June 15, 2025 • 6 mins
his is a teaser of the bonus episode, "Sparta's About Turn" found over on Patreon.
The precarious Greek alliance against Persia hung by the thinnest of threads in 479 BCE. After watching Athens burn twice while Sparta refused to march beyond the safety of the Peloponnese, Athenian patience had run out. When their final delegation arrived in Sparta, they delivered what amounted to an ultimatum: stand with us against Persia, or we may have no choice but to negotiate on our own.
Behind Sparta's reluctance lay a complex web of motivations – their preference for defensive warfare, religious observances, fears of helot rebellion, and the delicate politics of their Peloponnesian alliance. While Athens had twice rejected Persian offers that included autonomy and even dominance over other Greeks, Sparta remained fixated on the defense of the isthmus wall. What changed?
Something remarkable happened within Spartan leadership. Whether driven by strategic necessity, emergence of leaders like Pausanias, or the stark realization that Athens might actually defect, Sparta suddenly mobilized on an unprecedented scale. Five thousand Spartiates marched forth, each accompanied by seven helots, joined by another five thousand perioeci. As they moved north, other Greek cities rallied to the cause, transforming a fractured resistance into the largest Greek army ever assembled.
This pivotal moment represents more than just military history – it captures a rare instance when bitter rivals Athens and Sparta found common purpose. Their brief alliance, forged in crisis, would determine not just the outcome of the Persian invasion, but shape the cultural and political landscape of the ancient Mediterranean for centuries to come.
Were you fascinated by this analysis of Greek politics and the fragile nature of their alliance? Subscribe now and support us on Patreon to access more bonus episodes that explore the crucial moments that shaped the ancient world!
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:15):
Hello everyone and welcome back to another bonus
episode here on Patreon wherethis time we will look at the
about turn Sparta would take inthe lead up to the Battle of
Plataea.
Last bonus episode, we lookedat the idea that a fracture in
the Hellenic League had nowtaken place.
We had seen through the mainseries and here in the bonus
episodes that through the SecondPersian Invasion there were
(00:37):
many times where it seemed thatthe unity of the League was at a
breaking point, though it wouldmanage to stay intact.
This unity was threatenedmainly due to the policy
disagreements that the Leaguemembers had in regards to the
defence of Greece.
Basically, the Peloponnesianshad been in favour of falling
back into the Peloponnese andmounting a defence at the narrow
(00:57):
point of the Corinthian Isthmus.
Those members outside of thePeloponnese were in favour of
meeting the Persians as farnorth as possible to prevent
their territories being invaded.
One of the biggest reasons thatthe Hellenic League would stay
united and not retreat back intothe Peloponnese was due to the
fleet being of major importanceto the campaign, Since Athens
(01:17):
had the majority of the fleet'sstrength.
This would see thePeloponnesians holding their
positions outside thePeloponnese.
When push came to shove wouldsee the Peloponnesians holding
their positions outside thePeloponnese.
When push came to shove,however, with Salamis I and the
Persian fleet being effectivelywiped out, the fleet no longer
held the importance it had.
In the eyes of thePeloponnesians, the land forces
were now the main arm that wasgoing to win the war.
This is what we basically sawtake hold last episode.
(01:41):
The Peloponnesians hadwithdrawn back to their homes
and were now very reluctant tomarch back out and meet the
Persian army, now left under thecommand of Mardonius.
Although tensions would risebetween the Persians and Greeks
with the coming of the 479campaigning season, sparta and
the other Peloponnesians wouldnot march out.
Mardonius would end up marchingon Athens and sacking it for
(02:03):
the second time in the campaign,after Athens refused their
offer to come over to thePersians.
Athens would attempt to makethe Spartans concerned over the
Persian offers and make Spartaact, but Sparta would still
remain within the Peloponnese.
This episode will pick up thedevelopments where we left them
last time, but we will belooking at the diplomatic
(02:28):
manoeuvrings as best we can,while we will then attempt to
try and explain why Sparta andthe other Peloponnesians would
seemingly decide to march out ofthe Peloponnese suddenly, in
great strength to engage withthe Persians.
Last episode we saw that Athensa number of times had attempted
to get the Spartans to act andhave their army march into
Boeotia.
They'd even allowed theSpartans to think it might be
(02:49):
possible that Athens might do adeal with Persia, leaving the
rest of the League to contendwith the war.
In the speeches that followedaround these talks of
concessions with Persia,herodotus tells us that Athens
had no intention of acceptingany Persian terms, but took the
opportunity to scare theSpartans into action.
