May 10, 2025 • 40 mins
What happens when military might meets diplomatic cunning? In the fragile years following the Peace of Nicias, a dangerous dance unfolds across Greece as former enemies circle each other warily, neither willing to strike first yet both preparing for inevitable conflict.
Alcibiades emerges as Athens' bold strategist, orchestrating a brilliant campaign that uses military presence as leverage without actually breaking the peace. With just a small force, he marches confidently through Spartan territory, cutting supply lines and isolating allies in a masterclass of intimidation without battle. His gambit creates a web of alliances that threatens to strangle Sparta's influence across the Peloponnese.
Meanwhile, King Aegis of Sparta finds himself trapped between military necessity and political reality. When his massive army finally surrounds the Argives in what should be a decisive victory, he makes the shocking decision to negotiate a truce with just two Argive generals—no armies or governments consulted. This fateful choice nearly costs him everything, as enraged Spartans plot to destroy his home and impose crippling fines, while one Argive negotiator barely escapes being stoned to death by his own people.
The true power of religion in warfare becomes starkly apparent as both sides manipulate sacred festivals and divine omens to justify strategic decisions. The Argives creatively redefine their calendar to avoid religious restrictions, while convenient "unfavorable omens" provide perfect cover for Spartan withdrawals when circumstances turn unfavorable.
This episode reveals how the machinery of war often runs on factors far beyond battlefield courage—personality conflicts, political ambitions, and the complex dance between military leaders and the governments they serve. As the peace crumbles beneath the weight of unresolved grievances, we witness the seeds being planted for one of the most consequential battles of the entire Peloponnesian War.
Ready to discover how four men stopped an army of thousands? Listen now and join us as we unravel the fascinating diplomatic maneuvers that would ultimately change the course of Greek history.
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Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:15):
The Argives were now completely surrounded From the
plain, the Spartans and theirallies shut them off from the
city.
Above them were the Corinthians, the Lysians and Pelanians, and
on the side of Nemea, theBoeotians, siconians and
Megarians.
Meanwhile, their army waswithout cavalry, the Athenians
alone amongst their allies nothaving yet arrived Thucydides.
(00:39):
Hello, I'm Mark Selleck, andwelcome back to Casting Through
Ancient Greece, episode 94,diplomacy by Force.
The Peace of Nicias would seethe first phase of the
Peloponnesian War come to aclose, with a decade of conflict
within Greece subsiding.
The aim was for both Athens andSparta to reach an agreement
(01:01):
that would allow them to coexistwhile also pursuing their
self-interests.
To reach an agreement thatwould allow them to coexist
while also pursuing theirself-interests.
However, as we have seen, bothentered into a peace either at a
strategic disadvantage orsuffering from war weariness.
This led both sides to makingagreements without consulting
their various allies, placingthose allies in a position of
disadvantage.
While the terms were agreedupon at a time when both sides
(01:24):
were tired of war, the questionremained would these conditions
hold once both Athens and Spartaregain their strength and
morale had recovered withintheir populations?
With the peace of Nicias,geographical dynamics within
Greece changed dramaticallywithin the year.
With Athens and Spartatechnically allied, there was no
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longer a counterweight tosupport the many smaller cities
that had not fared well underthe peace terms.
As a result, corinth, sparta'slargest ally, encouraged,
assisted and then became part ofthe new league under the
leadership of Argos, sparta'straditional rival on the
Peloponnese.
Leadership of Argos, Sparta'straditional rival on the
(02:08):
Peloponnese.
As the Argive League came intobeing, the diplomatic situation
became confusing and worrisomefor many.
Sparta attempted to counter theformation of the League
diplomatically and then throughforce, but it persisted.
Now, facing two potentialthreats the Argive League and
the prospect of renewed conflictwith Athens, sparta began
taking measures to eliminate atleast one.
However, in doing so, theybreached the terms of the Peace
(02:31):
of Nicias.
In an attempt to fulfil theothers, Sparta entered into an
alliance with Thebes in order toregain territory to return to
Athens.
Yet for this blatant breach ofthe peace they would act too
little, too late and only worsentheir situation with Athens.
Many of the issues underpinningthe peace remained unresolved,
and now Sparta had created a newbreach by forming an alliance
(02:55):
outside of their agreement withAthens.
Sparta's manoeuvring duringthis period also alarmed Argos,
which initially feared it wasbeing isolated in a weak league,
believing Sparta and Athenswere working together.
However, with the rise of theAthenian Alcibiades, who was
hostile towards Sparta, argoswould come to an understanding
(03:15):
of the true nature of relationsbetween Athens and Sparta.
Relief also followed when Argoslearned of Athens' intention to
form an alliance with them as acounter to Sparta.
Under the Peace of Nicias thiswould not have been possible,
but Alcibiades had now gained alarger following and enthusiasm
had shifted towards hisanti-Spartan policies.
(03:38):
In this episode, we willcontinue with the disintegration
of the Peace of Nicias.
Technically, the peace wasstill in place, but with many
unresolved issues and the newbreaches it was only recognised
in name by this stage, thoughopen hostilities had not yet
recommenced between Athens andSparta.
It would only be a matter oftime.
In this episode, we will seeAlcibiades' policy begin to take
(04:00):
shape.
Initially, he would applydiplomatic pressure, though this
time he would use diplomaticpressure, though this time he
would use military presencerather than diplomats to
pressure Sparta and its allies.
Alcibiades campaigning in thePeloponnese would ultimately
provoke Sparta to respond andput their army into the field,
directed at Argos, with themajority of those in the
(04:23):
Athenian council and assemblynow backing a policy more
hostile to the Spartans,alcibiades continued to pursue
as what he saw as Athens' bestpath forward.
As we saw in the last episode,he had used diplomatic
manoeuvrings to discredit hispolitical opponent, nicias,
while also exposing Sparta asunreliable in negotiations and
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in upholding terms of the peace.
Although he had painted Spartain this light through deceitful
means, we have also seen that afaction within the Spartan
government was already lookingto discard the peace of Nicias
and resume hostilities.
With the approach of the summerof 419 BC, athens had now
established alliances withPeloponnesian cities that would
(05:05):
allow them to pursue moreaggressive actions aimed at
weakening Sparta.
With Argos, elos and Menteneanow aligned with the Athenians,
alcibiades arranged anexpedition into the Peloponnese
with their support.
The aim was not to march outand engage Sparta in a battle,
but rather to use military forceas a diplomatic tool.
He hoped to apply enoughpressure on Corinth and on some
engage Sparta in a battle, butrather to use military force as
(05:25):
a diplomatic tool.
He hoped to apply enoughpressure on Corinth and on some
of Sparta's other allies toweaken their position in the
Peloponnese.
Alcibiades wasted no time inlaunching the expedition,
needing to act while he stillheld the advantage.
Sparta had lost much of itsprestige over the past year and
Alcirieties sought to strengthen.
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The Argive League, a smallAthenian force composed of
hoplites and archers, sailed tothe Peloponnese, where they
first linked up with the Argives, before marching on to Mantinea
and Elis, gathering more troopsat each allied city along the
way.
Once the allied army wasassembled, they moved into
Achaea, north of Elis, stoppingoutside the coastal city of
(06:08):
Petrae, which lay on thesouthern side of the Corinthian
Gulf, opposite Neopactus.
Alcibiades successfullynegotiated with the city,
forcing them into an alliance.
He also persuaded them toconstruct walls down to the sea,
improving both their defensiveposition and communication lines
against potential attack.
Once this was complete, theintention was to move further
(06:33):
along the coast, to Reum, whichmarked the narrowest point of
the Corinthian Gulf, where afort was to be built.
If successful, athens wouldhave effectively cut off the
Corinthian shipping through thearea, as they would control both
coasts at this chokepoint.
However, before this part ofthe plan could be carried out,
corinth, sicyon and others inthe region marched out to
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prevent Alcibiades from reachingthe site.
Alcibiades and others'perception that Sparta had lost
its influence in the Peloponneseappeared to be confirmed by
this expedition.
He had entered the Peloponnesewith only a small force and
without naval support.
Yet he was able to marchthrough the northern Peloponnese
unopposed.
Upon reaching Petraea, the cityseemed to come over to his side
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very quickly, despite likelybeing able to resist the limited
force he had with him.
Alcibiades had now establisheda strong position along the
northern coast of thePeloponnese.
However, this was only one partof his plan to isolate Corinth.
The second phase was alsounderway.
Further south On the ArgolidPeninsula, just inland from
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Argos, lay the city of Epidaurus, which remained allied with
Sparta.
The Argives were tasked withmarching into its territory and
capturing the city of Epidaurus,which remained allied with
Sparta.
The Argives were tasked withmarching into its territory and
capturing the city.
