China-Israel Relations

Episode Transcript
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(00:06):
China is not a security guarantor inthe Middle East. China is an interesting
business and infrastructure partner. Yes,very politically, it depends whether it serves
It's all or not, and it'snot in for heavy lifting or peacemaking or
negotiations. Welcome to the China MidaPodcast. I'm your host Jonathan Fulton,

(00:37):
a nonresident Senior Fellow at the AtlanticCouncil and a political scientist outside university in
Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.A recurring theme throughout this show has been
that Middle Eastern countries have complex relationshipswith China. Nothing is as simple as
the headlines would have us believe.The signer was rarely bilateral relationship is particularly

(00:58):
complicated. Dense economic relations have tobe considered against the deeper and much more
important Israeli relationship with the US.And while China does a lot of business
with Israel, it's support for Palestineand international forums puts a ceiling on political
cooperation with Tel Aviv. To understandthe dynamics of the China Israel relationship,

(01:18):
I'm joined today by Asaf Yon.Asaf is a senior researcher at the Institute
of National Security Studies in the directorof the Diane and Guilford Glazer Israel China
Policy Center in Tel Aviv, Israel. Prior to joining i NSS, he
had a thirty two year career inthe Israeli Defensive Forces, where in his
final posting he served as a Headof Strategic Division and the IDF General Staff's

(01:41):
Planning Directorate, responsible for strategy andpolicy planning, international cooperation, military diplomacy
in liaison to the neighboring militaries andpeacekeeping forces. Since then, he's been
keeping busy, thinking, writing,and working on Israel China relations a welcome
to the show, Thank you,Jonathan, and thanks for inviting well,

(02:04):
of course pleasure. So can westart with just a general overview of the
Israel China bilateral relationship, which issuesare at a high level of engagement,
in which issues are underdeveloped or ornon starters at this point. Historically speaking,
we should understand the different chapters inthe Israel China history. From its

(02:29):
beginning, it was over shadowed bythe Cold War, in which it was
very clear that Israel's on the westernside of the blocks. From a nineteen
seventy nine when China turned to thereform and opening up under Dang, and

(02:50):
the US established its diplomatic ties.Actually, Israel was encouraged by America to
support China in defense and military aspectsafter China was defeated in its war in
Vietnam. So then began a chapterof about two decades of military and defense

(03:15):
relations, which were augmented by diplomaticties between Israel and China only in nineteen
ninety two. The end of thenineties, however, following the third crisis
in the Taiwan Straits, actually markedan inflection point in the military ties because

(03:38):
following two crises on defense exports,one the Falcon early warning plane and the
second is Harpy loitering the emissions.These generated the crisis between US, which
finally or suddenly woke up to Chinaas a possible military rival in Taiwan,

(04:01):
and then turned to Israel and said, hey, Israel, why are you
arming my potential rival. And intwo thousand and seven these a crisis culminated
in a legal step in Israel uhand since then there is a law of

(04:23):
defense export supervision or oversight, andbasically no more military or defense exposed to
China since then, if we moveforward to the decade of two thousand and

(04:44):
eleven and onwards than Etania years.These were a boost phase of economic relations
and mister ntania Is, the PrimeMinister, defined those relations as a marriage
made in heaven. And this culminatedin twenty seventeen establishing a comprehensive innovative partnership

(05:12):
between Israel and China which actually focuson technology, on innovation, corporation and
so on. Followed by a lotof Chinese activity in Israel infrastructure and investment,
mostly in technology, and recent years, I would say that you can

(05:34):
see the watershade line beginning in Washingtontwenty seventeen. In December, the Trump
administration published its Natural Security Strategy,which basically said the two main things.
One, China is my number oneproblem too. Technology is at the center

(05:55):
of this great power competition. AndIsrael in the recent years, also under
its new government now facing another election, I actually took a cool down or
a chill down approach of a morecautious approach to its relations with China.