(03:11):
However, even after this,sparta failed to act.
This would see Mardoniuscapture and burn Athens once
again while the Athenians madethe crossing back over to
Salamis.
They had again sentrepresentatives to convince
Sparta to act, but all thatcould be guaranteed by the
Spartans was that they wereprepared to take in Athenian
refugees.
So here we need to try and gainan understanding of why Sparta
(03:34):
would fail to act at every turnbefore we move on to why they
would suddenly alter theirstance.
Perhaps the first point we canlook at is Sparta's preference
for defensive warfare and theirreliance on the wall on the
Corinthian isthmus.
Here we have seen that allthrough the Persian invasion so
far the Spartans had beenhesitant in engaging the
Persians far forward in Greekterritory At every turn when, on
(03:57):
the eve of battle with thePersian forces, they, along with
the other Peloponnesians, hadargued for the League to fall
back.
They, along with the otherPeloponnesians, had argued for
the League to fall back.
We even saw when the decisionto send an army to Thermopylae,
the Spartans were very cautiousin sending their full army that
far north into Greece.
Only a small force of 300 menwould accompany the other Greeks
(04:18):
.
The wall on the Corinthianismwas also another point they
often brought up in their talksover the League strategy, this
also featuring before Xerxes hadended Greek lands.
However, no matter how heatedthe debates had become, even
with the imminent mutiny on theEvisalamus, the League would
remain intact outside thePeloponnese.
Now, though, with the Persianfleet defeated, the situation in
(04:40):
the eyes of the Peloponnesianshad changed.
Our next consideration to tryand help explain the delay comes
to internal issues in Sparta,such as around religious
considerations, concerns aroundrevolts and even diplomatic
reasons within the PeloponnesianLeague.
We have seen previously, spartahad used the excuse of
(05:01):
religious festivals to not marchout and become involved in
warfare.
The most famous example of thiswas 10 years earlier, before
the Battle of Marathon.
We know the Spartans wereextremely pious and seemed to
have taken religious mattersmore seriously than other Greek
cities, so it is possible thatthis was also a consideration.
Around this time, as we hadseen during one of the later
(05:23):
Athenian delegations, it wasnoted the Spartans were
celebrating the Canaea festival.
The Spartans may have also hadto take into account possible
discontent within their ownterritory with the helot
population.
They appear to have always beenwary of sending all their
fighting men out of the region,as this might encourage the
slave population to attempt torise up.
While it is also possibleSparta might have to contend
(05:47):
with the concerns of the othermembers within the Peloponnesian
League over marching away fromhome, it seems all of the
Peloponnesians would need to beon the same page with their
decisions, otherwise this couldrisk fracturing the
Peloponnesian League andundermine Sparta.
So, as we can see, it may havebeen these internal issues that
had varying degrees of influenceon Sparta's decision to delay.
(06:09):
We also need to address the ideathat Sparta was more concerned
with the protection of thePeloponnese than with any notion
of pan-Hellenic unity.
This idea feeds a little intothe first point we brought up
over being more defensive innature.
It is clear that Sparta viewedthe Peloponnese as its primary
concern, since they had createda league that looked to preserve
(06:30):
their influence in the region.
We also need to remember theancient Greeks didn't see Greece
as a unified country, butviewed each city as separate
from one another.
What concerned a city-state inGreece was their city and the
region it existed in.
For Sparta, the geography ofthe Peloponnese provided their
territory the best defensivechance of surviving an invasion.
(06:52):
The concerns for other citiesoutside the Peloponnese would
only have been a secondaryconcern, and only if these
cities provided an advantage toSparta's interests, which is
what the Athenian fleet had done.
But, like we had said, thesituation had now changed and
perhaps these secondary concernswere no longer as important as
they once were.
(07:13):
As the 479 campaigning seasoncontinued and the smoke still
lingered over the ruins ofAthens sacked for a second time,
the Athenians found themselvesagain in exile across the waters
on Salamis.
However, this time, thedestruction carried with it not
only physical devastation, butalso the bitter sting of
betrayal.
The repeated appeals to Spartahad gone unheeded, and now the
(07:36):
Athenians had come to a breakingpoint.
What followed would be theirmost direct and forceful
diplomatic effort, yet a finalultimatum to Sparta.
Direct and forceful diplomaticeffort, yet a final ultimatum to
Sparta.
Athens would send an embassy toSparta, this time making it
clear their patience had run out.
Herodotus preserves thisexchange that took place, and in
(07:58):
it we hear a sharper tone thanhad been used in previous
delegations.