To justify their actions, argoscited a religious violation as
a pretext for the attack.
If both objectives north andsouth could be achieved and held
, it was very possible thatCorinth and other Peloponnesian
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cities on the Corinthian side ofthis line would find themselves
isolated from Sparta andvulnerable to attacks from both
directions.
The broader idea was to exertenough pressure through these
military maneuvers and thethreats they presented to compel
Sparta's allies in the regionto either switch sides or at
least adopt a neutral stance.
(08:23):
It appears Sparta was beginningto recognise what was taking
place and the damage it could doto their Peloponnesian League
if carried out effectively.
Corinth was their chief ally inthe League and although they
held some blame for the creationof the Argive League, unfolding
events would see them reaffirmtheir alliance with Sparta.
However, their main intentionall along seems to have been to
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bring Sparta back into conflictwith Athens.
King Aegis, back in Sparta,would arrange for the full
Spartan army to assemble andthen march north onto the
frontier, into Arcadia.
From this position, aegis hadoptions and kept his opponents
guessing about his intentions.
He could choose to direct hisarmy against any of the
(09:05):
Peloponnesian allies who hadsided with Athens.
However, once he reached thefrontier, sacrifices were
conducted and, we are told, theomens came back unfavourable.
As a result, the Spartan armyreturned to Sparta, where they
would remain for the next monthdue to the Carnean Festival, a
religious observance thatrestricted Sparta from engaging
(09:25):
in warfare during its duration.
This withdrawal is curious.
As Donald Kagan points out, theSpartans had in the past, and
would again in the future,ignore unfavourable omens during
critical moments, perhaps withforces from other Peloponnesian
allies accompanying him.
Aegis used the omens as aconvenient excuse to return to
(09:46):
Sparta before the Carnanianfestival officially began.
It still feels like a strangereason to abandon the march, but
it's difficult for us to fullyunderstand just how seriously
the Spartans took theirreligious festivals.
There may also have beennon-religious motivations for
the withdrawal, but, as withmuch of Sparta's decision making
, we are left with no clearpicture.
(10:09):
The Argives, however, would takeadvantage of the Spartan
withdrawal and employed a bit oftrickery to circumvent the
restrictions of the Carneanfestival, which was meant to
apply to all Dorians, of whichthe Argives were part of.
They invaded Epidaurus on the27th day of the month prior to
the Carneia and, while in enemyterritory, they continued to
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recognise each day as stillbeginning on the 27th day of the
previous month.
One must wonder whether theArgives held the Carneia in the
same regard as the Spartans.
With the Argives now inEpidaurian territory, the
Epidaran sent out pleas forassistance to their
Peloponnesian allies.
However, few answered the call,citing the religious period as
(10:53):
preventing them from marching.
Those that did respond wentonly as far as the borders of
the Epidarus, ensuring theywould not technically engage in
any form of warfare.
The Argive League sought to takefull advantage of the inaction
from Epidaurus' allies, butbefore they could mount an
attack on the city, athens wouldcall for a conference.
Instead of forcing a battle todecide matters, alcibiades
(11:18):
turned to the hope of achievinghis aims through the pressure he
had built up via his militarymanoeuvres.
It was likely the withdrawal ofthe Spartan force that led him
to pursue a favorable outcomewith Corinth, with his forces
positioned in the north and theArgives holding the south.
In the Argyllid, a line waseffectively drawn that cut
Corinth off from Sparta.
(11:38):
With the Spartans now seeminglywithdrawn, corinth may have
felt abandoned, while hostileforces stood within easy reach
of the opening of the Isthmus.
A conference with theCorinthians was held at Mantinea
, where Alcibiades attempted topersuade them to abandon the
Spartan alliance.
However, the Corinthians werenot easily swayed.
(12:00):
They called Alcibiades out,accusing him of speaking one way
but acting another, referringspecifically to his talk of
peace, while at the same timeallied forces were engaged in
hostilities with their allies atEpidaurus.
Under such circumstances, theysaw no reason to continue
discussions.
Alcibiades, hoping the talksmight still produce a favourable
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outcome, was willing to concedeon this point.
Both sides agreed to sendrepresentatives to halt
hostilities in the south.
The Argives subsequentlyreturned home and talks resumed
once again in Mentinea.
However, despite the continuednegotiations, no agreement was
reached.
One wonders whether theCorinthians ever truly intended
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to make concessions toAlcibiades or whether they were
simply stalling for time,waiting for the Spartans to
march again.
With talks leading nowhere, theArgives once again invaded
Epidaurus, laying waste to itslands.
In response to this renewedaggression, king Aegis mobilized
his army and marched into thedirection of Argos.
(13:06):
This time, the Argives andAlcibiades gained a clear
picture of Sparta's intention.
Alcibiades dispatched 1,000Athenian hoplites to support the
Argives, prompting the Argivearmy to fall back to their city.
However, as before, aegis wassaid to have received
unfavourable omens upon reachingthe border and once again
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returned home.
It seemed he had littleinterest in engaging in battle,
and perhaps his true aim wassimply to disrupt the Argive
campaign, which he succeeded indoing.
Still, once word reached him ofthe Athenian reinforcement en
route, the Omens may haveconveniently offered a
justification to avoid conflictaltogether.
This would mark the finalmanoeuvres in the Peloponnesian
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campaign of 419 BC.
Alcibiades had failed to achievehis ultimate goal of severing
Corinth from the Spartanalliance.
With the campaigning seasonover, he would lead his Athenian
troops back to Attica for thewinter.
During the winter, sparta wouldsend troops to reinforce
Epidaurus in anticipation ofrenewed attacks from Argos.
(14:14):
Once the new campaigning seasonbegan, a contingent of 300 men
was dispatched by sea to avoidmarching through Argive
territory and provoking a directconfrontation.
Their route, however, took thempast Athenian-controlled bases
where the voyage could have beenintercepted.
Thucydides notes that theSpartan fleet eluded the
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Athenians, but consideringAthens' overwhelming control of
the region, it is plausible theyallowed the fleet to pass
unopposed.
Perhaps Athens, for the moment,was avoiding open conflict with
Sparta.
Argos would reproach theAthenians for this inaction,
pointing to the treaty betweenthem, which stated that enemies
of Argos were not to be allowedpassage through the allied
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territory.
Seeking consolation, argosdemanded that Athens send some
of the Mycenaeans and Helotssettled at Neopactus to Pylos,
from where they could beginharassing Sparta from the west.
Alcibiades managed to persuadethe Athenian assembly to have it
inscribed on the stele bearingthe Peace of Nicias that the
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Spartans had broken their oaths.
As a result, it was agreed thata force of helots be sent to
Pylos, from where they couldraid the Mycenaean region.
Still, athens would continue toformally abide by the peace of
Nicias and refrain fromlaunching any direct attacks
against Sparta.
Alcibiades had succeeded ingaining broad Athenian support
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for the alliance with Argos, butit appears this support did not
yet extend to the resumption ofopen war.
It appears this support did notyet extend to the resumption of
open war.
The hesitation wasn'tnecessarily due to a desire to
avoid conflict with Spartaaltogether, but rather a
reluctance to risk Atheniancitizens in renewed fighting.
The alliances brokered byAlcibiades, which would
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potentially see others doing thebulk of the fighting, were far
more palatable to the Athenianpublic.
However, alcibiades foundhimself increasingly frustrated
as he attempted to advance hisanti-Spartan policy.
His setbacks would continueduring the latest round of
elections, when Nicias andseveral of his supporters were
chosen as generals whileAlcibiades was passed over.
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Donald Kagan interprets thisdevelopment as a vote for
caution over adventure, writing"the failure of Alcibiades'
strategy to win an immediate anddecisive result, and perhaps
the fear of renewed war againstSparta, led to a fateful change
in Athenian leadership".
This result made clear thatAthens was not yet ready to
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abandon the peace of Nicias.
Though it remained committed tothe alliance with Argos, the
city now found itself in acontradictory position of
belonging to the alliance of twohostile states.
The resurgence of the supportof Nicias suggests that the
Athenians were attempting tohave the best of both worlds.
But such a balancing act couldnot last indefinitely.
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At this time, divisions withinthe Spartan government were also
evident.
Some factions continued tosupport the peace of Nicias,
while others believed it hadlost all authority and should be
abandoned.
The manoeuvres orchestrated byour sobrieties in the
Peloponnese the previous yearmay have strengthened the
arguments of the pro-war faction.
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However, since Athens hadtechnically not violated the
terms of the treaty, spartarefrained from declaring the
peace formally over and gave noofficial response to the
Athenians' accusations ofoath-breaking.
The remainder of the winterpassed without major action from
either Sparta or Athens aroundEpidaurus or Argos.
Nevertheless, the twoneighbouring cities continued to
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engage in intermittentskirmishing.
