August 18, 2025 • 38 mins
The battlefield at Mantinea in 418 BC witnessed one of the most consequential clashes of the Peloponnesian War, a moment when Sparta's reputation hung in the balance. Following years of diplomatic erosion and military hesitation, King Agis led a massive Spartan force north to confront a growing coalition threatening to unravel Sparta's entire alliance system.
What unfolded on that plain near Tegea wasn't merely a battle of spears and shields, but a collision of political visions for Greece. Alcibiades' ambitious strategy of isolating Sparta through diplomatic maneuvering had gained dangerous momentum. Even Tegea, Sparta's original partner in founding the Peloponnesian League, was considering changing allegiance. For Sparta, defeat would mean watching their carefully constructed hegemony crumble; victory might restore the respect their recent failures had squandered.
The battle itself reveals fascinating insights into ancient warfare and leadership. As the armies advanced toward each other—Spartans moving deliberately to flute music, Argives charging with fury—King Agis attempted a complex battlefield maneuver that nearly spelled disaster. The gap that opened in the Spartan line was exploited by elite Argive troops, while some Spartan commanders refused to execute orders they deemed too risky. This moment of crisis tested not just Spartan discipline but the very nature of battlefield command.
Ultimately, Sparta's victory transformed the political landscape. Argos was forced back into the Peloponnesian League, with Spartan garrisons installed and democratic institutions replaced by oligarchy. Athens saw its strategic opportunities in the Peloponnese vanish. Yet despite its immediate significance, Mantinea didn't fundamentally alter the war's trajectory—the stalemate between Athenian naval power and Spartan land dominance persisted for another decade. What the battle truly represents is Sparta's remarkable capacity to recover from adversity when its traditions and position were most threatened. Listen as we explore this pivotal moment when the fate of Greece hung in the balance.
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Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 2 (00:17):
As Thucydides observed, the strong do what
they can and the weak sufferwhat they must, a reality
nowhere more clearlydemonstrated than at Mantinea in
418 BC.
In his account, he regarded theencounter as the greatest that
had occurred for a very longwhile among the Hellenes, where
Sparta reasserted its dominancewith ritual and restraint alike,
(00:39):
even returning the enemy deadunder truce.
Hello, I'm Mark Selick andwelcome back to Castings for
Ancient Greece, episode 95, theBattle of Mantinea.
In our previous episode, weexplored the growing instability
in the Greek world followingthe uneasy peace of Nicias.
Although the treaty technicallyremained in place, its
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foundations had long been eroded.
Rather than curbing hostilities, the foundations had long been
eroded.
Rather than curbing hostilities, the peace had become a
diplomatic fig leaf concealingcontinued maneuvering and rising
antagonism on both sides.
At the centre of thisescalation was Ausopiades, the
ambitious and charismaticAthenian statesman whose bold
vision sought to redraw thebalance of power in the
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Peloponnese.
He turned his efforts towardsisolating Sparta by attacking
its network of allies,particularly targeting Corinth
and aligning more closely withArgos.
Alcibiades' strategy was notwithout success.
Sparta found itselfincreasingly on the defensive,
compelled to respond withoutappearing to break the peace
outright.
Corinth was diplomaticallycornered, while the Argive
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alliance, with Athenian support,pressed its advantage.
Sparta's response, led by KingAgis, was cautious at first.
Despite mobilising a largeforce, agis avoided direct
battle with the Argives, evenwhen he had them surrounded in a
position of clear advantage.
Instead, he negotiated a suddenand unauthorised truce, one
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that deeply angered Sparta'sallies and left the Argive
Democratic Assembly feelingbetrayed.
Far from stabilising the region, the truce only served to
deepen divisions and fan theflames of resentment.
Alcibiades wasted no timecapitalising on this discontent.
Through persuasive diplomacyand public rhetoric, he
reignited the anti-Spartan causewithin the Argive League,
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ensuring that hostilitiesresumed before the truce had a
chance to take hold.
While Argos itself hesitated toopenly break the agreement, its
allies continued militarypreparations and Athenian
support remained steadfast.
As the campaigning season of 418BC progressed, the stage was
set for open conflict.
Sparta now faced mountingpressure from within and without
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prepared to reassert itsauthority through force, agis,
seeing to redeem his earlierfailure and silence his critics,
once again led the Spartan armynorthward, this time with
determination to engage theArgives in open battle.
This brings us to the Battle ofMantinea, one of the most
pivotal and consequential landengagements up to this point in
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the Peloponnesian War.
What took place on the plainsnear Mantinea was not just a
clash of hoplites, but acollision of ideologies,
alliances and reputations.
For Sparta, it was anopportunity to restore its lost
prestige and discipline amongits wavering allies.
For Argos, athens and theircoalition, it was a chance to
prove that the old order couldbe challenged and that Sparta's
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grip on the Peloponnese was nolonger unshakable.
In today's episode, we willtrace the final moves leading to
the battle, examine thecomposition and tactics of the
opposing forces and follow thecourse of the fight itself.
We'll also explore thefar-reaching consequences that
followed, how the single day ofbattle shaped the political and
military landscape of Greece foryears to come.
(03:58):
We finished last episode withthe city-state of Tigeia
threatening to abandon thePeloponnesian League and ally
themselves with Argos.
For Sparta, this would be ahuge blow to their credibility
within the League.
The past year had been one thatwould not have filled their
allies with confidence.
Athens had been able to lead acoalition of forces through the
Peloponnese unopposed, which wasthreatening Sparta's allies.
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Then, when Sparta did get theirarmy in the field, they failed
to act decisively on a number ofoccasions.
Then another ally of theirs,orchomenus, had fallen to the
Argive League, this seeing avitally important strategic
location in the Peloponneseconnecting a number of allies to
Sparta, disappear.
This new threat now emerging inTigea, where factions within
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the city were looking to altertheir diplomatic stance based on
their evolving situation in thePeloponnese, would be a further
blow that could possibly makeit difficult for Sparta to
recover.
Tigea had been the city-statethat Sparta had originally
created the Peloponnesian Leaguewith.
If they left, then this couldhave irreversible effects on the
foundations of the League,effects on the foundations of
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the League Plus.
It probably isn't too hard toimagine that if these debates on
alliances were taking place inTigea, others were also probably
entertaining the idea.
However, agis now had anopportunity to regain his
reputation within Sparta.
Acting with authority and in adecisive manner, he would lead
one of the largest Spartanarmies yet seen, mobilised.
Thucydides would say lead oneof the largest Spartan armies
yet seen, mobilised.
Thucydides would say Upon thisnews, a force marched out from
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Sparta of Spartans and helotsand all their people,
immediately and upon a scalenever before witnessed.
We are not entirely certain ofthe exact numbers here, but
Thucydides appears to bereferring to the Spartiites, who
made up the backbone of thearmy, while when speaking of the
helots, it becomes clear thatmany who had been freed due to
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their past services would be inthis group, with it also
reasonable to expect many stillenslaved helots marching, as we
had seen before.
When speaking of all the people, he is probably referring to
others such as the perioche, whowere free but without citizen
rights, to others such as thePerioeci, who were free but
without citizen rights.
As the Spartans madepreparations for the assembly of
the army, messengers had alsogone out to their allies to
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converge on Tigeia.
The Spartan army marched northand instructed the Arcadians to
follow after them onto Tigeia,while the other allies, such as
the Corinthians, the Oceans,phakaeains and Locrians, had
only short notice of thecampaign.
Due to the distance themessengers had to travel, their
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instructions were to assembleand march for Mantinea as
quickly as they could possiblydo so.
However, these allies wouldalso have the hindrance of being
cut off from the Spartans dueto the fall of Aquamanis, which
lay in the path of their marchtowards the objective, while
they were also probably stillannoyed at the indecisive nature
of their previous campaigns.
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Agis with his Spartan armywould link up with the Arcadians
and had entered the territoryof Mantinea, just north of Tigao
, where they would establish acamp.
With their camp in place rightnear the Temple of Heracles,
they began plundering andravaging the surrounding areas,
taking what they could anddenying supplies and resources
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to their enemies.
