta,their league could now become

(18:14):
more powerful than thePeloponnesian League.
Both sent delegations to Tegiras, as they thought, if a city
of their standing could beconvinced to come across, then
surely many more of thePeloponnesians would follow.
Thucydides gives us theimpression.
The Corinthians were veryconfident and zealous in their
actions at this stage, thoughwhen wrapping up talks in Tigea,

(18:35):
this mood had changed.
The Tigeans had basically comeright out saying they were not
going to act against Sparta.
With this, we are told, theCorinthians relaxed their
confident campaign of recruitingallies, somewhat worried now
that the growth of the Leaguemay stall.
However, this rejection did notdeter them from visiting the
Boeotians to see if they couldconvince them to get off the

(18:57):
fence and perhaps put theirworries of differing political
systems at ease, though theirarguments over joining the
alliances were still rejected.
The Corinthians had also askedfor their help with the
Athenians.
It appears here the aim was totrick the Boeotians into having
to enter the new league.
In their discussions, they hadasked the Boeotians to come to
Athens with them to helpnegotiate a ten days truce that

(19:21):
the Boeotians had also justreceived.
The Corinthians had asked thatif the Athenians had rejected
this request, the Boeotiansshould renounce their agreement
with Athens.
The Boeotians agreed to travelwith the Corinthians to Athens,
where the request was basicallyrejected, with the Athenians'
response being the Corinthiansalready had a truce being allies
of Sparta.
Obviously, corinth was breakingaway from the Spartans and

(19:44):
attempting to establish a newcentre of power.
Athens appears to have beenplaying with the Corinthians,
telling them that they hadnothing to worry about being
allies of Sparta, but if not,they were on their own.
With this rejection, corinthalso became angry with the
Boeotians, as they did notrenounce their agreement with
Athens.
It appears the Boeotians hadnot agreed to all the demands

(20:06):
made by Corinth, but did providehelp when dealing with Athens.
However, they were not going totie down their own diplomatic
outcomes to a city they werewary of entering an alliance
with.
While these diplomaticmanoeuvrings were going on,
other events in and aroundGreece were still taking place.
Up in Thrace, the Athenianswere still present and had just
now reduced Sikone after havinglaid siege to the city for some

(20:30):
two years.
As per the declarations madeback before the siege began, the
adult men were put to death,the women and children were
enslaved and the land was handedover to the Plataeans to
resettle.
However, also up in Thrace,amphipolis remained hostile to
Athens.
We saw that the Spartans weresupposed to have handed the city
back over to Athens, but thepeople of the city did not want

(20:52):
Athenian control back.
Sparta, after having signed thepeace, seems to have moved out
of Amphipolis, though it wasn'tback in Athenian hands.
This would remain a stickingpoint for Athens as, although
Sparta abandoned the city, ithad not been handed over to
reflect its pre-war standing.
At this current point, ifAthens wanted control of the
city, they would need to mount amilitary operation against it

(21:20):
With it.
Very likely it would requirethe same effort and resources.
Their attack on Potidaea hadthe previous year around, when
Cleon had been setting out onhis campaign to Thrace.
The Athenians had expelled theDelians from the island of Delos
, this being the site that hadseen the initial home of the
treasury and what had given theleague Athens led its name, the
Delian League.
Supposedly, the inhabitants aremeant to have polluted the

(21:40):
island in some manner.
As charged by the Athenians.
Pollution in this context isdue to some activity that had
religious repercussions.
For this act, the Athenians hadremoved the Delians and settled
them elsewhere.
However, it is most likely thisexpulsion was part of a broader
effort by Athens to tightencontrol over the island, as
Delos was a vital religious andcommercial hub in the Athenian

(22:03):
Empire.
Though now, in 421, we hear ofthe Delians being brought back
to Delos to make their homesonce again, this was probably
done as part of thereconciliation efforts that came
down as part of the Peace ofNicias.
While Athens' own religiousconscience may have come into
play, where it may have beenseen as overly harsh, prompting

(22:24):
the Athenians to reverse theirdecision to restore piety in
divine favour, while we wouldalso hear that the traditional
rivals Phocis and Locrus wouldonce again resume hostilities.
They were both just south ofThessaly and both had interests
with the region of Delphi, withjust the Parnassus Mountains
separating them.
In this part, sparta and Athenshad intervened on either side,

(22:45):
but with the peace in place, itwould appear they were on their
own.
For now, with the establishmentof the Argive League, sparta now
looked to take the offensive onthe Peloponnese.
To put the pressure on thosemoving towards this new league,
plastinax would march out withthe full complement of the
Spartan army into Arcadia, withtheir focus being placed on
Parasia, a region that Mantineahad captured during the