(06:19):
So the combined I would say effectof great power competition and COVID has seen
a slowdown in many aspects of ourcooperation and as I was quote quoted in
some papers in the beginning of August. The honeymoon is over. But this

(06:44):
is not to understand that there isa divorce, but less infatuated relations,
I would say, and more coolheaded in a sense. When we look
at the actual index says we cansee growth in the volume of trade,
basically in goods. We can seeour export. Israel's export to China has

(07:10):
peaked in twenty eighteen and is strugglingsince it's not going beyond on the level
of twenty eighteen. And on exportservices, it's very important to understand the
scale. While Israel is exporting seventeenbillion dollars a year to America in services,

(07:33):
it exports only one hundred and seventymillion, So you can see one
percent of what we're doing with Americawe do with China on services. So
I think it needs to be understoodthis relationship as a developing relationship, deeply

(07:58):
affected by the great power are relationsWhen the sun is shining on the US
China relation, well, it waseasy. When there are it's more clouded
and stormy. We are also gettingour code. So that's consistent with what

(08:18):
we've seen here in the uae Ithink that point that you mentioned, the
National Security statement from the Trump administrationin late twenty seventeen was really the point
where you could see a lot ofcountries having to to recalibrate and think about
the relationship with China in different terms. I think it's also interesting how you
framed it, because again, whenwe keep seeing these raw numbers and you

(08:39):
see just a big spike, youknow, this huge growth in China Israeli
trade or investment, and it looksso impressive, but like you say,
you know, measured against you know, a comparative approach really does show how
you know, deep or shallow itit actually is so just you know.

(09:00):
I think it's another good point toput, you know, the COVID effect
that we've seen a lot of thataround the region. A lot of what
China's been doing in infrastructure contracting isslowed down because of that. But what
do you see in the near term, like in the short you know,
the years ahead, do you thinkChina and Israel are going to get back
to that pre COVID, pre Trumpera level or is it really a cooling

(09:26):
down? I think um and notall of it is due to what's happening
between China and America. Much ofit is coming from China itself, like
the peak of Chinese investment in Israelwas the twenty eighteen and since then a

(09:46):
drop, and we believe that thisis more to have with China's own policy
on capital flow then on bilateral issuesbetween Israel. In China. Tourism we
saw growth up to a point ofone hundred and seventy thousand Chinese tourists per

(10:09):
year, which was nice, butagain if we take it as in proportion,
Israel pre COVID enjoyed the three milliona year, so it's not a
huge tourist group. But at thesame time, after COVID there was shutdown,
so you hardly see a great delegationsas they used to be, much

(10:33):
less Israelis are going to China todo business and so on. So much
of its zero COVID and China's ownclosing up not opening out our chilling effects
of these we see more contentious aspectsin technology, not because of the Trump

(11:01):
administration, but because Israeli CEOs thinkingabout their prospect saying Okay, if I
want to go West and I planto market in America, having a Chinese
investment in my company is a liabilityand not a game, so they're much
more cautious in that. And Iwould add that Israel's part of the reconsideration,

(11:31):
I think is awakening to the factthat it's not the The challenge with
China relations is not just not makingAmerica angry, as many people frame it,
but China's own intricacies of how it'sdoing business and things that come with

(11:52):
having relations with China. And ifwe read well what's going up or going
on in the world, you shouldalso keep your eyes on influence on corruption
issues, although China is not alonein that, we're quite good at it
ourselves. There are issues of interventionin political systems, of espionage and technology

(12:20):
theft. Definitely, technology theft andespionage are something that is Israel should take
care and be cautious, as shouldevery serious or responsible country. So since
China went to implement strategically the militarycivil fusion, so every civilian application can

(12:50):
be and will be used by thestate security apparatus, it puts more constraints
on exports of such technologlogies. Wesee the difficult or the problematic space expanding
from narrow military and defense to dualuse and of course, emerging technologies which

