China's Vision for a New World Order

China's rise to power has led to discussions about whether the country will support or try to change the current international system. It is clear that China has both supported and been dissatisfied with certain aspects of the system. The country has demonstrated its preferences for a global order through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Development and Security Initiatives. To better understand the actions of China, we invited Nadege Rolland, is a Distinguished Fellow, China Studies, at the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), an American private think-tank based in Seattle and Washington, D.C. She will share an overview of the new 2 initiatives of China, the perspective of other countries towards China’s rise in the global economy, and if China will support the existing global order or not.

Nadège Rolland is Senior Fellow, Political and Security Affairs, at the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), an American private think-tank based in Seattle and Washington, D.C. Her research focuses mainly on China’s foreign and defense policy, grand strategy, and the articulation of China’s vision for itself as a great power on the world stage.
Takeaways
China’s opposing view against the International Order
The Global Development Initiative and Global Security Initiative of China
The China’s narrative to the world as a rising power in the geopolitical stage
China’s control and strategy in maintaining the power locally and globally

Quotes
China has been very worried and concerned about the Global order itself, because it really is antithetical to the principles under which the Chinese regime is being built. - Nadege
This BRI is really a way to support a vision for a new world order that is China centric. - Nadege
Where does the success of China come from exactly? and what constitutes this success? You will see that there's a lot to it, that it's more about the liberal elements that have allowed for China's success now. - Nadege

Featured in this Episode
Jonathan Fulton
Nonresident Senior Fellow for Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi
Profile: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/expert/jonathan-fulton/
Linkedin: https://ae.linkedin.com/in/jonathan-fulton-2627414b
Twitter: https://twitter.com/jonathandfulton
Nadège Rolland
Distinguished Fellow, China StudiesThe National Bureau of Asian Research
Linkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/in/nad%C3%A8ge-rolland-00778085/
Twitter: https://twitter.com/rollandnadege

Chapters
00:00 Introduction
02:16 Global Order
07:38 China’s view against the Order
15:07 Overview of GDI and GSI
24:50 China’s solution to world’s fundamental problems
39:46 China’s political values
48:08 The Resilience and Adaptability of One-Party Rule in China

This podcast was produced by Heartcast Media.
https://www.heartcastmedia.com

Episode Transcript

(00:06):
And because of China's own path andmodel, they think that it's not only
a viable solution for other countries,but a superior model. And so most
of the narrative that China is nowprojecting and the emerging and developing world is,

(00:26):
you know, you should try thisone. We could be an inspiration
for you because the other solutions haven'tworked that well for you. Welcome to
the China Mina Podcast. I'm yourhost Jonathan Fulton, a nonresident Senior Fellow

(00:47):
at the Atlantic Council and a politicalscientist at Zide University in Abu Dhabi,
United Arab Emirates. China's growing powerand influence has inspired a lot of work
that concentrates on what happens to theinternational system when a rising power approaches the
level of the country or countries thatdominate. Will the rising power be satisfied
with how the political and economic systemworks and support it, or will it

(01:10):
be dissatisfied and try to change therules and norms that shape how the system
works. With China, it's safeto say that on some issues they've been
somewhat satisfied and on others they're clearlyless so. And in recent years We've
seen a lot of Chinese initiatives thatshow us Beijing's preferences for global order,
things like the Belt and Road Initiative, the Digital Silk Road, the Health

(01:32):
Silk Road, and more recently,the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security
Initiative. To help us understand whatall these initiatives mean, I can't think
of a better guest than nad Rolandnadej is a Senior Fellow for Political and
Security Affairs at the National Bureau ofAsian Research, where she focuses on China's
foreign and defense policy and the changesin global dynamics resulting from the rise of

(01:55):
China. She's the author of thefirst great book on the bri China's Eurasian
Century, political and strategic implications,the Belton Road Initiative, as well as
several excellent reports for the NBR.Nadajah, thanks so much for joining us,
Hi Jonathan, thanks for having me. Oh, of course, of
course, I'm glad you could youcould make the time for us, So,

(02:16):
Nada, You've written a lot ofgreat work over the past few years,
but for the purposes of today's show, I want to focus on one
that you published nearly three years agofor NBR China's vision for a new world
order. Before we get into that, the idea of global order can be
pretty abstract for some some people whoaren't political scientists or professional political analysts.