(23:08):
Peloponnesian War.
The idea here by prying Parasiaaway, sparta could weaken
Mantinea's territorial andpolitical base, undermining its
ability to act as a leaderwithin the Argive League.
This would also have the effectof increasing Spartan influence
into the region and making itharder for Mantinea to continue
its activity in Arcadia.
The Argive League would respondto Sparta's actions by sending

(23:32):
a force to Mantinea itself, butwould not advance into the
threatened area.
It was left to the Mantineansto fight in vain, as the target
would be returned to itsoriginal inhabitants.
The Spartans would destroy theMantineans' forts and then
withdrew, where then anotherSpartan force was sent to the
region between Elis and Messenia.
By taking decisive militaryaction against Mantinea and Elis

(23:56):
, sparta sent a clear message toother Peloponnesian cities
considering defection to theArgive League.
The campaign demonstrated thatSparta would respond swiftly and
forcefully to any challenge toits authority, while Sparta's
immediate actions were limitedto regional skirmishes and
smaller campaigns in 421.
While Sparta's immediateactions were limited to regional

(24:17):
skirmishes and smallercampaigns in 421, these moves
laid the groundwork for theeventual Battle of Mantinea that
would take place in 418.
However, sparta had also aseries of internal problems they
needed to address.
A number of these had beendeveloping over the course of
the war and that we have lookedat previously, but with the

(24:38):
peace in place, they couldpotentially address these more
effectively.
However, in 421, these wouldagain be highlighted when the
army that Parasitus had led inThracian lands returned home.
Some 700 of these men werehelots and had been promised
their freedom for their service.
While the military serviceunder Brasidas demonstrated the

(25:00):
utility of helots as soldiersand auxiliaries, their freedom
and integration challenged therigid social hierarchy that
underpinned Sparta's dominance.
However, it appears thismeasure of employing helots as
soldiers in return for theirfreedom highlighted the
demographic decline that hadbeen taking place over the years
, which was also fed by aneconomic decline.

(25:20):
Another event that was tohighlight internal problems was
the return of the 120 Spartiitesand other soldiers captured by
the Athenians at the Battle ofSphacteria in 425.
The surrender of these elitewarriors long considered the
height of Sparta's valor, hadbeen a tremendous humiliation.
Their return, facilitated bythe peace of Nicias, sparked

(25:42):
controversy within Spartansociety.
Surrender was seen as a gravedishonor in Sparta's warrior
culture and many of thereturning men faced suspicion
and disdain.
The reintegration of thesesoldiers exposed deep divisions
within Spartan leadership andcitizenry.
Some argued for theirrehabilitation to bolster the
declining number of fullcitizens, while others viewed

(26:02):
them as unworthy of their formerstatus.
The debate over their fatehighlighted the broader pressure
on Sparta's rigid socialsystems and contributed to
internal discord.
Broader pressure on Sparta'srigid social systems and
contributed to internal discord.
The return of the army fromThrace and the Sphacterian
captives symbolised a broaderstrain on Spartan society, a
warrior state grappling withdishonour, declining resources

(26:24):
and internal divisions.
These crises, combined with ashrinking citizen population,
economic stagnation, hell ofunrest and political discord,
left Sparta vulnerable to bothinternal instability and
external threats.
Although the Peace of Niciasprovided a temporary reprieve,
the deeper structural weaknesseswithin Sparta foreshadowed the
challenges it would face in thedecades to come.

(26:46):
To address these challenges,leadership and unity would need
to come from the top, though atthis stage, king Palisthenics
and other proponents of peacesought to stabilise the state
and recover from losses of thewar, while more militaristic
factions likely viewed thetreaty as a capitulation to
Athens and a betrayal of Spartandominance.

(27:06):
These ideological dividescomplicated decision making and
further weakened Sparta'sability to address both internal
and external challenges.
As we have seen, sparta wasdealing with regional issues as
well as internal ones.
As well as these, both Spartaand Athens were already dealing
with the treaty obligations notbeing fulfilled.