(13:15):
are not technically dual use by theold Vastanar definitions. So the whole export
control regimes are being challenged. Andstill even with all those caveats and difficulties,
we see prospects to benefit from China'smarkets and so on, as many
countries including the US do, Anddefinitely when you look at Israel's relative advantages

(13:43):
on food technology, on medical andhealth technologies, on water technologies, and
things that are connected to the connectedto the climate crisis, all of these
I think are still on the bighind side that even in a very contentious
competition between the US and China,this should be, as we say,

(14:09):
kosher to continue and even to develop. So we need to be sharper better
understanding the differential parts of what wewon't do with China, like military and
military applicable issues like things will dowith China, because there are benign and

(14:31):
things that we need to spend moretime to figure out and understand. And
I think we're not alone in this. The whole Western hemisphere is actually looking
for answers, for better solutions,for better definitions. You know, just

(14:52):
a traffic light of red, greenand yellow is not rich enough to capture
the complex city of reality here.Yeah, that's a great way of putting
it, and I think you're right. You know, when you described earlier
about the honeymoon stage, it soundslike, you know, the more experience
you have in any bilateral relationship,the more the glow starts to fade and

(15:13):
you start to understand each other betterand you see what you should be thinking
more seriously about. And that seemsto be what you're describing here. I
think we're seeing that in a lotof places. So one thing you mentioned,
there's a lot of infrastructure construction that'sbeen taking place in Israel with Chinese
companies. This is interesting to mebecause I've been studying the BRI for for

(15:35):
several years, and it seems thecountries that have played the biggest role in
the BRI are those that connect beyondjust you know, those those countries where
projects link that country to other countries. You know, the BRI is all
about connecting markets and connecting across regions. So for the longest time, Israel,

(15:56):
you know, geographically has this thisnatural advantage with this Eastern Mediterranean position,
but within its own region wasn't reallyconnected to neighboring countries in a very
meaningful way. And of course sincethe Abraham Accords, we've seen that starting
to change pretty dramatically as Israel seesits connections across the Middle Ea start to
intensify. Do you think this experiencethat Israel's had with China on infrastructure construction

(16:22):
can develop into projects that link Israelwith its regional partners in Belton Road type
things. It's it's a very goodquestion, but I suggest you know before
starting, because bri is a greatcatch word, the Silk Road with all

(16:42):
the romance of history returning. It'sreturning to a point where Marco Polo started
in Italy. But we now hearthat BRI is in Latin America and Africa,
were the Silk Road never never reached. Yes, so arctic. So

(17:06):
when when we when we speak aboutthe Belton Road, I think we need
to differentiate the real facts from thebrand and on the early years since two
thousand thirteen when it was launched,it was like an unbelievable brand. Everybody
spoke about it. Everybody wanted tohave a share in the wealth and prosperity.

(17:32):
It brought in the glamor of youknow, the Silk in the Silk
Road. It was quite a festival, but I believe with over the years
it became a more toxic or atleast problematic brand. UM. You can
see that our previous governments UM spenta lot of time speaking and romancing about

(17:57):
br I and Israel's potential, andeven municipal level mayor said, oh,
my city will be part of aBRII, you know, becoming some center
of the universe. Now you're asmall town in the outskirts of Western Asia.
So the brand, I think isin decline. And I would also

(18:22):
point to the fact that China itselfinitiated another initiative, the Global Development Initiative,
which is a non BRI but dealingwith development, which tells us something
that China already identified. That thebrand has been maybe tarnished or at least

(18:45):
less successful. And if you lookat the pace of countries joining BRI,
it's on the decline. Like itagain, it peaked in twenty eighteen,
and now you see people stepping awayfrom that when we move from branding and

(19:07):
you know, images to actualities.Yes, Israel is in dire needs of
heavy infrastructure, and it's saw Chinacome and compete here for desalination, for
roads, for railroads, for lightrails and tunnels, ports, everything.