(02:38):
So what are we talking about whenwe talk about global order? Right?
So I have skipped that class whenI was in college and university. So
I'm going to and I'm not apolitical scientist by training, you know,
I've spent most of my career intogovernment. So I'm approached this from a

(03:00):
very sort of pragmatic and simple mindedway. To me. One way to
explain it, or the way Idefine it is the world order is what
gives shape and structure to the waystates interact with one another. It's sort

(03:22):
of simple, but it's in anyform of community, you have some rules
of engagement or and some some thingsthat are going on, and it's the
same at the international level between states. And since the end of the Cold
War, after the collapse of theSoviet Union, we have been living in

(03:44):
what the US has tried to buildas a as an international order, as
a liberal international order. They havetried to create this system that would comprise
mostly liberal amocracies that would interact accordingto a certain sets of rules and norms

(04:09):
UM, including for example, freetrade, respect for human rights, the
resolution of disputes through UM, throughnegotiation or peaceful resolution of disputes, elected
governments, rule of law, internationallaw. So set a set of of

(04:31):
of principles, rules and norms UMthat underpin this broader system. That's that's
what we're living in right now,or partially living in right now, because
there are some countries that don't thatdon't fit this description. Yeah, a
lot in my neighborhood here in theMiddle East. I think that's a really

(04:56):
good description because you covered a lotof the main points that I would talk
about with my students when we're talkingabout this stuff. You know, how
kind of the social aspect of it, right, How how countries have to
find ways to work together, andthe rules and norms I think are really
important. Right. And of coursethese gets set typically by countries that have
the most influence. And I thinkyou're right. Since the end of the

(05:18):
Cold War, my entire adult life, it's been you know, the US
has been the center of this order, and I think a lot of countries
have benefited from that, right,I mean, you could see countries like
North Korea or Iran where Iraq obviouslythat have chafed under this or been dissatisfied
or felt excluded. But China,I think has largely been the beneficiary of

(05:39):
a lot of this. It hasbeen, but that's the same benefits.
Yeah, absolutely, I think ithas been. But at the same time,
China has from the start being veryworried and concerned about the order itself
because it really is antithetical to theprinciples under on which the regime, the

(06:08):
Chinese Communist Party regime has been built. So, you know, um,
I would even argue that for thegovernment in Beijing, the liberal order is
actually a matter of existential threat becauseit promotes the idea of individual freedom,

(06:30):
respect from human rights and looking atthe world in free flows and exchanges,
and that's the opposite of what theParty state wants for itself inside of China,
but also on the global stage.You know, it wants to retain
a certain degree of control over economicforces, over its society, over its

(06:56):
security, over its Internet. It'sso we have very different visions of what
the world should look like for themselves, but also for the entire architecture that
we're talking about Yeah, I thinkthat's that's fair and I think, you
know, there's been a couple ofguests at different points since we've been doing

(07:17):
the show over the past few months. One was Don Murphy. I don't
know if you've seen Don Road areally book on, a really good book
on Chinese approach to the Global South, and she makes a distinction of the
rules based order and the liberal internationalorder. And when we talk about the
rules based I think that's something thatPRC says, Hey, we like that
if there's rules, we can figureout how to use these to our advantage.

(07:39):
We can go into the United Nationsand rally support for things that matter
to us and get an x numberof countries to agree, and this works
in our favor. And I thinkthey like that. They like, you
know, how you can resolve tradeissues or whatever. But the liberal international
part of it, I think iswhere they get really uncomfortable. And I
think they're not alone in this.I think a lot of country don't really

(08:01):
like the liberal bit and how itworks. Yes, I think that's a
very good way of explaining it.You know, the rules can be they
don't need to be necessarily liberal rules. I mean in theory. You could
have an architecture, you could haveinstitutions and organizations, but then the rules

(08:24):
and norms and values that underpin thosecould not necessarily be liberal ones as the
ones that I have just enumerated.You could have rules that are mostly status
mercantilists power based rather than you know, openness, transparency, effort to limit

(08:46):
corruptions and things like that. AndI think this is this is where the
moment that we're living in is soimportant, because we realize that instead of
socializing, I think that's the termthat political scientists have used, socializing countries

(09:09):
like Russia and China by incorporating theminto that liberal system, what has happened
is that those authoritarian countries have rejectedand have been really resilience against change,
against transformation, against socialization. So, in other words, I think the

(09:30):
belief was if they're if we're incorporatingthem into this system, they will see
how beneficial it is to them,and they will want to become more like
us. They will want to transformtheir economies, they will want to transform
their political system, they will wantto transform their approach to governance. And
none of this has happened because,and especially in the case of China,

(09:54):
which is the country that I'm focusingon, because none of these areas are
areas in which the party, theChinese Communist Party, wants to be transformed.
They have their own vision of whatmatters to them, of what is
important for their interests, and liberalizationis not one of one of those important

(10:18):
things to them. Yeah, that'sthat's holy fair. I think we often
project what we would like to seeon the party, but even you know,
when I think back to the goodold days, you know, of
the ujent Tao or the Junclemen years, when it kind of looked like the
trajectory was taking them in an arcthat was more compatible with I think what

(10:43):
some countries would have preferred from fromthe Western perspective, you could see,
you know that as I know thatthe party has clamped down a lot over
the past decade or even you know, over the past twelve years or so,
to clamp down on this, butyou can see a lot of pressure
from below, and I think that'swhy the sijmpingers have been so so strident,

(11:07):
is that there was a lot ofdissatisfaction with the party, that there
was a lot of pressure from peoplein China to start to move in a
more open direction. Um, Ijust so I kind of see what they've
been doing as a response to that. I think it's I would date it
back much much earlier than I mean, it's both a lot of change,

(11:30):
but mostly an acceleration or an intensificationof trends that were very visible for people
who were, you know, tryingto understand it for what it was and
not by projecting things onto a realitythat was not exactly what we wanted.