The envoys reminded Sparta thatAthens had rejected generous
offers from Mardonius, whosought to detach them from the
Hellenic cause by promisingautonomy, the rebuilding of
their city and domination overthe Greeks.
Yet, despite such temptingterms, athens had remained loyal
to the cause, even in the faceof repeated destruction.
(08:19):
Now, however, the envoys warnedthis loyalty was not guaranteed
to last If Sparta and thePeloponnesians continued to sit
behind the walls of.
The envoys warned, this loyaltywas not guaranteed to last If
Sparta and the Peloponnesianscontinued to sit behind the
walls of the isthmus whileAthens bore the brunt of the
Persian advance.
They could not be expected toendure alone indefinitely.
The implication was clearEither Sparta act or risk losing
(08:40):
Athens to Persia, or at thevery least see her withdraw from
the Hellenic League and fighton in her own way.
This was not just a diplomaticrequest.
It was a calculated anddesperate gambit.
The Athenians understood thegravity of the moment.
They had refused the Persianterms, but they also knew that
another refusal, without anySpartan support, might soon
(09:03):
leave them with no choice but tonegotiate.
This put an immense pressure onSparta.
The idea of a defection byAthens was not merely a
strategic blow.
It would mean that the largestand most capable naval power in
Greece would either beneutralised or, worse, turned
against the Hellenic cause.
Athens' final ultimatum, then,was not simply about compelling
(09:26):
military aid.
It was a call for Sparta todecide the fate of the entire
alliance.
Would they let the war befought, and perhaps lost, in
central Greece while theyremained behind their walls, or
would they finally acknowledgethat the Persian threat required
a united front beyond theboundaries of the Peloponnese?
Sparta, as we shall see next,would at long last begin to stir
(09:48):
from its seeming inaction.
Whether it was the moralpressure, the geographical
ramifications or internal shiftsin opinion, something had
changed.
The ultimatum delivered byAthens would soon be followed by
the first signs of movementfrom the south.
In the wake of Athens'uncompromising ultimatum, the
wheels of decision-making inSparta finally began to turn Up.
(10:11):
To this point, the Spartans hadseemed immovable, committed to
a strategy of defence within thePeloponnese and reluctant to
commit their full force beyondthe isthmus.
However, something had changed,where once there had been
hesitation, now there wasresolve.
The question becomes why?
To begin answering this, wemust look at the internal
(10:34):
workings of Sparta itself.
The Spartan political systemwas one of dual kingship, but
real power often lay with theEphors and the Gerousia, a body
of elders who weighed matters ofwar and peace.
Herodotus provides littledetail on the actual
deliberations, but it is notunreasonable to suggest that
intense debate must haveoccurred behind closed doors.
(10:56):
The Athenians' warning, coupledwith the visible cost of Spartan
inaction, the sacking of Athenswould have laid bare the
consequences of continued delay.
One major concern was likelystrategic.
If Athens were to make peacewith Persia, the balance of
power in Greece would shiftdramatically.
(11:17):
Sparta would lose the navalforce that had effectively
dictated strategy at Salamis andensured the cohesion of the
Hellenic League.
Furthermore, a Persian-alignedAthens, whether through alliance
or neutrality, would isolatethe Peloponnese and expose it to
future attack.
The Isthmus Wall, strong thoughit may have seemed, could not
serve as a permanent shield.
The enemy had already proventheir ability to overcome
(11:38):
terrain and resistance alike.
Inaction risked eventualdestruction, and not just delay.
In this climate, key figuresbegan to emerge in favour of
intervention.
Among them was Pausanias, theregent for the young king
Lysdarchus and a member of theroyal agiate house.
Pausanias is somewhat of anenigmatic figure in Herodotus'
(12:00):
account, but what is clear isthat he would eventually take
command of the Hellenic landforces.
His assumption of leadershipmay suggest he was already
advocating for decisive actionduring the debates.
Whether motivated by genuinePan-Hellenic sentiment, personal
ambition or politicalcalculation, pausanias would
(12:21):
become the face of Sparta'smilitary response.
Relative signs may have alsoplayed a role.
As we have seen before, theSpartans often delayed action
due to religious observations orunfavourable omens.
It is entirely possible that ashift in the interpretation of
divine signs, perhaps an oracleor sacrifice that now favoured
war, tipped the scales.
If the Carneia festival hadpassed and no other major
(12:45):
hurdles remained, the Spartanswould have found fewer
justifications for an action.
Additionally, pressure fromwithin the Peloponnesian League
itself may have contributed.
While Sparta led the League, itstill had to maintain the
confidence of its allies.