(27:27):
At this point in time, bothwere pushing each other on what
had not been delivered.
At this point in time, bothwere pushing each other on what
had not been delivered, as wealready saw.
Sparta was supposed to havehanded over Amphipolis and had
failed to do so, even thoughthey were no longer in control
of the city.
Another major issue that Athenskept pushing Sparta on was the
compliance of their alliedstates.
Both sides were expected toensure their allies adhered to

(27:51):
the peace of Nicias.
However, many allies, such asCorinth, thebes and other key
Peloponnesian allies, refused toaccept the treaty.
Apparently, sparta would makeassurances that this was under
control, but were not able togain any formal agreement from
them to show Athens.
However, in response to Athenspushing on these terms, sparta
would also attempt to holdAthens accountable for their

(28:12):
failings.
The Athenians still heldcontrol over Pylos and other
areas around the Peloponnese,with Sparta arguing these should
have already been handed overunder the terms of the treaty.
We find Thucydides telling usthat the Athenians were cautious
about handing these areas overjust yet, as they suspected
Sparta did not have their bestintentions on fulfilling their

(28:33):
terms.
However, after many talksbetween the two, some
compromises were made, with bothattempting to show they were
doing what they could.
This, for the time being saw.
The communications were stillopen between Athens and Sparta,
and peace between them remainedin place.
As the winter of 421-420 arrived, the Aethors, who had been in

(28:55):
office when the Peace of Niciaswas signed, had been replaced by
the successors.
This had the effect of seeingthe already disunited Spartan
government tip more towards anaggressive approach with war in
mind.
The view of a number of thesemen had been that Sparta had
only signed the Peace of Niciasto address the threat that Argos
would soon pose, while alsowanting to gain back the

(29:17):
Sphacterian prisoners andrecover Pylos To them.
This would allow them toaddress the main challenges
facing Sparta in the immediatefuture.
Argos had grown in power andwould exert an immediate
challenge to Sparta's dominanceon the Peloponnese, it would
most likely require Sparta'sfull attention to neutralize the
growth of Argos.
The return of the Spartiiteswould help alleviate some of

(29:38):
Sparta's manpower issues, whilealso allowing them to work past
the humiliation their captureand continued imprisonment had
represented, while the return ofPylos would see Athenian
influence removed from thePeloponnese, while also
addressing the fear the Spartanshad of another helot revolt, as
this is where they were findingsafety and friendship with the
Athenians.
So, within this new appointmentof Ephors, it seems the general

(30:02):
consensus was that the peacewas signed so Sparta could deal
with its immediate threats thatwere growing within the
Peloponnese.
Once these had been dealt with,they would then be in a better
position to resume the waragainst Athens.
We find Thucydides telling usthat two of the Aethors most
opposed to the peace would beginsecret talks with Sparta's
allies that were opposed tosigning the peace, while their

(30:24):
ambassadors were presidentSparta.
For this part, let's turn toThucydides.
Cleobulus and Xenaris, the twoAethors who were the most
anxious to break off the treaty,took advantage of this
opportunity to communicateprivately with the Boeotians and
Corinthians and, advising themto act as much as possible
together, instructed the formerfirst to enter an alliance with

(30:48):
Argos and then try and bringthemselves and the Argives into
an alliance with Lacedaemon.
The Boeotians would so be leastlikely to be compelled to come
into the Attic Treaty, and theLacedaemonians would prefer
gaining the friendship andalliance of Argos even at the
price of the hostility of Athensand the rupture of the treaty.
The Boeotians knew that anhonourable friendship with Argos

(31:11):
had long been the desire ofLacedaemon, for the
Lacedaemonians believed thatthis would considerably
facilitate the conduct of thewar outside the Peloponnese.
Meanwhile, they begged theBoeotians to place Panacteum in
their hands in order that shemight, if possible, obtain Pylos
in exchange for it and so bemore in a position to resume

(31:31):
hostilities with Athens.
As we had seen, the Boeotianshad been hesitant about joining
the alliance with the ArgiveLeague.
Their ability to act as theywished within the Peloponnesian
League, along with theirdifferences in political systems
, saw them not wanting to makethis move that would alter their
diplomatic dynamics.
However, now, after this lastround of talks with Sparta, they

(31:53):
may be possibly open tore-evaluating this decision.
With the Boeotian andCorinthian delegations departing
Sparta, they were met on theroad by a couple of officials
from Argos.
Here it's hard not to get theimpression that Argos was aware
of the talks that had beentaking place in Sparta, with it
being very likely the Spartanethos had allowed the
information to get to them.