(11:52):
But you know, you can.I'm not sure I want to go into
too much detail because I'm not surewhether they We're going to lose your audience
for that, but you know,in the jhansomen era, he had this
idea of the three Represents, whichwas a way to integrate class like classes

(12:16):
that are not the ones that usuallyMarxist regimes think about, including entrepreneurs and
business people inside of the party,and that, to me, that was
the first step into trying to adjustwith the changes that were starting to appear
in China while at the same timekeeping control over those people and production forces

(12:45):
and social forces. And in thehoujin Dao period, there's a I mean,
going back to two thousand and eight, two thousand and nine, there's
a lot of clamp down happening inChina already. I mean talk about Tibet
and and people in Sinjong and youknow remember those periods, and an effort

(13:05):
also to um To to control thesociety a bit more two thousand and three,
also in the Ujintao period, thisidea of China's Peaceful Rise. So
these are all indications of transformations thatare already happening, much much earlier on

(13:26):
than twenty thirteen. Yeah, SoI was working on a paper earlier this
year and I had to go backand read reread a lot of that Peaceful
Rise work, and it just seemsso quaint, you know, it seems
like a totally different era. Um. But also yes, but no,
you can see it's it's also sorry, sorry I'm interrupting, but I think

(13:48):
there's a lot of re repurposing ofthings. It's like the Party doesn't seem
to ever discard anything. It's it. It adds up layers and layers,
it builds on layers of the past, and it repurposes some of those older
concepts, or sometimes the concepts change, but the the substance of what's there

(14:18):
is the same, and I feellike you know you in your introduction,
you were talking about the Global SecurityInitiative, the Global Development initiatives, and
when you look at it, okay, it's another term, it's another formulation,
it's another brand. But if youstart to look at what has appeared

(14:41):
as a substance, what makes thesubstance of it, it's just a repurposing
of things that have appeared earlier.It's usually an evolution on the same themes.
Really, that's actually a great seguebecause I wanted to ask about these
two things. I always notice apretty significant gap between China announcing these big

(15:05):
initiatives and you know, the Westernmedia or Western governments, you know,
catching up on it. And withthe Global Development Initiative. When this was
announced, I didn't see really muchin the New York Times, Washington Post,
the Guardian. I don't think peoplereally paying a whole lot of attention.
And then the Global Security Initiative waswhat this April I think, yes,

(15:28):
twenty two they announced it, andstill I haven't seen a lot of
really substantive analysis of it. Itseems that a lot of people are not
really paying attention. So could yougive us a brief overview of these two
initiatives and what they're about and whythey're important. So it's not really surprising

(15:48):
that people haven't really paid attention becauseit's it's it's exactly what you're saying.
You know, the Beijing will launchthese things and and sometimes they will not
define it very clearly for a broaderaudience. So the thing is that seeding
Pin announced them six month apart,starting with the Global Development Initiative I think

(16:15):
it wasn't yes in September twenty twentyone, and then the Security Initiative in
April twenty twenty two. But thenit's it sounds more like it's um uh,
it's it's something that is out there, but we don't know the exact

(16:40):
content of it. It's a bitboth of them are a little bit nebulous,
and even in the official announcement whereit's very poor so far in details.
So the only thing that we cansay, or that I can personally
say about both of them now,it's, first of all, it's a

(17:00):
sort of formalization of China's global intentions, the global initiatives. So you know,
for a while, I think manyobservers were still thinking that China had
only limited regional ambitions limited to itsown region to East Asia, and both
the Belt and Rude initiative, Imean the Belt and Rude initiative to me,

(17:22):
was really that critical point in timewhere it was clear that China was
not envisioning itself solely as a regionalEast Asian power, but as a global
one. But since then, youknow, they've been recurrent official pronouncement position

(17:44):
in China at the center stage ofthe international arena, taking even the lead
of the reform of global governance andnow global security and global development. So
the ambition is really not just regional. That's that's just a a a very

(18:06):
clear marker of Beijing's um UH andglobal ambitions. But then it's also about
burnishing it's it's credentials um on theon the global stage. UM So I
would be cautious about discarding both initiativesas empty slogans. You know, I've