Agis could expect to face anarmy of similar size as to the
one he had faced the previousyear at Argos.
While he also had a similarsize force in the field, his
numbers were increased by theArcadians and those at Tigeia,
though he was still going to beoutnumbered or on par with the
Argive League unless his alliesfrom the north could arrive in a
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timely manner.
At some stage during the march,agus had sent back home the
oldest and youngest of theSpartan army to defend Sparta.
It appears he may have arrivedat this decision after learning
of the Spartan army to defendSparta.
It appears he may have arrivedat this decision after learning
of the Elans having fallen outwith the Argive League regarding
where an attack should bedirected.
This would see them march their3,000 troops off to Leprium.
This measure by Agus was toprovide some security to Sparta,
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since Leprium was on the border.
Plus, sparta was always nervousof leaving their territory
unguarded with such a largehelipopulation, though troop
numbers were not the onlyconcern he had to worry about.
The morale of the army and thatof his allies were probably at
a low point, this being due tothe lack of confidence Agis
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would have surely held withinall the ranks.
We have recently covered hiscampaigns, where he failed on a
number of occasions to havetaken decisive action.
But this behaviour could beseen even before the peace of
Nicias had come into being.
Agis had led the Peloponnesianarmy into Attica on two
occasions during the Archidamianphase of the war.
On the first attempt, anearthquake had seen him abandon
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the campaign, while on thesecond, lack of provisions,
storms and the threat of Pyloshad seen him withdraw back into
the Peloponnese.
So in the eyes of his men andhis allies he had yet to prove
himself in battle.
So far they had just seen himwithdraw whenever he was faced
with adversity, when a decisivedecision had to be made.
We'd also covered last episodehow the Spartan government had
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misgivings about Agus as aleader in the field but had
given him what appears to be onelast chance to prove himself.
They appear to have still gonewith Agus to lead the army, as
Plastionax would still have beenunacceptable to many in Sparta,
given his pro-peace stance andhim being discredited in the
past.
Though to prevent seeing arepeat of the last two campaigns
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, ten advisers were sent withAgus to assist in decision
making.
Given the points we had justraised about concerns over Agus,
we find he now faced astrategic dilemma in how to
proceed with the campaign.
Donald Kagan outlines this inhis book the Peloponnesian War.
The campaign.
Donald Kagan outlines this inhis book the Peloponnesian War.
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In undertaking the campaign,agus faced a tricky strategic
problem.
He had to get to Tigea as soonas possible to prevent a coup,
but after his arrival he wouldhave to wait at least a week for
the arrival of the northerncontingent, while in the
meantime being forced toconfront a larger enemy army.
A different Spartan leadercould choose to stay within the
walls of Tigea and refuse battleuntil his allies appeared,
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allowing the enemy to ravage theTigean land, destroying
farmhouses, approach the cityand hurl accusations of
cowardice at the Spartans andtheir commander.
But Agis could not afford toconvey even the slightest hint
that he was afraid to fight,because he knew he would face
superior numbers.
He also was forced to risktaking the entire Spartan army
with him, leaving Sparta itselfundefended at the time when the
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Mycenaeans were perched at Pylos, threatening to launch a
rebellion of the helots, withthe Spartans now establishing
camp at Mantinean territory withtheir allies, the Argive
Alliance would move to counterAegis' army.
They positioned themselves onground that would be difficult
to approach across from theSpartans, with the Argive League
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taking up battle positions.
Aegis would arrange for hisarmy to advance on the enemy
enemy.
Here we get the view fromThucydides that Aegis was acting
in a rash manner, influenced bythe harm done to his reputation
back in Sparta and amongstSparta's allies.
From Thucydides' account, weare told that the Spartans were
outnumbered at this stage andthe Argyres were in a
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well-defended location.
This, highlighting an attack onthe Argyre position, would not
be a smart move.
Thucydides provides us anantidote to highlight this point
.
The Spartans immediatelyadvanced against them and came
up as close as a stone's throwor javelin's cast.
At this point, one of the oldermen in the army, seeing that
they were advancing against sucha strong position, shouted out
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to Agis that he was trying tocure one evil with another,
meaning by this that he waswanting to make up for the
retreat from Argos for which hehad been blamed, by now courting
danger at the wrong time Aguswould hold his army and have
them withdraw back to theirstarting positions before they
became engaged with the Argives.
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Thucydides does mention that itisn't clear if Agus was
influenced by the old man'sadvice or had come to this
decision on his own initiative.
Whatever the reason, aegis wasnow aware the position that the
Argives held provided them toomuch of a defensive advantage.
The Spinozzi-Aegis looked for away to dislodge them from their
position so they could beengaged on more favourable terms
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.
At some point during Aegisbeing in the territory of
Mantinea, he had recognised thata battle was likely to result.
He, or his advisors, now saw itwas in the army's best interest
to recall the troops Agis hadsent back to Sparta.
On their march to Mantinea, amessage was sent back requesting
King Plastionax to return withhis troops to reinforce the
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Spartans.
A river ran through Mantineathat then continued on through
Tigea, and this same river hadbeen the source of many
disagreements between the twoover their history.
Agis would now use this riveras a strategy to try and force
the Argives from their position.
He now took measures to divertthe flow so that the supply of
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water would no longer feed intoTigea.
However, from Thucydides'account.
It doesn't appear that it wasthis operation around the
diverting the rivers course thatsaw the Argos leave their
defensive position, but ratherinternal disagreements between
the men and their generals.
The previous year we had seenthat the Argos had been
extremely frustrated with theircommanders for allowing the
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Spartans to withdraw fromoutside Argos without a battle.
They now saw a similarsituation with the withdrawal
that also had just taken place.
We hear that they wereastonished that the Spartans had
come so close while they werein battle order and then allowed
to fall back in their own timewithout any sort of pursuit.
This pressure that was nowcoming from the men would see
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the commanders take the decisionto leave their position and
march down into the plainstowards the Spartans, who were
now out of sight.
They would establish themselvesa new camp in level ground and
had the intention of advancingonto the Spartans' position.
The next day, after Agus hadcompleted operations on
diverting the river in the area,he advanced his army back in
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the direction of Tigea to awaitthe Argives' advance.
However, as the Spartans wentforward, agis was surprised to
learn that the Argives hadalready advanced from their
defensive position and were muchcloser than he had anticipated.
It appears the terrain in thearea had allowed the Argives to
gain warning of the Spartanapproach, as they would form up
in battle order right where Agiswould emerge, while the lay of
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the land would see that theSpartans had very little time to
work with once seeing the enemyto arrange their battle line.
However, this is where theSpartans held an advantage, with
the discipline of their troops,along with the command
structure stretching from theking downward.
Orders were given out and wereenacted with great efficiency
and without any panic setting in.
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The result would be that nowtwo armies roughly the same
strength stood arranged inbattle order in closest
proximity to one another.
The opportunity had now beenpresented to Agus to make up for
his hesitation and lack ofaction over the previous years.
He now had no excuse to notengage the enemy.
They had left the ground thathad seen him abort his initial
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attack, and they now no longerheld an advantage over him, with
both armies now standing inbattle formations across from
one another.
The Argives had not attemptedto charge the Spartans as they
emerged from the wooded areas incolumn formations.
Perhaps they were worried thatthis may have forced the
Spartans to retreat into thebroken ground where a decisive
battle was unlikely to result.
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The Argive commanders were undergreat pressure to perform and
give battle after their effortsat the previous engagements.
Under great pressure to performand give battle after their
efforts of the previousengagements.
However, now lined up ready tofight, the Argive League would
see those with the most investedin their region taking up
positions on the honoured rightflank of this battle line.
This saw the Mantineans on thefar right of the line, with the
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other Arcadians next to them.
These troops were basicallyfighting for their own territory
territory and seen as the mainleading force for the offensive
and inter-defensive action.
To also supplement the role ofthe right was the specially
trained thousand strong eliteArgives Making up the rest of
the line.
We see the main force ofArgives in the center, while the
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left was made up of somesmaller allies, with the
Athenians who had recentlyarrived, bringing up the extreme
left flank, where they alsodeployed the cavalry that they
had brought with them.