With the Persian threat now soclearly affecting the balance of
the Greek affairs, otherPeloponnesian members may have
been urging action, especiallyif they feared being seen as
(13:08):
cowards or losing influence tomore proactive states like
Athens.
Ultimately, sparta would makethe decision to march.
Not only would they act, theywould do so in a manner that
shocked other observers.
Rather than sending a tokenforce or limited expedition,
they mobilised what Herodotusdescribes as the largest Greek
army yet assembled.
(13:29):
While precise numbers aredebated among modern historians,
the symbolic weight of theforce was unmistakable.
Sparta had committed itself andin doing so signaled to the
rest of Greece that the finalreckoning with Persia would not
take place behind the walls, buton the fields of Boeotia.
This decision marked a turningpoint not just in the campaign,
(13:52):
but in the fragile allianceholding the Hellenic League
together.
What had once seemed fracturednow began to take shape again as
a unified front.
With Sparta's decision made andmobilisation underway, events
began to unfold rapidly.
For the first time since theoutbreak of the invasion, the
Spartans would commit a fullforce to the operations outside
(14:15):
the Peloponnese.
It was a moment that must havelifted the spirits of many among
the allied cities, especiallyAthens, who had grown
increasingly frustrated with thePeloponnesian inaction.
Sparta's move now promised amore united Greek front,
something that had seemedperilously close to collapse
mere weeks earlier.
The army that now marched northout of the Peloponnese was,
(14:38):
according to Herodotus, thelargest Greek force yet
assembled.
The Spartans themselvescontributed 5,000 Spartiites,
each accompanied by seven helots, alongside a further 5,000
perioeci, free but non-citizeninhabitants of Spartan territory
.
The presence of such asubstantial helot contingent was
unusual, but likely necessaryto support logistics and
(15:01):
reinforce numbers.
This in itself shows theseriousness with which Sparta
was now approaching the campaign.
As the Spartan host made itsway northward, it would be
joined by other Peloponnesianallies, each bringing their own
contingents.
Corinth, tegir and other citieshad earlier advocated for
defence within the Isthmus, nowaligned themselves behind
(15:22):
Sparta's initiative.
The very movement of this armyhelped galvanise further
contributions.
Even cities that had wavered orremained hesitant earlier now
began to commit forces, seeing agenuine opportunity to drive
the Persians out once and forall.
The logistical effort behindthis march must have been
(15:42):
immense.
While sources disperse on thespecifics, moving such a large
and diverse coalition forcewould have required careful
coordination, particularly giventhe varied priorities and
military traditions of theparticipating city-states.
The ability of the HellenicLeague to function in such
circumstances speaks to theremarkable achievement in
cooperation and in an otherwisefragmented Greek world.
(16:05):
As they advanced, the Greekarmy would eventually coordinate
with the Athenians and centralGreek forces already in motion,
the Athenians and central Greekforces already in motion.
The Athenians, who had bornethe brunt of the Persian
aggression and twice seen theircity occupied and sacked, were
now eager to reassert themselveson the field.
Despite the tensions of previousweeks, athens and Sparta were
(16:25):
now, at least for the moment,aligned in purpose.
Their forces would rendezvousin central Greece where they
would now begin planning for thedecisive confrontation.
This unity forged throughcrisis would prove to be one of
the greatest strengths of theGreek cause.
While old rivalries andsuspicions lingered just beneath
the surface for the time being,a greater threat had brought
(16:48):
them together.
The Hellenic League was onceagain on the move, not
retreating, not entrenching, butadvancing.
The decision of Sparta tofinally march out in full
strength marked not only a shiftin military strategy, but a
critical turning point in thefragile unity of the Greek
alliance.
For much of the campaign, therelationship between Athens and
(17:08):
Sparta had been strained, markedby mutual suspicion, differing
strategic priorities and afundamental divergence in world
view.
Yet it was at this point, whenthe fate of Athens hung in the
balance and the very future ofGreek independence was at stake,
these two leading powers founda measure of common cause, while
Sparta would provide theleadership and military muscle
(17:30):
of the land campaign to come.
It must be recognised that itwas Athens' persistence,
diplomacy and strategic leveragethat ultimately compelled
action.
Time and again, athens hadappealed to the greater cause in
framing the conflict not merelyas a defence of territory, but
a struggle for the survival ofGreek freedom.
Their refusal to accept Persianovertures, even when their own
(17:52):
city lay in ruins, underscores acommitment that forced the hand
of their more reluctant allies.
Without Athenian resolve, theHellenic League may very well
have fractured, leaving theGreek world divided and
vulnerable.