(18:30):
heard so much about BRI being anempty slogan, just a label on things
that were happening before, and itturned out not to be the case.
I think I would really caution everyoneeveryone who thinks about these things just like
empty announcements. Um it's just thatthe way the party state operates um and

(18:55):
and that was really obvious with theBelton Road. There are these anouncements and
then it's sort of an internal collectiveeffort to try to figure out how this
is going to be concretely fulfilled,implemented, the exact directions that this is
going to take. So it's adifferent way of strategy strategizing. It doesn't

(19:22):
mean that it's less efficient or thatit's stupid and empty. I think it's
just a different way of doing things. So I think more details might emerge
in the next few months for BeltonRoad. Between the official announcement by Seaging
Ping in late twenty thirteen and thepublication of a white paper in March twenty

(19:47):
fifteen, there's a whole year anda half where details were really scarce about
what it was exactly people were andthat's why people were starting to say it
doesn't amount too much. And yeah, I was, as you're describing this,
I was thinking a lot of thingsthat one was I was listening to
comedians recently about how they how theywork, and one guy says he'll often

(20:11):
write the punchline to a joke andthen figure out how to get there and
that's kind of what I think aboutwhen I think about BRI because you're right,
like in twenty thirteen there were thesebig announcements and then in twenty fifteen
the white paper came out and Iremember reading something where basically every ministry official
all throughout twenty fourteen had to youknow, make the thing right, like

(20:34):
Okay, this is what they want, Now how are we going to do
it? And I think one ofthe things that struck me when you're describing
it is just this, like Ikeep hearing from kind of BRII skeptics who
will say, like, you know, this is this thing isn't working.
The debt trap narrative has has undoneit. I think it's vagueness is its

(20:55):
strengths because it can be anything,you know, looking in the region here,
when when a lot of the developmentprojects weren't happening or trade started to
decrease because of COVID, then thepeople to people side gets amped up,
right that that people to people cooperationpriority becomes the focus and they can say
we're still doing Belton Road. We'redoing it through you know UM sharing information

(21:18):
and you know health Corporation, right, And I think that's true of this.
So, like I just pulled up, I've been working on a report
on the GSIGDI that's taking forever becausefor reasons you're describing, it's it's a
very kind of nebulous. You know. For the GDI, there's six priorities.

(21:41):
Staying committed to development, people centeredapproach, benefits for all, innovation
driven development, harmony between man andnature, results oriented actions. That's the
GDI at this point. What doesthat mean? Right, Yeah, it
can be anything. It's very lofty. It's very lofty. It's always it's
always like that, you know,it's very general. The direction, it's

(22:03):
just giving a sense of direction.And then you're right, it's that.
I like that parallel with the comedian, although in this case I don't think
it's any matter for for love,but but yes, it's it's it's how
it how it works, and peoplein the ministries but also like the academic

(22:25):
world and and experts are all calledinto that collective effort in trying to find
ways to make this happen. Thething with br is that because it was
it was lofty, it also hadfrom the beginning it had those very specific,

(22:45):
both specific and broad pillars about youknow, people just latched on to
this idea that this was about infrastructurebuilding, just infrastructure, and then forgot
about the other compose oponents of policycoordination, trade and financial integration and people

(23:07):
to people. But it's it's reallya full, full program of how you
create an order like a system thatwill prevail and create those new interactions between
countries and between countries and China.So this Belton Road is really a way

(23:29):
to support a vision for a newworld order that is China centric. So
from from concrete to more abstract.Yeah, so I just about two months
ago, I was talking with somebodyand they said, yeah, Belton Road.
You know, I asked somebody aboutyou know, these projects that are
linking ports around the Arabian Peninsula.And this person's quite dismissive and saying,

(23:53):
you know, the Belton Road isa toxic brand. Nobody talks about it
anymore. It's over. And youknow, I I wasn't quite so cavalier
about dismissing it. And then wesaw just so we're recording this December twenty
First, you know, two weeksago hijimping was in Saudi and when you
look at all the joint communications,the Belton Road was front and center of

(24:14):
all of it. You know,when they're talking to the Saudi's about things
are going to cooperate on, they'resaying, how are we going to merge
the Saudi Vision twenty thirty with theBelton Road initiative? And you know,
so that clearly isn't going away.This is still the I think the main
pillar of a lot of what they'retrying to do. And I agree,
I think there's a normative component tothis that doesn't get thought about enough.