Opposing the Argive LeagueAgis' force, who had been
hastily formed into battle line,had the Scurite on their left
operating as their ownindependent unit, this being the
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traditional role when part of aSpartan army Making up the main
bulk of the Spartan left wouldbe the Spartan troops, who had
been the soldiers who had madeup Brasidas' force in Thrace,
with the helots who had alsoearned their freedom next to
them.
The centre of the line was thentaken up by the different
regiments of the main Spartanforce.
Following on from the mainSpartan contingent was then the
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Arcadians allied to Sparta.
Following on from the mainSpartan contingent was then the
Arcadians allied to Sparta.
Making up the Spartan right wasthe Tigeans, who were given the
right flank, given that theywere fighting on their home
territory.
However, as the right wasalways seen as a position of
honour in the battle line, theSpartans would have a small
token force taking up theextreme right of the position,
since this was a Spartan ledarmy.
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Thucydides then goes on to tellus that the Spartan side looked
the largest of the two armies,though this observation must
have come from eyewitnessaccounts, since he was not
present.
Before going on to give hisestimates of the size of the
armies, he tells us that comingto a definite figure is
difficult as the Spartans weresecretive on their arrangements,
while the figures of the ArgiveLeague, he says, could not be
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trusted as men are so apt tobrag about the forces of their
country that they could not betrusted the way Thucydides words
.
This paragraph suggests he iswriting from the point of view
of the Spartans.
Thucydides then goes to give ushis estimate of the Spartan-led
force, based off of the knowninformation he had of who was
present, and the usual estimateof the Spartan-led force.
Based off of the knowninformation he had of who was
present and the usual numbers ofthe formations, he would come
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to a figure of around 9,000fighting men.
While he doesn't give a figureof the Argive League, modern
historians place them at around8,000 to 9,000 strong.
With both armies now drawn upin battle formation.
The men were prepared mentallyon both sides for the coming
clash.
The Argive League spokedirectly to the Mantineans,
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encouraging them to fight fortheir country.
Their actions would determineif they would keep their power
in their land or be subjected toslavery.
Their position in thePeloponnesian hierarchy would be
elevated and restored to itsheights of the past.
The generals also addressed theAthenians, pointing out the
glory that they would win bysupporting their allies of the
Peloponnese and defeating theirtraditional enemy, the Spartans.
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This would cement their powerand security in the Greek world.
On the other side, it wouldappear, the Spartans opted for
less dramatic speeches in frontof the army, where Thucydides
tells us.
On the other side, it wouldappear the Spartans opted for
less dramatic speeches in frontof the army, where Thucydides
tells us Realising that the longdiscipline of action is a more
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effective safeguard than thehurried speeches, however well
they may be delivered.
Both sides were now ready forthe clash that had for so many
times failed to take place.
This time around, however, oneof the greatest battles of the
Peloponnesian War to date wouldbe fought.
The Assyrius describes to us theopening stage of the battle,
with both sides advancing on oneanother.
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The contrast in how they movedforward couldn't be any more
different from one another.
The Argive League, we are told,advanced with great violence
and fury, while the Spartanscame on slowly with the sounds
of their flutes playing, keepingeveryone in time.
It appears here Thucydides ispointing out the disciplined
nature of the Spartans asopposed to the other armies in
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the field.
We also need to keep in mindThucydides, at this stage, had
been exiled from Athens andappears to have had a closer
relationship to what washappening in Sparta During this
advance.
Thucydides also gives us insightinto a movement common to just
about all hoplite battles.
We have previously brought uphow hoplite armies tend to drift
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to the right due to the naturalinclination of
self-preservation.
If you recall, when a hopliteholds their shield, they do so
in a manner that protects theman to his left.
However, this leaves the man onthe extreme right of the battle
line exposed, as he has noneighbour to his right.
This then finds this manpulling the rest of the line of
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the battle to the right as helooks to avoid confronting the
left flank of the enemy.
The rest of the line thenfollows, as they do not want to
be without the protection of theshield from the man to their
right.
Thucydides seems to detail theright drift on this particular
occasion, as it appears to havebeen more dramatic than other
battles.
It tells us that the Mantineansoverlapped the Spartan left
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considerably, even though theSpartan line was longer, this
indicating that the Spartans hadpulled their battle line to the
right quite a way.
However, due to this and theSpartan line being longer, agus
was able to recognise the threatto his left wing being
outflanked.
He could then afford toredeploy a contingent of his
troops to see that this overlapwas now met with a line of
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troops.
This redeployment was complex,however.
Although the Spartans wererenowned to carrying out
difficult manoeuvres, they had anumber of factors working
against them.
Firstly, not all thoseredeploying were Spartan troops.
Also, this redeployment wasordered at very short notice and
on the move.
The result would see a hole inthe Spartan line open up as
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those towards the left flankbegan moving to the far left.
Those on the right who had beenordered to fill the gap failed
to carry out the maneuver.
With this, it is indicating thecommanders of these elements
were hesitant to maneuver, beingso close to engaging the enemy
and therefore placing themselvesin a vulnerable position.
These commanders would later beexalted from Sparta with the
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charge of cowardice for theirfailure to carry out their
orders.
However, there was just enoughtime for those who had made the
initial move to start to fillback in the gap that had been
created.
This debacle on the move wouldsee, once the lines clashed, the
Spartans left would initiallybe defeated.
As Agus had feared.
There was still a weak pointwhere the gap had been created,
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as it had not been fully filled.
The Mantineans, with theirallies and the picked Argive
troops, exploited this point.
These two actions on the leftwould see the Argives begin
surrounding part of the Spartanarmy, where they would inflict
many casualties on them as theyattempted to fall back under the
pressure.
In this early stage, the Spartanleft had been defeated.
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However, the Spartan right andthe centre where Agis was
located held firm.
We hear that in the centre, the300 Spartan knights, those
Spartan hoplites who acted asthe king's bodyguard, would fall
upon the older elements of theArgives, as well as others, such
as the Athenians, stationednext to them.
Thucydides says that this partof the Argive line was put to
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flight, with many not even beingable to take the initial shock
of combat.
This now saw the Atheniansbeing closed in on all
directions.
Part of their line had alreadybeen defeated and the rest were
about to be surrounded.
However, the Athenians weresaved from the complete disaster
on account of two factors, onebeing the assistance from their
cavalry providing in harassingthe enemy bearing down on them,
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while Agis would also redirectthis part of the battle line to
go to the relief of his defeatedleft.
This order would allow theMantineans, their allies and the
Athenians to escape the fatethat was sure to overtake them
if this battle continued as itwas the victorious Mantineans
and Argives, seeing that therest of their line had been
defeated and they were nowcoming under threat on their
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flank, stopped their continuedassault on the Spartan left.
They were now in exposedposition and had begun to
retreat.
It seems the Mantineans werethe closest to the new threat as
they would suffer a great dealof casualties, but we hear the
Argive Rite was mostly able toescape being surrounded and
destroyed.
The Spartans followed up theretreating troops but did not
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pursue them for too long.
With this the Battle ofMantinea had been decided and it
was an overwhelming victory forthe Spartans.
Thucydides says it wascertainly the greatest battle
that had taken place for a verylong time among the Hellene
states.
It was no confusing who had wonthe battle.
The Spartans were able to takeup a position in front of the
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enemy dead, this showing thatthey held control of the field
of battle.
They erected a trophy andstripped the dead of their
armour.
To further cement this, theArgive League had to negotiate
an armistice so as to collecttheir fallen.
The final tally of those killedin the fighting, thucydides
tells us of 1,100 falling on theArgive League's side, while he
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says the losses on the Spartanside were hardly worth
mentioning, though he does admitit was hard to find out the
exact numbers.
He gives us a figure of 300that he says was floating around
at the time.
So, with the battle now won,here I want to touch on the
decisions that Agus had madeduring the fighting.
I'm going to draw on the ideasthat Donald Kagan brings up, as
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they do make some sense giventhe performance we have seen of
Agus in previous years oncampaign.