Towards the end of the winter,the Argives made a concerted
effort to breach the walls ofEpidaurus and take the city.
Yet this attempt failed due tomiscalculation.
The Argives underestimated howmany enemy forces still remained
within the city.
The Argives underestimated howmany enemy forces still remained
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within the city by the time ofthe warmer months of 418 BC
arrived.
Sparta recognised the need toact decisively in the Argolid.
Thucydides tells us that theylaunched a sizeable campaign
because their allies, theEpidarians, were in distress,
and of their other Peloponnesianallies, some were in rebellion
and others ill-disposed.
They thought that if they didnot take action swiftly, the
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trouble would go further.
In short, the Spartans saw itsgrip on the Peloponnese slipping
Without decisive intervention.
Their dominance risked beingovertaken by a rising power in
the region.
Although Alcibiades had notbeen elected as general for that
year, the effects of hisprevious policies were now
reverberating throughout thePeloponnese, helping to provoke
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Sparta's more assertive response.
King Aegis would act far moredecisively this year compared to
the indecisive manoeuvres ofthe previous campaign.
One of the largest Peloponnesianforces yet assembled was called
into the field with theintention of concentrating at
Phileas in Arcadia, near theArgolid border.
The Spartan-led force comprisedof two major contingents.
The first, gathered in Arcadia,included the full Spartan army,
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the Tigeans and other Arcadianallies, amounting to some 8,000
hoplites.
The second force, set torendezvous at Phyllis, consisted
of other Peloponnesiancity-states and Sparta's allies
from beyond the peninsula.
This contingent added another12,000 hoplites, 5,000 light
troops and 500 cavalry, as wellas 500 mounted infantry trained
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to support the cavalry.
The hoplites in this secondforce came primarily from
Corinth, the Boeotian cities andPhyllis, along with the
surrounding centres.
Thucydides notes that the menfrom these areas had committed
their entire fighting strength,given the likelihood a battle
would be fought in or near theirown territory.
The light troops and cavalrycame from Boeotia, where the
(20:05):
local terrain encouraged thedevelopment of such forces and,
by extension, superior trainingin their use compared to the
other regions.
Argos had been made aware ofSparta's intentions during the
early planning stages of thecampaign.
While it appears they knew ofthe assembly point, the Argives
delayed action until thePeloponnesian forces began to
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move.
They may have been reluctant tocommit too early, wary that
Aegis may once again change hiscourse mid-campaign, as they had
done the previous year.
Then the Spartans haddeliberately positioned
themselves, so their ultimateobjective was unclear.
Ultimate objective was unclear.
Learning from that experience,the Argives likely exercised
caution, waiting for clearerindications of Aegis' intentions
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before making their move.
In response to the impendingthreat, the Argives raised a
force of 7,000 hoplites.
They were joined by 3,000 fromElis and 2,000 from Mantinea,
with a combined force settingout to confront the enemy.
Although Athens, now againunder influence from Nicias and
his supporters, had agreed tosend a force of 1,000 hoplites
and 300 cavalry, this Atheniancontingent had not yet arrived
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by the time the Argive-led forcemarched out from their city.
Looking at the numbers, it isclear that the Argive's and
their allies were outnumberedroughly 20,000 troops from the
Peloponnesian League againstaround 12,000 from the Argive
Alliance.
Given that the Peloponnesianarmy was assembling in two
separate forces, the Argivesrecognised the importance of
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intercepting one of thesecontingents before they could
unite.
This strategic necessity ledthem to march west into Arcadia,
aiming to intercept the forceadvancing from Sparta.
Aegis, however, was fully awareof the vulnerability his army
faced before it could link upwith the northern contingent.
To mitigate this risk, heavoided the most direct route
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from Sparta to Phyllis.
Instead, he took a wider pathto the west.
As he advanced northward, theArgives had likely anticipated
that Aegis would march onMantinea, one of the key allies
and located on the most directroute north.
If Aegis had reached Mantineawith only a Spartan-led force,
it's possible he could havetaken the city, but that did not
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appear to be part of his plan.
Aegis had no intention ofengaging in battle until the
full Peloponnesian army wasunited.
The Argives nonethelesscontinued their march to
Mantinea, where their numberswere bolstered by the Mantinean
forces.
There they likely learned theSpartans had bypassed the city
and had taken a more westernroute.
Now reinforced, the Argoscontinued westward, hoping to
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intercept Aegis before he couldjoin his allies.
Contact between the two forceswas finally made west of
Mantinea, near Mithaeodrum,where both sides moved to occupy
the high ground and establishdefensive positions.
Upon learning that Aegis hadnot yet linked up with the
northern army, the Argosprepared to give battle.
However, aegis was not yetlinked up with the northern army
.
The Argives prepared to givebattle.
However, aegis was not willingto risk a fight just yet.
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Though the forces were close insize with the Argives, perhaps
slightly outnumbering his own,it was clear that once united
with the rest of thePeloponnesian army, the
advantage would swingdramatically in Sparta's favour.
During the night, while theArgyves were making preparations
for battle, aegis quickly brokecamp and withdrew under the
cover of darkness.
The Spartan retreat was notdetected until morning.
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By then.
The distance between the armieswas too great to overcome
quickly.
The Argyves, having focused onpreparing for combat that
morning, could not immediatelypursue Breaking down camp, and
organising a full army for aforced march would take time.
This delay allowed Aegis toreach Phyllis without being
forced into a premature battle.
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There, the Spartan army wasjoined by the 2nd Peloponnesian
force, swelling the numbers toapproximately 20,000 hoplites
plus additional light troops andcavalry.
With the two armies now united,the Spartans held a significant
numerical advantage and wereprepared for the next phase of
the campaign.
The Argives were aware of wherethe Spartans had marched and
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realised that their new positionlay closer to Argos than their
own.
Now united, the Peloponnesiansposed a significant threat to
the Argive territory.
As soon as the Argive brokecamp, they marched directly back
to Argos to defend theirhomeland.
Upon arrival, and discoveringthat Aegis had not yet set out,
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they then moved north to meetthe army in the field.
There were two possible routesthat the Peloponnesians could
take through the mountainousterrain to reach the Argive
plain.
One led towards Namir and wasbetter suited to cavalry.
The other, though more direct,passed through rugged country
that was difficult for cavalrybut still usable by the infantry
.
The Argive army chose to headtowards Nemea, expecting to meet
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the Spartans there.
Thucydides simply states thiswas the road that they
anticipated the Peloponnesianswould take, though he offers no
explanation for the decision.
Several possibilities exist.
Perhaps the presence of cavalryin the Spartan army made the
Nemean route appear more likely.
Or maybe the Argives werestalling, hoping for
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negotiations that might preventa battle.
It's also been suggested thatthe Argive leadership was
unaware of the western route,though this seems unlikely Given
its strategic significance.
It too emerged on the Argiveplain and posed a direct threat
to Argos.
Part of the Peloponnesian force,including the cavalry and
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troops from Sikion, megara andBoeotia, did indeed advance
along the Nemean Road.
This was the contingent theArgives initially encountered.
However, two additional columnsfrom the main Peloponnesian
army made a night march alongthe western route, positioning
themselves behind the Argivesand effectively cutting them off
from the city.
This manoeuvre left the Argivearmy in a perilous situation.
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A large hoplite force now stoodbetween them and Argos, while a
lighter, more mobile forcepressed from the front.
A retreat towards Argos riskedexposing their rear to
harassment and pursuit by thehoplites moving in from behind
them.
Once word arrived that thecountryside behind them was
being ravaged, the Argives beganwithdrawing from their position
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near Namir.
During the retreat, they wereattacked by enemy skirmishes,
with casualties sustained onboth sides.
Meanwhile, the mainPeloponnesian force from the
rear had not yet reached Namir,but continued advancing along
the road.
The Argives had now fallen backon along the road.
The Argives had now fallen backon.
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The Argive army eventually madeit back down into the plains,
where the rest of thePeloponnesian force, including
the Spartans, was located.
Contact was made and both sidesbegan forming up for battle.
The Spartans ceased theirravaging of the area and
likewise prepared for combat.
Despite making it back to theplains, the Argives now found
themselves in a dangerousposition.
The Spartan army stood beforethem, cutting off their route to
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Argos.
To the hills behind them, inthe west, another Peloponnesian
column, including theCorinthians, had taken up a
position, and to the rear, alongthe path they had just
retreated from, were theremaining Peloponnesian allies
and the cavalry.
Yet Thucydides tells us that theArgives did not initially
perceive the danger.
Instead, they believed they hadthe Spartans trapped in Argive
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territory and were emboldened bythis false sense of advantage.
Both sides were willing tofight, each convinced they held
the upper hand.
However, within the Argiveleadership, two generals
recognised the true nature oftheir predicament.