(24:36):
And you can see that with theGSI and the GDI as well, Like
they seem very vague or very general, but when they talk about replacing the
just going back to what you're sayingearlier about how these norms and values are
embedded in order, and I thinkwhat China is creating is an order that

(24:57):
embeds different values in different norms,and that's attractive to a lot of countries
in the Global South that never reallygot the good end of the liberal international
order, right, yeah, yeah, yeah. I think that's also what
China is frankly playing on because ityou know, this offer that China wants

(25:19):
to share with the rest of theworld. The China solution is an alternative
and the way China presents it tothe world is UM something that something that

(25:42):
will provide solution for others and thatcould provide solutions in places where the liberal
solutions have not done. And thisis the essence of So they're two.
There two sources of dissatisfaction for forBeijing UH with the current way, the

(26:07):
current order, or the current waythat the world is organized. The first
one is that currently it doesn't giveenough space for China UM, because it
gives they feel like UH, theirmaterial power has grown and the balance of

(26:27):
power is shifting towards Asia and Chinain particular, and yet the order as
it's organized still gives too much weightto Western countries and it's and specifically to
the US, but UM, soit doesn't reflect this change in the in
the balance of power. And thesecond one is that UM they criticize it

(26:52):
by saying, UM, it's it'sit's unreasonable. So the first part is
unfair, it's it's it's not afair share given to emerging countries and specifically
to China. And the second oneit's unreasonable because it doesn't provide, it
doesn't solve the world's most fundamental problemsof peace and prosperity. And actually they

(27:15):
inverted in saying that the liberal principlesand values and the promotion of democratic norms
are actually bringing chaos rather than peace, and so that the way China has
developed evolved, both in terms ofstability and economic growth, is a viable

(27:40):
alternative. And so they reject theidea of universal values and the fundamental individual
rights from which everything else in theliberal order stems from. Liberal means liberty,
I mean really, core of itis the individual freedom. From that

(28:03):
you if you the individual is free, he is free to to go to
enterprise, to go and get informed, to go and vote for his government
and decide who is going to representhim, etc. So everything falls into
place. So it's a it's avery different way of thinking about how to

(28:30):
organize those interactions and the world itself. And because of China's own path and
model, they think that it's notonly a viable solution for other countries,
but a superior model. And somost of the narrative that China is now
projecting and the emerging and developing worldis you, you should try this one.

(28:57):
We could be an inspiration for you. Because the other solutions haven't worked
that well for you, so asan inspiration. I've actually that's been another
recurring theme on this show, talkingto people from the Middle East who know
about China and say, we don'tsee it the same way you know the
Europeans or the Americans see it.We don't see it as a threat.

(29:18):
We see it as an inspiration.How did you go from being a poor,
underdeveloped country to this, you know, economic power, like, we
want to do this too, becausei amf solutions or World Bank solutions haven't
helped. And when you're describing this, just thinking your report. There was
a quote from Fuing, who wasthe chairperson of the National Party Congress Foreign

(29:41):
Afairs Committee, and she gave aspeech in London five or six years ago,
and she's saying, you know therule space bit, we like,
you know, we're part of that, We're in the UNSC we we want
to continue with that. But sheactually criticized the liberal orders, saying,
you know, this perpetuates Western dominance, It's not able to solve the world's
most serious problems. It often exacerbatesthe world's most serious problems. And you

(30:06):
know then saying yeah, why nottry what we do. It might be,
you know, an alternative for youright right, But what what the
what this narrative UM hides or obfiskatesis that China arrived to this point precisely
because it let it reformed and openand it let those you know, market

(30:33):
forces and select liberalization take hold.UM. So you cannot say, you
know, look at us, wehave achieved all this because of our exceptional
solution that is outside of the liberalorder, because it's not entirely true.
It actually allowed for some elements ofliberalization to you know it. It's the

(31:00):
image that thinks you're being used.We need to open the window, even
though they're going to be flies comingin. Um. We need to have
this openness so that we can attractcapital, investment, technology, sharing,
etc. Which China did. SoChina's success is not just based on the

(31:25):
on the party's specific solutions for itself. It actually has incorporated some of those
liberal norms and values, and it'sbecause of that that it's been beneficial to
China's development. So if if youjust say, look at us, we

(31:48):
are controlling our economy, or we'recontrolling the market forces, we're controlling our
society, we're controlling the information spaceand we're successful. I think this is
not it's it's um aligned publicity.In French we say in first publicity,
in publicity mass you're you're just you'rejust not telling the exact truth about what

(32:14):
you're selling, right, So Ithink you know, for countries um around
where you are based in the MiddleEast, this is something you need to
start understanding better. Where does thesuccess of China come from exactly? And
what constitutes this success? And thenyou can see that there's there's a lot

(32:37):
to it that it's more about actuallythe liberal elements of it that has allowed
for China success. Now, thoseare all great points and I think you
know, I was in Cairo afew months ago, and when people were
talking about China, it was theyused a lot of superlatives, but they

(32:58):
didn't really know much about China.You know. They would talk about how
it respects our sovereignty and it's theworld's grand it's economic power and rising political
and security power. But when youask the follow up questions, you know,
Okay, if it's a great militarypower, what is it doing in
the region security wise? And youknow, oh, we don't know.