The first has to do with hisorders of manoeuvring the battle
line while it was on the moveto engage the enemy.
This had seen a gap open up,while then another contingent
was also ordered to move outfrom this formation.
Kagan argues that these ordershighlight his inexperience in
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battle.
Kagan points out that it wasnormal for an army to drift to
the right, as we have touched onearlier.
He continues that Agus, seeingthis, may have panicked and
looked to correct what washappening, but risked
disorganising his entire battleline.
But, like we pointed out, theright drift may have also been
much more dramatic than what wasusual in a hoplite battle.
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However, it was also noted thatthere was no other example in a
hoplite battle where thesetypes of orders were issued
before.
Kagan also highlights that thetwo Spartan commanders who
disobeyed Agus's orders couldhave in fact, saved the Spartans
from a defeat.
As we covered, they would beexiled, having been charged with
(26:56):
cowardice, but in reality theywere being punished for
disobeying orders from the king.
The cowardice charge would havebeen added to the punishment,
as no Spartan would want to beknown as a coward.
However, their decision toignore the orders fits in with
Agus' lack of experience.
These commanders would haverecognised the situation before
(27:17):
them and knew that attempting tocarry out such a manoeuvre
while advancing to meet theenemy would have most likely
spelled disaster for theirentire battle line.
As the battle did begin, we sawthe gap that had been opened up
was exploited by the ArgiveLeague.
If more had been created torespond to the first, then it
would have been very possible.
There would have been a numberof vulnerable points along the
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Spartan line that could beexploited.
This would have significantlyincreased the chances that the
entire Spartan line would fallinto disarray.
However, with the commanderskeeping their troops on the
advance and ignoring Agus, theywere able to see that the
majority of the battle line heldfirm.
There was only one weak pointand, due to the rest of the line
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being in position, they wereable to respond to it after
defeating the forces they'dopposed them.
They were able to respond to itafter defeating the forces that
had opposed them.
The last point that I want totouch on that Kagan brings up
has to do with Agas's orderswhen the main part of the Argive
line was defeated.
Instead of letting his rightfinish off the defeated
Mantineans and Athenians, heordered them to move to assist
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the left of his line that hadretreated and was still under
assault from the enemy On facevalue.
From a military's perspective,it would make sense to give
these orders, since he wouldwant to preserve his own troops,
remembering here everySpartiite was extremely valuable
to the Spartan state.
However, kagan also points outpolitical reasons for making
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this order that might have comeinto Aegis' or his advisors'
thinking.
Technically, sparta and theAthenians were still at peace,
even though they had just facedthem at battle.
The thinking here was that ifSparta destroyed the Athenian
contingent, then those alliedwith Athens would have more fuel
to convince Athens to take amore aggressive stance towards
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Sparta and perhaps evenofficially recommence
hostilities, though if restraintwas shown, then perhaps the
Athenians would continue to takea moderate stance towards the
Sparta, allowing them more timeto rebuild their prestige on the
Peloponnese.
So Sparta had won the biggestbattle fought during the
Peloponnesian War so far and haddone it without its usual host
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of allies.
They did still have some fromthe Peloponnese present, but
those larger allies, such asCorinth and their allies from
beyond the Isthmus, had not beenpresent when it seemed likely
that a battle was going toeventuate.
It appears that these allieswere still on the march but, as
we saw, they had only been givenminimal time to get their
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forces on the move.
The other Spartan king,plastinex, had also set back out
from Sparta with his own forceof younger and older men who had
initially been sent back toguard against other possible
threats.
However, the battle would endup taking place before any of
these reinforcements could makeit to Agis.
When news of the victoryreached those on the march, they
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halted and turned back to theirrespective cities, the timing
on the victory, meaning allthose Dorians were able to
return and disband their armiesjust in time for the Carnea
festival to be celebrated.
This victory did wonders to thereputation of Sparta in the
eyes of its allies.
Thucydides writes Although theBattle of Mantinea had taken
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place and been won by theSpartans, the political
negotiations had yet taken place.
Once the celebrations of theCarneia had finished, the
Spartans brought their army backtogether and marched out to
Dagea and sent off to Argosproposals for an accommodation.
This action was done to remindArgos that Sparta was victorious
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and would once again go intoaction should negotiations be
avoided or fail.
Thucydides points out that theelite in Argos, who were in more
favour of oligarchy and, byextension, friendlier to Sparta,
were now more influential afterthe battle.
This would see that any termsset forth by Sparta could have a
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better chance at being accepted, with these men being able to
convince the people to follow.
Thucydides also tells us thatthe aristocrats of Argos had
plans to make a treaty withSparta, followed up with an
alliance, and then attempt toremove the democratic faction
within Argos.
Two proposals governing thepeace terms were sent by Sparta,
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where they allowed them to pickthe one they preferred.
After the terms for beginningnegotiations were sorted, sparta
returned home and it was leftto diplomatic measures to come
to terms of peace.
After these proceedings werefollowed through, the following
was agreed to between Sparta andArgos Argos would accept a
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peace with Sparta, ending thecompetition between the two on
the Peloponnese.
This would also see Argos comeback into the Peloponnesian
League, effectively making themallies with Sparta once again.
The constant hostility betweenthe two traditional rivals would
come to an end.
For now, although this peaceand alliance came into being,
sparta was well aware of thehistory between the two cities.
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To ensure that the alliancewould remain in effect, the
Spartans would have garrisonsstationed within the Argos
citadel.
Loyalty often needs to be backedup with a threat of
consequences if not adhered to.
The political system that hadexisted in Argos was more
inclined with the threat ofconsequences if not adhered to.
The political system that hadexisted in Argos was more
inclined, with the ideals ofAthens both being of democratic
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followings, to see that Argoswould now align in more ideals
and policies as Sparta.
Measures were taken to see thatthe oligarchy became the
dominant mode of government.
Obviously, it was also ensuredthat those in Argos who had
interests in this style ofgoverning also had pro-Spartan
leanings.
The terms that were finallyagreed on would technically see
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Argos an autonomous city-state,making decisions as they wished,
though with all the otherprovisions within and being a
member of the PeloponnesianLeague, it was at the mercy of
the overarching decisions bySparta when it came to policies
affecting diplomacy and anythingthat would affect the
relationships between themselvesand Sparta.
As we have seen, this controlSparta had within the
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Peloponnesian League would makeit difficult for members to
break away and act as theywished, while Sparta held a
place of respect and authority.
We had seen these notions hadbeen tested and cities took the
opportunity to make their ownalliances, but now, after
Mantinea, this respect hadreturned, making all those
within the Peloponnesian Leaguethink twice about any plans to
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revolt.
The Battle of Mantinea in 418 BCrepresented a critical moment
in the Peloponnesian War, notonly for its immediate military
outcomes, but also for thepolitical and strategic
reverberations it sent acrossGreece.
In the short term, the Spartanvictory decisively checked the
ambitions of theArgive-Athenian-Mantinean
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coalition, a rare alliance thathad the potential to challenge
Spartan authority in thePeloponnese.
By defeating this force in apitch-top-like battle, sparta
restored the military reputationit had lost after the
humiliation of Pylos andBacteria, reasserting itself as
a dominant land power in Greece.
This success strengthened thehead of the pro-Spartan faction
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within Argos, leading to a peaceagreement that neutralised a
key threat on Sparta's doorstep.
For Athens, mantinea closed offopportunities to extend
influence into the Peloponnese,forcing a reorganisation of a
strategic focus elsewhere.
Yet for all its immediate gains,mantinea did not fundamentally
alter the course of thePeloponnesian War.
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Gains Mantinea did notfundamentally alter the course
of the Peloponnesian War.
The structural stalematebetween Athenian naval supremacy
and Spartan land dominanceremained intact and neither side
could deliver a decisive blowto end the conflict.
While Sparta gained prestigeand political breathing space,
it failed to translate thevictory into a lasting strategic
advantage and the war soonshifted to other theatres.
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Into a lasting strategicadvantage and the war soon
shifted to other theatres.
Mantinea, therefore, is betterunderstood not as a defining
turning point, but as a strikingdemonstration of Sparta's
capacity to recover fromadversity and reaffirm its
military traditions whenchallenged.