(19:33):
Uh this again China's I would say, participation in Israel's infrastructure had picked twice
in twenty fifteen and nineteen, andsince then we see a decline to a
point that they actually compete less.In the past, there was a talk

(19:53):
about the railroad from a lot onthe Red Sea to the se enter of
Israel on the Mediterranean. There wasalso some talks very visionary, if not
fantastic, of railroad through Jordan toSaudi Arabia and connecting us to the Gulf.

(20:17):
Definitely, China is a huge enginefor such heavy, heavy infrastructure,
and should there be rails to connect, I guess that Israel will. We'll
try to connect, whether we callit b our I or not, which
I'm skeptic. It depends much aboutthe our next government, and we're now

(20:41):
heading into our fifth election, soyou should you should check before you decide,
you know, every half a yearor a year. So on heavy
infrastructure, I think there's still potentialfor China, Chinese contribution to what the
region needs. But we also needto recall that the BRI is also about

(21:07):
digital silk road and communication. Onthis, I've seen more enthusiasm in the
Gulf, including Saudi Arabia and theUAE and KATA. I think, like
Huawei and Zte infrastructure, Israel ismuch more conservative, not to say a

(21:30):
total outlier on communication security, andunlike others including the Five Eyes, we
don't have a by date to cleanup our network from Huawei as the UK
and the US and others, becausewe don't have Chinese components core components in

(21:55):
our cellular networks from second generation,not only fifth that are now building.
So if the BRI regionally comes witha communication package, I am not sure
that Israel will will connect and subscribeto that. That being said President by

(22:17):
them visiting Saudi Arabia also included someproposals for six G and five G development
and deployment, which seems to becompeting with what China is proposing. So

(22:37):
I think we're seeing the competition stillin place. And as I said,
BRI became a bit more toxic,and it actually spurred some approach that I
call the Chastity Belton Road, becausethere is an expectation that you won't touch

(22:59):
any of China, and I thinkthis expectation is a bit over emphasized.
You always won for the pithy phrasea stuff the Chasity Belton Road. I'm
sure that's gonna be the tagline episoderecording. Yeah, yeah, I think
that's a good point. I mean, so, yeah, the Belton Road
really was There's a lot of brandinggoing on, but you know, beneath

(23:22):
it was the fact that Chinese stateowned enterprises were really good at doing these
overseas infrastructure construction projects. And youknow, we saw this. You know,
one of the things that we didn'thear a lot about after the Altola
you know meeting that into the GCCfeud was you know, talk of recommitting
to this Arabian Peninsula railway link.And you can see, you know,

(23:44):
like you mentioned this the Red medor talk of this land bridge. You
really can see how if Si Jumpinggoes to Saudi Arabia this December or next
March, whenever he does go,I wouldn't be surprised if if there's a
lot of energy for Chinese So weused to get involved in those types of
projects and this could be something thatcould be beneficial for Israel, BRII or
not. You can see how youknow there would be some synergy there,

(24:10):
um, but just yeah, onon on infrastructure in general, I think
we need to differentiate between things theycome, they build, they leave,
like our Ashdod port, and wherethey stay and operate, which means more
dependence, reliance and access that needsmore care and attention. But you know,

(24:34):
just when you mentioned the port,I mean the port and hype of
course is something that got a lotof media attention. But this kind of
fits in with it, right,Like like that port links up with a
lot of other Chinese managed ports inthe Mediterranean, in the Red Sea.
This is something that really does linkup different markets and ports. So,
um, I don't know, didyou could you tell us a little bit

(24:56):
about that. I know we didn'tdiscuss the the hype of port beforehand,
but I think it's something that especiallyAmerican audiences often point to and think of,
you know, an Israeli vulnerability inthe relationship with China. Yeah,
Haifa got Haifa Port, which isactually the Haifa Bay Port, which is

(25:18):
an eight hundred meters wharf in theHaifa Bay Port complex, and it was
after many years of hardship in Israel'sthroughputs through the two ports we had hi
Fa nance dog. Our government intwo thousan eleven decided to try to double