(33:21):
You know, like a lot ofit is just the the assumption, right
they're hearing reading the headlines and justprojecting this hundred foot giant is how they
see it. It was interesting thatwhen they were talking about China there seems
it seems very transactional. They likedthe way China was seen to be standing
up for the global south. Thatit was that it was, you know,

(33:42):
using this new narrative of how theywould like to see the world work.
But there was nothing beyond that appreciation. There was nothing in material terms,
like what are they actually doing towork on it? And like you
say that they need to know moreabout it because there are very few people
in the regions speak Chinese. Veryfew people are studying Chinese politics. Culture.
It's it's really a blank slate fora lot of people. And I

(34:05):
think it doesn't really have a lotof natural allies or partners, you know,
because I think a lot of countriesmaybe admire what's done economically, they
admire the transformation. But you know, if you said, would you rather
do you want to live in youknow, under the party that's going to
lock everybody down for a couple ofyears and then open up and everybody gets
COVID, Is that what you want, and a lot of people don't find

(34:29):
that especially attractive. Yeah, it'sthat. It's also you know, from
a from an outsider's perspective, it'swhat is it that China has to offer
for yourself? You know what,how would that serve your own interests,
national interests, whether you are inIraq or in Algeria? You know,

(34:51):
what is it that you can getout of it? And I think here
too, there's a very fundamental differencein between U the way Beijing and maybe
Washington see their relationship with those countries. I mean, at the principle and
theoretical level, I think that theapproach from Beijing is we're basically favoring a

(35:14):
very elitist approach without much concern forthe people. So it's it's about creating
um, creating a lot of yeah, creating more depth and strength of government

(35:45):
or government political elites. And whenI say political elites, it's not just
the politicians, but also the businesscommunities, people who have the power.
Whereas I think the American approach,again in theory it's not necessarily always the
case and the reality and how ittranslates, but I think there's still an

(36:08):
effort to engage with civil societies withyou know, it's more a people based
approach. I mean, even democracyis about the people first. So for
countries in the Middle East, Ithink this is also what you need to

(36:29):
think about. Is it something thatwill benefit a certain portion of the government
elites or is it something that's goingto benefit the people and their entire country.
Because if China wants to come andsay, okay, do like us
and we're going to invest in thisproject, and by the way, we

(36:55):
don't really going. We're not goingto control whatever you're doing with the money.
And if ten percent of it isgoing to your own pocket, or
if you're taking people away from theirland, or if you don't respect level
laws. I mean, you know, sometimes I feel like in discussions I've

(37:17):
had with people from emerging and developingcountries, they're always like, yeah,
but development is what we need.You know, human rights is secondary.
What human What does human rights dowhen you don't have anything to eat or
you know, to warm yourself orsomething like that. But in reality,

(37:40):
I think the human rights are reallyfundamental because if you don't let the people
be entrepreneurial and decide and have asay in what is best for them,
then none of this is going tohappen to them because the money and the
food and the heat are going togo to the elites only because they're corrupt

(38:04):
and anti corruption is also a matterof transparency, which is also a matter
of rule of law, which isattached to again liberal ideas and norms.
So if you look at it thisway, there's there's a lot of things
that if you look deeper into whatthe China solution versus the the liberal solution

(38:25):
brings, there's a lot of foodfor thought. I think, Yeah,
the Middle East, Like, asa political scientist, this is really interesting
laboratory, you know, because youcan look at you know, this is
really the nexus of where the stuffcomes together. You know, they've got
these long standing relationships with the US, but these are kind of elite bargains,

(38:49):
you know, government to government bargains. It's mostly based on interests.
There's quite a big gap between thepublics and then you look at but you
know, as you describe, theUS does have these ideals that it would
like to think it tries to upholdin the region, although you know,
experience doesn't own the reality is different. Ye, it is very different,

(39:10):
but China comes in and says,yeah, that stuff isn't what we're about.
We're like you described, We're aboutbuilding states, you know, because
a strong state can solve these problems. And I think when you hear them,
going back to the GDI or theGSI, when Chinese analysts or politicians
talk about Middle Eastern security issues,they always say they always frame it as

(39:34):
it's about development. If you canbuild functioning economies, if the state has
capacity, if people have jobs,they're not going to be inspired to join,
you know, a terrorist group ora political Islamist group that tries to
overthrow the government, and you know, all that stuff goes away and you
get you know, a functioning governmentwith a good economy and a happy middle

(39:54):
class, and you don't need anarmy in this case because you've got you
know, stability, And that's kindof the way they frame it. My
issue with that is, Okay,well, then why isn't that working in
Shinjiong or into bad You know,if if if it's all a matter of
just providing econong stability, then peoplewon't fight against the state, right,

(40:17):
Yes, I think what really ismissing from this equation is that human beings
are fundamentally idealists. I mean,look at what's going on and you're run
I think you know here, youare in a system. I mean,
I'm again, I'm just observing itfrom the surface, So please forgive me

(40:38):
if I'm not qualifying anything in aproper way. But this is a system.
That is what you're talking about.It's a strong state that has control
over its population, has had itfor a long time, and yet you
see this movement. I've heard anIranian woman recently describing it so well.