This movement, then, stands asmore than just a prelude to the
Battle of Plataea.
It represents a brief butsignificant evolution in the
(18:13):
relationship between Athens andSparta, two city-states whose
rivalry would one day dominateGreek history.
Here, though, they stoodaligned.
Their combined efforts pointedtowards a decisive confrontation
with the invader.
As we look ahead, the comingclash at Plataea promises to be
the culmination of years ofconflict and shifting
(18:33):
allegiances.
It will be a battle not justfor territory but for the legacy
of resistance, for thepreservation of autonomy and for
the fragile idea of Greek unity.
Though the outcome remains tobe explored, the decisions made
in the lead up to the battlehave already shaped the course
of the war and the future of theGreek world.
Thank you all for yourcontinued support here on
(18:56):
Patreon.
I greatly appreciate it.
I hope you look forward to nextmonth's episode where we will
deal with some questions aroundwhat took place at the Battle of
Patea.
Hello everyone and welcome back to another bonus
episode here on Patreon wherethis time we will look at the
about turn Sparta would take inthe lead up to the Battle of
Plataea.
Last bonus episode, we lookedat the idea that a fracture in
the Hellenic League had nowtaken place.
We had seen through the mainseries and here in the bonus
episodes that through the SecondPersian Invasion there were
(00:37):
many times where it seemed thatthe unity of the League was at a
breaking point, though it wouldmanage to stay intact.
This unity was threatenedmainly due to the policy
disagreements that the Leaguemembers had in regards to the
defence of Greece.
Basically, the Peloponnesianshad been in favour of falling
back into the Peloponnese andmounting a defence at the narrow
(00:57):
point of the Corinthian Isthmus.
Those members outside of thePeloponnese were in favour of
meeting the Persians as farnorth as possible to prevent
their territories being invaded.
One of the biggest reasons thatthe Hellenic League would stay
united and not retreat back intothe Peloponnese was due to the
fleet being of major importanceto the campaign, Since Athens
(01:17):
had the majority of the fleet'sstrength.
This would see thePeloponnesians holding their
positions outside thePeloponnese.
When push came to shove wouldsee the Peloponnesians holding
their positions outside thePeloponnese.
When push came to shove,however, with Salamis I and the
Persian fleet being effectivelywiped out, the fleet no longer
held the importance it had.
In the eyes of thePeloponnesians, the land forces
were now the main arm that wasgoing to win the war.
This is what we basically sawtake hold last episode.
(01:41):
The Peloponnesians hadwithdrawn back to their homes
and were now very reluctant tomarch back out and meet the
Persian army, now left under thecommand of Mardonius.
Although tensions would risebetween the Persians and Greeks
with the coming of the 479campaigning season, sparta and
the other Peloponnesians wouldnot march out.
Mardonius would end up marchingon Athens and sacking it for
(02:03):
the second time in the campaign,after Athens refused their
offer to come over to thePersians.
Athens would attempt to makethe Spartans concerned over the
Persian offers and make Spartaact, but Sparta would still
remain within the Peloponnese.
This episode will pick up thedevelopments where we left them
last time, but we will belooking at the diplomatic
(02:28):
manoeuvrings as best we can,while we will then attempt to
try and explain why Sparta andthe other Peloponnesians would
seemingly decide to march out ofthe Peloponnese suddenly, in
great strength to engage withthe Persians.
Last episode we saw that Athensa number of times had attempted
to get the Spartans to act andhave their army march into
Boeotia.
They'd even allowed theSpartans to think it might be
(02:49):
possible that Athens might do adeal with Persia, leaving the
rest of the League to contendwith the war.
In the speeches that followedaround these talks of
concessions with Persia,herodotus tells us that Athens
had no intention of acceptingany Persian terms, but took the
opportunity to scare theSpartans into action.
(03:11):
However, even after this,sparta failed to act.
This would see Mardoniuscapture and burn Athens once
again while the Athenians madethe crossing back over to
Salamis.
They had again sentrepresentatives to convince
Sparta to act, but all thatcould be guaranteed by the
Spartans was that they wereprepared to take in Athenian
refugees.
So here we need to try and gainan understanding of why Sparta
(03:34):
would fail to act at every turnbefore we move on to why they
would suddenly alter theirstance.
Perhaps the first point we canlook at is Sparta's preference
for defensive warfare and theirreliance on the wall on the
Corinthian isthmus.
Here we have seen that allthrough the Persian invasion so
far the Spartans had beenhesitant in engaging the
Persians far forward in Greekterritory At every turn when, on
(03:57):
the eve of battle with thePersian forces, they, along with
the other Peloponnesians, hadargued for the League to fall
back.