(25:41):
the volume by privatizing, actually goingagainst the union labor unions of the ports
which are holding the country by byits throat. So Israel said, okay,
let's let's privatized, double and privateas the two new ones, one

(26:03):
in the south, one in thenorth. In the south, as I
said, in Ashdod, a Chinesecompany built it and left, and now
it's run by a Swiss Dutch company. In Haifa, another company built it
and Shanghai International Pod Group operates it, which means some cranes are in Haifa

(26:26):
and they're loading and unloading container shipsin Haifa. It means that about eight
to ten Chinese management crew is hereworking with a hundred Israelis with a lot

(26:48):
of security authorities potential to check whateverwe uh see. And the great buzz
of Haifa was created. In twentyeighteen conference that was three years after the
tender was signed, with no Americancompetitors even bidding. So in this conference,

(27:15):
a former Navy admiral, US Navyadmiral said, you know, if
the Chinese operated the sixth fleet mightnot be able to come to port calls
in Haifa because of espionage issue.Now you could argue about the value of

(27:38):
cranes for espionage. I'm not belittlingit, just for proportion. The same
company producing those granes is holding aseventy percent market share globally. And if
a Chinese crane inhibits the use forUS Navy, well maybe maybe the battle

(28:03):
for the seas or the oceans isalready already one. And I don't think
that's correct. But why should Imake an effort and explain it instead of
mentioning that since it started operating inSeptember two, twenty one, three port
calls by US Navy ships already occurredin Haifa, And I think it says

(28:26):
a lot about what America and AmericanNavy really think about this actual threat.
So there's a huge straw man there. But I don't think we should dismiss
China's challenges to advanced high tech democracies. And we understand by reading the current

(28:52):
National Security strategy, the previous nationalsecurity strategy, and China's own stress on
technology. We just saw some nominationsinto the Polite Biro with a heavier weight
to technology people space people, theCosmos Club, so to speak, at
the expense of economy or economists.So we understand that technology is a big

(29:19):
thing. We also remember that Israelis a big technological player, punching above
its weight, and this is whyChina is seeking a comprehensive innovative partnership with
US. So if the main focusis technology and safeguarding Israel's technology, is

(29:41):
it making sure that it doesn't leakor we don't lose it to China and
so on so forth, we shouldfocus our efforts on countering tech transfer and
tech laws to China, then runningafter the hypaport, flare or chaff.

(30:04):
It depends which homing system you are. So reading the books about Chinese industrial
espionage and quest for foreign technology,there's a great book by Routledge Routledge on
beyond espionage, we understand that thereare like thirty methods of tech transfer,

(30:32):
some of them legal, some ofthem illicit, and so on so forth.
Well, hypupport and investments are justtwo, and we need to take
a systemic approach looking at all thirty. That's really helpful, um, because
you know what we see is youknow, again a lot of headlines about
how you know, China's going intoHypha and it's going to really, you

(30:53):
know, subvert a lot of whatIsrael or the US strategy in the region.
And I think you just gave usa really good counter argument. UM.
Kind of switching track, just lookingdomestically within Israel. You know you've
you've mentioned a few times the theendless election cycle, which must be exhausting.

(31:15):
Um. How does China feature inthe domestic discourse and in Israeli domestic
politics. Is there a sense amongpublic that more engaged with China is a
good or a bad thing? Ordo people even think much about China?
Um, China is not a greatelection issue. If there is a good

(31:36):
election issue, we're mostly about ourown tribal uh, you know, camps
and so on, so Forthum.Israel is a country living under many security
threats, existential military defense and soon, so forth. China is not

(31:59):
an enemy, China is not amilitary threat. China is hardly even a
defense issue. So it enjoys Iwould say, an exceptionally good image in
Israel. The reputation is good,it's it's rather amiable in this sense.