Its significance lies in theway it momentarily stabilised
the Spartan dominance in thePeloponnese, yet without
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resolving the deeper tensionsand rivalries that would keep
the Peloponnesian War burningfor nearly another decade.
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series.
As Thucydides observed, the strong do what
they can and the weak sufferwhat they must, a reality
nowhere more clearlydemonstrated than at Mantinea in
418 BC.
In his account, he regarded theencounter as the greatest that
had occurred for a very longwhile among the Hellenes, where
Sparta reasserted its dominancewith ritual and restraint alike,
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even returning the enemy deadunder truce.
Hello, I'm Mark Selick andwelcome back to Castings for
Ancient Greece, episode 95, theBattle of Mantinea.
In our previous episode, weexplored the growing instability
in the Greek world followingthe uneasy peace of Nicias.
Although the treaty technicallyremained in place, its
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foundations had long been eroded.
Rather than curbing hostilities, the foundations had long been
eroded.
Rather than curbing hostilities, the peace had become a
diplomatic fig leaf concealingcontinued maneuvering and rising
antagonism on both sides.
At the centre of thisescalation was Ausopiades, the
ambitious and charismaticAthenian statesman whose bold
vision sought to redraw thebalance of power in the
(01:22):
Peloponnese.
He turned his efforts towardsisolating Sparta by attacking
its network of allies,particularly targeting Corinth
and aligning more closely withArgos.
Alcibiades' strategy was notwithout success.
Sparta found itselfincreasingly on the defensive,
compelled to respond withoutappearing to break the peace
outright.
Corinth was diplomaticallycornered, while the Argive
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alliance, with Athenian support,pressed its advantage.
Sparta's response, led by KingAgis, was cautious at first.
Despite mobilising a largeforce, agis avoided direct
battle with the Argives, evenwhen he had them surrounded in a
position of clear advantage.
Instead, he negotiated a suddenand unauthorised truce, one
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that deeply angered Sparta'sallies and left the Argive
Democratic Assembly feelingbetrayed.
Far from stabilising the region, the truce only served to
deepen divisions and fan theflames of resentment.
Alcibiades wasted no timecapitalising on this discontent.
Through persuasive diplomacyand public rhetoric, he
reignited the anti-Spartan causewithin the Argive League,
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ensuring that hostilitiesresumed before the truce had a
chance to take hold.
While Argos itself hesitated toopenly break the agreement, its
allies continued militarypreparations and Athenian
support remained steadfast.
As the campaigning season of 418BC progressed, the stage was
set for open conflict.
Sparta now faced mountingpressure from within and without
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prepared to reassert itsauthority through force, agis,
seeing to redeem his earlierfailure and silence his critics,
once again led the Spartan armynorthward, this time with
determination to engage theArgives in open battle.
This brings us to the Battle ofMantinea, one of the most
pivotal and consequential landengagements up to this point in
(03:13):
the Peloponnesian War.
What took place on the plainsnear Mantinea was not just a
clash of hoplites, but acollision of ideologies,
alliances and reputations.
For Sparta, it was anopportunity to restore its lost
prestige and discipline amongits wavering allies.
For Argos, athens and theircoalition, it was a chance to
prove that the old order couldbe challenged and that Sparta's
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grip on the Peloponnese was nolonger unshakable.
In today's episode, we willtrace the final moves leading to
the battle, examine thecomposition and tactics of the
opposing forces and follow thecourse of the fight itself.
We'll also explore thefar-reaching consequences that
followed, how the single day ofbattle shaped the political and
military landscape of Greece foryears to come.
(03:58):
We finished last episode withthe city-state of Tigeia
threatening to abandon thePeloponnesian League and ally
themselves with Argos.
For Sparta, this would be ahuge blow to their credibility
within the League.
The past year had been one thatwould not have filled their
allies with confidence.
Athens had been able to lead acoalition of forces through the
Peloponnese unopposed, which wasthreatening Sparta's allies.
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Then, when Sparta did get theirarmy in the field, they failed
to act decisively on a number ofoccasions.
Then another ally of theirs,orchomenus, had fallen to the
Argive League, this seeing avitally important strategic
location in the Peloponneseconnecting a number of allies to
Sparta, disappear.
This new threat now emerging inTigea, where factions within
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the city were looking to altertheir diplomatic stance based on
their evolving situation in thePeloponnese, would be a further
blow that could possibly makeit difficult for Sparta to
recover.
Tigea had been the city-statethat Sparta had originally
created the Peloponnesian Leaguewith.
If they left, then this couldhave irreversible effects on the
foundations of the League,effects on the foundations of
(05:06):
the League Plus.
It probably isn't too hard toimagine that if these debates on
alliances were taking place inTigea, others were also probably
entertaining the idea.
However, agis now had anopportunity to regain his
reputation within Sparta.
Acting with authority and in adecisive manner, he would lead
one of the largest Spartanarmies yet seen, mobilised.
Thucydides would say lead oneof the largest Spartan armies
yet seen, mobilised.
Thucydides would say Upon thisnews, a force marched out from
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Sparta of Spartans and helotsand all their people,
immediately and upon a scalenever before witnessed.
We are not entirely certain ofthe exact numbers here, but
Thucydides appears to bereferring to the Spartiites, who
made up the backbone of thearmy, while when speaking of the
helots, it becomes clear thatmany who had been freed due to
(05:48):
their past services would be inthis group, with it also
reasonable to expect many stillenslaved helots marching, as we
had seen before.
When speaking of all the people, he is probably referring to
others such as the perioche, whowere free but without citizen
rights, to others such as thePerioeci, who were free but
without citizen rights.
As the Spartans madepreparations for the assembly of
the army, messengers had alsogone out to their allies to
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converge on Tigeia.
The Spartan army marched northand instructed the Arcadians to
follow after them onto Tigeia,while the other allies, such as
the Corinthians, the Oceans,phakaeains and Locrians, had
only short notice of thecampaign.
Due to the distance themessengers had to travel, their
(06:31):
instructions were to assembleand march for Mantinea as
quickly as they could possiblydo so.
However, these allies wouldalso have the hindrance of being
cut off from the Spartans dueto the fall of Aquamanis, which
lay in the path of their marchtowards the objective, while
they were also probably stillannoyed at the indecisive nature
of their previous campaigns.
(06:52):
Agis with his Spartan armywould link up with the Arcadians
and had entered the territoryof Mantinea, just north of Tigao
, where they would establish acamp.
With their camp in place rightnear the Temple of Heracles,
they began plundering andravaging the surrounding areas,
taking what they could anddenying supplies and resources
(07:13):
to their enemies.
Agis could expect to face anarmy of similar size as to the
one he had faced the previousyear at Argos.
While he also had a similarsize force in the field, his
numbers were increased by theArcadians and those at Tigeia,
though he was still going to beoutnumbered or on par with the
Argive League unless his alliesfrom the north could arrive in a
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timely manner.
At some stage during the march,agus had sent back home the
oldest and youngest of theSpartan army to defend Sparta.
It appears he may have arrivedat this decision after learning
of the Spartan army to defendSparta.
It appears he may have arrivedat this decision after learning
of the Elans having fallen outwith the Argive League regarding
where an attack should bedirected.
This would see them march their3,000 troops off to Leprium.
This measure by Agus was toprovide some security to Sparta,
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since Leprium was on the border.
Plus, sparta was always nervousof leaving their territory
unguarded with such a largehelipopulation, though troop
numbers were not the onlyconcern he had to worry about.
The morale of the army and thatof his allies were probably at
a low point, this being due tothe lack of confidence Agis
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would have surely held withinall the ranks.
We have recently covered hiscampaigns, where he failed on a
number of occasions to havetaken decisive action.
But this behaviour could beseen even before the peace of
Nicias had come into being.
Agis had led the Peloponnesianarmy into Attica on two
occasions during the Archidamianphase of the war.
On the first attempt, anearthquake had seen him abandon
(08:41):
the campaign, while on thesecond, lack of provisions,
storms and the threat of Pyloshad seen him withdraw back into
the Peloponnese.