(41:07):
It just touched me to the core, which was they had the population,
and the women in Iran have beenprevented from having access to freedom for their
entire life since they were born.They were not taught what democracy and liberal

(41:28):
values were, and yet they feltthem inside of them very deeply. And
they're basically exerting their fundamental, universalhuman right to say no to tyranny and
to demand freedom. So I think, and I don't know if these women

(41:52):
really think about having a job oror you know, having food on the
table at this moment. What mattersmore to them is their ability to be
free and to to to and that'san ideal rather than a very material based

(42:13):
interest, and I think the whatwhat is out from the from the equation
in what you describe from those conversationsthat people have in the region when they
talk with China, is this ideationalelement you know, you need to have
and this is a sort of undercurrentforce in the in the human being psyche.

(42:39):
Really, if you had to choosebetween uh, living in a I
don't know, maybe I'm wrong,maybe people would would answer and say,
well, I'd rather be you know, in a stable, not censored uh
country where I don't need to makeany decisions for myself and I'm just following

(43:04):
what the government wants as long asI can have access to this, so
that maybe I don't know. It'sit's hard to say I don't know either.
I mean, it's it's easy tolook around the region and see extreme
examples where you could say, youknow, if you look at you know,
Syria or Iraq, and you couldsee these polar extremes where you know,

(43:27):
they had a functioning state and peoplelived in fear and they didn't have
any freedom, but they had adegree of stability or security, and then
the state didn't work and they livedin utter chaos, and you know,
given those extremes, it's pretty easyto say, you know, obviously I'd
rather not live in chaos. Butmost of the region's not in those extremes,
right, so it becomes a muchmore abstract question. I think I

(43:52):
thinking of somebody I was talking toin the region, and this person was
in a country that had swung froma to a more authoritarian turn in over
the past decade, and he said, when he sees his government talking with
China, it makes him nervous becausewhen you spend a lot of time with

(44:13):
authoritarians, you start to normalize authoritarianismand all those values that you might want
to see that give you a littlemore freedom or a little more opportunity to
just start getting shredded a little faster. It's interesting, but it's I don't
think it's restricted to countries in theregion. Right now, the Foreign Minister

(44:40):
of Australia is I think she isin China or she is going to China
soon, and there's there's a lotof controversy about this trip because people in
Austria. Some people in Australia aresaying she's logistimizing a dictatorial and genocidal regime.

(45:01):
You know, what what is theurgency of going there and visit And
isn't that opposite to what Australia standsfor in terms of values? So I
think this is it's it's exactly whatyou're saying. I think UM as China
is getting more and more out ofthe out of the closet and what its

(45:25):
real nature is and what it standsfor and what it rejects, and has
more power to pursue those objectives withoutum pretending otherwise, or pretending to be
some other form of government or oror um or or shaping or our perceptions

(45:52):
in a way that makes us lookelsewhere. UM is, are we going
to be even democracy sees are theygoing to be able to continue to interact
with Beijing in the same way theyused to? And that's something that European
countries are also. I think peopleare willing to go back very quickly to

(46:15):
Beijing because Beijing is seemingly giving somesignals that it wants to be more amenable
or more charming, less wolf warriorish, or less aggressive, and people

(46:36):
want to go back because they stillfeel like, you know, there's some
business to be done and there's somedialogues to be held and m and then
the question really becomes whether this isthis is something that helps Beijing owne its
own legitimacy. Yeah, well,I think you you hit right to the

(46:59):
heart of the problem because you know, a lot of the problems that we
face globally requires China. Right,Like when you're describing Europeans going to Beijing,
my first thought is Russia and Ukraine, right, obviously they want China
to do something to help luck that. Yeah, well, Shap, I
don't see it happening. But Ithink on most big issues, we see

(47:23):
China as you know, an actorwe have to try to engage and which
one are we going to get?I think to their credit, I hope
they realize in Beijing that the pastcouple of years that's very strident, aggressive
tone has really not done them anyfavors. So whether it's you know,
wolf warrior in sheep's clothing and theytry to you know, just mask,

(47:47):
you know, don't say the quietpart out loud anymore, and then just
try to rebuild some of those relationships. But I know, I'm from Canada
and we've had pretty big shift andhow we've seen China just over the past
ten years and I think the samecan be said of the Australians, the
British. You know, most liberaldemocracies have had a pretty hard time navigating

(48:13):
that relationship. I guess if anythinggives me hope, it's just that people
in China aren't especially happy either,and you know, the government, like
we saw with the zero COVID policygoing, maybe the government will have to
be responsive if the party wants tostay in power. Not that I think
it will change with that, youknow, the underlying nature of what the
party does or wants. But Ithink more than anything, they're about self

(48:35):
preservation, right, Yes, Ithink there's really the main theme that can
be learned and traced back several decadesis the resilience of the party and its
aims, and the first one beingits own survival and ability to perpetuate it

(49:00):
some power. And then there issome little flexibility about how to do exactly
that and the ingredients that you canuse to go to achieve this objective.
So you can be pursuing economic growthand giving more material comfort to your population.