As the two armies prepared toengage, they stepped forward and
requested a meeting with Aegis.
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They urged him not to give theorder to attack, proposing
instead that Argos submit to afair and equal arbitration.
Thucydides notes that thisdiscussion was held without the
knowledge or approval of eitherarmy.
Only one other man, ahigh-ranking official trusted by
Aegis, was brought into thetalks.
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As a result, all decisions madeat this critical juncture were
reached solely between thesefour individuals.
The outcome of this unusualmeeting, just before the battle
was to begin, was the unexpectedarrangement of a four-month
truce.
When Aegis returned to his army, he immediately made
preparations for thePeloponnesian forces to depart
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the Argyllid without offeringany explanation to his allies,
while the Spartans and theirallies were legally compelled to
follow Aegis' orders.
This move severely impacted themorale of the army legally
compelled to follow Aegis'orders.
This move severely impacted themorale of the army.
The allies lost respect forAegis' authority and a sense of
disillusionment spread.
The consensus was that thegreat army which had been
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assembled with such effort hadbeen utterly wasted.
The Peloponnesians had theirenemies surrounded, yet they
were now retreating withouthaving achieved anything of
significance given the size oftheir force.
Back in Sparta, aegis' enemiesseized upon this moment to
undermine his authority anddiscredit the policies he
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supported.
Meanwhile, in Argos, the news ofthe truce caused widespread
anger.
The Argives had believed thatvictory was within their grasp
and were furious that, at thelast moment, the battle was
taken from them.
Argos, a democratic city, sawthis as a betrayal and the
people were enraged that theyhad not been consulted about the
truce.
The anger culminated inviolence when the army returned
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to the city.
Thrasylus, one of the Argivegenerals who had played a role
in arranging the truce wasalmost stoned to death by the
mob.
He managed to seek refuge at analtar, but the people were not
satisfied with his escape.
They decreed that he should bestripped of all his property for
his actions in brokering thepeace.
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After the build-up of forces,the extensive marching and the
dramatic counter-marching, theshowdown in the Argive Plain
ultimately turned into ananti-climax.
By the time this pivotal momenthad passed, the Athenians had
finally arrived with theirreinforcements 1,000 hoplites
and 300 cavalry.
However, their forces were toosmall to make any significant
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impact and arrived too late toinfluence the outcome of the
campaign.
Despite the discontent withinArgos over the truce, the
Argives were still hesitant tobreak the agreement.
They feared that allowing theAthenians to address their
assembly, given the people'sanger, would convince the masses
to break the truce altogether.
As a result, the Argivesrequested that the Athenians
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leave and Athens' repeatedrequests to address the assembly
were denied.
However, alcibiades, who hadaccompanied the Athenian force
as an ambassador, seized theopportunity.
While in Argos, he addressedthe Argives and their allies
Elis and Mantinea in whatappears to have been a council
setting, according to Thucydides.
Alcibiades argued that thetreaty had not been lawfully
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made without the consent of therest of the alliance and that
they should now, since theAthenians had arrived at such
favourable moment, resume thewar.
While this was likely theessence of Alcibiades' argument,
it was compelling enough topersuade Elis, mantinea and the
other smaller allies to continuethe fight.
This effectively led to theLeague's decision to continue
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military action, despite theArgos' reluctance to break the
truce.
The target for the League's nextcampaign was Orchomenus in
Arcadia, a strategicallysignificant city.
It sat on a critical route thatcould prevent an army marching
from the Corinthian isthmus fromreaching the central
Peloponnese.
This was essentially an effortto avoid the earlier situation
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where the two Peloponnesianarmies had met and then marched
into the Argive plain, a movethat had led to the frustrating
anticlimax of the truce.
The League marched westward andlaid siege to Archiminus.
After some delay, the Argiveforces arrived to join the siege
.
The defenders, realising theirsituation, quickly surrendered
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and the city entered into a newalliance, becoming the newest
member of the Argive League.
News of Archiminus' fall was ablow to Sparta, heightening the
anger within the Peloponnesiancamp and making Aegis' actions
in the Argive Plain seem evenmore disastrous.
Tensions within the Spartangovernment reached a boiling
point and plans were made todestroy Aegis' house and then
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fine him 10,000 drachma.
However, aegis admitted faultand vowed to avenge the disgrace
in his next campaign.
His pledge temporarily haltedany punishment, but he was now
assigned advisors who wouldaccompany him on future
campaigns, ensuring that hecould not act without their
consent.
It seemed the Spartangovernment was not questioning
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Aegis' abilities as a militaryleader, but rather his political
missteps.
As a military leader, butrather his political missteps.
Aegis had likely been avoidingbattle to buy time, hoping to
sway the oligarchs of Argos tochange their policies.
Initially, much of the Spartangovernment supported this
cautious strategy, but the lossof Orchomenus and the resulting
frustration put an end to thepatience for such an approach.
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The hope that Argos might fallfrom within had now cost the
Spartans a strategicallyvaluable city with potential
ramifications for their futureactions.
While Aegis had been reluctantto act as swiftly as the
majority of the Spartangovernment wished, he now found
himself forced to comply withthe broader consensus.
Fortunately, anotheropportunity to reverse his
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earlier failures was soon topresent itself Tigea, a city
that had been a founding memberof the Peloponnesian League in
the 6th century had grown bolderin the wake of Sparta's
perceived weakness.
A faction within Tigea nowfavoured an alliance, with Argos
gaining dominance in the city.
The opposing faction, whichsought to maintain the city's
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ties with Sparta, sent word toSparta that if action wasn't
taken quickly, tigea would jointhe Argyve League.
The loss of Tigea was asituation Sparta could not
afford.
The fall of Ocumenes wasalready a blow, but the loss of
Tigea would significantly weakenthe Peloponnesian League and
Sparta's position as a dominantpower in the region.
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Sparta's alliance with Tigeiahad been pivotal in its rise to
power, and losing the city wouldnow signal a decline in its
influence.
Faced with this intimate threat, aegis marched out once again,
this time with a renewed senseof urgency.
His mission was clear to saveTigeia and restore Sparta's
prestige and dominance withinGreece.
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As we have seen, the tensionswithin Greece were steadily
increasing and by this point thepeace of Nicias remained in
place, largely because Athensand Sparta had yet to engage
directly in battle.
The episode illustratedAlcibiades' continued aggressive
stance towards Sparta, where hesought to pursue his diplomatic
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goals through military action.
Alcibiades' focus turned toisolating Sparta by targeting
its allies, particularly Corinth.
If Corinth and otherPeloponnesian cities could be
cut off from Sparta, it washoped that these cities might
either negotiate separately withAthens or join the Argive
League.
Sparta responded to Alcibiades'campaign but avoided direct
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confrontation with the Athenians, strategically positioning
themselves to avoid battle.
This outcome achievedAlcibiades' intended result.
Corinth's isolation was furthersolidified.
Though negotiations withCorinth took place, they failed
to yield to Athenian demands,appearing more as a delaying
tactic to buy time for theSpartans to launch a new
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campaign.
The Spartans eventuallymobilised a fresh army, sending
it toward Argos in an attempt torelieve pressure on their
northern Peloponnesian allies.
However, aegis once againavoided direct engagement,
causing Athenian forces to bedrawn away from their position
near the Isthmus to assist Argos.
This marked the end of the 419BC campaigning season, with no
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battles fought and both Athensand Sparta appearing hesitant to
engage directly.
That winter it became clearboth sides were dissatisfied
with the current policies.
Athens expressed its discontentwhen Alcibiades was not voted
into the position of general forthe coming year.
Within Sparta, the pro-warfaction seemed to gain traction,
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largely due to Alcibiades'actions and Sparta's reluctance
to respond forcibly.
As the 418 BC campaigning seasonarrived, agis, the Spartan king
took decisive action bylaunching an army to threaten
Argos and relieve pressure onEpidaurus, which the Argives had
besieged over the winter.
This marked the beginning ofthe Peloponnesian campaign of
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418 BC, which, despite its boldintentions and the immense size
of the Peloponnesian army,ultimately faltered in its
execution.
The large army under Aegis atone point outmaneuvered and
surrounded the Argive forces,holding the advantage both in
numbers and position.
Yet the opportunity to delivera decisive blow was squandered,
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not due to miscalculation in thefield, but because of a sudden
and unauthorised politicalcompromise.
A hastily arranged truceresulted, leaving both sides
deeply dissatisfied.
Sparta's allies felt betrayedby Aegis' abrupt withdrawal,
while the Democratic Assembly ofArgos was outraged at being
sidelined from the decisionsthat directly impacted their
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security and honour.
Alcibiades' presence in theaftermath ensured that Sparta's
fleeting moments of advantagedid not translate into lasting
stability.