(32:15):
These officials once againattempted to entice the
Boeotians into an alliance, thistime around, putting forward an
ambitious offer.
They stated that becoming amember of the League would see
that they would be part of analliance that would employ a
common policy.
They could make war against, ora treaty with, the Spartans, or
with anyone else they mightchoose.
The Boeotians, having just comeaway from talks with the E4s,

(32:38):
who had encouraged them to makean alliance with Argos, now saw
no reason to reject the offer.
After all, the one city thatthey were worried about acting
against was pushing them to makethis move.
Now, even though the Boeotiandelegation had been enthusiastic
on this offer, it still had tobe discussed within the Boeotian
Federal Council.
Corinth, still pushing to getthe Boeotians into some form of

(33:00):
agreement, proposed the Boeotiandelegates, while still on the
road with them, that oathsshould be sworn, binding them
the Corinthians, thracians andMegarians, where help should be
provided to any of them thatrequired, and no war or peace be
arranged unless a commonagreement.
The Boeotian delegates saw thatthis was basically the same

(33:20):
terms that would take hold whenjoining the Argive Alliance, so
decided to provide theirapproval.
However, before they could givetheir oath, approval still had
to come from the Federal Council.
When the Boeotian envoysreturned to the Boeotian Federal
Council, they presented thediplomatic propositions made by
both the Spartan ethors andrepresentatives of Argos.
However, the secret talks withthe two pro-war ethors were not

(33:45):
divulged due to potentiallycausing a crisis with the
Theban-Spartan alliance.
The Boeotian Council carefullyweighed both proposals,
reflecting on their geographicalposition as a central Greek
power with considerable militarystrength but significant
vulnerabilities.
The Council recognised theappeal of the Argive League's
promise of autonomy andresistance to Sparta's dominance

(34:07):
, but also noted Argos'srelative isolation and lack of a
proven military track recordagainst Athens or Sparta.
Conversely, sparta's offeraligned with Theban conservative
tendencies and ensured thecontinuation of a relationship
with a powerful ally capable ofproviding security in the face
of Athenian aggression.
Ultimately, the BoeotianCouncil decided against joining

(34:30):
the Argive League.
This decision was driven byloyalty to Sparta Thebes, as the
dominant Boeotian polisprioritised its historical and
ideological alignment withSparta.
The Boeotians also doubtedArgos' ability to stand as a
credible leader of a powerfulcoalition capable of challenging
Sparta or Athens, ultimatelystaying allied with Sparta,

(34:52):
proved a more immediate andreliable defence mechanism
against the Athenians.
The formation of the ArgiveLeague in 421 BC marked a
significant moment in politicalrealignment.
In the Peloponnesian War, argoscapitalised on the
dissatisfaction among Sparta'sallies following the peace of
Nicias, positioning itself as arallying point for those seeking

(35:12):
autonomy from Sparta's alliesfollowing the peace of Nicias,
positioning itself as a rallyingpoint for those seeking
autonomy from Sparta's dominance.
Diplomatic maneuverings toexpand this alliance, including
overtures to the Boeotians,highlighted the fragmented
loyalties within the Greek world, while Corinth's mediation
showcased the potential for abroader coalition.
The Boeotians ultimatelyprioritised their ties to Sparta

(35:33):
, reflecting the challengesArgos faced in uniting disparate
states under a common cause.
For Sparta, the periodfollowing the Peace of Nicias
was fraught with difficulties.
The peace treaty, while adiplomatic victory, left many
allies disillusioned and exposedSpartan vulnerabilities.
The Argive League represented adirect challenge to Sparta's

(35:54):
dominance, forcing the Spartansto navigate a delicate balance
between maintaining control overtheir allies and preparing for
potential conflicts with Argosand its growing coalition.
As 420 BC approached, the stagewas set for the Argive League
to test its newfound alliances.
The future inclusion of Athensin the alliance hinted at a
broader and more dangerouscoalition against Sparta,

(36:17):
escalating tensions and layingthe groundwork for renewed
hostilities.
The fragile peace of 421 BC wasunravelling and the coming
years would see the ArgiveLeague's ambitions collide with
Sparta's resilience in astruggle that would reshape the
balance of power and grace.
Thank you all for the supportand continuing to support the

(36:37):
series.
It is greatly appreciated.
I'd like to give an extraspecial thank you to all my
Patreon Archon members, so a bigshout out to Neil Bennett, ali
Ullman, nick Kablifakis, paulVermingen-Matthew and John for
choosing to support the seriesover on Patreon and supporting
at the Archon level.
If you've also found some valuein the series and wish to

(36:58):
support the show, you can headto wwwcastingthraneshipgreececom
and click on the support theseries button, where you can
find the link to Patreon as wellas many other ways to support
the show.
Be sure to stay connected andupdated on what's happening in
the series and join me over onFacebook or Instagram at Casting
Terrain to Greece, or onTwitter at Casting Greece.

(37:18):
Once again, thanks for thesupport and I hope you can join
me next episode where wecontinue the narrative in the
series.
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