They, along with the otherPeloponnesians, had argued for
the League to fall back.
We even saw when the decisionto send an army to Thermopylae,
the Spartans were very cautiousin sending their full army that
far north into Greece.
Only a small force of 300 menwould accompany the other Greeks
(04:18):
.
The wall on the Corinthianismwas also another point they
often brought up in their talksover the League strategy, this
also featuring before Xerxes hadended Greek lands.
However, no matter how heatedthe debates had become, even
with the imminent mutiny on theEvisalamus, the League would
remain intact outside thePeloponnese.
Now, though, with the Persianfleet defeated, the situation in
(04:40):
the eyes of the Peloponnesianshad changed.
Our next consideration to tryand help explain the delay comes
to internal issues in Sparta,such as around religious
considerations, concerns aroundrevolts and even diplomatic
reasons within the PeloponnesianLeague.
We have seen previously, spartahad used the excuse of
(05:01):
religious festivals to not marchout and become involved in
warfare.
The most famous example of thiswas 10 years earlier, before
the Battle of Marathon.
We know the Spartans wereextremely pious and seemed to
have taken religious mattersmore seriously than other Greek
cities, so it is possible thatthis was also a consideration.
Around this time, as we hadseen during one of the later
(05:23):
Athenian delegations, it wasnoted the Spartans were
celebrating the Canaea festival.
The Spartans may have also hadto take into account possible
discontent within their ownterritory with the helot
population.
They appear to have always beenwary of sending all their
fighting men out of the region,as this might encourage the
slave population to attempt torise up.
While it is also possibleSparta might have to contend
(05:47):
with the concerns of the othermembers within the Peloponnesian
League over marching away fromhome, it seems all of the
Peloponnesians would need to beon the same page with their
decisions, otherwise this couldrisk fracturing the
Peloponnesian League andundermine Sparta.
So, as we can see, it may havebeen these internal issues that
had varying degrees of influenceon Sparta's decision to delay.
(06:09):
We also need to address the ideathat Sparta was more concerned
with the protection of thePeloponnese than with any notion
of pan-Hellenic unity.
This idea feeds a little intothe first point we brought up
over being more defensive innature.
It is clear that Sparta viewedthe Peloponnese as its primary
concern, since they had createda league that looked to preserve
(06:30):
their influence in the region.
We also need to remember theancient Greeks didn't see Greece
as a unified country, butviewed each city as separate
from one another.
What concerned a city-state inGreece was their city and the
region it existed in.
For Sparta, the geography ofthe Peloponnese provided their
territory the best defensivechance of surviving an invasion.
(06:52):
The concerns for other citiesoutside the Peloponnese would
only have been a secondaryconcern, and only if these
cities provided an advantage toSparta's interests, which is
what the Athenian fleet had done.
But, like we had said, thesituation had now changed and
perhaps these secondary concernswere no longer as important as
they once were.
(07:13):
As the 479 campaigning seasoncontinued and the smoke still
lingered over the ruins ofAthens sacked for a second time,
the Athenians found themselvesagain in exile across the waters
on Salamis.
However, this time, thedestruction carried with it not
only physical devastation, butalso the bitter sting of
betrayal.
The repeated appeals to Spartahad gone unheeded, and now the
(07:36):
Athenians had come to a breakingpoint.
What followed would be theirmost direct and forceful
diplomatic effort, yet a finalultimatum to Sparta.
Direct and forceful diplomaticeffort, yet a final ultimatum to
Sparta.
Athens would send an embassy toSparta, this time making it
clear their patience had run out.
Herodotus preserves thisexchange that took place, and in
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it we hear a sharper tone thanhad been used in previous
delegations.
The envoys reminded Sparta thatAthens had rejected generous
offers from Mardonius, whosought to detach them from the
Hellenic cause by promisingautonomy, the rebuilding of
their city and domination overthe Greeks.
Yet, despite such temptingterms, athens had remained loyal
to the cause, even in the faceof repeated destruction.
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Now, however, the envoys warnedthis loyalty was not guaranteed
to last If Sparta and thePeloponnesians continued to sit
behind the walls of.
The envoys warned, this loyaltywas not guaranteed to last If
Sparta and the Peloponnesianscontinued to sit behind the
walls of the isthmus whileAthens bore the brunt of the
Persian advance.
They could not be expected toendure alone indefinitely.
The implication was clearEither Sparta act or risk losing
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Athens to Persia, or at thevery least see her withdraw from
the Hellenic League and fighton in her own way.