His speech at Argos reignitedthe anti-Spartan coalition and
fractured any fragile peace thathad momentarily settled over
the region.
While Argos itself refrainedfrom openly breaking the truce,
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the rest of the League wasconvinced to continue
hostilities, effectivelyundermining the very agreement
that had just been struck.
The events of 418 BC revealedhow fragile alliances, personal
ambition and political systemscould quickly undo even the most
coordinated military efforts.
With the conflict reigniting sosoon after a major campaign had
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ended, it was clear that thePeloponnesian War was far from
over.
Rather, the conclusion of the418 BC campaign served as a
prelude to one of the mostsignificant land battles of the
entire war, setting the stagefor further escalation and
turmoil in Greece.
The Argives were now completely surrounded From the
plain, the Spartans and theirallies shut them off from the
city.
Above them were the Corinthians, the Lysians and Pelanians, and
on the side of Nemea, theBoeotians, siconians and
Megarians.
Meanwhile, their army waswithout cavalry, the Athenians
alone amongst their allies nothaving yet arrived Thucydides.
(00:39):
Hello, I'm Mark Selleck, andwelcome back to Casting Through
Ancient Greece, episode 94,diplomacy by Force.
The Peace of Nicias would seethe first phase of the
Peloponnesian War come to aclose, with a decade of conflict
within Greece subsiding.
The aim was for both Athens andSparta to reach an agreement
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that would allow them to coexistwhile also pursuing their
self-interests.
To reach an agreement thatwould allow them to coexist
while also pursuing theirself-interests.
However, as we have seen, bothentered into a peace either at a
strategic disadvantage orsuffering from war weariness.
This led both sides to makingagreements without consulting
their various allies, placingthose allies in a position of
disadvantage.
While the terms were agreedupon at a time when both sides
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were tired of war, the questionremained would these conditions
hold once both Athens and Spartaregain their strength and
morale had recovered withintheir populations?
With the peace of Nicias,geographical dynamics within
Greece changed dramaticallywithin the year.
With Athens and Spartatechnically allied, there was no
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longer a counterweight tosupport the many smaller cities
that had not fared well underthe peace terms.
As a result, corinth, sparta'slargest ally, encouraged,
assisted and then became part ofthe new league under the
leadership of Argos, sparta'straditional rival on the
Peloponnese.
Leadership of Argos, Sparta'straditional rival on the
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Peloponnese.
As the Argive League came intobeing, the diplomatic situation
became confusing and worrisomefor many.
Sparta attempted to counter theformation of the League
diplomatically and then throughforce, but it persisted.
Now, facing two potentialthreats the Argive League and
the prospect of renewed conflictwith Athens, sparta began
taking measures to eliminate atleast one.
However, in doing so, theybreached the terms of the Peace
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of Nicias.
In an attempt to fulfil theothers, Sparta entered into an
alliance with Thebes in order toregain territory to return to
Athens.
Yet for this blatant breach ofthe peace they would act too
little, too late and only worsentheir situation with Athens.
Many of the issues underpinningthe peace remained unresolved,
and now Sparta had created a newbreach by forming an alliance
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outside of their agreement withAthens.
Sparta's manoeuvring duringthis period also alarmed Argos,
which initially feared it wasbeing isolated in a weak league,
believing Sparta and Athenswere working together.
However, with the rise of theAthenian Alcibiades, who was
hostile towards Sparta, argoswould come to an understanding
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of the true nature of relationsbetween Athens and Sparta.
Relief also followed when Argoslearned of Athens' intention to
form an alliance with them as acounter to Sparta.
Under the Peace of Nicias thiswould not have been possible,
but Alcibiades had now gained alarger following and enthusiasm
had shifted towards hisanti-Spartan policies.
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In this episode, we willcontinue with the disintegration
of the Peace of Nicias.
Technically, the peace wasstill in place, but with many
unresolved issues and the newbreaches it was only recognised
in name by this stage, thoughopen hostilities had not yet
recommenced between Athens andSparta.
It would only be a matter oftime.
In this episode, we will seeAlcibiades' policy begin to take
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shape.
Initially, he would applydiplomatic pressure, though this
time he would use diplomaticpressure, though this time he
would use military presencerather than diplomats to
pressure Sparta and its allies.
Alcibiades campaigning in thePeloponnese would ultimately
provoke Sparta to respond andput their army into the field,
directed at Argos, with themajority of those in the
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Athenian council and assemblynow backing a policy more
hostile to the Spartans,alcibiades continued to pursue
as what he saw as Athens' bestpath forward.
As we saw in the last episode,he had used diplomatic
manoeuvrings to discredit hispolitical opponent, nicias,
while also exposing Sparta asunreliable in negotiations and
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in upholding terms of the peace.
Although he had painted Spartain this light through deceitful
means, we have also seen that afaction within the Spartan
government was already lookingto discard the peace of Nicias
and resume hostilities.
With the approach of the summerof 419 BC, athens had now
established alliances withPeloponnesian cities that would
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allow them to pursue moreaggressive actions aimed at
weakening Sparta.
With Argos, elos and Menteneanow aligned with the Athenians,
alcibiades arranged anexpedition into the Peloponnese
with their support.
The aim was not to march outand engage Sparta in a battle,
but rather to use military forceas a diplomatic tool.
He hoped to apply enoughpressure on Corinth and on some
engage Sparta in a battle, butrather to use military force as
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a diplomatic tool.
He hoped to apply enoughpressure on Corinth and on some
of Sparta's other allies toweaken their position in the
Peloponnese.
Alcibiades wasted no time inlaunching the expedition,
needing to act while he stillheld the advantage.
Sparta had lost much of itsprestige over the past year and
Alcirieties sought to strengthen.
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The Argive League, a smallAthenian force composed of
hoplites and archers, sailed tothe Peloponnese, where they
first linked up with the Argives, before marching on to Mantinea
and Elis, gathering more troopsat each allied city along the
way.
Once the allied army wasassembled, they moved into
Achaea, north of Elis, stoppingoutside the coastal city of
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Petrae, which lay on thesouthern side of the Corinthian
Gulf, opposite Neopactus.
Alcibiades successfullynegotiated with the city,
forcing them into an alliance.
He also persuaded them toconstruct walls down to the sea,
improving both their defensiveposition and communication lines
against potential attack.
Once this was complete, theintention was to move further
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along the coast, to Reum, whichmarked the narrowest point of
the Corinthian Gulf, where afort was to be built.
If successful, athens wouldhave effectively cut off the
Corinthian shipping through thearea, as they would control both
coasts at this chokepoint.
However, before this part ofthe plan could be carried out,
corinth, sicyon and others inthe region marched out to
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prevent Alcibiades from reachingthe site.
Alcibiades and others'perception that Sparta had lost
its influence in the Peloponneseappeared to be confirmed by
this expedition.
He had entered the Peloponnesewith only a small force and
without naval support.
Yet he was able to marchthrough the northern Peloponnese
unopposed.
Upon reaching Petraea, the cityseemed to come over to his side
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very quickly, despite likelybeing able to resist the limited
force he had with him.
Alcibiades had now establisheda strong position along the
northern coast of thePeloponnese.
However, this was only one partof his plan to isolate Corinth.
The second phase was alsounderway.
Further south On the ArgolidPeninsula, just inland from
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Argos, lay the city of Epidaurus, which remained allied with
Sparta.
The Argives were tasked withmarching into its territory and
capturing the city of Epidaurus,which remained allied with
Sparta.
The Argives were tasked withmarching into its territory and
capturing the city.
To justify their actions, argoscited a religious violation as
a pretext for the attack.
If both objectives north andsouth could be achieved and held
, it was very possible thatCorinth and other Peloponnesian
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cities on the Corinthian side ofthis line would find themselves
isolated from Sparta andvulnerable to attacks from both
directions.
The broader idea was to exertenough pressure through these
military maneuvers and thethreats they presented to compel
Sparta's allies in the regionto either switch sides or at
least adopt a neutral stance.
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It appears Sparta was beginningto recognise what was taking
place and the damage it could doto their Peloponnesian League
if carried out effectively.
Corinth was their chief ally inthe League and although they
held some blame for the creationof the Argive League, unfolding
events would see them reaffirmtheir alliance with Sparta.
However, their main intentionall along seems to have been to
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bring Sparta back into conflictwith Athens.
King Aegis, back in Sparta,would arrange for the full
Spartan army to assemble andthen march north onto the
frontier, into Arcadia.
From this position, aegis hadoptions and kept his opponents
guessing about his intentions.
He could choose to direct hisarmy against any of the
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Peloponnesian allies who hadsided with Athens.
However, once he reached thefrontier, sacrifices were
conducted and, we are told, theomens came back unfavourable.