(32:27):
But we also need to look atthe trend back in twenty nineteen, after
I think consecutive years of governments inIsrael very supportive of China relations. It
was like Eldorado, you know,go and make money in China and looking

(32:49):
at the pupil. From twenty nineteen, in America there were about sixty six
percent negative positions on China and thenIsrael the world sixty something percent positive to
China and twenty six negative. Intwenty twenty two, the Pew polls showed

(33:10):
that America even more went even morenegative to eighty two or eighty four percent
negative, and Israel corrected. Iwould say to h forty eight positive and
forty six negative. So it's nowa more balanced view on China, like

(33:37):
twenty points decline. I think Chinadid a lot of self damages in the
world warrior diplomacy in being hard handedon Australia and Lithuania. America has a
voice in Israel when we're talking aboutokay, sixty six percent and positive to

(34:00):
China and Israel in nineteen America isabove eighty eighty three eighty eight. It's
it's not by mistake that the PresidentTrump says, oh, I'm so popular
there. I could have been thePrime Minister America is very popular and loved
in Israel, so I think it'sit's something that informs itself from world events.

(34:30):
But we should also remember that Israelis very Middle East focused. There's
hardly good coverage of what's happening inEast Asia. China is not a big
thing in our press. You don'tsee many of it, many news about
it, and perhaps mostly on theeconomic magazines, but on the geo strategic

(34:58):
aspects, very little assts. Soon the whole, since it's not coming
from the threat flank, it's stillconsidered as an economic partner, promising economic
partner, and even it's a regionalpolicies of supporting the Palestinians in words,

(35:22):
and helping Iran circumvent sanctions and developingweapons systems that some of them Israel was
on the receiving end of. Wewere hit by a Chinese model missile produced

(35:42):
in Iran and shot or launched byHesbala in two thousand and six. We
lost four men on a missile boat. So I would say the images is
more or less benign. With growingat I would say a awareness of threat,
of risk and of implications to ourrelations with the US that's very clear.

(36:08):
If there's one thing you'd ask Israelisis that doing anything with China today
needs to be done with your eyesto the rear view mirror of what America
thinks about it. And as weknow, in mirrors, objects are closer
than they appear. That's great.So you mentioned a couple of things that

(36:30):
I want to go into, andyou know, Palestine being one of them.
You know, China has a specialenvoy for the Israel Palestine issue.
They've offered at different points to actas a mediator to varying degrees of interest.
It's issued lots of statements in theUnited Nations and the press in response.

(36:53):
We've heard some pretty frank comments froma bus on China, remarkably frank
comments about what he thought of Chinaand what China could do um and we've
also heard lots of Israeli dissatisfaction withChinese rhetoric and actions on this issue.
I was trying to seen on thisissue from a Reeli perspective, like does
anybody think that China has the answerto this problem? And you know,

(37:16):
when China injects itself into this,is it seen as useful or or or
otherwise. One of our colleagues inthe Random Corporation, Andrewscobel once I wrote
about China in the Middle East asbeing an economic heavyweight, political lightweight,

(37:38):
and military featherweight on the Palestinian issue. Well, you see the political overtures,
the positions, I would say,are so stale you think you're you're
in back in nineteen sixty four.It resonates the old support to the liberation

(38:01):
movements of the mid sixties, likeI think it carries maoist legacy and this
automatic. Yes, they're saying theright things about both sides rights to live

(38:21):
in peace and so on, butthey already recognize a state of Palestine,
and whenever there's condemnations to be done, they usually come our way. All
votes in the UN are against us, and when you look at the opportunity

(38:42):
side, once in a while,China publishes four point plan, five point
plan. All the plans are thesame. The level of political heft actually
doing the heavy lifting needed for negotiationsare not there. China is not even
doing what Japan is doing and tryingto promote infrastructure for the Palestinians and israelis

(39:09):
infrastructure for peace very limited and whenyou look at the actual political activity,
diplomatic activity. They hold conferences inuh in China, fanfare, conferences between
irrelevant Palestinians and irrelevant Israelis. Like, this isn't hardly even a track two.