So in the eyes of his men andhis allies he had yet to prove
himself in battle.
So far they had just seen himwithdraw whenever he was faced
with adversity, when a decisivedecision had to be made.
We'd also covered last episodehow the Spartan government had
(09:07):
misgivings about Agus as aleader in the field but had
given him what appears to be onelast chance to prove himself.
They appear to have still gonewith Agus to lead the army, as
Plastionax would still have beenunacceptable to many in Sparta,
given his pro-peace stance andhim being discredited in the
past.
Though to prevent seeing arepeat of the last two campaigns
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, ten advisers were sent withAgus to assist in decision
making.
Given the points we had justraised about concerns over Agus,
we find he now faced astrategic dilemma in how to
proceed with the campaign.
Donald Kagan outlines this inhis book the Peloponnesian War.
The campaign.
Donald Kagan outlines this inhis book the Peloponnesian War.
(09:48):
In undertaking the campaign,agus faced a tricky strategic
problem.
He had to get to Tigea as soonas possible to prevent a coup,
but after his arrival he wouldhave to wait at least a week for
the arrival of the northerncontingent, while in the
meantime being forced toconfront a larger enemy army.
A different Spartan leadercould choose to stay within the
walls of Tigea and refuse battleuntil his allies appeared,
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allowing the enemy to ravage theTigean land, destroying
farmhouses, approach the cityand hurl accusations of
cowardice at the Spartans andtheir commander.
But Agis could not afford toconvey even the slightest hint
that he was afraid to fight,because he knew he would face
superior numbers.
He also was forced to risktaking the entire Spartan army
with him, leaving Sparta itselfundefended at the time when the
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Mycenaeans were perched at Pylos, threatening to launch a
rebellion of the helots, withthe Spartans now establishing
camp at Mantinean territory withtheir allies, the Argive
Alliance would move to counterAegis' army.
They positioned themselves onground that would be difficult
to approach across from theSpartans, with the Argive League
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taking up battle positions.
Aegis would arrange for hisarmy to advance on the enemy
enemy.
Here we get the view fromThucydides that Aegis was acting
in a rash manner, influenced bythe harm done to his reputation
back in Sparta and amongstSparta's allies.
From Thucydides' account, weare told that the Spartans were
outnumbered at this stage andthe Argyres were in a
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well-defended location.
This, highlighting an attack onthe Argyre position, would not
be a smart move.
Thucydides provides us anantidote to highlight this point
.
The Spartans immediatelyadvanced against them and came
up as close as a stone's throwor javelin's cast.
At this point, one of the oldermen in the army, seeing that
they were advancing against sucha strong position, shouted out
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to Agis that he was trying tocure one evil with another,
meaning by this that he waswanting to make up for the
retreat from Argos for which hehad been blamed, by now courting
danger at the wrong time Aguswould hold his army and have
them withdraw back to theirstarting positions before they
became engaged with the Argives.
(12:00):
Thucydides does mention that itisn't clear if Agus was
influenced by the old man'sadvice or had come to this
decision on his own initiative.
Whatever the reason, aegis wasnow aware the position that the
Argives held provided them toomuch of a defensive advantage.
The Spinozzi-Aegis looked for away to dislodge them from their
position so they could beengaged on more favourable terms
(12:22):
.
At some point during Aegisbeing in the territory of
Mantinea, he had recognised thata battle was likely to result.
He, or his advisors, now saw itwas in the army's best interest
to recall the troops Agis hadsent back to Sparta.
On their march to Mantinea, amessage was sent back requesting
King Plastionax to return withhis troops to reinforce the
(12:43):
Spartans.
A river ran through Mantineathat then continued on through
Tigea, and this same river hadbeen the source of many
disagreements between the twoover their history.
Agis would now use this riveras a strategy to try and force
the Argives from their position.
He now took measures to divertthe flow so that the supply of
(13:04):
water would no longer feed intoTigea.
However, from Thucydides'account.
It doesn't appear that it wasthis operation around the
diverting the rivers course thatsaw the Argos leave their
defensive position, but ratherinternal disagreements between
the men and their generals.
The previous year we had seenthat the Argos had been
extremely frustrated with theircommanders for allowing the
(13:27):
Spartans to withdraw fromoutside Argos without a battle.
They now saw a similarsituation with the withdrawal
that also had just taken place.
We hear that they wereastonished that the Spartans had
come so close while they werein battle order and then allowed
to fall back in their own timewithout any sort of pursuit.
This pressure that was nowcoming from the men would see
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the commanders take the decisionto leave their position and
march down into the plainstowards the Spartans, who were
now out of sight.
They would establish themselvesa new camp in level ground and
had the intention of advancingonto the Spartans' position.
The next day, after Agus hadcompleted operations on
diverting the river in the area,he advanced his army back in
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the direction of Tigea to awaitthe Argives' advance.
However, as the Spartans wentforward, agis was surprised to
learn that the Argives hadalready advanced from their
defensive position and were muchcloser than he had anticipated.
It appears the terrain in thearea had allowed the Argives to
gain warning of the Spartanapproach, as they would form up
in battle order right where Agiswould emerge, while the lay of
(14:34):
the land would see that theSpartans had very little time to
work with once seeing the enemyto arrange their battle line.
However, this is where theSpartans held an advantage, with
the discipline of their troops,along with the command
structure stretching from theking downward.
Orders were given out and wereenacted with great efficiency
and without any panic setting in.
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The result would be that nowtwo armies roughly the same
strength stood arranged inbattle order in closest
proximity to one another.
The opportunity had now beenpresented to Agus to make up for
his hesitation and lack ofaction over the previous years.
He now had no excuse to notengage the enemy.
They had left the ground thathad seen him abort his initial
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attack, and they now no longerheld an advantage over him, with
both armies now standing inbattle formations across from
one another.
The Argives had not attemptedto charge the Spartans as they
emerged from the wooded areas incolumn formations.
Perhaps they were worried thatthis may have forced the
Spartans to retreat into thebroken ground where a decisive
battle was unlikely to result.
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The Argive commanders were undergreat pressure to perform and
give battle after their effortsat the previous engagements.
Under great pressure to performand give battle after their
efforts of the previousengagements.
However, now lined up ready tofight, the Argive League would
see those with the most investedin their region taking up
positions on the honoured rightflank of this battle line.
This saw the Mantineans on thefar right of the line, with the
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other Arcadians next to them.
These troops were basicallyfighting for their own territory
territory and seen as the mainleading force for the offensive
and inter-defensive action.
To also supplement the role ofthe right was the specially
trained thousand strong eliteArgives Making up the rest of
the line.
We see the main force ofArgives in the center, while the
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left was made up of somesmaller allies, with the
Athenians who had recentlyarrived, bringing up the extreme
left flank, where they alsodeployed the cavalry that they
had brought with them.
Opposing the Argive LeagueAgis' force, who had been
hastily formed into battle line,had the Scurite on their left
operating as their ownindependent unit, this being the
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traditional role when part of aSpartan army Making up the main
bulk of the Spartan left wouldbe the Spartan troops, who had
been the soldiers who had madeup Brasidas' force in Thrace,
with the helots who had alsoearned their freedom next to
them.
The centre of the line was thentaken up by the different
regiments of the main Spartanforce.
Following on from the mainSpartan contingent was then the
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Arcadians allied to Sparta.
Following on from the mainSpartan contingent was then the
Arcadians allied to Sparta.
Making up the Spartan right wasthe Tigeans, who were given the
right flank, given that theywere fighting on their home
territory.
However, as the right wasalways seen as a position of
honour in the battle line, theSpartans would have a small
token force taking up theextreme right of the position,
since this was a Spartan ledarmy.
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Thucydides then goes on to tellus that the Spartan side looked
the largest of the two armies,though this observation must
have come from eyewitnessaccounts, since he was not
present.
Before going on to give hisestimates of the size of the
armies, he tells us that comingto a definite figure is
difficult as the Spartans weresecretive on their arrangements,
while the figures of the ArgiveLeague, he says, could not be
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trusted as men are so apt tobrag about the forces of their
country that they could not betrusted the way Thucydides words
.