As a result, the Spartan armyreturned to Sparta, where they
would remain for the next monthdue to the Carnean Festival, a
religious observance thatrestricted Sparta from engaging
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in warfare during its duration.
This withdrawal is curious.
As Donald Kagan points out, theSpartans had in the past, and
would again in the future,ignore unfavourable omens during
critical moments, perhaps withforces from other Peloponnesian
allies accompanying him.
Aegis used the omens as aconvenient excuse to return to
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Sparta before the Carnanianfestival officially began.
It still feels like a strangereason to abandon the march, but
it's difficult for us to fullyunderstand just how seriously
the Spartans took theirreligious festivals.
There may also have beennon-religious motivations for
the withdrawal, but, as withmuch of Sparta's decision making
, we are left with no clearpicture.
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The Argives, however, would takeadvantage of the Spartan
withdrawal and employed a bit oftrickery to circumvent the
restrictions of the Carneanfestival, which was meant to
apply to all Dorians, of whichthe Argives were part of.
They invaded Epidaurus on the27th day of the month prior to
the Carneia and, while in enemyterritory, they continued to
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recognise each day as stillbeginning on the 27th day of the
previous month.
One must wonder whether theArgives held the Carneia in the
same regard as the Spartans.
With the Argives now inEpidaurian territory, the
Epidaran sent out pleas forassistance to their
Peloponnesian allies.
However, few answered the call,citing the religious period as
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preventing them from marching.
Those that did respond wentonly as far as the borders of
the Epidarus, ensuring theywould not technically engage in
any form of warfare.
The Argive League sought to takefull advantage of the inaction
from Epidaurus' allies, butbefore they could mount an
attack on the city, athens wouldcall for a conference.
Instead of forcing a battle todecide matters, alcibiades
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turned to the hope of achievinghis aims through the pressure he
had built up via his militarymanoeuvres.
It was likely the withdrawal ofthe Spartan force that led him
to pursue a favorable outcomewith Corinth, with his forces
positioned in the north and theArgives holding the south.
In the Argyllid, a line waseffectively drawn that cut
Corinth off from Sparta.
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With the Spartans now seeminglywithdrawn, corinth may have
felt abandoned, while hostileforces stood within easy reach
of the opening of the Isthmus.
A conference with theCorinthians was held at Mantinea
, where Alcibiades attempted topersuade them to abandon the
Spartan alliance.
However, the Corinthians werenot easily swayed.
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They called Alcibiades out,accusing him of speaking one way
but acting another, referringspecifically to his talk of
peace, while at the same timeallied forces were engaged in
hostilities with their allies atEpidaurus.
Under such circumstances, theysaw no reason to continue
discussions.
Alcibiades, hoping the talksmight still produce a favourable
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outcome, was willing to concedeon this point.
Both sides agreed to sendrepresentatives to halt
hostilities in the south.
The Argives subsequentlyreturned home and talks resumed
once again in Mentinea.
However, despite the continuednegotiations, no agreement was
reached.
One wonders whether theCorinthians ever truly intended
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to make concessions toAlcibiades or whether they were
simply stalling for time,waiting for the Spartans to
march again.
With talks leading nowhere, theArgives once again invaded
Epidaurus, laying waste to itslands.
In response to this renewedaggression, king Aegis mobilized
his army and marched into thedirection of Argos.
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This time, the Argives andAlcibiades gained a clear
picture of Sparta's intention.
Alcibiades dispatched 1,000Athenian hoplites to support the
Argives, prompting the Argivearmy to fall back to their city.
However, as before, aegis wassaid to have received
unfavourable omens upon reachingthe border and once again
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returned home.
It seemed he had littleinterest in engaging in battle,
and perhaps his true aim wassimply to disrupt the Argive
campaign, which he succeeded indoing.
Still, once word reached him ofthe Athenian reinforcement en
route, the Omens may haveconveniently offered a
justification to avoid conflictaltogether.
This would mark the finalmanoeuvres in the Peloponnesian
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campaign of 419 BC.
Alcibiades had failed to achievehis ultimate goal of severing
Corinth from the Spartanalliance.
With the campaigning seasonover, he would lead his Athenian
troops back to Attica for thewinter.
During the winter, sparta wouldsend troops to reinforce
Epidaurus in anticipation ofrenewed attacks from Argos.
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Once the new campaigning seasonbegan, a contingent of 300 men
was dispatched by sea to avoidmarching through Argive
territory and provoking a directconfrontation.
Their route, however, took thempast Athenian-controlled bases
where the voyage could have beenintercepted.
Thucydides notes that theSpartan fleet eluded the
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Athenians, but consideringAthens' overwhelming control of
the region, it is plausible theyallowed the fleet to pass
unopposed.
Perhaps Athens, for the moment,was avoiding open conflict with
Sparta.
Argos would reproach theAthenians for this inaction,
pointing to the treaty betweenthem, which stated that enemies
of Argos were not to be allowedpassage through the allied
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territory.
Seeking consolation, argosdemanded that Athens send some
of the Mycenaeans and Helotssettled at Neopactus to Pylos,
from where they could beginharassing Sparta from the west.
Alcibiades managed to persuadethe Athenian assembly to have it
inscribed on the stele bearingthe Peace of Nicias that the
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Spartans had broken their oaths.
As a result, it was agreed thata force of helots be sent to
Pylos, from where they couldraid the Mycenaean region.
Still, athens would continue toformally abide by the peace of
Nicias and refrain fromlaunching any direct attacks
against Sparta.
Alcibiades had succeeded ingaining broad Athenian support
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for the alliance with Argos, butit appears this support did not
yet extend to the resumption ofopen war.
It appears this support did notyet extend to the resumption of
open war.
The hesitation wasn'tnecessarily due to a desire to
avoid conflict with Spartaaltogether, but rather a
reluctance to risk Atheniancitizens in renewed fighting.
The alliances brokered byAlcibiades, which would
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potentially see others doing thebulk of the fighting, were far
more palatable to the Athenianpublic.
However, alcibiades foundhimself increasingly frustrated
as he attempted to advance hisanti-Spartan policy.
His setbacks would continueduring the latest round of
elections, when Nicias andseveral of his supporters were
chosen as generals whileAlcibiades was passed over.
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Donald Kagan interprets thisdevelopment as a vote for
caution over adventure, writing"the failure of Alcibiades'
strategy to win an immediate anddecisive result, and perhaps
the fear of renewed war againstSparta, led to a fateful change
in Athenian leadership".
This result made clear thatAthens was not yet ready to
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abandon the peace of Nicias.
Though it remained committed tothe alliance with Argos, the
city now found itself in acontradictory position of
belonging to the alliance of twohostile states.
The resurgence of the supportof Nicias suggests that the
Athenians were attempting tohave the best of both worlds.
But such a balancing act couldnot last indefinitely.
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At this time, divisions withinthe Spartan government were also
evident.
Some factions continued tosupport the peace of Nicias,
while others believed it hadlost all authority and should be
abandoned.
The manoeuvres orchestrated byour sobrieties in the
Peloponnese the previous yearmay have strengthened the
arguments of the pro-war faction.
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However, since Athens hadtechnically not violated the
terms of the treaty, spartarefrained from declaring the
peace formally over and gave noofficial response to the
Athenians' accusations ofoath-breaking.
The remainder of the winterpassed without major action from
either Sparta or Athens aroundEpidaurus or Argos.
Nevertheless, the twoneighbouring cities continued to
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engage in intermittentskirmishing.
Towards the end of the winter,the Argives made a concerted
effort to breach the walls ofEpidaurus and take the city.
Yet this attempt failed due tomiscalculation.
The Argives underestimated howmany enemy forces still remained
within the city.
The Argives underestimated howmany enemy forces still remained
(18:07):
within the city by the time ofthe warmer months of 418 BC
arrived.
Sparta recognised the need toact decisively in the Argolid.
Thucydides tells us that theylaunched a sizeable campaign
because their allies, theEpidarians, were in distress,
and of their other Peloponnesianallies, some were in rebellion
and others ill-disposed.
They thought that if they didnot take action swiftly, the
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trouble would go further.
In short, the Spartans saw itsgrip on the Peloponnese slipping
Without decisive intervention.
Their dominance risked beingovertaken by a rising power in
the region.
Although Alcibiades had notbeen elected as general for that
year, the effects of hisprevious policies were now
reverberating throughout thePeloponnese, helping to provoke
(18:56):
Sparta's more assertive response.
King Aegis would act far moredecisively this year compared to
the indecisive manoeuvres ofthe previous campaign.
One of the largest Peloponnesianforces yet assembled was called
into the field with theintention of concentrating at
Phileas in Arcadia, near theArgolid border.
The Spartan-led force comprisedof two major contingents.