(49:24):
You can use ideology, you canuse repression, a little bit of
the three, more of one,less of the two. This is these
are the ingredients that they have usedto to sustain that power, just like
any other authoritarian country would. Butbut what really matters is this the sustainability

(49:49):
of the one party rule. Andthen it's this perpetual reinvention or ability to
as I was saying before, tobuild on the layers of the past without
rejecting any of them. Like Siegingpinghas not rejected uh the Maoist heritage,

(50:14):
and he has not rejected fully Dung'sheritage, and not even jongs And whose
heritage he's building on top of it. And he's putting his own sauce uh
to to to create that bond betweenthose very disparate elements UM and adding some

(50:35):
um Chinese civilization and traditional culture ontop of it, and nationalism as a
spice to to to link everything togetherand to serve that dish to the population.
So this is this is something um. The ability to adjust and adapt
and reinvent itself is really interesting.And the party state works that nationalism spice.

(51:04):
I think they've used a little toomuch. It's kind of ruining the
flavor of everything else. Um.Yeah. But on the other hand,
from I think from the party's perspective, it has it's a way to replace
the the like the Marxist the pureMarxist ideology. China is not a revolutionary

(51:27):
power anymore. There are it's it'sthis very idiosyncratic composition of elements. UM.
There they're bits of that, butit's not fully that. There are
lots of references that are pseudo Confucian, but they're not a Confucian state either.
Um. There's lots of references toUM like almost mythical histories of of

(51:55):
of China's glorious past. This thisneed to um, this strive to get
back their place in the world eraisethe Century of Humiliation. So it's a
it's a domestic narrative that has alot of repercursions and implications for China's external

(52:20):
behavior, but it's a way alsoto both bring this coalition or glue internally
domestically, and it's a way forthe party to create that sense of perpetual
crisis which it needs to uh tocreate this sense of unity. You know,

(52:44):
there's always something going on, there'ssome always some attack from elsewhere.
We need to stay together, beunited in order to confront and survive and
and emerge as as the winners ofthis situation and if it's not this critis
if only another crisis. You know, throughout the history of the last few

(53:06):
decades. Uh, you know,for a while it was Japan, and
then it became the US, andnext time now it was it was COVID,
next it and it's India at sometimes, and sometimes it's Taiwan.
I mean, there's always something goingon that is both imagined and created um

(53:31):
to to to provide this ability tohave the country knit together because there's no
other ideal that the party can provideto its people. The slowing down of
its economy has started to erode theability of the party to say we're going

(53:54):
to provide you more with material comfort, as compared with the Maoist era when
we were just trying to create thisrevolutionary state. Now we're going to we're
going to give you more economy comfort, material comfort. And now that it's

(54:15):
a roading and what is left reallywell, you need to serve something to
your people. When you're a dictatorship, you still need to have this ideational
underpinning of what motivates you to moveforward, and nationalism is the spice and

(54:37):
it's the driver. There are somany directions. I'd love to go in
from this, but I've already takenway too much of your time. I've
really enjoyed this. Um, thanksso much. This has been really really
helpful. I think people in thein our audience will will take a lot
from it because, um, well, because it's really useful. I think

(54:58):
your your work is we're going toput on the show page links to your
your NBR page and all the reportsand the books and things. What are
you working on now? Is thereanything that you have coming up soon that
we'll we'll build on this? Oh, thank you for asking. I'm starting
in January a new a new projectthat's going to try to understand China's I

(55:25):
called its China's strategic space. So, um, it's a bit I'm using
the party's own recipes. I'm keepingit broad. I'm not sure that of
the direction of it yet, andit will be up to some colleagues of
mine to see what we're putting intointo it. But um, looking at

(55:49):
the region, the way that Chinawants to reorganize its own periphery and its
own region, I think that's themain idea behind the project. So maybe
in a year from now, I'llbe able to tell you more about there
are the answers to that question.I can't wait. I'm such a huge
fan, I have been for years. I really appreciate you taking the time.

(56:12):
Thank you, and look forward towhatever you put out next to audience
for the invitation. Oh, ofcourse, you were on the wish list
from day one. So for allof you folks listening, thanks for joining
us. Follow us on social media, subscribe, review and rate us on
iTunes, Spotify, or wherever weget your podcasts, and we'll see you
next month. Produced by Heartcast Media