(39:34):
I would say two and a half. So I don't think that beside
when when Abbas goes and lords Chinafor standing by the Palestinians, Yes,
but it's standing there with his withhis hands in its pockets. It's not
doing anything. He doesn't want tostick its neck into a very problematic,

(40:04):
you know, a very complex problemset. It doesn't want to pay the
cost of failure because well, whenyou're hosting complicated negotiations, you need to
also to explain the failures, notjust the victories or the winds. You
don't see great money dangling to promote, you know, economic stabilization, because

(40:31):
China is not a great donor.It's an investor, yes, with economic
logic, but it doesn't just donatethe way the US does. Would You
would never see a Chinese Marshall Planbuilding any other nation in a serious way

(40:52):
unless they're building their own future businessand infrastructure. So I think their participation
in the so called the peace makingis very symbolic, and the Palestinian authority,
which is not really in the businessof making peace. Not that I

(41:13):
think that the conditions now on ourside that are suitable, but they are
totally unsuitable right now. And it'sgood to have China as a declaratory friend
somewhere to go to to say yes. The American you know, American role
is uncredible, unreliable. So theUS bashing is great when you go to

(41:39):
Beijing, But do they really expectChina to bring Israel to be able to
mediate effectively? To be seen asan honest broker? But by both sides,
what with China standing by Iran tooclosely saying nothing when I run attacks

(42:00):
its neighbors, not really a goodstarting position. So I think we need
to be differential in our approach andexpectations from China. China is not a
security guaranteur in the Middle East.China is an interesting business and infrastructure partner.
Yes, very politically, it dependswhether it serves its all or not.

(42:24):
And it's not in for heavy liftingor peast making or negotiations. Okay,
well that's perfect because when you mentionedIran, that was the other thing
I want to bring up from yourprevious comment. You know that China has
had this kind of balanced approach whereit will work with both sides and very
intense regional rivalries. And of courseit's worked with Iran in this conference of

(42:46):
Strategic Partnership and bringing it into theShanghai Cooperation Organization. I've often argued that
it's engagement with the GCC is muchmore meaningful than what it does with Iran
in real terms, whether economic termsor political terms. But it does prop
up Iran in a way that probablypeople in Israel fine problematic. So it's

(43:07):
you know, China's approach to theMiddle Eastern general does it do how do
you see it affecting Israel's regional interest? Is it a source of supporter subversion
or is it something in between.As much as it's uh, let's say,
promoting infrastructure and economy and promoting stabilizationthrough economic prosperity, I think it's

(43:34):
positive as much as it's you know, it's a non partisan, it's not
taking sides. It's a sort ofneutral. It's navigating between sworn enemies.
One visit includes She's she she JNKthings visit in twenty sixteen included Saudi Array,

(44:00):
Egypt and Iran. So the Arabiaand Iran are not a love story.
These are sworn enemies, existential enemies, and being able to walk both
sides of the Gulf and having comprehensivestrategic partnerships with both. And yes,

(44:21):
I agree the volume of trade betweenthe Gulf States and China is much more
formidable than Iran. But geostrategically,let's let's look at and let's look at
at what China does. Yes,it's supported the JCPOA in a way.