The first, gathered in Arcadia,included the full Spartan army,
(19:20):
the Tigeans and other Arcadianallies, amounting to some 8,000
hoplites.
The second force, set torendezvous at Phyllis, consisted
of other Peloponnesiancity-states and Sparta's allies
from beyond the peninsula.
This contingent added another12,000 hoplites, 5,000 light
troops and 500 cavalry, as wellas 500 mounted infantry trained
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to support the cavalry.
The hoplites in this secondforce came primarily from
Corinth, the Boeotian cities andPhyllis, along with the
surrounding centres.
Thucydides notes that the menfrom these areas had committed
their entire fighting strength,given the likelihood a battle
would be fought in or near theirown territory.
The light troops and cavalrycame from Boeotia, where the
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local terrain encouraged thedevelopment of such forces and,
by extension, superior trainingin their use compared to the
other regions.
Argos had been made aware ofSparta's intentions during the
early planning stages of thecampaign.
While it appears they knew ofthe assembly point, the Argives
delayed action until thePeloponnesian forces began to
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move.
They may have been reluctant tocommit too early, wary that
Aegis may once again change hiscourse mid-campaign, as they had
done the previous year.
Then the Spartans haddeliberately positioned
themselves, so their ultimateobjective was unclear.
Ultimate objective was unclear.
Learning from that experience,the Argives likely exercised
caution, waiting for clearerindications of Aegis' intentions
(20:51):
before making their move.
In response to the impendingthreat, the Argives raised a
force of 7,000 hoplites.
They were joined by 3,000 fromElis and 2,000 from Mantinea,
with a combined force settingout to confront the enemy.
Although Athens, now againunder influence from Nicias and
his supporters, had agreed tosend a force of 1,000 hoplites
and 300 cavalry, this Atheniancontingent had not yet arrived
(21:14):
by the time the Argive-led forcemarched out from their city.
Looking at the numbers, it isclear that the Argive's and
their allies were outnumberedroughly 20,000 troops from the
Peloponnesian League againstaround 12,000 from the Argive
Alliance.
Given that the Peloponnesianarmy was assembling in two
separate forces, the Argivesrecognised the importance of
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intercepting one of thesecontingents before they could
unite.
This strategic necessity ledthem to march west into Arcadia,
aiming to intercept the forceadvancing from Sparta.
Aegis, however, was fully awareof the vulnerability his army
faced before it could link upwith the northern contingent.
To mitigate this risk, heavoided the most direct route
(21:58):
from Sparta to Phyllis.
Instead, he took a wider pathto the west.
As he advanced northward, theArgives had likely anticipated
that Aegis would march onMantinea, one of the key allies
and located on the most directroute north.
If Aegis had reached Mantineawith only a Spartan-led force,
it's possible he could havetaken the city, but that did not
(22:21):
appear to be part of his plan.
Aegis had no intention ofengaging in battle until the
full Peloponnesian army wasunited.
The Argives nonethelesscontinued their march to
Mantinea, where their numberswere bolstered by the Mantinean
forces.
There they likely learned theSpartans had bypassed the city
and had taken a more westernroute.
Now reinforced, the Argoscontinued westward, hoping to
(22:45):
intercept Aegis before he couldjoin his allies.
Contact between the two forceswas finally made west of
Mantinea, near Mithaeodrum,where both sides moved to occupy
the high ground and establishdefensive positions.
Upon learning that Aegis hadnot yet linked up with the
northern army, the Argosprepared to give battle.
However, aegis was not yetlinked up with the northern army
.
The Argives prepared to givebattle.
However, aegis was not willingto risk a fight just yet.
(23:09):
Though the forces were close insize with the Argives, perhaps
slightly outnumbering his own,it was clear that once united
with the rest of thePeloponnesian army, the
advantage would swingdramatically in Sparta's favour.
During the night, while theArgyves were making preparations
for battle, aegis quickly brokecamp and withdrew under the
cover of darkness.
The Spartan retreat was notdetected until morning.
(23:32):
By then.
The distance between the armieswas too great to overcome
quickly.
The Argyves, having focused onpreparing for combat that
morning, could not immediatelypursue Breaking down camp, and
organising a full army for aforced march would take time.
This delay allowed Aegis toreach Phyllis without being
forced into a premature battle.
(23:53):
There, the Spartan army wasjoined by the 2nd Peloponnesian
force, swelling the numbers toapproximately 20,000 hoplites
plus additional light troops andcavalry.
With the two armies now united,the Spartans held a significant
numerical advantage and wereprepared for the next phase of
the campaign.
The Argives were aware of wherethe Spartans had marched and
(24:15):
realised that their new positionlay closer to Argos than their
own.
Now united, the Peloponnesiansposed a significant threat to
the Argive territory.
As soon as the Argive brokecamp, they marched directly back
to Argos to defend theirhomeland.
Upon arrival, and discoveringthat Aegis had not yet set out,
(24:37):
they then moved north to meetthe army in the field.
There were two possible routesthat the Peloponnesians could
take through the mountainousterrain to reach the Argive
plain.
One led towards Namir and wasbetter suited to cavalry.
The other, though more direct,passed through rugged country
that was difficult for cavalrybut still usable by the infantry
.
The Argive army chose to headtowards Nemea, expecting to meet
(24:59):
the Spartans there.
Thucydides simply states thiswas the road that they
anticipated the Peloponnesianswould take, though he offers no
explanation for the decision.
Several possibilities exist.
Perhaps the presence of cavalryin the Spartan army made the
Nemean route appear more likely.
Or maybe the Argives werestalling, hoping for
(25:20):
negotiations that might preventa battle.
It's also been suggested thatthe Argive leadership was
unaware of the western route,though this seems unlikely Given
its strategic significance.
It too emerged on the Argiveplain and posed a direct threat
to Argos.
Part of the Peloponnesian force,including the cavalry and
(25:40):
troops from Sikion, megara andBoeotia, did indeed advance
along the Nemean Road.
This was the contingent theArgives initially encountered.
However, two additional columnsfrom the main Peloponnesian
army made a night march alongthe western route, positioning
themselves behind the Argivesand effectively cutting them off
from the city.
This manoeuvre left the Argivearmy in a perilous situation.
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A large hoplite force now stoodbetween them and Argos, while a
lighter, more mobile forcepressed from the front.
A retreat towards Argos riskedexposing their rear to
harassment and pursuit by thehoplites moving in from behind
them.
Once word arrived that thecountryside behind them was
being ravaged, the Argives beganwithdrawing from their position
(26:27):
near Namir.
During the retreat, they wereattacked by enemy skirmishes,
with casualties sustained onboth sides.
Meanwhile, the mainPeloponnesian force from the
rear had not yet reached Namir,but continued advancing along
the road.
The Argives had now fallen backon along the road.
The Argives had now fallen backon.
(26:48):
The Argive army eventually madeit back down into the plains,
where the rest of thePeloponnesian force, including
the Spartans, was located.
Contact was made and both sidesbegan forming up for battle.
The Spartans ceased theirravaging of the area and
likewise prepared for combat.
Despite making it back to theplains, the Argives now found
themselves in a dangerousposition.
The Spartan army stood beforethem, cutting off their route to
(27:10):
Argos.
To the hills behind them, inthe west, another Peloponnesian
column, including theCorinthians, had taken up a
position, and to the rear, alongthe path they had just
retreated from, were theremaining Peloponnesian allies
and the cavalry.
Yet Thucydides tells us that theArgives did not initially
perceive the danger.
Instead, they believed they hadthe Spartans trapped in Argive
(27:33):
territory and were emboldened bythis false sense of advantage.
Both sides were willing tofight, each convinced they held
the upper hand.
However, within the Argiveleadership, two generals
recognised the true nature oftheir predicament.
As the two armies prepared toengage, they stepped forward and
requested a meeting with Aegis.
(27:53):
They urged him not to give theorder to attack, proposing
instead that Argos submit to afair and equal arbitration.
Thucydides notes that thisdiscussion was held without the
knowledge or approval of eitherarmy.
Only one other man, ahigh-ranking official trusted by
Aegis, was brought into thetalks.
(28:14):
As a result, all decisions madeat this critical juncture were
reached solely between thesefour individuals.
The outcome of this unusualmeeting, just before the battle
was to begin, was the unexpectedarrangement of a four-month
truce.
When Aegis returned to his army, he immediately made
preparations for thePeloponnesian forces to depart
(28:35):
the Argyllid without offeringany explanation to his allies,
while the Spartans and theirallies were legally compelled to
follow Aegis' orders.
This move severely impacted themorale of the army legally
compelled to follow Aegis'orders.
This move severely impacted themorale of the army.
The allies lost respect forAegis' authority and a sense of
disillusionment spread.
The consensus was that thegreat army which had been
(28:56):
assembled with such effort hadbeen utterly wasted.