This paragraph suggests he iswriting from the point of view
of the Spartans.
Thucydides then goes to give ushis estimate of the Spartan-led
force, based off of the knowninformation he had of who was
present, and the usual estimateof the Spartan-led force.
Based off of the knowninformation he had of who was
present and the usual numbers ofthe formations, he would come
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to a figure of around 9,000fighting men.
While he doesn't give a figureof the Argive League, modern
historians place them at around8,000 to 9,000 strong.
With both armies now drawn upin battle formation.
The men were prepared mentallyon both sides for the coming
clash.
The Argive League spokedirectly to the Mantineans,
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encouraging them to fight fortheir country.
Their actions would determineif they would keep their power
in their land or be subjected toslavery.
Their position in thePeloponnesian hierarchy would be
elevated and restored to itsheights of the past.
The generals also addressed theAthenians, pointing out the
glory that they would win bysupporting their allies of the
Peloponnese and defeating theirtraditional enemy, the Spartans.
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This would cement their powerand security in the Greek world.
On the other side, it wouldappear, the Spartans opted for
less dramatic speeches in frontof the army, where Thucydides
tells us.
On the other side, it wouldappear the Spartans opted for
less dramatic speeches in frontof the army, where Thucydides
tells us Realising that the longdiscipline of action is a more
(19:27):
effective safeguard than thehurried speeches, however well
they may be delivered.
Both sides were now ready forthe clash that had for so many
times failed to take place.
This time around, however, oneof the greatest battles of the
Peloponnesian War to date wouldbe fought.
The Assyrius describes to us theopening stage of the battle,
with both sides advancing on oneanother.
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The contrast in how they movedforward couldn't be any more
different from one another.
The Argive League, we are told,advanced with great violence
and fury, while the Spartanscame on slowly with the sounds
of their flutes playing, keepingeveryone in time.
It appears here Thucydides ispointing out the disciplined
nature of the Spartans asopposed to the other armies in
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the field.
We also need to keep in mindThucydides, at this stage, had
been exiled from Athens andappears to have had a closer
relationship to what washappening in Sparta During this
advance.
Thucydides also gives us insightinto a movement common to just
about all hoplite battles.
We have previously brought uphow hoplite armies tend to drift
(20:34):
to the right due to the naturalinclination of
self-preservation.
If you recall, when a hopliteholds their shield, they do so
in a manner that protects theman to his left.
However, this leaves the man onthe extreme right of the battle
line exposed, as he has noneighbour to his right.
This then finds this manpulling the rest of the line of
(20:55):
the battle to the right as helooks to avoid confronting the
left flank of the enemy.
The rest of the line thenfollows, as they do not want to
be without the protection of theshield from the man to their
right.
Thucydides seems to detail theright drift on this particular
occasion, as it appears to havebeen more dramatic than other
battles.
It tells us that the Mantineansoverlapped the Spartan left
(21:18):
considerably, even though theSpartan line was longer, this
indicating that the Spartans hadpulled their battle line to the
right quite a way.
However, due to this and theSpartan line being longer, agus
was able to recognise the threatto his left wing being
outflanked.
He could then afford toredeploy a contingent of his
troops to see that this overlapwas now met with a line of
(21:41):
troops.
This redeployment was complex,however.
Although the Spartans wererenowned to carrying out
difficult manoeuvres, they had anumber of factors working
against them.
Firstly, not all thoseredeploying were Spartan troops.
Also, this redeployment wasordered at very short notice and
on the move.
The result would see a hole inthe Spartan line open up as
(22:05):
those towards the left flankbegan moving to the far left.
Those on the right who had beenordered to fill the gap failed
to carry out the maneuver.
With this, it is indicating thecommanders of these elements
were hesitant to maneuver, beingso close to engaging the enemy
and therefore placing themselvesin a vulnerable position.
These commanders would later beexalted from Sparta with the
(22:27):
charge of cowardice for theirfailure to carry out their
orders.
However, there was just enoughtime for those who had made the
initial move to start to fillback in the gap that had been
created.
This debacle on the move wouldsee, once the lines clashed, the
Spartans left would initiallybe defeated.
As Agus had feared.
There was still a weak pointwhere the gap had been created,
(22:50):
as it had not been fully filled.
The Mantineans, with theirallies and the picked Argive
troops, exploited this point.
These two actions on the leftwould see the Argives begin
surrounding part of the Spartanarmy, where they would inflict
many casualties on them as theyattempted to fall back under the
pressure.
In this early stage, the Spartanleft had been defeated.
(23:12):
However, the Spartan right andthe centre where Agis was
located held firm.
We hear that in the centre, the300 Spartan knights, those
Spartan hoplites who acted asthe king's bodyguard, would fall
upon the older elements of theArgives, as well as others, such
as the Athenians, stationednext to them.
Thucydides says that this partof the Argive line was put to
(23:34):
flight, with many not even beingable to take the initial shock
of combat.
This now saw the Atheniansbeing closed in on all
directions.
Part of their line had alreadybeen defeated and the rest were
about to be surrounded.
However, the Athenians weresaved from the complete disaster
on account of two factors, onebeing the assistance from their
cavalry providing in harassingthe enemy bearing down on them,
(23:57):
while Agis would also redirectthis part of the battle line to
go to the relief of his defeatedleft.
This order would allow theMantineans, their allies and the
Athenians to escape the fatethat was sure to overtake them
if this battle continued as itwas the victorious Mantineans
and Argives, seeing that therest of their line had been
defeated and they were nowcoming under threat on their
(24:20):
flank, stopped their continuedassault on the Spartan left.
They were now in exposedposition and had begun to
retreat.
It seems the Mantineans werethe closest to the new threat as
they would suffer a great dealof casualties, but we hear the
Argive Rite was mostly able toescape being surrounded and
destroyed.
The Spartans followed up theretreating troops but did not
(24:41):
pursue them for too long.
With this the Battle ofMantinea had been decided and it
was an overwhelming victory forthe Spartans.
Thucydides says it wascertainly the greatest battle
that had taken place for a verylong time among the Hellene
states.
It was no confusing who had wonthe battle.
The Spartans were able to takeup a position in front of the
(25:03):
enemy dead, this showing thatthey held control of the field
of battle.
They erected a trophy andstripped the dead of their
armour.
To further cement this, theArgive League had to negotiate
an armistice so as to collecttheir fallen.
The final tally of those killedin the fighting, thucydides
tells us of 1,100 falling on theArgive League's side, while he
(25:26):
says the losses on the Spartanside were hardly worth
mentioning, though he does admitit was hard to find out the
exact numbers.
He gives us a figure of 300that he says was floating around
at the time.
So, with the battle now won,here I want to touch on the
decisions that Agus had madeduring the fighting.
I'm going to draw on the ideasthat Donald Kagan brings up, as
(25:50):
they do make some sense giventhe performance we have seen of
Agus in previous years oncampaign.
The first has to do with hisorders of manoeuvring the battle
line while it was on the moveto engage the enemy.
This had seen a gap open up,while then another contingent
was also ordered to move outfrom this formation.
Kagan argues that these ordershighlight his inexperience in
(26:13):
battle.
Kagan points out that it wasnormal for an army to drift to
the right, as we have touched onearlier.
He continues that Agus, seeingthis, may have panicked and
looked to correct what washappening, but risked
disorganising his entire battleline.
But, like we pointed out, theright drift may have also been
much more dramatic than what wasusual in a hoplite battle.
(26:36):
However, it was also noted thatthere was no other example in a
hoplite battle where thesetypes of orders were issued
before.
Kagan also highlights that thetwo Spartan commanders who
disobeyed Agus's orders couldhave in fact, saved the Spartans
from a defeat.
As we covered, they would beexiled, having been charged with
(26:56):
cowardice, but in reality theywere being punished for
disobeying orders from the king.
The cowardice charge would havebeen added to the punishment,
as no Spartan would want to beknown as a coward.
However, their decision toignore the orders fits in with
Agus' lack of experience.