This was not just a diplomaticrequest.
It was a calculated anddesperate gambit.
The Athenians understood thegravity of the moment.
They had refused the Persianterms, but they also knew that
another refusal, without anySpartan support, might soon
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leave them with no choice but tonegotiate.
This put an immense pressure onSparta.
The idea of a defection byAthens was not merely a
strategic blow.
It would mean that the largestand most capable naval power in
Greece would either beneutralised or, worse, turned
against the Hellenic cause.
Athens' final ultimatum, then,was not simply about compelling
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military aid.
It was a call for Sparta todecide the fate of the entire
alliance.
Would they let the war befought, and perhaps lost, in
central Greece while theyremained behind their walls, or
would they finally acknowledgethat the Persian threat required
a united front beyond theboundaries of the Peloponnese?
Sparta, as we shall see next,would at long last begin to stir
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from its seeming inaction.
Whether it was the moralpressure, the geographical
ramifications or internal shiftsin opinion, something had
changed.
The ultimatum delivered byAthens would soon be followed by
the first signs of movementfrom the south.
In the wake of Athens'uncompromising ultimatum, the
wheels of decision-making inSparta finally began to turn Up.
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To this point, the Spartans hadseemed immovable, committed to
a strategy of defence within thePeloponnese and reluctant to
commit their full force beyondthe isthmus.
However, something had changed,where once there had been
hesitation, now there wasresolve.
The question becomes why?
To begin answering this, wemust look at the internal
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workings of Sparta itself.
The Spartan political systemwas one of dual kingship, but
real power often lay with theEphors and the Gerousia, a body
of elders who weighed matters ofwar and peace.
Herodotus provides littledetail on the actual
deliberations, but it is notunreasonable to suggest that
intense debate must haveoccurred behind closed doors.
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The Athenians' warning, coupledwith the visible cost of Spartan
inaction, the sacking of Athenswould have laid bare the
consequences of continued delay.
One major concern was likelystrategic.
If Athens were to make peacewith Persia, the balance of
power in Greece would shiftdramatically.
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Sparta would lose the navalforce that had effectively
dictated strategy at Salamis andensured the cohesion of the
Hellenic League.
Furthermore, a Persian-alignedAthens, whether through alliance
or neutrality, would isolatethe Peloponnese and expose it to
future attack.
The Isthmus Wall, strong thoughit may have seemed, could not
serve as a permanent shield.
The enemy had already proventheir ability to overcome
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terrain and resistance alike.
Inaction risked eventualdestruction, and not just delay.
In this climate, key figuresbegan to emerge in favour of
intervention.
Among them was Pausanias, theregent for the young king
Lysdarchus and a member of theroyal agiate house.
Pausanias is somewhat of anenigmatic figure in Herodotus'
(12:00):
account, but what is clear isthat he would eventually take
command of the Hellenic landforces.
His assumption of leadershipmay suggest he was already
advocating for decisive actionduring the debates.
Whether motivated by genuinePan-Hellenic sentiment, personal
ambition or politicalcalculation, pausanias would
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become the face of Sparta'smilitary response.
Relative signs may have alsoplayed a role.
As we have seen before, theSpartans often delayed action
due to religious observations orunfavourable omens.
It is entirely possible that ashift in the interpretation of
divine signs, perhaps an oracleor sacrifice that now favoured
war, tipped the scales.
If the Carneia festival hadpassed and no other major
(12:45):
hurdles remained, the Spartanswould have found fewer
justifications for an action.
Additionally, pressure fromwithin the Peloponnesian League
itself may have contributed.
While Sparta led the League, itstill had to maintain the
confidence of its allies.
With the Persian threat now soclearly affecting the balance of
the Greek affairs, otherPeloponnesian members may have
been urging action, especiallyif they feared being seen as
(13:08):
cowards or losing influence tomore proactive states like
Athens.
Ultimately, sparta would makethe decision to march.
Not only would they act, theywould do so in a manner that
shocked other observers.
Rather than sending a tokenforce or limited expedition,
they mobilised what Herodotusdescribes as the largest Greek
army yet assembled.
(13:29):
While precise numbers aredebated among modern historians,
the symbolic weight of theforce was unmistakable.
Sparta had committed itself andin doing so signaled to the
rest of Greece that the finalreckoning with Persia would not
take place behind the walls, buton the fields of Boeotia.
This decision marked a turningpoint not just in the campaign,
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but in the fragile allianceholding the Hellenic League
together.
What had once seemed fracturednow began to take shape again as
a unified front.