(44:42):
Yes, it doesn't push Iran.It doesn't help to use sanctions as a
good coercion leverage because Iranian oil ischeap and China needs it. So China
is it big time. I wouldpoint to the concerns in Israel about the

(45:07):
military and defense clauses in the newagreement, which we saw the draft of
two years ago, because we knowthat Iran was already supported by China in
its nuclear project, in the Isfahanuranium conversion facility and in other parts and

(45:34):
I mentioned already missiles. So inthis sense, helping Iran out of isolation
and helping its circumvanced the pressures tocome to a better agreement. The longer
and stronger or whatever is unhelpful whenIran is attacking Saudi Arabia in twenty nineteen

(45:58):
or throughout the years that the Hootiesbombarded Saudi Arabia and even the EMI rates.
You didn't hear China in public sayIran, why are you going after
energy security that is tankers and oilfields and so on, which is a

(46:19):
vital Chinese interest? And why areyou launching and destroying assets of my other
comprehensive strategic partners. Maybe they saidit quietly, but we don't see China
as a great restraint or restraining power. And last point, I think we

(46:43):
need to spend some attention and timeon the new emergencies of the actual East
Bloc of China, Russia, andIran. When Iran is joining Russia's war
in Ukraine, and China is moreor less adopting Russia's narrative about the war,

(47:06):
blaming the US, blaming NATO,trying to sidestep the question of using
military force to infringe on Ukraine's sovereigntyand territorial integrity. All of these are
high principles of Chinese foreign policy.So you see more or less the emergence

(47:30):
of a block around the Shanghai CorporationalGroup organization, but also even just the
trilateral part between China, Russia andIran is something that you can't just say,
Okay, they're they're just doing business. It's beyond business. You see

(47:52):
naval exercises by Iranian, Chinese andRussian vessels navies near Iran. That's that's
going, you know, beyond justholding hands in the in the General Assembly.
It's very real. And the deeperit grows because of Russian necessity and

(48:15):
isolation, because Iranian necessity and isolation, and China's own more assertive, more
aggressive sometime and military build up,we will end up seeing more and we
do see already more Chinese weapon systemsflying around the Middle East, China helping

(48:37):
Saudi Arabia to promote uranium extraction,China helping Saudi Arabia with ballistic missile development
and solid propellant, which means thatChina is ussering the nuclear arms race of

(49:00):
the Middle East, following the Irangrowing to be a threshold state. So
in this sense, I think thatit's very evident that there is like a
gap between China's role as an economicplayer in the Middle East, a big
one at that, and it's defenseand political strategic involvement, which is still

(49:30):
pretty lightweight and just one caveat wesee. I think the early buds of
Chinese military presence in the Middle Eastin the in the Jibouti port, in
in uh we heard about or readabout pot Halifa, with Guadar across the

(49:53):
Gulf. I think China is slowlymoving in to have more assets. I
wouldn't go as far as those whopush the theory that it's displacing the United
States or replacing it, because Idon't think they're providing those services, but

(50:15):
certainly they are making themselves ready touse military force one day. So if
this has been really, really fascinating, really fun for me, I always
enjoy talking regional affairs with you.But we've we've gone on already, We've
taken too much of your time.I'd encourage all of our listeners to check
U Stuff's profile page at i NSSbecause we've got links there to all of

(50:37):
his recent articles, which are alwaysvery insightful and very useful. Do you
have anything you've published recently that you'dlike to share promote? Yes, I
recently published a piece in The Mosaicmagazine called No Israel is Not falling into

(50:58):
China's orbit, trying to diffuse alot of wrong assertions about Israel China relations
and laying a more factual approach toaddress it. These are complicated and complex
issues, and they really deserve attentionto facts, figures, trends, and

(51:22):
nuance, not just are you withus or against us, or as we
sometimes say, my way or theHuawei. Nice there you are again with
the Pith. Listen. That articleis really good. The day it came
out, my inbox lit up peopleyou know all over the Middle East and
Washington. We're sending it to meand saying, oh, why you're going

(51:43):
to check this out? Really goodarticle. We'll put a link to that
on the show page. Thank youso much, look forward to chatting with
you again soon. To our audience. Thanks for joining us. Thank you
for audience. Thanks for joining us. Follow us on social media, subscribe,
view and rate us on iTunes,Spotify, Stitcher, or wherever you
get your podcasts. And we'll seeyou next months with another episode. Thank

(52:07):
you very much. Produced by HeartcastMedia

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