These commanders would haverecognised the situation before
(27:17):
them and knew that attempting tocarry out such a manoeuvre
while advancing to meet theenemy would have most likely
spelled disaster for theirentire battle line.
As the battle did begin, we sawthe gap that had been opened up
was exploited by the ArgiveLeague.
If more had been created torespond to the first, then it
would have been very possible.
There would have been a numberof vulnerable points along the
(27:40):
Spartan line that could beexploited.
This would have significantlyincreased the chances that the
entire Spartan line would fallinto disarray.
However, with the commanderskeeping their troops on the
advance and ignoring Agus, theywere able to see that the
majority of the battle line heldfirm.
There was only one weak pointand, due to the rest of the line
(28:01):
being in position, they wereable to respond to it after
defeating the forces they'dopposed them.
They were able to respond to itafter defeating the forces that
had opposed them.
The last point that I want totouch on that Kagan brings up
has to do with Agas's orderswhen the main part of the Argive
line was defeated.
Instead of letting his rightfinish off the defeated
Mantineans and Athenians, heordered them to move to assist
(28:24):
the left of his line that hadretreated and was still under
assault from the enemy On facevalue.
From a military's perspective,it would make sense to give
these orders, since he wouldwant to preserve his own troops,
remembering here everySpartiite was extremely valuable
to the Spartan state.
However, kagan also points outpolitical reasons for making
(28:45):
this order that might have comeinto Aegis' or his advisors'
thinking.
Technically, sparta and theAthenians were still at peace,
even though they had just facedthem at battle.
The thinking here was that ifSparta destroyed the Athenian
contingent, then those alliedwith Athens would have more fuel
to convince Athens to take amore aggressive stance towards
(29:07):
Sparta and perhaps evenofficially recommence
hostilities, though if restraintwas shown, then perhaps the
Athenians would continue to takea moderate stance towards the
Sparta, allowing them more timeto rebuild their prestige on the
Peloponnese.
So Sparta had won the biggestbattle fought during the
Peloponnesian War so far and haddone it without its usual host
(29:29):
of allies.
They did still have some fromthe Peloponnese present, but
those larger allies, such asCorinth and their allies from
beyond the Isthmus, had not beenpresent when it seemed likely
that a battle was going toeventuate.
It appears that these allieswere still on the march but, as
we saw, they had only been givenminimal time to get their
(29:50):
forces on the move.
The other Spartan king,plastinex, had also set back out
from Sparta with his own forceof younger and older men who had
initially been sent back toguard against other possible
threats.
However, the battle would endup taking place before any of
these reinforcements could makeit to Agis.
When news of the victoryreached those on the march, they
(30:11):
halted and turned back to theirrespective cities, the timing
on the victory, meaning allthose Dorians were able to
return and disband their armiesjust in time for the Carnea
festival to be celebrated.
This victory did wonders to thereputation of Sparta in the
eyes of its allies.
Thucydides writes Although theBattle of Mantinea had taken
(30:49):
place and been won by theSpartans, the political
negotiations had yet taken place.
Once the celebrations of theCarneia had finished, the
Spartans brought their army backtogether and marched out to
Dagea and sent off to Argosproposals for an accommodation.
This action was done to remindArgos that Sparta was victorious
(31:09):
and would once again go intoaction should negotiations be
avoided or fail.
Thucydides points out that theelite in Argos, who were in more
favour of oligarchy and, byextension, friendlier to Sparta,
were now more influential afterthe battle.
This would see that any termsset forth by Sparta could have a
(31:29):
better chance at being accepted, with these men being able to
convince the people to follow.
Thucydides also tells us thatthe aristocrats of Argos had
plans to make a treaty withSparta, followed up with an
alliance, and then attempt toremove the democratic faction
within Argos.
Two proposals governing thepeace terms were sent by Sparta,
(31:49):
where they allowed them to pickthe one they preferred.
After the terms for beginningnegotiations were sorted, sparta
returned home and it was leftto diplomatic measures to come
to terms of peace.
After these proceedings werefollowed through, the following
was agreed to between Sparta andArgos Argos would accept a
(32:11):
peace with Sparta, ending thecompetition between the two on
the Peloponnese.
This would also see Argos comeback into the Peloponnesian
League, effectively making themallies with Sparta once again.
The constant hostility betweenthe two traditional rivals would
come to an end.
For now, although this peaceand alliance came into being,
sparta was well aware of thehistory between the two cities.
(32:34):
To ensure that the alliancewould remain in effect, the
Spartans would have garrisonsstationed within the Argos
citadel.
Loyalty often needs to be backedup with a threat of
consequences if not adhered to.
The political system that hadexisted in Argos was more
inclined with the threat ofconsequences if not adhered to.
The political system that hadexisted in Argos was more
inclined, with the ideals ofAthens both being of democratic
(32:54):
followings, to see that Argoswould now align in more ideals
and policies as Sparta.
Measures were taken to see thatthe oligarchy became the
dominant mode of government.
Obviously, it was also ensuredthat those in Argos who had
interests in this style ofgoverning also had pro-Spartan
leanings.
The terms that were finallyagreed on would technically see
(33:17):
Argos an autonomous city-state,making decisions as they wished,
though with all the otherprovisions within and being a
member of the PeloponnesianLeague, it was at the mercy of
the overarching decisions bySparta when it came to policies
affecting diplomacy and anythingthat would affect the
relationships between themselvesand Sparta.
As we have seen, this controlSparta had within the
(33:39):
Peloponnesian League would makeit difficult for members to
break away and act as theywished, while Sparta held a
place of respect and authority.
We had seen these notions hadbeen tested and cities took the
opportunity to make their ownalliances, but now, after
Mantinea, this respect hadreturned, making all those
within the Peloponnesian Leaguethink twice about any plans to
(34:01):
revolt.
The Battle of Mantinea in 418 BCrepresented a critical moment
in the Peloponnesian War, notonly for its immediate military
outcomes, but also for thepolitical and strategic
reverberations it sent acrossGreece.
In the short term, the Spartanvictory decisively checked the
ambitions of theArgive-Athenian-Mantinean
(34:24):
coalition, a rare alliance thathad the potential to challenge
Spartan authority in thePeloponnese.
By defeating this force in apitch-top-like battle, sparta
restored the military reputationit had lost after the
humiliation of Pylos andBacteria, reasserting itself as
a dominant land power in Greece.
This success strengthened thehead of the pro-Spartan faction
(34:46):
within Argos, leading to a peaceagreement that neutralised a
key threat on Sparta's doorstep.
For Athens, mantinea closed offopportunities to extend
influence into the Peloponnese,forcing a reorganisation of a
strategic focus elsewhere.
Yet for all its immediate gains,mantinea did not fundamentally
alter the course of thePeloponnesian War.
(35:07):
Gains Mantinea did notfundamentally alter the course
of the Peloponnesian War.
The structural stalematebetween Athenian naval supremacy
and Spartan land dominanceremained intact and neither side
could deliver a decisive blowto end the conflict.
While Sparta gained prestigeand political breathing space,
it failed to translate thevictory into a lasting strategic
advantage and the war soonshifted to other theatres.
(35:27):
Into a lasting strategicadvantage and the war soon
shifted to other theatres.
Mantinea, therefore, is betterunderstood not as a defining
turning point, but as a strikingdemonstration of Sparta's
capacity to recover fromadversity and reaffirm its
military traditions whenchallenged.
Its significance lies in theway it momentarily stabilised
the Spartan dominance in thePeloponnese, yet without
(35:49):
resolving the deeper tensionsand rivalries that would keep
the Peloponnesian War burningfor nearly another decade.
Thank you all for the supportand continuing to support the
series.
It is greatly appreciated.
I'd like to give an extraspecial thank you to all my
Patreon Archon members.
So a big shout out to NeilBennett, ali Olman, nick
(36:11):
Koutloufakis, paulFormiga-Matthew and John for
choosing to support the seriesover on Patreon and supporting
at the Archon level.
If you've also found some valuein the series and wish to
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and click on the Support theSeries button, where you can
find the link to Patreon as wellas many other ways to support
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me next episode where wecontinue the narrative in the
series.
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