With Sparta's decision made andmobilisation underway, events
began to unfold rapidly.
For the first time since theoutbreak of the invasion, the
Spartans would commit a fullforce to the operations outside
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the Peloponnese.
It was a moment that must havelifted the spirits of many among
the allied cities, especiallyAthens, who had grown
increasingly frustrated with thePeloponnesian inaction.
Sparta's move now promised amore united Greek front,
something that had seemedperilously close to collapse
mere weeks earlier.
The army that now marched northout of the Peloponnese was,
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according to Herodotus, thelargest Greek force yet
assembled.
The Spartans themselvescontributed 5,000 Spartiites,
each accompanied by seven helots, alongside a further 5,000
perioeci, free but non-citizeninhabitants of Spartan territory
.
The presence of such asubstantial helot contingent was
unusual, but likely necessaryto support logistics and
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reinforce numbers.
This in itself shows theseriousness with which Sparta
was now approaching the campaign.
As the Spartan host made itsway northward, it would be
joined by other Peloponnesianallies, each bringing their own
contingents.
Corinth, tegir and other citieshad earlier advocated for
defence within the Isthmus, nowaligned themselves behind
(15:22):
Sparta's initiative.
The very movement of this armyhelped galvanise further
contributions.
Even cities that had wavered orremained hesitant earlier now
began to commit forces, seeing agenuine opportunity to drive
the Persians out once and forall.
The logistical effort behindthis march must have been
(15:42):
immense.
While sources disperse on thespecifics, moving such a large
and diverse coalition forcewould have required careful
coordination, particularly giventhe varied priorities and
military traditions of theparticipating city-states.
The ability of the HellenicLeague to function in such
circumstances speaks to theremarkable achievement in
cooperation and in an otherwisefragmented Greek world.
(16:05):
As they advanced, the Greekarmy would eventually coordinate
with the Athenians and centralGreek forces already in motion,
the Athenians and central Greekforces already in motion.
The Athenians, who had bornethe brunt of the Persian
aggression and twice seen theircity occupied and sacked, were
now eager to reassert themselveson the field.
Despite the tensions of previousweeks, athens and Sparta were
(16:25):
now, at least for the moment,aligned in purpose.
Their forces would rendezvousin central Greece where they
would now begin planning for thedecisive confrontation.
This unity forged throughcrisis would prove to be one of
the greatest strengths of theGreek cause.
While old rivalries andsuspicions lingered just beneath
the surface for the time being,a greater threat had brought
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them together.
The Hellenic League was onceagain on the move, not
retreating, not entrenching, butadvancing.
The decision of Sparta tofinally march out in full
strength marked not only a shiftin military strategy, but a
critical turning point in thefragile unity of the Greek
alliance.
For much of the campaign, therelationship between Athens and
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Sparta had been strained, markedby mutual suspicion, differing
strategic priorities and afundamental divergence in world
view.
Yet it was at this point, whenthe fate of Athens hung in the
balance and the very future ofGreek independence was at stake,
these two leading powers founda measure of common cause, while
Sparta would provide theleadership and military muscle
(17:30):
of the land campaign to come.
It must be recognised that itwas Athens' persistence,
diplomacy and strategic leveragethat ultimately compelled
action.
Time and again, athens hadappealed to the greater cause in
framing the conflict not merelyas a defence of territory, but
a struggle for the survival ofGreek freedom.
Their refusal to accept Persianovertures, even when their own
(17:52):
city lay in ruins, underscores acommitment that forced the hand
of their more reluctant allies.
Without Athenian resolve, theHellenic League may very well
have fractured, leaving theGreek world divided and
vulnerable.
This movement, then, stands asmore than just a prelude to the
Battle of Plataea.
It represents a brief butsignificant evolution in the
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relationship between Athens andSparta, two city-states whose
rivalry would one day dominateGreek history.
Here, though, they stoodaligned.
Their combined efforts pointedtowards a decisive confrontation
with the invader.
As we look ahead, the comingclash at Plataea promises to be
the culmination of years ofconflict and shifting
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allegiances.
It will be a battle not justfor territory but for the legacy
of resistance, for thepreservation of autonomy and for
the fragile idea of Greek unity.
Though the outcome remains tobe explored, the decisions made
in the lead up to the battlehave already shaped the course
of the war and the future of theGreek world.
Thank you all for yourcontinued support here on
(18:56):
Patreon.
I greatly appreciate it.
I hope you look forward to nextmonth's episode where we will
deal with some questions aroundwhat took place at the Battle of
Patea.
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