The Peloponnesians had theirenemies surrounded, yet they
were now retreating withouthaving achieved anything of
significance given the size oftheir force.
Back in Sparta, aegis' enemiesseized upon this moment to
undermine his authority anddiscredit the policies he
(29:17):
supported.
Meanwhile, in Argos, the news ofthe truce caused widespread
anger.
The Argives had believed thatvictory was within their grasp
and were furious that, at thelast moment, the battle was
taken from them.
Argos, a democratic city, sawthis as a betrayal and the
people were enraged that theyhad not been consulted about the
truce.
The anger culminated inviolence when the army returned
(29:41):
to the city.
Thrasylus, one of the Argivegenerals who had played a role
in arranging the truce wasalmost stoned to death by the
mob.
He managed to seek refuge at analtar, but the people were not
satisfied with his escape.
They decreed that he should bestripped of all his property for
his actions in brokering thepeace.
(30:02):
After the build-up of forces,the extensive marching and the
dramatic counter-marching, theshowdown in the Argive Plain
ultimately turned into ananti-climax.
By the time this pivotal momenthad passed, the Athenians had
finally arrived with theirreinforcements 1,000 hoplites
and 300 cavalry.
However, their forces were toosmall to make any significant
(30:23):
impact and arrived too late toinfluence the outcome of the
campaign.
Despite the discontent withinArgos over the truce, the
Argives were still hesitant tobreak the agreement.
They feared that allowing theAthenians to address their
assembly, given the people'sanger, would convince the masses
to break the truce altogether.
As a result, the Argivesrequested that the Athenians
(30:45):
leave and Athens' repeatedrequests to address the assembly
were denied.
However, alcibiades, who hadaccompanied the Athenian force
as an ambassador, seized theopportunity.
While in Argos, he addressedthe Argives and their allies
Elis and Mantinea in whatappears to have been a council
setting, according to Thucydides.
Alcibiades argued that thetreaty had not been lawfully
(31:09):
made without the consent of therest of the alliance and that
they should now, since theAthenians had arrived at such
favourable moment, resume thewar.
While this was likely theessence of Alcibiades' argument,
it was compelling enough topersuade Elis, mantinea and the
other smaller allies to continuethe fight.
This effectively led to theLeague's decision to continue
(31:32):
military action, despite theArgos' reluctance to break the
truce.
The target for the League's nextcampaign was Orchomenus in
Arcadia, a strategicallysignificant city.
It sat on a critical route thatcould prevent an army marching
from the Corinthian isthmus fromreaching the central
Peloponnese.
This was essentially an effortto avoid the earlier situation
(31:54):
where the two Peloponnesianarmies had met and then marched
into the Argive plain, a movethat had led to the frustrating
anticlimax of the truce.
The League marched westward andlaid siege to Archiminus.
After some delay, the Argiveforces arrived to join the siege
.
The defenders, realising theirsituation, quickly surrendered
(32:15):
and the city entered into a newalliance, becoming the newest
member of the Argive League.
News of Archiminus' fall was ablow to Sparta, heightening the
anger within the Peloponnesiancamp and making Aegis' actions
in the Argive Plain seem evenmore disastrous.
Tensions within the Spartangovernment reached a boiling
point and plans were made todestroy Aegis' house and then
(32:39):
fine him 10,000 drachma.
However, aegis admitted faultand vowed to avenge the disgrace
in his next campaign.
His pledge temporarily haltedany punishment, but he was now
assigned advisors who wouldaccompany him on future
campaigns, ensuring that hecould not act without their
consent.
It seemed the Spartangovernment was not questioning
(33:00):
Aegis' abilities as a militaryleader, but rather his political
missteps.
As a military leader, butrather his political missteps.
Aegis had likely been avoidingbattle to buy time, hoping to
sway the oligarchs of Argos tochange their policies.
Initially, much of the Spartangovernment supported this
cautious strategy, but the lossof Orchomenus and the resulting
frustration put an end to thepatience for such an approach.
(33:22):
The hope that Argos might fallfrom within had now cost the
Spartans a strategicallyvaluable city with potential
ramifications for their futureactions.
While Aegis had been reluctantto act as swiftly as the
majority of the Spartangovernment wished, he now found
himself forced to comply withthe broader consensus.
Fortunately, anotheropportunity to reverse his
(33:45):
earlier failures was soon topresent itself Tigea, a city
that had been a founding memberof the Peloponnesian League in
the 6th century had grown bolderin the wake of Sparta's
perceived weakness.
A faction within Tigea nowfavoured an alliance, with Argos
gaining dominance in the city.
The opposing faction, whichsought to maintain the city's
(34:06):
ties with Sparta, sent word toSparta that if action wasn't
taken quickly, tigea would jointhe Argyve League.
The loss of Tigea was asituation Sparta could not
afford.
The fall of Ocumenes wasalready a blow, but the loss of
Tigea would significantly weakenthe Peloponnesian League and
Sparta's position as a dominantpower in the region.
(34:27):
Sparta's alliance with Tigeiahad been pivotal in its rise to
power, and losing the city wouldnow signal a decline in its
influence.
Faced with this intimate threat, aegis marched out once again,
this time with a renewed senseof urgency.
His mission was clear to saveTigeia and restore Sparta's
prestige and dominance withinGreece.
(34:49):
As we have seen, the tensionswithin Greece were steadily
increasing and by this point thepeace of Nicias remained in
place, largely because Athensand Sparta had yet to engage
directly in battle.
The episode illustratedAlcibiades' continued aggressive
stance towards Sparta, where hesought to pursue his diplomatic
(35:09):
goals through military action.
Alcibiades' focus turned toisolating Sparta by targeting
its allies, particularly Corinth.
If Corinth and otherPeloponnesian cities could be
cut off from Sparta, it washoped that these cities might
either negotiate separately withAthens or join the Argive
League.
Sparta responded to Alcibiades'campaign but avoided direct
(35:32):
confrontation with the Athenians, strategically positioning
themselves to avoid battle.
This outcome achievedAlcibiades' intended result.
Corinth's isolation was furthersolidified.
Though negotiations withCorinth took place, they failed
to yield to Athenian demands,appearing more as a delaying
tactic to buy time for theSpartans to launch a new
(35:54):
campaign.
The Spartans eventuallymobilised a fresh army, sending
it toward Argos in an attempt torelieve pressure on their
northern Peloponnesian allies.
However, aegis once againavoided direct engagement,
causing Athenian forces to bedrawn away from their position
near the Isthmus to assist Argos.
This marked the end of the 419BC campaigning season, with no
(36:17):
battles fought and both Athensand Sparta appearing hesitant to
engage directly.
That winter it became clearboth sides were dissatisfied
with the current policies.
Athens expressed its discontentwhen Alcibiades was not voted
into the position of general forthe coming year.
Within Sparta, the pro-warfaction seemed to gain traction,
(36:38):
largely due to Alcibiades'actions and Sparta's reluctance
to respond forcibly.
As the 418 BC campaigning seasonarrived, agis, the Spartan king
took decisive action bylaunching an army to threaten
Argos and relieve pressure onEpidaurus, which the Argives had
besieged over the winter.
This marked the beginning ofthe Peloponnesian campaign of
(37:02):
418 BC, which, despite its boldintentions and the immense size
of the Peloponnesian army,ultimately faltered in its
execution.
The large army under Aegis atone point outmaneuvered and
surrounded the Argive forces,holding the advantage both in
numbers and position.
Yet the opportunity to delivera decisive blow was squandered,
(37:25):
not due to miscalculation in thefield, but because of a sudden
and unauthorised politicalcompromise.
A hastily arranged truceresulted, leaving both sides
deeply dissatisfied.
Sparta's allies felt betrayedby Aegis' abrupt withdrawal,
while the Democratic Assembly ofArgos was outraged at being
sidelined from the decisionsthat directly impacted their
(37:46):
security and honour.
Alcibiades' presence in theaftermath ensured that Sparta's
fleeting moments of advantagedid not translate into lasting
stability.
His speech at Argos reignitedthe anti-Spartan coalition and
fractured any fragile peace thathad momentarily settled over
the region.
While Argos itself refrainedfrom openly breaking the truce,
(38:08):
the rest of the League wasconvinced to continue
hostilities, effectivelyundermining the very agreement
that had just been struck.
The events of 418 BC revealedhow fragile alliances, personal
ambition and political systemscould quickly undo even the most
coordinated military efforts.
With the conflict reigniting sosoon after a major campaign had
(38:33):
ended, it was clear that thePeloponnesian War was far from
over.
Rather, the conclusion of the418 BC campaign served as a
prelude to one of the mostsignificant land battles of the
entire war, setting the stagefor further escalation and
turmoil in Greece.
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